Dismal Stories

Law and ethics, simply put.

Liberalism, is-ought and non-cognitivism

April 3, 2012

Here in Israel there are (relatively) a lot of Objectivists. This is partly

due to a historical coincidence
(http://www.kheper.net/topics/gurus/Moshe_Kroy.html) (a professor
named Moshe Kroy was a charismatic and mentally ill early adopter),
and partly due to Rand’s staunch black & white, pro-Israel
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uHSv1asFvU), pro-war stances
which are appealing to the Israeli right (the fact that she
is Jewish doesn’t hurt).

While I think Mrs. Rand has done a large net good to the cause of
liberty (drawing very smart people to libertarianism with her novels),
she has also done a lot of harm. Along with Rothbard, whom she
greatly influenced, they popularized an incredibly naive, extreme, and
ridiculously untenable view of morality. This caused them to make
bizarre moral claims about things like homosexuality (which Rand
thought was “immoral” [m. 12:00
(http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?
pagename=reg_ar_moratorium)]) or suicide (which both Rothbard and
Rand thought was “immoral”).

Even worse, these ‘natural rights’ views came after far more sensible
positions held by scholars such as Mises, Hayek and Hazlitt. This
dogma has unfortunatly now come to plague and be associated with
libertarianism as a whole and Austrian-rationalism as well. Such
positions are however the epistemological equivalent of crack. It might
make you feel high, but you’re making a fool of yourself.

(http://www.smbc-comics.com/comics/20111205.gif)

Skip this paragraph if you understand and accept the is-ought

dichotomy. In short, descriptive claims about reality, like the real
objects they refer to, are of course objectively true or false. There is a
tree there or there isn’t. However, moral claims, ought’s and should’s,
refer to goals. Goals are not a part of objective reality. Therefor the truth
status of normative claims is not, by any stretch of the imagination, that
of descriptive statements. It doesn’t matter how natural or intuitive the
“right to life” or “self-ownership” appear to you. It doesn’t matter how
much you enjoy taking the moral high-grounds in arguments. You
epistemologically can’t claim such statements are somehow objectively
true. What we cannot speak about, we better pass over in silence.

Interestingly, and as has become apparent due to

the beautiful breakthroughs of the last 30 years, this is not the end of
the story, and we should not all just become utilitarians.[1
(http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_3_7_dejasay.pdf)]

First, as Hoppe noticed

(https://argumentationethics.wordpress.com/2011/12/25/argumentation-
ethics/), moral propositions are only really relevant in a certain context,
come to think about it – in the context of discourse. And in this specific
context of action, i.e. given the action axiom, some norms are already
implied.

This is by the way a common point of confusion to people who fail to

understand his argument. Hoppe does not claim the NAP is objectively
true in the normal sense of truth, just that it is a logical presupposition of a
specific class of actions. Not even the most ardent moral skeptic would
deny that given a certain norm as an assumption you can then
“objectively” derive other norms (“you ought to smell good”->”you
ought to bathe”). Hoppe claims only this, not violating any of the rules
of epistemology.

Separately de-Jasay came up with a weaker yet valid and original

argument by noting that such normative propositions are still
constrained by the epidemiological rules of verifiablity. Since you
cannot be called on to prove a negetive, it can be shown that “positive
rights” claims are all nonsensical (I’ll publish a post about this
argument).
Both of these are value-free, rigorous (and a bit hard to understand)
arguments. They are however slowly becoming the basis of a much
more powerful and modern libertarian philosophy. We don’t need
simplistic views carried from the enlightenment. Let’s move beyound
natural rights, easy-life arguments, and hold rigor above emotion.

Both Hoppe and de-Jasay have shown that a humble epistemological

view, combined with a strict use of logic are more then enough to
establish liberalism in a delightfully dogmatic, non compromising and
historically unprecedented way. Until libertarianism won’t shake off
some of the more naive views, it will not be able to establish itself in the
remarkable historic position it now, uniquely, has the tools to attain.

