P704

TEAMCODE: P704
IN THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUSLAND
BEFORE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND OTHER PUISINE JUDGES OF THE COURT
THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDUSLAND
IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.: _ OF 2019
R. MANEKSHAW …PETITIONER
VERSUS
UNION OF INDUSLAND …RESPONDENT
7TH KIIT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ………………………….………………………………….…………….…....3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ………………………………………………….………………….......8
STATEMENT OF FACTS ………………………………………………………..…………………..…….9
QUESTIONS PRESENTED …………………………………………………….…………………………11
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ………………………………………………………..…………………….13
1. Whether the beliefs of the Petitioners as contended in the Writ Petition and pertaining to the
Ankurans, form an “essential” and “integral” part of the Saras religion?
2. Whether the construction of a tunnel under the Ankuran will desecrate the spiritual sanctity of the
Ankuran and violate the Petitioners’ fundamental rights under Article 25 of the Constitution?
3. In the event it is established that there is a fundamental right under Article 25 of the Constitution
in the present case, whether there will be any conflict with any fundamental rights under Article 21
of the Constitution or whether the two fundamental rights can be balanced?
4. Whether the Petitioners had established a fundamental right under Article 29 of the Constitution
and whether there was any violation thereof?
PRAYER ……………………………………………………………..…………………………….……40
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
1. STATUTES REFERRED
SR .NO. STATUTES REFERRED CITED ON PAGE NO.
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PASSIM

2. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR MINORITIES PASSIM
ACT, 1992.
3. LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 2013 PASSIM
2. TABLE OF CASES
NAME OF THE CASES AND ITS RELEVANT CITATIONS PAGE NUMBER
(REPORTED JUDGMENTS)
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27: (1950) SCR 88. 25
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (19.03.1996 - SC): 30
MANU/SC/0455/1996.
Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, 21
Calcutta, (1983) 4 SCC 522.
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389: 34
(1974) 1 SCC 717: (1975) 1 SCR 173.
Adelaide Company of Jevhovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. The Commonwealth: 15
67 CLR 116.
Bal Patil and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (08.08.2005 – SC): 34
MANU/SC/0472/2005: AIR2005SC3172.
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748: (1986) SCR 518: (1986) 3 29
SCC 615.
Cf. D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (II), AIR 1971 SC 1737: (1971) Supp SCR 33
688: (1971) 2 SCC 269 (para. 6) (CB).
Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and 27
Ors. (11.03.2004 - SC): MANU/SC/0218/2004
Dara Singh v. Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490; 23
Francis v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 746. 26
Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, AIRN 1963 SC 1638 23

Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 946: (1996) 2 SCC 648. 26
Indian young lawyer association and ors. Vs. The state of kerala and ors (2018): 22
MANU/SC/1094/2018.
Ismail v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605. 16
Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Daulta: AIR 1965 SC 183: [1964]6SCR750. 35
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332.
Kalyan Das v. State of Madras, AIR 1973Mad 264. 22
M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360. 19
Mohd. Hamid v. Badi Masjid Trust, (2011) 13 SCC 61: 20114 LW 796: (2011) 3 27
KLT 401.
N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 106. 14
Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (06.09.2018 - SC): 27
MANU/SC/0947/2018.
Marsh v. Chambers, (1983) 463 US 783. 29
P. Raghunanda Rao v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1995 Orissa 113. 34
P. Rathinam v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1844: (1994) 3 SCC 394, over-ruled 26
on another point
Ram Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 549. 26
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v State of Bombay.
Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 461. 23
Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of 21
Bombay ,1962 Supp. (2) SCR 496.
Ramanuja v. State of T, AIR 1972SC 1586. 23
S.R. Bommai and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (11.03.1994 - SC): 31
MANU/SC/0444/1994.
Shayara Bano v Union of India (2016) 2 SCC 725. 20
Surksh Chandra Chiman Lal Shah Vs. Union of India and 36
Ors.: AIR1975Delhi168: MANU/DE/0096/1975.
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors: AIR 1983 SC 1. 20
Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, 1962 Supp. (2) SCR 496. 29
Srinivasa v. Saraswati, AIR 1952 Mad 193. 23
The Commissioner v. L T Swamiar of Srirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005. 13

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha 28

Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt. (16.04.1954 - SC): MANU/SC/0136/1954.
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1964) 1 SCR 561. 22
Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors. (08.11.1957 - SC): 28
MANU/SC/0026/1957.
Virendra v. Delhi Admn., (1990) 2 SCC 307: AIR 1990 SC 1148: (1990) 1 SCR 805 33
(para. 7) – 3 Judges.
Young Indian Association v. The State of Kerala & Others, W.P. (C) No. 373 of 2006. 19
3. TREATISES, BOOKS, REPORTS AND DIGESTS
SR. NO. NAME OF THE TREATISE, BOOK, REPORT AND DIGESTS WITH THE AUTHOR OR
PUBLISHER
1. A ZOROASTRIAN TAPESTRY BY PHEROZA J. GODREJ
2. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.
3. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
4. VII CAD 832.
5. CAD VII.
6. COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA DURGA DAS BASU 8 TH
EDITION
7. UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
BELONGING TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC
MINORITIES.
8. K.K VENUGOPAL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 1ST ED., PP. 560-561.
9. THE HINDU.
10. UNESCO.
11. D.K SEN, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION, P.638.
12. THE TIMES OF INDIA.
13. DIRECTORATE GENERAL CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
14. THE DIVINE AND EXALTED STATUS OF CONCENTRATED FIRE IN
ZORAASTRIAN.
15. J.J MODI, “THE RELIOUS CEREMONIES AND CUSTOMS OF PARSEE
RELIGION”.

16. “MANECKJI NUSSARVANJI DHALIA, “HISTORY OF ZOROASTRIANISM”.

17. KHOJESTE P. MISTREE, “ZOROASTRIANISM- AN ETHNIC PERSPECTIVE”.
18. FIROZE M. KOTWAL, “WORSHIP IN A ZORASTRIAN FIRE TEMPLE”.
4. IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
1. “Petitioner” for the purpose of this Memorandum shall stand for ‘R. Manekshaw’
2. “Respondent” for the purpose of this Memorandum shall stand for ‘Union of Indusland’
5. DYNAMIC LINKS
(OFFICIAL WEBSITES APPROVED BY THE APEX COURT OF UNION OF INDIA)
1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.judis.nic (Official website of the Supreme Court of India: Unreported Judgments)
4. www.westlawindia.com
6. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SR.NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

1. SC Supreme Court
2. MMRCL Meghnad Metro Rail Corporation Limited
3. IBID JUST ABOVE
4. SUPRA ABOVEMENTIONED
5. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
6. BOM. BOMBAY
7. CL CLAUSE
8. ART. ARTICLE

