Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245

Lech T. Polkowski

Logic:
Reference Book
for Computer
Scientists
The 2nd Revised, Modified,
and Enlarged Edition of “Logics
for Computer and Data Sciences,
and Artificial Intelligence”
Intelligent Systems Reference Library

Volume 245

Series Editors
Janusz Kacprzyk, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
Lakhmi C. Jain, KES International, Shoreham-by-Sea, UK
The aim of this series is to publish a Reference Library, including novel advances
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Lech T. Polkowski

Logic: Reference Book

for Computer Scientists
The 2nd Revised, Modified, and Enlarged
Edition of “Logics for Computer and Data
Sciences, and Artificial Intelligence”
Lech T. Polkowski
Department of Mathematics
and Informatics
University of Warmia and Mazury
Olsztyn, Poland

ISSN 1868-4394 ISSN 1868-4408 (electronic)

Intelligent Systems Reference Library
ISBN 978-3-031-42033-7 ISBN 978-3-031-42034-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4

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To Maria and Marcin
To Andrzej Skowron
Foreword

The new book LOGIC: Reference Book for Computer Scientists by Prof. Lech
Polkowski is another remarkable contribution that the author has offered to the hand
of the readers. This is an addition to his another book Logics for Computer and Data
Sciences, and Artificial Intelligence which was published in the series Studies in
Computational Intelligence.
This new book is a substantial extension of the already published book as well as
it covers different domains of classical and non-classical logic; among them senten-
tial logic, first-order logic, intuitionistic and modal logics, temporal logics, many
valued logics, dynamic logic, epistemic logics, mereology and rough mereology
(with important results of Prof. Polkowski), logic models of knowledge in relation
to the rough set approach, and some advanced issues concerning second-order logic,
in particular monadic second-order logic, are a few to name.
What is very impressive is its wide extent covering all these domains with so
many deep mathematical results; usually such a wide range is not even possible to
cover in a monograph of lectures on mathematical logics.
I see this book as a further step and more deep in comparison to the first one,
towards the realization of the idea of Prof. Helena Rasiowa; she formulated in 1960s
some ideas emphasizing the fundamental role of logic for the development of CS
and AI and conversely a very significant role of CS and AI for the development of
logic.
From this perspective, the new book concentrates on the presentation of the basic
domains of logic which have a great importance for the contemporary state of devel-
opment of CS and AI. This concerns, e.g., application of logic as a very important
tool for expressing concepts on which different forms of reasoning can be performed,
deep characterization of computational complexity of many different important prob-
lems in CS and AI as well as application of Boolean reasoning in different domains
of CS and AI.
Moreover, the book also covers theoretical issues which yet have not been consid-
ered in the scope of CS or AI applications. Exploiting these issues more may lead
to the discovery of new technologies. It is worthwhile mentioning that researchers
in AI are gradually discovering the usefulness of advanced tools related to different

vii
viii Foreword

branches of advanced mathematics and logic, e.g., topology and reasoning in solving
the advanced problems related to Machine Learning.
One can also observe that nowadays there is also an important call to logi-
cians, especially from AI, for developing new reasoning tools based on the rele-
vant computing model necessary for solving challenges, related to, e.g., Intelligent
Systems dealing with complex phenomena; the book How Smart Machines Think by
Sean Gerrish (MIT Press, 2019) may be considered as an example of such reflection
of thought.
The research related to an emerging computing paradigm of Interactive Granular
Computing model, different from the classical Turing model, may also be counted
to recognize the importance of research on such new reasoning tools. In this direc-
tion, the section on rough mereological logic, essentially devoted to computing with
granules of knowledge, may provide a starting point towards more complex logics.
The material is presented in a very condensed and precise way. This concerns the
whole book starting from the preliminary chapter which can serve as a basis for a
quite a few courses for graduate and Ph.D. students from CS and AI. It should be
also noted that all theorems are presented together with the detailed proofs.
Moreover, the historical comments added to the chapters will help the readers to
better understand how different branches of logics have been born and developed.
The problems included in all the chapters will also stimulate the readers for deeper
studies.
This will certainty work as a reference book for the graduate students and Ph.D.
students; for the researchers working in CS or AI this book has the potential of
guiding them in their studies through different areas of applied and theoretical issues
of logic.
The content of the book is so varied that the researchers working on different
areas of CS or AI for sure will find some sketch of selected contents relevant for their
areas of interest.

Warsaw, Poland Andrzej Skowron

February 2023
Preface

Repetitio mater studiorum est. Repetition allows to perceive some facts not seen
at the first study. It allows for connecting some threads not connected at first and
for better seeing main dominating lines in apparently distinct reasoning moods. For
those moods, let us be allowed to say that logic is about consistency. Satisfaction
of consistent sets implies completeness, maximal consistent sets provide models,
consistency guarantees incompleteness in the Gödel-Rosser sense. Another mood is
exploitation of closures of formulae, also appearing in many places in this text; we
should mention as well the role of the filter separation theorem which is applied in
many important proofs of completeness, witness the Chang theorem.
The aim to exhibit those moods to a fuller degree has been the reason that this
author has underwent the enlarged at the same time corrected edition of his book
styled Logics for Computer and Data Sciences and Artificial Intelligence (the title
abbreviated to ’Logics’ in the sequel) published by Springer Nature Switzerland in
the Series Studies in Computational Intelligence as no. 992.
The present text is larger by about 35% in comparison to the text in ‘Logics’
and much richer topically. It is in fact a new book which implies a new title, better
reflecting the content. Let us present shortly that content to the Reader.
It opens with Chap. 1 which contains prerequisites in order to provide the Reader
with necessary information so they have almost no need to reach for external infor-
mation. Section 1.1, Set Theory Recapitulated, contains an account of ZFC set theory
with theory of relations functions, ordering, complete ordering, well ordering, equipol-
lence theory, cardinal and ordinal numbers, transfinite induction, elements of theory of
graphs and trees, a new section on topology. We include proofs of fundamental theo-
rems: the Knaster-Tarski theorem in Theorem 1.2, the Dedekind-McNeille theorem
in Theorem 1.3, the Cantor diagonal theorem in Theorem 1.5, the Cantor-Bernstein
theorem in Theorem 1.6, the Zermelo theorem on the well ordering in Theorem 1.12,
many of them in the basic repertoire of set-theoretic tools in computer science,
the Zorn maximal principle theorem in Theorem 1.13, the Teichmüller-Tukey prin-
ciple in Theorem 1.14, the König theorem in Theorem 1.15, the Ramsey theorem in
Theorem 1.16. In Sect. 1.2 about Rewriting Systems, we address topics of grammars,
finite-state automata, regular expressions and grammars, automata on infinite words

ix
x Preface

(Büchi automata), showing relations between regular grammars and automata. We

prove theorems on relations between regular finite languages and finite-state automata
in Theorem 1.21, and, on relations between regulae ω-languages and Büchi automata.
Section 1.3 on Computability brings basic information on Turing Machines, primitive
recursive and recursive functions. Arithmetization of Turing machines by means of the
Gödel numbering is the content of Sect. 1.4. The central part of Sect. 1.4 is the proof of
the primitive recursiveness of the Kleene predicate which allows for proofs of unde-
cidability of certain predicates (Theorem 1.34). Section 1.5 brings a characterization
of recursively enumerable sets. In Sect. 1.6, we address the undecidability issues and
Sect. 1.7 recalls the Smullyan account of frameworks for the Gödel incompleteness
theorems in Theorems 1.43, 1.46 and for the Tarski theorem on non-arithmeticity of
truth in Theorem 1.45.
We recall in Sect. 1.8 main issues of Complexity theory. We introduce basic classes
of complexity; L, NL, PTIME, PSPACE, P,NP, EXP, NEXP. We include proofs of
many statements whenever it is possible, including the proof of the Savitch theorem
in Theorem 1.59, the Cook-Levin theorem in Theorem 1.53, with examples of prob-
lems: CNT-CONTRA-UR, DGA, SAT(CNF), SAT(3-CNF), TQBF, SAT(BSR) of
Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey. We will see in the following chapters the role of the
algebraic approach, notably the role of the separation theorem in proofs of complete-
ness in Chaps. 6 and 7. For this reason, we include Sect. 1.9 on Algebraic Structures
in which we introduce lattices, complete lattices with filters and ideals in lattices,
distributive lattices with the proof of the separation theorem in Theorem 1.68, rela-
tively pseudo complemented algebras and Boolean algebras. The new topic is the
Marshall Stone theory of representation of Boolean algebras in Theorem 1.80.
The new topic is Topology section in which we introduce the basic notions and
results of set-theoretic topology: the notion of a topological space, open and closed
sets, interior and closure operators, properties like T2 (Hausdorff) property, compact-
ness with the Tychonoff theorem, degrees of disconnectedness, and elements of the
Marshall Stone theory of topological representations of Boolean algebras in Haus-
dorff zero-dimensional compact Stone spaces in Theorems 1.86, 1.87. The last topic
will be useful in Chap. 7 in discussion of mereological scheme for fuzzy computing.
We are of opinion that Chap. 1 may serve as a basis for a one-semester course in
mathematical foundations of Computer Science.
Chapter 2 is dedicated to Sentential Logic. We use this name in order to distinguish
this much more elaborated chapter from its predecessor in ‘Logics’. Nevertheless in
the subsequent chapters we often return to the synonymous term ‘propositional’. It
is the first of two cornerstone chapters on classical logic. It introduces main ideas,
notions, and results which permeate all logic.
We begin this chapter with the section on a brief account of history. We aim at
turning attention to systems of Syllogistics of Aristotle and the sentential logic of
Stoics and Megarians. In both cases, we meet an automatized system of deduction:
medieval scholastic scholars gave names to figures of syllogisms which allowed to
reduce syllogisms to those of the first group regarded as accepted unconditionally,
Preface xi

predecessors of today’s axiom schemes. Stoics introduced five moods of reasoning

and means for reduction of complex expressions to those moods. Justly Fr. I. M.
Bochenski wrote that leading scholars of Stoic and Megarian schools like Philo of
Megara, Chrysippus, Zeno of Elea can be counted among the greatest thinkers in
logic. Next two Sects. 2.2, 2.3 are devoted, respectively, to syntax and semantics of
sentential logic. In the section on syntactic properties of sentential logic, we discuss
the language of SL, the notion of a well-formed formulae, we introduce sentential
connectives and minimal sets of them. In the next section on semantics, we intro-
duce truth tables, formation trees, notions of satisfiability, validity, unsatisfiability,
as well as the notions of a model and of a logical consequence. All those notions will
appear in discussions of all other logics. Section 2.4 is devoted to normal forms; we
discuss negation, conjunctive, and disjunctive normal forms along with algorithms
for conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms. In Sect. 2.5 we introduce axiomatic
schemes and inference rules. We adopt for the rest of the chapter the axiomatic system
of Jan Łukasiewicz along with detachment, substitution, and replacement as infer-
ence rules. We also introduce the notion of a proof and of a provable formula. We
conclude this section with the statement and a proof of the Herbrand-Tarski deduc-
tion theorem in Theorem 2.4, the notion of logical matrices serving in independence
proofs of axiom schemes and with a discussion of the Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra of
the sentential logic in Definition 2.28. Sections 2.6, 2.7 open a discussion of Natural
Deduction in which we discuss the method of sequents due to Gentzen and the related
variant of decomposition diagrams of Rasiowa-Sikorski. We continue this topic in
Sect. 2.8 with analytic tableaux in the sense of Smullyan. Tableaux offer a milieu for
proving basic theorems on properties of sentential logic. We prove in this section the
theorem on tableau-completeness of sentential logic.
The fundamental for logic notion of consistency of sets of formulae along with the
notion of maximal consistency are introduced in Sect. 2.9. We prove the Lindenbaum
Lemma 2.18 on existence of the maximal consistent extensions for consistent sets.
We prove the strong completeness of sentential logic. In Sect. 2.10, we recall the
classical proof by Kálmar of completeness of sentential logic and we state and prove
the Craig interpolation lemma. Section 2.11 brings the topic of resolution. We give a
proof of its completeness based on the notion of consistency and on play between this
notion and satisfiability. Horn clauses are discussed in Sect. 2.12 along with reasoning
methods of forward and backward chaining. We conclude this section with the Haken
theorem on exponential complexity of resolution in Theorem 2.29. Complexity of
satisfiability problems in sentential logic is approached in Sect. 2.13. Due to NP-
completeness of the SAT problem, we present heuristic approaches by Davis-Putnam
and Davis-Logemann-Loveland. We bring also the case of Horn formulae with the
APT algorithm for solvability of 2-SAT problem in linear time. In the end of Chap. 2,
we mention physical realization of validity proofs by means of logical circuits and
McCulloch-Pitts neuron nets with their improvement by perceptron nets. We prove
the theorem on perceptron learning in Theorem 2.32.
xii Preface

Chapter 3 deals with the first-order logic (FO), the culmination of classical logic
and the environment for the deepest results in logic. The chapter consists of 22
sections. We begin with syntax of FO in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 brings an account of
semantics. We define the notion of a model, and notions of satisfiability, validity and
unsatisfiability.
In Sect. 3.3 we enter the realm of Natural Deduction with the sequent calculus
and in Sect. 3.4 we continue this topic with diagrams of formulae, due to Rasiowa-
Sikorski, being yet another rendering of the Gentzen idea. This last method allows
us to prove a weak form of completeness for predicate logic. Section 3.5 continues
discussion of methods in Natural Deduction with the method of tableaux. As with SL,
also in predicate logic, tableaux allow for proving the basic properties of predicate
logic.
This is initiated in Sect. 3.6 in which we introduce Hintikka sets and prove
their satisfiability which in turn proves tableau-completeness of predicate logic in
Theorem 3.6. Continuing this line, we prove the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem 3.8
and the compactness property of predicate logic. Relations between sequents and
tableaux are discussed in Sect. 3.7: by means of then we prove the completeness
of the sequent calculus. Normal forms are introduced in Sect. 3.8. We introduce
the prenex normal form and the Skolem functions. We introduce conjunctive and
disjunctive normal forms and we discuss the techniques of skolemization, renaming
and unification in obtaining these normal forms. In Sect. 3.9, we prove theorems
on existence of the most general unifier, and on soundness and completeness of
predicate resolution. Horn formulae return for predicate logic in Sect. 3.10 along
with SLD-resolution and logic programs. We give examples of reasoning in these
structures.
Section 3.11 begins the discussion of deepest problems in FO, beginning with
undecidability of satisfaction and validity problems. We apply the fact that the deci-
sion problem of membership is undecidable for type 0 grammars and we construct an
undecidable formula of predicate logic. We include a classical undecidable problem
PCP of Post with a proof by Sipser in Theorem 3.22 and the Church theorem with
the proof by Floyd in Theorem 3.19. Section 3.12 is in a nutshell mentioning of
complexity issues. In Sect. 3.13, we prove that the specialization of FO, the monadic
FO is decidable.
Section 3.14 is devoted to the exposition of the Herbrand theory and the proof of
the Herbrand theorem in Theorem 3.29 which reduces the validity problem for predi-
cate logic to validity problem for SL. Many proofs of completeness for various logics
apply the idea of building models as sets of maximal consistent sets of formulae. This
pioneering idea of Henkin was applied by him in the proof of the Gödel completeness
theorem for FO and in Sect. 3.15 we include this proof. Henkin proves a generaliza-
tion of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem to higher cardinalities.The idea of Henkin
will appear in chapters on modal logics and on many-valued logics. We include in
Sect. 3.16 the Smullyan proof of the Tarski theorem on unprovability of truth in the
arithmetic theory L E .
Preface xiii

The famous Gödel incompleteness theorem is proved, again after Smullyan,

in Sect. 3.17. The Rosser incompleteness theorem along with the famous Rosser
sentence, both proved under the mere consistency assumption, are included in
Sect. 3.18.
Section 3.19 takes up the theme of finite models for FO, important for applications.
We define finite models with the analysis of expressive power of FO on mind. We
define basic notions of an isomorphism and a partial isomorphism, m-equivalence
and FO-definability. The tool for checking expressive power of FO is the Ehrenfeucht
game, described and applied in examples in Sect. 3.20. We include a proof of the
Ehrenfeucht theorem on equivalence of the existence of the winning strategy in the
game Gm for the player called Duplicator with m-equivalence of structures on which
the game is played. This opens up a way to check whether a given class of structures
is definable within FO.
In Sect. 3.21, we prove the form of the deduction theorem for FO. The Craig
interpolation theorem and the Beth definability theorem for FO are discussed and
proved in Sect. 3.22.
Chapters 2 and 3 close our treatment of classical logic and we enter into the realm
of logics which introduce new elements be it new models or new operators.
We begin non-classical logics with Chap. 4 which treats modal and intuitionistic
logics of which modal logics are close to classical first-order logic. In Sect. 4.1, we
introduce syntax of modal logics with operators L of necessity and M of possibility
along with detachment and necessity as inference rules. We introduce the notion of
a normal modal logic and the modal system K as the basic system on which other
more complex systems are built.
Semantics for modal logics is introduced in Sect. 4.2. We define Kripke struc-
tures which inherit some features of first-order semantics but formalize in a new
way domains of structures as sets of worlds related one to another by a relation of
accessibility. We define the notion of satisfaction for modal logics which shows a
dependence of validity of modal formulae on properties of accessibility relation.
For modal logics K, T, B, 4, D, 5, 4C, DC and G, we show the corresponding
relation and prove the 1-1 correspondence for pairs logic-relation. We define logics
S4 and S5. We focus in our discussion of modal logic on the canonical sequence K
T S4 S5 occasionally using B and D.
In Sect. 4.3, we discuss natural deduction for modal logics in the form of tableaux
for logics K, T, S4 and for S5. Section 4.4 opens a discussion of meta-theoretic
properties of modal logics. We define Hintikka sets proving their satisfiability and
proving the tableau-completeness of modal logics K, T, S4 in Theorem 4.16. Special
treatment of S5 due to the condition of symmetry of the corresponding accessibility
relation follows. The theme of natural deduction is continued in Sect. 4.5 with the
sequent calculus. We bring modal sequent rules for K, T and S4. We establish tableau-
completeness of modal sequent calculus by means of relation between sequent and
tableaux calculi.
xiv Preface

In Sect. 4.6, we discuss notions of provability and consistency for modal logics,
maximal consistent sets and relation of accessibility among them as preparation for
completeness theorem in Sect. 4.7. The proof of completeness is in the Henkin style
via maximal consistent sets.
Section 4.8 contains a discussion of the notion of filtration which leads to the
proof of decidability for logic K, T and S4 in Theorem 4.34. A further step for S5
requires the notion of bisimulation which allows for proof od decidability for S5 in
Theorem 4.37. In Sect. 4.9, devoted to satisfiability, we recall the Ladner proof that
SAT(S5) is NP-complete.
With Sect. 4.10 we begin a discussion of quantified modal logic (QML). We
mention the de re and de dicto readings of statements and on this basis we introduce
the Barcan, Definition 4.36, and the converse Barcan formulae, Definition 4.37. We
define the notion of satisfaction for QML which blends elements of FO with Kripke
structures.
Section 4.11 brings an analysis of tableaux for QML. Here one discerns between
constant and variable domains of QML structures. We recall elements of Fitting
approach to either case. For K, we prove tableau-completeness.
With Sect. 4.12 we begin introduction to propositional intuitionistic logic (SIL).
This logic is constructed on ontological insight of L. E. J. Brouwer that truth means
provability. This logic models mathematical truth which requires proofs. SIL for
instance rejects the law of exclusion of the middle. From Gödel’s result that SIL can
be interpreted within the S4 and subsequent Kripke models for SIL, S4 serves as a
structure for SIL with necessary modifications. In this section, we define the notion
of satisfaction for SIL. Tableaux for SIL are introduced in Sect. 4.13 with a proof
of satisfaction for Hintikka families and the resulting proof of tableau-completeness
for SIL.
In Sect. 4.14, we recall the Henkin style proof of strong completeness of SIL.
Section 4.15 opens a discussion of the last in Chap. 4 logic: the first-order intuition-
istic logic (FOIL). It is set in Kripke structures for S4. We introduce the structure for
FOIL which adds to the structure for S4 elements of first-order theory. This serves
as a prelude to Sect. 4.16 in which we prove the completeness of FOIL.
Temporal logics which attempt at defining models for time related events are often
regarded as forms of modality. Chap. 5 opens the second part of the book in which
we meet logics for time, many valued logics and logics for action and knowledge
which have a strong application appeal. Though built on principles inherited to some
extent from first-order and propositional logic, yet they show distinct principles for
their construction.
In Chap. 5, we give a description of temporal logic triad LTL, CTL, CTL*. Their
importance stems from their applications in descriptions of systems properties and
in consequence in model checking.
In Sect. 5.1, we recall the logic of tenses due to Arthur Prior which inspired
Pnueli and Kamp to transfer it to computer science as LTL: Linear Temporal
Logic. In Sect.5.2, we discuss syntactic properties of LTL in few sub-sections.
Sub-section 5.2.1 brings description of operators of LTL: G (always) and F (even-
tually) modeled on the universal and existential quantifiers of FO and additional
Preface xv

new operators X (next) and the binary operator U (until). In sub-section 5.2.2 we
define formulae of LTL: Gp, Fp, Xp, pUq. Sub-section 5.2.3 brings description of
a Kripke structure for LTL as the linear set S = {si : i ≥ 0} of states endowed
with the transition relation modeled as the successor relation with an assignment
si → 2 A P , each i, where A P is the set of atomic propositions.
For branching time models, Kripke structures for CTL are transitions systems,
i.e., sets of states S = {si : i ≥ 0} with transition relations S → 2 S , sets of initial
states I and an assignment L : S → 2 A P , and CTL adds operators A (for all) and E
(exists). The need for considering various paths calls for a complex syntax with the
formulae set split into state and path formulae. We define satisfaction for states and
the global satisfaction for transitions systems. We conclude Sect. 5.3 with examples
of valid CTL formulae.
Section 5.4 is dedicated to Full Computational tree Logic CTL* which subsumes
LTL and CTL. Its models are transitions systems. As for previous systems LTL, CTL,
we discuss in 5.4.1–5.4.4 the syntax, semantics, and satisfaction relation for CTL*.
Section 5.5 begins the discussion of meta-theory of temporal logics. We begin
with LTL, for which we prove the basic result about the ultimate periodic structure
in Definition 5.16 and we define the Fisher-Ladner closure FLC(φ) in Definition
5.17. We define the notion of consistency and we define maximal consistent sets
for FLC(φ) in Definition 5.19. We make maximal consistent sets into a transition
relation, Definition 5.20 and we prove the Sistla-Clarke theorem about satisfiability of
a satisfiable formula in the ultimate periodic model in Theorem 5.7. The consequence
is decidability of LTL in Theorem 5.8. We conclude with the Sistla-Clarke result in
Theorem 5.10 that SAT(LTL) is in PSPACE. We also sketch the proof by Markey
that SAT(CTL) is in PTIME in Theorem 5.11.
In Sect. 5.6, we discuss the logic LTL+PAST which adds to LTL past operators.
In Sect. 5.7, we begin the description of model checking problem beginning with
model checking by automata. We give examples for model checking of some system
properties. In Sects. 5.8–5.10, we discuss tableaux for LTL and CTL with examples
of tableaux and proofs of tableau-completeness for those systems.
With regard to role of automata in model checking, we open in Sect. 5.11 a
discussion of automata on infinite words (Büchi automata) in Definition 5.27. We
define languages accepted by automata in Definition 5.28 and we include basic results
on Büchi automata: constructions of the union, the intersection, and the complement
for Büchi automata in Theorems 5.18–5.21 due to Choueka. Decision problems
for automata are considered in Sect. 5.12 with the Vardi-Wolper theorem on linear
time decidability and NL-completeness of the non-emptiness decision problem in
Theorem 5.22.
Section 5.13 begins with definitions of alternation in Definition 5.34 and of the
structure of labeled trees in Definition 5.35. For alternating automata on labeled
trees which are defined in Definition 5.36, we define runs and acceptance conditions
in Definition 5.37. We recall in Theorem 5.23 the result by Miyano-Hayashi about
equivalence of an alternating Büchi automaton on n states with a non-deterministic
xvi Preface

Büchi automaton on 2 O(n) states. Section 5.14 is concerned with the Vardi-Wolper
theorem on translation of LTL to a non-deterministic Büchi automaton. This requires
the notion of extended closure EC L(φ) in Definition 5.38. Maximal consistent sets
of EC L(φ) serve as states for the automaton defined in Definition 5.39. We include
the theorem (Kupferman) about the existence for an LTL formula φ of an alternating
Büchi automaton on O(|φ|) states and the same induced language in Theorem 5.24. In
Sect. 5.15, we again address the LTL model checking. It is about the problem whether
a given Kripke structure satisfies a given formula. We give a proof of the Sistla-Clarke
theorem on PSPACE-completeness of the problem by indicating a pasage from the
Kripke structure to a non-deterministic Büchi automaton of complexity proportional
to 2 O(|φ|) .
Section 5.16 addresses the parallel problem for branching time logics. This time
structures are labeled trees and automata are alternating tree automata (ata) (Thomas,
Muller-Schupp), see Definition 5.40. Runs of (ata) are defined in Definition 5.41, in
Definition 5.42 we define weak alternating automata and in Definition 5.43 we intro-
duce structures of trees in Kripke structures. The model checking problem for CTL is
defined in Definition 5.44 and Theorem 5.26 brings the theorem by Kupferman-Vardi-
Wolper on the existence of a weak alternating automaton A(φ, Δ) which induces the
same language as the set of trees with spread Δ that satisfy the formula φ.
Section 5.17 is of different character as it addresses the method OBDD (Ordered
Binary Decision Diagrams) for symbolic model checking. Its essence is in building
graphs for representation of propositional formulae. In Definition 5.45 we present
the OBDD methods for representation of sets and transitions in OBDD and Defini-
tion 5.46 treats notions of images and pre-images, essential in model checking. In
Definition 5.47, we give examples of computation and we include OBDD schemes
for LTL and CTL model checking after Bryant and Chaki-Gurnfinkel.
We return in a sense to classical logics in Chap. 6 which is about many-valued
logic whose existence was posed by Jan Łukasiewicz in March 1918 followed by
detailed exposition by Łukasiewicz in 1920 and by Post logics about that time.
We discuss the propositional case. We begin with the Łukasiewicz formulae for
negation and implication and other connectives in Sect. 6.1. In Sect. 6.2, we define
auxiliary functions: T-norms and T-co-norms. Their role my be compared to the
role of accessibility relations in modal logics. We define classical T-norms and the
corresponding T-co-norms. We define the classical T-norms of Łukasiewicz, Goguen,
and Gödel which later define corresponding logics. T-norms induce residua which
serve as implications for respective logics in Definition 6.4. In the end, we recall all
basic connectives for the three T-norms in Theorem 6.1. The interesting idea due to
Hájek of studying the many-valued logic (BL-logic) introduced by the smallest T-
norm which would inherit properties common to all T-norms is presented in Sect. 6.3.
We reproduce axiom schemes for BL and give a list of selected valid formulae.
Deduction theorem for BL is given a proof in Theorem 6.4. An algebraic proof of
completeness of BL is reproduced in Sect. 6.4.
In Sect. 6.5, we embark on theory of 3-valued logic of Łukasiewicz. We begin with
axiom schemes due to Wajsberg (Sect. 6.5, introduction) and we proceed with the
completeness proof by Goldberg-Leblanc-Weaver on lines of the Henkin method of
Preface xvii

maximal consistent sets. We list established by Wajsberg valid formulae of 3 L neces-

sary for the proof. We recapitulate the Wajsberg deduction theorem in Theorem 6.10
and we prove in Theorem 6.12 the strong completeness property of the Łukasiewicz
3-valued logic.
In Sect. 6.6, we briefly recall some other 3- or 4-valued logics: the Kleene 3 K logic,
the Bochvar logics 3 B E and 3 B I , and the 4-valued modal logic 4 L M of Łukasiewicz.
In Sect. 6.7, we treat the n-valued logics for n > 2. The scheme we present is due
to Rosser-Tourquette. In the beginning, we outline their convention of inverted truth
values and in Definition 6.21 we list their axiom schemes. The completeness theorem
for the logic n L is proved in Th. 6.14. Very short Sect. 6.8 defines Post logics and
Sect. 6.9 brings us to the core of the chapter: the infinite valued Łukasiewicz logic
[0, 1] L .
We begin with definitions and properties of strict and Archimedean T-norms
in Definition 6.23 and in Theorem 6.15, and we prove the Ling theorem on the
Hilbert style representations of Archimedean T-norms in Theorem 6.17. We define
and prove properties of residua and we conclude with the Manu-Pavelka theorem on
the Łukasiewicz T-norm in Theorem 6.24. Section 6.10 begins our discussion of the
logic [0, 1] L of Łukasiewicz. We recall its syntax and we formulate the axioms of
[0, 1] L due to Łukasiewicz. We insert a comparison (Hájek) of BL to [0, 1] L . Proofs
of basic valid formulae of [0, 1] L are collected in Theorem 6.26.
We are on the threshold of the completeness proof of [0, 1] L which is algebraic and
this compels us to a study of relevant algebraic structures. We begin with Sect. 6.11
about Wajsberg algebras, an algebraic rendition of Wajsberg axiom schemes. They
are defined in Definition 6.27 and in Theorem 6.27 principal valid formulae are given
proofs. MV-algebras, algebras crucial for the proof of completeness are presented in
Sect. 6.12. Ideals in MV-algebras are discussed in Sect. 6.13. Theorem 6.34 brings
the proof od the separation theorem.
The Chang representation theorem is proved in Sect. 6.14. Steps to it are as follows:
the notion of a sub-direct product in Definition 6.33, a criterion for sub-directness in
Theorem 6.37, and the Chang theorem that each MV-algebra is a sub-direct product
of MV-chains in Theorem 6.38. The Chang completeness theorem is at the core of
the completeness proof for the [0, 1] L logic. It asserts that each equation t = 0 in
any MV-algebra holds true if and only if it is true in the algebra over [0, 1] (called the
Łukasiewicz residuated lattice). This technical proof is demonstrated in Sect. 6.15
in the version due to Cignoli-Mundici.
Steps to the completeness proof for infinite-valued logic of Łukasiewicz are
included in Sects. 6.16, 6.17. In Sect. 6.16, we recall the Łukasiewicz residuated
lattice and we show that Wajsberg algebras and MV-algebras can be represented in
each other. By means of the Wajsberg algebra structure in MV-algebras, we define
MV-formulae and MV-terms. The completeness theorem for [0, 1] L is finally proved
in Sect. 6.17. The algebraic proof is based on the Chang completeness theorem and
algebraic prerequisites of Sects. 6.16 and 6.17.
Infinite-valued logics of Goguen and Gödel are briefly commented upon in
Sect. 6.18. Its peculiar features are highlighted.
xviii Preface

The complexity issue is discussed in Sect. 6.19. We consider satisfiability prob-

lems SAT(Goguen), SAT(Gödel), SAT(Luk) for respective logics. We recall in
Theorem 6.47 Hájek’s proof that SAT, SAT(Goguen), and SAT(Gödel) are equiv-
alent hence all are NP-complete. The problem of complexity of SAT(Luk) is much
more complex. It seems that one cannot avoid a functional appproach. We begin the
exposition of a proof due to Mundici which employs McNaughton polynomial func-
tions and Theorem 6.48 formulates the McNaughton theorem about the equivalence
between formulae of [0, 1] L and McNaughtons functions.
We recall McNaughton functions for connectives of [0, 1] L . In Definition 6.43,
we recall the formula of Mundici ζn,t which embeds propositional logic into [0, 1] L
by means of the equivalence: φ is valid in propositional logic if and only if ζn,t ⊃ φ
is valid in [0, 1] L .
This allows for a proof that SAT(Luk) is NP-hard in Theorem 6.50. As all coeffi-
cients of McNaughton functions are integers, and all functions define regions which
cover the cube [0, 1]n , by connectedness two distinct functions either have disjoint
regions or their regions have a common border defined by a set of algebraic equations
with rational coefficients. This is exploited in the proof by Mundici in which it is
shown that for the McNaughton function f φ corresponding to a satisfiable formula
φ of [0, 1] L there exists a rational point b ∈ [0, 1]n . Its estimate is obtained via
the Hadamard determinant theorem for the set of linear equations defining b. A
polynomial guessing procedure for b shows SAT(Luk) in NP.
Chapter 7 leads us into a few areas of logic related to logic for programs and
actions, logics for episteme, and logics related to decision tables which describe
in logical terms the notion of functional dependence among groups of features and
exhibit the modal character of relations hidden in data tables. A separate area is
Boolean reasoning applied to data tables with the aim of minimizing the set of
features or discretization of continuously valued features. The last topic is a logic of
approximate concepts couched in terms of approximate mereology, the extension of
mereological theory of concepts.
In Sect. 7.1, we describe the propositional dynamic logic (PDL) in its regular
variant. We define sytnax and semantics of PDL along with the axiomatization due to
Segerberg in Definition 7.4. We introduce the Fisher-Ladner closure and in this frame-
work we render the Kozen-Parikh proof of completeness of PDL in Theorem 7.4. We
discuss filtration for PDL in Definition 7.8 and we prove the small model existence
for PDL after Fisher-Ladner in Theorem 7.6. We conclude our review of PDL with
the result by Fisher-Ladner that satisfiability of a formula φ of PDL can be checked
in NTIME(c|φ| ).
Section 7.2 returns us to modal logics as we define epistemic logics which are
clones of modal ones. We mention epistemic logics EX for X = K , T, S4, S5, D
for one reasoner, and then we discuss the case of n agents. En passant, we discuss
the epistemic-doxastic logics after Hintikka and Lenzen. New is the case of n agents,
here we have a greater combinatorial freedom. The simple case is when we regard
each agent as a separate individual reasoning unit, hence, each agent owns a separate
Preface xix

accessibility relation. Under these assumption we define epistemic logics EXn. We

prove completeness of logics EXn (2.16–2.24) with proofs in the Henkin style by
applying maximal consistent sets of formulae in Theorems 7.17. and 7.18.
One more method of generating knowledge for a group of agents is the group
knowledge where knowledge is expressed by the knowledge operator Eφ = ∧i K i φ
where K i is the knowledge operator of the i-th agent. In this way, we secure that
all agents know each formula φ. Finally, we may secure that each agent knows  that
each agent knows that ..., i.e., we construct the transitive closure TC(E)= k≥0 E k
and we let Cφ = ∧k≥0 E k φ as the common knowledge operator. These constructs
are described in Definition 7.22.
Satisfaction relation for E and C is defined in Definition 7.23 and in Theorem 7.20
we introduce an additional inference rule involving the common knowledge oerator
C. In this framework, we render the proof of completeness of logics ECXn in
Theorem 7.21. In Theorems 7.22 and 7.23, we include results by Halpern-Moses about
the small model existence for logics ECXn as well as results on complexity of these
logics.
Section 7.3 departs from the two previous. It invokes the theory of mereology
(Leśniewski), i.e, a theory of concepts, i.e., sets of things, whose primitive operator is
expressed as the predicate of a part. This theory has roots in Aristotle and in medieval
logics, nevertheless it is a fruitful tool in describing relations between concepts in
a sense close to modern topology as far as it does not enter into the contents of
sets. We define basic notions of mereology in Definitions 7.21–7.30 which include
the notions of a part, of an ingredient, and of overlap relation and in the inference
rule of mereology. In particular, Definition 7.29 introduces the notion of a class,
a mereology counterpart to the notion of the union of sets. Definition 7.30 brings
the axiom about the class existence. The universal class V is defined in Definition
7.31 and it allows for definitions of relative complement and the complement in
Definitions 7.35, 7.36. The Tarski complete Boolean mereological algebra endowed
with Tarski fusion operations of addition, multiplication and negation, the class V as
the unit and rid of the null element is defined in Definition 7.37. In Definition 7.38,
we introduce the mereological implication.
In Sect. 7.4, we develop the theory of rough mereology whose primitive predicate
is the part to a degree. We introduce into the mereological universe the notion of
a mass assignment axiomatized in Definition 7.40. Theorem 7.33 gathers provable
consequences of this scheme. We introduce the notion of a part to a degree by means of
the relation of rough inclusion. Rough inclusions have features of fuzzy membership
function and its theory parallels the infinite-valued logic of Łukasiewicz. We include
provable formulae of this theory in Theorem 7.34. We conclude with the counterpart
of the Stone representation theorem for the Tarski Boolean algebra and with its
consequence as the compactness theorem for mereological spaces in Theorem 7.39.
We return to problems of logic models of knowledge in Sect. 7.5. We consider
data tables formally known as information systems, and we introduce the notion of
indiscernibility in the sense of Leibniz in Definition 7.45. Classes of indiscernibility
constitute the smallest definable concepts. Important notion of a rough concept (set)
xx Preface

as a non-definable set appears in Definition 7.47. The basic notion of a functional

dependence between sets of features of things is defined in Definition 7.47 in which
we also define approximations by definable concepts to non-definable ones.
After this introduction, Sect. 7.6 brings the rendering of the Rauszer FD-logic of
functional dependence set in the framework of the sequent calculus. An algebraic
proof of completeness of this logic fills the rest of this section. Boolean reasoning
which goes back to Boole and owes its rediscovery to Blake and Quine is a very useful
method of proofs of existence of various constructs of Data Science. Such constructs
are, e.g., reducts, i.e., minimal sets of features which preserve knowledge induced by
the whole of features, both in information and decision systems. In Definitions 7.60
and 7.61, we recall algorithms for detection of reducts based on Boolean reasoning.
We add a discussion of algorithms for finding minimal decision rules and optimal
cuts in discretization of continuous features in Definitions 7.62 and 7.66.
Chapter 7 proceeds with Sect. 7.8 about Information Logic (IL) which studies
relations that emerge in generalized information systems which allow for multi-
valued features. Relations of indiscernibility I, tolerance T, and inclusion C along
with the notion of the deterministic set D are defined in Definition 7.67. Theorem 7.52
lists dependencies among those relations. Relations I, T, C give rise to modal operators
[I], [T], [C]. Axiom schemes for IL are given in Definition 7.69, and an algebraic
proof of completeness of IL closes Sect. 7.8. Chapter 7 comes to a close with Sect. 7.9,
a short account of Pavelka’s scheme for propositional fuzzy logic.
The huge bulk of very interesting and deep results in the realm between FO and
second-order logic SO, especially in the theory of finite models for FO deserves to
be addressed and this is done in Chap. 8.
All logics considered up to this point have been modeled on FO or SL. The addition
to FO of quantifiers acting on concepts yields the second-order logic SO. Though SO
is too complex for analysis parallel to that for FO yet some fragments are susceptible
for analysis like monadic SO (MSO). The other way to transcend limitations of FO is
to endow FO with inductive definitions which locates such logics midway between
FO and SO and opens a way to relate logics to complexity problems in Descriptive
Complexity and to problems of Model Checking.
In Chap. 8, we give a review of the resulting logics with some basic facts about
FO, MSO, and SO. We begin our account with a recapitulation of sections of
Chap. 3 covering the expressive power of FO notably with Ehrenfeucht’s games
and Ehrenfeucht-Fraïsse’s theorem in Definitions 8.1–8.5 and in Theorem 8.1. We
prove the Hanf locality theorem. We begin with the notion of a Gaifman graph in
Definition 8.6 and we recall the metric structure of a Gaifman graph in Definition
8.7. In Definition 8.8, we recall the notion of m-equivalence. A sufficient criterion
for m-equivalence is given in the Hanf Theorem 8.5. The counterpart of the Hanf
theorem for finite structures was proposed by Fagin, Stockmeyer, and Vardi and we
state it and enclose a proof in Theorem 8.6. These authors also simplified their result
to an elegant criterion stated in Theorem 8.7.
Preface xxi

In Sect. 8.2, we introduce the syntax and the sematics of the second-order logic SO.
In Definition 8.11, we define the monadic second-order logic MSO. In Definition 8.12–
8.15 we introduce Ehrenfeucht games for MSO and in Theorem 8.10 we enclose the
proof that the class EVEN is not definable in ∃MSO. Theorem 8.12 due to Kannelakis
states the REACH is expressible in ∃MSO for undirected finite graphs and we include
an argument by Ajtai and Fagin. we define Ajtai-Fagin games for ∃MSO in Definition
8.17 and Theorem 8.13 states the equivalence of the winning strategy by Duplicator to
non-definability in ∃MSO with a proof due to Immerman. As an example, we include
the proof by Arora and Fagin that dREACH is not definable in ∃MSO.
Section 8.4 is dedicated to the status of strings in MSO. We begin with definition
Definition 8.23 of languages induced by formulae and in Theorem 8.15 we include
the proof by Ladner of the fundamental theorem due to Büchi that a language is MSO
definable if and only if it is regular. A contrasting theorem due to McNaughton-Papert
that a language is FO-definable if and only if it is regular-star free is given with a
proof by Ebbinghaus-Flum in Theorem 8.16.
Section 8.5 contains two fundamental theorems due to, respectively, Trakhtenbrot
and Fagin. The Trakhtenbrot theorem on undecidability of the finite satisfiability
problem over vocabularies containing a binary predicate is proved in Theorem 8.17.
The Fagin theorem that ∃SO = NP is stated and proved in Theorem 8.18.
With Sect. 8.6, we open the vast area of augmentations of FO by additional
constructs which lead to logics stronger than FO and subsumed by SO. We consider
in Sect. 8.6 FO+inductive definitions; an example of such definition is the Transitive
Closure TC which is non-definable in FO. In Definition 8.24, we return to the Knaster-
Tarski fixed point theorem (see Chap. 1) in order to introduce fixed point operators
LFP and GLP and the logic LFP=(FO+LFP+GLP). The theorem, independently
by Immerman and Vardi, that LFP=PTIME is stated in Theorem 8.20 with a proof
by Immerman. We notice that LFP⊆ ∃MSO.
Introduced by Gurevich and Shelah Inductive fixed points IFP and Inflationary
fixed points are defined in Definitions 8.28 and 8.29. Finally, in Definition 8.30 Partial
fixed points PFPs are defined. Theorem 8.24 by Kreutzer that IFP≡ LFP simplifies
the landscape of fixed points. Theorem 8.25 due independently to Immerman and
Vardi states that on ordered finite structures IFP=LFP=PTIME, and Theorem 8.26
due to Vardi which establishes that PFP=PSPACE conclude Sect. 8.6.
Up tp now, FO and fixed point logics have been unable to count as witnessed
by EVEN. The logics with counting introduced by Immerman and Lander make
up for this deficiency. The logic (FO+Count) is defined in Definitions 8.31–8.33.
Infinitary connectives are defined in Definition 8.34 and their addition leads to the
logic (FO+Count)inf in Definition 8.35. A further step is the logic in Definition 8.36.
Its strength is curtailed by restriction to formulae of a finite rank (Definition 8.37) in
the logic (FO+Count)*inf ,ω (Libkin) in Definition 8.38.
Bijective Ehrenfeucht games (Hella, Libkin) are introduced in Definition 8.39. In
Theorem 8.27, we prove that the winning strategy by Duplicator on structures A, B is
equivalent to the agreement of those structures on closed formulae of (FO+Count)inf,ω
xxii Preface

of rank m. Logics (FO+TC) and (FO+DTC) due to Immerman are described in

Sect. 8.8 along with due to Immerman results that (FO+TC)=NL and (FO+DTC)=L.
Section 8.9 introduces yet another game in Definition 8.42, the Pebble game
(Immerman, Poizat) in Definition 8.43, yet another variant of the basic idea of the
Ehrenfeucht game with the partial isomorphism of obtained structures as the winning
criterion for Duplicator. We notice that Pebble games characterize logics with finitely
many variables (Barwise).
Definability versus locality is studied in Sect. 8.10 with locality in the sense of
Hanf in Definition 8.50 and the locality in the sense of Gaifman in Definition 8.52.
Hanf based and Gaifman based criterions for definability are stated in respective
Theorems 8.32 and 8.33. Relations between the two localities are explained in Corol-
lary 8.4: each Hanf-local Query for m > 0 is Gaifman-local and in Theorem 8.36:
each FO-definable Query is Hanf-local.
Given a collection Mn of structures with n-element domains and an Mn closed
formula φ, we define estimate μn (φ) of the probability that a randomly selected
structure in Mn will satisfy φ. The limit of μn (φ) at ∞ is denoted μ(φ). A languge
L obeys the 0-1 law if and only if for each φ in L, either μ(φ) = 0 or μ(φ) = 1.
In Sect. 8.11, we state the proof by Fagin that FO obeys 0-1 law. To this end, we
define Gaifman’s extension formulae in Definition 8.57, and we consider their set
TG . For completeness’ sake, we introduce the Łoś-Vaught test in Theorem 8.38 and
we show that TG is complete save a proof of categoricity, to be given in Sect. 8.12.
Theorem 8.39 states and proves the Fagin theorem that if TG |= φ, then μ(φ) = 1.
The conclusion is Theorem 8.41 by the same authors that FO obeys 0-1 law.
The predicate BIT and the Random Graph are defined in Sect. 8.12. We include
a proof that TG is categorical in ω in Theorem 8.43. In preparation to Parity game,
we define games on graphs in Sect. 8.13. The architecture of a game is defined in
Definition 8.60, winning strategies and positions are defined in Definition 8.62, the
Query GAME is defined in Definition 8.63. Parity game is defined in Definition
8.64 and Theorem 8.44 states the result by Emerson-Jutla and, independently, by
Mostowski, about positional determinacy.
The important for applications in model checking modal μ-calculus L μ is intro-
duced in Sect. 8.14. Kripke models are here labeled transition systems and we define
formulae of L μ in Definition 8.65. and Definition 8.66 brings the satisfaction rules.
Formulae of L μ are sometimes difficult to be disentangled, and we give some exam-
ples of them. Operators μ.X, ν.X of L μ are in fact LFP and GFP, respectively, and
we use definitions of these fixed points to define unfolding of μ.X and ν.X in Defini-
tion 8.67. Well-named formulae and alternation depth are defined in Definition 8.68.
Model checking by means of mu-calculus is considered in Sect. 8.15 in which
we define parity games in Definition 8.69 with rules of them stating the moves by
players E and A. Also defined are priority assignments. The discussion culminates in
theorem which we state and prove after Bradfield and Walukiewicz that a transition
system T at a state s satisfy a formula φ if and only if the player E has a winning
strategy from the position (s, φ).
Preface xxiii

The last Sect. 8.16 is dedicated to DATALOG. We define DATALOG programs in

Definition 8.71 and we show that the outcome is a simultaneous fixed point LFPsim .
We prove the Bekić lemma that LFPsim is equivalent to a single LFP.
Each chapter is provided with a list of problems, their total number is about
150. Our philosophy in selection of problems is not very original: we borrow them
mostly from research papers in belief that they reflect fully the important additional
results. About 150 problems span Chaps. 2–8. As problems are provided with links
to respective works, the Reader will have the opportunity to consult original sources.
Full list of references counts about 270 positions, providing the reader with links
to influential and often breakthrough works.
The debt and pleasure of the author is to thank them who helped. We owe our
gratitude to many though we cannot mention all.
We are grateful to Prof. Maria Semeniuk-Polkowska for Her patience during many
months of work on the book and for Her unrelenting support.
To Prof. Andrzej Skowron we offer thanks for His friendship and for the scientific
cooperation which lasted for years as well as for His kind willingness to provide
Foreword to our book.
Author’s thanks and gratitude go to Prof. Janusz Kacprzyk, a Series Editor, for
His support of our books and we send thanks to Prof. Lakhmi C. Jain, a Series Editor,
for kind acceptance of this book.Ms Grażyna Domańska-Żurek provided invaluable
expertise in Latex and expertly set the book.
Let us be allowed to remember late Profs. Helena Rasiowa and Zdzisław Pawlak
who were very kind to offer their invaluable support.
Ms Grażyna Domańska-Żurek provided an expertise in Latex and set expertly the
book.
We want to express our gratitude to the team at Springer Nature: Thomas Ditzinger,
Syvia Scheider and Sabine Schmitt for their support of the book project and to
Varsha Prabakar and Jegadeeswari Diravidamani at Springer Nature Chennai for
their professional involvement in various stages of book production and readiness to
help.
Names of Adolf Lindenbaum, Gerhard Gentzen and Mordechai Wajsberg are
often mentioned in this text. We would like to dedicate this book to their memories
as representatives of the legion of Polish and other European logicians and mathe-
maticians and scientists from all venues of science who perished or suffered during
the II WW and other wars in often unknown circumstances.