A is A.
Posted by ‫מדע אומלל‬
Filed in Uncategorized
Tags: Anthony de-Jasay, Argumentation Ethics, de-jasay,
epistomology, Hans Hermann Hoppe, is-ought, Libertarian ethics, non-
cognitivism, presumption of freedom, presumption of liberty, rant
3 Comments »

Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics: A User

Friendly, Neighborly Introduction

December 25, 2011

“What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence.”

–Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Humans act in incredibly stupid, as well as incredibly clever ways.
Trade and production coexists alongside murder and rape. The
application of deductive reasoning to actions such as trade and
production (“praxeology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxeology)“)
gives us interesting insights into economics. We can deduce trade to be
mutually beneficial and artificially low interest rates to cause an
unsustainable economic boom. However to apply praxeology only to
trade and production, as if they were the sum total of human activity,
would be somewhat of an understatement. Us humans know some
other tricks.

Other than the problem of our desire for goods and services, we also
encounter other problems in our life. A very important problem, one
that is at the core of much death and strife, is that of conflict resolution.
Reality doesn’t provide unlimited plenty on mere request. In
economical jargon, scarcity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarcity) is
pervasive. Some resources are rivalrous
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rivalry_%28economics%29) by nature.
Differing ideas about how to use them can conflict. Though there are
many motives for engaging in war, all acts of war can be reduced to
this- a conflict over “resources”.

To illustrate, imagine a husband and wife both own a car, which they
want to use for different aims at the same time. There is not only a
relationship problem, but a conflict over a resource. Both
can’t simultaneously drive the car to two different places. A car, by its
nature, is therefore a rivalrous resource. A non rivalrous resource,
for example, is the air we breath. Air is so abundant and all-around that
conflicts over the use of it do not arise. We can freely breathe and breath
as much as we want. Air is therefor not rivalrous but superabundant.
People steal cars, but not air. Most goods of course are not air-like. And
so, it’s only fair to ask the golden question of political
philosophy… How should such conflicts be resolved?

At the most basic level, humans have two options:

 1. Fight for control.
2. Talk it over.

Now, if one chooses to engage in violence against his wife over the use
of a car, the choice has been made and option 1 was selected. This is the
“animal like” choice, as non-human animals are mostly incapable of
resolving conflicts in other ways. Only if the parties choose to avoid
violence and instead engage in discourse to resolve their dispute, the
question of what is justified arises. The parties are then engaged in an
interaction. A goal oriented peaceful corporation, which we can now
praxeologicly examine.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly- Tuco Shoots

Trade is said to be mutually beneficial because by choosing to

trade both willful participants demonstrate their common preference
for the post-trade state of affairs over the pre-trade state of affairs.
Otherwise they wouldn’t have voluntarily traded. Underling every
voluntary corporation is some common goal… So, lets reflect on what
goal is implied by engaging in argumentation as means to resolve a
conflict. The implied goal is of course option 2. The participants prefer
to resolve their dispute peacefully, without the threat of force.
Let’s put it in formal terms: Violence-aversion,
i.e achieving peaceful conflict resolution, is the presupposition
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presupposition) or demonstrated preference
(http://mises.org/daily/2205#1a) of the argument participants. The act
of Argumentation, presupposes the basic norm of peaceful conflict
resolution. Physically speaking, an actor engages in argumentation by
using his body to express a proposition (i.e by moving his mouth,
hands, blinking morse code, some combination of those, ext.). An
argument is nothing but an exchange of verbal propositions. Thereby, it
is by the very act of expressing a proposition that one demonstrates his
preference to resolve the given conflict without the use violence.

But then you see, professor Hans Hermann-Hoppe

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Hermann_Hoppe) asks, what if
the actual content of your proposition is in direct contradiction with
what is implied by the act of expressing it (the demonstrated
presupposition of argumentation)? That is, what if the content of your
proposition is something like- “I don’t care about what you have to say,
violence is the only way to resolve disputes…”?