9. CO. COMPANY
10. s. SECTION
11. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
12. SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTER
13. U.O. I UNION OF INDIA
14. U.P. UTTAR PRADESH
15. GUJ GUJARAT
16. ALL. ALLAHABAD
17. CAL. CALCUTTA
18. ILR INDIAN LAW REVIEW
19. PUNJ. PUNJAB
20. MAD. MADRAS
21. M/s. MESSERS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner humbly submits before the Hon’ble Supreme Court the Memorandum for the Petitioner is
Special Leave Petition no: _____ of 2019 under Article 136(1) of The Constitution of India.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. State of Aaryavarta is the economically and industrially developed state of the Indusland. Meghnad
Metro Rail Corporation Limited (“MMRCL”) is a joint venture between the Government of Indusland
and the Government of Aaryavarta. MMRCL proposes to construct a metro rail which is known as the
Meghnad Metro Rail Project (MMRP).
2. The proposed metro project involves phases where the project will be implemented underground. A
part of the Meghnad Metro Line, which also runs along a stretch in South Meghnad, has been proposed
to run directly under one of the fire temples (“Ankuran”). Certain members of the Saras community
filed a Writ Petition before the Aaryavarta High Court in connection with the proposed construction
of the metro tunnel directly under the Ankuran. The petitioners submitted that the construction would
violate their fundamental rights under Article 25 and article 29.
3. The Petitioners had made various representations before the Government which did not bear any result,
therefore the Petitioners moved to the Hon'ble Aaryavarta High Court to protect their fundamental
rights. When the Petition was filed, the proposed construction was around 100 meters away from the
said Ankuran. The Hon'ble High Court appreciating the serious challenge raised by the Petitioners and
considering that the issue involved aspects of Constitutional law, granted an ad- interim stay on the
proposed construction, pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition.
4. The Petition was thereafter heard by the Hon'ble Aaryavarta High Court over a period of one month,
the Petitioners requested that the MMRCL should be directed to shift the proposed alignment of the
metro tunnel by 5 meters.
5. The Respondents on the other hand, argued that the Petitioners had failed to establish any right under
Article 25 of the Constitution and since there was no scriptural material produced which would show
that boring a tunnel 60 feet below the Ankuran would violate the spiritual sanctity of the Ankuran.
6. Additionally, it was submitted that rights under Article 25 of the Constitution are subject to other
fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution and that the citizens of Meghnad have a right
under Article 21 of the Constitution to use a metro line.
7. Further, it was argued that a large majority of the Saras scriptures had been destroyed in the course of
history and, therefore, a test of scriptures should not be applied in the case of Sarasism. The Petitioners

added that they were not challenging the metro project that was a necessity. They submitted that the
rights should be balanced.
8. After a detailed hearing, the Hon'ble High Court disposed of the Writ Petition and permitted MMRCL
to continue with the construction of the tunnel under the present alignment without any change. The
Hon'ble High Court upheld the contentions of MMRCL and rejected the contentions of the Petitioners.
The Hon'ble High Court held that the Petitioners had failed to establish that there was any violation of
any fundamental right under Article 25 and Article 29 of the Constitution.
9. The Petitioners have now approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indusland by way of a Special
Leave Petition. The Supreme Court has granted an injunction on the proposed construction pending
the hearing and final disposal of the case. The matter is being finally heard.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
THE PETITIONERS’ SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE PRESENT CASE.
1) WHETHER THE BELIEFS OF THE PETITIONERS AS CONTENDED IN THE WRIT PETITION AND PERTAINING
TO THE ANKURANS, FORM AN “ESSENTIAL” AND “INTEGRAL” PART OF THE SARAS RELIGION?
2) WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TUNNEL UNDER THE ANKURAN WILL DESECRATE THE SPIRITUAL
SANCTITY OF THE ANKURAN AND VIOLATE THE PETITIONERS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 25
OF THE CONSTITUTION?
3) IN THE EVENT IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE PRESENT CASE, WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY CONFLICT WITH ANY FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OR WHETHER THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE
BALANCED?
4) WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAD ESTABLISHED A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY VIOLATION THEREOF?

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER THE BELIEFS OF THE PETITIONERS AS CONTENDED IN THE WRIT PETITION AND
PERTAINING TO THE ANKURANS, FORM AN “ESSENTIAL” AND “INTEGRAL” PART OF THE SARAS
RELIGION?
The beliefs of the Petitioners pertaining to the Ankuran with regard to the holy fire forms an essential
and integral part of the Saras religion as it fulfills the test laid down to determine the essential part of
the religion.
2. WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TUNNEL UNDER THE ANKURAN WILL DESECRATE THE
SPIRITUAL SANCTITY OF THE ANKURAN AND VIOLATE THE PETITIONERS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The construction of the metro project has affected the spiritual sanctity of the Ankuran which is an
essential part of the Saras community protected under Article 25 of the Constitution and the restriction
based on Article 25 is not applicable in the present matter.
3. IN THE EVENT IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF

THE CONSTITUTION IN THE PRESENT CASE, WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY CONFLICT WITH ANY
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OR WHETHER THE TWO
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE BALANCED?
The impugned demand of the Petitioners is in consonance to other fundamental rights under Part III
and specifically in lieu to Article 21 as the fundamental rights must be construed harmoniously and
can be balanced.
4. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAD ESTABLISHED A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY VIOLATION THEREOF?
The nature of Article 29 is not restrictive which construes further that the Constitution does not impose
restrictions on it and the proposed construction of the metro project is hampering the Petitioner’s right
to conserve its “Culture” as stated in Article 29.

PLEADINGS
It is humbly submitted that,
1. WHETER THE BELEIFS OF PETITIONER AS CONTENETD IN THE WRIT PETITION

AND PERTAINING TO THE ANKURANS, FORM AN “ESSENTIAL” AND INTEGRAL
PART OF THE SARAS RELIGON?
1. It is humbly submitted by R. Manekshaw [hereinafter referred to as the [“Petitioners”] that the beliefs
of the Petitioners with regards to the holy fire in the Ankuran; the fire must be in direct connection
with Mother earth is an “essential” and “integral” part of the Saras religion as, it fulfils the test laid
down to determine the essential part of the religion (A).
(A) Test to determine the “essential” and “integral” part of the Saras religion
2. Religion is that which binds a man with his customs, his creator or super force. Essentially religion is
a matter of personal faith and belief of personal relations of an individual with what he regards as
Cosmos, his master or his creator which he believes. 1In The Commissioner v. L T Swamiar of Srirur
Mutt,2 for the first time, it was held that what constitutes an essential part of a religion will be
ascertained with reference to the tenets and doctrines of that religion itself.
3. The Court had opined thus: "In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is
primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. The Court in the
same case went ahead and laid down in detail as to what can be constituted as essential part to the
religion, “What is meant by 'an essential part or practices of a religion' is now the matter for
elucidation. Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief.
It is upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices the superstructure of religion is built. Without
which, a religion will be no religion. Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to the
religion is - to find out whether the nature of religion will be changed without that part or practice.
It is such permanent essential part is what is protected by the Constitution. Such alterable parts or
1
A.S Narayan Deekshithalu v. State of A.P, AIR 1996 SC 1765; Trivikram Narin Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1987 All 632;
Sarup v. State of Punjab AIR 1959 SC 860; Moti v. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942.
2
1954 SCR 1005.

practices are definitely not the 'core' of religion where the belief is based and religion is founded
upon. It could only be treated as mere embellishments to the nonessential part or practices.”3 It has
been held that, the logic underlying the constitutional guarantee regarding ‘practice’ of a religion are
as such a part of religion as religious faith or doctrines.
4. Further, in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay and Ors,4 “Religious practices or
performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief
in particular doctrines. Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that certain rites
and ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot be said
that these are secular activities partaking of commercial or economic character simply because they
involve expenditure of money or employment of priests or the use of marketable commodities. Of
course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances may be
and is a matter of administration of property belonging to religious institutions; and if the expenses
on these heads are likely to deplete the endowed properties or affect the stability of the institution,
proper control can certainly be exercised by State agencies as the law provides.”
5. Therefore, it is most evidently established that the beliefs of a particular religion needs to be
considered as essential through the tenets of that particular religion only which has the right to
propagate and practice its beliefs and faith.
6. “If this is the belief of the community” observed the learned Judge “and it is proved undoubtedly to
be the belief of the Zoroastrian community, a secular Judge is bound to accept that belief it is not for
him to sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to interfere with the conscience of donor who
makes a gift in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his religion and the welfare of his
community or mankind”5 In this matter the court takes into consideration the conscience of the
community and the tenets of the religion concerned to decide whether a particular practice is
‘religious’ in character and if so whether it is an essential and integral part of the said religion or it is
merely secular or superstitious in nature. This doctrine is particularly religious and includes the
practice which are regarded by the community as a part of religion as a decisive factor.6
7. The case at hand, therefore, is where the line needs to be drawn between what are matters of religion
and what are not? Our Constitution-makers have made no attempt to define what ‘religion’ is and it
4
1954 SCR 1055; Punjab Rao v. D.P Meshram, AIR 1965 SC 1179.
5
Jamshed ji v. Soonabai 33 Bom. 122.
6
N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 106.