Warsaw, Poland Lech T. Polkowski

March–April 2023
Contents

1 Introduction: Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 ZFC Set Theory. Basic Constructs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Equipollence and well-Ordered Sets. Cardinal
and Ordinal Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.3 Graph Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Rewriting Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Computability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Arithmetization of Turing Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Recursively Enumerable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.7 Incompleteness. Non-provability of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.8 Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.9 Algebraic Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.10 Topological Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2 Sentential Logic (SL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.1 A Bit of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2 Syntax of Sentential Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Semantics of Sentential Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Normal Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5 Sentential Logic as an Axiomatic Deductive System . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.6 Natural Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.7 Natural Deduction: Decomposition Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.8 Tableaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.9 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.10 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

xxv
xxvi Contents

2.11 Resolution, Logical Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

2.12 Horn Clauses. Forward and Backward Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.13 Satisfiability, Validity and Complexity in Sentential Logic.
Remarks on SAT Solvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.14 Physical Realization of SL. Logic Circuits, Threshold Logic . . . . . 102
2.15 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.1 Introduction to Syntax of FO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.2 Introduction to Semantics of FO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.3 Natural Deduction: Sequents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4 Natural Deduction: Diagrams of Formulae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.5 Natural Deduction: Tableaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.6 Meta-Theory of Predicate Logic. Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.6.1 Tableau-Completeness of Predicate Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.7 Analytic Tableaux Versus Sequents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.8 Normal Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.9 Resolution in Predicate Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.10 Horn Clauses and SLD-Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.11 Meta-Theory of FO. Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.11.1 Undecidability of Satisfiability and Validity
Decision Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.12 Complexity Issues for Predicate Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.13 Monadic Predicate Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.14 The Theory of Herbrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.15 The Gödel Completeness Theorem. The Henkin Proof . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.16 The Tarski Theorem on Inexpressibility of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.17 Gödel Incompleteness Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.18 The Rosser Incompleteness Theorem. The Rosser Sentence . . . . . . 156
3.19 Finite FO Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.20 Ehrenfeucht Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.21 The General form of Deduction Theorem for FO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.22 Craig’s Interpolation Theorem. Beth’s Definability Theorem . . . . . 167
3.23 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.1 Sentential Modal Logic (SML) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.2 Semantics of the Modal System K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.3 Natural Deduction: Analytic Tableaux for Modal Logics . . . . . . . . 189
4.4 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics: Part I: K,T,S4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.5 Natural Deduction: Modal Sequent Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Contents xxvii

4.6 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics. Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

4.7 Model Existence Theorem and Strong Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.8 Small Model Property, Decidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
4.9 Satisfiability, Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
4.10 Quantified Modal Logics (QML) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
4.11 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for Quantified Modal Logics . . . . . . 210
4.12 Sentential Intuitionistic Logic (SIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
4.13 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for SIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
4.14 Consistency of Intuitionistic Sentential Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.15 First-Order Intuitionistic Logic (FOIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
4.16 Natural Deduction: FOIL-Tableaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
4.17 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model
Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
5.1 Temporal Logic of Prior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
5.2 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
5.3 Computational Tree Logic (CTL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
5.4 Full Computational Tree Logic (CTL*) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
5.5 Meta-theory of Temporal Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
5.6 Linear Time Logic with PAST (LTL+PAST) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
5.7 Properties of Systems, Model Checking by Means
of Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
5.8 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for LTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
5.9 Tableaux Construction for Linear Temporal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
5.10 Tableaux for Computational Tree Logic CTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
5.11 Non-deterministic Automata on Infinite Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
5.12 Decision Problems for Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
5.13 Alternation. Alternating Automata on Infinite Words . . . . . . . . . . . 262
5.14 From LTL to Büchi Automata on Infinite Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
5.15 LTL Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
5.16 Model Checking for Branching-time Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
5.17 Symbolic Model Checking: OBDD (Ordered Binary
Decision Diagram) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
5.18 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
6.1 3-Valued Logic of Łukasiewicz (3 L ). Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
6.2 T-Norms, T-Co-norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
6.3 Basic Logic (BL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
6.4 Meta-Theory of BL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
6.5 Meta-Theory of 3 L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
xxviii Contents

6.6 Some Other Proposals for 3, 4-Valued Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

6.7 The n-Valued Logic n L : The Rosser-Tourquette Theory . . . . . . . . . 297
6.8 The Post Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
6.9 Infinite-Valued Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
6.10 Infinite-Valued Logic [0,1] L of Łukasiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
6.11 Wajsberg Algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
6.12 MV-Algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
6.13 Ideals in MV-Algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
6.14 The Chang Representation Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
6.15 The Chang Completeness Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
6.16 Wajsberg Algebras, MV-Algebras and the Łukasiewicz
[0,1] L Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
6.17 The Completeness Theorem for Infinite-Valued Sentential
Logic [0,1] L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
6.18 Remarks on Goguen and Gödel Infinite-Valued Logics . . . . . . . . . . 326
6.19 Complexity of Satisfiability Decision Problem
for Infinite-Valued Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
6.20 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
7.1 Sentential Dynamic Logic (SDL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
7.2 Epistemic Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
7.3 Mereology Based Logic for Granular Computing and Fuzzy
Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
7.4 Rough Mereology. Rough Inclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
7.5 Knowledge as an Ability to Classify. Information/Decision
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
7.6 The Logic of Functional Dependence (FD-Logic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
7.7 Boolean Reasoning in Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
7.8 Information Logic (IL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
7.9 Pavelka’s Fuzzy Sentential Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
7.10 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
8 Beyond FO Within SO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
8.1 Introduction: Expressive Power of FO. Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . 393
8.2 Syntax and Semantics of Second-Order Logic (SO) . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
8.3 Graph Structures in MSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
8.4 Strings in FO and MSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
8.5 Theorems of Trakhtenbrot and Fagin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
8.6 FO+Inductive Definitions. Fixed Point Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
8.7 Logics with Counting (FO+Count) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
8.8 FO+Transitive Closure (FO+TC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
Contents xxix

8.9 Logics with a Finite Number of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

8.10 Definability Versus Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
8.11 0-1 Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
8.12 BIT Relational Symbol. Random Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
8.13 Games on Graphs and Transition Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
8.14 Modal μ-Calculus (Lμ ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
8.15 μ-Calculus Model Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
8.16 DATALOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
8.17 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Automaton for concatenation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Fig. 2.1 Formation tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Fig. 2.2 Diagram of a formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Fig. 2.3 Forms of decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Fig. 2.4 A closed tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Fig. 2.5 An open tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Fig. 2.6 Logical gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Fig. 2.7 A logical circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Fig. 2.8 The artificial neuron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Fig. 3.1 A formation tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Fig. 3.2 A diagram of decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Fig. 3.3 Types of decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Fig. 3.4 A closed predicate tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Fig. 3.5 An open predicate tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Fig. 3.6 The pattern for SLD resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Fig. 3.7 The resolution tree for the Example 3.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Fig. 3.8 Connectedness example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Fig. 4.1 A modal closed K-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Fig. 4.2 A modal closed T-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Fig. 4.3 A modal closed 4-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Fig. 5.1 Sentential decomposition forms: A reminder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Fig. 5.2 Decomposition forms for LTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Fig. 5.3 The initial LTL-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Fig. 5.4 The final LTL-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Fig. 5.5 Decomposition forms for CTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Fig. 5.6 The initial CTL-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Fig. 5.7 The final CTL-tableau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Fig. 5.8 BDD(φ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Fig. 5.9 Kripke’s structure K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Fig. 8.1 Graphs G 1 , G 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

xxxi
List of Tables

Table 1.1 Automaton B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Table 1.2 Automaton NB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 2.1 Truth-functional description of connectives and of ⊥ . . . . . . . . 65
Table 2.2 Truth table for the formula φ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Table 2.3 Truth table for the formula φ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 2.4 C,N truth matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Table 3.1 Sequent rules rendered as tableau rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Table 4.1 Proof of (i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Table 4.2 Proof of (iii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Table 5.1 Complexity of satisfiability decision problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Table 5.2 Automaton B1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Table 5.3 Automaton B2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Table 5.4 Transition system TS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Table 5.5 Automaton B3  ........................................ 248
Table 5.6 Product TS B1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Table 6.1 The truth function of the Łukasiewicz implication . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Table 6.2 The truth function of the Łukasiewicz negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Table 6.3 Connectives of L 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Table 6.4 T-norms, related residua and t-co-norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Table 6.5 T-norms, related negation operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Table 6.6 The Kleene implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Table 6.7 The truth table for conjunction ∧ B I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Table 6.8 The truth table for 4 L M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Table 6.9 The truth table for modality M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Table 6.10 The truth table for modality L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Table 7.1 The partial decision system PLAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
Table 7.2 The decision system minimal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

xxxiii
Chapter 1
Introduction: Prerequisites

In this chapter, we collect basic information on set theory, rewriting systems, com-
putability, complexity, algebraic structures, topological structures, which will serve
us in what follows as references.

1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated

Naïve notion of a set comes from Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, who
defined a set as a collection of objects united by a common property. This definition
was sufficient in the first period of development up to the end of 19th century; as
reasoning on the basis of it led to antinomies, beginning of the XX century brought
attempts at formal definitions which resulted in some formal theories of sets, accepted
as satisfactory for developing basic mathematical theories.
Definition 1.1 (ZFC theory of sets) The syntactic constituents of ZFC belong in a
few categories of symbols:
(i) the letters X, Y, Z , ... denote sets;
(ii) letters x, y, z, ... denote elements of sets;
(iii) the symbol ∈ (the Greek ‘esti’) denotes the phrase ... is an element of ...;
(iv) the symbol = denotes identity of sets;
(v) connectives ∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬, ≡ meaning intuitively or, and, if ... then ..., ,
if and only if ....
Some relations between sets are derived first. The primitive formula of the set theory
is x ∈ X (‘a thing x is an element of the set X ’).
Definition 1.2 (Containment of sets) The symbol for this notion is ⊆; X ⊆ Y if
and only if x ∈ X ⊃ x ∈ Y no matter what thing is substituted for x. When (X ⊆
Y ) ∧ ¬(Y ⊆ X ), then one uses the symbol ⊂ and writes X ⊂ Y meaning that X is
a proper subset of Y .

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 1

L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_1
2 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.3 (Set algebra) We define elements of set algebra: the union X ∪ Y is
the set defined by the formula x ∈ X ∪ Y ≡ x ∈ X ∨ x ∈ Y ; the intersection X ∩ Y
is defined by the formula x ∈ X ∩ Y ≡ x ∈ X ∧ X ∈ Y ; the difference X \ Y is
defined by the formula x ∈ X \ Y ≡ x ∈ X ∧ ¬(x ∈ Y ).
Definition 1.4 (Identity of sets) X = Y if and only if X ⊆ Y ∧ Y ⊆ X ; equivalently,
(X = Y ) ≡ (x ∈ X ≡ x ∈ Y ) for each thing x.

1.1.1 ZFC Set Theory. Basic Constructs

We now list allowed in ZFC operations for forming new sets. We give them in the
format X, Y, Z , ..., x, y, z, ...
,
new constr uct on basis o f X, Y, Z , ..., x, y, z, ...

calling them axioms. The set with elements x, y, . . . is denoted {x, y, . . .}.
x,y
(A1) Axiom of unordered pair: {x,y} ; for each pair of things x, y, there exists the set
{x, y} containing exactly things x and y;
(A2) Axiom of separation: X,P XP
where (x ∈ X P ) ≡ (x ∈ X ∩ P); we are allowed to
single out of X elements which are in P. The set P is called a property, later
on, we meet its symbolic rendition in logic under the name of a predicate;
(A3) Axiom of the power set: 2XX , where (x ∈ 2 X ) ≡ (x ⊆ X ); it follows that the
power set 2 X consists of all subsets of 
the set X ;
(A4) Axiom of the union: XX , where (x ∈ X ) ≡ [(x ∈ Y ) ∧ (Y ∈ X )] for some

set Y ; therefore, the set X consists of all elements which are elements in an
element of X ;
(A5) Axiom of the empty set: ∅ , where the empty set ∅ consists of no element: for
each x it is true that ¬(x ∈ ∅);
(A6) Axiom of infinity: ∅∅∞ , where ∅∞ has the following properties:

(i) ∅ ∈ ∅∞ ;
(ii) for each x, if x ∈ ∅∞ , then {x, {x}} ∈ ∅∞ ; thus, ∅, {∅, {∅}}, ... are elements
of the set ∅∞ ;

(A7) Axiom of replacement: let X, Y be sets and F(x, y) be defined for x ∈ X and
be such that for each x ∈ X there exists exactly one y ∈ Y satisfying F(x, y).
Then YX,Y
X,F , where Y
X,F
⊆ Y and y ∈ Y X,F if and only if F(x, y) holds true for
some x ∈ X ;
(A8) Axiom of choice (C): XXC , where X C contains exactly one element from each
element of X ; X C is a selector for X .This supposes that elements of X are
non-empty sets themselves and the set X C selects exactly one element from
each of these sets. We call X a family of sets.
Let us add that letters ZF stand for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and the letter C
stands for Choice.
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated 3

A number of new constructs follow from axioms.

x,y
Definition 1.5 (Ordered pairs) {x,{x,y}} . The set {x, {x, y}} is denoted <x, y> and
it is called the ordered pair. The name is justified by the property: (<x1 , y1 > =
<x2 , y2 >) ≡ (x1 = x2 ∧ y1 = y2 ).
X,Y
Definition 1.6 (Cartesian product) {<x,y>:(x∈X )∧(y∈Y )}
. The resulting set of ordered
pairs is denoted X × Y and called the Cartesian product of sets X and Y . It exists as
a subset of the set 2 X ∪Y (existing by (A2), (A3),(A4)).

Definition 1.7 (Binary relations) For sets X, Y , the relation R between X and Y
is a subset R ⊆ X × Y . In case <x, y> ∈ R, we write R(x, y) or x Ry. We list
definitions of most frequently used relations. Consider a relation R ⊆ X × X ; R is:
(i) reflexive: R(x, x) for each x;
(ii) linear: R(x, y) ∨ R(y, x) for each pair x, y;
(iii) symmetric: R(x, y) ⊃ R(y, x) for each pair x, y;
(iv) transitive: R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) ⊃ R(x, z);
(v) serial: for each x, there exists y such that R(x, y);
(vi) Euclidean: R(x, y) ∧ R(x, z) ⊃ R(y, z) for each triple x, y, z;
(vii) directed: if R(x, y) and R(x, z), then there exists t such that R(y, t) and R(z, t)
for each triple x, y, z;
(viii) functional: R(x, y) ∧ R(x, z) ⊃ (y = z) for each triple x, y, z.

A relation satisfying (i) and (iii) is a tolerance relation which expresses similarity, if
R satisfies in addition (iv), then it is an equivalence relation.
The inverse to R relation R −1 is defined by the equivalence (R −1 (x, y)) ≡
(R(y, x)). Clearly, (R −1 )−1 = R. Relations can be composed: (R ◦ S(x, y)) ≡
(R(x, z) ∧ S(z, y)) for some z. Obviously, (R ◦ S)−1 = S −1 ◦ R −1 .
For a binary relation R, we denote by R n the composition of n copies of R; the
union ∞ n
n=0 R is the transitive closure of R denoted T C(R). Two things x, y are in
the relation T C(R) if and only if there exists n such that R n (x, y).
Definition 1.8 (Functions) For sets X, Y , a relation R ⊆ X × Y is a function if and
only if it does observe the property R(x, y1 ) ∧ R(x, y2 ) ⊃ y1 = y2 ; for functions
symbols f, g, ... are used and notation f (x) = y is applied when the instance f (x, y)
holds. Functions are denoted more suggestively by symbols of the form f : X → Y .
We now define basic notions related to the notion of a function like image, counter-
image, domain, range, functions total (surjective), injective, bijective.
Definition 1.9 For a function f : X → Y and a subset Z ⊆ X , the set f (Z ) = {y ∈
Y : y = f (x)} for some x ∈ X is the image of the set Z . By analogy, for a subset
W ⊆ Y , the subset f −1 (W ) = {x ∈ Z : f (x) = y ∧ y ∈ W } of X is the counter-
image of W . The set X is the domain dom( f ) of f and the set f (X ) is the range
r ng( f ) of f ; in case when the range of f is Y the function f is total. The function
f is injective if for each y ∈ Y there exists at most one x ∈ X with f (x) = y; f is
bijective when it is injective and total.
4 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.10 (Orderings) A binary relation R ⊆ X × X is a partial ordering on

the set X in case the following properties hold:
(i) R(x, x);
(ii) R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) ⊃ R(x, z);
(iii) R(x, y) ∧ R(y, x) ⊃ x = y.
If, in addition, R satisfies
(iv) R(x, y) ∨ R(y, x), then R is a linear ordering.
An ordering R is strict linear in case it satisfies (ii), (iv) and
(v) R(x, y) ⊃ ¬R(y, x).
Partial ordering is often denoted ≤ with the inverse ≤−1 denoted ≥ and strict linear
ordering is denoted <.
Definition 1.11 (Bounds, lattices) For a set X ordered partially by ≤ and a subset
Z of X , an element x ∈ X is an upper (lower) bound of Z if z ≤ x (x ≤ z) for each
z ∈ Z ; we write Z ≤ x (respectively, x ≤ Z ). A subset Z of X has the least upper
bound (l.u.b.) x0 in case x0 is an upper bound and for each Z ≤ x, we have x0 ≤ x.
Analogously, an element x0 is the greatest lower bound (g.l.b.) of Z if x0 is a lower
bound and for each x ≤ Z , we have x ≤ x0 .
A set X partially ordered by ordering ≤ is a lattice if for each pair x, y of its
elements the set {x, y} has the least upper bound (called the join) and the greatest
lower bound (called the meet); l.u.b.{x, y} is denoted x ∪ y, g.l.b.{x, y} is denoted
x ∩ y.
Theorem 1.1 The following are among properties of meets and joins:
(i) x ∩ y = y ∩ x;
(ii) x ∪ (y ∪ z) = (x ∪ y) ∪ z;
(iii) x ∩ (y ∩ z) = (x ∩ y) ∩ z;
(iv) (x ∪ y) ∩ x = x;
(v) (x ∩ y) ∪ x = x;
(vi) (x ≤ y) ≡ ((x ∪ y) = y);
(vii) (x ≤ y) ≡ ((x ∩ y) = x);
(viii) ((x ∪ y) = y) ≡ ((x ∩ y) = x).
Definition 1.12 (Complete orderings) For a set X partially ordered by a relation
≤ X , the ordering is complete if each subset of X has the least upper bound and the
greatest lower bound. The least element of X is denoted 0, the greatest element of X
is denoted 1.
A function f : X → Y from a partially ordered by a relation ≤ X set X into a
partially ordered by ≤Y set Y is isotone (or, monotone) if it satisfies, for each pair
x, y of elements of the set X , the condition:

x ≤ X y ⊃ f (x) ≤Y f (y).

Isotone functions on complete orderings have an important property (Knaster and

Tarski [1]). Its impact will be felt in Chap. 8 with fixed point logics.
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated 5

Theorem 1.2 (The Knaster-Tarski theorem) For a set X ordered completely by an

ordering ≤ and for an isotone function f : X → X , there exists a fixed point x0 for
f , i.e., f (x0 ) = x0 .

Proof Consider the set A = {x ∈ X : x ≤ f (x)}; the set A is non-empty as 0 ∈ A,

hence there exists a = sup A. As x ≤ a for each x ∈ A also x ≤ f (x) ≤ f (a) for
x ∈ A, hence, a ≤ f (a). Thus f (a) ≤ f ( f (a)), thus f (a) ∈ A, i.e., f (a) ≤ a so
finally a = f (a). 

Any lattice X can be embedded into a complete lattice L, i.e., there exists an
isotone injective function from X into L. This construction is called the Dedekind-
McNeille completion.
Definition 1.13 (Structure, operation, vocabulary) An operation of arity n on a set
A is a function which assigns to each sequence of length n of elements of A an
element of A. A structure is a set A with a set Σ of operations on it. The structure A
with the vocabulary Σ and the domain A is the pair (A, Σ).

Theorem 1.3 (The Dedekind-McNeille completion) For each lattice M ordered by

≤, there exists a complete lattice (L , ≤ ∗) and an embedding ι : M → L.

Proof For a set A, a subset of a lattice M, we define sets: (i) A+ = the set of all upper
bounds for A (ii) A− =the set of all lower bounds for A. Then, one checks that the
following hold:
(iii) if A ⊆ B, then B + ⊆ A+ and B − ⊆ A− ;
(iv) A ⊆ (A+ )− ;
(v) {[(A+ )− ]+ }− = (A+ )− .
We 
 define the complete lattice L along with the embeddingι. We recall that operations
, are defined for any collection F of sets as follows: F = {x : x ∈ A, A ∈ F}
and F = {x : x in each A ∈ F}.
+ −
(vi) L is the set of all sets A such that A = (A
 ) +and operations of bounds
are: for
a family F of elements of L, g.l.b.F=( {A : A ∈ F})− , l.u.b. F=( {A+ :
A ∈ F})− ;
(vii) for x ∈ M, we define the set (←, x]={x}− . Then ((←, x]+ )− =(←, x].
(viii) the embedding ι is defined as ι(x) = (←, x].


Definition 1.14 (The set of natural numbers) Consider the collection N of all sets
satisfying (A6) (i), (ii). Call them inductive sets. Let N= N ; then N is the minimal
inductive set; we denote ∅ by 0, the set {∅, {∅}} by 1 and so on, the generic symbols
for elements of N are m, n, ..... They are called natural numbers.

The set N is an archetype for well-ordered sets.

6 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.15 A structure (X, ≤) is well-ordered when the ordering ≤ is linear

and each non-empty subset of X contains the least element. Natural ordering on
N is given by (m < n) ≡ (m ⊂ n). Consider a subset A ⊆ N; let m ∈ A. The set
{n : n < m} is finite, hence, either m is the least element in A or after finitely many
checks we reveal the least element in A.

Theorem 1.4 (The principle of mathematical induction) For each n ∈ N there exists
the least element greater than n, i.e., = n ∪ {n}; it is called the successor of n and
it is denoted as n + 1. Suppose that the set A ⊆ N has properties (i) n 0 ∈ A (ii) for
each n > n 0 , if all natural numbers m such that n 0 < m < n are in A, then n ∈ A.
Then each n ≥ n 0 ∈ A. In particular, if n 0 = 0, then A=N.

Definition 1.16 (Cartesian products) The principle of induction allows us to define

Cartesian products of n sets X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n by induction: (i) for n = 2, the product
X 1 × X 2 is already defined in Definition 1.6. For n > 2, if the product Πi=1 n
X i is
defined, then Πi=1 X i is defined as Πi=1 X i × X n+1 .
n+1 n

Definition 1.17 (Arity) An n-ary relation R is a subset of a Cartesian product

Πi=1
n
X i . A function of arity n is defined on a Cartesian product Πi=1
n
Xi .

1.1.2 Equipollence and well-Ordered Sets. Cardinal and

Ordinal Numbers

Definition 1.18 (Equipollence) Sets X, Y are equipollent (are of the same cardinal-
ity) if there exists a bijection f : X → Y . The cardinality type of a set X is denoted
|X |. The equipollence relation between sets X and Y is denoted as |X | = |Y |. For
instance, no natural number n is equipollent with the set of natural numbers N. Each
set equipollent with N is said to be countably infinite. Cardinality of N is denoted by
the symbol ω, the first infinite cardinal number. We say that a cardinal number |X |
is greater than a cardinal number |Y | if the set Y is a bijective image of a subset of a
set X and there is no bijection of Y onto X .

The question whether there exist cardinal numbers greater than ω is settled by the
Cantor theorem.
Theorem 1.5 (Cantor) For each set X , sets X and the power set 2 X are not equipol-
lent and |X | < |2 X |.

Proof To the contrary, suppose that f : X → 2 X is a bijection, and let A = {x : x ∈

/
f (x)}; there is y ∈ X with A = f (y). If y ∈ f (y) then y ∈
/ f (y) and if y ∈
/ f (y)
then y ∈ f (y), a contradiction. Thus, f cannot be any bijection. 

We meet here the celebrated diagonal argument, an echo of the ancient Liar
paradox, repeated after Cantor in many proofs and constructions including the Gödel
incompleteness theorem and the Tarski theorem on non-definability of truth.
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated 7

The set X embeds into the set 2 X by the injection x → {x}, hence cardinality
of X is smaller than cardinality of 2 X . Clearly, |X | = |X |, |X | = |Y | ∧ |Y | = |Z | ⊃
|X | = |Z |; what about condition (iii) of Definition 1.10? It turns out that it also holds.

Theorem 1.6 (Cantor-Bernstein)

If |X | ≤ |Y | and |Y | ≤ |X |, then |X | = |Y |.

X
Proof We  the power set 2 is completely ordered by inclusion
 exploit the fact that
⊆ with as the join and as the meet. By assumptions, there exist an injection
f : X → Y and an injection g : Y → X . We define a function h : 2 X → 2 X by the
formula
h(A) = g[Y \ f (X \ A)]

Then h is order-preserving: if A ⊆ B then (X \ B) ⊆ (X \ A), hence,

f (X \ B) ⊆ f (X \ A),

thus
[Y \ f (X \ A)] ⊆ [Y \ f (X \ B)]

and
g(Y \ f (X \ A)) ⊆ g(Y \ f (X \ B)),

i.e.,
h(A) ⊆ h(B).
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, h(C) = C for some C ⊆ A. Then,

Y \ g −1 (C) = f (X \ C)

and we can define the function k : X → Y as follows: k(x) = f (x) if x ∈ X \ C and

k(x) = g −1 (x) if x ∈ C.
Clearly, k is a bijection of X onto Y , so |X | = |Y |. 
Definition 1.19 (Countability) A set is countable if it embeds into the set N of natural
numbers.

Theorem 1.7 If for each n ∈N, the set X n is countable, then the union n X n is
countable.

Proof Consider a set X = {X n : n ∈N} such that each X n = {xn,k : k ∈N}. First,
we change the set X n into the set X n × {n} for each n. Clearly, |X n | = |X n × {n}|.
Thus, each set X n × {n} is countable and now all sets X n × {n} 
are pairwise disjoint.
Therefore, we my assume that no two sets in the union X  = {X n × {n} : n ∈N}
have the same pair of indices. By axiom of choice, we can select for each n ∈ N
8 1 Introduction: Prerequisites


an injection gn : X n × {n} →N. The function g : n∈NX n × {n} →N defined as
g(xn,k ) = gn (xn,k ) for n ∈N is an injection of the union X  into N. 

To be more specific, we prove

Theorem 1.8 The Cartesian product N × N is equipollent with N.
x!
Proof We denote by bn(x, y) the binomial coefficient y!·(x−y)! . We claim that
the function f : N × N → N defined as f (x, y) = bn(x + y + 1, 2) + x = 21 [(x +
y)2 + 3x + y] is a bijection from N × N onto N.
Suppose that f (x, y) = f (u, w). Then x = u: was x > u, it would be x = u + q
and we would have bn(u + q + y + 1, 2) + q = bn(u + w + 1, 2), hence, w > y +
q, i.e., w = y + q + t.
Then,
bn(u + q + y + 1, 2) + q = bn(u + y + q + t + 1, 2)

and letting d = u + q + y + 1 we have

bn(d, 2) + q = bn(d + t, 2).

But q < d, hence,

bn(d, 2) + q < bn(d, 2) + d = bn(d + 1, 2),

a contradiction. Hence, it cannot be x > u; by symmetry, it cannot be u > x, hence,

u = x. Similarly, y = w and f is injective.
It remains to prove that f is total. We have f (0, 0) = 0, f (0, 1) = 1. If f (x, y) =
n and y > 0 then

f (x + 1, y − 1) = bn(x + 1 + y − 1 + 1, 2) + (x + 1) =

bn(x + y + 1, 2) + (x + 1) = f (x, y) + 1 = n + 1.

If y = 0, then x > 0 by case considered, then n = bn(x + 1, 2) + x, and,

n + 1 = bn(x + 1, 2) + x + 1 = bn((x − 1) + 1 + 1, 2) + (x + 1) = f (x − 1, 1)

This proves that f is total and finally a bijection. 

A combinatorial sequel is applied in complexity theory. Let us represent the prod-

uct N×N as N1 ×N2 , and let pr1 :N1 ×N2 → N1 and pr2 :N1 ×N2 → N2 be projections
onto N1 , N2 , respectively, given by pr1 (x, y) = x and pr2 (x, y) = y.
As f (x, y) is a bijection, there exists the inverse bijective function f −1 : N→
N1 × N2 . Composing f −1 with pr1 and pr2 we obtain functions K (n), L(n) such
that f (K (n), L(n)) = n.
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated 9

To get K (n) and L(n) explicite, let us represent f (x, y) as

(x + y + 1)(x + y) (x + y)2 + 3x + y
+x = = z.
2 2

Then 8z + 1 = (2x + 2y + 1)2 + 8x. From this we get

(2x + 2y + 1)2 ≤ 8z + 1 < (2x + 2y + 3)2 ,

hence,
1
(2x + 2y + 1) ≤ (8z + 1) 2 < 2x + 2y + 3

It follows that 1
(8z + 1) 2  + 1
  = x + y + 1,
2
finally,
1
(8z + 1) 2  + 1
(x + y) =   − 1 = P(z)
2
and 1
(8z + 1) 2  + 1
3x + y = 2z − [  − 1]2 = Q(z).
2
Solving this system of linear equations, we obtain explicit expressions for K (z) =
x and L(z) = y as

1 3 1
K (z) = · (Q(z) − P(z); L(z) = · P(z) − · Q(z).
2 2 2

Corollary 1.1 For each natural number k, the set Nk is equipollent with N.

Proof It follows by Theorem 1.8 and induction on k. 

A set X is uncountable if it is not equipollent with any subset of N. An example

is the set 2N . Iteration of the operation of the power set yields an infinite sequence
N
of larger and larger cardinalities of sets N, 2N , 22 , ....
Definition 1.20 (Algebra of cardinal numbers) A cardinal number is a symbol
assigned to a set X denoted |X |; sets of the same cardinality are assigned the same
cardinal number. We denote cardinal numbers with letters m, n, ... as natural num-
bers are cardinal numbers of finite sets and we extend this notation over all cardinal
numbers. We consider disjoint sets X of cardinality m and Y of cardinality n. Then
we define the algebraic operations on cardinal numbers m, n as follows:
10 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

(i) the sum m + n is the cardinal number of the union X ∪ Y ;

(ii) the product m · n is the cardinal number of the Cartesian product X × Y ;
(iii) the power of m to the exponent n, denoted m n , is the cardinal number of the set
X Y of all functions from the set Y to the set X .
Algebra of cardinal numbers has same properties as algebra of natural numbers:
(i) m + n = n + m, m · n = n · m;
(ii) m · (n 1 + n 2 ) = m · n 1 + m · n 2 ;
(iii) (m n )k = m n·k ; (m · n)k = m k · n k ;
(iv) m n+k = m n · m k ;
(v) m · 1 = m, where 1 is the cardinal number of the singleton set {∅}.
The cardinal number 2ω , i.e., the cardinality of the set 2N is called the cardinality of
continuum. As each real number can be represented as an infinite sequence over the
set {0, 1}, the cardinality of the set of real numbers is 2ω , the cardinality of continuum.

Definition 1.21 (Order types) In addition to cardinality, linearly ordered sets can
be compared with respect to their orderings; if there exists an isotone function f :
X → Y , then the order type of X is not greater than the order type of Y ; in case f
is an isotone bijection, we call it an isomorphism and then order type of X is equal
to the order type of Y . We recall that a linearly ordered set X is well-ordered when
each non-empty subset of X has the least element.
Theorem 1.9 Consider well-ordered structures (X, ≺) and (Y, <) with strict linear
orderings ≺ and <. Then
(i) if f : X → X is isotone, then x ≺ f (x) or x = f (x) for each x;
(ii) if f : X → Y is isotone, then either f establishes an isomorphism between X
and Y or X is isomorphic to a set S(y) = {z ∈ Y : z < y} for some y ∈ Y (S(y)
is called the initial segment of y);
(iii) no well-ordered set X can be isomorphic to its initial segment.
Proof For (i): the symbol  will denote the weak relation ≺ ∪ =. Consider the set
A = {x ∈ X : x  f (x)}. The set A is non-empty as 0 ∈ A. Suppose that A = X
and let y be the first element in X \ A. As for x ∈ A we have x ≺ y, we have x 
f (x) ≺ f (y). It follows that y  f (y), a contradiction which proves (i). Property
(iii) follows: was X isomorphic to a segment S(x), we would have f (x) ≺ x, contrary
to (i). For(ii): as x ≺ y implies f (x) < f (y), f is an embedding of X into Y , hence,
f (X ) is a well-ordered subset of Y . Then either f (X ) = Y or f (X ) is an initial
segment of Y . 
Corollary 1.2 For two well-ordered sets X, Y either X and Y are isomorphic or X
isomorphic to an initial segment of Y , or, Y is isomorphic to an initial segment of X .
Theorem 1.10 (Transfinite induction) Suppose the structure (X, ≺) is well-ordered
and the subset A of X has properties (i) 0 ∈ A (ii) for each x ∈ X , if S(x) ⊆ A, then
x ∈ A. Then, A = X .
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated 11

Proof Suppose that A = X and x ∈ X is the least element not in A so S(x) ⊆ A.

By (ii), x ∈ A, a contradiction, hence, A = X . 

Definition 1.22 (Ordinal numbers) An order type of a well-ordered set is called an

ordinal number.

Definition 1.23 (Algebra of ordinal numbers) Suppose α, β are ordinal numbers,

order types of well-ordered sets X by < X and Y by <Y . We can make those sets
disjoint : X ← X × {0}, Y ← Y × {1}, without changing their order types. On the
union X ∪ Y we introduce an ordering ≺ by letting

x ≺ y ≡ (x < X y ∧ x, y ∈ X ) ∨ (x <Y y ∧ x, y ∈ Y ) ∨ (x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ Y ),

i.e., each element of X precedes each element of Y and orderings < X and <Y are
preserved on X and Y , respectively.

Then, we let α + β to be the order type of (X ∪ Y, ≺).

The product α · β is defined as follows. Consider the Cartesian product X × Y
with the ordering :

(< x1 , y1 >< x2 , y2 >) ≡ ((y1 = y2 ∧ x1 < X x2 ) ∨ (y1 <Y y2 )).

This is the anti-lexicographic ordering which is ordering X × Y into the ordinal type
of α · β. On the other hand, the product β · α is the type of the Cartesian product
X × Y with the lexicographic ordering:

(< x1 , y1 >< x2 , y2 >) ≡ ((x1 < X x2 ) ∨ (x1 = x2 ∧ y1 <Y y2 )).

It follows that operations +, · on ordinal numbers are not symmetric.

By Corollary 1.2, each set of ordinal numbers is well-ordered. For ordinal numbers
α, β, α < β if a set of ordinal type α is a segment of a set of ordinal type β. For an
ordinal α, we denote by the symbol L(α) the set of ordinal numbers smaller than α.
A transfinite sequence of type γ is an assignment of an element of some set to each
ordinal number less than γ .

Definition 1.24 (Definitions by transfinite induction) For a set X and an ordinal

number α, we consider the set O of all transfinite sequences of elements of X of length
less or equal to α and let F : O → X . We define a function f (β) = F( f (L(β)))
for β ≤ α. The corresponding theorem follows.

Theorem 1.11 The function f (β) = F( f (L(β))) is well and uniquely defined.

Proof That f is unique follows by transfinite induction. 

A consequence of Definition 1.24 is the Zermelo theorem Zermelo [2] on

well-ordering.
12 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Theorem 1.12 (Well-ordering) For each set X there exists a relation well-ordering
X.

Proof The proof relies essentially on the Axiom of Choice (A8): let f be the selector
for the family 2 X \ {∅}; let f be extended by letting f (∅) = q for some q ∈ / X.
Consider the set Γ of all ordinal numbers with the property: γ ∈ Γ if and only if
there exists a subset of X well-ordered into type γ .
Let α be the least ordinal number greater than any number in Γ . Define the transfi-
nite sequence <φ(ξ ) : ξ < α> of type α by letting φ(ξ ) = f (X \ {φ(η) : η < ξ }).
Was φ(ξ ) = q for each ξ < α, we would obtain a well-ordered subset of X of ordinal
type α, contrary to the choice of α. Hence, for some β < α, we have φ(β) = q, which
implies that {φ(ξ ) : ξ < β} well-orders X into
type β. 

We return for a while to partially ordered sets. For a set X partially ordered by the
ordering ≤, we call a chain any linearly ordered subset. Set X is upward-bounded if
each chain in X has the least upper bound. An element x is maximal when there is
no element greater than it. We have in this context the Zorn maximal principle due
to Zorn [3] and anticipated by Kuratowski [4] and Hausdorff [5].
Theorem 1.13 (The maximal principle) In each partially ordered upward-bounded
set X there exists a maximal element.

Proof Consider a set X with properties as in assumptions. Let f be a selector for the
family 2 X \ {∅} extended by f (∅) = q ∈ / X . Let the ordinal number α be the same
as in proof of Theorem 1.12.
Define the transfinite sequence <φ(ξ ) : ξ < α> by letting φ(ξ ) = f ({x ∈ X :
x > l.u.b.{φ(η) : η < ξ }}). As in proof of Theorem 1.12, there exists the least β < α
with φ(β) = q which witnesses that there is no x greater than l.u.b.{φ(ξ ) : ξ < β}
therefore l.u.b.{φ(ξ ) : ξ < β} is a maximal element in X . 

The statement of Theorem 1.13 is usually called the Zorn lemma. There is a
number of statements asserting the existence of some extremal element. We state
here two of them: (i) The Teichmüller-Tukey lemma cf. Tukey [6], Kelley [7] and (ii)
the Kuratowski-Hausdorff lemma.
Theorem 1.14 (i) A property P of sets if of finite character if a set satisfies P if and
only if each finite subset of it satisfies P. If a family of sets F is of finite character, then
in F there exists a maximal set with respect to inclusion (ii) In a partially ordered
set, each linearly ordered subset is contained in a maximal linearly ordered subset.

Proof For (i): By assumptions, each chain L of sets in F ordered by inclusion has
the least upper bound which is the union L in F, so by the Zorn lemma in F there
exists a maximal element. For (ii), proof goes on similar lines. 
1.1 Set Theory Recapitulated 13

1.1.3 Graph Structures

Definition 1.25 (Graphs) An undirected graph (a graph for short), is a structure

G = (V, E) with the set V of vertices and the vocabulary {E}, and E is a relation
symbol interpreted in the set V as the edge relation e; each pair {u, v} ∈ e is called
the edge between u and v. A path in G is a sequence of vertices v0 , v1 , ..., vn such
that {vi , vi+1 } ∈ e for i = 0, 1, .., n − 1. A cycle in G is a path for which v0 = vn .
A graph G is acyclic when it contains no cycle. A graph G is connected when any
two vertices are end vertices of a path. A vertex s is reachable form a vertex t when
{t, s} ∈ e, which we denote as REACH(s,t).

Definition 1.26 (Trees) A tree T is an undirected graph which is connected and

acyclic. A rooted tree is a tree in which we single out a vertex called the root.
Buildup of the tree T begins with the root to which vertices of the
level 1 = {v ∈ V : {r oot, v} ∈ e}
are adjoined; then we form
level 2 = {v ∈ V : exists u in level 1 such that {u, v} ∈ e}
and we continue this process until there is no vertex to be adjoined to the tree or the
tree is infinite. When the tree is finite, then each branch, i.e., linearly ordered by e
subset ends with a leaf, i.e., the vertex which has no child.

One of most important results is the König theorem König [8].

Theorem 1.15 (The König theorem) Suppose that a tree T has each level finite and
for each natural number n there exists a vertex with the path to the root of length n.
Then T contains a branch of infinite length.

Proof Call a vertex v ∈ V promising if the subtree with the root v contains branches
of any finite length. Then produce a path
r oot, v1 ∈ level 1, v2 ∈ level 2, ...,
vk ∈ level k, ....
consisting of promising vertices which is possible due to finiteness of levels. This
path is an infinite branch in T . 

Ramsey’s theorems on graphs Ramsey [9] belong also in a standard repertoire of

tools.
Theorem 1.16 Given a set of natural numbers n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k there exists a number
R(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) with the property that if a complete graph G = (V, E) with |V | =
R(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) has its edges painted with k distinct colors then for some j ≤ k it
contains a clique on n j vertices with all edges painted with the color j.

Proof First, one shows that

R(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , R(n k−1 , n k )) ≤ R(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k−1 , n k ).

14 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Consider a complete graph G on R(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , R(n k−1 , n k )) vertices. Find a new

name of color for the mixture of colors (k − 1) and k and operate with (k − 1) colors.
By inductive assumption, there either exists a clique on n i nodes painted with the
i − th color for i < k − 1 in which case we are done or there is a clique on n k−1 + n k
vertices painted with mixture of colors k − 1 and k. In the latter case, supposing we
have already proved the theorem in the case of two colors, we either have a clique
on n k−1 vertices painted with the color k − 1 or the clique on n k colors painted with
the color k.
It remains to prove the case of two colors. In this case, we denote two numbers
by k, l and we notice that R(k, 2) = R(2, k) = k. Then we induct on k + l and
we check that R(k, l) ≤ R(k, l − 1) + R(k − 1, l). Consider a complete graph on
R(k, l − 1) + R(k − 1, l) vertices painted with colors 1 and 2 and select a vertex u.
Partition the remaining vertices into two sets: enlist a vertex v into the set A if the
edge {u, v} is painted color 1, else enlist v into the set B. As |A| + |B| + 1= R(k, l −
1) + R(k − 1, l), either |A| ≥ R(k − 1, l) or |B| ≥ R(k, l − 1). In the former case,
if l vertices in A are painted with color 2 the case is proved, else A is painted on
k − 1 edges with color 1 and adding the edge from u painted color 1, we obtain
a clique on k vertices painted color 1. The case with the set B goes along similar
lines. 

Theorem 1.16 has two particular variants. A complement to a graph G = (V, E) is

the graph G  = (V, [V ]2 \ E), where [V ]2 denotes the set of all pairs of distinct ver-
tices in V . A clique Q in a graph G = (V, E) is a sub-graph G  = (V  , (V prime )[2] ),
where (V prime )[2] is the set of all two-element subsets of V  ; in plain words, a clique
is a complete sub-graph of a graph.
Theorem 1.17 For each n ∈ N there exists m ∈ N such that if the set of vertices V
has cardinality m, then for each subgraph G of the complete graph [V ]2 , there exists
a clique C of cardinality n with the property that either C ⊆ G or C ⊆ G  .
The infinite variant of the Ramsey theorem is

Theorem 1.18 Consider an infinite set of vertices V . Then for each graph G on V ,
either G or G  contains an infinite clique.

Directed graphs
Directed acyclic graphs (dags) allow topological sorting which means a linearization
of the graph by means of a linear order on the set of vertices. We denote edges of a
directed graph by symbols <u, v>. It is important to know that by definition, directed
graphs allow for loops, i.e, edges of the form <v, v> for any vertex v.
Dag G = (V, E) is topologically sorted when its vertices can be linearly ordered
in an ordering  such that u  v if and only if <u, v> ∈ E.
Theorem 1.19 In each finite dag G = (V, E), there exist a vertex u without any
incoming edge.
1.2 Rewriting Systems 15

Proof Suppose to the contrary that each vertex v is the end vertex of an edge; choose
a vertex v0 and let <v1 , v0 > be an edge. As the graph is acyclic, v0 = v1 ; in turn, v1
is the end vertex of some edge <v2 , v1 > and as the graph is acyclic, v2 ∈ / {v0 , v1 }.
Continuing, we define an infinite sequence of pairwise distinct vertices {vi : i ∈ N }
such that <vi+1 , vi > is an edge for i ∈ N , a contradiction with finiteness of V . 

Theorem 1.20 Each finite dag G = (V, E) can be sorted topologically.

Proof Let u 0 be a vertex with no incoming edge. Remove u 0 and out-coming from
it edges from the graph to obtain the graph G 1 , put u 0 on the list L and continue with
the graph G 1 putting the obtained vertex u 1 on L after u 0 and repeat until all vertices
are on the list L. The list L contains topologically sorted vertices of the graph G. 

1.2 Rewriting Systems

In this section, we propose to review notions from generative grammars with an

emphasis on context-free grammars and regular expressions. Buildup of a rewriting
system begins with a set A of symbols called the alphabet. Finite sequences over A
are called words, their set denoted A∗ . The symbol ε will denote the empty word, and
the symbol A+ will denote the set A∗ \ {ε}. A language over A is a subset L ⊆ A∗ .
Definition 1.27 (Rewriting systems) A rewriting system is a pair (A, P), where A is
an alphabet and P is a finite set of ordered pairs of words over A. For a pair <u, v> ∈
P, called a production, we write more suggestively u ⇒ v, meaning ‘replace u with
v in a word containing an occurrence of u’. Productions act on words: if a word and
a production are in agreement, i.e., the word w is a sequence xuy and a production
p is u ⇒ v, then the word w is rewritten into the word w = xvy; we denote this
fact by the symbol w ⇒ w . Productions may be concatenated: by the symbol ⇒∗
we denote the transitive closure of ⇒: for words w, w , w ⇒∗ w  if and only if there
exists a sequence of words w1 , w2 , ..., wk such that (i) w ⇒ w1 (ii) wi ⇒ wi+1 for
i = 1, 2, .., k − 1 (iii) wk ⇒ w  .
We define some variants of a rewriting system: axiomatic rewriting systems, gen-
erative and recognizing systems.
Definition 1.28 An axiomatic rewriting system A =<A, Ax, P> consists of an
alphabet A, productions in the set P, and of a subset Ax ⊆ A∗ of axioms. In this
setting, A generates the language L A ={w ∈ A∗ : u ⇒∗ w for some u in Ax}. In the
reversed manner, A may serve as a recognizing device: the language recognized by
A is {w ∈ A∗ : w ⇒∗ u ∈ Ax}.
Rewriting systems appear also as generative grammars. To this end, the alphabet
A is presented as the disjoint union of two subsets N and T . The set N consists of
non-terminal symbols and the set T is the set of terminal symbols.
16 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.29 (Grammars) A grammar G = <N , T, a, P>, where N , T are sets

of non-terminal, respectively, terminal symbols, a is a non-terminal symbol, an
axiom, and P is a finite set of productions u ⇒ w, where u, w are words over
A and u contains a symbol from N . The language L(G) generated by the grammar
G consists of all words w ∈ T ∗ such that a ⇒∗ w.