In philosophy propositions that contradict what is directly implied by

the very act of expressing them are called performative contradiction
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Performative_contradiction)s (s). For example
propositions like “I am currently dead”, or “I can’t express arguments” are
performative contradictions. An attempt to argue them is just by itself
contradictory. The very action of proposing them implies they are
false… A participant who is engaged in argumentation and argues for
violence is thus also engaged in such a performative contradiction. If
argumentation implies “option 2” it’s contradictory to argue for option
1. This is all almost a matter of semantics.

Contemplating such propositions will make their incoherence even

clearer. What point is there to argue with someone who openly states
the result of the argument is of no interest to him? In effect that
argumentation has no bearing on how the conflict should be actually
bee resolved. And so, the presupposition of argumentation- violence-
free conflict resolution, cannot logically be argued against (denied).

From this first presupposition we can now derive other, directly

derived presuppositions, which also cannot be logically denied. For
example, it is presupposed in argumentation that- “Claims need
justification”. Trying to deny this (arguing “I don’t need to justify claims I
make…”) contradicts the underling first presupposition of achieving
conflict resolution based on non-violent (i.e verbal means). Because if
anyone can just claim whatever nonsense he wants, with no need to
provide justification, the dispute cannot be peacefully resolved on the
basis of nothing but claims. So we can also deduce that “Claims need to
be justified” is another, derived, presupposition of argumentation.
“Language is capable of meaning” is another. We can see now that
argumentation is not a bunch of random, free floating statements, but a
practical affair with guiding underling presuppositions which cannot
just be rationally denied.

So, now it is only sensible to ask, which other propositions (specifically

which moral, normative propositions
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norm_%28philosophy%29)) can
be consistently expressed without contradiction, in order to resolve a
conflict? The answer is simple: It depends on the conflict… To explain,
let’s first examine a situation where the conflict is over the use of the
most important and basic resource human beings have: the humane body.
That is, imagine a conflict where one person wants to put another
person’s body to some use, but that other person has, say, a headache at
the moment. Now, let’s suppose both want to avoid violence and so
begin to argue the matter at hand.

Will one of them be consistent with

the aforementioned presuppositions of argumentation if he argues “I
can use your body as my own, because you are black and I am white”? or
maybe “I can use your body because my eyes are green and your eyes are
blue”? The answer is he wouldn’t. This is since both participants
are moral agents (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_agency) fully
capable of reasoning and discourse, and then, since it is presupposed
that “Claims need to be justified” an arbitrary, deniable, moral distinction
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_standard) between them, by the
very nature of being an arbitrary distinction, cannot be justified. That is,
a person with blue eyes can coherently deny such a claim with no
implied contradiction (or just as well assert the opposite proposition- “I
can use your body because my eyes are blue and your eyes
are green”). Acceptance of a norm containing in it such a subjective, arbitrary
distinction is then also arbitrary. “Claims need to be justified”, and thus
arguing an arbitrary norm contradicts a presupposition of
argumentation, trapping the arguer in a performative contradiction.

In general slavery norms are therefor illogical, inconsistent propositions.

And so since arguing arbitrary assertions is logically to be avoided,
only universalizeble
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universalizability) “same for all” norms
can in principle be justified. It does not follow that all such universal
norms are automatically justified, among them the universal norm-
“Everyone should hug every kitten they see”, or “Everyone should get
drunk every morning”. It only means that a norm which is
not universal (i.e. particularistic
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_particularism)) is by its very
nature, a-priori
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori), unjustified
and inconsistent with the basic presuppositions of argumentation.
Slavery norms aside, by examining which universal norms can be used
for resolving conflicts over a body, we can now show that only the
norm “Every person owns its own body” can be justified in argumentation.
This is because any other universal norm simply does not justify a
person acting- i.e using his body at all. Partial ownership of body (every
person having an equal very small share in every other person) nor a
complete lack of ownership over body, justify an actor’s own
independent choice to move, if only to engage in argumentation (Read
in further detail here
(https://argumentationethics.wordpress.com/2012/02/01/argumentation-
ethics-and-equivocation/) on this blog or read Murry
Rothbard original discussion of this here
(http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/eight.asp)). Thus, any non-self
ownership universal propositions are contradicted by the very act of
proposing them.