is certainly not possible to frame an exhaustive definition of the word ‘religion’ which would be
applicable to all classes of persons. As a religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs and
doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conducive to their spiritual well-
being, but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges
of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and
religious belief. A religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression
in acts as well. 7
8. Thus, it can be manifested that since the entire Saras community is under the impression that their
beliefs are those which are mentioned in the Writ Petition8 are fundamental to Sarasism they thereby
form an “essential and integral” part of the Saras religion.
9. In The Commissioner v. L T Swamiar of Srirur Mutt9 case, the court relied on the following judgement
to understand the test of essential practice, Adelaide Company of Jevhovah’s Witnesses Incorporated
v. The Commonwealth,10
“It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil
government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with
any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom
of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the interpretation
of s. 116. Thus the section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in
pursuance of religious belief as part of religion.”
10. Thereby leading the Supreme Court to lay down the following, “what constitutes the essential part
of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the
tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol
at particular hours of the day, all these would be regarded as part of the religion, all of these are
religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article
26(b).Under Article 26(b)”
7
Young Indian Association v. The State of Kerala & Others, W.P. (C) No. 373 of 2006.
8
Page 2, paragragh 4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Moot Problem.
9
1954 SCR 1005.
10
67 CLR 116.

11. Further, “places of worship of any religion having a particular significance for that religion to make
it an essential or integral part of that religion stands on a different footing and has to be treated
differently and more reverentially.”11
12. In pursuance to the books, of the Saras religion it can be known that the fire is to be connected to
mother earth and thereby it is to be considered as an essential and integral part of the Saras religion. 12
13. Therefore, it can be undoubtedly said that the Courts have considered and emphasized that what
constitutes essential practices is to be determined by the beliefs and faith to the tenets of that religion
and not by the customs and beliefs of another religion also, the courts must accept the beliefs and
faith of an individual and not dictate terms to it based on a different religion. This leads us to the
spiritual head of a particular religion.
(a) The statement of the Spiritual Head of the religion is to be considered

14. Justice Lakshman, in his judgement, held: “What would constitute an essential part of the religion or
religious practice is to be determined with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion which
includes practices which are regarded by the community as a part and parcel of that religion and the
Court cannot say that a belief or practice is not a part of that religion.”
15. The learned Judge further observed that, “In any religion, practices may be introduces by according
to the decision of the Spiritual Head. The learned Judge has also relied on the earlier decision which
held that no outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of the religion
and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they
like”13
16. In another case, it was held that, A Mathadhipati is certainly not a corporate body; he is the head of
a spiritual fraternity and by virtue of his office has to perform the duties of a religious teacher. It is
his duty to practice and propagate the religious tenets, of which he is an adherent and if any provision
of law prevents him from propagating his doctrines that would certainly affect the religious freedom
which is guaranteed to every person under Article 25. Institutions as such cannot practice or propagate
religion; it can be done only by individual persons and whether these persons propagate their personal
11
Ismail v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605.
12
Pheroza J. Godrej, ‘A Zorastrian Tapestry’, 2002; “The divine and Exalted Status of Concentrated Fire in Zoraastrian”;J.J
Modi, “The Relious Ceremonies and Customs of Parsee Religion”, 1930 ; Maneckji Nussarvanji Dhalia, “History of
Zoroastrianism”, 1938 ; Khojeste P. Mistree, “Zoroastrianism- An Ethnic Perspective” ; Firoze M. Kotwal, “Worship in a
Zorastrian Fire Temple”.
13
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avdhuta, AIR 2004 SC 2984.

views or the tenets for which the institution stands is really immaterial for purposes of Article 25. It
is the propagation of belief that is protected, no matter whether the propagation takes place in a church
or monastery, or in a temple or a parlour meeting. 14
17. Hence, it can be distinctly laid down from the above observations of the Court that the statements of
the priest is of high relevance and due regard. In the present matter it plays more relevance since there
is an absence of scriptures. In furtherance the connectivity is laid on scriptures and its essentiality.
(b) The scriptures and the books do not solely limit the test of “essentiality’ of the religion
18. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether performance of Tandava dance is a religious rite
or practice essential to the tenets of the religious faith of the Ananda Margis. As indicated the Tandava
dance was not accepted as an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955 the Ananda
Marga order was first established. It is the specific case of the petitioner that Shri Ananda Murti
introduced Tandava as a part of religious rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966.”Tandava is a custom
amongst sect members, it is a customary performance and its origin is over four thousand years old,
hence it is not a new invention” On the basis of the literature of the Ananda Marga denomination it
has been contended that there is prescription of the performance of Tandava dance by every follower
of Ananda Marga. Even conceding that Tandava dance has been prescribed as a religious rite for
every follower of the Ananda Marga it does not follow as a necessary corollary that Tandava dance
is to be performed in the public is a matter of religion.15
19. However, in the concluding judgment, the court held, that Tandav dance in processions or at public
places by the Ananda Margis carrying lethal weapons and human skulls was not an essential religious
rite of the followers of Ananda Marga and, therefore, the order under Section 144 Cr.PC. prohibiting
such processions in the interest of public order and morality was not violative of the rights of the
Ananda Marga denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution more so when the order
under Section 144 Cr.PC. did not completely ban the processions or gatherings at public places but
only prohibited carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls which posed danger to public order and
morality.
14
The Commissioner v. L T Swamiar of Srirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005, Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore AIR
1958 SC 255 : 1958 SCR 8.
15
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta and Ors. v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Anr., (1983) 4 SCC.

20. In the Bijoy Emmanuel v. The State of Kerela,16where the Court held “we, therefore, find that the
Fundamental Rights of the appellants under Art. 19(1) (a) and 25(1) have been infringed and they are
entitled to be protected. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct the
respondent authorities to re-admit the children into the school, to permit them to pursue their studies
without hindrance and to facilitate the pursuit of their studies by giving them the necessary facilities.”
21. Thereby, it can be construed that the scriptures are not the only determinative factor to consider the
essentiality of the religion and also that the religion is what a person’s derives it spiritual conscience
and that is what should be considered by the Court likewise in the present case.
Therefore, it is humbly concluded that the beliefs of the Petitioners pertaining to the Ankurans
form an “essential” and “integral” part of the Saras religion.
16
AIR 1987 SC 1586.

2. WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TUNNEL UNDER THE ANKURAN WILL

DISCRETE THE SPIRITUAL SANCTITY OF THE ANKURAN AND VIOLATE THE
PETITIONERS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUION?
1. It is humbly submitted by R. Manekshaw [hereinafter referred to as the “Petitioners”] that the
Meghnad Metro Rail Corporation (“MMRCL’) has acted un-reasonably during the construction of
the metro rail project, since, firstly, the spiritual sanctity of the Ankuran is essential to Saras religion
and thereby is protected by Article 25 of the Constitution (A); and secondly, the restriction subject to
public order, morality and health is not applicable in present matter (B).
(A) The spiritual sanctity of the Ankuran is essential to Saras religion and thereby is protected by
Article 25 of the Constitution
2. In the recent landmark case of Young Indian Association v. The State of Kerala & Others,17 “Religion
is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. A
religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of
religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress.” The
protection under Articles. 25 and 26 of the Constitution is with respect to religious practice which
forms the essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be religious practice which forms
an essential and integral part of the religion. The latter is not protected by Article 25.18
3. In Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others 19, being
the second Ananda Marga case, the Court has elaborately discussed the true nature of an essential
practice and has further laid down the test for determining whether a certain practice can be
characterized as essential to a particular religion in order to guarantee protection under the
Constitution. The Court has opined that, "The protection guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution is not confined to matters of doctrine or belief but extends to acts done in pursuance of
religion and, therefore, contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of
worship which are essential or integral part of religion. What constitutes an integral or essential part
17
W.P. (C ) No. 373 of 2006.
18
M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360.
19
(2004) 12 SCC 67.

of religion has to be determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background
etc. of the given religion.”
4. Thus, in the present matter it can be concluded that the beliefs of the Saras religion that a tunnel passing
below the Ankuran would desecrate the sanctity of the Ankuran and specifically that of the holy fire.
Also, as the Saras religion revolves around the existence of the fire inside the Ankuran, any alteration
to the same can change the basic crux of the religion.
5. Justice Chinnappa Reddy, in the S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors, 20 quoted, “Any freedom or right
involving the conscience must naturally receive a wide interpretation and the expression religion and
religious denomination must therefore, be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but in a liberal,
expansive way.” In Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors, 21 the apex Court noted that “the
personal views of judges are irrelevant in ascertaining whether a particular religious belief or practise
must receive the protection guaranteed under Article 25(1).”
6. Subject to the restrictions which this article imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our
Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or
conscience. 22 “It is clear that Triple Talaq is only a form of Talaq which is permissible in law, but at
the same time, stated to be sinful by the very Hanafi school which tolerates it. According to Javed v
State of Haryana23 it was concluded that, this would not form part of any essential religious practice.
Applying the test stated in Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avdhuta,24 it is
equally clear that the fundamental nature of the Islamic religion, as seen through an Indian Sunni
Muslim’s eyes, will not change without its practice”25
7. While the majority based its conclusion on an examination of the substantive doctrines of Islam and
the theological sanctity of triple talaq, the minority relied on the widespread practice of triple talaq to
determine its essentiality. The majority and minority concurred, that the belief of a religious
denomination claiming a particular practice to be essential must be taken into consideration in the
determination of the essentiality of that practice 26 Thus the spiritual sanctity is essential to Saras
religion and thereby should be protected under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
20
AIR 1983 SC 1.
21
AIR 1987 SC 748.
22
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay: AIR 1954 SC 388.
23
(2003) 8 SCC 369.
24
(2004) 12 SCC 67.
25
Shayara Bano v Union of India (2016) 2 SCC 725.
26
Shayara Bano v Union of India (2016) 2 SCC 725.

(B) The restriction subject to public order, morality and health is not applicable in the present
matter
8. It is popularly known as the first Ananda Marga case, it was held that Tandava dance in processions
or at public places by the Ananda Margis carrying lethal weapons and human skulls was not an
essential religious rite of the followers of Ananda Marga and, therefore, the order under Section 144
Cr.PC. prohibiting such processions in the interest of public order and morality was not violative of
the rights of the Ananda Marga denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, more-over
when the order under Section 144 Cr.PC did not completely ban the processions or gatherings at public
places but only prohibited carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls which posed danger to public order
and morality. 27 The exceptions to this individual right are public order, morality and public health.
“Public Order” is distinguished from “law and order”, “public disorder” must affect the public at
large as opposed to certain individuals. A disturbance of public order must cause a general disturbance
of public tranquillity. The term “morality” is therefore difficult to define. In the present matter, suffice
it to say that it refers to that which is considered abhorrent to civilized society, given the mores of the
time, by reason of harm caused by way, inter alia, of exploitation or degradation, “health” would
include noise pollution and the control of disease.28
9. In the present matter, it can be said that firstly, there is no such activity that needs to be urgently taken
care of as there is no genuine situation which is causing harm to the public order, thus merely shifting
the metro line by 5 meters is to protect the “essential” and “integral” part of the Saras religion and in
no good sense it is harming public order rather it is encouraging the spirit of democracy and secularism
the broad pillars of our Constitution.
10. N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay29, “In my
view by the phrase “laws providing for social welfare and reform” it was not intended to enable the
legislation to “reform” a religion out of existence or identity. Art. 25(2)(a) having provided for
legislation dealing with “economic, financial, political or secular activity which may be associated
with religious practices”, succeeding clause proceeds to deal with other activities of religious groups
and these also must be those which are associated with religion. Just as the activities referred to in
27
Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta,(1983) 4 SCC 522.
28
Young Indian Association v. The State of Kerala & Others, W.P. (C ) No. 373 of 2006.
29
1962 Supp. (2) SCR 496.

Art. 25(2)(a) are obviously not of the essence of the religion, similarly the saving in Art. 25(2)(b) is
not intended to cover the basic essentials of the creed of a religion which is protected by Art.25(1).”
11. It is only the essential part of religion, as distinguished from secular activities, that is the subject matter
of the fundamental right. Superstitious beliefs which are extraneous, unnecessary accretions to religion
cannot be considered as essential parts of religion.
12. “What is protected under Articles 25(1) and 26(b) respectively are the religious practices and the
right to manage affairs in matters of religion. If the practice in question is purely secular or the affair
which is controlled by the statute is essentially and absolutely secular in character, it cannot be urged
that Art. 25(1) and Art 26(2) has been contravened”30
13. “All secular activities which may be associated with religion but which do not constitute an essential
part of it may be amenable to State regulations but what constitutes the essential part of a religion may
be ascertained primarily from the doctrines of that religion itself according to its tenets, historical
background and change in evolved process, etc. The concept of essentiality is not itself a determinative
factor. It is one of the circumstances to be considered in adjudicating whether the particular matters of
religion or religious belief are an integral part of the religion. It must be decided whether the practices
or matters are considered integral by the community itself”. 31
14. Keeping the above stated law in the anterior, in the present case it can be certainly established that the
fire needs to be connected to mother earth and the sanctity of the Ankuran is not a secular activity
where the Court can simply intervene in the name of development and construction. It is the most
essential part of the Saras religion which is righteously to be protected under Article 25 of the
Constitution.
15. Further, restrictions by the State upon free exercise of religion are permitted both under Articles 25
and 26 on grounds of public order, morality and health. Clause (2)(a) of Article 25 reserves the right
of the State to regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political and other secular activities which
may be associated with religious practice and there is a further right given to the State by sub-clause
(b) under which the State can legislate for social welfare and reform even though by so doing it might
interfere with religious practices. The learned Attorney-General lays stress upon clause (2)(a) of the
30
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1964) 1 SCR 561.
31
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) 9 SCC 548; Kalyan Das v. State of Madras, AIR 1973Mad
264.