Definition 1.30 (Operations on languages) Consider languages L , M over an alpha-

bet A. As L , M are sets, their union, intersection and difference are defined exactly
as in the case of sets, the complement to L is −L = A∗ \ L. L and M can be concate-
nated to form the language L M={uv : u ∈ L , v ∈ M}, where uv is the product of
concatenation of two strings: in uv, u is the prefix and v is the suffix. The operation of
concatenation is associative: (L M)K = L(M K ), the empty language ∅ is the zero:
L∅ = ∅ = ∅L, the unit is the language {ε}: L{ε} = L = {ε}L. The power L i of L
is defined by induction: L 0 = {ε}, L i+1 = L i L for i > 0. The saturation of L is the
union L = i≥0 L i , and the symbol L + denotes the set L ∗ \ {ε}.
∗

Depending on the form of productions, grammars are classified into a hierarchy

(the Chomsky hierarchy); we are interested in regular grammars due to their role in
logics presented in what follows.
Definition 1.31 (Regular grammars and languages) A grammar <N , T, a, P> is
regular if and only if productions in P are either of the form b ⇒ cw or of the
form b ⇒ w, where b, c ∈ N . A language L is regular if it is generated by a regular
grammar.
Regular grammars can be recognized by a physical mechanism called an automa-
ton.
Definition 1.32 (Automata) A finite automaton is the structure <Q, Q 0 , A, tr, F>,
where Q is the set of states, Q 0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, A is an alphabet, F is
a set of accepting states, and tr : Q × A → 2 Q is the transition function. Automata
are deterministic or non-deterministic; a finite deterministic automaton (FDA) has
exactly one initial state q0 and for each pair <q, a> there is at most one state q1
with tr (q, a) = q1 , i.e., tr : Q × A → Q. To the contrary, a finite non-deterministic
automaton (FNA) may have more than one initial state and the transition tr may
assign to each pair <q, a> a set of states, so tr ⊆ Q × A × Q is a relation.
The automaton accepts words over A by working step by step: for a word a0 a1 ...an ,
it begins in an initial state q0 ∈ Q 0 and reads the symbol a0 , then it moves to one
of states, say, q1 ∈ tr (q0 , a0 ) and it reads the symbol a1 and it continues in this way
until it reaches the symbol an in the state qn . If qn ∈ F, then the word is accepted.
When tr (q, a, q  ) holds, we write q ⇒a q  ; we denote by ⇒∗ the transitive closure
of the relation ⇒. Then, the formula q ⇒∗w q  means that computation which begins
at the state q on a word w arrives after some steps at the state q  .
It follows that automatons are able to accept languages and recognize them.
Definition 1.33 For an automaton FA, the language L(F A) = {w ∈ A∗ : q0 w ⇒∗
q ∈ F}. An automaton may work as well as recognizer, then it works in a sense, in
1.2 Rewriting Systems 17

reversed order: productions are now of the form v ⇒ u, initial states are q ∈ F and
to reach the state q0 a production ε ⇒ q0 is added. Then the language recognized is
{w : qw ⇒∗ q0 } for some q ∈ F.
We have made no clear distinction between FDA’s and NDA’s. The reason is that
both types accept the same languages.
Theorem 1.21 The following conditions are equivalent for a language L:
(i) L is accepted by an FDA; (ii) L is accepted by an NDA; (iii) L is regular.

Proof (after Salomaa [10], 1.4.1). (i) implies (ii) as each FDA is an NDA. For
the implication (ii)–(iii), we take a closer look at the language L(N D A) accepted
by an NDA. L(N D A) is the union of languages L(N D A, q, q  ) for q ∈ Q 0 , q  ∈
F. Transition rules of FNA have the form of productions of regular grammar, and
we introduce q0 by production ε ⇒ q0 , declaring q  as the initial symbol. Hence,
each L(N D A, q, q  ) is regular.The remaining part is to show that finite unions of
L(N D A, q, q  )’s are L(N D A). It is enough to show that the union L ∪ M of two
regular languages is regular, the rest is provided by induction.
Suppose that L is generated by the grammar

G(L) = <N (L), T (L), a(L), P(L)>

and M is generated by the grammar

G(M) = <N (M), T (M), a(M), P(M)>.

The fusion G(L) ∪ G(M) is defined as the grammar

< N (L) ∪ N (M)∪ {x}, T (L)∪ T (M), x, P(L)∪ P(M)∪ {x ⇒ a(L), x ⇒ a(M)} > .

The symbol x denotes a new initial symbol, not in alphabets of L or M.

Clearly, the fusion realizes productions of either grammar so it is regular and
generates either language. That (iii) implies (i) is more technical and we refer this
part to (Salomaa loc.cit.). 

Regular languages are characterized by regular expressions.

Definition 1.34 (Regular expressions) Regular expressions (RE’s) are defined recur-
sively, by letting (i) (∅) is RE (ii) (a) is RE for each a ∈ A (iii) if (u), (v) are RE’s,
then (u)∗ , (uv), (u ∪ v) are RE’s.
Regular expressions code languages.
Definition 1.35 We denote by L(α) the language defined by the RE α: L(∅) = ∅,
L(a) = {a}, L(u ∗ ) = (L(u))∗ , L(uv) = L(u)L(v), L(u ∪ v) = L(u) ∪ L(v).
It remains to tie each regular language to a characterizing regular expression.
18 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Theorem 1.22 A language L is regular if and only if it is defined by a regular

expression.
Proof We know already from Definition 1.34 that L(u ∪ v) is regular. We consider
languages L of type u generated by the grammar

G(L) =< N (L), T (L), a(L), P(L) >

and the language M of type v generated by the grammar

G(M) =< N (M), T (M), a(M), P(M) > .

In P(M) insert in place of each production of the form x ⇒ w, where x ∈ N (M)

and w ∈ T (M)∗ the production x ⇒ a(L)w.
Let the set of the new productions be P ∗ . The grammar

G =< N (L) ∪ N (M), T (L) ∪ T (M), a(M), P ∪ P ∗ >

generates the language L M. In order to obtain a grammar which would generate the
language of type (v ∗ ), form the set of productions P + by replacing each production
x ⇒ w, where x ∈ N (M) and w ∈ T (M)∗ by the production x ⇒ a(M)w. Let x ∗
be a symbol neither in the alphabet of L nor in the alphabet of M and form the
grammar

G ∗ =< N (M) ∪ {x ∗ }, T (M), x ∗ , {x ∗ ⇒ ε, x ∗ ⇒ a(M)} ∪ P(M) ∪ P ∗ >

which generates the language M ∗ . If a language L is defined by a regular expression

over the alphabet A = {a1, a2, ..., ak} , then L is a result of a finite number of
applications of regular operations of (u ∪ v), (uv), (u ∗ ) on elementary languages
{∅}, {a1}, {a2}, ..., {ak}, hence, L is regular.
Assume now that L is regular. By 1.2(i), L is accepted by an FDA; assume that
final states of FDA are q1 , q2 , ..., qk and the initial state is q0 . Accepted words are
obtained on a path from q0 to some q j for j ≤ k. Consider case of some s j . On a path
to q j we have a concatenation ai11 ...ai1m = w1 followed by a periodic state of order
n, say, so we may have a word w2∗ then again a word w3 ... and so on up to a finite
number of such words. This path determines a regular expression for this particular
language, and the language L is a finite union of those languages hence it is defined
by a regular expression. 

Definition 1.36 (Infinite words) For an alphabet A, an infinite word, called also an
ω-word, over A is an infinite sequence of symbols in A; the set of all ω-words is
denoted Aω . We can concatenate finite words with infinite ones: if u ∈ A∗ and v ∈ Aω
then uv ∈ Aω .

Processing infinite words requires a new type of automata with modified accep-
tance conditions: Büchi automata Büchi [11].
1.2 Rewriting Systems 19

Definition 1.37 (Büchi automata) A deterministic Büchi automaton DBA is a tuple

<A, Q, q0 , tr, F>, where as in case of DFA, Q, q0 , A, F, tr are, respectively, the
set of states, the initial state, the alphabet, the set of accepting states, the transition
function tr : Q × A → Q. The non-deterministic variant NBA differs in that tr is
a transition relation tr ⊆ Q × A × 2 Q , i.e., for each pair (q, a) there exists a set
{q  : tr (q, a, q  )} and there is defined a set of initial states I , so the signature of NBA
is <A, Q, I, tr, F>.
In case of Büchi automata, executions are called runs, which are infinite sequences
q0 ⇒a0 q1 ⇒a1 . . . with q0 ∈ I and qi+1 ∈ tr (qi , ai ) in case of NBA, and, qi+1 =
tr (qi , ai ) in case of DBA, for each i ≥ 0; the ω-word a0 a1 . . . ai . . . is called the
label of the run.
Definition 1.38 (The Büchi acceptance) For a run σ , the set in f (σ ) is the set {q :
q occurs infinitely often in σ }. The run σ is accepted by a Büchi automaton if and
only if the set F ∩ in f (σ ) is infinite. Equivalently, there exists an accepting state q ∗
which occurs infinitely many times in σ .
The language L(B) accepted by the Büchi automaton is the set of accepted runs
which are then called ω-words in the language L(B) of the automaton B.
Definition 1.39 (ω-regular expressions and sets) We add to regular expressions
from the finite case: (∅), (a), (u ∪ v), (uv), (u)∗ the expression (u)ω . We call these
expressions ω-regular.
For an alphabet A, we consider the set A∗,ω = A∗ ∪ Aω . A set C ⊆ A∗,ω is ω-
regular if and only if
(i) C = ∅ or C = {a} for some a ∈ A, or
(ii) C = X ∪ Y for some ω-regular sets (hence any finite union of ω-regular sets is
ω-regular, or
(iii) C = X Y for some ω-regular X ⊆ A∗ and some ω-regular Y ⊆ A∗,ω , or
(iv) C = X ∗ or C = X ω for some ω-regular X ⊆ A∗ .
We denote by the symbol R E G(ω) the smallest family of sets satisfying (i)-(iv);
therefore, R E G(ω) is closed on empty set, elements of the alphabet A, finite unions,
concatenations and finite and infinite powers of its elements, i.e., it contains sets X ∗
and X ω for each of its elements X .
In search of analogies between finite and infinite expressions, we consider the
analogy to Theorem 1.22. It turns out that the analogy holds true.
ω
Theorem 1.23 A set k if it is ωdenoted by an ω-
k X ⊆∗ A ωis in R E G(ω) if and only
regular expression i=1 (u )(v ) for some k, i.e., X = i=1 X i Yi for some regular
subsets X i , Yi of A∗ .

Proof Clearly, each set of the given form is ω-regular. Conversely, one checks
directly that sets of this form constitute the class satisfying Definition 1.39(i)–(iv),
hence, they are contained in the class R E G(ω). 
20 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Table 1.1 Automaton B

States: q0 q1 q2
a q1 ∅ ∅
b ∅ q2 q2

Fig. 1.1 Automaton for concatenation

Example 1.1 In Table 1.1, we give an example of a deterministic Büchi automaton

DBA. The final state is in boldface and the initial state is denoted s0 .
Language L(DBA) is (a)(bω ).
The relation between Büchi automata and ω-regular languages is expressed by
the counterpart to Theorem 1.21 for the infinite case.

Theorem 1.24 A language L ⊆ Aω is ω-regular if and only if it is of the form L(B)

for some finite Büchi automaton B.

Proof If a language L is ω-regular, then by Theorem 1.23 it is of the form

 k ∗ ω
i=1 (u )(v ) and it is sufficient to recall the automata for recognition of regular
languages u ∗ v ω and of finite unions of regular languages. The automaton for the
concatenation u ∗ v ω is sketched in Fig. 1.1. For the union u ∪ v, if u is recog-
nized by the Büchi automaton <A, Q, q0 , tr, F> and v is recognized by the Büchi
automaton <A, Q  , q0 , tr  , F  >, where we may assume that Q ∩ Q  = ∅, then u ∪ v
is recognized by the Büchi automaton

< A, Q ∪ Q  , q0 , q0 , tr ∪ tr  , F ∪ F  > .

Conversely, if L = L(B) for some automaton B, then for each initial state q1 and each
accepting state q2 , the fragment of L containing paths beginning at q1 and ending at
q2 can be written as L(q1 , q2 ) =L ∗ (q1 , q2 )(L(q2 , q2 )ω , i.e., as a regular expression
and the language L is the union {L(q1 , q2 ) : (q1 , q2 ) ∈ I × F}. 

Contrary to the finite case (Theorem 1.21), there are languages accepted by non-
deterministic Büchi automata but not accepted by any deterministic Büchi automaton.
1.3 Computability 21

Table 1.2 Automaton NB

States: q0 q1
a q0 ∅
b {q0 , q1 } q1

An example is given in Landweber [12] of the language L = ({a} ∪ {b})∗ (bω ) which
is accepted by the automaton NBA in Table 1.2 but not by any deterministic automaton
DBA.
Proof that no deterministic Büchi automaton accepts the language L can be
sketched as follows: let tr ∗ be transitive closure of tr . We denote by b∗ a finite
string of symbols b, irrespective of its length, this will simplify notation.
As bω ∈ L, b∗ reaches an accepting state s1 ∈ F; we define for each k a sequence
σk : b∗ ab∗ a . . . ab∗ with k symbols a such that tr ∗ (s0 , b∗ ab∗ a . . . ab∗ ) = sk ∈ F. As
F is finite, there exist s∗ ∈ F which accepts infinitely many strings σk , hence, the
language L should contain words with infinitely many occurrences of a, a contra-
diction.

1.3 Computability

Rewriting systems are computing devices, they perform a series of operations on

words in order to verify whether a given word belongs in a language accepted by the
system. On the other hand many computing devices fall into the realm of rewriting
systems. A visual model of computation is Turing machine (TM) Turing [13] and we
first offer its description and properties along with description of objects computable
by it and demonstrations of some undecidable problems.
Definition 1.40 (One-tape Turing machines) A Turing machine consists of a sym-
bolic part and of mechanical part. The symbolic part has signature <A, Q, q0 , L ,
R, N >, where A is a finite alphabet, Q is a finite set of states, q0 is the initial
state, L , R are symbols denoting some actions of the mechanical part. Among states,
the halting state q(halt) and the accepting state q(accept) can be singled out. The
mechanical part consists of a tape divided into cells (or, squares). The tape may
extend to the left and to the right indefinitely; in some versions, the markers are used
to mark the left and the right ends of the tape and the markers can be shifted left or
right when more space is needed.
We assume that the tape is simply infinite in both directions. In addition to the tape,
TM is equipped with a readingwriting head which can scan the cell just below it,
erase the symbol written in the cell, write a new symbol in the cell, or leave the cell
intact, after selecting the option, the head can move left (L), right (R), or stay on the
current cell (which is marked by the lack of either R or L in the instruction).
22 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.41 (Actions of the one tape Turing machine) TM operates on words,
rewriting of words is steered by instructions. Instructions are in the form uv, where
u and v are words built from symbols of states, symbols of alphabet A, symbols
L , R. Antecedents of instructions are in the form of words qa, meaning that TM is
currently at the state q and it is scanning the cell in which the symbol a is written, and
consequents denote actions of TM which are of few kinds: TM can erase the symbol
a, it can write a new symbol into the cell, move left or right or make no move. A
sequence of actions constitutes a computation, TM reaches the result of computation
if it halts after a finite number of actions, otherwise it produces no result.
TM can decide the language computed, i.e., output YES if the final string is in
the language and NO otherwise; TM can also accept the string into language. In the
first case the language is recursive, in the second case it is recursively enumerable.
Definition 1.42 (Instructions of TM) We assume that the alphabet A consists of
symbols a0 , a1 , ..., ak ; we denote a0 by the symbol B standing for blank, i.e., the
empty cell, a1 will denote 1. Instructions for TM are of the form:
(1) qi a j ak qn ;
(2) qi a j Rqn ;
(3) qi a j Lqn
Each instruction when performed alters the content of the tape. The content of the
tape is the word written currently on the tape. It is called formally an instantaneous
description, denoted by the symbol ID. For two ID’s, ID1 and ID2, the symbol ID1
ID2 denotes that the instantaneous description ID1 has changed into ID2 as the result
of an applied instruction.
Definition 1.43 (Instantaneous descriptions vs. instructions) A general form of an
ID is Pqi a j Q, where qi is the current state of TM, a j is the alphabet symbol currently
scanned, P is a word to the left of a j , Q is the word to the right of a j . Below, we list
all cases of  brought forth by instructions (1)–(3).
(4) if I D1 is Pqi a j Q and an instruction is qi a j ak qn , then I D1  I D2 : Pqn ak Q;
(5) if I D1 is Pqi a j ak Q and an instruction is qi a j Rqn , then I D1  I D2 : Pa j qn ak Q;
(6) if I D1 is Pqi a j and an instruction is qi a j Rqn , then I D1  I D2 : Pa j qn B;
(7) if I D1 is Pak qi a j Q and an instruction is qi a j Lqn , then I D1  I D2 : Pqn ak a j Q;
(8) if I D1 is qi a j Q and an instruction is qi a j Lqn , then I D1  I D2 : qn Ba j Q
An ID is terminal if there is no I D1 such that I D  I D1 .
A sequence of instantaneous descriptions related by  is a computation.
Definition 1.44 (Computations by TM) A computation by TM is a finite sequence
I D1 , I D2 , . . . , I Dm such that I Di  I Di+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1 and I Dm is
terminal. For the purpose of computations, the symbol a1 is 1, and the natural
number n is coded as the sequence of n + 1 symbols 1: n = 11...1 (n+1 repeti-
tions, for short 1n+1 ). A sequence n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k of natural numbers is written down
as 1n 1 +1 B1n 2 +1 B . . . B1n k +1 . This long sequence can be replaced with a shortcut
<n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k >.
1.3 Computability 23

An output of TM is presented as the number |I Dm | of 1’s in the final tape expres-

sion I Dm , i.e., in the word left on the tape at the conclusion of computation. A
computation begins with I D1 = q0 1n 1 +1 B1n 2 +1 B . . . B1n k +1 and it ends with I Dm
so the result is |I Dm |. A function computed by TM is denoted f T(k)M ; it is total when
it has the value computed for each input, otherwise it is partial.
As an example we show the computation of the function idT(1)M , where idT(1)M (k) =
k. The initial I D1 is q0 1k+1 and the instruction is q0 1Bq0 . Under this instruction I D1
changes into I D2 =q0 B1k which is terminal and |I D2 | = k.
It is known that a TM can accept any language generated by a generative grammar
(grammar of type 0 in the Chomsky hierarchy Salomaa [10]).
Definition 1.45 (Computable functions) A k-ary function f is computable if and
only if there exist a Turing machine TM and a function f T(k)M such that f = f T(k)M
and the function f T(k)M is total; if f T(k)M is not total and f = f T(k)M , then f is partially
computable.
For a set X , its characteristic function χ X is defined as χ X (x) = 0 if x ∈ X ,
otherwise χ X (x) = 1.
Definition 1.46 (Computable sets) A set X is computable, if and only if its charac-
teristic function χ X is computable. This definition covers relations as well.
One shows, see Davis [14], that the family of computable functions is closed on
compositions.
We denote by the shortcut x n the sequence <x1 , x2 , ..., xn >.
Definition 1.47 (Minimization) To a total function f (y, x n ), minimization assigns
the function g(x n ) = argmin y [ f (y, x n ) = 0] in case the set {y : f (y, x n ) = 0} is
non-empty, otherwise the function g is undefined. The notation for g is
min y [ f (y, x n ) = 0].
One shows that if the function f is computable, then the function g is partially
computable. The function f is called regular if the function g is total.
Theorem 1.25 Among computable functions are: f T(2)M (x, y) = x + y,
f T(2)M (x, y) = x −∗ y which is x − y in case x ≥ y, and 0 otherwise, f T(1)M (x) = x + 1
(the successor function, denoted usually S(x)), f T(n) M (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) = x i for some
(2)
i ≤ n (usually denoted U (n, i)), f T M (x, y) = x y.
Proof of computability consists in constructing appropriate Turing machines.
Their description is lengthy even for simple functions, hence, we refer the reader
to Davis [14].
Definition 1.48 (Partially recursive functions) A function f is (partially) recursive
if it can be obtained from the set of functions {S(x), U (n, i), x + y, x −∗ y, x y} by
finitely many applications of operations of minimization and composition. A function
is recursive if all functions in this process are regular.
24 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

It follows from Theorem 1.25 that each (partial) recursive function is (partially)
computable. As the converse statement holds true, recursiveness is equivalent to
computability.
Theorem 1.26 The following functions are recursive, hence, computable:
(i) Z (x) ≡ 0;
(ii) A(x) = 1 −∗ x;
(iii) x 2;
1
(iv) x 2 ;
(v) |x − y|;
(vi)  xy  if y = 0 else 0;
(vii) x −∗ y ·  xy  (the remainder of x divided by y);
(viii) f (x, y) = 21 [(x + y)2 + 3x + y] of Theorem 1.8;
(ix) functions K (z) = x, L(z) = y such that f (K (z), L(z)) = z of Theorem 1.8.

Proof For: (i) Z (x) = U (1, 1)(x) −∗ U (1, 1)(x).

(ii) A(x) = S(Z (x)) −∗ U (1, 1)(x).
(iii) x 2 = U (1, 1)(x)U (1, 1)(x).
1
(iv) x 2  = min y [A((S(U (2, 2)(x, y)))2 − U (2, 1)(x, y)) = 0].
(v) |x − y| = (x −∗ y) + (y −∗ x).
(vi)  xy  = min z [y A(y(z + 1) −∗ x) = 0].
(vii) it is already defined.
(viii), (ix) the claim follows as functions P(z) and Q(z) defined in proof of Theo-
rem 1.8 are recursive and equations established there: x + y = P(z) and
3x + y = Q(z) yield x = K (z) = 21 (Q(z) −∗ P(z), y = L(z) = P(z)−∗
( 21 (Q(z) −∗ P(z)). 

Definition 1.49 (Definitions by primitive recursion) For total functions f (x n ) and

g(y n+2 ), the function h(x n+1 ) is defined in two steps as h(0, x n ) = f (x n ), h(z +
1, x n ) = g(z, h(z, x n ), x n ).

Theorem 1.27 If functions f, g in Definition 1.49 are recursive, then the function h
is recursive, too.

For a proof, please consult Davis [14].

Definition 1.50 (Primitive recursive functions) A function f is primitive recursive if
it can be obtained by finitely many operations of composition and primitive recursion
from functions S(x) = x + 1, Z (x) ≡ 0, U (i, n)(xn ).
Clearly, each primitive recursive function is recursive.
Among primitive recursive functions, we find familiar ones.
Theorem 1.28 Functions x + y, x y, x y , x!, A(x), |x − y| are primitive recursive.
1.3 Computability 25

Proof For: (i) x + y: x + 0 = U (1, 1)(x), x + (y + 1) = S(x + y);

(ii) x y: x0 = Z (x), x(y + 1) = x y + U (2, 1)(x, y);
(iii) x y : x 0 = S(Z (x)), x y+1 = x y U (2, 1)(x, y);
(iv) x!: 0! = S(Z (x)), (x + 1)! = x!S(x);
(v) A(x), one lets A(x) = S(Z (x)) −∗ U (1, 1)(x);
(vi) finally, |x − y| = (x −∗ y) + (y −∗ x). 

Theorem 1.29 The class of primitive recursive functions is closed on bounded sums
and bounded  products: for a primitive recursive
 function f (y, x n ), functions
g(k, x n ) = m≤k f (m, x n ) and h(k, x n ) = m≤k f (m, x n ) are primitive recursive.

Proof Indeed, g(0, x n ) = f (0, x n ) and g(k + 1, x n ) = g(k, xn ) + f (k + 1, x n ).

Similarly for h, with the exception that addition is replaced by multiplication. 

We recall that relations are represented by their characteristic functions: χ R (x n ) =

0 if R(xn ) holds, otherwise χ R (x n ) = 1. We use relations in place of predicates. A
predicate is a property of things denoted in models as a relation.
Bounded existential symbol ∃my=0 R(y, x n ) means that there exists a value k of
y bounded by m such that R(k, x n ) holds. Similarly for bounded universal symbol
∀my=0 R(y, x n ), the meaning is: for each value of y ≤ m, R(y, x n ) holds.
Theorem 1.30 If R(y, x n ) is primitive recursive, then ∃my=0 R(y, x n ) and
∀my=0 R(y, x n ) are primitive recursive.

Proof We have χ∃my=0 R(y,x n ) = m k=0 χ R(k,x n ) . For the second part, we recall the
negation symbol ¬ meaning ‘it is not true that ...’ and we exploit the duality
(∀y.R(y, x n )) ≡ (¬∃y.¬R(y, x n ) along with the relation χ¬R =
1 −∗ χ R . 

In the same vein we prove that R ∨ P and R ∧ P are primitive recursive as χ R∨P =
(χ R ) · χ P and χ R∧P = (χ R + χ P ) −∗ (χ R · χ P ).
Minimization also preserves primitive recursiveness. For a relation R(y, x n ), we
let M(z, x n ) = min y≤z R(y, x n ) in case such y exists, otherwise the result is 0.
Theorem 1.31 If the relation R(y, x n ) is (primitive) recursive, then the function
M(z, xn ) is (primitive) recursive.
For the proof see Davis [14].
We notice that relations x = y, x < y and x ≤ y are primitive recursive:

χx=y = A(A(|x − y|)), χx<y = A(x −∗ y), and (x ≤ y) ≡ (x = y ∨ x < y).

We can now show important new examples.

Theorem 1.32 The relation y divides x, symbolically y|x, the relation ‘x is a prime
number, Pr (x), and the function ‘the n-th prime number Prime(n)’ are primitive
recursive.
26 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Proof (y|x) ≡ (∃z≤x x = yz);

(Pr (x)) ≡ ((x > 1) ∧ ∀z≤x (z = 1 ∨ z = x ∨ ¬(z|x))).

For proof for Prime(n), the argument of Euclid in his proof that there exist infinitely
many prime numbers is used:

Prime(0) = 0, Prime(n + 1) = M y=0

n!+1
(Pr (y) ∧ y > Prime(n)).

It follows from the above that functions K (z), L(z) : N × N → N, of Theorem 1.8
are primitive recursive.
We now propose to discuss a function which is total and not recursive known as
the ‘Busy Beaver’function, BB for short.
Definition 1.51 (Busy Beavers) An example of a function which is not recursive
is the ‘Busy Beaver’ function Radó [15], Aaronson [16]. BB for the given natural
number n begins on a Turing machine TM B B with the alphabet {1, B}, B denoting
blank, with n states, not counting the halting (blocking) state q f and with the clean
tape. BB determines the value of the function Σ(n) = the maximal number of 1s on
the tape when a machine TM B B halts. Endless loops do not count.
The impression about the hardness of the problem can be given, if we realize
that the number of Turing machines satisfying the conditions for the given n is
4 · (n + 1)2n . The function Σ is accompanied by the function S(n)= the maximal
number of moves by the machine TM B B .
Not much is known about the function Σ as well as about the function S. The
largest n is about 6, for which one of the best current results is Kropitz [17]: Σ(6) ≥
3.515 · 1018267 .
Theorem 1.33 Functions Σ and S are total non-computable.

Proof The idea of the proof is to show that Σ grows faster than any computable
function.
Claim For each computable function f there exists a natural number c f such that
Σ(n + c f ) ≥ f (n) for each n ≥ 0.
Proof of Claim. Let TM(f) compute the function f and c f be the number of states
of TM(f). We define the Turing machine TM(f,n): it writes n 1’s to the tape and then
begins to emulate TM(f); clearly,
(i) Σ(n + c f ) ≥ f (n) for n ≥ 0.
Let h(n) = Σ(2n); was Σ computable, we would have
(ii) Σ(n + ch ) ≥ Σ(2n).
As Σ is monotonically increasing, for n ≤ ch , we have
(iii) Σ(n + ch ) ≤ Σ(2n), contrary to (i).

1.4 Arithmetization of Turing Machines 27

BB shows some interesting results, for instance, as shown in (Yedidia and Aaron-
son [18]), with BB on 748 states, it halts if and only if the set theory ZFC is incon-
sistent.
We are now in a position to arithmetize Turing machines, in order that they can, in
a sense, compute on themselves. This approach opens up a way to the most important
results in computability theory.

1.4 Arithmetization of Turing Machines

To begin with, we assign an initial segment of odd natural numbers to symbols of

TM:
R → 3, L → 5, a0 → 7, q0 → 9, a1 → 11, q1 → 13, ....;

in general, the alphabet symbol ai is assigned the number 4i + 7 and the state sym-
bol qi is assigned the number 4i + 9. This enumeration extends over sequences of
symbols, e.g.,to the expression q0 1Rq1 , the sequence assigned is <9, 11, 3, 13>.
Definition 1.52 (Gödel numbering) For an expression s = s1 s2 ...s
k enumerated by
the sequence <m 1 , m 2 , ..., m k >, the Gödel number is gn(s) = k1 Prime(n)m n .
This extends over sequences of expressions E : E 1 E 2 ....E k , gn(E) =
k numbering gn(E n)
n=1 Prime(n) .
Due to the uniqueness of decomposition of a natural number into a product of
primes, no two distinct sequences of expressions have the same Gödel number.
As a set X of n expressions can be ordered in n! distinct ways, X has n! distinct
Gödel numbers.
The central place in our discussion in this section will be taken by the Kleene
predicate Kleene [19].
Definition 1.53 (The Kleene predicate) For n > 0, the Kleene predicate is
Tn (z, x n , y), where z = gn(Z ), Z is a Turing machine TM which begins with
I D1 : q0 1x1 +1 B1x2 +1 B....B1xn +1 , and y is the Gödel number of the resulting com-
putation.
The Kleene predicate captures all essential information: full information about
TM is encoded in z, y codes the computation with the initial ID.
The fundamental result is the Kleene theorem Kleene [19].
Theorem 1.34 (Kleene) The predicate Tn (z, x n , y) is primitive recursive.

Proof Though the proof is lengthy, we will sketch it bearing in mind the importance
of the predicate. The proof consists in a series of statements describing essential
aspects of computation (our exposition follows the exposition in Davis [14]).
28 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

(P1) outputs the Gödel number of a given member of a sequence of symbols or

expressions. Its definition is
gn(E)
G(n, E) = M y=0 [(Prime(n) y |gn(E)) ∧ ¬(Prime(n) y+1 |gn(E))],

where E is a sequence of expressions or symbols;

(P2) returns for a given sequence the number of its members. Its definition is
gn(E) gn(E)
C(x) = M y=0 [(G(y, E) > 0) ∧ ∀ j=0 (G(y + j + 1, E) = 0)];

(P3) asserts that x is a Gödel number with positive exponents. Its definition is

G N (x) ≡ ∀C(x)+1
y=1 [(G(y, x) > 0) ∨ (G(y + 1, x) = 0)];

(P4) asserts that x is the exponent at some prime factor in Gödel number z. Its
formal name is
C(z)
E x p(x, z) ≡ [G N (z) ∧ ∃i=1 (x = G(i, z))];

(P5) expresses Gödel number of concatenation of two sequences of expressions

E 1 with gn(E 1 ) = x and E 2 with gn(E 2 ) = y.Its definition is

C(y)−∗ 1

x⊗y=x· [Prime(C(x) + i + 1)G(i+1,y) ];
i=0

(P6) holds if its argument is a Gödel number of some state qi . Its definition is

S N (x) ≡ ∃xy=0 (x = 4y + 9);

(P7) holds if its argument is a Gödel number of an alphabet symbol. Its definition
is
Al(x) ≡ ∃xy=0 (x = 4y + 7);

(P8) holds if its argument is an odd number. Its definition is

Odd(x) ≡ ∃xy=0 (x = 2y + 3);

(P9) holds if its argument is a Gödel number of a quadruple of the format of an

instruction of a TM. Its definition is

Quad(x) ≡ G N (x) ∧ (C(x) = 4) ∧ (S N (G(1, x)) ∧ (Al(G(2, x))∧

(Odd(G(3, x)) ∧ (S N (G(4, x));

1.4 Arithmetization of Turing Machines 29

(P10) holds if its arguments are Gödel numbers of two distinct quadruples having
the same sets of two first symbols. Its definition is

N D(x, y) ≡ Quad(x) ∧ Quad(y) ∧ (G(1, x) = G(1, y))∧

(G(2, x) = G(2, y)) ∧ (x = y);

(P11) holds if its argument is a Gödel number of a Turing machine TM. Its definition
is
C(x) C(x)
T M(x) ≡ G N (x) ∧ ∀n=1 [Quad(G(n, x)) ∧ ∀m=1 (¬(N D(G(n, x), G(m, x))))];

(P12) holds if it yields the Gödel number of the code for the machine representation
of its argument. Its definition is

Code(0) = 211 ∧ Code(n + 1) = 211 × Code(n),

hence, Code(n) = gn(1n+1 ) =< n >;

(P13) it is the characteristic function of the relation G(n, x). Its definition is

CU (n, x) = 0 if G(n, x) = 11, else CU (n, x) = 1;

(P14) it is a function which returns the number of ones in an expression with Gödel
number x. Its definition is


C(x)
Cor n(x) = CU (n, x);
n=1

(P15) returns the result of a computation by a Turing machine TM. More generally,
for a sequence of expressions E 1 , E 2 , ..., E n with the Gödel number x, it
returns the number of ones in E n . Its definition is

U (x) = Cor n(G(C(x), x));

(P16) holds if its argument is a Gödel number of an instantaneous description. Its

definition is
∗
C(x)− 1
I D(x) ≡ G N (x) ∧ ∃i=1 [S N (G(i, x)) ∧ ∀C(x)
j=1 (( j = i) ∨ Al(G( j, x)))];

In order to shorten descriptions that follow, we introduce the extension of the

predicate Code of (P12); Code(x n ) will denote the machine representation
of x n .
30 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

(P17) represents the Gödel number x of the initial sequence q0 Code(x n ). Its defi-
nition is

I nit (x n ) = 29 ⊗ Code(x1 ) ⊗ 27 ⊗ Code(x2 ) ⊗ 27 ⊗ ... ⊗ Code(xn );

(P18) Next group of predicates are related to computations by TM. The first predi-
cate holds true when x, y are Gödel numbers of I D1 and I D2 with I D1  I D2
according to instruction (1) of TM with gn(T M) = z of Definition I.3.3. Its
definition is

1 (x, y, z) ≡ T M(z) ∧ I D(x) ∧ I D(y)∧

y
∃xA,B,a,b=0 ∃c,d=0 [(x = A ⊗ 2a ⊗ 2b ⊗ B)∧

(y = A ⊗ 2c ⊗ 2d ⊗ B)] ∧ S N (a) ∧ S N (c) ∧ Al(b) ∧ Al(d) ∧ E x p(2a · 3b · 5d · 7c , z);

(P19) expresses I D1  I D2 according to instruction (2) in Definition I.3.3. Its def-

inition is

2 (x, y, z) ≡ I D(x) ∧ I D(y) ∧ T M(z)∧

y
∃xA,B,a,b=0 ∃c,d=0 [(x = A × 2a × 2b × 2c × B)∧

(y = A × 2b × 2d × 2c × B)] ∧ S N (a) ∧ S N (d) ∧ Al(b) ∧ Al(c) ∧ E x p(2a · 3b · 53 · 7d , z);

(P20) holds when I D1  I D2 according to instruction (3) in Definition I.3.3. It is

defined as
y
3 (x, y, z) ≡ I D(x) ∧ I D(y) ∧ T M(z) ∧ ∃xA,a,b=0 ∃c=0 [(x = A × 2a × 2b )∧

(y = A × 2b × 2c × 27 )] ∧ S N (a) ∧ S N (c) ∧ Al(b)∧

E x p(2a · 3b · 53 · 7c , z);

(P21) collects (P18-P20) into one predicate which holds when x, y are Gödel num-
bers of I D1 , I D2 , z is gn(T M) and I D1  I D2 . Formally,

 (x, y, z) ≡ ∃i=1
3
i ;

(P22) holds, where z is a Gödel number of a TM and x a Gödel number of an

instantaneous description ID, when ID is a final ID in a computation by TM.
Formally.
1.5 Recursively Enumerable Sets 31

Fin(x, z) ≡ I D(x) ∧ T M(z) ∧ ∃xA,B,a,b=0 [(x = A ⊗ 2a ⊗ 2b ⊗ B) ∧ S N (a) ∧ Al(b)]

C(z)
∧{∀i=1 [(G(1, G(i, z)) = r ) ∨ G(2, G(i, z)) = s]};

(P23) holds when z is a Gödel number of a TM and y is a number of a computation

by TM. Its formal definition is
∗
C(x)− 1
Comp(y, z) ≡ T M(z) ∧ G N (y) ∧ ∀i=1  (G(i, y), G(i + 1, y), z)∧

Fin(G(C(y), y));

(P24) the final step in which the Kleene predicate is expressed by the above defined
primitive recursive predicates:

Tn (z, xn , y) ≡ Comp(y, z) ∧ G(1, y) = I nit (xn ).

This concludes the proof that the Kleene predicate is primitive recursive. 

The Kleene normal form Kleene [20] expresses values of computable functions
in terms of the Kleene predicate.
Theorem 1.35 (The Kleene normal form) For a function f Tn M computed by a Turing
machine Z with gn(Z ) = z, the following holds:

f T(n)
M (x n ) = U (min y [Tn (z, x n , y)]).

Hence, a function f (x n ) is (partially) computable if and only if

f (x n ) = U (min y [Tn (z, x n , y)])

for some Gödel number z.

Thus, a function is (partially) computable if and only if it is (partial) recursive.

1.5 Recursively Enumerable Sets

Definition 1.54 (Recursively enumerable predicates) For a predicate P(x n ), we call

its denotation the set I (P) = {x n : P(x n ) holds}. A predicate P(x n ) is recursively
enumerable (abbrev. RE) if and only if there exists a partially computable function
f (x n ) whose domain is the set I (P).

We mention some important properties of RE predicates.

Theorem 1.36 The following hold:
32 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

(i) computable predicates are recursively enumerable;

(ii) if a predicate P(y, x n ) is computable, then the predicate ∃y.P(y, x n ) is recur-
sively enumerable;
(iii) if a predicate P(xn ) is recursively enumerable, then there exists a computable
predicate Q(y, xn ) such that P(x n ) ≡ (∃y.Q(y, x n ));
(iv) The Kleene enumeration theorem: if a predicate P(x n ) is recursively enumer-
able, then
(P(x n )) ≡ (∃y, z.Tn (z, xn , y)).

Proof For (i): Suppose that the predicate P(x n ) is computable, hence, its charac-
teristic function χ P is computable. Then the set I (P) is the domain of the function
min y [χ P (x n ) + y = 0].
For (ii): I (P) is the domain of the function min y [χ P (y, x n ) = 0].
For (iii), (iv): Suppose that the predicate P(x n ) is recursively enumerable, hence
the set I (P) is the domain of a computable function f (x n ). By Theorem 1.35,
f (x n ) = U (min y [Tn (z, x n , y)]) for some z. It follows that

I (P) = dom( f (x n )) = {x n : ∃y.[Tn (z, x n , y)]},

hence, (P(x n )) ≡ (∃y.Tn (z, xn , y)). 

The important relation between computability and recursive enumerability is pro-
vided by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.37 A predicate P(x n ) is computable if and only if predicates P(x n ) and
¬P(x n ) are recursively enumerable.
Proof One way it is simple: if P(x n ) is computable, then ¬P(x n ) is computable
and both predicates are recursively enumerable by Theorem 1.36.
Conversely, if P(x n ) and ¬P(x n ) are recursively enumerable, then there exist
predicates R(y, x n ) and Q(y, x n ) such that (P(x n )) ≡ (∃y.R(y, x n ) and (¬P(xn )) ≡
(∃y.Q(y, x n ).
Clearly, for each argument x n either R(y, x n ) or Q(y, x n ) must be true, so, the
function
f (x n ) = min y [R(y, x n ) ∨ Q(y, x n )]

is defined everywhere, i.e., it is total, hence, computable. As

(P(xn )) ≡ (R( f (x n ), x n )),

P is computable. 
It turns out that RE predicates can be characterized as ranges of computable
functions. We recall that the class of recursive predicates is close on proposi-
tional connectives ∧, ∨, ¬: indeed, for (partially) recursive predicates P, Q, char-
acteristic functions of, respectively P ∧ Q, P ∨ Q, ¬P are, respectively χ P∧Q =
(χ P + χ Q ) −∗ (χ P · χ Q ), χ P∨Q = χ P · χ Q , χ¬P = 1 −∗ χ P .
1.6 Undecidability 33

Theorem 1.38 (i) If a predicate P(x) is the range of a (partially) computable func-
tion f (x), then P is recursively enumerable (ii) if P is a non-vacuous RE predicate,
then there exists a computable function f (x) such that I (P) is the range of f (x).
Proof For (i): By the Kleene normal form, Theorem 1.35,

f (x) = U (min y [T (z, x, y)])

for some z. Then, y is a value of f , if and only if for some x, u, y = U (u) and
T (z, x, u) holds. Hence, {y : P(y)}={y : ∃x, u, y = U (u) ∧ T (z, x, u)}, i.e., P is
an RE.
For (ii) (after Davis [14]): we know that (P(x)) ≡ (∃y, z.T (z, x, y)). We denote
by χT (x, y) the characteristic function of the predicate T with z fixed. The function
f is defined as follows: f (0)=the least element x0 in the denotation I (P);

f (n + 1) = χT (K (n + 1), L(n + 1)) · f (n)

+ A[χT (K (n + 1), L(n + 1))] · K (n + 1)

for n ≥ 0. When χT = 0, K (n + 1) gives the next value in I (P). 

It follows that a predicate is RE when its denotation is the domain of computable
function equivalently it is the range of a computable function. The important upshot
of the above discussion is that a set is recursive if and only if both the set and its
complement are recursively enumerable.

1.6 Undecidability

We will relate some deep results obtained by means of the Kleene predicate. We
denote the predicate T1 (z, x, y) as T (z, x, y).
Theorem 1.39 The predicate Q(x) : ∃y.T (x, x, y) is recursively enumerable but
not computable.
Proof Q(x) is recursively enumerable. Suppose that ¬Q(x) is recursively enu-
merable. By the Kleene enumeration Theorem 1.36(iv), ¬Q(x) ≡ ∃y.T (z, x, y)
for some z. Letting z = x, we obtain a contradiction: ∃y.T (x, x, y) ≡ ¬∃y.T (x,
x, y). 
Definition 1.55 (Decision problems) For a predicate P(x n ), the decision problem
is to obtain answer Y es or N o to the question: given an arbitrary argument a n is it
true that P(a n ) holds?
Clearly, the decision problem is closely related to computability: in order to pass
the test of decision problem, the predicate P(xn ) must be computable, i.e., recur-
sive. Hence, a predicate P(xn ) which answers in the positive to decision problem
34 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

is said to be recursively solvable, otherwise it is recursively unsolvable. Other used

terminology is decidable or undecidable.
Theorem 1.40 The predicate ∃y.T (x, x, y) is undecidable.
The other ‘classical’ undecidable computing problem is the Halting Problem.
Definition 1.56 (The Halting Problem) Consider Turing Machine TM and an ID.
The problem is to decide whether TM started with ID as the initial word will halt.

Theorem 1.41 There exists a Turing machine TM for which the Halting Problem is
undecidable.

Proof Consider a Turing machine T M which computes the function f M (x) =

min y [T (x, x, y)] and a predicate PT M (x): x is the Gödel number of ID with
which T M begins computation. Then, x ∈ I (P) if and only if ∃y.[T (x, x, y)], also
x ∈ I (P) if and only if PT M (gn(q0 < x >)). Were P computable, ∃y.[T (x, x, y)]
would be computable. As it is not computable, P is not computable. 

There are many problems about recursive sets which are undecidable, see, e.g.,
(Rozenberg and Salomaa [21]). For each predicate P which is RE but not recursive,
its negation ¬P is not RE. We complete this section with yet another example of a
set which is not RE, cf. Davis [14].
Theorem 1.42 The set of Gödel numbers of Turing machines T M whose functions
f T M are total is not recursively enumerable.

Proof Let G = {gn(M) : M is T M, f M is total}. Was G an RE, G would

be the range of a computable function f (n) and the function U (min y [T ( f (n),
x, y)]) would be computable (total), hence, U (min y [T ( f (n), x, y)]) + 1 would
be computable and for some n 0 , U (min y [T ( f (n), x, y)]) + 1 = U (min y [T ( f (n 0 ),
x, y)]). For n = n 0 , we arrive at contradiction. 

1.7 Incompleteness. Non-provability of Truth

Gödel numbering is used in proving fundamental results about non provability of

truth due to Gödel and Tarski Gödel [22], Tarski [23]. We owe to Smullyan [24] an
elegant abstract exposition of the most general framework for these results. They are
set in the framework of formal systems. We have met such systems when discussing
grammars. The following definition gives the ingredients of a formal system which
of course are realized in different ways for different systems.
Definition 1.57 (Formal systems) A formal system F consists of the following
components:
(i) a language L(F);
(ii) a countable set EXP of expressions of the language L(F);
1.7 Incompleteness. Non-provability of Truth 35

(iii) a subset S ⊆ E X P of statements;

(iv) a subset P ⊆ S of provable statements;
(v) a subset R ⊆ S of refutable statements;
(vi) a subset T ⊆ S of valid statements;
(vii) a set Q of predicates which express some properties of natural numbers;
(viii) a set of expressions X (n) for X ∈ E X P and n ∈ N;
(ix) a set of expressions of the form Q(n) ∈ S, where Q ∈ Q and n satisfies Q if
and only if Q(n) ∈ T .

Definition 1.58 (Expressibility) A set A of natural numbers is expressed by a pred-

icate Q if and only if A = {n ∈ N : Q(n) ∈ T }, i.e., A is expressible by Q if A
collects numbers n for which Q(n) is valid. A set A is expressible if it is expressed
by a predicate Q.

We now involve Gödel’s numbering into discussion and we assume that we have
infinitely many expressions, sentences and predicates and we enumerate all these
sets with infinitely many countably many Gödel’s numbers.
Hence, we denote by E n the expression E with gn(E) = n.
Now, we apply the Cantor diagonal argument.
Definition 1.59 (Diagonal expressions) For any expression E n , the diagonalization
of E n is the expression E n (n), where n = gn(E n ).For any predicate Q, Q n (n) is the
predicate Q n acting on its own Gödel number.

Definition 1.60 (Diagonal function) We define δ(n) = gn(E n (n)). δ is the diagonal
function.

Definition 1.61 (Diagonal sets) For any subset A ⊆ N, we denote by Aδ the set of
natural numbers n such that δ(n) ∈ A. In fact, Aδ = δ −1 (A).

We say that the system F is regular if and only if P ⊆ T and T ∩ R = ∅, i.e.,

what is provable is valid and what is non provable is invalid (false); we denote the
fact of regularity by the symbol R E G(F).
Now, we have the Gödel theorem about incompleteness.
Theorem 1.43 (Gödel) If R E G(F) and the set (N \ P)δ is expressible, then there
exists a sentence in L(F) which is valid but not provable.

Proof Let Q be the predicate which expresses the set (N \ P)δ and let n = gn(Q)
so Q(n) is true if and only if n ∈ (N \ P)δ . It also means that δ(n) ∈ N \ P.
As δ(n) ∈ P if and only if Q(n) is provable and δ(n) ∈ / P if and only if Q(n)
is not provable, it follows that Q(n) is true if and only if Q(n) is not provable. As
falsity of Q(n) excludes provability by assumption of regularity, we are left with the
conclusion that the sentence Q(n) is true but not provable. 

We now recall the Tarski theorem on non-definability of truth. First some

technicalities.
36 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.62 (Gödel sentences) A sentence E n is a Gödel sentence for a set A of

natural numbers if and only if E n is true if and only if n ∈ A, hence, if E n is false
then n ∈
/ A.
A criterion for having a Gödel sequence by a set of natural numbers is as follows.

Theorem 1.44 For a set A, if the set Aδ is expressible, then there exists a Gödel
sentence for A.

Proof Let Q n be the predicate which expresses Aδ , so Q n is true if and only if

n ∈ Aδ , hence Q n is true if and only if δ(n) ∈ A which means that Q n is a Gödel
sentence for A. 

We denote by G(T ) the set of Gödel numbers of true sentences.

Theorem 1.45 (Tarski) (i) the set (N \ G(T ))δ is not expressible; (ii) if for each
expressible set A the set Aδ is expressible, then the set N \ G(T ) is not expressible;
(iii) if for any expressible set A the set N \ A is expressible, then the set G(T ) is not
expressible.

Proof Essentially, (i) is in need of a proof. Was the set (N \ G(T ))δ expressible,
there would exists a Gödel sentence for it, which would mean that the sentence
would be true if and only if its Gödel number would not be a Gödel number of any
true sentence. (ii) and (iii) follow immediately. 

The upshot of the Tarski theorem is that in sufficiently strong systems the notion
of truth is not definable.
Finally, we address the Gödel incompleteness theorem in the general setting.
Definition 1.63 (Consistency) A system is consistent if no sentence is simultane-
ously provable and refutable, i.e., P ∩ R = ∅.

Definition 1.64 (Decidability) A sentence is decidable if it is either provable or

refutable, otherwise it is undecidable.

Definition 1.65 (Completeness) A system is complete if each sentence is decidable,

otherwise it is incomplete.

Theorem 1.46 (The Gödel incompleteness theorem) If R E G(F) and the set (N \
P)δ is expressible, then L(F) is incomplete.

Proof Under the same assumptions there exists a sentence which is true and not
provable. As it is true it is not refutable by the assumptions of correctness. Hence,
the system is incomplete. 