Not bad! We have now shown that argumentation must presuppose

each person owns its own body. The denial of this is a performative
contradiction. But wait… before we can go and calmly smoke whatever
we want, knowing we justifiably own our body, we must first also deal
with the question of conflicts over external, rivalrous resources. That’s
what we’ll be smoking.

A norm used to resolve conflicts over external resources

must essentially match (i.e link) between a resource and its owner. Such
a link can be defined in a subjective manner (e.g. “whomever wants
more the resource is its owner”, or “whomever noticed first the resource
is its owner” ext.) or an objective manner, which will be discussed. A
subjective norm is essentially nothing more than a verbal assertion of
ownership (“I claim that I want it more, and therefore it is mine”). The
other party could just as easily (and consistently) claim the contrary
(“You are wrong, I want it more, and therefore it is mine”). No one
can justify his claim, that is, objectively demonstrate his claim of
ownership is correct, based on a subjective norm. Therefore holding
such a subjective norm is inconsistent with the presuppositions of
argumentation, and therefore contradictory.

As for an objective norm, unlike your body, which is naturally

objectively linked to you just by virtue of your direct control over it and
your use of it in argumentation, external resources are by default not
objectively linked to anyone. To establish an objective link to a
resource (what Emanuel Kant termed intersubjectively ascertainable) one
must first act upon the resource to physically create a clear and evident
link. As John Lock termed it- by “mixing ones labor” with it. This
established link can than be used (by the actor or by others)
to objectively resolve or avoid conflicts. An actor can put an apple in his
pocket, or he can erect a nice white picket fence (If the rivalrous
resource is land). This act is called Homesteading
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homestead_principle) or appropriation
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriation). Homesteading creates an
objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link to a resource*. No one can
then justifiably use a homesteaded resource as this would disregard the
prior objective link to it, thereby adopting some invalid subjective
norm. If you have such a claim, you can now go and smoke…
 The A priori of Argumention

Light it up, don’t be shy. We have now shown that the Non-Aggression
Principle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-
aggression_principle) (A.K.A. NAP) is presupposed in every argument,
and so only it can logically be justified. Initiation of violence cannot. We
have now finally, after much hardship, proved that socialists are
irrational! Yeeeha! Wait… didn’t we know that? Never mind, moving
on…

So this was the ultimate proof of the freedom philosophy, which is

implied in the very act of peacefully resolving disputes, as the civilized
human beings we so often are not. As mentioned, this argument was
formulated by Hans Hermann Hoppe during 1988.

In the next (short) post, I will deal with a few misunderstandings I

encountered about this argument. Meantime, have a blast. Live Free. Tu
ne cede malis.

UPDATE: Post here.

(https://argumentationethics.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/argumentation-
ethics-objections/)
Notes

* Note that since such a link has been artificially created, it can also be
disowned, redirected ext. And so one can also trade with others those
resources he labored to homestead. Read more here
(http://mises.org/daily/3660) (sec. “Property in External Things”).

** Note that the ownership extent of what homesteading grants is

derived from it’s pupose- deciding who can justly act upon a resource.
And thus Rothbard introduces the concept of relevant technological
unit (RTU). Read here (http://mises.org/daily/2120#10).

*** Resources about Argumentation ethics

(http://mises.org/daily/5322/Argumentation-Ethics-and-Liberty-A-
Concise-Guide) (It is recomended to also read Hoppe’s presentation of
the argument and Hoppe’s explanation of the problem of social order
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TI-RUPQ9RdA), further discussing
scarcity).
Posted by ‫מדע אומלל‬
Filed in Uncategorized
Tags: Argumentation Ethics, Freedomain Radio, Hans Hermann
Hoppe, Hoppe, Hoppe argumentation, Libertarian ethics, Libertarian
philosophy, Non-aggression principle, Non-aggression principle
justification, UPB
6 Comments »

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