Article and his contention is that all secular activities, which may be associated with religion but do
not really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to State regulation.32
16. It is also well established that social reforms or the need for regulations contemplated by Article 25(2)
cannot obliterate essential religious practices or their performances and what would constitute the
essential part of a religion can be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that religion itself. 33 It
is also well established that social reforms or the need for regulations contemplated by Article 25(2)
cannot obliterate essential religious practices or their performances and what would constitute the
essential part of a religion can be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that religion itself. 34
Our concept of secularism is that the State shall treat all religion and religious groups equally and with
equal respect without in any manner interfering with their individual right of religious activites, faith
and worship.35
17. In the recent and most famous case of the Sabrimala temple which is Young Indian Association v. The
State of Kerala & Others, 36 the Court said that, “Constitutional Morality in a pluralistic society and
secular polity would reflect that the followers of various sects have the freedom to practise their faith
in accordance with the tenets of their religion. It is irrelevant whether the practise is rational or
logical. Notions of rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts.” It further noted that,
“ State interference was not permissible, except as provided by Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution,
where the State may make law providing for social welfare and reform. It is therefore difficult to
accept the contention that Article 25(2)(b) is capable of application without reference to an actual
legislation. What is permitted by Article 25(2) is State made law on the grounds specified therein, and
not judicial intervention.” It observed that, “Constitutional morality requires the harmonisation or
balancing of all such rights, to ensure that the religious beliefs of none are obliterated or undermined.”
18. Therefore, in the present matter it can be concluded that the restrictions which is subject to public
order, morality and health is clearly and distinctly not applicable in the present matter.
32
Young Indian Association v. The State of Kerala & Others, W.P. (C ) No. 373 of 2006.
33
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (1964) 1 SCR 561.
34
Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 461; Srinivasa v. Saraswati, AIR 1952 Mad 193.
35
Dara Singh v. Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490; Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, AIRN 1963 SC 1638; Ramanuja v.
State of T, AIR 1972SC 1586.
36
W.P. (C ) No. 373 of 2006.

Thus, it is humbly contended by the Petitioners that the construction of a tunnel under the
Ankuran will desecrate the spiritual sanctity of the Ankuran and violate the Petitioner’s
fundamental rights under Article 25 of the Constitution.

3. IN THE EVENT IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER

ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUION IN THE PRESENT CASE, WHETER THERE WILL BE ANY
CONFLICT WITH ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUION
OR WHETER THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE BALANCED?
1. It is humbly submitted by R. Manekshaw [hereinafter referred to as the “Petitioners”] that the
Meghnad Metro Rail Corporation (“MMRCL’) has acted un-reasonably during the construction of
the metro rail project, since, firstly, the impugned demand of the Petitioners is in consonance to other
rights under Part III and specifically Art. 21 which has a wider interpretation (A); secondly, Art. 21
and Art. 25 can be constructed harmoniously and both the rights can be balanced (B); and, lastly, the
Preamble and the Constituent Assembly debates thrive for the same i.e. enhancing the spirit of
democracy and secularism (C).
(A) The impugned demand of the Petitioners is in consonance to other rights under Part III and
specifically Art. 21
2. Rights are the essence of a civilized society and they alone determine the present and pave way for a
secure future for posterity. It guarantees the minority as well as the majority of its rights in a way that
together they form a harmonious society where the distinction between the two groups amalgamates.
In the present matter the Petitioners are not against the development the way it is been portrayed by
the Respondents.
3. Art. 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty says that no person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The early approach to Art. 21 which
generates right to life and personal liberty was circumscribed by literal interpretation. 37 But in course
of time, the scope of this application of the Articles against arbitrary encroachment by the executives
has been expanded by liberal interpretation of the components of the Article in tune with the relevant
international understanding. Thus protection against arbitrary privation of “life” is no longer means
mere protection of death, or physical injury, but also an invasion of the right to “live” with human
dignity and would include all these aspects of life which would go to make a man’s life meaningful
and worth living, such as his tradition culture and heritage. 38
37
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 : (1950) SCR 88.
38
Francis v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 746.

4. Furthermore, very liberal interpretation is given to this Article, it was held: “The right to live with
human dignity and same does not connote continued drudging. It takes within its fold some process of
civilization which makes life worth living and expanded concept of life would mean the tradition,
culture, and heritage of the person concerned.” 39 The expression “personal liberty” is used in a
compendious term to include within its variety of rights of a person which go to make up “personal
liberty” of an individual. 40
5. In the current matter at hand the dignity of one entire minority community are at stake.
6. Keeping the principle in the anterior, in Ram Saran v. Union of India, 41 it was held: “It is true that life
in its expanded horizons today includes all that which gives meaning to man’s life including his
tradition, culture and heritage, and protection of that heritage in its full measure would certainly come
within compass of an expanded concept of Art. 21 of the Constitution.”
7. Art. 25 (1) is subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and
propagate religion. The protection of life and personal liberty granted by Art. 21 is for every individual.
8. Keeping the principle of practicing religious activities in the anterior, it was held that “The full concept
and scope of religious freedom is that that there are no restraints upon the free exercise of religion
according to the dictates of one's conscience or upon the right freely to profess, practice and propagate
religion save those imposed under the police power of the State and the other provisions of Part III of
the Constitution. This means the right to worship God according to the dictates of one's conscience.
Man's relation to his God is made no concern for the State.”42
9. The craft of constitutional morality has been dealt finely stating, the concept of constitutional morality
is not limited to the mere observance of the core principles of constitutionalism as the magnitude and
sweep of constitutional morality is not confined to the provisions and literal text which a Constitution
contains, rather it embraces within itself virtues of a wide magnitude such as that of ushering a
pluralistic and inclusive society, while at the same time adhering to the other principles of
constitutionalism. 43
39
P. Rathinam v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1844 : (1994) 3 SCC 394, over-ruled on another point in Gian Kaur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 946 : (1996) 2 SCC 648.
40
See Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332.
41
Ram Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 549.
42
Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta and Ors. v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Ors. (20.10.1983 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0050/1983.
43
Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (06.09.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/0947/2018.

10. The Latin maxim Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means the law assists
those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. In the present matter the
Petitioners continuous representations were ignored by the government over a long period of time. 44
11. It was held that Anand Margis have right to take a procession in public places after obtaining necessary
permission from the concerned authorities and they are also entitled to carry Trishul or Trident, Conch
or Skull so long as such procession is peaceful and does not offend the religious sentiments of other
people who equally enjoy fundamental right to exercise their religious freedom. An Anand Margi is
entitled to transmit or spread religion by taking out procession in public places and also carry Trishul,
Conch or Skull. 45
12. The Muslim graves coming up un-authorisedly and illegally on other’s land can be shifted in the larger
interests of society for maintaining public order. Such action is not un-Islamic and is not violative of
Arts. 25 and 26. Therefore, dead body of a saint can be shifted with all dignity and in accordance with
law.46 In the current matter the Saras community is quietly requesting for a mere 5 meter shift of the
metro line.
13. In the anterior, the term 'morality' occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution cannot be viewed with
a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or
religious sect may perceive the term to mean. Since the Constitution has been adopted and given by
the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality in Article 25 has to be appositely
understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality. 47
14. Lastly, Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights48 states that – In those States
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not
be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language and India is a state party to this
covenant. Thus the demand of the Petitioners is in consonance to other rights under Part III and
specifically Art. 21.
(B) Art. 21 and Art. 25 can be constructed harmoniously and both the rights can be balanced
44
Para 2 Moot Proposition.
45
Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Ors. (11.03.2004 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0218/2004.
46
Mohd. Hamid v. Badi Masjid Trust, (2011) 13 SCC 61 : 20114 LW 796 : (2011) 3 KLT 401.
47
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala & Ors. (2018) : AIR 2018 SC 373.
48
Article 27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