We have recalled the basic meta-theoretic results on formal systems. Further

discussion will take place in Ch.3 on first-order logic.
1.8 Complexity 37

1.8 Complexity

Complexity theory is concerned with assessment of resources of time and space

necessary to perform computations in a given computation model. We adopt the
orthodox approach, i.e., computations by Turing machines. We speak therefore of
time- and space-complexity and classify problems into classes with respect to sizes
of those resources. Concerning the computing device, there are many of them like
lambda-calculus, Post canonical systems, Markov or semi-Thue rewriting systems,
DNA computing, Membrane Computing, Quantum computing, Molecular comput-
ing, Swarm computing.
We restrict ourselves to Turing machines. There are basically two types of Turing
machines (not mentioning some specialized variants of them): single-tape machines
and many-tape machines. Though apparently distinct, yet they are equivalent in the
sense to be explicated below.
A k-tape TM consists of k tapes, of which tape 1 is the input tape which is read-
only and tape k is the output tape on which the machine gives values of solutions or
answers Yes or No when the problem is a decision one. Tapes from 2 to k are read-
write and machine can read cell contents and modify them by writing new symbols
in place of the current ones. As with one-tape machines the k-tape TM can find
itself in one of states from the state set Q, and one of the states is qinit which marks
the beginning of a computation, and in some problems one of the states is qhalt , its
reaching denotes the end of computation when the machine stops (haltsaccepts).
As with one-tape TMs, each of the tapes can move one cell left or right in every
step. In our description of one-tape machine, the tape was infinitely extendable in
both directions, with k-tape TMs it is often assumed that tape extends only to the
right so the first move must be to the right.
Theorem 1.47 If on an input of length n the k-tape T M1 uses at most T (n) steps,
then one-tape T M2 emulating T M1 uses at most 4 · k · T (n)2 steps.

Proof The idea for constructing T M2 is simple: take a segment of length k · T (n) of
cells on the tape of T M2 and subdivide it into k sub-segments of length T (n) each.
Reproduce on the i − th segment the instantaneous descriptions of the i − th tape of
T M1 by marking the positions of heads and performing a double sweep to the right
and then back to the left; during the right sweep, read positions of heads and after
returning make the second forth and back sweep in order to change the instantaneous
descriptions to the new ones resulting from the instructions. This requires at least
4 · k · T (n)2 steps; if some movements are required for technical reasons, then a
small overhead is added. 

Due to this result, we will stay with 1-tape TM’s as by this the polynomial com-
plexities will not be affected.
Complexity theory makes use of Bachmann’s notation Bachmann [25] for orders
of growth of functions from the set of natural numbers N into itself.
38 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.66 (Orders of growth) For functions f, g : N → N, we say that

(i) f is O(g) ( f is ‘big O’ of g) if there exist a constant C > 0 and n 0 ∈ N such
that f (n) ≤ C · g(n) for n ≥ n 0 ;
(ii) in case (i), we denote this case by writing dually that g(n) is Ω( f (n));
f (n)
(iii) if there exists a finite limit lim n→∞ g(n) = C = 0, then f (n) is O(g(n)) and
g(n) is O( f (n)). In this case we write that f (n) is (g(n)) and g(n) is ( f (n)).
f (n)
If lim n→∞ g(n) = 0 then we denote this fact by writing that f (n) is o(g(n)).

This convention means that constant coefficients are eliminated, for instance the
estimate for T M2 of 4 · k · T (n)2 is  of T (n)2 shortly written down as (T (n)2 ).
Definition 1.67 (Complexity classes DTIME and P) We consider first the determin-
istic case when no two instructions of the machine have the common prefix, hence,
in each step of computation at most one instruction may be active.
We first consider languages that can be decided in polynomial time, i.e, the time
complexity function T (n) is bounded by a polynomial p(n) where n is the length
of the input. This case splits into sub-cases bound by polynomials of fixed degree.
Thus, classes DTIME(n k ) for each natural number k are introduced first.
We say that a TM decides a language L if and only if it computes the characteristic
function χ L (x) of L. We let (χ L (x) = 0) ≡ (x ∈ L): the value 0 of χ L (x) means
that the string x ∈ L, otherwise x is rejected.
The language L is in the class DTIME(n k ) if and only if χ L (x) can be decided
in time T (n) ≤ n k .
k
The union of classes DTIME(n  ) is the class Pkof languages having deterministic
polynomial time complexity: P= k∈N DTIME(n ).
In the class P we find problems of sorting, graph problems like searching, find-
ing spanning trees, shortest paths etc. There are three issues related to classes of
complexity: reduction, hardness and completeness.
Definition 1.68 (Karp reducibility; X-hard, X-complete languages) We say that a
language L 1 is time-polynomially Karp reducible to the language L 2 if there exists
function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ computable in polynomial time and such that for each
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ , x ∈ L 1 if and only if f (x) ∈ L 2 . This relation is denoted L 1 ≤ Kp L 2 .
Clearly, the relation ≤ Kp is reflexive and transitive as the composition of two poly-
nomials is a polynomial.
For a complexity class X , a language L is X -hard if each language L  ∈ X is ≤ Kp
reducible to L; if in addition L ∈ X , then L is X -complete.
We describe a P-complete problem. We refer to the resolution in propositional
logic and we add that the unit resolution is a particular variant of resolution in which
1 ∨y2 ∨...∨yk
the resolution rule is the following: x,¬x∨y
y1 ∨y2 ∨...∨yk
, i.e., one of clauses is a singleton.

Definition 1.69 (The problem CNF-CONTRA-UR) It is the set of propositional for-

mulae in CNF that can be show unsatisfiable by the unit resolution.
1.8 Complexity 39

Theorem 1.48 CNF-CONTRA-UR is in P.

Proof Consider a formula φ in CNF-CONTRA-UR with k clauses; let C be the

set of clauses and C = U ∪ N , where U is the set of unit clauses and N = C \ U .
Consider the first unit clause c ∈ U and check c against clauses in N : if c cannot be
resolved with any of them, then delete c from the list U , otherwise let c1 be the first
clause in the list N with which c can be resolved.
Let c2 be the resolvent from c and c1 ; delete c1 from the list N . If c2 is the empty
clause then halt and report that φ is contradictory. If c2 is a unit clause, attach it to the
list U , otherwise attach it to the list N . In the end output that φ is not contradictory.
The algorithm requires at most k 2 steps, hence, CNF-CONTRA-UR is in P. 

Theorem 1.49 CNF-CONTRA-UR is P-hard.

Proof Let L be a language in P, p(n) a polynomial and TM a Turing machine whose

one of states is qhalt , the halting state. For x ∈ L, we have to construct in a polynomial
time a formula ψ(x) such that x ∈ L if and only if ψ(x) ∈ CNF-CONTRA-UR.
Clearly, the formula ψ(x) must reflect the computation process of x. To this end,
we define matrices:

A p(|x|)×|Q| , B p(|x|)×(2 p(|x|)+1) , C p(|x|)×(2 p(|x|)+1) .

The matrix A registers states of the machine in consecutive steps of computation,

the matrix B registers the position of the head in consecutive steps and the matrix
C carries records of instantaneous descriptions on the tape in consecutive steps. The
number 2 p(|x|) + 1 of cells stems from the position of the head in the beginning of
computation and p(|x|) cells to the right and to the left of this original position of
the head which is the maximal reach of the head during computation.
Let I = {1, 2, . . . , p(|x|)}, J = {1, 2, . . . , 2 p(|x|) + 1}, the entries in matrices
A, B, C are:
(i) for the matrix A = [ai,q ], ai,q = 1 if s(i) = q else 0, where s(i) is the state of
TM at i − th step;
(ii) for the matrix B = [bi, j ], bi, j = 1 if the head is at position j in the i − th step,
else 0;
(iii) for the matrix C = [ci, j,a ], ci, j,a = 1 if ci, j = a, where ci, j is the symbol of the
alphabet in the step i in the cell j.
We can now start the construction of the formula ψ(x). First, we build the formula
ψ1 (x) which will reflect the fact that at each step, the head is in exactly one position,
there is exactly one state TM is in, and in each position there is exactly one symbol of
the alphabet. Thus, we need a formula which, if satisfied, selects exactly one variable
to be true:
(E(y1 , y2 , . . . , yk )) ≡ (∃i.(yi ⊃ ∀y j = yi .(¬y j ))).
40 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Then, ψ1 (x) is

∀i ∈ I.E{ai,q : q ∈ Q} ∧ ∀i ∈ I.E{bi, j : j ∈ J }∧

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J.E{ci, j,a : a ∈ Γ },

where Γ is the alphabet of TM.

The formula ψ2 (x) confirms that the first row of matrices (i=1) reflects the initial
instantaneous description of the tape. Let x = x1 x2 . . . xm and p(m) = n. Then ψ2 (x)
is

a1,q0 ∧ b1,n+1 ∧ ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n.c1, j,B ∧ c1,n+1,x1 ∧ x1,n+2,x2 ∧ . . . ∧ c1,n+m,xm ∧

∀n + m + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n + 1.c1, j,B ,

where B denotes blank, i.e, the empty cell.

The formula ψ3 (x) testifies that the content of the cell may change only if the
head is over the cell. Thus, ψ3 (x) is

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J.∀a ∈ Γ.(b(i, j) = 1 ∨ ci, j,a = ci+1, j,a ).

The formula ψ4 (x) certifies that any change, be it state’s, head position’s, contents’
of the tape, can be effected only in accordance with an instruction. Let an instruction
be (q, a, b, m, q  ), where m ∈ {−1, 0, +1} encodes the movement, respectively, to
the left, no move, to the right. Then, ψ4 (x) is

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J.(¬ai,q ∨ ¬bi, j ∨ ¬ci, j,a ∨ ai+1,q  ∧ bi+1, j+d ∧ ci+1, j,b ).

The formulaψ5 (x) describes the halting step: in it, the unit resolution has to derive
a p(|x|),q f from i ψi (x), hence, ψ5 (x) is

¬a p(|x|),q f .

The formula ψ(x) is

ψ1 (x) ∧ ψ2 (x) ∧ ψ3 (x) ∧ ψ4 (x) ∧ ψ5 (x).

It is in P and the reduction to it of x is polynomial in time and logarithmic in space:

log(|x|) cells are sufficient to record numbers up to 2|x| hence up to |J |. 

Corollary 1.3 It follows that CNF-CONTRA-UR is P-complete.

Definition 1.70 (Classes L and NL) Class L is the class of languages which are
decided by a deterministic Turing machine in space bounded by logarithm of the
length of the input. Class NL is the class of languages which can be decided by a
1.8 Complexity 41

non-deterministic Turing machine in space bounded by logarithm of the length of

the input.
Clearly, L⊆ NL. We give an example of a language which is NL-complete.
Definition 1.71 (Log-space reducibility) Language L 1 is log-space reducible to lan-
guage L 2 if there exists a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ computable by log-space
bounded Turing machine such that ∀x.((x ∈ L 1 ) ≡ ( f (x) ∈ L 2 )) and | f (x)| ≤
c · |x| for some constant c. This relation is denoted ≤ L .
Definition 1.72 (Language DGA) DGA={((V, e), u, V  )}: (V, e) is a directed graph,
u a node in V, V  ⊆ V and there exists v ∈ V  such that there exists a path from
u to v.
Theorem 1.50 DGA is in NL.
Proof Select non-deterministically an edge (u, w) ∈ e; if w ∈ V  , then stop and
accept, else, let V  as V  \ {w} and repeat. Output ‘No’. The required space is
O(log(|V | + |E|)). 
Theorem 1.51 DGA is ≤ L -hard for the class NL.
Proof Let A ∈ NL and TM be a log-space bounded Turing machine that accepts A.
We construct an instance of the graph (V, E, u, V  ). Let computation of TM on an
instance x of A be the set of instantaneous descriptions I D1 , I D2 , . . . , I Dk . For each
I Di , let vi be a node in the graph and V = {vi : i ≤ k}. Let u = v1 . It is convenient
to assume that TM has two tapes: the input tape with space O(log|x|) and the work
tape of space O(log|x|). IDs are read and vertices are written to the work tape.
The edges are then written to the work tape, an edge (vi , v j ) is enlisted to e if
I Di  I D j , i.e., I D j is a successor to I Di .
Finally, nodes in V  are written to the work tape; a node vi is enlisted into V  if
the state qi in I Di is final. Clearly, x ∈ DGA if and only if there is a path from u
into V  and the space required is O(log|x|). 
Corollary 1.4 DGA is NL-complete.
Definition 1.73 (Class NP)
A language L ∈ {0, 1}∗ is in NP if there exist a polynomial p and a polynomial-time
bounded Turing machine TM such that for each x ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,

(x ∈ L) ≡ (∃w ∈ {0, 1} p(|x|) .T M(x, w) = 1).

The successful w is called the certificate.

Thus, L ∈ NP if it is possible to check in polynomial time for each w whether the
proposed w be a solution to the problem, but the experience shows that for no one
such problem an algorithm in P has been found. Whether P=NP is a long-standing
open problem. An archetypal NP-complete problem is SAT(CNF) along with its
variant sat(3-CNF).
42 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.74 (Problems SAT(CNF) and SAT(3-CNF)) Problem SAT(CNF) con-

sists in deciding whether a given propositional formula is satisfiable. Problem SAT(3-
CNF) is SAT for propositional formulae in the normal CNF form in which each clause
contains exactly three literals.

Theorem 1.52 SAT(3-CNF) is in NP.

Proof Given an instance φ : C1 ∧ C2 ∧ . . . Ck where Ci is l1i ∨ l2i ∨ l3i and l ij are

literals, a certificate is a valuation V : {l ij : i ≤ k, j = 1, 2, 3} → {0, 1}. Verification
whether V (φ) = 1 can be done in polynomial time of the size = the number of functors
in φ. 

NP-completeness of SAT(CNF) was established in Cook [26] and Levin [27].

Theorem 1.53 SAT(CNF) is NP-complete.

Proof We refer to proof of P-completeness of the problem CNF-CONTRA-UR;

formulae ψ1 (x) − ψ4 (x) are the same in this case, the formula ψ5 (x) is now a p(|x|),q f .
5
The formula ψ(x) is the conjunction i=1 ψi (x). 

We now address space complexity.

Definition 1.75 (The class PSPACE) A language L is in PSPACE if there exists a
 ) non-blankkcells for
k
deterministic Turing machine TM that decides L using O(n
some natural number k. Hence, one can define PSPACE as k P SPACE(n ), where
PSPACE(n k ) is the class of languages that can be decided by deterministic Turing
machines in space bounded by n k .

Definition 1.76 (The class NPSPACE) A language L is in NPSPACE if there

exists a non-deterministic Turing machine TM that decides L using O(n k ) non-

blank cells for some natural number k. Hence, one can define NPSPACE as k
NPSPACE(n k ) where NPSPACE(n k ) is the class of languages that can be decided
by non-deterministic Turing machines in space bounded by n k .

We will show later that PSPACE=NPSPACE, hence, we restrict ourselves now

to the class PSPACE. Our example of a PSPACE-complete problem is again related
primarily to logic. It is TQBF (True Quantified Boolean Formula) problem (Stock-
meyer and Meyer [28]).
Definition 1.77 (Formulae QBF, problem TQBF) QBF is a formula in prenex form
Q 1 x1 .Q 2 x2 . . . Q n xn .φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ), where each Q i is either ∀ or ∃ and each xi
is an atomic proposition. Clearly, each QBF is a closed formula, hence either valid
or invalid. Problem TQBF (true QBF) is the satisfiability problem for QBF.

Theorem 1.54 TQBF is in PSPACE.

1.8 Complexity 43

Proof Following (Stockmeyer and Meyer [28]) and (Arora and Barak [29]), we
consider a formula

 : Q 1 x1 Q 2 x2 . . . Q n xn φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ),

where the size of φ in CNF, measured in the number of functors is m.

We consider two cases, for Q 1 : if Q 1 is ∃ then call restricted formulas  ↑ [x1 = 0]
and  ↑ [x1 = 1] and return true to  if at least one of restrictions yields true. If Q 1
is ∀ then return true if both restrictions yield true.
Assuming that work space is reused, one gets that all computations take space
s(n, m) expressed by the recurrence s(n, m) = s(n − 1, m) + O(m), whence
s(n, m) = n · m, i.e., it is polynomial in size of the problem. 

Theorem 1.55 TQBF is ≤ p -hard for PSPACE.

Proof Consider a language L decided by the deterministic Turing machine in space

s(n) and let x ∈ {0, 1}n . Let m = O(s(n)) be the space needed for instantaneous
descriptions for computations on input of length n.
We recall the formula ψ4 (x) from the proof of Theorem 1.68. It testifies that two
IDs are adjacent IDs in the computation on x. We denote here ψ4 (x) simply as ψ(x).
We let ψ0 to be ψ(x) and we let ψi (x)(c1 , c2 ) to be true if there is a path of length
at most 2i from ID c1 to ID c2 in the computation on x.Clearly, ψi (x)(c1 , c2 ) if and
only if there exists an ID c such that ψi−1 (x)(c1 , c) ∧ ψi−1 (x)(c, c2 ).
This allows for an inductive definition of ψi (x) as:

(ψi (x)(c1 , c2 )) ≡ (∃c.∀c , c .{[(c = c1 ) ∧ (c = c)] ∨ [(c = c) ∧ (c = c2 )]} ⊃

ψi−1 (x)(c , c )).

Then, size(ψi (x)) ≤ size(ψi−1 (x)) + 0(m). For ψm (x) which testifies about accept-
ing computation, this formula yields size(ψm (x)) ≤ O(m 2 ). Clearly, ψm (x) can be
converted in polynomial time to the prenex form. 

Let us observe that in games of perfect information, like chess, hex or go, the
order of appearance of quantifiers codes the result of play. Suppose that the order is:
Q i is ∃ for i odd and it is ∀ for i even. This means that the first player has a winning
strategy in case the described QBF is true. Thus, the existence of winning strategy
is PSPACE-complete.
We now address relations among complexity classes.

Theorem 1.56 NDSPACE(f)⊆ k>0 DTIME(k f ).

Proof Consider a non-deterministic f -space bounded Turing machine TM, deciding

a language L. For x ∈ L, of size n, IDs in the computation on x occupy the space
at most f (n). The number of IDs is bounded by n · |Q| · |A| f (n) ≤ a f (n) for some
constant a, where A is the alphabet of the machine.
44 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

On basis of this estimate, it is possible to design a deterministic Turing machine,

which we denote DTM, which will decide the language L. The machine DTM uses
an inductive procedure to check all IDs of TM inducting on their used space l from
l = 1 on. For each l, there are at most d l IDs of space used l. DTM begins with
the initial ID and partitions all IDs into three classes: untried, yet not seen and not
known to be reachable from the initial ID, used: already tried and having determined
successors, active: reachable from the initial ID but without determined as of yet
successor.
DTM examines all active IDs in turn. If the ID is final, DTM decides x and halts.
If not, then the active ID is labelled used and untried IDs are labelled active and the
next active ID is examined.
When all active IDs of space l are examined, DTM repeats the procedure with
IDs using space l + 1.
There are at most a l active IDs and at most a l successor IDs. As l does not exceed
f (n), the procedure takes at most b f (n) steps which proves that DTM is b f (n) -time
bound. 

Theorem 1.57 DTIME(f)

 ⊆ NDTIME(f) ⊆ DSPACE(f) ⊆
NDSPACE(f) ⊆ c>0 DTIME(c f )

In this statement only inclusion NDTIME(f)⊆ DSPACE(f) requires a comment. A

technical result is helpful here.
Theorem 1.58 The following hold:
(i) DSPACE(f)=DSPACE(c· f);
(ii) NDSPACE(f)=NDSPACE(c·f).

Proof For an f-space bounded deterministic Turing machine TM and c > 0, choose a
natural number r such that f (n)
r
≤ c f˙(n). A machine TM1 simulating TM has alpha-
bet V ∪ V where V is the alphabet of TM, and, the set of states Q × {1, 2, . . . , r }
r

(we assume the one-tape TM for simplicity). Hence, TM1 can represent in a single
cell the content of r cells of TM.
Appropriately modified are IDs of TM. In consequence, DSPACE(f)⊆
DSPACE(c·f).
By symmetry, DSPACE(c·f)⊆ DSPACE( 1c · c· f)=DSPACE(f).
Finally, DSPACE(f)=DSPACE(c·f). In case of NDSPACE we follow along same
lines. 

Now, we return to the proof that NDTIME(f)⊆ DSPACE(f) and we consider a

non-deterministic f -time bounded Turing machine TM which in any computation
on input of length n can access at most f (n) + 1 cells. For a language L decided by
TM and x ∈ L, the deterministic machine TM1, decides x by checking for successive
values of k, the non-deterministic computations of length k by TM until a deciding
x computation is found.
Computations are specified by strings of symbols of TM indicating possible
choices during computation. Space needed is f (|x|) cells to represent successive
1.8 Complexity 45

strings of length k and space f (|x|) + 1 cells for computation specified by a given
string. By Theorem 1.58, we can compress the space to f (n). This concludes the
proof of Theorem 1.57.
For PSPACE versus NPSPACE, we have the result due to Savitch [30].
Theorem 1.59 (The Savitch theorem) If the function s is space-constructible (mean-
ing that there exists a Turing machine that uses s(n) cells on input of length n and
s(n) ≥ logn), then NDSPACE(s)⊆ DSPACE(s 2 ).
Proof The idea for a proof is similar to one already used. Let TM be a non-
deterministic Turing machine that decides a language L of space-complexity s(n).
For x ∈ L, with |x| = n, the number of IDs of TM does not exceed 2 O(s(n)) . Deciding
x in deterministic fashion will mean that the accepting ID is reached from starting
ID in O(s(n)) steps.
Given two IDs, ID1 and ID2, the recurrence (I D1, I D2, i) ≡ (∃I D.(I D1, I D,
i − 1) ∧ (I D, I D2, i − 1)), where (I D1, I D2, i) means that ID2 is reached from
ID1 in at most 2i steps, requires finding ID. This is achieved by enumerating all ID’s
in O(s(n)) space and searching for an ID satisfying the recurrence.
At i = O(s(n)) the procedure stops and yields a path from starting ID to a final
ID, which results in deciding x. The space complexity of this procedure is given
by recurrence space(O(s(n)), i) = space(O(s(n)), i − 1) + O(s(n)) hence it is
O(s(n)2 ). 
Corollary 1.5 (i) PSPACE=NPSPACE
(ii) L⊆ NL ⊆ P ⊆ NP ⊆ PSPACE = NPSPACE.
Definition 1.78 (Classes co-X, EXPTIME, NEXPTIME) The class co-X for a class
X consists of languages L which are of the form {0, 1}∗ \ L for L ∈ X. From the
logic point of view, the class co-NP is especially interesting as the language S AT
consists of unsatisfiable formulae but their negations are formulae which are valid
(are tautologies) and the language T AU T consisting of valid formulae is in co-NP.
One proves that TAUT is co-NP-complete.
 2k
The class EXPTIME of exponential time is defined as k DTIME(2n ). Parallel
 2 k
definition of NEXPTIME is k NDTIME(2n ). These classes are interestingly
related to classes with linear exponent in place of a polynomial one. The class E is
defined as DTIME(k n ), the class NE is NDTIME(k n ).
Theorem 1.60 Each language L in NEXPTIME reduces to a language L  in NE.
For a proof, see Papadimitriou [31].
An example of NEXPTIME-complete problem is the Bernays - Schönfinkel-
Ramsey SAT(BSR) problem (cf. Ramsey [9]).
Definition 1.79 The SAT(BSR) problem: A formula φ of predicate logic is in BSR
form if it is in the prenex form

∃x1 ∃x2 . . . ∃xm ∀y1 ∀y2 . . . ∀yn ψ

46 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

and the formula ψ contains only constant and predicate symbols without predicate
of identity.
The problem is: given a formula in this language decide whether it is satisfiable.
To this end, we have the following statement.
Theorem 1.61 Consider a formula φ in SAT(BSR) form with p constant symbols in
ψ. Then, the formula φ is satisfiable if and only if it has an interpretation with at
most m + p elements.

Proof If M = (D, I ) is an interpretation for φ, then let elements u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m

satisfy the formula ∀y1 ∀y2 . . . ∀yn ψ. Let W be the subset of U which consists of
u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m and of all elements of the form I (c) for each constant c in ψ. Then
W is a model of cardinality m + p for φ. 

Theorem 1.62 SAT(BSR) is in NEXPTIME.

Proof If the formula φ requires length q of representation, then m + p < q, and

predicates in ψ are of arity less than q, the model of cardinality m + p needs the
length O(q 2q ) to be described and verification that a guessed set of m + p elements
is a satisfying interpretation requires O(q m+n ) steps. 

Theorem 1.63 SAT(BSR) is NEXPTIME-complete.

Proof We sketch the proof after Papadimitriou [31]. We may assume that a language
L in NE is decided by a non-deterministic Turing machine TM with two choices at
each step in time of 2n .
For each x ∈ L, the formula φ(x) in the SBR-SAT form is constructed as fol-
lows: the formula ψ(x), the matrix of φ(x) on 2n variables x1 , . . . , xn , y1 , . . . , yn is
quantified universally so

φ(x) : ∀x1 , x2 , . . . , xn .∀y1 , y2 , . . . yn .ψ(x).

The burden is now on ψ(x). This formula is the conjunction of formulae specifying
computation of TM on x in the way we used for proof in case of completeness of
SAT and CNF-CONTRA-UR. For details, please see (Papadimitriou [31], 8.3). 

Polynomial hierarchy was introduced in (Meyer and Stockmeyer [32]).

p
Definition 1.80 (Polynomial hierarchy) A language L is in the class Σi if and only
if for a polynomial-time Turing machine TM and a polynomial p,

x ∈ L ≡ ∃u 1 ∈ {0, 1} p(|x|) ∀u 2 ∈ {0, 1} p(|x|) . . . Q i u i ∈ {0, 1} p(|x|) .

T M(x, u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u i ) = 1,
p p p
where Q i is ∀ for i even and it is ∃ for i odd. Thus, Σ1 =NP and Σi ⊆ Σi+2 . Between
p p p p
Σi and Σi+2 , the class Πi = co-Σi finds itself.
1.9 Algebraic Structures 47

 p  p
The polynomial hierarchy PH is the union i>0 Pii = Σi .
p p
It was shown in (Meyer and Stockmeyer [32]) that if for some i, Σi = Πi , then
p
PH= Σi .
Definition 1.81 (The problem SAT(Σi )) It consists in verification of satisfiability of

∃u 1 .∀u 2 . . . . Q i u i .ψ(u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u i ) = 1.

(Meyer and Stockmeyer [32]) offer us the following result.

p
Theorem 1.64 The problem SAT(Σi ) is Σi -complete for i = 1, 2, . . ..
A discussion can be found in (Arora and Barak [29]).

1.9 Algebraic Structures

Some completeness proofs for logics are carried out in the algebraic setting, let us
mention here the proof by Chang of completeness of the infinite-valued logic of
Łukasiewicz or the Rasiowa-Sikorski algebraic approach to meta-theory of
logic (Rasiowa and Sikorski [33]). For this reason, we include a short introduction
to algebraic structures.
In this survey a most abstract rendering of notions and results about algebraic
structures is presented, which in some chapters that follow will be given in more
specialized contexts.
Definition 1.82 (Lattices) A set L partially ordered by a relation ≤ is a lattice if and
only if for each pair x, y ∈ L there exist the least upper bound x ∪ y and the greatest
lower bound x ∩ y, with the following properties:
(i) x ≤ x ∪ y;
(ii) y ≤ x ∪ y;
(iii) (x ≤ z) ∧ (y ≤ z) ⊃ (x ∪ y) ≤ z;
(iv) x ∩ y ≤ x;
(v) x ∩ y ≤ y;
(vi) (z ≤ x) ∧ (z ≤ y) ⊃ (z ≤ x ∩ y);
(vii) x ∪ y = y ∪ x;
(viii) x ∩ y = y ∩ x;
(ix) x ∪ (y ∪ z) = (x ∪ y) ∪ z;
(x) x ∩ (y ∩ z) = (x ∩ y) ∩ z;
(xi) (x ∪ y) ∩ x = x;
(xii) (x ∩ y) ∪ x = x;
(xiii) (x ≤ y) ≡ (x ∪ y = y);
(xiv) (x ≤ y) ≡ (x ∩ y = x);
(xv) (x ∪ y = y) ≡ (x ∩ y = x).
Lattices are related by homomorphisms.
48 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.83 (Homomorphisms) A mapping h : L 1 → L 2 from the lattice L 1 into

the lattice L 2 is a homomorphism if it preserves joins and meets,i.e.,
(i) h(x ∩ y) = h(x) ∩ h(y);
(ii) h(x ∪ y) = h(x) ∪ h(y).
It follows from these identities that the image h(L 1 ) is a lattice—a sub-lattice of L 2 .
Lattices L 1 and L 2 are isomorphic if the homomorphism h exists which is a
bijection and h(x) ≤ h(y) if and only if x ≤ y.
Definition 1.84 (Maximal elements in a lattice) Complete lattices: An element a ∈
L is maximal if there is no element greater than it, hence, for x ∈ L, a = a ∪ x,
hence, x ≤ a for each x ∈ L. It follows that an element is maximal if and only if it is
the greatest element in the lattice L. If it exists then it is called the unit and denoted
1. Dually, the minimal element is the least element in the lattice L and it is denoted 0
(zero). The notion of the greatest (dually, of the least) element can be defined relative
to a subset X of the lattice L.
We denote by sup X the join of the subset X , i.e., the least element a greater than
any element of X : x ≤ a for each x ∈ L and if x ≤ b for each x ∈ X than a ≤ b.
Dually, we denote by inf X the meet of X , i.e., the greatest element a smaller than
any element in X : a ≤ x for each x ∈ X and if b ≤ x for each x ∈ X then b ≤ a. If
sup X and inf X exist for each non-empty set X ⊆ L then the lattice L is complete.
Clearly, if supL exists, then it is the unit 1 and if in f L exists, then it is the zero 0.
Suprema sup X and infima inf X have properties:
(i) sup X ∪ sup Y = sup{x ∪ y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y };
(ii) inf X ∩ inf Y = inf{x ∩ y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y };
(iii) inf X ∪ inf Y ≤ inf{x ∪ y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y };
(iv) sup{x ∩ y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } ≤ sup X ∩ sup Y .
An important consequence of completeness is the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theo-
rem (Theorem 1.2). The Dedekind-McNeille theorem (Theorem 1.3) asserts that any
lattice can be isomorphically embedded into a complete lattice.
Filters and dual to them ideals constitute a powerful tool in deciding completeness.

Definition 1.85 (Filters, ideals) A filter (dually, an ideal) in a lattice L is a subset

F of L (respectively, a subset I of L) such that
(i) if x, y ∈ F, then x ∩ y ∈ F; dually, if x, y ∈ I then x ∪ y ∈ I ;
(ii) if x ∈ F and x ≤ y, then y ∈ F; dually, if x ∈ I and y ≤ x, then y ∈ I .
A principal filter F(a) is the set {x ∈ L : a ≤ x}. Dually, a principal ideal I (a) is
the set {x ∈ L : x ≤ a}. If a lattice L contains the unit 1, then 1 ∈ F for each filter
F. Dually, if the lattice L contains zero 0, then 0 ∈ I for each ideal I . A filter (an
ideal) is maximal if it is not contained as a proper subset in any filter (ideal).
The intersection of a family of filters is a filter. Given a subset A ⊆ L, there exists
the smallest filter F(A) containing A, given as the intersection of all filters containing
A. The explicit expression for this filter is given in the theorem that follows.
1.9 Algebraic Structures 49

Theorem 1.65 The filter F(A) is the set

{a : ∃x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ∈ A.a ≥ x1 ∩ x2 ∩ . . . ∩ xk }.

The dual statement for ideals replaces ≥ with ≤ and ∩ with ∪. If a lattice L contains
zero element 0, then by excluding 0 from filter in the filter definition, i.e., by adding
the condition 0 ∈/ F, we define a proper filter. Dually, the condition 1 ∈ / I defines
the proper ideal I . As any increasing chain of filters is a filter, it follows by the Zorn
maximal principle that
Theorem 1.66 In any lattice L containing 0, each proper filter is contained in a
maximal proper filter. Dually, in any lattice containing the unit 1, any proper ideal
is contained in a maximal proper ideal.

Definition 1.86 (Prime filters and prime ideals) A proper filter F is prime if from
x ∪ y ∈ F it follows that either x ∈ F or y ∈ F. A proper ideal is prime if from
x ∩ y ∈ I it follows that either x ∈ I or y ∈ I .

Definition 1.87 (Distributive lattices) A lattice L is distributive if it satisfies the

condition
x ∩ (y ∪ z) = (x ∩ y) ∪ (x ∩ z).

Then the dual condition

x ∪ (y ∩ z) = (x ∪ y) ∩ (x ∪ z)

holds also. Distributivity bears on properties of filters.

Theorem 1.67 Suppose that the lattice L is distributive. Then each maximal filter
F (respectively, each maximal ideal I ) is prime.

Proof Suppose to the contrary that a maximal filter F is not prime. Then there exist
x, y ∈ L such that x ∪ y ∈ F but x ∈/ F and y ∈
/ F. Consider the filter

G = {z ∈ L : ∃u ∈ F.z ≥ x ∩ u}.

Then F ⊆ G and we have to check that the inclusion is proper and G is a proper
filter.
Claim. y ∈
/ G.
Indeed, were y ∈ G, we would have y ≥ x ∩ u for some u ∈ F; as x ∪ y ∈ F and
y ∪ u ∈ F we would have

y = (x ∩ u) ∪ y = (x ∪ y) ∩ (x ∪ y) ∈ F,

a contradiction. Thus G is a proper filter, F is a proper subset of G, hence F is not

maximal, a contradiction. 
50 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Dual proof in which we would replace ≤ with ≥ and ∪ with ∩ would prove the
part for ideals. We now state and prove the theorem on separation of elements in a
lattice by a prime filter, the fact of crucial importance for proofs of completeness of
various logics by algebraic tools.
The following separation theorem plays a decisive role in many proofs of com-
pleteness in the following chapters.
Theorem 1.68 (Filter separation theorem) Suppose that L is a distributive lattice
and x = y are elements of L such that it is not true that x ≤ y. Then there exists a
prime filter F such that x ∈ F and y ∈
/ F.

Proof Consider the set F of all filters on L which contain x and not contain y.
The principal filter F(x) ∈ F, hence, F = ∅. As any linearly ordered chain in F
has an upper bound, by the Zorn maximal principle there exists a maximal filter Fm
satisfying x ∈ Fm , y ∈
/ Fm .
Claim. The filter Fm is prime. Suppose to the contrary. We have u, v ∈ L with
u ∪ v ∈ Fm but u ∈ / Fm and v ∈/ Fm . Let Fu be the filter generated by {u} ∪ Fm , and,
Fv be the filter generated by {v} ∪ Fm .
Sub-claim. Either y ∈ / Fu or y ∈
/ Fv . Was y in Fu and in Fv , then we would have
q1 , q2 ∈ Fm with y ≥ u ∩ q1 and y ≥ v ∩ q2 , hence, for q = q1 ∩ q2 ∈ Fm we would
have y ≥ u ∩ q and y ≥ v ∩ q, hence,

y ≥ (u ∩ q) ∪ (v ∩ q) = (u ∪ v) ∩ q ∈ Fm ,

so it would follow that y ∈ Fm , a contradiction. This proves Sub-claim.

/ Fu . Then Fu contains x but not y and Fm ⊆ Fu . As
Suppose that for instance y ∈
u ∈ Fu and u ∈
/ Fm , Fu = Fm , contrary to maximality of Fm . This proves Claim and
theorem. 

The following corollary is the dual statement for prime ideals.

Corollary 1.6 If x, y are elements of a distributive lattice L, x = y and it is not
true that y ≤ x, then there exists a prime ideal I with the property that x ∈ I and
y∈ / I.

Definition 1.88 (Complements) Existence of zero or unit elements allows for intro-
duction of complements in a lattice L. For an element x ∈ L, if 1 ∈ L, then a ∪-
complement to x is the least element a ∈ L such that a ∪ x = 1; dually, if 0 ∈ L,
then a ∩-complement to x is the greatest element a ∈ L such that a ∩ x = 0. Ele-
ment a is the complement to x if it is simultaneously the ∩-complement and the
∪-complement. It is denoted by −x.

Theorem 1.69 The following are properties of the complement:

(i) if a ∩ x = 0 and a ∪ x = 1, then a = −x;
(ii) if x ≤ y, then −y ≤ −x;
1.9 Algebraic Structures 51

(iii) −(−x) = x;
(iv) −(x ∩ y) = −x ∪ −y;
(v) −(x ∪ y) = −x ∩ −y;
(vi) −0 = 1; −1 = 0.
Proof Suppose that x ∩ y = 0; then

y = y ∩ (x ∪ a) = (y ∩ x) ∪ (y ∩ a) = y ∩ a

implying that y ≤ a which shows that a is the ∩-complement to x. Dually, one proves
that from x ∪ y = 1 it follows that y ≥ a, hence, a is the ∪-complement to y. Finally,
it shows that a is the complement to x.
Suppose that x ≤ y. Then x ∩ −y = (x ∩ y) ∩ −y=0, i.e, −y ≤ −x. If −x is the
complement to x, then x ∪ −x = 1, x ∩ −x = 0, i.e., x is the complement to −x,
i.e., −(−x) = x.
We have

(x ∪ y) ∩ (−x ∩ −y) = (x ∩ −x ∩ y) ∪ (y ∩ −x ∩ −y) = 0 ∪ 0 = 0

and

(x ∪ y) ∪ (−x ∩ −y) = (x ∪ −x ∪ y) ∩ (y ∪ −x ∪ −y) = 1 ∩ 1 = 1.

From the last two facts, we deduce that −(x ∪ y) = −x ∩ −y. The claims fourth and
fifth follow by duality. The last claim is obvious as 1 ∩ 0 = 0, 1 ∪ 0 = 1. 
The ∩-complement is also called the pseudo-complement.
Definition 1.89 (Relative pseudo-complement) A relative variant of the pseudo-
complement is the pseudo-complement of x relative to y defined as the greatest
element a such that x ∩ a ≤ y, denoted x ⇒ y and called the relative pseudo-
complement. We will dwell on it awhile because of its role in many-valued logics.
We have the fundamental duality

(x ⇒ y ≥ z) ≡ (z ∩ x ≤ y).

Theorem 1.70 The following are among properties of the relative pseudo-
complement:
(i) x ⇒ y ≥ y;
(ii) x ≤ y if and only if x ⇒ y = 1;
(iii) 1 ⇒ y = y;
(iv) −x = x ⇒ 0.
All these properties follow in a straightforward way from definitions.
Theorem 1.71 If in a distributive lattice there exists the complement −x of x, then
x ⇒ y = −x ∪ y for each y.
52 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Definition 1.90 (Relatively pseudo-complemented lattices) A lattice L is relatively

pseudo-complemented if and only x ⇒ y exists for each pair x, y of elements of
L. As x ⇒ x = 1, each relatively pseudo-complemented lattice is endowed with the
unit 1.

Theorem 1.72 Every relatively pseudo-complemented lattice satisfies the following

properties:
(i) x ⇒ y = 1 if and only if x ≤ y;
(ii) x ⇒ x = 1;
(iii) 1 ⇒ x = x;
(iv) (x ⇒ x) ∩ y = y;
(v) x ∩ (x ⇒ y) = x ∩ y;
(vi) (x ⇒ y) ∩ y = y;
(vii) (x ⇒ y) ∩ (x ⇒ z) = x ⇒ (y ∩ z);
(viii) (x ⇒ z) ∪ (y ⇒ z) = (x ∪ y) ⇒ z;
(ix) x ⇒ (y ⇒ z) = y ⇒ (x ⇒ z);
(x) x ≤ − − x;
(xi) − − −x = −x;
(xii) x ⇒ y ≤ −y ⇒ −x;
(xiii) x ⇒ −y = y ⇒ −x;
(xiv) x ⇒ (y ⇒ (x ∩ y)) = 1;
(xv) (x ⇒ y) ∩ (y ⇒ z) ≤ x ⇒ z;
(xvi) (x ∪ y) ⇒ z = (x ⇒ z) ∩ (y ⇒ z);
(xvii) (x ∩ y) ⇒ z = y ⇒ (x ⇒ z).

Filters in relatively pseudo-complemented lattices can be defined by means of

relative pseudo-complements.
Theorem 1.73 For a relatively pseudo-complemented lattice L, a subset F of L is
a filter if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) 1 ∈ F;
(ii) if x ∈ F and x ⇒ y ∈ F, then y ∈ F.

Proof Suppose that both conditions hold; by Theorem 1.72(xiv), x ⇒ (y ⇒ (x ∩

y)) = 1. If x, y ∈ F, then x ∩ y ∈ F. If x ∈ F and x ≤ y then x ⇒ y = 1 ∈ F and
y ∈ F, so F is a filter. Conversely, if F is a filter then 1 ∈ F and if x ⇒ y ∈ F, then
x ∩ y = x ∩ (x ⇒ y) ∈ F by Theorem 1.72(v), hence, x ∩ y ∈ F. 

Definition 1.91 (Filter ordered lattices) Filters induce orderings by letting

(x ≤ F y) ≡ (x ⇒ y ∈ F).

The relation ≤ F is reflexive as x ⇒ x=1 ∈ F and transitive as, by Theorem 1.72(xv),

x ≤ F y and y ≤ F z imply x ≤ F z.
1.9 Algebraic Structures 53

Definition 1.92 (Quotient spaces modulo filters) A relation

(Q) (x ≡ F y) ≡ [(x ⇒ y ∈ F) ∧ (y ⇒ x ∈ F)]

is an equivalence relation and we denote its classes by [x] F and the quotient space by
the symbol L/ ≡ F . The quotient space is an ordered lattice by the relation [x] F ≤ [y] F
if and only if x ⇒ y ∈ F.

The lattice operations factor through ≡ F .

Theorem 1.74 The following properties hold:
(i) [x] F ∪ [y] F = [x ∪ y] F ;
(ii) [x] F ∩ [y] F = [x ∩ y] F ;
(iii) [x] F ⇒ [y] F = [x ⇒ y] F ;
(iv) −[x] F = [−x] F .

Proof Let us recall the arguments. For (i),

x ⇒ x ∪ y = 1, y ⇒ x ∪ y = 1,

hence, [x] F ≤ [x ∪ y] F and [y] F ≤ [x ∪ y] F thus [x] F ∪ [y] F ≤ [x ∪ y] F . For the

converse, suppose that [x] F ≤ [z] F and [y] F ≤ [z] F so both x ⇒ z, y ⇒ z ∈ F,
hence, by Theorem 1.72(xvi), (x ∪ y) ⇒ z ∈ F, i.e., [x ∪ y] F ≤ [z] F , i.e., [x ∪ y] F
is [x] F ∪ [y] F . In proof of (ii), one applies in a similar way properties (i) and (vii)
in Theorem 1.72. To prove (iii), one makes use of property (xvii) in Theorem 1.72.
The unit in L/ ≡ F is [1] F as x ⇒ 1 = 1 for each x and the zero in L/ ≡ F is
[0] F as 0 ⇒ x = 1 for each x (both facts under assumption that L possesses 0, 1,
respectively). Finally, −[x] F = [x] F ⇒ [0] F =[x ⇒ 0] F =[−x] F . 

Remark 1.1 (i) If x ∈ F, then 1 ⇒ x = x ∈ F, i.e., [1] F ≤ [x] F so [1] F = [x] F

(ii) from (i), we infer that the filter F is proper if and only if the quotient lattice
L/ ≡ F is at least a two-element set.We recall that given an element x in a lattice L
and a filter F, the set

(G) G(F, x) = {y ∈ L : ∃z ∈ F.y ≥ x ∩ z}

is the least filter containing x and F. We add a property of G(F, x).

Theorem 1.75 G(F, x) is proper if and only if −x ∈

/ F.

Proof Indeed, was −x ∈ F, we would have −x ≥ x ∩ z for some z ∈ F, hence,

0 = x ∩ −x ≥ x ∩ z, i.e., 0 ∈ F, hence F = L. 

Theorem 1.76 If F is a maximal filter, then for each x ∈ L, F contains either x or

−x, hence, L/ ≡ F is a two-element {0, 1} lattice.
54 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Proof Concerning maximal filters, by Theorem 1.75, for a maximal filter F, given
x ∈ L, the filter G(F, x) extends F as a proper filter if and only if −x ∈
/ F and then
it coincides with F. Hence, a maximal filter F contains x or −x for each element
x ∈ L. From this fact it follows that for each x ∈ L, either [x] F = 1 (if x ∈ F ) or
[−x] F = −[x] F = 1 (if −x ∈ F), hence, [x] F = 0; thus the quotient L/ ≡ F contains
exactly two elements 0 and 1. 

Dually, all properties of filters are true for ideals; in particular, for each element
x = 1 there exists a maximal ideal I such that x ∈ I .
Definition 1.93 (Boolean algebras) A Boolean algebra is a distributive lattice in
which every element x has the complement −x satisfying properties x ∪ −x = 1,
x ∩ −x = 0. The new construct is the difference of elements defined as x − y =
x ∩ −y. The relative complement ⇒ satisfies the formula x ⇒ y = −x ∪ y.
An example of a Boolean algebra is the two-element algebra L/ ≡ F defined in
Theorem 1.76.
Theorem 1.77 The operations in the algebra L/ ≡ F are as follows:
(i) 0 = 0 ∪ 0 = 0 ∩ 0 = 0 ∩ 1 = 1 ∩ 0 = 1 ⇒ 0 = −1;
(ii) 1 = 0 ∪ 1 = 1 ∪ 0 = 1 ∪ 1 = 1 ∩ 1 = 0 ⇒ 0 = 0 ⇒ 1 = 1 ⇒ 1 = −0.

Theorem 1.78 The following properties hold in any Boolean algebra:

(i) −(x ∩ y) = −x ∪ −y; −(x ∪ y) = −x ∩ −y;
(ii) − − x = x;
(iii) x ⇒ y = −y ⇒ −x;
(iv) −x ⇒ y = −y ⇒ x;
(v) x ⇒ y = −(x − y).

Concerning filters, in Boolean algebras it is true that

Theorem 1.79 In each Boolean algebra, each prime filter is maximal, hence, notions
of a prime filter and a maximal filter are equivalent.

Proof Indeed, if a filter F is prime, then for each x ∈ L it contains 1 = x ∪ −x,

hence either x or −x is in F which is equivalent to maximality. 

In (Stone [34]) a representation theory of algebraic structures in topological struc-

tures was developed and we include here its algebraic aspects.
Definition 1.94 (The Stone set lattice) For a distributive lattice L, consider the set
F(L) of all prime filters on L. For each element x ∈ L, consider the set h(x) = {F ∈
F(L) : x ∈ F} and let St (L) = {h(x) : x ∈ L}. St (L) is the Stone set lattice of L
and F(L) is the Stone set of L.

Theorem 1.80 St (L) is a set lattice and h establishes an isomorphism between L

and St (L).
1.10 Topological Structures 55

Proof That h is injective, follows from separation property of filters: if x = y, then

one of x ≤ y, y ≤ x cannot hold, hence there exists a prime filter F which contains
only one of x, y, hence, h(x) = h(y). To prove that h(x ∪ y) = h(x) ∪ h(y), assume
that x ∪ y ∈ F, F a prime filter. Then either x ∈ F or y ∈ F, hence, F ∈ h(x) or
F ∈ h(y), therefore, F ∈ h(x) ∪ h(y). Conversely, If F ∈ h(x) or F ∈ h(y), hence,
either x ∈ F or y ∈ F, so x ∪ y ∈ F, hence, F ∈ h(x ∪ y).
Proof that h(x ∩ y) = h(x) ∩ h(y) follows on similar lines. If F ∈ h(x ∩ y), then
x ∩ y ∈ F so x ∈ F and y ∈ F so F ∈ h(x) ∩ h(y). The proof for converse goes in
the reversed direction. 

Corollary 1.7 Each distributive lattice is isomorphic to a set lattice.

The reader will find in (Rasiowa and Sikorski [33]) an extensive and deep discus-
sion of the topics in this section.

1.10 Topological Structures

The role played by topology in certain realms of logic calls for an introduction
of basic notions and results into this chapter; for more information, please consult
Kelley [7].
Definition 1.95 (Topological structures) A topological structure is a pair (Ω, O),
where Ω is a non-empty set and O is a family of subsets of Ω which satisfies the
following conditions:
(i) O is closed on finite intersections;
(ii) O is closed on arbitrary unions.
In particular, the empty set and Ω are in O. We will denote open sets with symbols
F, G, H, ...
Definition 1.96 (Open and closed sets)
A set X ⊆ Ω is open of and only if X ∈ O. A set Y is closed if and only if the
set X = Ω \ Y is open. It follows by Definition 1.95 (i), (ii) that the collection C of
closed sets satisfies the following conditions:
(i) C is closed on arbitrary intersections;
(ii) C is closed on finite unions.
Closed sets will be denoted with symbols K , P, Q, ....
Definition 1.97 label1.10.3(Neighborhoods, interiors, closures) For a thing x ∈ Ω,
an open neighborhood is an open set G such that x ∈ G. A neighborhood of x is a
set X such that there exists an open set G with properties: x ∈ G ⊆ X .
56 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

 An interior I nt X of a set X is the union of all open sets contained in X : I nt X =

{G ∈ O ∧ G ⊆ X }.
A closure Cl X of a set X is defined as Ω \ I nt (Ω \ X ). In order to reveal the
more digestible characterization, we resort to the local version: x ∈ Cl X if and only
if for each neighborhood Y of x, Y ∩ X = ∅.
The duality between interior and closure expressed in the formula Cl X =
Ω \ I nt (Ω \ X ) can be expressed as well in the form: I nt X = Ω \ Cl(Ω \ X ).
Similarly, we have a local characterization of interiors; x ∈ I nt X if and only if there
exists a neighborhood of x contained in X . Clearly, I nt X ⊆ X and X ⊆ Cl X .
Theorem 1.81 The following are properties of interiors and closures:
(i)I nt (X ∩ Y ) = (I nt X ) ∩ (I ntY ); dually, Cl(X ∪ Y ) = (Cl X ) ∪ (ClY );
(ii)(X ⊆ Y ) implies I nt X ⊆ I ntY and Cl X ⊆ ClY ;
(iii)I nt (I nt X ) = I nt X ; dually, Cl(Cl X ) = Cl(X );
(iv) I nt∅ = ∅ = Cl∅;
(v) for any open set G and any set X , if G ∩ X = ∅, then G ∩ Cl X = ∅; Because,
X ⊆ (Ω \ G), the set Ω \ G closed, and Cl X ⊆ (Ω \ G) by (ii);
(vi) for any open set G and any set X , Cl(G ∩ Cl X ) = Cl(G ∩ X ).
Proof We prove (vi): From right to left: (a) G ∩ X ⊆ G ∩ Cl X ; (b) Cl(G ∩ X ) ⊆
Cl(G ∩ Cl X ); from left to right: we assume that x ∈ Cl(G ∩ Cl X ). Take any open
neighborhood H of x. Then H ∩ (G ∩ Cl X ) = (H ∩ G) ∩ Cl X = ∅ and as H ∩ G
is an open neighborhood of x, x ∈ Cl(G ∩ X ). 
Definition 1.98 (Boundary sets) The boundary Fr X of a set X is the set (Cl X ) ∩
Cl(Ω \ X ). Hence, locally, x ∈ Fr X if and only if each neighborhood of x intersects
both X and Ω \ X .
As boundary of a set represents in Chap. 7 the region of uncertain/incomplete
knowledge, we deem it useful to include some properties of the Fr operator.
Theorem 1.82 The following are selected properties of boundaries:
(i) I nt X = X \ Fr X ; dually, Cl X = X ∪ Fr X ;
(ii) Fr I nt X ⊆ Fr X ; dually, FrCl X ⊆ Fr X ;
(iii) Fr X = Cl X \ I nt X ;
(iv) Fr (X ∪ Y ) ⊆ Fr X ∪ Fr Y ;
(v) Fr (X ∩ Y ) ⊆ ((Fr X ) ∩ ClY ) ∪ ((Cl X ) ∩ Fr Y ).
Definition 1.99 (Complexity of topologies) Complexity of a topology can be mea-
sured by ability to separate subsets of Ω by open sets. We denote by τ the topology
on Ω and we define the basic T2 property:
(i) τ is T2 (Hausdorff) if and only if for each pair x, y of elements in Ω, there exist
open disjoint sets G, H such that x ∈ G and y ∈ H .
Definition 1.100 (Continuous mappings) A mapping f : Ω1 → Ω2 of a topolog-
ical space (Ω1 , O1 ) into a topological space (Ω2 , O2 ) is continuous if and only if
f −1 (G) ∈ O1 for each G ∈ O2 . By this definition,
1.10 Topological Structures 57

(i) f −1 (I ntY ) ⊆ I nt f −1 (Y ) for each Y ⊆ Ω2 ;

(ii) f (Cl X ) ⊆ Cl f (X );
(iii) Cl f −1 Y ⊆ f −1 (ClY ) for each Y ⊆ Ω2 .

Definition 1.101 (Filters) A filter on a space (Ω, τ ) is a family of sets F ⊆ 2Ω

which satisfies the following conditions:
(i) if A ∈ F and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ F;
(ii) if A, B ∈ F, then A ∩ B ∈ F;
(iii) ∅ ∈/ F.

By the Zorn maximal principle, each filter is a subset of a maximal filter, called an
ultrafilter.
Definition 1.102 (Compactness)
 An open covering of Ω is a family C of open sets
with the property that C = Ω; a space (Ω, O) is compact if each open covering
of it contains a finite sub-family which is an open covering.

Definition 1.103 (Centered families. Limit and cluster points) A family of sets is
centered if and only if each finite sub-family has a non-empty intersection. An element
x is a limit point of a filter F if and only if each neighborhood of x is an element of
F. An element x is a cluster point of F if and only if x is in closure of each element
of F.

Theorem 1.83 (i) A space τ is compact if and only if each centered family of closed
sets has a non-empty intersection;
(ii) A space τ is compact if and only if each filter has a cluster point;
(iii) A space τ is compact if and only if each ultrafilter has a limit point.

Definition 1.104 (Induced topological structures) Set-theoretic constructs applied

to topological spaces produce new structures which inherit many properties. We
examine the most important one.

Cartesian products: given a Cartesian product T =Πs∈S Ωs with topologies Os on

Ωs for each s, we call a finite box the Cartesian product Πs∈J G s × Πs ∈J / Ωs , where
J ⊆ S is finite and G s ∈ Os for each s ∈ J . The product topology on T is defined by
declaring a subset G of T open if and only if it is the union of some family of finite
boxes. The Cartesian product T is related to factors Ωs by projections pso : (xs )s →
xso for so ∈ S. Projections are continuous: ps−1o
(G so ) = G so × Πs=so Ωs .
For a filter F on T , and for each s ∈ S, the projection ps (F) = Fs is a filter; if
F is an ultrafilter, then Fs is an ultrafilter.
Tychonoff theorem Tychonoff [35] is one of most important in topology but finds
also its usage in some areas of computer science.
Theorem 1.84 The Cartesian product of compact spaces is compact.

Proof It suffices to verify that for an ultrafilter F, if xs is a limit point of the ultrafilter
Fs for s ∈ S, then (xs )s∈S is a limit point of F. 
58 1 Introduction: Prerequisites

Metric spaces are present in many reasoning schemes, we will find them in Gaif-
man’s graphs in Chap. 8.
Definition 1.105 A metric on a set Ω is a function δ : X × X → R1 such that
(i) δ(x, y) ≥ 0; (δ(x, y) = 0) ≡ (x = y);
(ii) δ(x, y) = δ(y, x);
(iii) δ(x, y) ≤ δ(x, z) + δ(z, y).

Definition 1.106 (Limit and cluster points) A set X endowed with a metric δ is a
metric space. For x ∈ X and r > 0, an open ball B(x, r ) = {y : δ(x, y) < r }.

In the topology induced by metric δ, a set is declared open if and only if it is a

union of a family of open balls. In metric spaces filters are replaced with sequences:
x is a cluster point of a sequence (xn ) if and only if there exists a subsequence xn k
with x = lim k xn k .
That sequences define topology of a metric space follows from the fact: x ∈ Cl A
if and only if x = limn an with an ∈ A. This is true because each x has a countable
neighborhood base: open balls B(x, qn ) where (qn )n is a sequence of rational numbers
with limit 0 have the property that each neighborhood of x contains such ball for
some qn .
Hence, pick by axiom of choice an element xn from the intersection A ∩ B(x, qn )
for each n to obtain the sequence converging to x.
Theorem 1.85 If τn is a metric space with the bounded by 1 metric δn for each n,
∞
then the Cartesian product Πn=1 τn is a metric space with the metric δ((x)n , (y)n ) =
∞ δn (xn ,yn ) ∞
1 2n
which yields the finite box topology of Πn=1 τn . The restriction that
metrics δn are bounded by 1 is immaterial because the metric min{1, δn } introduces
the same topology as the metric δn .

Definition 1.107 (Degrees of connectedness) A topological space τ = (Ω, O) is

connected if the set Ω cannot be represented as the union G ∪ H of two open disjoint
sets G and H , otherwise τ is disconnected. A space τ is totally disconnected if and
only if the set Ω contains no connected subset of at least two elements. A space τ is
extremely disconnected if and only if, for each open set G, the closure ClG is open.

We now return to the Stone theory (Stone [34]) in its topological aspect.
Theorem 1.86 (The Stone topology) Suppose that a lattice L is a Boolean algebra.
The Stone set F(L) is a compact totally disconnected Hausdorff (T2 ) topological
space. Each element of the Stone set lattice St (L) is open-and-closed and St (L) is
a Boolean algebra (a field of sets).

Proof Compactness follows by the existence 

 of the unit 1: suppose that F(L) =
s∈S G s , each G s open. As each G s is a union i ∈ Is h(ai,s ), we may assume that
sets h(ai,s ) for all i, s form an open covering.
Suppose, to the contrary, that no finite collection of sets of the form h(ai,s )
can cover F(L). As F(L) = h(1), any finite collection a1 , a2 , . . . , am satisfies
References 59

m
h(∪i=1 ai ) = h(1), hence, ∪i=1 m
ai = 1. Denote by J the ideal generated by the col-
/ J , J is proper, hence, J extends to J ∗ -a maximal
lection {a1 , a2 , . . . , am }. Then, 1 ∈
ideal, hence, prime, and the collection {a : a ∈ / J ∗ } is a prime filter F ∗ , and it fol-
lows by arbitrariness of the selected collection that no a ∈ L is an element of F ∗ , a
contradiction. Hence, F(L) is compact.
As h(a) ∪ h(−a) = F(L), and, h(a) ∩ h(−a) = ∅, each set h(a) is closed-and-
open, hence F(L) is totally disconnected. That F(L) is a Hausdorff space (T2 ),
follows by the same fact: any two distinct filters F1 , F2 point to some a ∈ L which
is an element in one of them only, then, h(a) contains one of filters, say, F1 , and,
h(−a) contains F2 . 
A Boolean algebra is complete if and only if each subset has the least upper bound.

Theorem 1.87 The Stone space of a complete Boolean algebra is extremely

disconnected.

Proof Consider an open set G in St (L). G is a union i∈J h(ai ); let a be the l.u.b.
of the collection {ai : i ∈ J }. Then h(a) is closed, contains G and is the smallest
closed set with this property. 

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31. Papadimitriou, C.: Computational Complexity, 2nd edn. Longman, Reading MA (1995)
32. Meyer, A.R., Stockmeyer, L.: The equivalence problem for regular expressions with squaring
requires exponential time. In: FOCS, pp. 125–129. IEEE (1972)
33. Rasiowa, H., Sikorski, R.: The Mathematics of Metamathematics. PWN-Polish Scientific Pub-
lishers, Warszawa (1963)
34. Stone, M.H.: The theory of representations for Boolean algebras. Trans. Am. Math. Soc. 40,
37–111 (1936)
35. Tychonoff, A.: Über die topologische Erweiterung von Räumen. Math. Ann. 102, 544–561
(1929)
Chapter 2
Sentential Logic (SL)

Called also Propositional Logic/Calculus, or Sentential Calculus, this logic is con-

cerned with sentences, i.e., statements for which the value can be assigned of truth
or falsity. It provides a cornerstone for other logics and this determines its role as
a pioneering field for introduction of notions and concepts later transferred to other
logics. At the same time, its simple formulation allows to see clearly the structure of
a logical theory. We use standard notation for connectives, in particular we apply the
‘horseshoe’ symbol ⊃ in order to denote implication. We identify adjectives ‘senten-
tial’ and ‘propositional’ as synonyms and we give preference to adjective ‘sentential’
to stress that logics are about sentences, i.e., true statements.

2.1 A Bit of History

Rudiments of SL emerged in Greece in times of Plato who underwent an analysis of

language as the system roughly preceding original system of Syllogistic by Aristotle
(384-322 B.C.E.), i.e., a logic of terms built on lines of logic as figures of Syllogistics
are implications of the form ‘if A and B, then C’, where A, B, C have the form of
formulae Xab, where a, b are terms like ’a man’, an animal’, ’a Greek’ etc., and X
is one of four operators: A for ’all’, E for ’no one’, O for ’some’, I for ’some is not’,
in effect elementary statements are Aab: ’all a is b’, Eab: ’no a is b’, Oab: ’some a
is b’, I ab:’some a is not b’, yielding 256 possible figures of which 24 are valid. En
passant, Aristotle introduced variables into logic (cf. Łukasiewicz [1]).
Sentential logic emerged from attempts by Diodorus Cronus (before 307 B.C.E.)
and Philo of Megara (about 400 B.C.E.). Their efforts brought forth the implica-
tion understood to be true in all cases except when the antecedent is true and the
consequent is false and, in consequence, the truth-functional view on statements.
Problems related to contingency and modalities were also initiated by their school.
A descendant of this school (called by some the Megaric School) Zeno of Chition

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 61

L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_2
62 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

(ca. 336-246 B.C.E.) founded the Stoic School (Stoa Poikile (the Painted Gate) was
the site for their meetings). Stoics, principally their member Chrysippus of Soloi (ca.
281-205 B.C.E.) created a system of sentential logic in which they discerned among
sentential connectives of disjunction ’or’ (though Chrysippus understood disjunction
as the exclusive disjunction, which bears on the form and meaning of Moods 4 and 5,
below), conjunction ’and’, negation ’it is not the case that ...’, in addition to already
constructed implication ‘if ..., then ...’, they introduced and they built a deductive
system based on five ’indemonstrables’ and four ’themata’. They represented logical
arguments as ’moods’ i.e., sets of numbered terms representing statements either
true or false. They had been:
Mood 1. If 1st, 2nd; but 1st; therefore 2nd.
Mood 2. If 1st, 2nd; but not 2nd; therefore not 1st.
Mood 3. Not 1st and 2nd; but 1st; therefore not 2nd.
Mood 4. 1st or 2nd; but 1st; therefore not 2nd.
Mood 5. 1st or 2nd; but not 2nd; therefore 1st.
Mood 1 is Modus Ponens (detachment), Mood 2 is Modus Tollens. In addition four
themata were used to reduce complex statements to one of five indemonstrables. In
this way, Stoics created a deduction system, in modern times proposed by Gottlob
Frege (Bocheński [2], Bobzien [3], Łukasiewicz [5]). Let us complete this succint
account with the words from (Bocheński [2], p.5): ‘the leading Megaricians and
Stoics are among the greatest thinkers in Logic’.

2.2 Syntax of Sentential Logic

Definition 2.1 (The language of SL)

The alphabet A of the language L of sentential logic consists of the following cate-
gories of symbols.
(i) A countable set P of atomic propositions: P = { p0 , p1 , p2 , . . . , pk , . . .}. In
practice we denote a number of first of them as p, q, r, s, . . . and use them in
formulae;
(ii) The set C of sentential connectives ⊃ (implication), ¬ (negation);
(iii) The set B of parentheses ( ) [ ] { } and the set M of punctuation marks;
(iv) the symbol ⊥.

An expression of SL is any word over A. Some expressions are not meaningful like
pq∨ etc., therefore, we single out well formed expressions denoted wff’s (standing
for well-formed formulae) defined recursively.

Definition 2.2 (Well-formed formulae of SL)

The set of wffs is the smallest set which satisfies the following conditions:
(i) each atomic proposition is a wff;
2.2 Syntax of Sentential Logic 63

(ii) if φ and ψ are wffs, then ¬φ and φ ⊃ ψ are wffs;

(iii) ⊥ is a wff.

It follows by (ii) and (iii) that  ≡ ¬⊥ is a wff.

Definition 2.3 (Auxiliary connectives)

We introduce connectives and formulae which simplify wffs and by themselves are
important in formalization of utterances or written sentences. These connectives are
the following:
(i) φ ∨ ψ is (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ; ∨ is the connective of disjunction;
(ii) φ ∧ ψ is ¬(φ ⊃ ¬ψ); ∧ is the connective of conjunction;
(iii) φ ≡ ψ is (φ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ φ); ≡ is the connective of equivalence.

By rules (i)-(iii) in Definition 2.2, and by Definition 2.3, all formulae involving con-
nectives of Definition 2.3 and  are defined by means of wffs, hence, they are wffs.

Theorem 2.1 By conditions of Definitions 2.2 and of 2.3, the following list consists
of wf formulae:
(1) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )];
(2) p ⊃ p;
(3) p ⊃ (q ⊃ p);
(4) p ⊃ (q ⊃ p ∧ q);
(5) [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )];
(6) [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )];
(7) p ⊃ ¬¬ p;
(8) (¬¬ p) ⊃ p;
(9) p ⊃ p ∨ q;
(10) q ⊃ p ∨ q;
(11) ( p ∧ q) ⊃ p;
(12) ( p ∧ q) ⊃ q;
(13) [( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [( p ∨ q) ⊃ r ];
(14) [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ ( p ∧ q ⊃ r );
(15) ( p ∧ q ⊃ r ) ⊃ [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )];
(16) ( p ∧ ¬ p) ⊃ q;
(17) p ∨ ¬ p;
(18) [ p ⊃ ( p ∧ ¬ p)] ⊃ ¬ p;
(19) ¬( p ∧ ¬ p);
(20) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (¬ p ∨ q);
(21) (¬ p ∨ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ q);
(22) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (¬q ⊃ ¬ p);
(23) (¬q ⊃ ¬ p) ⊃ ( p ⊃ q);
(24) ( p ⊃ ¬q) ⊃ (q ⊃ ¬ p);
(25) (¬ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (¬q ⊃ p);
(26) [( p ⊃ q) ⊃ p] ⊃ p;
(27) ¬( p ∨ q) ⊃ (¬ p ∧ ¬q);
64 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

(28) (¬ p ∧ ¬q) ⊃ ¬( p ∨ q);

(29) ¬( p ∧ q) ⊃ (¬ p ∨ ¬q);
(30) (¬ p ∨ ¬q) ⊃ ¬( p ∧ q);
(31) [( p ∧ q) ∨ r ] ⊃ [( p ∨ r ) ∧ (q ∨ r )];
(32) [( p ∨ r ) ∧ (q ∨ r )] ⊃ [( p ∧ q) ∨ r ];
(33) [( p ∨ q) ∧ r ] ⊃ [( p ∧ r ) ∨ (q ∧ r )];
(34) [( p ∧ r ) ∨ (q ∧ r )] ⊃ [( p ∨ q) ∧ r ];
(35) ( p ⊃ q) ∧ (q ⊃ p) ⊃ ( p ≡ q);
(36) ( p ≡ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ q) ∧ (q ⊃ p).

Some formulae in this list bear historic names: (27)–(30) are DeMorgan laws, (17)
is the law of excluded middle, (22) is the law of contradiction, (31)–(34) are laws of
distribution, (1) is transitivity of implication (the hypothetical syllogism), (16) is the
Duns Scotus formula.

Definition 2.4 (Minimal sets of connectives)

A set C of connectives is minimal (a base) if all connectives can be defined from C
and no proper subset of C has this property.

For instance, the set {⊃, ¬} is minimal; if we accept ⊥, then ¬φ can be defined
as φ ⊃ ⊥, and the set ⊃, ⊥ is minimal. Other minimal sets are {∨, ¬}, {∧, ¬}.
Indeed, from the set {∨, ¬}, we obtain the following definitions:
(i) p ∧ q is ¬(¬ p ∨ ¬q);
(ii) p ⊃ q is ¬ p ∨ q;
(iii) p ≡ q is (¬ p ∨ q) ∧ (¬q ∨ p) is ¬[¬(¬ p ∨ q) ∨ ¬(¬q ∨ p)].
For the set {∧, ¬}, the definitions are the following:
(i) p ∨ q is ¬(¬ p ∧ ¬q);
(ii) p ⊃ q is ¬( p ∧ ¬q);
(iii) p ≡ q is [¬( p ∧ ¬q)] ∧ [¬(q ∧ ¬ p)].
Minimality of the set {⊃, ¬} was shown in Definition 2.3. If we define ¬ p as
p ⊃ ⊥, then we may use this definition for the set {⊃, ¬} to obtain
(i) ¬ p is p ⊃ ⊥;
(ii) p ∨ q is ( p ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ q;
(iii) p ∧ q is (( p ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ (q ⊃ ⊥).
We have deliberately left ≡ off.

Definition 2.5 (Other connectives. Sheffer’s stroke, Peirce’s arrow) These two con-
nectives have the property that each of them defines all 16 Boolean functions of two
variables.

The Sheffer stroke D (the alternative denial) is defined as follows: p Dq is p ⊃ ¬q.

From this definition, we are able to express sentential connectives in terms of D.
2.3 Semantics of Sentential Logic 65

(i) ¬ p is p Dp;
(ii) p ⊃ q is p D( p Dq).
Having ⊃ and ¬ defined in terms of D, we can use Definition 2.3 in order to express
∨, ∧, ≡ in terms of D.
The Peirce arrow ↓ (denoted also NOR, ‘logical OR’) is expressed in terms of D
as: p ↓ q is ¬(¬ p D¬q), hence,

(i) ¬ p is p ↓ p;
(ii) p ⊃ q is [( p ↓ p) ↓ q] ↓ [( p ↓ p) ↓ q)];
(iii) p ∨ q is ( p ↓ q) ↓ ( p ↓ q)];
(iv) p ∧ q is ( p ↓ p) ↓ (q ↓ q).

Peirce’s arrow in terms of our standard connectives is a conjunction of negations.

2.3 Semantics of Sentential Logic

Sentential logic is truth-functional: the truth value of a formula depends solely on

truth values of atomic propositions from which it is built. There are two truth values:
truth denoted 1 and falsity denoted 0, accordingly, the formula may only be valid
(true) or invalid (false). A discussion of semantics begins with truth tables for con-
nectives. Truth tables give values of formulae of the form p Xq where X is a binary
connective of either disjunction or conjunction, or, implication, or, equivalence and
values of formulae of the form ¬ p as truth functions of truth values of atomic propo-
sitions p, q. An assignment A is a function which assigns to each atomic proposition
a truth value 0 or 1. The truth table gives values of formulae for all assignments.

Definition 2.6 (Truth tables for connectives)

Table 2.1 collects truth functions for connectives.

The 0 − ar y connective ⊥ (’falsum’) is constantly valued 0, i.e., it is always

invalid (false). The negation of ⊥, ¬⊥, denoted  (’verum’, a’thumbtack’) is always
valid by the truth-table for negation.

Table 2.1 Truth-functional description of connectives and of ⊥

p q ¬p p∨q p∧q p→q p≡q ⊥
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
66 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Values of truth functions for atomic propositions that occur in a formula φ,

determine the value of truth function for φ. The notation φ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) indi-
cates that φ is built from atomic propositions p1 , p2 , . . . , pn . We denote by
A∗ (φ) the truth value of a formula φ under the assignment A; then A∗ (φ) =
A∗ (A( p1 ), A( p2 ), . . . , A( pn )). Clearly, for a formula with n atomic propositions,
the number of possible assignments is 2n .

Definition 2.7 (Sub-formulae)

The set Sub(φ) of sub-formulae of the formula φ is defined by the following condi-
tions:
(i) Sub( p) = { p} for each atomic proposition p;
(ii) Sub(¬φ) = Sub(φ) ∪ {¬φ};
(iii) Sub(φ ◦ ψ) = Sub(φ) ∪ Sub(ψ) ∪ {φ ◦ ψ}, where ◦ is a binary connective;
(iv) Sub(⊥)=∅=Sub().

We denote members of the set Sub(φ) by the generic symbol sub(φ).

Definition 2.8 (Immediate sub-formulae)

The notion of an immediate sub-formula, in symbols: im − sub(φ) is defined as
follows:
(i) im − sub( p) does not hold for any atomic proposition p;
(ii) im − sub(¬ p) holds for p only;
(iii) im − sub(φ ◦ ψ) holds only for φ and ψ for each binary connective ◦.

Definition 2.9 (Subordination relation sub. The formation tree)

For formulae η, χ , we say that η is subordinated to χ , η subχ , if there exists a
sequence χ1 , χ2 , . . . , χk such that (i) χ1 is η (ii) χk is χ (iii) for each i ≤ (k − 1),
χi+1 im − subχi holds. We call such sequence a branch. The formation tree of a
formula is the graph of the relation im − sub.

By the Kuratowski-Hausdorff lemma (Theorem 1.40 (ii)), each branch extends to a

maximal branch. By its definition, each maximal branch for a formula φ has φ as
the greatest element and an atomic proposition as the least element. Therefore the
undirected graph of the relation sub is connected. For any sub-formula of the form
η ◦ χ , formulae η and χ initiate two disjoint branches (η ◦ χ is the bifurcation point).
The relation sub is transitive. The graph of the relation sub is acyclic. Hence, the
graph of the relation im − sub for any formula φ is a tree with the root φ.
In Fig. 2.1, we show the formation tree for the formula φ : ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (¬ p ∨ q).
We may apply this tree towards satisfiability check of the formula φ by procedure
called labelling.
For an assignment A which assigns truth values at the leaves of the formation
tree, we go up the tree and at each node we compute the value of A at that node from
already computed values of A at immediate sub-formulae for that node. When we
have reached the root, we have found the truth value of the formula at the root of the
tree for the assignment A.
2.3 Semantics of Sentential Logic 67

Fig. 2.1 Formation tree

This procedure shows that the truth function for the formula φ at the root of tree is
actually the composition of truth functions of sub-formulae composed according to
the pattern of the formation tree. Labelling allows to bypass this task by the reverse
process of walking the tree bottom-up. This is an example of structural induction:
inferring that a formula φ satisfies a property P from the fact that P is satisfied by
sub-formulae of φ.
Yet another characteristics of a formula is its size.
Definition 2.10 (The size of a formula)
The size of a formula, si ze(φ), is defined by structural induction as follows,
(i) si ze( p) = 0;
(ii) si ze(¬φ) = 1 + si ze(φ);
(iii) si ze(φ ◦ ψ) = si ze(φ) + si ze(ψ) + 1;
(iv) |Sub(φ)| ≤ 2si ze(φ) .
It is easy to realize that si ze(φ) is the number of occurrences of connectives in
φ. As each sub-formula takes a subset of these connectives, we obtain the inequality
(iv).
Definition 2.11 (Validity, satisfiability, unsatisfiability)
We denote by the symbol A∗ (φ, A) the value of the truth function A∗ (φ) under
assignment A. In case A∗ (φ, A) = 1, we say that φ is satisfied by A. A formula φ
is valid (is a tautology) if and only if it is satisfied by each assignment A. A formula
φ is unsatisfiable if and only if the formula ¬φ is valid. A formula φ is satisfiable if
and only if there exists an assignment by which the formula φ is satisfied.
Definition 2.12 (Truth tables)
A truth table for a formula φ is a tabular form of the formation tree: for each assign-
ment A, we compute values of sub-formulae by structural induction and place them
in the table under appropriate headings. A formula is valid when the column headed
by the formula contains only values equal to 1.
68 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Table 2.2 Truth table for the formula φ

p q r p→q q →r p→r (q → φ
r) →
(p → r)
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Table 2.2 is the truth table for the formula

φ : ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )].

It follows that φ is valid. One may check that formulae listed above as (1)-(36)
are valid.
Definition 2.13 (Models. Logical consequence)
For a formula φ, an assignment A such that A∗ (φ, A) = 1 determines a model for φ,
we may write this fact down as A |= φ. This notion extends to sets of formulae. For
a set Γ of formulae, we write A |= Γ if and only if A∗ (φ, A) = 1 for each formula
φ ∈ Γ.
We say that a formula φ is a logical consequence of a set Γ of formulae if and only
if for each assignment A, if A |= Γ , then A |= φ. We express this fact of logical
consequence with the formula Γ |= φ.

2.4 Normal Forms

Definition 2.14 (Semantic equivalence)

Formulae φ and ψ are semantically equivalent, when they have the same value of
the truth function A∗ for each assignment A, i.e., A∗ (φ, A) = A∗ (ψ, A) for each
assignment A. We denote semantic equivalence with the symbol ≡ A . This means
that the formula φ ≡ A ψ is valid.
Normal forms of formulae are distinguished due to their specialized structure, we
are going to discuss negation normal forms, conjunctive normal forms and disjunctive
normal forms, the latter two of importance for later developments, the first is put here
just for the record. Each normal form of a formula is semantically equivalent to it.
2.4 Normal Forms 69

Definition 2.15 (Negation normal form)

A negation normal form is a form of a formula in which the connective of negation
is applied only to atomic propositions and connectives are only those of conjunction
and disjunction.

This form is obtained due to semantic equivalences:

(i) p ⊃ q is equivalent to ¬ p ∨ q
(ii) De Morgan laws: ¬( p ∨ q) is equivalent to (¬ p) ∧ (¬q), ¬( p ∧ q) is equiv-
alent to (¬ p) ∨ (¬q)
(iii) ¬(¬ p) is equivalent to p.
As an example, we obtain the negation normal form for the hypothetical syllogism:
( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )]: by applying (i) and the distribution law, p ∧ q) ∨
r ≡ A ( p ∨ r ) ∧ (q ∨ r ), we obtain the formula

(¬ p ∨ q) ∨ [(q ∨ ¬ p) ∧ (q ∨ r ) ∧ (¬r ∨ ¬ p) ∧ (¬r ∨ r )].

Much more important are the conjunctive normal form (CNF) and the disjunctive
normal form (DNF).

Definition 2.16 (Literals)

A literal is an expression l of the form p which may be either p or ¬ p. A pair (l, ¬l)
forms the pair of contradictory literals.

Definition 2.17 (Clauses)

A clause is a formula l1 ∨ l2 ∨ . . . ∨ lk where each li is a literal.

Definition 2.18 (Conjunctive normal form (CNF))

CNF is a formula C1 ∧ C2 ∧ . . . ∧ Ck , for some k, where each Ci is a clause.

Definition 2.19 (Implicants)

An implicant is an expression of the form I : l1 ∧ l2 ∧ . . . ∧ lm for some m, where
each li is a literal.

Definition 2.20 (Disjunctive normal form (DNF))

DNF is formula I1 ∨ I2 ∨ . . . ∨ In , for some n, where each Ii is an implicant, called
in this case a prime implicant.
j
We may use shortcut symbols: i=k means the disjunction of expressions numbered
j
from k to j for k ≤ j, i=k is a conjunction of expressions, so we may write down
k m i p  i
DNF as i=1 [ j=1 l j] and CNF as i=1 [ nj=1 l j ].
70 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Let us observe that

Theorem 2.2 A clause is valid if and only if it contains a pair of contradictory literals
and C N F is valid if and only if all of its clauses are valid. Dually, an implicant is
valid if and only if it contains no pair of contradictory literals and DNF is valid if
and only if at least one of its prime implicants is valid. From this it follows that CNF
and DNF of a formula are dual in the sense: CNF( phi)≡ A ¬DNF(¬φ).
Theorem 2.3 For each formula φ of SL, there exist semantically equivalent normal
forms C N F(φ) and D N F(φ).
Proof The following algorithm produces DNF for any formula φ:
Algorithm (A) which returns DNF of a formula

n truth table for the given formula φ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ); if φ is unsatisfiable, write the

1 Write
formula i=1 ( pi ∧ ¬ pi ) as DNF(φ)
2 For each assignment A with value 1 of φ, form the conjunction of literals: if an atomic
proposition p has value 0 under A, then insert into the conjunction the literal ¬ p, otherwise insert
the literal p
3 Form the disjunction of conjunctions for all assignments
4 Return the obtained DNF(φ)

Correctness of the algorithm follows from the fact that, by virtue of the construc-
tion of DNF(φ), φ and DNF(φ) are semantically equivalent.
As for CNF, we have two possibilities.
Algorithm (B1) which returns CNF of a formula
1 Apply algorithm (A) to the formula ¬φ to obtain DNF(¬φ)
2 Negate the formula DNF(¬φ) and obtain ¬(DNF(¬φ)) which is CNF(φ)

We can also obtain a dual to algorithm (A) for the formula φ.

Algorithm (B2) which returns CNF of a formula

n 1 Write truth table for the given formula φ; if φ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) is valid, then write the formula
i=1 ( pi ∨ ¬ pi ) and return it as CNF(φ)
2 For each assignment A with value 0 for φ, form the disjunction of literals: if a sentential
variable p has the value 1 under A insert into the disjunction the literal ¬ p, otherwise insert p
3 Form the conjunction of obtained disjunctions
4 Return the obtained CNF(φ)

Correctness of the algorithm follows, as φ and obtained CNF(φ) are semantically

equivalent. 
For example, consider Table 2.3 for a formula φ:
Following algorithm (A), we produce the equivalent form DNF: (¬ p ∧ ¬q ∧
¬r ) ∨ ( p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r ) ∨ ( p ∧ ¬q ∧ r ).
Algorithm (B2) yields the following form CNF: ( p ∨ q ∨ ¬r ) ∧ ( p ∨ ¬q ∨ r ) ∧
( p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r ) ∧ (¬ p ∨ ¬q ∨ r ) ∧ (¬ p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r ). This demonstrates a merit of
normal forms, they allow us to reconstruct an explicit form of a formula from its
truth table.
2.5 Sentential Logic as an Axiomatic Deductive System 71

Table 2.3 Truth table for the p q r φ

formula φ
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0

2.5 Sentential Logic as an Axiomatic Deductive System

Stoic school elaborated themata as means for reduction of expressions to five

indemonstrables, medieval scholasticians gave names to valid syllogisms in order
to reduce them to those of the first group, Euclid built a system of geometry as an
axiomatic system. This idea of axiom schemes and inference rules was implemented
by Frege [4], who according to Łukasiewicz [5], was the first to clearly separate
axiom schemes from rules of inference.
Gottlob Frege proposed the following system of axiom schemes:
1 p ⊃ (q ⊃ p).
2 [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [( p ⊃ q) ⊂ ( p ⊃ r )].
3 [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )].
4 ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(¬q) ⊃ (¬ p)].
5 (¬(¬ p)) ⊃ p.
6 p ⊃ (¬(¬ p)).
It was shown (cf. Łukasiewicz [5]) that the scheme 3 follows from schemes 1 and 2.
Kleene [6] proposed a set of 13 axiom schemes.
David Hilbert proposed a few axiom systems, we quote (Hilbert and Acker-
man [7]) system :
1 ( p ∨ p) ⊃ p;
2 p ⊃ ( p ∨ q);
3 ( p ∨ q) ⊃ (q ∨ p);
4 ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [( p ∨ r ) ⊃ (q ∨ r )].
The Hilbert second system (H2) was as follows:
1 p ⊃ (q ⊃ p);
72 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

2 ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ [( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )];
3 (¬q ⊃ ¬ p) ⊃ [(¬q ⊃ p) ⊃ q)].
In Church [8], a system P1 is discussed, among other systems, whose axiom schemes
involve falsum ⊥:
1 p ⊃ (q ⊃ p);
2 [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )].
3 [( p ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥] ⊃ p.
Two extremes in this area are the single axiom scheme in Meredith [9]:
((((( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (¬r ⊃ ¬s)) ⊃ r ) ⊃ u) ⊃ ((u ⊃ p) ⊃ (s ⊃ p)))
(cf. a discussion of organic schemata in (Łukasiewicz and Tarski [10])), and a
proposition by Herbrand to accept all valid formulae as axiom schemes. This proposal
would eradicate syntactic considerations: rules of inference, provability problems,
and large part of metatheory.
We adopt in the sequel the Łukasiewicz system Łukasiewicz [11].
Definition 2.21 (The Łukasiewicz axiom schemes)
(L1) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )] (hypothetical syllogism);
(L2) (¬ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p;
(L3) ( p ⊃ (¬ p ⊃ q)) (the Duns Scotus formula).
A set of axiom schemes is one ingredient of a deductive system, the other is a set of
rules of inference, which are symbolic valued functions on sets of formulae producing
new formulae; some systems like Hilbert’s or Kleene’s apply the detachment rule
solely, the first Hilbert system admits substitution, other like (Łukasiewicz’s (L1)-
(L3)) use also the substitution rule along with the replacement rule. We define these
rules formally.
Definition 2.22 (Rules of inference)
(MP) the rule of detachment (Modus Ponens (MP)): (MP) is exactly Mood 1 of the
Stoic logic. It is written now in the following form

p, p ⊃ q
,
q

i.e., q follows from p and p ⊃ q;

(S) the rule of substitution (S): in each wff, one may substitute for all equiform
occurrences of an atomic proposition, a well-formed expression in such man-
ner that equiform occurrences of that expression coincide with equiform occur-
rences of the sentential variable;
(R) the rule of replacement allows for substitutions of definiendum p in any defini-
tion p = q in place of definiens q in any wff. For example, we have defined the
connective p ∨ q = (¬ p) ⊃ q and, in consequence, we can substitute p ∨ q
for (¬ p) ⊃ q in any wff.
2.5 Sentential Logic as an Axiomatic Deductive System 73

Let us mention that substitution is present in axiomatic systems, if not as a genuine

inference rule then at first stages of proofs when substitutions are made in axiom
schemes to produce instances of schemes.
The crucial notion for deductive systems is the notion of a proof.

Definition 2.23 (The notion of a proof)

A proof of a formula φ from a set AX of axiom schemes is a sequence of formulae
ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn with the properties that (i) ψn is φ (ii) each ψi for i ≤ n is an instance
of an axiom scheme in AX or it is obtained from formulae in the set {ψ j : j < i} by
means of an inference rule.

Definition 2.24 (Provability)

A formula is provable in the given axiomatic system if and only if it has a proof in
this system. Provable formulae are called theorems of the system.

Example 2.1 As an example, we recall a proof of the formula p ⊃ p.

1 Begin with (L1): ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )]
2 Substitute (q/¬ p ⊃ q) to obtain the instance
3 (L1*) [ p ⊃ (¬ p ⊃ q)] ⊃ [((¬ p ⊃ q) ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )]
4 Apply detachment with (L3) to (L1*) and then substitution ( p/q)
to obtain
5 [(¬ p ⊃ p) ⊃ r )] ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )]
6 Substitute (r/ p) in (5) to obtain
7 [(¬ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p)] ⊃ ( p ⊃ p)]
8 Apply detachment rule with (L2) to (7) to obtain
9 p ⊃ p.

Definition 2.25 (The notion of a relative proof)

For a set Γ of formulae and a formula φ, a proof of φ from Γ is a sequence
ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn of formulae such that: (i) ψn is φ (ii) each ψi is either an instance of
an axiom scheme or is in Γ , or, follows from some preceding formulae by a rule of
inference. The fact that φ is provable from Γ is denoted Γ  φ. In particular, for a
theorem φ the fact of provability is denoted  φ.

We come to the stage in our exposition in which we will rely on a number of

provable formulae. As provability proofs are often quite complex and lengthy, we
will point to proofs in Łukasiewicz [11].
One of most important results about provability is the Herbrand deduction theorem
Herbrand [12]. Independently, a parallel result was obtained by Tarski [13] in which
deduction was related to the notion of consequence.

Theorem 2.4 (The deduction theorem) If Γ ∪ {ψ}  φ, then Γ  ψ ⊃ φ.

74 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Proof Consider a proof ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn for φ with φ equiform with ψn . Proof goes

by induction with respect to i for the formula

(∗) Γ  ψ ⊃ ψi .

We consider particular cases.

Case 1. i = 1: ψ1 is (a) an instance of an axiom (b) an element of Γ or (c) ψ. In
sub-cases (a) and (b), we apply the provable instance ψ1 ⊃ (ψ ⊃ ψ1 ) (derivation 18
in Łukasiewicz [11]) and detachment rule yields Γ  ψ ⊃ ψ1 . In case (c), we have
already proved the formula  ψ1 ⊃ ψ1 in Example 2.1. This completes the proof of
Case 1.
Suppose that (*) has been proved for i < j.
Case 2. i = j: ψi is as in Case 1 or (d) ψi is obtained by an application of detach-
ment rule from some ψm and ψk : ψm ⊃ ψ j with m < k. Hence, by hypothesis of
induction,
(e) Γ  ψ ⊃ ψm

and
( f ) Γ  ψ ⊃ (ψm ⊃ ψ j )

From the instance (derivation 35 in [11])

(ψ ⊃ (ψm ⊃ ψ j )) ⊃ ((ψ ⊃ ψm ) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ ψ j ))

we obtain by the detachment rule applied twice the conclusion Γ  ψ ⊃ ψ j .

Case 3. i = n: we obtain Γ  ψ ⊃ φ. Proof is concluded. 

In case Γ is finite, Γ = {γi : i = 1, 2, . . . , n}, Theorem 2.4 takes the following

form

Theorem 2.5 If γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γn  φ, then γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γn−1  γn ⊃ φ.

We introduce a symbol Γi=1

k
γi p in order to denote a sequence of implications γ1 ⊃
(γ2 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (γk ⊃ p))). Then, by iteration of Theorem 2.5, we obtain the following
form of deduction theorem.

Theorem 2.6 If γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γn  φ, then  Γi=1

n
γi φ.

We state a lemma Church [8].

Lemma 2.1 If γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γn  φ and δ1 , δ2 , . . . , δm are formulae such that among

them is each of γi , then δ1 , δ2 , . . . , δm  φ.

Lemma 2.2 Formula p ⊃ (q ⊃ p ∧ q) is provable (derivation 91 in

Łukasiewicz [11]).
2.5 Sentential Logic as an Axiomatic Deductive System 75

Using Lemma 2.1 and Definition 2.21 along with detachment, we can obtain the
deduction theorem in the following form.
n
Theorem 2.7 If γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γn  φ, then  i=1 γi ⊃ φ.
Now, we allow ourselves a bit of digression.
Definition 2.26 (The Polish notation)
This notation, introduced by Jan Łukasiewicz around 1922, called also the prefix
notation, writes down formulae by prefixing arguments with operators, e.g., the for-
mula p ⊃ q is written as C pq (C was the symbol applied for implication); similarly,
negation was written as N p (here, of course, the prefix notation and standard notation
coincide except for the symbol).
For example, the axiom schema (L1) would be written as CC pqCCqrC pr (notice
that the symbol C always acts on two succeeding groups of symbols or single
symbols). The Polish notation and its dual, the Reverse Polish notation, prompted
the introduction of the stack data structure.
Definition 2.27 (Logical matrices)
Invented independently by few authors beginning with C. S. Peirce, among them
Bernays [14] and Łukasiewicz (some authors point also at Post and Wittgenstein),
logical matrices have been used to ascertain the independence of axiomatic schemes
in the sense that no instance of a scheme can be derived from other axiom schemes
by rules of inference. We explain the usage of those matrices with an example in
Łukasiewicz [11].
Consider a matrix which is a specially designed truth table for C that is, ⊃ and N
that is ¬:
We may look at this matrix as a multiplication table, e.g., C12 = 0, C20 = 1.
If we compute the value of (L1) for p = 2, q = 0, r = 2, we obtain the result
CC20CC02C22 = 0, while for (L2) and (L3), any substitution of values yields
the result 1 (Table 2.4).
It remains to notice that the result of computations is invariant under rules of
inference, hence, axiom scheme (L1) is independent of (L2)+(L3).
Definition 2.28 (The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra)
By deduction theorem, the provable formula p ⊃ p, and, the hypothetical syllogism
(L1), p ⊃ q, q ⊃ r  p ⊃ r , it follows that the relation p ∼ q if and only if p ⊃ q
and q ⊃ p are provable is an equivalence relation on the theory T of wffs.

Table 2.4 C,N truth matrix

C 0 1 2 N
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0
2 1 1 0 2
76 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

The formula p ⊃ q if provable defines the ordering p ≤ q. The quotient set T / ∼

is the carrier of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra (called also the Lindenbaum algebra
(unpublished by Lindenbaum)). The ordering ≤ factorizes through ∼: [φ]∼ ≤∼ [ψ]∼
if and only if φ ≤ ψ. Please notice that while the relation ≤ is only reflexive, by prov-
ability of p ⊃ p and transitive by (L1), the factorization by ∼ yields the symmetry
, i.e., ∼ is an equivalence. The Lindenbaum-Tarski construction leads to Boolean
algebra in case of SL.

Theorem 2.8 The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of sentential logic is a Boolean alge-

bra. The unit of this algebra is the class of all provable formulae, the zero is the class
of all unsatisfiable formulae. We have the following relations between operations of
logic and lattice operations:
(i) [φ]∼ ∪ [ψ]∼ = [φ ∨ ψ]∼ ;
(ii) [φ]∼ ∩ [ψ]∼ = [φ ∧ ψ]∼ ;
(iii) −[φ]∼ = [¬φ]∼ .

Proof First, we verify the lattice structure: that [φ ∨ ψ]∼ is the join φ]∼ ∪ [ψ]∼
follows from provability of formulae:
(1) ( p ⊃ p ∨ q);
(2) (q ⊃ p ∨ q);
(3) ( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ ((q ⊃ r ) ⊃ (( p ∨ q) ⊃ r ))).
Similarly, [φ]∼ ∩ [ψ]∼ is [φ ∧ ψ]∼ due to provability of formulae:
(4) p ∧ q ⊃ p;
(5) p ∧ q ⊃ q;
(6) (( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ q ∧ r ))).
We introduce into the lattice T / ∼ the relative pseudo-complementation ⇒
defined as [φ]∼ ⇒ [ψ]∼ is [φ ⊃ ψ]∼ due to provability of formulae
(7) (( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ (( p ∧ q) ⊃ r ));
(8) ((( p ∧ q) ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )));
The existence of the complement − is secured by the provable formulae:
(9) p ∧ ¬ p ⊃ q;
(10) (( p ⊃ ( p ∧ ¬ p)) ⊃ p).
By (9), [ p ∧ ¬ p]∼ is the element zero 0. By (10), −[φ]∼ = [φ]∼ ⇒ [φ ∧ ¬φ]∼ =
[φ ⊃ (φ ∧ ¬φ)]∼ = [¬φ]∼ .
Finally, the unit element 1 is provided by provable formula p ∨ ¬ p which implies
[φ]∼ ∪ [¬φ]∼ = 1. 

Provability of formulae (1)–(10) may be asserted by syntactic means: cf. e.g.,

Łukasiewicz [11] or by semantic means via the completeness property which will be
proved in the sequel. Please consult (Rasiowa and Sikorski [15]) for more detailed
analysis.
2.6 Natural Deduction 77

2.6 Natural Deduction

In verifying validity of a formula we often apply an ‘informal’ approach, e.g., for

hypothetical syllogism

φ : ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )],

we could argue as follows: φ may be false only if truth value of the antecedent p ⊃ q
is 1, i.e, when the truth value of p is 0 or truth value of p is 1 and truth value of q is
1. In the first case, truth value of p ⊃ r is 1 which makes the consequent true and φ
valid. In the second case, truth value of the consequent is decided by truth value of
r ; but regardless whether r is valued 0 or 1, the consequent is true and φ is valid.
Such informal ways of estimating validity prompted Jan Łukasiewicz to pose at
the seminar in Warsaw University in 1926 the problem of formalization of ‘natural
deduction’. Solutions were proposed by Jaśkowski (Jaśkowski [16, 17]) and Gentzen
[18]).
We begin with the Gentzen sequent calculus for sentential logic.

Definition 2.29 (Sequents)

A sequent is a formula of the form Γ ⇒ Δ, where Γ = {φ1 , φ2 , . . . , φn } and
Δ = {ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψm } are sets of formulae. As with implications in SL, Γ is the
antecedent and Δ is the consequent of the sequent.