15. The very purpose of fundamental rights was to safeguard the rights of the people and therefore they
are under Part III of the Constitution. The fundamental right is not for the majority or the minority, it
is for every individual.
16. The fact is that though Art. 25(1) deals with rights of individuals, Art. 25(2) is much wider in its
contents and has reference to the rights of communities, and controls both Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b).
The result then is that there are two provisions of equal authority, neither of them being subject to the
other. The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which
cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be
given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. 49
17. In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with
reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus
prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day all these would
be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or
employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular
activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and
should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of article 26(b). 50
18. Art. 25 recognizes a fundamental right in favour of “all persons” which has reference to natural
persons. This fundamental right equally entitles all such persons to the said fundamental right. The
content of the fundamental right is the fleshing out of what is stated in the Preamble to the Constitution
as “liberty of thought, belief, faith and worship”. Thus, all persons are entitled to freedom of
conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. 51
19. The Supreme Court of India also has observed that no rights in an organized society can be absolute.
Enjoyment of one’s right must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others. Where a free
play of social forces is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set
right the imbalance between two competing interests.52
49
Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors. (08.11.1957 - SC) : MANU/SC/0026/1957.
50
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt. (16.04.1954
- SC) : MANU/SC/0136/1954.
51
52
Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 2098 : (1975) 1 SCC 11.

20. Art. 25 is an Article of faith in the Constitution. Our personal views and reactions are irrelevant. If the
belief is genuinely and conscientiously held, it attracts the protection of Art. 25, subject to inhibitions
contained therein. It was held that our tradition teaches us tolerance, our philosophy teaches
tolerance, our Constitution preaches tolerance, let us not dilute it.53
21. In Marsh v. Chambers, a “unique history” to uphold constitutionality of opening legislative sessions
with prayers led by a State employed chaplain. It was observed that history ran from colonial times to
the present and included the first Congress hiring a chaplain in 1789 only three days before it reached
a final agreement as the language of the First Amendment. It was held that the practice of opening
legislative session with prayer has become “part of the fabric of our society”. 54 In the same light the
essential tradition of the Saras community has been in practice since the last 188 years.
22. Freedom of conscience would be meaningless unless it were supplemented by the freedom of
unhampered expression of spiritual conviction in word and action. In so far as the freedom of
conscience is concerned, it may not be associated with any religion at all, in which case, it may be
called freedom of thought,55 which becomes external action in the shape of speech or other expression
[which would bring the latter under Art. 19(1)(a)].
23. Likewise, as Pandit Lakshmikanta Maitra observed,56 the very foundation of society in India being
religion, India, would lose all her spiritual values and heritage unless the right to practice and propagate
religion was recognized as a fundamental right. The right to propagate is not given to any particular
religion or community alone. It is given to all, subject to the right and duty of the State to see that these
rights are not exercised in a manner that would upset the order, morality and health of the country.
24. The observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. are enlightening to understand the nature of protection
afforded under Art. 25, and the role of the Court in interpreting the same. “Art. 25 is an article of faith
in the Constitution, incorporated in recognition of the principle that the real test of a true democracy
is the ability of even an insignificant minority to find its identity under the country’s Constitution. This
has to borne in mind in interpreting Art. 25”
25. Religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of
religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. No outside authority has any right to say that these
53
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748 : (1986) SCR 518 : (1986) 3 SCC 615.
54
Marsh v. Chambers, (1983) 463 US 783.
55
It is noticeable that Art. 18 of the Universal Declaration (p. 3444, ante) mentions “freedom of thought, conscience and
religion”, to dispel any doubts in this behalf. The word ‘opinion’ in Art. 19 of the Declaration also refers to similar mental
process.
56
VII CAD 832.

are not essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or
prohibit them in any manner they life under the guise of administering the trust estate.57 The religious
practices in the present case can easily be avoided if the Respondents act reasonably.
26. Keeping the harmonious construction principle at the core; it is practically impossible today to
consecrate an Atash Behram due to a variety of reasons including non-avaialability of the trained
priests and the complex rituals that go into the process of consecrating the Ankuran. Leaving beside
the spiritual damage there is a direct possibility of physical damage to the structure as well.
27. Lastly, in the famous Mulki Temple case, the Court held (applying the doctrine of harmonious
construction) when there is no general or total exclusion of members of the public from worship in the
temple, but exclusion from only certain religious services then: “If the denominational rights are such
that to give effect to them would substantially reduce the right conferred by Art. 25(2)(b), then of
course, on our conclusion that Art. 25(2)(b) prevails as against Art. 26(b), the denominational rights
must vanish. But where that is not the position, and after giving effect to the rights of the denomination
what is left to the public of the right of worship is something substantial and not merely the husk of it,
there is no reason why we should not so construe Art. 25(2)(b) as to give effect to Art. 26(b) and
recognize the rights of the denomination in respect of matters which are strictly denominational,
leaving the rights of the public in other respects unaffected.”58
28. Therefore, it is humbly concluded before the Hon’ble Court that the rights under Art. 21 and Art. 25
can be construed harmoniously and both the rights can be balanced by giving equal weightage to both.
(C) The Preamble and the Constituent Assembly debates thrive for harmony i.e. enhancing the
spirit of democracy and secularism
29. The Preamble of the Constitution sets out secularism, equity, fraternity, liberty of worship and faith
and dignity of persons as integral scheme of the Constitution in its march to establish an egalitarian
social order. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles seek to resuscitate them.59 In S.R. Bommai
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., larger Bench of nine Judges has held that secularism is basic
structure of the Constitution. Religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups and
57
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1954 SC 388.
58
Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors. (08.11.1957 - SC) : MANU/SC/0026/1957.
59
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (19.03.1996 - SC) : MANU/SC/0455/1996.

protection of life, property and place of worship are essential parts of secularism. Profession, actions
and conduct of persons should be consistent with secularism and they need to be measured in that
perspective.60
30. The mere fact that the present matter has reached the doors of this Hon’ble Court shoots the meaning
that the idea of secularism has somewhere been weak. Despite the various representations by the
Petitioners no action was initiated on the part of the Government.
31. Rev. Jerome D'Souza draw the attention of the House during the Constituent Assembly debates in
relation to Article 25 and had said: 61
“Sir, it is because we all believe,--and that is the implication of this chapter of fundamental Rights,--
that man has certain rights that are inalienable, that cannot be questioned by any humanly constituted
legislative authority, that these Fundamental Rights are framed in this manner and a sanction and a
protection given to them by this provision for appeal to the Supreme Court.
As I said, Sir, the implication of this is that an individual must be protected even against the collective
action of people who may not fully appreciate his needs, his rights, his claims. It is because we believe
that the fullest and the most integral definition of democracy includes and is based upon this
sacredness of the individual, of his personality and the claims of his conscience, that we have framed
these rights.”
32. Answering Shrimati G. Durgabai’s question: "Why is it that provision has been made to change this
Constitution? Why should not these sacred rights be placed beyond the possibility of abrogation?" I
would answer him: "If the convictions and the faith of our people go away, there is no use in trying to
protect these rights by sanctions. The rights and the sanctions would be illusory. But if faith remains,
no one will want to touch them."
33. Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar : “Mr. Vice-President, Sir, the Supreme Court according to me
is the Supreme guardian of the citizen's rights in any democracy. I would even go further and say that
it is the soul of democracy. In less than three or four years during which a parliament is in being,
many governments may come and go, and if the fundamental rights of the individual are left to the
tender mercies of the Government of the day, they cannot be called fundamental rights at all.”62
60
S.R. Bommai and Ors. v.. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (11.03.1994 - SC) : MANU/SC/0444/1994.
61
CAD VII.
62
CAD VII.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the Meghnad Metro Rail Corporation has acted un-
reasonably during the construction of the metro rail project and the right under Art. 25 is not in
conflict with other fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution and specifically with Art.
21 and both these rights can be balanced harmoniously.

4. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAD ESTABLISHED A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE CONSTITUION AND WHETER THERE WAS ANY
VIOLATION THEREOF?
1. It is humbly submitted by R. Manekshaw [hereinafter referred to as the “Petitioners”] that the Union
of Indusland’s [hereinafter referred to as the “Respondent”] metro construction project which is a
joint venture between the Government of Indusland and Government of Aaryavarta is violating the
Petitioner’s right under Article 29, since, firstly, rights under Article 29 are absolute in nature and the
Constitution itself does not impose any restrictions on it (A); and secondly, the proposed construction
of the metro project is hampering the Petitioner’s right to conserve its “Culture” as stated under Article
29 (B).
(A) Rights under Article 29 are absolute in nature and the constitution itself does not impose any
restrictions on it
2. The Constitution ensures that the rights of every individual be safeguarded and hence Part III of the
Constitution is termed as the fundamental right of every individual. The core essence of it is that no
individual’s right should be curtailed.
3. Further Art. 29 (1) and 30 (1) overlap at times. While Art. 29 (1) is applied to any section of citizens
having a distinct language, Art. 30 (1) protects a minority ‘based on language’. Hence a linguistic
minority can come under both provisions. 63 Thus, a linguistic minority has, under Art. 29 (1), the right
to conserve its distinct language, script or culture; and under Art. 30 (1), it has right to establish and
administer educational institutions of its choice. 64 Art. 29 (1) says that it would refer to any section of
the citizens who may have a distinct language, script or culture, even though they may not belong to a
‘minority’ community in the sense of Art. 30(1). This was made clear in the 2 nd D.A.V. College case.65
4. Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Zoroastrians (Parsis) have been notified as minority
communities under section 2 (c) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992. The Preamble
of the constitution proclaims to guarantee every citizen ‘liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
63
Commentary on the Constitution of India Durga Das Basu 8th Edition.
64
Virendra v. Delhi Admn., (1990) 2 SCC 307 : AIR 1990 SC 1148 : (1990) 1 SCR 805 (para. 7) – 3 Judges.
65
Cf. D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (II), AIR 1971 SC 1737 : (1971) Supp SCR 688 : (1971) 2 SCC 269 (para. 6) (CB).

and worship. Group of Articles 25 to 30 guarantee protection of religious, cultural and educational
rights to both majority and minority communities. 66
5. The Saras community therefore gently fits into the ambit of Art. 29 (1). The Ankuran which is in
contention in the present matter is not only associated with the culture of the Saras community people
but is also imbibed as a part of their belief and expression of their religion taking into its ambit Art. 19
(a) of the Constitution as well.
6. While the official language prescribed by Art. 343 is Hindi, subject to the provisions of Part XVII
(post), the present Clause guarantees that if any section of citizens has any other distinct language of
its own, it shall have the right to conserve that language (with script, if any), notwithstanding any other
provision on languages.67
7. Interpreting, the text of the Article, it may be inferred that the stress is on the word “conserve”. It
intends to preserve the special traditions and characteristics of the minority which distinguish it from
the dominant group.
8. Keeping the above principle in the anterior, it must be considered that the Ankuran which is a 188 year
old structure, has a lot to its cultural heritage. The fact that it has special religious and spiritual
significance for the Saras community itself draws the inference of firstly, its paramount importance as
a matter of faith, secondly, the fact that only 8 such Ankurans are there in Indusland, depicts the rich
culture and faith associated with the Ankuran. Thirdly, the last Ankuran was consecrated over 122
years ago, itself concludes the essence of an Ankuran.
9. Furthermore, States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for
the promotion of that identity. 68 Article 29 seeks to save the cultural and educational rights of any
section of citizens having residence in any part of India. 69
10. The conservation of language, script or culture under Art. 29 (1) may be by means wholly unconnected
with educational institutions.70 It is true that under Article 29(1) a Section of the citizens having a
distinct language, script or culture, might establish an educational institution for conserving the same.
But, under Article 30(1), the right conferred on the religious or linguistic minority is not only the right
66
Bal Patil and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (08.08.2005 – SC): MANU/SC/0472/2005: AIR2005SC3172.
67
Commentary on the Constitution of India Durga Das Basu 8th Edition.
68
Article 1, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities.
69
P. Raghunanda Rao v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1995 Orissa 113.
70
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389: (1974) 1 SCC 717: (1975) 1 SCR 173.

to establish an educational institution for the purpose of conserving its language, script or culture, but
any educational institution of its choice. Whereas Article 29 does not deal with education as such… 71
11. Unlike Art. 19(1), Art. 29(1) is not subject to any reasonable restrictions. The right conferred upon the
section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof to conserve their language,
script or culture is made by the Constitution absolute. 72 The Ankuran which is a part of the rich heritage
of the Saras community people would get hampered, the numerical minority which they are and the
culture which they are trying to protect is enough to prove a fundamental right under Art. 29.
12. Arguendo, Art. 29 is restrictive in nature, the purpose of fundamental right must be to preserve the
rights of each individual and even where one provision is not subject to another there would still be a
ground to read both together so that they exist in harmony. Constitutional interpretation is all about
bringing a sense of equilibrium, a balance, so that read individually and together the provisions of the
Constitution exist in contemporaneous accord. Unless such an effort were to be made, the synchrony
between different parts of the Constitution would not be preserved. In interpreting a segment of the
Constitution devoted exclusively to fundamental rights one must eschew an approach which would
result in asynchrony. Coexistence of freedoms is crucial, in the ultimate analysis, to a constitutional
order which guarantees them and seeks to elevate them to a platform on which every individual without
distinction can reap their fruit without a bar to access. Thus, the absence of words in Article 26 which
would make its provisions subordinate to the other fundamental freedoms neither gives the right
conferred upon religious denominations a priority which overrides other freedoms nor does it allow
the freedom of a religious denomination to exist in an isolated silo. 73
13. Art. 25 (1) gives the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate
religion and Art. 25 is restrictive in nature. As the practice of the Saras community people is essential
therefore to preserve it Art. 29 (1) comes into play and the right to conserve the culture is protected
thus construing both the fundamental rights to its truest meaning. Also a practice cannot be propagated
or even practised if it is not being conserved.
14. Thus, it brings out that rights guaranteed to citizens residing in India under Article 29(1) of the
constitution guarantees the Saras religion to “conserve” their language, script or culture which is not
71
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389: (1974) 1 SCC 717: (1975) 1 SCR 173.
72
Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Daulta: AIR 1965 SC 183: [1964]6SCR750.
73