Definition 2.30 (Validity notion for sequents)

Each sequent of the generic form Γ ⇒ Δas in Definition  2.29, has the truth value
n
equal to the truth value of the implication i=1 φi ⊃ mj=1 ψ j due to Gentzen [18].
Hence, the sequent Γ ⇒ Δ is valid if each formula φi is valid and some formula ψ j
is valid in case sets Γ and Δ are non-empty.
n
Limiting cases are: if Γ = ∅, then i=1 φi has truth value 1 and for the sequent
to be valid there should exist at least one valid formula ψ j ; if there is no such ψ j
then the sequent is of the form ∅ ⇒ ∅, hence it is invalid. If Δ = ∅, then the sequent
has truth value 1 only if there exists a formula φi with truth value 0.
From Definition 2.30, the criterion of validity for sequents follows.

Theorem 2.9 A sequent Γ ⇒ Δ is valid if and only if either there exists an invalid
formula in Γ or there exists a valid formula in Δ.

There are many variants of the Gentzen sequent calculus, the original Gentzen cal-
culus LK, the variant K of Ketonen (see Indrzejczak [19]), the systems G, G∗, G 1 , G 2
(see Smullyan [20]), diagrams of (Rasiowa and Sikorski [15]), among others. We
will discuss the system K.

Definition 2.31 (The sequent system K)

The system K consists of the following rules:
Γ ⇒Δ,φ
(left¬) ¬φ,Γ ⇒Δ
(right ¬) Γφ,Γ ⇒Δ
⇒Δ,¬φ
;
78 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

φ,ψ,Γ ⇒Δ Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ ⇒Δ,ψ

(left ∧) φ∧ψ,Γ ⇒Δ
(right ∧) Γ ⇒Δ,φ∧ψ
;
Γ,φ⇒Δ Γ,ψ⇒Δ Γ ⇒Δ,φ,ψ
(left ∨) Γ,φ∨ψ⇒Δ
(right ∨) Γ ⇒Δ,φ∨ψ ;
(left ⊃) Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ,ψ⇒Δ
Γ,φ⊃ψ⇒Δ
(right ⊃) ΓΓ,φ⇒Δ,ψ
⇒Δ,φ⊃ψ
.

Actually, the system K is the system G0 in Smullyan [20].

An axiom is any sequent of the form Γ, φ ⇒ φ, Δ.
Obviously, every instance of the axiom schema is a valid sequent. Let us observe
that as Γ, Δ are sets, the order of listing their elements is irrelevant. Terminology
associated with sequent figures is as follows: the formula obtained as a result of
introducing a connective is principal, terms which have constituted the principal
formula are side formulae, other formulae are forming context for the figure (also
called parametric formulae).

Theorem 2.10 Each rule of the sequent system K is valid in the sense that validity
of the antecedent implies validity of the consequent.

Proof We give a pattern for the proof, all other rules are checked along similar lines.
For (left ¬): suppose the sequent Γ ⇒ Δ, φ is valid. Then, either a formula in Γ is
invalid in which case the consequent ¬φ, Γ ⇒ Δ is valid, or, a formula in the set
Δ ∪ {φ} is valid, in which case, either φ is valid, and then ¬φ is invalid which makes
the consequent valid, or, a formula in Δ is valid which again makes the consequent
valid. This pattern holds as well for rules with two antecedents. 

A proof of a formula φ is the sequent ∅ ⇒ φ.

Proofs in sequent calculus are carried from axioms to the formula to be proved.
S
Let us observe that rules of sequent calculus are invertible: for the rule S∗ , the rule

S∗ S S S∗ S∗
S
is valid; in case of the rule S∗ , rules S and S  are valid.

Example 2.2 We prove the contraposition ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(¬q) ⊃ ¬ p].

The proof may go like below.

1 p ⇒ q, p p, q ⇒ p
2 p, p ⊃ q ⇒ q by applying (left ⊃) to 1
3 p ⊃ q ⇒ q, ¬ p by applying (right ¬) to 2
4 p ⊃ q, ¬q ⇒ ¬ p by applying (left ¬) to 3
5 p ⊃ q ⇒ ¬q ⊃ ¬ p by applying (right ⊃) to 4
6 ⇒ ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(¬q) ⊃ ¬ p] by applying (right ⊃) to 5.
We add a proof of the formula ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ((¬ p) ∨ q).

1 p ⇒ q, p p ⇒ q, p
2 p, p ⊃ q ⇒ q
3 p ⊃ q ⇒ ¬ p, q
4 p ⊃ q ⇒ (¬ p ∨ q)
5 ⇒ ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(¬ p) ∨ q].

These examples introduce us to the notion of a theorem of the sequent calculus.

2.7 Natural Deduction: Decomposition Diagrams 79

Definition 2.32 (Sequent provability)

A formula φ is a theorem of the sequent calculus if and only if the sequent ⇒ φ has
a sequent proof.

That sequent calculus is sound follows from validity of sequent rules and of
validity of axioms. Completeness of sequent calculus will be proved in Sect. 2.8.
We also include a variant of Gentzen system due to (Rasiowa and Sikorski [15])
in which implication is replaced by its equivalent (¬ p) ∨ q.

2.7 Natural Deduction: Decomposition Diagrams

By the symbol Γ we denote finite sequences of formulae. A sequence is final if it

consists solely of literals and it is valid if it contains a pair of contradictory literals.

Definition 2.33 (Decomposition rules)

Each of these rules decomposes a sequence either into a conjunction of two sequences
(we call such rules as being of type α) or into a disjunction of two sequences (type
β of a rule). We denote disjunction as a coma ‘, and we denote conjunction as
semicolon ‘; .

The rules are:

Γ1 , φ ∨ ψ, Γ2
(∨)
Γ1 , φ, ψ, Γ2
Γ1 , ¬(φ ∨ ψ), Γ2
(¬∨)
Γ1 , ¬φ, Γ2 ; Γ1 , ¬ψ, Γ2
Γ1 , φ ∧ ψ, Γ2
(∧)
Γ1 , φ, Γ1 ; Γ1 , ψ, Γ2
Γ1 , ¬(φ ∧ ψ), Γ2
(¬∧)
Γ1 , ¬φ, ¬ψ, Γ2
Γ1 , φ → ψ, Γ2
(→)
Γ1 , ¬φ, ψ, Γ2
Γ1 , ¬(φ → ψ), Γ2
(¬ →)
Γ1 , φ, Γ2 ; Γ1 , ¬ψ, Γ2
Γ1 , ¬¬φ, Γ2
(¬) .
Γ1 , φ, Γ2

In the above schemes, the sequence Γ1 is always an indecomposable sequence, if

any. A sequence is a leaf sequence if it is either indecomposable or valid.
In Fig. 2.2, the decomposition of formula φ : ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (¬ p ∨ q) is presented.
We obtain disjunctions of literals in the leaves of the tree, i.e., clauses. As we obtain
over the leaves a conjunction of clauses (a C N F form of the formula), we obtain
80 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Fig. 2.2 Diagram of a

formula

Theorem 2.11 A formula φ is valid if and only if the tree of decomposition is finite
and all leaf sequences (leaf clauses) in the decomposition of φ are valid.

Proof It is easy to grasp that as decomposition rules are defined by valid equiva-
lences, the formula φ is equivalent to the conjunction of end clauses. Hence, validity
of φ implies validity of all leaf clauses and an upper bound on the height of the tree:
suppose not, and let the tree contain branches of any height. Then, by the König
Theorem 1.15, there exists an infinite branch B. Branch B cannot contain any pair of
contradictory literals because in that case, after the appearance of a complementary
literal making a contradictory pair, the branch would end by the validity condition
for a leaf sequence. It follows that the branch B contains for each literal either only
non-negated or only negated occurrences. But then B would be not valid and the
formula φ would be not valid, a contradiction which proves the finiteness of the tree.
The converse is obvious. 

Corollary 2.1 The set of valid formulae of SL is the least set containing all valid
clauses and closed on the decomposition rules.

Theorem 2.12 (a form of completeness theorem for SL) Each valid clause is prov-
able. If a formula φ is valid, then its semantically equivalent CNF is provable.

Proof The formula p ∨ ¬ p is provable (derivation

 9 in [11]). Consider the clause C :
p ∨ ¬ p ∨ Q, where Q is the sub-clause i qi . The formula p ⊃ p ∨ q is provable
(derivation 73 in [11]) under substitution ( p/ p ∨ p), which is equivalent to the
formula ¬ p ∨ p ∨ q.
Substituting for q in the latter formula the sub-clause Q, we obtain that the clause C
is provable. Suppose that CNF(φ) is a conjunction of k clauses, from C1 to Ck . On the
strength of provable formula p ⊃ (q ⊃ p ∧ q) (derivation 91 in [11]), with clauses
C1 substituted for p and C2 substituted for q, we obtain by applying detachment twice
that the conjunction C1 ∧ C2 is provable. This argument repeated with C1 ∧ C2 for
p and C3 for q yields that the conjunction C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3 is provable; by continuing
this argument to Ck , we prove that C N F(φ) is provable. 

Yet another offspring of the Gentzen sequent calculus is the method of tableaux
(Beth [21], Smullyan [20]).
2.8 Tableaux 81

2.8 Tableaux

Tableaux realize in similar but distinct form the idea of natural deduction of
Jaśkowski-Gentzen. A tableau is a tree with the given formula φ at the root. In
the subsequent steps, the formula is decomposed in a manner of Definition 2.9. The
difference is that formulae are signed, i.e., prefixed with the symbol T or F, meaning
valid or invalid. Depending on the sign, decomposition takes distinct forms. We con-
tinue with our convention of denoting disjunction with ‘, and conjunction with ‘; .
Tableaux we discuss are called analytic in Smullyan [20] (this name is given tableaux
also in Fitting [22] in distinction to semantic tableaux in Beth [21]). Analyticity of
tableaux means that no external formulae are allowed in the decomposition process
contrary to semantic tableaux of Beth in which such intervention is allowed.

Definition 2.34 (Tableau rules)

The schemes for decomposition of signed formulae are defined in accordance with
truth tables for connectives and with valid equivalences; they are as follows:
T ( p ∧ q) F( p ∨ q) F( p ⊃ q)
1
T p; T q F p; Fq T p; Fq

T ( p ∨ q) F( p ∧ q) T ( p ⊃ q)
2
T p, T q F p, Fq F p, T q

T (¬ p) F¬ p
3
Fp Tp

The explanation for schemes is in the following: (1) collects decomposition rules
in which components are related by conjunction (rules of type α); (2) collects decom-
position rules in which components are related by disjunction (rules of type β); (3)
concerns negation. The graphic presentation of rules (1)–(3) is shown in Fig. 2.3.
Tableaux are built recursively from the root. Suppose the process of building the
tableau has reached a node N . We consider the path π(N ) from the root to N . Then
we can extend the path π(N ) if on the path π(N ) before N there is a formula to be
decomposed; if the formula is of type (α), with α1 and α2 as imminent sub-formulae,
then we extend the path π(N ) by adding α1 and then α2 to the path π(N ) so we
obtain the path π(N ) - α1 - α2 .
In case the formula is of type (β), with imminent sub-formulae β1 ,β2 forming
disjunction, the path π(N ) splits into two paths, on one the successor to N is β1 , on
the other the successor to N is β2 . This, clearly, realizes the distributive law. Like in
the diagrammatic method, we obtain a branching tree. A branch is closed (marked
X) when one finds on it a formula along with its negation, so conjunction of formulae
on the branch is unsatisfiable. Otherwise, the branch is open.
82 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Fig. 2.3 Forms of

decomposition

The formula φ is unsatisfiable when all branches in its tableau are closed; it is
valid if and only if all branches on its tableau are open; when there exists an open
branch in the tableau then the formula is satisfiable.
These facts are exploited when the signed formula at the root of a tableau is Fφ.
The closed tableau witnesses unsatisfiability of Fφ, hence, validity of φ; on the
contrary, the existence of an open branch is a witness to satisfiability of ¬φ.

Example 2.3 In Fig. 2.4, the tableau is shown for the signed formula Fφ : F[( p ⊃
(q ⊃ r )) ⊃ (q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ))]. All three branches are closed, hence, the assumption of
falsity of φ has led to contradiction, hence, φ is valid.
On the contrary, in the tableau in Fig. 2.5 for the signed formula F [(( p ∧ q) ⊃
r ) ⊃ (( p ∨ q) ⊃ r )], we see two branches closed, marked X, and two branches open,
marked , which point to valuations falsifying the formula φ: V1 : p = 0, q =
1, r = 0 and V2 : p = 1, q = 0, r = 0.

We sum up these facts.

Definition 2.35 (Hintikka sets)

A Hintikka set (Hintikka [23], cf. Smullyan [20]), is a set Δ of formulae such that

(i) neither ⊥ nor any pair F p, T p for any atomic proposition p are in Δ;
(ii) for each formula φ ∧ ξ ∈ Δ, φ, ξ ∈ Δ;
(iii) for each formula φ ∨ ξ ∈ Δ, either φ ∈ Δ or ξ ∈ Δ.

We recall that a set of formulae is satisfiable if there exists an assignment which

satisfies each formula in the set.

Theorem 2.13 Each Hintikka set of formulae is satisfiable.

2.8 Tableaux 83

Fig. 2.4 A closed tableau

Proof To satisfy atomic propositions, we let A( p) = 0 if F p ∈ Δ and A( p) = 1 if

T p ∈ Δ. If neither F p nor T p occurs in Δ, then we assign arbitrarily either value 1
or value 0. The rest goes by structural induction. Condition (ii) guarantees that if φ
and ξ are satisfied then φ ∧ ξ is satisfied and if either φ or ξ is satisfied then φ ∨ ξ
is satisfied. 

Corollary 2.2 Each open branch of a tableau is a Hintikka set hence it is satisfiable.
In particular an infinite branch of a tableau is satisfiable.

Definition 2.36 (Tableau provability)

A formula φ is tableau provable if and only if each tableau for Fφ is closed.

Theorem 2.14 (On tableau completeness) If a formula φ is valid then it has a tableau
proof.

Proof Suppose that φ is not tableau provable, hence, Fφ has a tableau with an open
branch which is satisfiable, and thus, φ is not valid. 

It follows from the definition of validity of a sequent in Definition 2.30 that validity
of a sequent Γ ⇒ Δ, where Γ = {γi : i ≤ n} and Δ = {δ j : j ≤ m}, is equivalent
84 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Fig. 2.5 An open tableau

to validity of the tableau for the set of signed formulae T γ1 , T γ2 , . . . , T γn , Fδ1 ,

Fδ2 , . . . , Fδn . Tableau completeness implies the following result:

Theorem 2.15 (Completeness of the sequent calculus) If a formula φ is valid, then

the sequent ⇒ φ is provable.

Proof Suppose that the sequent ⇒ φ is not provable, hence, a tableau for the signed
formula Fφ is not closed, hence, there is an open branch, which is satisfiable, and
thus, φ is not valid. 

2.9 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part I

We have already entered into this realm by proving the deduction theorem. Now, we
address meta-properties of sentential logic. We apply analytic tableaux to this end.
In the first place, we collect the basic properties of the relation Γ  φ. We recall
that Σ SL is the set of theorems of SL.
2.9 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part I 85

Theorem 2.16 The following are properties of the relation Γ  φ:

(i) Σ  φ for each φ ∈ Σ SL ;

(ii) if φ ∈ Γ , then Γ  φ;
(iii) if Γ ⊆ Γ  and Γ  φ, then Γ   φ;
(iv) if Γ  φ, then Γ   φ for a finite subset Γ  of Γ ;
(v) if Γ ∪ {φ}  ψ, then Γ  φ ⊃ ψ;
(vi) if Γ  φ and φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Σ SL , then Γ  ψ.

Proof For (i): it follows by definition of Σ SL and validity preservation by detach-

ment(MP), substitution S, and, replacement (R);
For (ii): it follows as p ⊃ p is a theorem in Σ SL (cf. Example 2.1);
For (iii): it is obvious as each formula in Γ is in Γ  ;

For (iv): if Γ  φ then there exists a set {ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn } such that i ψi ⊃ φ ∈
Σ SL is a proof; clearly, Γ  = {ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn } is as desired;
For (v): it is the deduction theorem;
For (vi): by addition to a proof of φ of the implication φ ⊃ ψ we obtain a proof
of ψ from Γ . 

Property (iv) is a compactness property.

Consistency property means essentially that a set of formulae cannot prove all
wffs, in particular, it cannot prove falsity.

Definition 2.37 (Consistency)

A set Γ of formulae is consistent if and only if there is no formula φ such that both
φ and ¬φ are provable from Γ .

Equivalently, a set Γ is consistent if and only if it is not true that Γ  ⊥. Indeed, if

Γ  φ and Γ  ¬φ for some formula φ, then the provable formula ¬φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ⊥)
(derivation 36 in [11]) implies that Γ  ⊥. The converse follows on similar lines.

Theorem 2.17 Consistency has the following basic properties.

(i) a set Γ is inconsistent if and only if Γ  φ for each φ;

(ii) a set Γ is consistent if and only if there is a formula φ not provable from Γ ;
(iii) a set Γ is consistent if and only if each finite subset of Γ is consistent;
(iv) if Γ  φ, then the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent;
(v) if Γ ∪ {φ} is consistent, then ¬φ has no proof from Γ ;
(vi) the set Σ SL is consistent;
(vii) if Γ ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent then Γ  φ.

Proof For (i): From left to right. Inconsistency of Γ means Γ  φ and Γ  ¬φ for
some φ. From provable formula ¬φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ) (derivation 36 in [11]) it follows by
detachment applied twice that Γ  ψ for each formula ψ. The converse is obvious,
(ii) is the negation of (i).
86 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Property (iii) follows by the compactness property; for property (iv): suppose that
Γ  φ; (L3) states that φ ⊃ (¬φ ⊃ q) is provable and the substitution q/⊥ yields
the provable formula φ ⊃ (¬φ ⊂ ⊥). By detachment, we obtain that Γ  ¬φ ⊃ ⊥.
If a sequence σ of formulae is a proof of ¬φ ⊃ ⊥ from Γ , then σ, ¬φ is a proof of
⊥ from Γ ∪ {¬φ}, hence, the latter set is inconsistent;
Property (v) is a transposition of (iv); for property (vi): as Σ SL consists of provable
formulae which are valid by validity-preserving properties of inference rules, no
falsity can be inferred from Σ SL ;
For property (vii): if Γ ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent, then Γ ∪ {¬φ}  ⊥ and by deduc-
tion theorem Γ  ¬φ ⊂ ⊥. From (¬φ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ φ in Σ, we infer that Γ  φ. 
Consistency of a set Γ will be denoted by the symbol Con(Γ ).
Definition 2.38 (Maximal consistency)
A consistent set Γ is maximal consistent if and only if Γ is consistent and there does
not exist a consistent proper superset Γ ∗ of Γ . Maximality of a consistent set Γ will
be denoted by the symbol MaxCon(Γ ). Maximality has important consequences
and therefore it is important to know that maximal extension exists for each consistent
set Γ . While the finite character of consistency (Theorem 2.17(iii)) allows for the
application of the Teichmüller-Tukey lemma (Theorem 1.14(i)), we include, also for
historic reasons, another argument known as the Lindenbaum Lemma.
Theorem 2.18 (The Lindenbaum Lemma)
Each consistent set Γ of formulae has a maximal consistent extension Γ ∗ .
Proof As each formula in SL uses only finitely many atomic propositions, and
their set is countable, the set of formulae is at most of cardinality of the set of
finite sequences over a countable set, hence, it is countable and we can arrange all
formulae into, possibly infinite, sequence φ0 , φ1 , . . . , φn , . . .. We define a sequence
Γ0 , Γ1 , Γ2 , . . . , Γn , . . . of sets of formulae by letting
(i) Γ0 = Γ ;
(ii) Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {φn } if Γn ∪ {φn } is consistent;
(iii) Γn+1 = Γn , otherwise.

We let Γ ∗ = {Γn : n ≥ 0} and we claim that
(iv) Γ ⊆ Γ ∗ ;
(v) Γ ∗ is consistent;
(vi) Γ ∗ is maximal consistent.
We easily prove by induction that each Γn is consistent. Then for (iv): it follows
by (i) and definition of Γ ∗ . For (v): by the Teichmüller-Tukey Lemma (Thm. 1.14(i))
it is sufficient to check that each finite subset Δ of Γ ∗ is consistent. By finiteness of
Δ, there exists n such that Δ ⊆ Γn . As Γn is consistent, Δ is consistent, hence, Γ ∗
is consistent.
For (vi): suppose that Γ ∗ ⊂ Ω and Con(Ω). Let φ ∈ Ω \ Γ ∗ . Then φ is φn for
some n. It follows that Γn ∪ {φn } is inconsistent, hence, Γ ∗ ∪ {φn } is inconsistent
2.9 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part I 87

and as Γ ∗ ∪ {φn } ⊆ Ω, the set Ω is inconsistent, a contradiction, i.e., Γ ∗ is maximal

consistent extension of Γ . Proof is concluded. 

Corollary 2.3 If ConΓ and Con(Γ ∪ {φ}) implies φ ∈ Γ , then MaxCon(Γ ).

Theorem 2.19 The following are basic properties of maximal consistent sets. Sup-
pose that MaxCon(Γ ).

(i) Γ  φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ ;

(ii) Σ SL ⊆ Γ ;
(iii) φ ∈ Γ if and only if ¬φ ∈/ Γ;
(iv) φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ ;
(v) φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ ;
(vi) φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ Γ implies that ψ ∈ Γ .

Proof For (i): if Γ  φ and φ ∈ / Γ , then Γ ∪ {φ} is inconsistent, hence, Γ ∪ {φ} 

⊥. As Γ  ⊥ is impossible, the proof of ⊥ from Γ ∪ {φ} must involve φ, and thus,
Γ  φ along with Γ ∪ {φ}  ⊥ imply Γ  ⊥, a contradiction;
For (ii): by definition of a proof, Γ proves all theorems, hence all theorems are in
Γ , i.e. Σ SL ⊆ Γ ;
For (iii): were φ, ¬φ ∈ Γ , we would have Γ  φ, Γ  ¬φ, a contradiction,
hence, at most one of φ, ¬φ may be in Γ ;
For (iv): property (iv) follows by formulae φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ ∧ ψ) and by φ ∧ ψ ⊃ φ,
and, φ ∧ ψ ⊃ ψ, ([11]);
For (v): property (v) follows by provable formulae φ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ and ψ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ
(derivation 72 in [11]) for the proof from right to left and by provable formulae
φ ∨ ψ ⊃ (¬φ ⊃ ψ) and φ ∨ ψ ⊃ (¬ψ ⊃ φ) (derivations 84–86 in [11]) for the
proof from left to right;
For (vi): property (vi) follows on the strength of the provable formula (φ ⊃ ψ) ≡
¬φ ∨ ψ (derivations 84–86 in [11]), since either ¬φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ . If φ ∈ Γ then
ψ ∈ Γ. 

Theorem 2.20 Each MaxCon(Γ ) is a Hintikka set, hence, each maximal consistent
set is satisfiable.

Proof By Theorem 2.13 and by Theorem 2.19(iii)–(v). 

Corollary 2.4 Each consistent set of formulae is satisfiable.

Corollary 2.5 (i) For a consistent set Γ of formulae and a formula φ, Γ  φ if and
only φ ∈ Ω for each maximal consistent extension Ω of Γ ;
(ii) φ ∈ Σ SL if and only if φ ∈ Ω for each MaxCon(Ω);
(iii) Each formula in a consistent set Γ is provable from each maximal consistent
extension of Γ .
88 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

The importance of Corollary 2.4 stems from its relation to completeness. We will
see usages of this relation in the following chapters. This relation may be expressed
in the following statement.

Theorem 2.21 (The strong completeness of SL) If each consistent set of formulae
is satisfiable, then for each set Γ of formulae and each formula φ,

(SC) i f Γ |= φ, then Γ  φ.

Proof Suppose the conclusion is false, i.e., for a set Γ of formulae and a formula φ
we have that Γ |= φ but it is not true that Γ  φ. Then, the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent
but not satisfiable because truth of Γ in a model would imply the truth of φ in the
model, hence, the falsity of ¬φ. The property (SC) is called the strong completeness
property. 

2.10 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part II

We have pointed to property of completeness in Theorem 2.12 save the provability

of the equivalence φ ≡ φ C N F . We have relied on this property when discussing the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra in Definition 2.28, and finally we have proved strong
completeness in Corollary 2.4 and in Theorem 2.21. In spite of this proof, we include
the proof of completeness in purely syntactical environment.
Two important characteristics of each deductive systems are soundness and com-
pleteness. In case of SL axiomatized by (L1)–(L3), soundness means that each for-
mula provable from(L1–L3)) by means of (MP), (S), and, (R) is valid and complete-
ness of SL means that each valid formula is provable from (L1–L3) by means of
(MP),(R), and (S). While soundness of SL results immediately from validity of all
instances of axiom schemata (L1)–(L3) and from preservation of validity by rules of
inference, a proof of completeness requires some additional work.
Many authors provided proofs of completeness for SL, from Emil Post [24],
through Łukasiewicz [11], Church [8], Hilbert and Ackerman (Hilbert and Acker-
man [7]) among others. We recall here the ‘classical’ proof by Kalmár in [25], by
elimination of variables, which has served as pattern for some other proofs, like
Rosser and Tourqette’s completeness proof for n-valued logic in Chap. 6.
In this proof, some provable formulae are used, and, we will point to derivations
of those formulae in Łukasiewicz [11] to make the proof self-contained.

Theorem 2.22 The following formulae are provable.

(A) p ⊃ p;
(B) p ⊃ ¬¬ p;
(C) ¬ p ⊃ ( p ⊃ q);
(D) (¬ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p;
(E) p ⊃ (q ⊃ p);
2.10 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part II 89

(F) p ⊃ [(¬q ⊃ ¬( p ⊃ q)];

(G) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(¬ p ⊃ q) ⊃ q];
(H) (¬ p ⊃ ¬q) ⊃ [(¬ p ⊃ q) ⊃ q];
(J) [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )] ⊃ [ p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )].

(A) is proved in Example 2.1, other formulae will be given, when met in the proof,
references to derivations in Łukasiewicz [11].
Theorem 2.23 SL is complete, i.e., each valid formula is provable: for each φ, if
|= φ, then  φ.

Proof (Kalmár) Consider a valid formula φ. We list all atomic propositions in φ as

p1 , p2 , ..., pn and their set will be denoted by P. For each assignment A, we denote
by f ( p, A) the truth value of p and we introduce formulae φ ∗ , p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pn ∗ as
follows.
(1) φ ∗ is φ if f (φ, A) = 1, else φ ∗ is ¬φ;
(2) p ∗j is p j if f ( p j , A) = 1, else p ∗j is ¬ p j .

Observe that f (φ ∗ , A) = 1 and f ( p ∗j , A) = 1.

We now prove the intermediary claim.

Claim. p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pn∗  φ ∗ .

Proof of Claim. It goes by structural induction on φ, i.e., we consider the
increasingly complex form of φ, complexity measured by si ze(φ). We begin with
si ze(φ) = 0. In this case φ is reduced to an atomic proposition p1 . As p1∗ ⊃ p1∗ is
provable, it follows by deduction theorem that p ∗  p ∗ so either p  p or ¬ p  ¬ p
depending on the assignment A.
Now, we assume that Claim is true for all formulae with size less then k. Consider
a formula φ of size k and check the following cases.
Case 1. φ is ¬ψ, hence, ψ has (k − 1) connectives so, by induction hypothesis,

(3) p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pn∗  ψ ∗

Suppose first that ψ is true under A, so ψ ∗ is ψ and A∗ (φ, A) = 0, hence, φ ∗ is

¬φ which is ¬¬ψ. We know that ψ ⊃ ¬¬ψ is provable (see derivation 40 in [11]),
hence, p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pn∗  ¬¬ψ, i.e., p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pk∗  φ ∗ .
Next, we assume that A makes ψ false, hence A∗ (φ, A) = 1, and thus φ ∗ is φ. By
assumption, p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pn∗  ¬ψ, i.e., p1∗ , p2∗ , ..., pk∗  φ ∗ . This concludes Case 1.
Case 2. φ is ψ ⊃ χ . As ψ and χ have less connectives then φ, the hypothesis of
induction holds for them and we have

(4) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗  ψ ∗ ,

90 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

where p1 , p2 , . . . , pl are atomic propositions in ψ and

(5) q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  χ ∗ ,

where q1 , q2 , . . . , q p are atomic propositions in χ .

Then, p1 , p2 , . . . , pl , q1 , q2 , . . . , q p are atomic propositions in φ (possibly with
repetitions); enlarged sets of variables preserve provability, hence,

(6)) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  ψ ∗ , χ ∗

There are some sub-cases to be considered.

Sub-case 2.1. In this sub-case we assume that both ψ, χ are true under assignment
A: A∗ (ψ, A) = 1 = A∗ (χ , A), so ψ ∗ is ψ and χ ∗ is χ which implies that φ ∗ is φ.
By (6), we infer
(7) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  ψ, χ

It is sufficient now to invoke (E) (derivation 18 in [11]) in the form χ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ χ )

and then detachment gives

(8) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2 , . . . , q ∗p  ψ ⊃ χ ,

(9) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  φ ∗ .

Sub-case 2.2 Now we assume that A∗ (ψ, A) = 1 and A∗ (χ , A) = 0, hence, ψ ∗

is ψ and χ ∗ is ¬χ . Also, A∗ (ψ ⊃ χ , A)=0, so φ ∗ is ¬φ. We know by the hypothesis
of induction that

(10) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  ψ, ¬χ .

The provable formula (F) (derivation 69 in [11]) becomes after substitutions

( p/ψ; q/χ )
(11) ψ ⊃ [¬χ ⊃ ¬(ψ ⊃ χ )].

By applying detachment twice, we obtain

(12) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  φ ∗

Sub-case 2.3 As implication with false premise is true, it is enough to consider

as the last case that A∗ (ψ, A) = 0, so ψ ∗ is ¬ψ and φ ∗ is φ. By the hypothesis of
induction we have

(13) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  ¬ψ

By provable formula (C) (derivation 36 in [11]), we obtain

2.10 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part II 91

(14) ¬ψ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ χ )

and from (14) it follows by detachment

(15) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pl∗ , q1∗ , q2∗ , . . . , q ∗p  φ ∗

All cases concluded, proof of Claim is concluded.

We return to the proof of the completeness theorem. As φ is valid, φ ∗ is φ, the set
P = { pi : i = 1, 2, ..., n} contains all atomic propositions in φ. Let M P denote the
set of all worlds for the set P. We know by Claim, that

(16) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pn∗  φ

The idea now is to eliminate subsequently all pi∗ from the antecedent of (16), begin-
ning with pn∗ down to p1∗ . We begin with pn∗ . We choose from the set M P two
assignments A+ and A− such that A+∗ ( pn , A+ ) = 1 and A−∗ ( pn , A− ) = 0. In case
of A+, we have
(17) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pn−1
∗
, pn  φ.

Similarly, for A− :
(18) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pn−1
∗
, ¬ pn  φ.

By deduction theorem, applied to (17) and (18), we obtain

(19) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pn−1

∗
 pn ⊃ φ,

(20) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pn−1

∗
 ¬ pn ⊃ φ.

We now invoke the provable formula (G) (derivation 120 in [11]), which after sub-
stitutions takes the form

(21) ( pn ⊃ φ) ⊃ [(¬ pn ⊃ φ) ⊃ φ].

Detachment applied twice to (21), yields

(22) p1∗ , p2∗ , . . . , pn−1

∗
 φ.

It suffices now to follow the above procedure with pn−1 , ..., p1 and after removing
p1 we are left with
(23)  φ

and the proof of the completeness theorem is concluded. 

By this theorem, syntactic and semantic consequences are the same.

92 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

In the above proof, we have witnessed provability in action. This is often a tedious
process to prove a formula, hence, completeness is a very useful meta-property as
checking validity is much easier. In particular, we may check that formulae (1)–(10)
in Definition 2.28 are valid, hence, they are provable.
We now reveal the interpolation property for sentential logic by stating and proving
the Craig interpolation theorem.

Definition 2.39 (An interpolant)

Consider a valid formula φ ⊃ ψ. An interpolant for this formula is a formula ξ with
the properties that all atomic propositions in ξ are also in φ and ψ and both formulae
φ ⊃ ξ and ξ ⊃ ψ are valid.

This definition can be extended to sets of formulae. Using the formalism of analytic
tableaux, we consider the formula ξ : φ ⊃ ψ with its signed form Fξ which is φ ∧
¬ψ. We begin the tableau with φ and ¬ψ in the initial branch. We use the idea in
Fitting [22] of biased formulae. In the case of our formula ξ , we refer to its original
ancestry by denoting φ as le f t (φ) and ¬ψ as right (¬ψ). This denotation continues
with the buildup of the tableau. For instance, descendants of right (¬(¬ p ⊃ q)) will
be right (¬ p) and right (¬q), all of course in one branch.
The definition of an interpolant can be extended to sets of biased formulae of the
form Γ : {le f t (γ1 ), le f t (γ2 ), . . . , le f t (γn ), right (δ1 ), right
(δ2 ), . .
., right (δm }:
an interpolant for Γ is the interpolant for the formula (I ) n1 γi ⊃ m 1 ¬δ j . This
generalization is in agreement with the case of the formula ξ : φ ⊃ ψ for which the
closed tableau begins with the set Γ  =le f t (φ), right (¬ψ), hence, an interpolant
for Γ  according to the generalized definition is the interpolant for the formula
φ ⊃ ¬(¬ψ), i.e., an interpolant for ξ .

Definition 2.40 (Rules for closed tableaux for biased signed formulae) We keep the
notation of type α for conjunctions and of type β for disjunctions.

We follow the generalized definition for an interpolant, remember that formulae

denoted as le f t enter the conjunction in the antecedent and those denoted right enter
the disjunction of negations in the consequent of the implication (I). If there is no
right formula, then the consequent is false, as we meet disjunction over the empty
set.
{Γ,le f t (φ),le f t (¬φ)}
(i) inter polant:⊥
;
{Γ,right (ψ),right (¬ψ)}
(ii) inter polant:
;
{Γ,le f t (φ),le f t (¬φ)}
(iii) inter polant:⊥
;
{Γ,le f t (φ),right (¬φ)}
(iv) inter polant:φ
;
{Γ,le f t (¬φ),right (φ)}
(v) inter polant:¬φ
;
{Γ,le f t (⊥)}
(vi) inter polant:⊥
;
{Γ,right (⊥)}
(vii) inter polant:
.

We now state sentential rules.

2.10 Meta-Theory of Sentential Logic. Part II 93

(viii) Γ, le f t () and Γ, le f t (¬⊥) have the same interpolants;

(ix) Γ, le f t (⊥) and Γ, le f t (¬) have the same interpolants;
(x) Γ, right (⊥) and Γ, right (¬) have the same interpolants;
(xi) Γ, right () and Γ, right (¬⊥) have the same interpolants;
(xii) Γ, le f t (φ) and Γ, le f t (¬¬φ) have the same interpolants;
(xiii) Γ, right (φ) and Γ, right (¬¬φ) have the same interpolants;

The phrase ‘have the same interpolants’ is to be understood as ‘if ξ is an interpolant

for one, then ξ is an interpolant for the other’. We now state rules for types α and β.
Γ,le f t (α1 ),le f t (α2 ) has an inter polant ξ
(xiv) for α : α1 ∧ α2 : Γ,le f t (α) has an inter polant ξ
;
Γ,right (α1 ),right (α2 ) has an inter polant ξ
(xv) for α : α1 ∧ α2 : Γ,right (α) has an inter polant ξ
;
Γ,le f t (betai ) has an inter polant ξi
(xvi) for β : β1 ∨ β2 for i = 1, 2: Γ,le f t (βi ) has an inter polant ξ1 ∨ξ2 ;
Γ,right (betai ) has an inter polant ξi
(xvii) for β : β1 ∨ β2 for i = 1, 2: Γ,right (βi ) has an inter polant ξ1 ∧ξ2
.

We justify rules (xvi) and (xvii) as a pattern for other rules. Let Γ = {le f t (γ1 ),
le f t (γ2 ), ..., le
f t (γn ), right
 (δ1 ), right (δ2 ), ..., right (δm )}, hence, the correspond-
ing formula is in γi ⊃ m 1 ¬δi .
For rule (xvi): Suppose ξ1 is an interpolant for Γ, le f t (β1 ) and ξ2 is an interpolant
for Γ, le f t (β2 ), hence,

(a) β1 ∧ n1 γi ⊃ ξ1 ;

(b) β2 ∧ n1 γi ⊃ ξ2 .

Then,


n 
n
β∧ γi ≡ (β1 ∨ β2 ) ∧ γi ≡
1 1
n 
n
(β1 ∧ γi ∨ β2 ∧ γi ⊃ ξ1 ∨ ξ2 .
1 1


ξ2 to m
The other implication from ξ1 ∨  1 ¬δ j follows obviously from implications
from ξ1 respectively, from ξ2 to m 1 ¬δ j .
The requirement
 that all atomic proposi-
tions in ξ1 ∨ ξ2 have occurrences in both n1 γi and m 1 δ j is satisfied by virtue of
assumptions about ξ1 and ξ2 .
For rule (xvii), we assume

(c) ξ1 ⊃ m ¬δ j ∨ ¬β1 ;
1
(d) ξ2 ⊃ m 1 ¬δ j ∨ ¬β2 .
94 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Then,


m 
m
ξ1 ∧ ξ2 ⊃ ( ¬δ j ∨ ¬β1 ) ∧ ( ¬δ j ∨ ¬β2 ) ≡
1 1

m 
m 
m
¬δ j ∨ (¬β1 ∧ ¬β2 ) ≡ ¬δ j ∨ ¬(β1 ∨ β2 ) ≡ ¬δ j ∨ ¬β.
1 1 1


That n1 γi ⊃ ξ1 ∧ ξ2 follows obviously and the requirement about occurrences
of atomic propositions is also satisfied.
After a closed tableau for Fφ ⊃ ψ started with le f t (φ) and right (¬ψ) is con-
structed, we apply the rules bottom-up.

Example 2.4 Consider the formula ξ : p ∧ q ∧ r ⊃ ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ r . It is valid: if the

antecedent is true then p, q, r are truth valued and the consequent is true, so the
formula is true. The interpolant for ξ results from the following tableau presented in
the schematic form of left and right biased components:
F[( p ∧ q ∧ r ) ⊃ (( p ⊃ q) ⊃ r )]
left:
p–q –r
right:¬r − −¬ p, q
Interpolant: ((¬ p) ∨ q) ∧ r .

The interpolant induced from the tableau is ξ : ((¬ p) ∨ q) ∧ r . Let us check it

is so. Obviously all atomic propositions p, q, r are in the antecedent and in the
consequent of ξ . We consider first the implication: p ∧ q ∧ r ⊃ ((¬ p) ∨ q) ∧ r . If
the antecedent is true, then the consequent is true, so the implication holds. We
consider next the implication (((¬ p) ∨ q) ∧ r ) ⊃ (( p ⊃ q) ⊃ r ). If the consequent
is false, then r is valued false but then the antecedent is false so the implication holds.

Theorem 2.24 (Craig interpolation, Craig [26]) For each valid formula φ ⊃ ψ there
exists an interpolant.

Proof Suppose that the formula φ ⊃ ψ has no interpolant. Consider a property C of a

finite collection
 H offormulae: C(H) if there exists a partition F = F1 ∪ F2 and the
formula F1 ⊃ ¬ F2 has no interpolant. Then one checks that H is a Hintikka set,
hence, satisfiable. Apply this to the valid formula φ ⊃ ψ and define the collection H
as {φ, ¬ψ}. Partition the set {φ, ¬ψ} into {φ} and {¬ψ}. Had the formula φ ⊃ ¬¬ψ
an interpolant, also the formula φ ⊃ ψ would have an interpolant, contrary to the
assumption. It follows that the collection {φ, ¬ψ} is satisfiable, contradicting the
validity of the formula φ ⊃ ψ. This concludes the proof. 

Remark 2.1 The idea for the proof as well as rules for interpolants come from
Fitting [22].
2.11 Resolution, Logical Consequence 95

2.11 Resolution, Logical Consequence

The rule of detachment can be expressed in the form φ,¬φ∨ψ

ψ
, which can be interpreted
as the cancellation of contradictory literals φ,¬φ in two clauses in the numerator of
the fraction and moving the remaining literals from both clauses to the denominator.
It has been generalized to arbitrary clauses with a pair of contradictory literals in
Robinson [27].

Definition 2.41  (The resolution rule)


k j j
For clauses C1 : i=1 l1i and C2 : mj=1 l2 with contradictory literals l1i and l2 , the
resolution rule is
j
l11 ∨ l12 ∨ . . . ∨ l1i ∨ . . . ∨ l1k , l21 ∨ l22 ∨ . . . ∨ l2 ∨ . . . ∨ l2m
(R R)   .
j
l1 ∨ l1 ∨ . . . ∨ l1 ∨ . . . ∨ l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l2 ∨ . . . ∨ l2 ∨ . . . ∨ l2
1 2 i k 1 2 m


The symbol x means that the literal so denoted is omitted; thus, (RR) acts on a
pair of clauses by removing a pair of contradictory literals, one from each clause.

The resolution rule is valid as from validity of clauses C1 , C2 under an assign-

ment A, the validity under A of the resulting clause called resolvent and denoted

r es(C1 , C2 ) follows: if the literal marked with l is removed and it is valued 0, then
there is other literal valued 1 in its clause and it finds itself in the resolvent. Clearly, of
the two contradictory literals one must have
value 0.
We denote by Box  the empty clause which is unsatisfiable as existential quan-
tification over the empty set of objects is false. The context of resolution is a set of
clauses C={C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck }.

Definition 2.42 (Resolution refutation)

A sequence of resolution steps from the set C of clauses to the empty clause Box
 is called the resolution refutation.

The existence of resolution refutation points to unsatisfiability of the set C of

clauses: was the set C of clauses satisfiable, satisfiability would be preserved along
any sequence of resolution steps with clauses in C. We obtain the following results.

Theorem 2.25 Resolution is sound, i.e., if the initial set of clauses is satisfiable,
then there does not exist resolution refutation.

Completeness of resolution means that if the initial set of clauses C is unsatisfiable,

then there exists a resolution refutation.

Theorem 2.26 Resolution is complete: if a set of clauses is unsatisfiable, then there

exists a resolution refutation.
96 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Proof Let C be an unsatisfiable set of clauses. By Corollary 2.4, C is inconsistent,

hence, there exists a proof C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck of falsum ⊥. The inference rule is detach-
ment, i.e, a particular case of the resolution rule. Hence, the sequence C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck
is a resolution refutation. 
Example 2.5 Consider the set of clauses C which contains clauses: 1. p ∨ q, 2.
q ∨ ¬r , 3. ¬ p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r , 4. p ∨ q ∨ r , 5. p ∨ ¬r , 6. r. We decide whether this
set is satisfiable or not by searching for a resolution refutation. Consider the sequence
of resolution steps: 5,6 , 3,6 , 7,8 , 2,9 , 6,10
7 r 8 ¬ p∨¬q 9 ¬q 10 ¬r 
.
The set C of clauses is unsatisfiable.
Definition 2.43 (Logical consequence. Entailment)
A set Δ of formulae is a logical consequence of a set Γ of formulae if and only if
for each assignment A, if A satisfies Γ , then A satisfies a formula in Δ. In particular
case when Δ = {φ}, we say that φ is entailed by Γ . We denote the fact of sentential
consequence with the symbol Γ |= Δ.
Theorem 2.27 A set Δ of formulae
 is a sentential consequence to a set Γ of formulae

if and only if the formula ( Γ ) ∧ ¬Δ is unsatisfiable.
Proof Suppose that A is an assignment on atomic propositions in formulae in Γ ∪ Δ
which satisfies Γ ; then 
A satisfies
 a formula in Δ, hence, ¬Δ is false. As A is
arbitrary, the formula ( Γ ) ∧ ¬Δ is unsatisfiable. The converse is proved on
similar lines. 
Example 2.6 In conditions of Example 2.5, consider the clause 5: p ∨ ¬r . It is the
negation of the formula φ : (¬ p) ∧ r . By Theorem 2.27, the formula φ is entailed
by the set of clauses with nos.: 1,2,3,4,6.
We meet here the two facets of resolution: it can be applied towards checking
satisfiability or towards checking entailment. In both applications, resolution is sound
and complete.

2.12 Horn Clauses. Forward and Backward Chaining

We comment briefly on two inference methods. A set of clauses is called, when

applications are discussed, a Knowledge Base (KB). Inferences from Knowledge
Bases can be obtained by other means then resolution. The form depends on the
aim. If we want to check whether a given query follows from the Knowledge Base
then we may apply Backward Chaining besides Resolution. If we want to infer all
consequences of the Knowledge Base then our choice can be Forward Chaining.
These labels tell the idea of each search in Knowledge Bases: Backward Chaining
begins with the query and tries to verify it, Forward Chaining begins with the first fact
in the Knowledge Base and collects in the top-down manner all facts encountered in
the process.
2.12 Horn Clauses. Forward and Backward Chaining 97

It is understandable that these procedures may require some other then in resolu-
tion form of clauses.
Definition 2.44 (Horn clauses)
A Horn clause Horn [28] is any clause which contains at most one non-negated
literal. A Horn clause can be in one and only one of the following forms:  (i) as a
non-negated literal p or (ii) as a clause with one  non-negated literal p ∨ i∈I ¬ pi ,
or (iii),
 as a clause with only negated literals
 j∈J ¬ p j . A clause of the form (ii)
p ∨ i∈I ¬ pi can be brought to the form i∈I pi ⊃ p called  a decision rule. The
clause of the form  p is called a fact. The third possibility of j∈J ¬ p j can be written
down in the form j∈J p j ⊃ ⊥ called an integrity constraint. A Horn formula is a
formula in CNF whose all clauses are Horn.
Example 2.7 Backward Chaining The textual version of Knowledge Base is as
follows (Carroll [29]): 1. The only animals in this house are cats. 2. Every animal
that loves to gaze at the moon is suitable for a pet. 3. When I detest an animal, I avoid
it. 4. No animals are carnivorous unless they prowl at night. 5. No cat fails to kill
mice. 6. No animals ever like me, except those that are in this house. 7. Kangaroos are
not suitable for pets. 8. None but carnivorous animals kill mice. 9. I detest animals
that do not like me. 10. Animals that prowl at night always love to gaze at the moon.
11. Query: Therefore, I always avoid a kangaroo.
In order to render this set of statements in symbolic form, we introduce some
acronyms: AH = animal in house; C = cat; LGM = loves to gaze at the moon; Pet
= pet;Det = detest;Av = avoid; CA = carnivorous; PR = prowl; K = kill; LI =
likes; KNG = kangaroo. Clearly, we could encode these phrases with letters a,b,c
etc. but then the reading would be more difficult. With this set, statements 1–11 can
be transformed into decision rules:
(I) AH → C; (II) LG M ⊃ Pet; (III) Det ⊃ AV ; (IV) C A ⊃ P R; (V) C ⊃ K ;
(VI) L I ⊃ AH ; (VII) ¬Pet ⊃ K N G; (VIII) K ⊃ C A; (IX) ¬L I ⊃ Det; (X) P R ⊃
LG M; (XI) Query: AV ⊃ K N G.
In order to prove Query from (I)-(X), we assume that the premise AV is true and we
enter the backward reasoning in order to derive the consequent K N G. The following
chain of derivations leads from consequents to verifying them antecedents. In this
process, we often use the contraposition law, using ¬q ⊃ ¬ p instead of p ⊃ q. We
prefer this approach instead of rendering some of (I)-(X) in the contraposition form
in order to preserve the syntax of the original text.
The solution to the Query is a list of goals: AV to (III): Det to (IX): ¬L I to (VI):
¬AH to (I): ¬Cat to (V): ¬K to (VIII): ¬C A to (IV): ¬P R to (X): ¬LG M to (II):
¬Pet to (VII): K N G.
The consequent K N G of Query (XI) has been derived from (I)-(X), hence, Query
is proved. The backward chaining process is illustrated with the chain of applications
of detachment rule:
AV →(I I I ) Det →(I X ) ¬L I →(V I ) ¬AH →(I ) ¬Cat →(V ) ¬K →(V I I I )
¬C A →(I V ) ¬P R →(X ) ¬LG M →(I I ) ¬Pet →(V I I ) K N G.
98 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

To introduce Forward Chaining, we enlarge our set of atomic propositions by

allowing open predicate statements like Cat (Amber ) which are treated like atomic
propositions in sentential logic. They are called facts.

Example 2.8 Forward Chaining The textual version is as follows (folklore): 1.

Amber is a cat. 2. Cats prowl at nights. 3. If a cat prowls at nights then it gazes
at the moon. 4. Amber is black. 5. If a cat is black then it is not visible at nights. 6.
If a cat is not visible at nights then it catches a big catch. 7. Amber is shy. 8. If a cat
is shy then it goes into hiding during a day. 9. If a cat goes into hiding during a day
then it is not known to neighbors. 10. If a cat is black and goes into hiding during a
day then it does not cross our paths.
Acronyms for predicative statements are: PR = prowl at night; GM = gazes at
the moon; NV = not visible at nights; CTCH = catches a big catch; GH = goes into
hiding;NKN = not known; NCR = not crosses our paths.
Let us convert the text into a symbolic form. Our atomic propositions are in
predicative open form.
The facts are:
(I) Cat (Amber );
(II) Black(Amber );
(III) Shy(Amber ).

Decision rules extracted from the text are:

(IV) Cat (Amber ) → P R(Amber );
(V) P R(Amber ) → G M(Amber );
(VI) Black(Amber ) → N V (Amber );
(VII) N V (Amber ) → C T C H (Amber );
(VIII) Shy(Amber ) → G H (Amber );
(IX) G H (Amber ) → N K N (Amber );
(X) Black(Amber ) ∧ G H (Amber ) → N C R(Amber ).
Derivations of new facts by detachment are:
(a) (I, I V ) → (X I ) : P R(Amber );
(b) (V, X I ) → (X I I ) : G M(Amber );
(c) (I I, V I ) → (X I I I ) : N V (Amber );
(d) (V I I, X I I I ) → (X I V ) : C T C H (Amber );
(e) (I I I, V I I I ) → (X V ) : G H (Amber );
(f) (I X, X V ) → (X V I ) : N K N (Amber );
(g) (I I, X, X V ) → (X V I I ) : N C N (Amber ).

Theorem 2.28 Backward chaining with Horn decision rules is sound and complete.
2.13 Satisfiability, Validity and Complexity in Sentential Logic. Remarks … 99

Proof Consider a set of decision rules R1 , R2 , . . . , Rk and suppose we have obtained

a derivation from them of a consequent qk of the rule Rk . In the process of derivation,
we checked each antecedent pi in the rule Rk finding a rule in which pi was the
consequent and adding antecedents od that rule to the queue of antecedents to be
checked. Checking a premise can be regarded, if we consider rules in their clausal
form, as executing the resolution rule.
We consider the qk -saturated set Sk defined as the smallest set containing literals
used in the process of validating qk except for qk . Let Ci be the clausal form of the
rule Ri for i ≤ k. Let Cik be the sub-clause of the clause Ci containing those literals in
Ci which occur in the set Sk . Then: qk is validated if and only if resolution performed
on the set of clauses Cik , C2k , . . . , CkK yields . 

It follows, by soundness and completeness of resolution, that backward chaining

is sound and complete.
Resolution has the exponential complexity Haken [30].

Theorem 2.29 (Exponential complexity of resolution) There exists a sequence of

formulae (Hn )∞
n=1 such that the set of clauses for Hn is of cardinality of order of n
3

and resolution tree for Hn contains the order of cn clauses for some constant c.

It may be interesting to point to the idea for the proof. Formulae Hn stem from the
pidgeon-hole principle of Dirichlet: n + 1 letters cannot be put into n mailboxes in
such way that each matchbox contains exactly one letter. For a given n, the formula
Hn is constructed as follows:

(1) let Pi j means that the letter i is in the mailbox j;

(2) in order
n+1toexpress the fact that each letter is in a mailbox, we need the formula
n
φ : i=1 j=1 Pi j ;
(3) in order to express
 the fact
 that two letters fall into some mailbox, we need the
n+1 n+1
formula ψ : np=1 i=1 j=i+1 .(Pi p ∧ P j p );
(4) the formula φ ⊃ ψ is the formula Hn .

Proof in Haken [30] is not reproduced here due to its length.

2.13 Satisfiability, Validity and Complexity in Sentential

Logic. Remarks on SAT Solvers

Satisfiability (SAT) decision problem in sentential logic consists in determining

whether a given formula is satisfiable which can be paraphrased as the question
whether each clause in CNF of the formula is satisfiable. The decision problem for
satisfiability property is theoretically decidable by brute force: given a formula φ,
one has to construct the truth table for φ and check each assignment of truth values
100 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

for φ. If we meet an assignment for which the value is 1 for φ, then φ is satisfiable
and this assignment yields the model.
The validity problem is dual to satisfiability problem as a formula φ is valid if and
only if the formula ¬φ is unsatisfiable, so checking unsatisfiability for φ by means
of the truth table is equivalent to checking validity of φ. Hence, the decision problem
of validity is decidable.
This approach has exponential complexity of 2n in case of formulae of size n,
hence, it is impractical.
In terms of computability, we formulate the decidability for SL, by stating that
the set of Gödel numbers of valid formulae is recursive, hence, the decision problem
whether a formula is valid is recursively solvable (see Chap. 1 or Davis [31]).
It is known, cf. Theorem 1.53, that the problem CNF-SAT of checking satisfiability
of a formula in CNF as well as the problem (3-CNF)-SAT of checking satisfiability
of a formula in 3-CNF, i.e., in CNF in which each clause has exactly three literals, are
NP-complete. Hence, the validity problem is co-NP-complete. Yet, satisfiability is a
vital property in applications, so there are a number of algorithms to test satisfiability
property of formulae of sentential logic in a heuristic way.
We present here some ideas on which SAT solvers are based. Let us first comment
on some variants of resolution. Let C be a non-empty set of clauses. A unit resolution
is the variant in which the rule (RR) is allowed only if at least one clause is a singleton
(l). It is known that unit resolution is complete for sets of Horn clauses. We now
consider some operations on sets of clauses with resolution on mind.

Definition 2.45 (A pre-processing of clauses)

(1) if we have already observed that each clause containing a pair of contradictory
literals can be removed from a set of clauses without affecting the issue of
satisfiability;
Suppose that there exists a literal l such that the clause (l) ∈ C. Let Cl be the
set {C ∈ C : l ∈ C} and C  = C \ Cl . If C is satisfiable in the world V , then
V (l) = 1, hence each clause in Cl is valid at V . The test of satisfiability is with
C  , hence, satisfiability of C is equivalent to satisfiability of C  . Hence,
(2) if a set of clauses C contains a singular clause l (called an orphan), then the
literal ¬l can be removed from all remaining clauses;
(3) after (i) and (ii) are performed, we remove all orphaned literals.
Finally, consider a valid formula C ⊃ C  between clauses in the set C of clauses.
Clearly, if C is valid under an assignment V , then C  is valid under V . The impact
of this remark is that
(4) in the set C of clauses we can remove all non-minimal clauses with respect to
set-theoretic inclusion on sets of literals in clauses.

We call a set C of clauses pre-processed with the result being the set of clauses C pr e
if and only if we have applied to C reduction rules (i)–(iv) in this order.
2.13 Satisfiability, Validity and Complexity in Sentential Logic. Remarks … 101

We now introduce the Davis-Putnam (Davis and Putnam [32]) solver which con-
veys the basic ideas of SAT solving.

Definition 2.46 (Davis-Putnam algorithm)

Consider a pre-processed set of clauses C. Do the following:
(1) select non-deterministically a literal l and perform resolution with the set D of
all clauses containing l and ¬l adding resolvents and after that removing all
clauses in D;
(2) Repeat (1) until either Box is obtained and report unsatisfiable or
there is nothing left to resolve and Box is not obtained in which case report
satisfiable.

Example 2.9 (i) Consider the set of clauses: (x ∨ y ∨ z), (y ∨ ¬z ∨ ¬w), (¬y ∨ t).
1 There is no unit literal, so prescription in Definition 2.46(1) is skipped;
2 There are orphaned literals x and ¬w and by Definition 2.46(2), we remove
clauses containing them. A satisfying assignment A should have values A(x) =
1, A(w) = 0 and the pre-processed set of clauses is: (¬y ∨ t). The report is then:
satisfiable.
(ii) Let us consider one more case of a set of clauses in 2-SAT: (x ∨ y), (x ∨
¬y), (¬x ∨ z), (¬x ∨ ¬z).
1 Resolve clauses with x and ¬x, add resolvents, remove clauses resolved; remain-
ing clauses are: (y ∨ z), (y ∨ ¬z), (¬y ∨ z), (¬y ∨ ¬z).
2 Resolve clauses with y, ¬y, add resolvents, remove clauses resolved; remaining
clauses are: (z), (¬z).
3 Resolve the last two clauses: the resolvent is Box - the formula is not satisfiable;
report unsatisfiable.

Definition 2.47 (The Davis-Logemann-Loveland (DLL/DPLL) algorithm)

This algorithm uses backtracking along a search tree.

Example 2.10 Consider clauses (¬x ∨ ¬y), (¬z ∨ y), (¬x ∨ z ∨ ¬w), (z ∨ w).
The search tree begins with the root x and contains levels for y, z, w in that order;
left edge is labelled with 1, right edge is labelled with 0, so we have 16 maximal
branches and we list them as sequences of labels 0,1 on edges of the tree along
branches together with satisfiability results F (unsatisfiable), T (satisfiable):

1111F, 1110F, 1101F, 1100F, 1011F, 1010F, 1001T, 1000F, 0111T, 0110T,

0101T, 0100F, 0011F, 0010F, 0001T, 0000F

The set of clauses is satisfiable.

In practical execution of the algorithm, we would begin with values x = 1, y = 1

which invalidate the first clause, hence, we backtrack to x = 1, y = 0, z = 1 which
102 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

invalidate the second clause so we backtrack to values x = 1, y = 0, z = 0, w = 1

which invalidate the third clause, hence, we backtrack to values x = 1, y = 0, z =
0, w = 0 which invalidate the fourth clause, so we backtrack to values x = 0, y =
1 which satisfy clauses 1,2,3 but not decide on clause 4, hence, we go down to
values x = 0, y = 1, z = 1 which satisfy the set of clauses. We now consider some
additional cases of polynomial complexity.
We mention cases of sets of Horn clauses and of 2-CNF clauses.

Theorem 2.30 The satisfiability problem SAT-HORN for sets of Horn decision rules
is solvable in time linear in number of literals (Dowling and Gallier [33]). It is a
PTIME-complete problem, see (Greenlaw et al. [34]).

Theorem 2.31 2-SAT satisfiability problem is solvable in linear time. It is an NL-

complete problem (Aspvall et al. [35]).

Proof We outline an idea of a proof. Consider the problem 2-SAT in which a formula
in CNF consists of clauses with two literals. The APT-algorithm for solving the
problem in linear time is recalled below. Linearity comes from Tarjan’s algorithm
for finding strongly connected components in a graph Tarjan [36].

APT-algorithm
Represent clauses of φ in the graph called the implication graph: set of vertices W
is the set of all literals in the formula and their negations. Edges are of the following
types:

(i) if the clause is of the form u ∨ v, then edges are ¬u → v, ¬v → u;

(ii) if the clause is of the form ¬u ∨ v then edges are u → v, ¬v → ¬u;
(iii) if the clause is of the form ¬u ∨ ¬v edges are of the form u → ¬v, v → ¬ u.

Then the following are equivalent:

(i) the formula φ is satisfiable under an assignment A;
(ii) the satisfying assignment A assigns complementary values to complementary
vertices and there is no path which leads from a vertex valued 1 to a vertex
valued 0;
(iii) for no vertex u, both u and ¬u are in one strongly connected component of the
graph. 

2.14 Physical Realization of SL. Logic Circuits, Threshold

Logic

Two-valued sentential logic can be implemented in physical environment. Logical

gates are one way for doing it. See Fig. 2.6 for symbolic rendering of gates AND,
OR, NOT and Fig. 2.7 for the circuit which computes the formula ( p → q) → [(q ↔
2.14 Physical Realization of SL. Logic Circuits, Threshold Logic 103

Fig. 2.6 Logical gates

Fig. 2.7 A logical circuit

Fig. 2.8 The artificial neuron

r ) → ( p → r )] in its CNF: ( p ∨ q ∨ ¬ p ∨ r ) ∧ (¬q ∨ q ∨ ¬ p ∨ r ). Theory of cir-

cuits parallels theory expounded above with a suitable change of terminology.
The other way is to turn to neural networks. The McCulloch-Pitts neuron (McCul-
loch and Pitts [37]) is a rendering of the physiological neuron (Ramón y Cajal [38])
described by Ramón y Cajal, see Fig. 2.8.
In this figure, we see the soma (body), input synapses each of which can convey a
unit impulse and the output. The symbol Θ denotes the threshold. Computations by
McCulloch-Pitts neuron follow the rule: if i xi ≥ Θ, then y = 1, otherwise y = 0.
Hence, this type of neuron computes the Heaviside function.
This type of neuron computes monotone functions. One can enhance its computing
power by introducing excitatory and inhibitory inputs; a neuron endowed with a
104 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

single inhibitory input and threshold Θ = 0 computes the negation NOT: input x = 1
activates inhibition and the neuron outputs no value, i.e., 0, while the input x = 0
produces the output 1. Then a network of connected McCulloch-Pitts neurons can
compute each Boolean function of finitely many atomic propositions. In order to
provide learning capabilities to neurons one has to endow the neuron with weights
on inputs. Then, one obtains a perceptron Rosenblatt [39]. While weighted networks
are equivalent to networks of McCulloch-Pitts neurons with inhibitory powers, yet
introduction of weights allows for a proof of the perceptron learning theorem.
The computation rule for the perceptron is: if i wi xi ≥ Θ, then y = 1, otherwise
y = 0. In a learning process of a concept, a perceptron is given a sample S of positive
(P) and negative (N) examples, each coded as input vector x = [x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ].
Classification of the concept consists in a linear separation of positive from negative
examples. if this is achieved, then we say that the perceptron has learned the concept.
The criterion for the proper classification is: if an example is positive, then i wi xi ≥
Θ, where the vector x is coding the example, and, in case of a negative example, the
criterion is i wi xi < Θ.
Theorem 2.32 (the perceptron learning theorem) If sets (P) and (N) of examples
coded as sets of vectors in the Cartesian space can be linearly separated by linear
manifold, then the perceptron beginning with a random set of non-zero weights, can
apply a learning algorithm whose execution will terminate after finitely many steps
with a set of weights which will properly classify the concept, i.e, they will separate
linearly (P) from (N).
Proof We make a few simplifications. First, we can suppose that Θ = 0: this change
will result only in a shift of (P)∪(N) by a vector, not affecting relative positions of
(P) and (N). Next, a simplification consists in considering the set (-N) instead of
(N): then the criterion for proper classification will be i wi xi ≥ 0 for each vector
x ∈ (P) ∪ (−N ). Finally, we may assume that all vectors are normalized, i.e., the
length (the norm) of each is 1 as this does not change the sign of the scalar product.
The assumption that (P) and (N) are linearly separable means that there exists a
weight vector w which correctly classifies all vectors in the sample.
In the process of learning, two types of error can be made: (i) a vector x ∈ (P)
can be classified as negative (ii) a vector x ∈ (N ) can be classified as positive. The
learning algorithm has to account for and correct those errors. The remedy is to
change weights.
We simplify notation, we denote the vector of weights as w and we denote the
scalar product i wi xi as x · w.

The learning algorithm

Input: vectors in (P)∪(-N), random vector w0 , Θ = 0
Q = the queue of vectors to be tested on satisfiability of the criterion x · w ≥ 0
t = time measured as steps in the execution of the algorithm; t = 0; wt = current
value of the weight vector at time t; xt = the vector dequeued at time t.
2.15 Problems 105

For a vector xt ∈ (P)∪ (N):

1 if xt ∈ (P) and xt · wt ≥ 0, then enqueue xt , dequeue(Q) and test the dequeued
vector xt+1
2 if xt ∈ (P) and xt · wt < 0, then wt+1 =wt + xt , enqueue xt , dequeue Q and test
the vector xt+1
3 if xt ∈ (N) and xt · wt < 0, then enqueue xt , dequeue Q and test the dequeued
vector xt+1
4 if xt ∈ (N) and xt · wt ≥ 0, then wt+1 =wt − xt , enqueue xt , dequeue Q and test
the dequeued vector xt+1
Suppose that an error was committed at some time t and the vector wt+1 was
computed as wt + xt (due to convention that (N) was replaced with (-N)). Suppose
that we compute the distance from w to wt+1 . We denote by ||v|| the norm of the
vector v. As distance can be measured by the cosine of the angle between vectors,
we compute
wt+1 · w
(i) cos(wt+1 , w) =
||wt+1 ||

Let η = min{x · w : x ∈ (P) ∪ (−N )}; clearly, η > 0. Then

(ii) wt+1 · w ≥ wt · w + x · w ≥ wt · w + η

By recurrence, we obtain

(iii) wt+1 · w ≥ w0 · w = (t + 1) · η

On the other hand,

(iv)||wt+1 || = sqr t[(wt + xt ) · (wt + xt )] = sgr t (||wt ||2 + ||xt ||2 + 2 · xt · wt ) ≤ sqr t (||wt ||2 + 1)

By (iii) and (iv), cos(wt+1 , w) → ∞ as t → ∞, impossible, hence, time is

bounded from above. 
The estimate for maximum number of steps is given by 1 ≥ sqr t (t + 1) · η, i.e,
t ∼ η12 . It follows that the number of steps depends on the distance between sets (P)
and (N) measured by η.

2.15 Problems

Problem 2.17 was picked up from (Gallier J. H.: Logic for Computer Science. Founda-
tions of Automatic Theorem Proving. Dover Publications (2015), 3.5.9) and (Chang,
C. C., Keisler, J. H.: Model Theory. Elsevier Science Publ., Amsterdam (1992),
Chap. 4.6).
106 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Problem 2.1 (Logical consequence)

(after Smullyan [20]). We recall that Γ |= Δ denotes logical consequence (11.6).
For a set of formulae Γ and formulae φ, ψ, prove the following: if Γ, φ |= ψ and
Γ, φ |= ¬ψ, then Γ |= ¬φ.
Problem 2.2 (Sentential compactness, consistency) 
(after Smullyan [20], II.4). Prove: If Γ |= φ, then Δ ⊃ φ is valid for a finite
Δ ⊆ Γ.
Problem 2.3 (Consistency)
(after Beth [21], 89, p.262). A set Γ of formulae is called complete if and only if for
each formula φ either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ . Prove:
(i) the Lindenbaum theorem: each consistent set has a complete and consistent
extension;
(ii) each set Γ of formulae which is consistent and complete is maximally con-
sistent.
Problem 2.4 (Consistency. The Tarski theorem)
(after Beth [21], 89, p. 262). Prove: Each consistent set Γ is the intersection of all its
consistent and complete extensions.
Problem 2.5 (Replacement theorem)
(after Fitting [22], 2.5.1). Consider a formula φ( p) in which p is a singled out atomic
proposition (there may be more of them in φ) along with formulae φ and χ and an
assignment A. Apply structural induction in order to prove: if A(ψ) = A(χ ), then
A(φ( p/ψ)) = A(φ( p/χ )).
Problem 2.6 (Tableaux)
(after Fitting [22], 3.1.2). Prove by means of an analytic tableau that the function
X O R( p, q) = ((¬ p) ∧ q) ∨ ( p ∧ (¬q)) is associative.
Problem 2.7 (Validity)
(after Fitting [22], 3.6.6). Prove that if for formulae φ and ψ which have no atomic
proposition in common the formula φ ⊃ ψ is valid, then either ¬φ is valid or ψ is
valid.
Problem 2.8 (Validity. Dilemmatic mood)
(after Church [8], 15.9). Prove validity of the following moods; for simplicity we
use symbols for atomic propositions.
Simple constructive dilemmatic mood: If p, then q. If r, then q. p or r. Therefore
q.
Simple destructive dilemmatic mood: If p, then q. If p, then r.Not q, not r. Therefore
not p.
Complex constructive dilemmatic mood: If p, then q. If r, then s. p or r. Therefore
q or s.
Complex destructive dilemmatic mood: If p, then q. If r, then s. Not q, not s.
Therefore not p, not r.
2.15 Problems 107

Problem 2.9 (Sentential connectives: converse non-implication)

(after Church [8], 24, p.155). The connective of converse non-implication ⊂n is
defined as p ⊂n q = (¬ p) ∧ q = ¬(q ⊃ p). Prove: ⊃, ⊂n constitute a complete
system of independent connectives, i.e, together they define all other connectives.
Problem 2.10 (Normal forms: implicative normal form)
(after Church [8], 15.4). A formula φ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) is in implicative normal form
if and only if φ is of the form
(i) C1 ⊃ (C2 ⊃ (. . . (Cm−1 ⊃ (Cm ⊃ ⊥)))), where
(ii) each Ci is of the form Ci1 ⊃ (Ci2 ⊃ (. . . (Cin ⊃ ⊥))), where
(iii) each Cik is either pk or ¬ pk ;
(iv) formulae Ci are arranged in the lexicographic order of their Cik s with respect
of superscripts k with precedence of pk over¬ pk , i.e., suppose that the sequence
Ci1 , Ci2 , . . . , Cik−1 =C 1j , C 2j , . . . , C k−1
j and Cik = pk , and, C kj = ¬ pk , then Ci pre-
cedes C j .
Prove: for each formula φ there exists a unique implicative normal form φ⊃ which
contains atomic proposition same as φ and such that  φ ≡ φ⊃ . [Hint: Recall CNF
and the valid equivalence ¬ p ≡ p ⊃ ⊥].
Problem 2.11 (Normal forms: negation normal form)
A negation normal form is a form of a formula in which negation signs are applied
only to atomic propositions. Prove that each formula can be transformed into an
equivalent negation form. [Hint: Apply the replacement Theorem 2.5].
Problem 2.12 (Independence)
A set Γ of formulae is independent if and only if for each formula φ ∈ Γ , it is not
the case that Γ \ {φ}  φ. Prove: for each finite set Γ , there exists Δ ⊆ Γ such that
Δ is independent and Δ  φ for each φ ∈ Γ .
Problem 2.13 (Resolution)
(after Fitting [22], 3.8.4). A set Γ of clauses is resolution saturated if and only if
with each clause C it contains results of any application to C of the Resolution Rule
(RRR).
Prove: A set Γ of clauses, which is resolution saturated and unsatisfiable contains
the empty clause.
Problem 2.14 (Robinson sets)
(after Fitting [22], 3.8.5, 3.8.6). For a set Γ of formulae, Γ is a Robinson set if and
only if
(i) for each φ ∈ Γ , Γ contains clauses of its clausal expansion;
(ii) Γ contains all results of applications of Resolution Rule (RRR) to any pair
of its clauses;
(iii) Γ does not contain the empty clause.
Prove: Each Robinson’s set is satisfiable.
108 2 Sentential Logic (SL)

Problem 2.15 (Craig interpolation theorem)

Decide the form of the Craig interpolant for the valid formula φ ⊃ ψ which satisfies
conditions of Problem 2.7.

Problem 2.16 (Haken formulae. Complexity of resolution)

(after Haken [30], Theorem 2.29). Write down the formula H2 for two pidgeon-holes
and 3 letters and check its validity either by the method of analytic tableaux or by
the method of resolution.

Problem 2.17 (Reduced products)

We recall the notion of a proper filter (see Sect. 1.9) as a family F of subsets of set S
such that (i) ∅ ∈
/ F (ii) A, B ∈ F ⊃ A ∩ B ∈ F (iii) A ∈ F ∧ A ⊆ B ⊇ S ⊃ B ∈ F.
By Zorn maximal principle, each proper filter extends to a maximal proper filter,
called ultrafilter. Recall: a family of sets is finitely centered if each finite subfamily
has a non-empty intersection.
 (a) Prove: each finitely centered family of sets H , extends to a filter on the set
H;
(b) consider an infinite set S and the family I of all finite subsets of S. For each
s ∈ S, consider the set I (s) = {A ∈ I : s ∈ A}, hence, each I (s) is a collection of
finite subsets of S and we let J = {I (s) : s ∈ S}; J is a family of subsets of the set
I . Prove: J has the finite intersection property, hence, J extends to a proper filter FJ
and then to an ultrafilter U J ;
(c) consider a non-empty set S, a filter F on S along with a set As = ∅ for each
s ∈ S. Let C = s As be the Cartesian  product of the family {As : s ∈ S} of sets.
Elements of C are functions f : S → As such that f (s) ∈ As for each s ∈ S.
Consider a relation f ∼ F g on functions in C, defined as follows: f ∼ F g if and
only if {s ∈ S : f (s) = g(s)} ∈ F. Prove: The relation ∼ F is an equivalence relation
on C.
(d) with reference to (c), denote by the symbol [ f ]∼ the class of the function
f on C and let C F = {[ f ]∼ F : f ∈ C} which set is called the reduced product of
the family {As : s ∈ S}. Prove: for the set P of atomic propositions, for a collection
{A p : p ∈ P} of assignments, and for a filter F on P, C F |= p if and only if {q ∈
P : Aq |= p} ∈ F. [Hint: Use the reduced product and observe that it defines an
assignment.]

References

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tific Publishers (PWN), Warsaw (1966). (reprinted from mimeographed notes by students of
Warsaw University (1929))
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Travaux Soc. Sci. Lett. Varsovie cl. III, pp. 128 (1930). (also in: Van Heijenoort, J.: From
Frege to Gödel. A Source Book in Mathematical Logic 1879–1931, Harvard University Press,
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fundamental concepts of metamathematics’ in: Tarski, A.: Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics,
pp. 30–37. Oxford University Press, New York (1956))
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Mathematische Zeitschrift, XXV (1926)
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(PWN), Warszawa (1963)
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of deduction based on suppositional directives). In: Ksiȩga Pamia̧tkowa I Polskiego Zjazdu
Matematycznego. Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Kraków (1929)
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431 (1934/5)
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& Row Publishers, New York (1966)
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23–41 (1965)
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Chapter 3
Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

In this chapter we present basic results on the second classical logic, first-order
logic in many topics discussed here reduced to the predicate logic, i.e, logic without
function symbols, yet with the full power of FO when deepest results like the Gödel
completeness theorem, Gödel incompleteness theorems, the Rosser incompleteness
theorem, and the Tarski theorem on non-definability of truth are discussed.

3.1 Introduction to Syntax of FO

First-order logic (FO) adds to propositional logic the possibility of expressing prop-
erties of individuals collectively by using quantified phrases ‘for all’ and ‘for some’.
In this, it follows in the footsteps of Aristotle’s Syllogistics which introduced those
expressions into its syllogisms.
In order to express properties, FO is using relations rendered symbolically in the
form of predicates encoded as relational symbols. The term ‘predicate’ is derived
from the latin ‘praedicatum’ meaning a declared property of an object/subject. As
predicates are interpreted as relations, we will use the name of a relational symbol
in place of a name of a predicate but we keep the traditional name of the predicate
logic for FO without function symbols.
For instance, when we want to state that ‘John loves each animal’, we need
the binary predicate loves(J ohn, x) and a unary predicate animal(x); the pred-
icate ‘loves’ does express a relation of being in love for two beings, and, the
unary predicate ‘animal’ renders the property of being an animal. In proposi-
tional logic,we could express our statement, at least partially, by listing all ani-
mals, at least accessible to John, as a1 , a2 , . . . , an , . . . and forming the formula
loves(J ohn, a1 ) ∧ loves(J ohn, a2 ) ∧ ... with each loves(J ohn, a) as an atomic
proposition. In predicate logic, we would write down the formula (∀x.(animal(x) ⊃
loves(J ohn, x))).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 111
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_3
112 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

The expression ∀ is the universal quantifier meaning ‘for all’. Similarly, if we

wanted to convey to someone the information that there are no unicorns, we would
write down the formula (¬∃x.unicor n(x)) in which the predicate ‘unicorn’ does
express the property of being a unicorn and the existential quantifier ∃ means ‘for
some’, ‘exists’. Let us see some more examples.
‘Every animal that prowls at nights loves to gaze at the moon’ is rendered as

((∀x.((animal(x) ∧ pr owl − at − night (x)) ⊃ (loves − gaze − at − moon(x)))).

‘Anyone who knows Mary loves her’ is rendered as

(∀x.((knows(x, Mar y) ⊃ loves(x, Mar y)))).

‘If some animal loves me, then it is an animal in the house’ is rendered as

(∃x.(animal(x) ∧ loves(x, m) ⊃ in − house(x))).

In the above examples, ‘m’ meaning myself and ‘Mary’ are constants.
‘If a prime number divides the product of two numbers then it does divide at least
one of them’ is rendered as

(∀x, y, z.(( prime(x) ∧ x|yz) ⊃ (x|y ∨ x|z))).

In the last formula, we meet specialized predicates which express some arithmetic
properties; in such cases we say that this statement belongs in the theory of arith-
metics, a specialized case of FO. In absence of specialized predicates, we simply
speak of FO and in absence of function symbols and the relational symbol = of
identity, we discuss predicate logic.
From the above examples it follows that in order to be able to render in sym-
bols such complex statements, we may need symbols for individual variables like
‘x’, symbols for individual constants like ‘m’ or ‘Mary’, symbols for functions and
predicates, quantifier symbols, symbols for propositional connectives and auxiliary
symbols like parentheses and commas.
We now define formally the syntax of first-order logic. We distinguish between
logical and non-logical symbols. Logical symbols are those for individual variables,
logical connectives, quantifiers, and auxiliary symbols like punctuation marks, paren-
theses. Non-logical symbols are constant, relational and function symbols which are
subject for interpretations.
List of symbols L = L v ∪ L c ∪ L q ∪ L a , where
(i) L v = {x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , . . .} is the countably infinite set of individual variables,
often expressed in formulae as x, y, z, . . .;
(ii) L c = {∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡, ¬} is the set of logical connectives of SL;
(iii) L q = {∀, ∃} is the set of quantifier symbols ‘forall’ and ‘exists’;
3.1 Introduction to Syntax of FO 113

(iv) L a = {, (, ), ], [} is the set of auxiliary symbols: parentheses and punctuation

marks.
The relational vocabulary for FO is the set Q = P ∪ C ∪ F, where

(v) P = ∞ n=1 Pn , Pn = {P1 , P2 , . . . , Pk , . . .} is the set of relational symbols and
n n n

each Pn is the set of relational symbols of arity n;

(vi) C = {c1 , c2 , . . . , cn , . . .} is a countably infinite set of constant symbols;

(vii) F = ∞ n=0 Fn , Fn = { f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k , . . .} is the set of function symbols, each
n n n

Fn is the set of symbols for functions of arity n.

The vocabulary may also contain the special relational symbol = of identity.
Formulae of FO are built from elementary sequences of symbols: terms and atomic
formulae.
Definition 3.1 (Terms)
Terms are defined by the following conditions:
(i) constants and variables are terms;
(ii) if function symbols are present, f jn is a function symbol and t1 , t2 , . . . , tn are
terms, then f jn (t1 , t2 , . . . , tn ) is a term;
(iii) each term is obtained either as in (i) or (ii).
Definition 3.2 (Atomic formulae)
Atomic formulae are defined as follows:
(i) for each relational symbol Pnk , and terms t1 , t2 , . . . , tk , the expression
Pnk (t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ) is an atomic formula;
(ii) if the identity symbol = is present, then for each pair t1 , t2 of terms, the expres-
sion t1 = t2 is an atomic formula;
(iii) each atomic formula is obtained either as in (i) or as in (ii).
Definition 3.3 (Formulae of FO)
The set of formulae is defined by rules (i)–(iv). Each formula obtained by means of
rules (i)–(iii) is well-formed (wf). We use the shortcut wff for the phrase:‘well-formed
formula’:
(i) each atomic formula is a wff;
(ii) if φ, ψ are wffs, and ◦ is one of ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡, then φ ◦ ψ and ¬φ are wffs;
(iii) for each wff φ, and an individual variable x, expressions∀x.φ, ∃x.φ are wffs;
(iv) Each wff is obtained solely by means of (i)–(iii).
Rules (i)–(iii) are rules of formation and their consecutive applications lead from
atomic formulae to the formula. The formation tree is the visualization of the process
of application of formation rules.
Example 3.1 (The formation tree) The formation tree for the formula
φ : ∀x.∀y.(P(x, y) ⊃ ∃z.¬R(x, y, z)) is presented in Fig. 3.1.
In nodes of the tree we have sub-formulae of the formula φ. The set Sub(φ)
contains sub-formulae of φ.
114 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Fig. 3.1 A formation tree

Definition 3.4 (Sub-formulae)

For each formula φ, we define the set of its sub-formulae Sub(φ) as follows:
(i) Sub(φ) = {φ} for each atomic formula φ;
(ii) Sub(φ ◦ ψ) = Sub(φ) ∪ Sub(ψ) ∪ {φ ◦ ψ} for ◦ ∈ {∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡};
(iii) Sub(¬φ)= {¬φ} ∪ Sub(φ);
(iv) Sub(∀x.φ) = {∀x.φ} ∪ Sub(φ); Sub(∃x.φ) = {∃x.φ} ∪ Sub(φ).
Definition 3.5 (Scope, free and bound occurrences, independence of terms)
For formulae ∀x.φ(x), ∃x.φ(x), the scope of the quantifier is the formula φ(x).
For instance, in the formula φ of Example 3.1, the scope of ∀x is the sub-formula
∀y.(P(x, y) ⊃ ∃z.¬R(x, y, z)), the scope of ∃z is the sub-formula is ¬R(x, y, z).
An individual variable x is bound in a formula if it occurs in the scope of a
quantifier ∀x, or, ∃x, in the contrary case the variable is free. In the formula φ in
Example 3.1, all variables are bound. A formula is open if all variables that occur in
it are free; a formula is closed if all variables in it are bound. Closed formulae are
called sentences because they behave like formulae in propositional logic.
A term t is independent of a variable x in a formula φ if no free occurrence of x in
φ falls into the scope of any quantifier ∀y or ∃y such that y is a variable in the term
t. If we check that t is independent of x in φ, then the substitution (x/t) in φ will
not bound any variable in t. In particular, independence of a variable y of a variable
x in a formula φ means that no free occurrence of x in φ occurs in the scope of ∀y
or ∃y. If so, substitution (x/y) preserves free occurrence of the variable.
The closure of a formula φ, denoted φ, is obtained by prefixing φ with uni-
versal quantifiers for every variable that occurs in φ as free. For instance, the
closure of the formula [P(x) → Q(x)] ∨ ∃y.[R(y, z) ∨ S(y)] is ∀z.∀x.[P(x) →
Q(x)] ∨ ∃y.[R(y, z) ∨ S(y)]. Closed formulae are called sentences: they behave
like sentential sentences with respect to truth.
Any open formula is obtained by means of steps (i) and (ii) in Definition 3.3,
which implies the following relation between predicate and propositional logics.
Theorem 3.1 Each open formula of predicate logic is the result of a substitution of
atomic formulae into a formula of propositional logic.
3.2 Introduction to Semantics of FO 115

3.2 Introduction to Semantics of FO

It is obvious from our discussion of syntax of predicate logic that the notion of
truth for predicate logic should be defined in more complex environment then it
was the case for propositional logic: we should accommodate individual variables,
constants, function symbols, relational symbols and quantifiers, i.e, various types of
grammatical categories of the syntax language for first-order logic. Semantic theory
for predicate logic which we will present goes back to Tarski [1].

Definition 3.6 (Domain, interpretation)

A structure for FO is a pair M = (D, I ). The set D of things is called the domain of
the structure and I is an interpretation of non-logical constructs of the logic in the
set D:
(i) for a relational symbol P = P jk , the interpretation P I ⊆ D k is the relation of
arity k on the domain D;
(ii) for a function symbol f = f jk , the interpretation is the function f I : D k → D;
(iii) for a constant symbol c = c j , the interpretation c I ∈ D is a fixed element of
the domain D.

It remains to settle the case of individual variables. Their meanings are decided
by assignments.

Definition 3.7 (Assignments)

An assignment is a mapping A on the set of individual variables L v into the domain
D, which assigns to each individual variable xi an element xiA ∈ D.

Definition 3.8 (Substitution)

∞
Assume that variables are ordered into a sequence σ : (xi )i=1 . For an assignment A,
an individual variable xi and an element d ∈ D, a substitution σ(i, d) is a mapping
σ(i, d)(A) on the set of A-assignments to individual variables defined as follows:
(i) σ(i, d)(x jA ) = x jA in case j = i;
(ii) σ(i, d)(xiA ) = d.

Definition 3.9 (A-structures)

An A-structure is a triple M I,A = (D, I, A), where (D, I ) is a structure M, and
A is an assignment. Interpretations in the A-structure are as follows: P I,A = P I ,
f I,A = f I , c I,A = c I , xiI,A = xiA and, more generally, interpretations for terms are
denoted t I,A .

We now address the issue of satisfiability and we define the notion of satisfaction
of a formula in an A-structure.

Definition 3.10 (Satisfaction)

For an A-structure over a fixed domain D, the following conditions define the relation
I, A |= φ of formula satisfaction:
116 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

(i) for each atomic formula φ : P k (t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ), I, A |= φ if and only if

(t1I,A , t2I,A , . . . , tkI,A ) ∈ P I ;
(ii) I, A |= (t1 = t2 ) if and only if t1I,A = t2I,A ;
(iii) I, A |= f (t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ) = t if and only if f I (t1I,A , t2I,A , . . . , tkI,A ) = t I,A ;
(iv) I, A |= φ ∨ ψ if and only if either I, A |= φ or I, A |= ψ;
(v) I, A |= φ ∧ ψ if and only if I, A |= φ and I, A |= ψ;
(vi) I, A |= ¬φ if and only if it is not the case that I, A |= φ;
(vii) I, A |= φ ⊃ ψ if and only if either it is not the case that I, A |= φ or I, A |= ψ;
(viii) I, A |= ∀xi .φ if and only if for each d ∈ D, I, σ(i, d)(A) |= φ;
(ix) I, A |= ∃xi .φ if and only if for some d ∈ D, I, A, σ(i, d)(A) |= φ.
Please observe that conditions (viii) and (ix) make satisfaction for closed formulae
(sentences) independent from σ.
Definition 3.11 (Validity, satisfiability)
A formula φ is true in an A-structure M I,A if and only if I, A |= φ. In this case the
formula φ is satisfiable and the A-structure M I,A is a model for the formula φ.
A formula φ is true in a structure M, in symbols M |= φ, if and only if it is true
in A-structure M I,A for all assignments A.
Finally, the formula φ is valid, which is denoted |= φ, if and only if φ is true in
each structure M. If there is no A-structure in which a formula φ is true, then the
formula φ is unsatisfiable.
Clearly, a formula is valid if and only if its negation is unsatisfiable.
These notions extend to sets of formulae: for a set Γ of formulae, I, A |= Γ if
and only if I, A |= φ for each φ ∈ Γ . The same convention is obeyed in cases of
M |= Γ and |= Γ .
Definition 3.12 (Logical consequence. Entailment)
A set Γ of formulae entails a set Δ of formulae (Δ is a logical consequence of Γ )
if and only if for each structure M if M |= Γ , then M |= ψ for a formula ψ ∈ Δ. If
Δ = {φ}, then we say that φ is entailed by Γ .

3.3 Natural Deduction: Sequents

Sequents, introduced in Gentzen [2] responded to the call for formalization of natural
deduction whose first formalization had been due to Jaśkowski [3, 4]. In case of Γ
and Δ being finite sets of formulae, Γ = {γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γk }, Δ = {δ1 , δ2 , . . . , δl }, we
call the ordered pair < Γ, Δ > a sequent.
Definition 3.13 The meaning of the pair is: if all formulae in Γ are true in an interpre-
tation M, then some formula in Δ is true in the interpretation M; this understanding
of the pair < Γ, Δ > is stressed by the notation: we denotesequents by  the symbol
k
Γ ⇒ Δ and the truth condition in any structure M is M |= i=1 γi ⊃ lj=1 δ j . This
condition is equivalent to saying that Δ is a logical consequence to Γ .
3.3 Natural Deduction: Sequents 117

Before we list the rules, we comment on some limiting cases involving empty sets
of formulae.
(i) in case of a sequent ∅ ⇒ Δ (written in Gentzen [2] as ⇒ Δ), the conjunction
of the empty set of formulae is valid, hence the sequent is valid if at least one
formula in Δ is valid;
(ii) in case of a sequent Γ ⇒ (we already apply the Gentzen notation), the disjunc-
tion of Δ is false, hence, the sequent is valid if and only if at least one formula
in Γ is invalid;
(iii) in the extreme case, the sequent ⇒ is unsatisfiable as neither there is a valid
formula in Δ nor there is an invalid formula in Γ .
We may now list the rules of sequent calculus pertaining to predicate logic (i.e.,
without function and identity symbols). The reader may check their validity by means
of our definition of a sequent as an implication. Each rule is traditionally presented
as a fraction with premisses in the numerator and consequents in the denominator.
We know from Chap. 1 that connectives ∨, ¬ define all other connectives, and,
similarly, by definition of semantics, the equivalence ∀x.φ ≡ ¬∃¬φ is valid, thus, we
need only, e.g., the quantifier ∃; accordingly, the rules below employ only connectives
∨, ¬ and quantifier ∃. In case we want to prove a formula with other connectives or
quantifier, we use replacement rules.

Definition 3.14 (Rules for the sequent calculus)

Of few modifications of the original Gentzen system (cf., e.g., Indrzejczak [5]),
we adopt the system G 0 plus quantifier rules in Smullyan [6]. First we recall the
propositional part.

(Rule 1) (The axiom) Γ, φ ⇒ φ, Δ;

Γ,φ⇒Δ
(Rule 2) (introduction of right negation) Γ ⇒Δ,¬φ
;
Γ ⇒Δ,φ
(Rule 3) (introduction of left negation) Γ,¬φ⇒Δ ;
(Rule 4) (introduction of right disjunction) ΓΓ⇒Δ,φ∨ψ
⇒Δ,φ,ψ
;
Γ,φ⇒Δ Γ,ψ⇒Δ
(Rule 5) (introduction of left disjunction) Γ,φ∨ψ⇒Δ
;
Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ ⇒Δ,ψ
(Rule 6) (introduction of right conjunction) Γ ⇒φ∧ψ
;
Γ,φ,ψ⇒Δ
(Rule 7) (introduction of left conjunction) Γ,φ∧ψ⇒Δ ;
(Rule 8) (introduction of right implication) ΓΓ,φ⇒Δ,ψ
⇒Δ,φ⊃ψ
;
Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ,ψ⇒Δ
(Rule 9) (introduction of left implication) Γ,φ⊃ψ⇒Δ
.

Now, we add rules for quantification.

Γ,φ(d)⇒Δ
(Rule 10) (introduction of left universal quantifier) Γ,∀x.φ(x)⇒Δ
;
Γ ⇒Δ,φ(d)
(Rule 11) (introduction of right universal quantifier) Γ ⇒Δ,∀x.φ(x)
under proviso: d
has no occurrence in the consequent;
Γ,φ(d)⇒Δ
(Rule 12) (introduction of left existential quantifier) Γ,∃x.φ(x)⇒Δ under proviso: d
has no occurrence in the consequent;
(Rule 13) (introduction of right existential quantifier) Γ Γ⇒Δ,∃x.φ(x)
⇒Δ,φ(d)
.
118 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Example 3.2 We prove the formula ∀x.α(x) ⊃ ∃x.α(x).

(i) α(d) ⇒ α(d): axiom (Rule 1);
(ii) ∀x.α(x) ⇒ α(d): introduction of left universal quantifier (Rule 10);
(iii) ∀x.α(x) ⇒ ∃x.α(x): introduction of right existential quantifier (Rule 13);
(iv) ⇒ ∀x.α(x) ⊃ ∃x.α(x): introduction of right implication (Rule 8).
A proof of a formula φ is a sequence S0 , S1 , . . . , Sk of sequents such that S0 is an
axiom, Si+1 for 0 < i ≤< k is obtained from Si by one of the rules, and, Sk is ⇒ φ.
A formula φ is provable if and only if it has a proof. Sequent calculus is sound:
from validity of axiom, validity is preserved by each rule from the premiss to the
consequent, and, finally, to the validity of the result φ given in the form ⇒ φ. Hence,
each provable formula is valid.

We postpone a discussion of completeness of the sequent calculus to Sect. 3.6.

In Gentzen [2], some additional rules were proposed like thinning:

Γ ⇒Δ Γ ⇒Δ
, .
Γ, φ ⇒ Δ Γ ⇒ Δ, φ

The Gentzen ‘Hauptsatz’ theorem concerns the elimination of the Cut Rule:

Γ1 , φ ⇒ Δ1 Γ2 ⇒ φ, Δ2
;
Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ Δ 1 , Δ2

each formula proved with usage of Cut Rule can be proved without using it. We
return to this topic in Sect. 3.5.

3.4 Natural Deduction: Diagrams of Formulae

We return now to Chap. 2 in which we presented the ‘diagrammatic method’ for

validity checking. We recall this idea for the case of predicate logic, on the lines
of (Rasiowa and Sikorski [7]). Diagrams of formulae are constructed on same ideas
as sequents, they are based on valid inference rules but they applied them in the
opposite way: each diagram is a fraction, in which premisses are below the line and
consequents are above the line.

Definition 3.15 (Diagrams of formulae)

Each diagram is either of the form ΓΓ0 (type (β)) or Γ0Γ;Γ1 (type (α)). In case of type
    
(β), the rule Γ0 ⊃ Γ and in case of type (α) the rule Γ0 ∧ Γ1 ⊃ Γ are
valid inference rules. As with propositional diagrams, coma ‘, denotes disjunction
and the sign of semicolon ‘; denotes conjunction.

We suppose that individual variables and constants are ordered into infinite
sequence σ without repetitions. With these provisos, diagrams are the following:
3.4 Natural Deduction: Diagrams of Formulae 119

Γ0 , α ∨ β, Γ1
(∨)(1)
Γ0 , α, β, Γ1

Γ0 , ¬(α ∨ β), Γ1
(¬∨)(2)
Γ0 , ¬α, Γ1 ; Γ0 , ¬β, Γ1

Γ0 , α ∧ β, Γ1
(∧)(3)
Γ0 , α, Γ1 ; Γ0 , β, Γ1

Γ0 , ¬(α ∧ β), Γ1
(¬∧)(4)
Γ0 , ¬α, ¬β, Γ1

Γ0 , α ⊃ β, Γ1
(⊃)(5)
Γ0 , ¬α, β, Γ1

Γ0 , ¬(α ⊃ β), Γ1
(¬ →)(6)
Γ0 , ¬α, Γ1 ; Γ0 , β, Γ1

Γ0 , ¬¬αΓ1
(¬¬)(7)
Γ0 , α, Γ1

Γ0 , ∃x.α(x), Γ1
(∃)(8)
Γ0 , α(c), Γ1 , ∃x.α(x)

Condition for (8): c is a term in the sequence σ with the property that the formula
α(c) does not appear at any earlier step of decomposition, including the consequent
of the currently considered rule.
Γ0 , ¬∃x.α(x), Γ1
(¬∃)(9)
Γ0 , ∀x.¬α(x), Γ1

Γ0 , ∀x.α(x), Γ1
(∀)(10)
Γ0 , α(y), Γ1

Condition for (10): y is a variable which has no occurrence in any formula in the
consequent.
Γ0 , ¬∀x.α(x), Γ1
(¬∀)(11)
Γ0 , ∃α(y), Γ1

A formula is indecomposable if and only if it is a clause, i.e., a disjunction of

literals, i.e, atomic formulae and their negations.
A sequence Γ is final in case it consists of indecomposable formulae and it is
valid in case it contains an indecomposable formula along with its negation. Due to
120 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Fig. 3.2 A diagram of

decomposition


valid disjunction p ∨ ¬ p, the disjunction Γ is valid. As with propositional logic,
this disjunction is provable.
The procedure for a formula φ begins with a formula φ at the root and then a tree is
grown: each time a type β is met, the tree branches according to the distributive law.
There are two outcomes possible: either the obtained tree is finite and all formulae
at the nodes are indecomposable or the tree is infinite; in the latter case the formula
φ is unsatisfiable, in the former case the result is a conjunction of disjunctions of
indecomposable formulae. When all disjunctions are valid the resulting formula is
valid, moreover it is provable.