supposed to be necessarily a part of educational institution and it also is an absolute right and the same
cannot be barred by the state authorities.
(B) The proposed construction of the metro project is hampering the petitioner’s right to conserve
its “Culture” as stated under Article 29
15. Culture is the essence of a community. Practices which are practiced over the years from the essence
of culture and later it acquires a cardinal place in a particular religious denomination. In the present
matter the Ankuran is itself a cultural denomination, with its rich heritage spanning over 188 years.
The fire in the Ankuran was ignited 188 years ago and since then it has been burning. Therefore, over
the years a lot of emotions and beliefs have got attached to it, thus preserving it is essential.
16. The rights of minorities to their culture and religion and the right to be protected against
majoritarianism, were recognized as far as back as 1928 in the Motilal Nehru draft constitution. 74
17. On the death of a Hindu, the performance of his Shradha may be a matter of religion which is a concern
of his son and the priest. Also, it would be strange indeed if the marrying couple and the priest were
to complain that the joy about the marriage is expressed by others or if the son of a deceased Hindu
75
were to complain that the memory of the departed is being commemorated by others.
18. Thus it can be construed by the above case law that religion as a whole can be constituted to the tune
of “Culture”. In the present matter worshiping of the holy fire under the Saras community is a part of
their religion, while protecting and conserving the traditions, customs and the heritage is a part of their
rich and composite culture.
19. According to eminent lawyer K.K Venugopal, “Differences on grounds of language or religion are
understandable, but it is difficult to define the word “Culture”. A number of definitions stress the idea
that “culture” is a collective name for the material, social, religious and artistic achievements of
human groups, including traditions, customs and behaviour patterns, all of which are unified by
common belief and values. Values provide the essential part of culture and give it its distinctive quality
and tone. 76
74
Neera Chandhoke (2002) ‘Why minority Rights?’ The Hindu, 27 July 2002, available at: (https://www.thehindu.com/todays-
paper/tp-national/tp-tamilnadu/why-minority-rights/article27860250.ece).
75
Surksh Chandra Chiman Lal Shah Vs. Union of India and Ors.: AIR1975Delhi168: MANU/DE/0096/1975.
76
K.K Venugopal, constitutional law of India, 1st Ed., pp. 560-561.

20. The content of the right concerns itself with the word ‘Religion’. “Religion” in this article would mean
matters of faith with individuals or communities, based on a system of beliefs or doctrines which
conduce to spiritual well-being. The aforesaid does not have to be theistic but can include persons who
are agnostics and atheists. 77
21. Cultural heritage is the legacy of physical artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or society that
are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future
generations. Tangible heritage includes buildings and historic places, monuments, artefacts, etc.,
which are considered worthy of preservation for the future. These include objects significant to the
archaeology, architecture, science or technology of a specific culture. 78
22. In the present matter what if the TBM machine mal-functions just while boring below the Ankuran,
then the only way it can be fixed is by drilling vertically, which will damage the structure at all odds.
This will be a great loss for the entire community as well. When there are realignment options open
but the Respondents have shown least interest for the same and adopted a stand which is not in the
interest of a minority community, its sentiments, religious feelings and established practices and
beliefs.
23. Furthermore, being a heritage grade-III structure, it shall be regulated and controlled, ensuring that it
does not mar the grandeur of, or view from Heritage Grade-III.79
24. In addition, according to a reply received by an RTI query filed by TOI, 212 buildings developed
cracks since tunneling began in mid-2012 along a 24 Km stretch in phase 1. At least 99 buildings in
north Chennai were damaged when Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) were at work to build a 2 Km
corridor for phase 1 extension.80
25. Hence, it is vital to note that the method used for constructing the tunnel i.e. the tunnel boring machine
(TBM) would devastate the heritage structure and would cause irreplaceable damage to the structure
which could not be in any matter compensated in terms of money.
26. In the anterior, it is noteworthy to note that the word used in the Article is “Conserve” and not
“Preserve”. The right to “preserve” is merely a passive right. It connotes a right to maintain its
existence in fact. It is merely a passive right form of attitude adopted in defence. The ‘right to conserve’
77
Indian young lawyer association and ors. v. The state of kerala and ors (2018): MANU/SC/1094/2018.
78
UNESCO, available at: ( http://www.unesco.org/new/en/cairo/culture/tangible-cultural-heritage/).
79
Directorate General Central Public Works Department, conservation of heritage buildings- A guide, July 2013.
80
U Tejnomayam (2017), ‘Metro rail tunnelling has damaged 300-plus buildings since mid-2102’, The Times of India, 2
December 2017, available at: < https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/metro-rail-tunnelling-has-damaged300-plus-
buildings-since-mid-2012/articleshow/61886194.cms>.

is wider than the right to preserve. It includes both positive and negative aspects. The right to
conservation may include following rights: “(1) The right to profess, practice and preach its own
religion, if it is a religious minority. (2) The right to follow its own social, moral and intellectual way
of life. (3) The right to impart instructions in its tradition and culture. (4) The right to perform any
other lawful act or to adopt any other lawful measures for the purpose of preserving its culture. 81
27. Furthermore, in relation to the Ankuran’s location, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is applicable
uniformly to all properties including places of worship. Right to acquisition there under is guided by
the express provision of the Land Acquisition Act and executive instructions. Acquisition of any
religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose
keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in the extinction of the right to practice the
religion, if the significance of that place is such. 82
28. Therefore, in the present matter the proposed construction of MMRCL under the Saras temple will not
only discrete the spiritual sanctity and hamper the essential practice of the Saras religion but will also
put the culture (Rituals, customs, traditions and the cultural heritage) into danger. The Saras temple
being a 188-year-old heritage should be protected by the state authorities in order to “Conserve” the
Cultural rights of the Saras religion under Art. 29 of the Constitution.
Therefore, it is humbly contented that the proposed metro construction of MMRCL if allowed to pass
under the Saras temple would violate the fundamental rights of the Petitioners’ under Article 29 of
the Constitution.
81
D.K Sen, comparative study of Indian constitution, p.638.
82
Dr. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360 : AIR 1995 SC 605.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited it is most humbly
and respectfully requested that the Hon’ble Supreme Court to adjudge and declare,
1. The Decision of Hon’ble Aaryavarta High Court to be overturned;

2. To direct MMRCL to shift the proposed alignment of the metro tunnel by merely 5 meters.
And pass any other order, decree or judgment that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in light of justice, equity
and good conscience.
Sd/-
____________________
Counsel for the Petitioner

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IN THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUSLAND

IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.: _ OF 2019

UNION OF INDUSLAND …RESPONDENT

7TH KIIT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ………………………….………………………………….…………….…....3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ………………………………………………….………………….......8

STATEMENT OF FACTS ………………………………………………………..…………………..…….9

QUESTIONS PRESENTED …………………………………………………….…………………………11

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ………………………………………………………..…………………….13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 2

SR .NO. STATUTES REFERRED CITED ON PAGE NO.

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PASSIM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 4

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha 28

3. TREATISES, BOOKS, REPORTS AND DIGESTS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 5

16. “MANECKJI NUSSARVANJI DHALIA, “HISTORY OF ZOROASTRIANISM”.

(OFFICIAL WEBSITES APPROVED BY THE APEX COURT OF UNION OF INDIA)

SR.NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 11

3. IN THE EVENT IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OR WHETHER THE TWO

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE BALANCED?

4. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAD ESTABLISHED A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF

THE CONSTITUTION AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY VIOLATION THEREOF?

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 12

It is humbly submitted that,

1. WHETER THE BELEIFS OF PETITIONER AS CONTENETD IN THE WRIT PETITION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 15

(a) The statement of the Spiritual Head of the religion is to be considered

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 16

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 18

2. WHETHER THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TUNNEL UNDER THE ANKURAN WILL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 22

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 24

3. IN THE EVENT IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 28

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 32

4. WHETHER THE PETITIONERS HAD ESTABLISHED A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 33

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER Page 34