Theorem 3.2 A formula φ is a valid formula of predicate logic if and only if the
diagram for φ is finite and all conjuncts are valid.

As each of them is a substitution of atomic formulae and their negation into a

tautology, all conjuncts are provable (see Chap. 2). We obtain

Theorem 3.3 (A form of completeness theorem for predicate logic) For each valid
formula of predicate logic, the formula resulting from decomposition is provable.

Example 3.3 Consider Fig. 3.2 which represents the diagram for the formula φ :
∀x.(P(x) ⊃ (Q(x)) ⊃ P(x)). The final sequence ¬P(y) ∨ Q(y) ∨ P(y) proves
validity of φ.

Theorem 3.4 The following are valid formulae of predicate logic.

A. Formulae involving negation

(1) ∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ¬∃x.¬φ(x) (duality for quantifiers, De Morgan laws);
(2) ¬∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ∃x.¬φ(x) (duality for quantifiers, De Morgan laws);
(3) ¬∃x.φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.¬φ(x) (duality for quantifiers, De Morgan laws);
(4) ∃x.φ(x) ⊃ ¬∀x.¬φ(x) (duality for quantifiers, De Morgan laws).

B. Formulae involving implication

In formulae (5)–(8), ψ is a formula in which individual variable x is not free. For
conciseness sake, we present these formulae as equivalences, so each equivalence
replaces forth and back implications.
(5) ∀x.(φ(x) ⊃ ψ) ≡ ((∃x(φ(x)) ⊃ ψ));
(6) ∀x.(ψ ⊃ φ(x)) ≡ (ψ ⊃ (∀x.φ(x));
3.5 Natural Deduction: Tableaux 121

(7) (∃x.(φ(x) ⊃ ψ) ≡ ((∀x.(φ(x)) ⊃ ψ);

(8) (∃x.(ψ ⊃ φ(x)) ≡ (ψ ⊃ (∃x.φ(x)));
(9) ∀x.(φ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)) ⊃ (∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.ψ(x));
(10) ∀x.(φ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)) ⊃ (∃x.φ(x) ⊃ ∃x.ψ(x)).
Formulae (5)–(8) allow for pulling out quantifier symbols.
C. Formulae involving disjunctions and conjunctions
In formulae (11)–(14) individual variable x in ψ is not free. We state equivalences
which represent implications forth and back. These formulae also allow for pulling
out quantifier symbols.
(11) ∀x.(ψ ∧ φ(x)) ≡ (ψ ∧ ∀x.φ(x));
(12) ∀x.(ψ ∨ φ(x)) ≡ (ψ ∨ ∀x.φ(x));
(13) ∃x.(ψ ∧ φ(x)) ≡ (ψ ∧ ∃x.φ(x));
(14) ∃x.(ψ ∨ φ(x)) ≡ (ψ ∨ ∃x.φ(x)).

D. Distributivity laws
(15) ∀x.(φ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)) ≡ (∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.ψ(x));
(16) ∃x.(φ(x) ∨ ψ(x)) ≡ (∃x.φ(x) ∨ ∃x.ψ(x));
(17) (∀x.φ(x) ∨ ∀x.ψ(x)) ⊃ (∀x.(φ(x) ∨ ψ(x));
(18) ∃x.(φ(x) ∧ ψ(x)) ⊃ (∃x.φ(x) ∧ ∃x.ψ(x)).

E. Generalization and specification rules

(19) ∀x.φ(x) ⊃ φ(t), where t is an arbitrary term;
(20) (Gen) φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.φ(x).

3.5 Natural Deduction: Tableaux

As with propositional logic, tableaux decompose signed formulae into a form of a

tree with sub-formulae in nodes. They resemble very much diagrams in their idea,
but are different when we come to details.
We extend the set of types of formulae beyond propositional types: (α) is the type
of conjunctive formulae p ∧ q, (β) is the type of disjunctive formulae p ∨ q; we
add the type (γ) of universally quantified formulae ∀x.φ, ¬∃x.φ and the type(δ) of
existentially quantified formulae ∃x.φ, ¬∀x.φ.
The symbol φ(x/d) will denote the result of uniform substitution of a constant
d ∈ D (D is the domain of a structure) for individual variable x free in φ. In the
following tableau rules, semi-colon ‘; means conjunction, coma ‘, means disjunc-
tion; in definition of types, as well as in tableau analysis, we acknowledge analysis
in Smullyan [6]. The tableaux we discuss are called analytic in Smullyan [6], as an
aftermath of semantic tableaux in Beth [8] and ‘block’ tableaux in Hintikka [9]. The
formulae in analytic tableaux are signed, i.e, as in propositional version, prefixed
with T meaning ‘true’ or F meaning ‘false’.
122 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Definition 3.16 (Tableau rules)

A. A general form of rules
φ
(i) For type (α): φ1 ;φ2
;
φ
(ii) For type (β): φ1 ,φ2
;
φ
(iii) For type (γ): φ(a)
;
φ
(iv) For type (δ): φ(d)
,
on condition that d is a constant not occurring in the preceding steps of tableau
development.
B. Explicit tableau rules for signed formulae of types (γ), (δ).
T (∀x.φ)
(v) For type (γ): ; F(∃x.φ) ;
T (φ(x/d)) F(φ(x/d))
T (∃x.φ)
(vi) For type (δ): ; F(∀x.φ) .
T (φ(x/d)) F(φ(x/d))

on condition in (vi) that in both cases d has not been employed before.

In Fig. 3.3, we present diagrams for signed formulae of types (γ) and (δ).

Example 3.4 Consider the formula

ξ : [∀x.(φ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)) ⊃ (∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.ψ(x))].

We show in Fig. 3.4 the tableau for the signed formula Fξ. Please observe that
both branches are closed: the left branch contains contradictory atomic formulae
P(a), ¬P(a), the right branch contains contradictory atomic formulae Q(a), ¬Q(a).
This means that ξ is valid (we know that, actually, this is the valid formula (9).

Contrariwise, Fig. 3.5 for the signed formula

F[¬∃x.((¬P(x) ⊃ P(x)) ⊃ P(x))]

Fig. 3.3 Types of

decomposition
3.6 Meta-Theory of Predicate Logic. Part I 123

Fig. 3.4 A closed predicate

tableau

Fig. 3.5 An open predicate

tableau

presents tableau whose all three branches are open, i.e., not contradictory which
point to satisfying structures. In effect, the formula [∃x.((¬P(x) ⊃ P(x)) ⊃ P(x))]
is valid.

3.6 Meta-Theory of Predicate Logic. Part I

We pursue topics of consistency, compactness, completeness, soundness, not nec-

essarily in this order, using tableaux. We have met a form of completeness when
discussing diagrams. Yet, we use tableaux in a proof of completeness.
124 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

We address completeness, compactness, countable model property, and, consis-

tency, first. Tableaux prove to be a very convenient milieu to prove those properties
of the predicate logic.

3.6.1 Tableau-Completeness of Predicate Logic

Definition 3.17 (Hintikka sets for predicate logic)

A set Γ of formulae is a Hintikka set for a structure M = (D, I ) if and only if the
following conditions are fulfilled:
(H0) The set Γ does not contain simultaneously an atomic formula and its nega-
tion; it does not contain ⊥. In the realm of signed formulae this means that
Γ cannot contain both T P and F P for any atomic formula P;
(H1) If Γ contains a formula φ : φ1 ∧ φ2 of conjunctive type (α), then it contains
both formulae φ1 and φ2 ;
(H2) If Γ contains a formula φ : φ1 ∨ φ2 of type (β), then it contains either φ1 or
φ2 ;
(H3) If Γ contains a formula φ of type (γ), then it contains the formula φ(d) for
each d ∈ D;
(H4) If Γ contains a formula φ of type (δ), then it contains the formula φ(d) for
an element d ∈ D;
(H5) If Γ contains a formula ¬¬φ, then Γ contains the formula φ.

It follows by structural induction, as in case of propositional logic, that Γ is

satisfied in M.

Theorem 3.5 Each Hintikka set for the structure M is satisfied in M.

Proof As announced, the proof goes by structural induction. For atomic formulae,
we assign to P the value 1 (truth) if T P ∈ Γ , and, the value 0 (falsity) if F P ∈ Γ ;
otherwise, if {T P, F P} ∩ Γ = ∅, we assign truth value at random. Consider now
formulae of size > 0.
If φ is φ1 ∧ φ2 , then φ1 , φ2 ∈ Γ by (H1), and, by hypothesis of induction, φ1 , φ2
are satisfied in M, hence, φ is satisfied in M. Same argument works for φ which is
φ1 ∨ φ2 with (H2) in place of (H1). If φ ∈ Γ is of the form ∀x.ψ (i.e., of type (γ)),
then, by (H3), ψ(d) ∈ Γ for each d ∈ D, hence, by hypothesis of induction, each
ψ(d) is valid in M and this is necessary for validity of φ ∈ M. Finally, if φ ∈ Γ
is ∃x.ψ, then, by (H4), ψ(d) ∈ Γ for some d ∈ D which implies by hypothesis of
induction that ψ(d) is valid in M, witnessing validity of φ in M. Similarly, for (H5).
The point is now in considering the tableau for a formula φ with validity of φ on
mind. Let us observe that if a tableau for a formula Fφ contains an open branch then
(H0) and (H1) and (H2) are satisfied for some open extension, the same holds for
(H4), (H5) and only (H3) requires more attention as it can lead to an open infinite
branch. With some judicious choice of a strategy for expanding nodes, one can
3.6 Meta-Theory of Predicate Logic. Part I 125

satisfy (H3) in order to make some open extension, possibly infinite, a Hintikka set,
i.e, satisfiable. It follows that if a formula φ is valid, then the tableau for Fφ is closed,
i.e., all branches are closed and these facts must be noticed in a finite number of steps
for each branch, hence, the tableau is finite. A theorem obtains. 

Theorem 3.6 (Tableau-completeness) If a formula φ is valid, then the tableau for

Fφ is finite and closed, hence, φ is tableau-provable.
Countable model property: the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem; compactness
property
Another observation related to the above discussion is that an open Hintikka
branch witnesses the satisfiability of the formula and this branch is countable, which
implies the Löwenheim theorem Löwenheim [10].

Theorem 3.7 (The Löwenheim theorem) If a formula is satisfiable in an interpre-

tation, then it is satisfiable in an interpretation with the countable domain.

Löwenheim theorem was generalised in Skolem [11] to the following result.

Theorem 3.8 (The Skolem-Löwenheim theorem) Each countable set of formulae

which are jointly satisfiable in a common interpretation, are jointly satisfiable in a
common interpretation over a countable domain.

Proof For a countable set Γ of formulae {φn : n ≥ 1}, suppose that formulae are
ordered in that order, and, modify the tableau by beginning it with φ1 . After φ j for j <
n have been used, attach φn to the end of each open branch and continue. By induction,
a tableau is built. Was the tableau closed, it would prove joint unsatisfiability of a
finite set of formulae from Γ , a contradiction. Therefore, there exists an open branch
proving joint satisfiability of formulae from Γ . The branch is countable. 

Corollary 3.1 (Compactness property)

A countable set Γ of formulae is jointly satisfiable if and only if each finite subset Δ
of it is jointly satisfiable.

Proof The condition that each finite set of formulae is jointly satisfiable implies that
no tableau built from them as in proof of Theorem 3.8 can close, hence there exists
in it, by the König Theorem 1.43 an open infinite branch witnessing satisfiability of
Γ . The converse is manifest. 

Consistency: existence of interpretations

We cannot analyse consistency as in the case of propositional logic: as of yet, we
have not introduced any syntactic proof mechanism, yet we may define consistency
by means of properties of consistent sets, established in Chap. 2, and well suited for
the tableau paradigm.
126 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Definition 3.18 (Consistent sets)

A set Γ of formulae is consistent if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) for no atomic formula P, Γ contains T P and F P; Γ does not contain ⊥;
(ii) if a formula φ : φ1 ∧ φ2 of type (α) is in Γ , then the set Γ ∪ {φ1 , φ2 } is
consistent;
(iii) if a formula φ : φ1 ∨ φ2 of type (β) is in Γ , then either Γ ∪ {φ1 } is consistent
or Γ ∪ {φ2 } is consistent;
(iv) if a formula φ of type (γ) is in Γ , then the set Γ ∪ {φ(x/d)} is consistent;
(v) if a formula φ of type (δ) is in Γ , then the set Γ ∪ {φ(x/d)} is consistent, where
d has no occurrence in Γ .
By properties (i)–(v), any tableau for the set Γ must contain an open branch. By
a repetition of arguments in Theorem 3.8, we conclude that
Theorem 3.9 (Consistency implies satisfiability) Any consistent set of formulae has
an interpretation with a countable domain, which can be stated as follows: each con-
sistent set is satisfiable. We know from Chap. 2 that this implies strong completeness.
Theorem 3.10 Predicate logic is tableau–strongly complete.

3.7 Analytic Tableaux Versus Sequents

From the definition of validity of sequents it follows that a sequent

S : {γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γk } ⇒ {δ1 , δ2 , . . . , δm }

is valid if only if the set of signed formulae{T γ1 , T γ2 , . . . , T γk , Fδ1 , Fδ2 , . . . , Fδm }

is tableau-unsatisfiable. Therefore a proof of unsatisfiability of the set

{T γ1 , T γ2 , . . . , T γk , Fδ1 , Fδ2 , . . . , Fδm }

supplies the proof of validity of the sequent S. The following result obtains by
tableau-completeness.
Theorem 3.11 (Completeness of sequent calculus) Sequent calculus for predicate
logic is complete: each valid sequent is provable.
We can render sequent rules in tableaux, as the following examples show. We
denote as TΓ the sequence T γ1 , . . . , T γk and as FΔ the sequence Fδ1 , . . . , Fδm
(Table 3.1).
Tableau-completeness supplies also a short argument in favor of Hauptsatz in
Smullyan [6]. Gentzen’s Hauptsatz concerns Cut Rule:

Γ 1 , φ ⇒ Δ1 Γ2 ⇒ φ, Δ2
Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ Δ1 , Δ2
3.8 Normal Forms 127

Table 3.1 Sequent rules Sequent r ules As tableau r ules

rendered as tableau rules
Γ, φ ⇒ Δ, φ T Γ, T φ, FΔ, Fφ
Γ,φ,ψ⇒Δ T Γ,T φ,T ψ,FΔ
Γ,φ∧ψ⇒Δ T Γ,T φ∧ψ,FΔ
Γ ⇒Δ,φ,ψ T Γ,FΔ,Fφ,Fψ
Γ ⇒Δ,φ∨ψ T Γ,FΔ,Fφ∨ψ

and the possibility of proving sequents without the Cut Rule. The Hauptsatz states
that each sequent provable with use of Cut Rule is provable without use of Cut Rule.
The argument for Hauptsatz formulated in the framework of tableau counterpart
to sequents runs as follows: suppose that tableaux for Γ, φ and for Γ, ¬φ are closed,
hence, both Γ, φ and Γ, ¬φ are unsatisfiable which forces the conclusion that Γ is
unsatisfiable, hence, the tableau for Γ is closed. This means that φ is eliminable.
In (Gentzen, op.cit.), a constructive proof of the Hauptsatz is given, by means of
a primitive recursive function which does estimate complexity of the closed tableau
for Γ in terms of complexities of closed tableaux for Γ, φ and for Γ, ¬φ. Smullyan
[6] gives the proof on these lines which does encompass the Hauptsatz for tableaux
and sequents.

3.8 Normal Forms

Laws of predicate logic allow for presentation of formulae in some specialized forms.
As with propositional logic, we meet in FO negative normal form, CNF and DNF
forms and some forms which we discuss later on: Prenex normal form, Skolem
normal forms and Herbrand normal forms. A good introduction to this topic is the
negative-normal form. We recall that a literal is either an atomic formula or its
negation.

Definition 3.19 (Negative-normal forms)

A formula φ is in a negative-normal form if and only if negation signs are negating
literals only and other connectives are ∨ and ∧ along with quantifiers ∀, ∃.

Duality laws of predicate logic secure the existence of negative-normal form for
each formula. Consider, e.g., the formula

φ : ¬(∀x.(ψ(x) ⊃ (ξ(x) ⊃ ψ(x))))

The sequence of transformations

∃x.(¬(¬ψ(x) ∨ ¬ξ(x) ∨ ψ(x)))

∃x.(ψ(x) ∧ ξ(x) ∧ ¬ψ(x))

128 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

yields a negative-normal form for φ. Let us observe that negative-normal forms are
not defined uniquely.

Definition 3.20 (Renaming)

In formulae 3.4(5)–(8), we find sub-formulae ψ in which there are no free occurrences
of individual variables; examples of such sub-formulae are sentences like ∀x.ξ(x),
∃y.ξ(y). It is obvious that truth of sentences does not depend on the variable used,
so we are allowed to rename variables in closed formulae in order to apply relevant
laws from among 3.4.(1)–(20).

For instance, consider:

(∗)(∀x.(ξ(x) ∧ ¬φ(c))) ∧ (φ(c) ∨ ∃x.ξ(x))

rename x as y in the first disjunct: (∀y.(ξ(y) ∧ ¬φ(c))) ∧ (φ(c) ∨ ∃x.ξ(x))

pull out ∃x.:(∀y.(ξ(y) ∧ ¬φ(c))) ∧ ∃x.(φ(c) ∨ ξ(x))

pull out ∃:∃x.(∀y.(ξ(y) ∧ ¬φ(c))) ∧ (φ(c) ∨ ξ(x))

Finally, we obtain: (∗∗)∃x.∀y.(((ξ(y) ∧ ¬φ(c))) ∧ (φ(c) ∨ ξ(x)))

The form (**)is yet another normal form: the prenex form.

Definition 3.21 (The prenex normal form)

A formula φ is in the prenex normal form if φ is Q 1 x1 Q 2 x2 . . . Q k xk .ψ, where
the prefix Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . Q k contains all quantifier symbols in φ and the matrix ψ is
quantifier-free. In other words, all quantifier symbols are pulled out and they form
the prefix of φ.

Renaming, laws (1)–(20) of Theorem 3.4 and equivalences allow for transforming
each formula into a prenex form. An example is formula (**), the prenex form of
formula (*). A formal proof of the existence of prenex can be given by structural
induction:
(i) literals are already in prenex;
(ii) if a connective ◦ is ∨ or ∧ (and they suffice), φ is ψ ◦ ξ and, by induction
hypothesis ψ, ξ are in prenex forms, then renaming and laws (12)-(15) give
prenex form for φ;
(iii) if φ is ¬ψ and ψ is in a prenex form, e.g., ∀x.ξ(x), then duality laws (1)-(4),
transform φ into ∃x.¬ξ(x) and, by induction hypothesis,¬ξ(x) is in a prenex
form, hence, φ is in the prenex form;
(iv) if φ is Qx.ψ and ψ is in a prenex form, then φ is in prenex form.
Elimination of existential quantifier symbols from a formula can be effected by
means of a technique due to Skolem [12].
3.8 Normal Forms 129

Definition 3.22 (Skolem normal forms)

For a formula φ in prenex form, a Skolem sequence of quantifier symbols in the prefix
of φ is a sequence Sk : ∀xi1 ∀xi2 . . . ∀xik ∃y. The Skolem function symbol associated
with the sequence Sk is f (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik ), where the function symbol f has no
occurrence in φ, and the Skolem substitution (Skolemization) is the substitution
y/ f (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik ). Particular cases are:

(i) for a formula φ : ∃y.ψ(y): the Skolem function symbol becomes a function of
arity 0, i.e., a Skolem constant f and the formula φ becomes ψ( f );
(ii) for a formula φ : ∀x.∃y.ψ(x, y): the Skolem function symbol is f (x) and φ
becomes ψ(x, f (x)).

Skolem normal form is a prenex form in which for all Skolem sequences, existen-
tial quantifiers have been replaced with Skolem function symbols. We denote by the
symbol ∀F O the set of all formulae in FO in prenex forms whose prefixes consist
solely of universal quantifier symbols and matrices contain only bound individual
variables. A formula in a Skolem normal form is in ∀F O.

Theorem 3.12 A formula φ is satisfiable if and only if its Skolem normal form is
satisfiable.

Proof Suppose that φ is Skψ, with Sk of Definition 8.4, free variables in ψ are
x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , y and φ is closed. If φ is satisfied in an A-structure M I,A = (D, I, A),
then, for each sequence d = (d1 , d2 , . . . , dn ), each di ∈ D, there exists ad ∈ D such
that ψ(x1 /d1 , x2 /d2 , . . . , xn /dn , y/ad ) holds in M I,A .
For the Skolem normal form, with the substitution y/ f (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ), we let
f (d1 , d2 , . . . , dn ) = ad , for each substitution (x1 /d1 , x2 /d2 , . . . , xn /dn ) and then
ψ(x1 /d1 , x2 /d2 , . . . , xn /dn , y/ f (x1 /d1 , x2 /d2 , . . . , xn /dn ) holds in M I,A . 
A formula and its Skolem normal form need not be equivalent: introducing, e.g.,
a constant reduces the class of possible interpretations for the Skolem normal form.
A remedy is to add to the Skolem normal form a set of Skolem axioms, see (Boolos
et al. [13]).

Example 3.5 We find the Skolem normal form for

φ : ∀x.∃y.[(P(x, y) ⊃ R(y)) ∨ ∃z.S(z)]

(i) We introduce the Skolem symbol f : ∀x.∃y.[(P(x, y) ⊃ R(y)) ∨ S( f )];

(ii) We introduce the Skolem function symbol g(x): ∀x.[(P(x, g(x)) ⊃
R(g(x))) ∨ S( f )].

A finite diagram in Example 3.3 for a formula φ yields a CNF form of φ, i.e., a
conjunction
 of disjunctions.
 Also, a tableau for Fφ results in DNF of φ, viz., this
DNF is branches (branch). Negating this DNF, we obtain the CNF form for φ.
130 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Definition 3.23 (Conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms)  

Conjunctive normal form (CNF) of an open formula is i Di , where Di is j l ij for
each i, literals l ij are atomic formulae or their negations. Sub-formulae of the form
 i
j l j are clauses.
 
Disjunctive normal forms (DNF’s) are i Ci , where Ci is j l ij for each i. Sub-
 i
formulae of the form j l j are prime implicants.
By means of tautologies ¬( p ∨ ¬q) ≡ (¬ p) ∧ (¬q), ¬( p ∧ ¬q) ≡ (¬ p) ∨
(¬q), ( p ⊃ q) ≡ ((¬ p) ∨ q), and distributivity laws (( p ∧ q) ∨ r ) ≡ (( p ∨ r ) ∧
(q ∨ r )), (( p ∨ q) ∧ r ) ≡ (( p ∧ r ) ∨ (q ∧ r )), each open formula can be trans-
formed into an equivalent conjunctive normal form.
As negation converts CNF’s into DNF’s, each formula can be expressed equiva-
lently as a DNF via CNF of its negation. It follows that CNF’s for open formulae are
obtained exactly as in the case of propositional logic.
For a formula φ of predicate logic, CNF can be obtained in the following steps:
1. Introduce Skolem constant and function symbols for each Skolem sequence;
2. Drop universal quantifiers in front of sub-formulae by virtue of Theorem 3.3(19),
using eventually renaming;
3. Transform the resulting open formula to a CNF.

Example 3.6 Consider the formula φ:

(¬∀x.((P(x) ⊃ ∃y.(Q(y) ∧ R(x, y))) ⊃ ∃z.T (z)))

Its CNF form is obtained in the following steps.

(1) duality ¬∀ ≡ ∃¬: (∃x.¬((P(x) ⊃ ∃y.(Q(y) ∧ R(x, y))) ⊃ ∃z.T (z)));
(2) Skolemization: Skolem constants f for x, g for z, h for y : (¬(P( f ) ⊃ (Q(h) ∧
R( f, h))) ⊃ T (g));
(3) removal of implications: (¬(¬(¬P( f ) ∨ (Q(h) ∧ R( f, h)) ∨ T (g))));
(4) removal of inner negations:‘(¬(P( f ) ∧ (¬Q(h) ∨ ¬R( f, h))) ∨ T (g));
(5) removal of outer negation: ((¬P( f ) ∨ (Q(h) ∧ R( f, h))) ∨ T (g));
(6) application of a distribution law: (((¬P( f ) ∨ Q(h)) ∧ (¬P( f ) ∨ R( f, h))) ∨
T (g));
(7) application of a distribution law: (¬P( f ) ∨ Q(h) ∨ T (g)) ∧ (¬P( f ) ∨
R( f, h) ∨ T (g)).
We obtain two clauses.
3.9 Resolution in Predicate Calculus 131

3.9 Resolution in Predicate Calculus

In Chap. 2, we have discussed resolution in propositional logic. We recall that reso-

lution was a procedure for testing satisfiability for sets of formulae in clausal form
CNF. The procedure was based on Robinson’s Resolution Rule (RRR) which for
two clauses C1 , C2 with contradictory literals l1 ∈ C1 , l2 ∈ C2 produces the clause
r es(C1 , C2 ) = (C1 ∪ C2 ) \ {l1 , l2 }, called the resolvent. In case of predicate logic,
due to presence of individual variables and constants, an application of the resolution
rule becomes possible after some preliminary pre-processing of formulae.
We refer to Chap. 2 for a discussion of principles of resolution; we would like
only to recall the equivalence: a set Δ of formulae
 is a logical consequence of a set

Γ of formulae if and only if the formula ( Γ ) ∧ ( ¬Δ) is unsatisfiable, which is
the foundation for resolution refutation.
To see the need for pre-processing of formulae, consider for instance atomic
formulae P(a, b) and ¬P(x, y); we may apply the resolution rule only after the
procedure of unification: after we make the substitution (x/a; y/b) in the latter
formula, the formulae become contradictory literals and we may apply the rule (RR)
to them. It follows that we have to consider more closely the unification procedure.
The unifying substitution is called the unifier.
Definition 3.24 (Unification)
A unifier for a set of atomic formulae is a set of substitutions which make all formulae
equiform.
An abstract case here is that we have a finite set of formulae Γ with the finite set
T (Γ ) of terms in Γ and a countable set of terms T from which we select substitutions;
as each set of substitutions is finite, we have a countable set of possible substitutions
for terms in T (Γ ) . Among them are substitutions of the same minimal cardinality.
We call them minimal unifiers. Consider a minimal unifier U and any unifier V .
As cardinality of U is not greater then that of V , for each substitution x/t  by V ,
there exists the substitution x/t by U , hence, we obtain a set of substitutions of the
form t  /t which we denote by Q. Then, U ◦ Q = V .
A substitution U such that for each substitution V there exists a set of substitutions
Q such that U ◦ Q = V is called the most general unifier (m.g.u). We therefore see
that each minimal unifier is an m.g.u. We obtain
Theorem 3.13 (Robinson [14]). For any set Γ of finitely many formulae, there exists
a most general unifier.
There is a substantial literature on unification, especially in the context of auto-
mated theorem proving, see (Baader et al. [15]).
In order to give an example, we reinstate function symbols f, g and we consider
the set of literals
{P( f (x, g(z)), a), P( f (a, b, a), g(a))}.

We substitute: g(a)/a, x/a, g(z)/b. This is a minimal substitution, hence, an m.g.u.

A ground clause is the clause in which the only terms are constants.
132 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Theorem 3.14 Suppose that C1 , C2 are two ground clauses with contradictory lit-
erals l, l c . Let C = (C1 \ {l}) ∪ (C2 \ {l c }) be the resolvent r es(C1 , C2 ). If clauses
C1 , C2 are satisfiable, then the clause r es(C1 , C2 ) is satisfiable.

Proof Suppose that M = (D, I )) is the structure in which C1 , C2 are true. Either
(l) M = 1 or (l c ) M = 1.As two cases are symmetric, we suppose that (l) M = 1, hence,
(l c ) M = 0. As the clause C2 is valid, there exists a literal l  ∈ C2 such that (l  ) M = 1
which secures satisfiability of r es(C1 , C2 ). 

We denote the empty clause by the symbol . Obviously, the empty clause is
ground and unsatisfiable.

Corollary 3.2 (Soundness of ground resolution) If for a set of clauses, after a finite
number of resolution rule applications, the empty clause is obtained, then the set of
clauses is unsatisfiable.

We may observe that as open clauses are substitutions into propositional formulae,
resolution is actually the propositional resolution whose completeness have been
proved in Chap. 1.

Theorem 3.15 Predicate resolution is complete, i.e., if a set of open clauses is

unsatisfiable, then the resolution procedure yields the empty clause.

Example 3.7 Consider the formula φ:

¬[(∃w.∃x.∃y.P(x, w, y)) ⊃ (∀w.∀x.P(x, w, x))].

We obtain the conjunction

(∃w.∃x.∃y.P(x, w, y)) ∧ (∃w.∃x.¬P(x, w, x)).

We introduce Skolem constants: into the first conjunct w/a, x, b, y/c to obtain the
atomic formula P(b, a, c) and into the second conjunct: w/e, x/ f to obtain the
atomic formula ¬P( f, e, f ). The unifier {b/ f, c/ f, a/e} leads to .

3.10 Horn Clauses and SLD-Resolution

Definition 3.25 (Horn clauses)

A Horn clause Horn [16] is any clause which contains at most one non-negated (alias
positive) literal. A Horn clause
 is definite if and only if it contains a positive literal.
In that case, a Horn clause
 i ¬Pi (x i ) ∨ Q(y) can be rewritten into the equivalent
form of a decision rule: i Pi (xi ) → Q(y). Horn clauses without any positive literal
are called negative clauses and positive clauses contain only positive (non-negated)
literals, hence, any positive Horn clause consists of a unique non-negated literal.
3.10 Horn Clauses and SLD-Resolution 133

Definition 3.26 (SLD-resolution)

There are some restricted forms of resolution, discussed mostly in connection with
logic programming. The positive resolution (P-resolution) is the variant in which
one of any two clauses that undergo resolution is to be positive, i.e, without negated
literals, similarly, the negative resolution performs resolution rules on pairs of clauses
of which at least one is negative , i.e., with only negated literals. A linear resolution
for φ is the one for which there exists a sequence C1 , C2 , . . . , Cn of clauses with C1 ,
the base, a clause in φ, Cn the empty clause and each Ci is resolved with either a
clause D in φ or with one of earlier C j s (called the side clause). These three variants
of resolutions are complete (see Schöning [17] for proofs).

SLD-resolution is a linear resolution with a negative clause (called in this case

a goal clause) as a base endowed with a strategy for selecting the next side clause
which should be non-negative, i.e., having a positive literal, i.e, being a decision rule
with possibly more than one decision value. SLD resolution and linear resolution are
complete on Horn clauses, see Gallier [18].

Example 3.8 We consider a set of clauses C={P, Q, ¬R ∨ ¬Q, ¬P ∨ R}. Clauses

P, Q, ¬P ∨ R are definite, the clause ¬R ∨ ¬Q is the goal clause.
The SLD-refutation is shown in Fig. 3.6.

Definition 3.27 (Logic programs)

A set of clauses C along with a query C is said to be a logic program.

In applications, the set of clauses C is often called a Knowledge Base (KB).

Ground clauses of the form P are called facts. We give an example.

Example 3.9 Consider the following textual form of knowledge base (see Russell
and Norvig [19]): 1. Jack owns a dog. 2. Every dog owner is an animal lover. 3. No
animal lover kills an animal. 4. Either Curiosity or Jack killed the cat named Tuna.

Fig. 3.6 The pattern for

SLD resolution
134 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

After Skolemization, the knowledge base consists of the following clauses:

I. Facts:
1. dog(D).
2. owns(Jack,D).
3. cat(Tuna).
II. Definite clauses:
4. ¬Dog(D) ∨ ¬owns(J ack, D) ∨ animal − lover J ack.
5. kills(Curiosit y, T una) ∨ kills(J ack, T una).
6. ¬cat (T una) ∨ animal(T una).
III. Goal clauses:
7. ¬animal − lover (J ack) ∨ ¬animal(T una) ∨ ¬kills(J ack, T una).
8.negation of Query Q:∃y.kills(y, T una) in clausal form: ¬kills(y, T una).
In Fig. 3.7 we show the resolution steps leading to solution y = Curiosit y to the
Query.

Fig. 3.7 The resolution tree

for the Example 3.9
3.11 Meta-Theory of FO. Part II 135

3.11 Meta-Theory of FO. Part II

3.11.1 Undecidability of Satisfiability and Validity Decision

Problems

We propose to consider the following result in (Salomaa [20], Theorem I.9.6).

Theorem 3.16 There exists a language L which is non-recursive and recursively

enumerable.

Proof We regard language L as a set of finite words over an alphabet A, a subset

of the set A∗ of all finite words over A and by Thm. 1.37 in order to demonstrate
that L is not recursive, it suffices to prove that the complement −L = A∗ \ L is not
recursively enumerable.
We consider the alphabet A = {a}, i.e, the single-letter alphabet. We may assume
that L is generated by a type 0 grammar, i.e, by a Turing machine, and we can list
all computations which yield all languages over A as C0 , C1 , C2 , . . . . We use the
symbol C j → a j in case the word a j is listed by C j . Now, the language L is defined
as

(L)L = {a n : Cn → a n }

We apply a diagonal method of reasoning: was −L recursively enumerable, it would

be listed by some C j and then a j would be in −L, contrary to definition of L which
assures that a j ∈ L. Hence, −L is not recursively enumerable and L is not recursive.
The argument for recursive enumerability of L consists in representing each C j
as the sequence of steps (i, j) where we may assume that if a procedure terminates at
some i 0 then steps after i 0 simply repeat what was obtained at i 0 , hence, pairs (i, j)
run over all pairs of natural numbers. It is well-known that the function f (i, j) =
bn(i + j + 1, 2) + i establishes a bijection between the set of pairs (i, j) and the set
N of natural numbers (Theorem 1.8). We can thus list all words in L by examination
of all pairs (i, j) in the order indicated by the ordering f (i, j) and adding a j to L in
case it is listed in C j . 

Corollary 3.3 The membership decision problem for type-0 grammars is undecid-
able.

Let us give a few necessary facts about type 0 grammars. Each grammar G over
a vocabulary V generates from a word X 0 called an axiom, the language L(G)
containing words over V obtained by means of a finite set P of productions; each
production in case of type 0 grammars is an expression P : Q ⇒ R, where Q and R
are words over V . The action of a production Q ⇒ R consists in rewriting a word of
the form T QW into the word T RW . A word Z is in L(G) if there exists a proof of
it from X 0 , i.e., a finite sequence of productions P1 , P2 , . . . Pk such that the premiss
to P1 is X 0 , each Pi+1 has premiss obtained as the consequent of the production Pi
136 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

and the consequent of the production Pk is Z . It is usually expressed by the formula

X 0 ⇒∗ Z , where ⇒∗ is the transitive closure of ⇒.
Consider then the grammar G of type 0 with the production set P which generates
the language L(G) = L of Theorem 3.16, which has the undecidable membership
problem.
Let Q be a binary predicate defined as follows

(Q)∃.∃x1 , x2 , . . . , xk , y0 , y1 , . . . , yk .(X 0 , y0 ) ∧ (y0 , x1 ) ∧ (x1 , y1 ) ∧ (y1 , x2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ (xk , yk ),

where (x, y) is satisfied in M if and only if there exist words (x/T, y/W ) such
that T ⇒ W ∈ P. Then
Theorem 3.17 A word Z is in L(G) if and only if Q is satisfied in M with yk /Z .
Theorem 3.18 The satisfiability problem for predicate logic is undecidable. Hence,
the validity problem for predicate logic is undecidable.
Proof Was Q satisfiability decidable for each Z ∈ L(G), the membership problem
for L(G) would be decidable. As it is not, satisfiability problem for predicate logic
is undecidable. As validity is equivalent to unsatisfiability, the decision problem for
validity is undecidable for predicate logic. 
We can render these results in terms of computation theory by recalling the Church
theorem Church [21].
Theorem 3.19 (Church) The set of Gödel numbers of valid formulae of predicate
logic is recursively enumerable but not recursive. Hence the validity problem for
predicate calculus is recursively unsolvable (undecidable).
Proof (Floyd [22] in Manna [23]). We exploit here the undecidability of PCP in
Theorem 3.22, below. We consider the PCP over the alphabet {0, 1}. Let

A = {(u 1 , v1 ), (u 2 , v2 ), . . . , (u k , vk )}

be an instance of PCP.
Proof consists in the construction of a formula F with the property that F is valid
if and only if the instance A has a solution. Models for F will have as domain the
set of words {0, 1}∗ , i.e., the set of finite binary sequences, a relational vocabulary
consisting of a binary predicate symbol P, two unary function symbols f 0 and f 1 ,
0-ary function, i.e. a constant symbol c.
The formula F is defined as follows:

F : [(∀i=1
k
P( f u i (c), f vi (c)) ∧ ∀x, y.(P(x, y) ⊃ ∀i=1
k
P( f u i (x), f vi (y))] ⊃
∃z.P(z, z).

Claim. PCP instance A has a solution if and only if F is valid.

3.11 Meta-Theory of FO. Part II 137

Proof of Claim. Let the structure M = (D, c, f 0 , f 1 , P), with D, c, f 0 , f 1 , P

defined specifically as D = {0, 1}∗ , c = ε, i.e, the empty word, f 0 (x) = x0, f 1 (x) =
x1, P(x, y) holds if and only if there exists a sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m with m ≤ k such
that x = (u i1 , u i2 , . . . , u im ) and y = (vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vim ).
The assignment in the structure M is defined as sending a variable to a sequence
of the form either (u i1 , u i2 , . . . , u i j ) for some j or (vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vi p ) for some p.
Suppose that F is valid in the structure M. It is easy to see that functions f u i , f vi
return on c simply u i , respectively vi , hence the predicate P rendered in M is true.
For this reason, both sub-formulae ∀i=1 k
P( f u i (c), f vi (c)) and ∀x, y.(P(x, y) ⊃
∀i=1 P( f u i (x), f vi (y)) are valid in M, hence the consequent ∃z.P(z, z) is valid which
k

means the existence of a sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i q of indices with the property that

(u i1 u i2 . . . u iq ) = (vi1 vi2 . . . viq ) ,which is a solution to PCP.
Now, suppose that PCP is decidable, and any instance A has a solution
(u i1 u i2 . . . u iq ) = (vi1 vi2 . . . viq ), this satisfies the consequent ∃z.P(z, z) in any
model, hence F is valid. 
Let us compare (see Sect. 1.6):
Theorem 3.20 The set of Gödel numbers of proofs in predicate logic is recursive.
The set of Gödel numbers of closed formulae is recursive. The set of Gödel numbers
of provable formulae is recursively enumerable.
Let us mention some undecidable decision problems.
Theorem 3.21 The following are undecidable:
(i) the decision problem for the Kleene predicate ∃y.T (x, x, y) see Theorem 1.6.2;
(ii) the halting problem see Sect. 1.6.;
(iii) the acceptance problem whether a Turing machine accepts a given word w.
Proof We recall that (i) and (ii) are proved in Sect. 1.6. For (iii): If a Turing machine
halts on w, then add a new state qaccept and let the machine to make one more move
to the state qaccept so the word w is accepted. If the machine does not halt, w is not
accepted. Hence, the acceptance problem is equivalent to the halting problem. 
Definition 3.28 (The Post Correspondence Problem (PCP))
The problem introduced in Post [24] is a quadruple PCP = (A, n, U, V ) where
A is an alphabet, n is a positive natural number, U = (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) and V =
(b1 , b2 , . . . , bn ) are sequences of words over A. A solution to PCP is a set of indices
i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k such that (ai1 ai2 . . . aik ) = (bi1 bi2 . . . bik ).
An example of an instance of PCP is (∗) U =< bc, a, ba, b >, V =< c, ab,
a, bb > with the solution abcbbba.
It is known that PCP is undecidable: there is no algorithm which would produce
a solution to each instance of PCP (for a proof, see Post [24], also (Manna [23],
p. 60), (Salomaa [20], VIII). The alphabet A can be reduced to two symbols only
(Salomaa [20], VIII), hence, A can be the binary alphabet {0, 1} and a, b are then
binary sequences.
138 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Post’s proof relies on undecidable decision problem of membership for normal

grammars (see, please, Salomaa [20] for the definition of a normal grammar), Salo-
maa [20] exploits the analogous problem for type 0 grammars, Scott [25] reduces
the PCP problem to Halting Problem for Post Machines (see, e.g., Manna [23], pp.
24–28); an exhaustive analysis of computing machinery is given in Friedman [26]
with applications to undecidable problems, in particular PCP is reduced there to the
Halting Problem for Shepherdson-Sturgis Machines and RAM Machines.
We deem that a visualization of the proof by Scott and others is the version given
in Sipser [27]. PCP in Sipser [27] is reduced to the acceptance problem for Turing
Machines cf. Theorem 3.28(iii). As with many other undecidable problems it applies
the domino tiles. Each domino is of the form [ ww ] with w at the upper side, w  at the
lower side. For any word w, a computation is described which matches the sequence
of top sides with the sequence of bottom sides if and only if w is accepted.

Theorem 3.22 The PCP problem is undecidable.

Proof (Sipser [27]). In this proof, given a word w over the alphabet of a Turing
Machine T M, an accepting computation is searched for; the instance of PCP is
constructed from instructions of the machine with antecedent filling top side and
consequent filling bottom side; as instructions are repeated one by one antecedents
and consequents occupy alternately top and bottom sides. A match is achieved if and
only if the word w has an accepting computation.
The construction proceeds in steps.
Step 1. The initial domino tile is [ #q0 a1 a#2 ...ak # ];
Step 2. In this step, for each instruction (q, a → q  , b, right), where q = qr eject ,
add the tile [ bq
qa
 ];

Step 3. In this step, for each instruction (q, a → q  , b, le f t), where q = qr eject ,
add the tile [ qcqa
 cb ], where c is a tape symbol, for each c;

Step 4. For each tape symbol a, add the tile [ aa ];

Step 5. Add tiles [ ## ] and [ B# #
], where B is blank;
aqaccept q a
Step 6. For each tape symbol a, add tiles [ qaccept ] and [ qaccept
accept
];
qaccept ##
Step 7. The last tile added is [ #
].
In order to illustrate this computation, we assume that consecutive instructions
for a TM with tape symbols 0, 1, 2, B and word w = 0100, have been: (i) q0 0 →
q5 2 right so the tile added is [ q20q05 ]; (ii) step 4 adds tiles [ 00 ], [ 11 ], [ 22 ], [ BB ]; (iii) . . ..
At this stage, we get the following partial match: [ #q #q0 0100#
0 0100#
].
Upon reaching a halting state which accepts, the tiles added in step 7 are applied
#q ##
leaving the top and bottom sequences as [ # qaccept
accept ##
].
We have omitted some technical issues, the interested Reader will please consult
quoted sources. 
3.14 The Theory of Herbrand 139

3.12 Complexity Issues for Predicate Logic

For some classes of formulae, the satisfiability problem has high complexity: the
Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey SAT(BSR) problem is NEXPTIME-complete (see
p
Sect. 1.8), the SAT(TQBF) problem is PSPACE-complete (see Sect. 1.8), SAT(Σi )
p
is Σ i -complete (see Sect. 1.8). It follows that any level of the polynomial hierarchy
is accessible with formulae of predicate logic.

3.13 Monadic Predicate Logic

Monadic predicate logic allows for unary predicates only. The main property of
monadic logic is the following theorem about finite model property.

Theorem 3.23 For each formula φ(P1 , P2 , ..., Pn , x1 , x2 , ..., xk ) of monadic predi-
cate logic, if M |= φ for a structure M, then there is a sub-structure M ∗ ⊆ M such
that cardinality of M ∗ is not greater than 2n and M ∗ |= φ.

Proof Let φ be in the prenex form:

Q 1 x1 Q 2 x2 ...Q m xm β(P1 , P2 , .., Pn , x1 , x2 , ..., xk )

Consider the set of binary sequences of length k and for each such sequence σ form
the set M(σ) = {a ∈ M : A(Pi (a)) = σ(i) for i=1,2,..., n}. From each subset M(σ)
of M, select an element a(σ) and let M ∗ = {a(σ) : σ ∈ {0, 1}n }. Then M ∗ |= φ. 

It follows from Theorem 3.23 that monadic predicate calculus is decidable: to

check the truth of φ one can build a truth table for φ with at most 2n worlds.
We have seen some close encounters between SL and FO and now we arrive at
the Hebrand theory Herbrand [28] which canonizes these relations.

3.14 The Theory of Herbrand

We consider FO L with non-empty countable sets of individual variables, predicate

symbols, function symbols, and, constant symbols.

Definition 3.29 (Herbrand structures)

We recall that a term is either an individual variable or a constant, or, an expression
of the form f (t1 , . . . , tk ), where f is a k-ary function symbol and all ti are terms. A
term is closed if and only if it contains no free individual variable symbols. For the
logic L, we consider the set T (L) of all closed terms obtained from constructs in L.
T (L) is the Herbrand universe.
140 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

The Herbrand structure for L is the pair M H (L)=(T (L), I T (L) ), where I T (L) (t) =
t for each t ∈ T (L). Thus, in Herbrand interpretation, the logic L interprets in a sense
itself.
We recall known from tableau theory types of quantified formulae: γ for uni-
versally quantified formulae ∀xφ, ¬∃xφ and δ for existentially quantified formulae
∃xφ, ¬∀xφ.

Theorem 3.24 (Satisfaction conditions) For a formula of type γ, respectively of

type δ, M H |= γ (respectively M H |= δ) if and only if M H |= γ(t) for each t ∈ T (L)
(respectively M H |= δ(t) for some t ∈ T (L)).

Definition 3.30 (Relative Herbrand models)

For a closed formula φ of FO L, the Herbrand model for φ is built on the Herbrand
universe T (φ) of all closed terms built from function and constant symbols in φ.

Example 3.10 We consider φ : ∀x.P(c, f (a, x), h(x, c)) with the matrix P(c,
f (a, x), h(x, c)). T (φ) is:

{a, c, f (a, a), f (a, c), h(a, c), h(c, c), f (a, f (a, c)), f ( f (a, c), a)),

f ( f (a, c)), f (a, c), h( f (a, a), c), ...}

It may happen that a formula φ has no occurrences of any constant symbols; in such
case we add a constant symbol {c} in order to built a non-empty Herbrand universe.

Definition 3.31 (The Herbrand normal form (the validity functional form))
The closed formula φ (denoted ψ H ) is the Herbrand normal form of the closed
formula ψ if φ is ¬Sk(¬ψ), where Sk(α) is the Skolem normal form of α. Please
observe that ψ H is valid if and only if ψ is valid: suppose that ψ is valid, hence, ¬ψ
is unsatisfiable, thus, by Theorem 3.12, Sk(¬ψ) is unsatisfiable, hence, ¬(Sk(¬ψ))
is valid. The converse is proved by reversing the direction of these inferences.

Example 3.11 Consider φ : ∀z.∃w.∀x.((∀u.Q(x, u)) ⊃ Q(w, z)). Then ¬φ is:

∃z.∀w.∃x.¬(∀u.Q(x, u) ⊃ Q(w, z))

Skolemization of ¬φ yields: ∀w.¬((∀u.Q( f (w), u)) ⊃ Q(w, c)), where c is a

Skolem constant symbol and f is a Skolem function symbol.
Negation of Skolem form of ¬φ yields φ H : ∃w.((∀u.Q( f (w), u)) ⊃ Q(w, c)).
The function symbol f and the constant symbol c induce the Herbrand universe
T (φ) : {c, f (c), f ( f (c)), f ( f ( f (c))), . . .}.
This is the feature of the Herbrand normal form: it begins with the existential
quantifier (it is essentially existential).

Theorem 3.25 Each closed formula φ is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable in

the Herbrand interpretation M H .
3.14 The Theory of Herbrand 141

Proof It suffices to prove the implication to the right. Suppose then that φ is satisfiable
in an interpretation M = (D, I ). We assign to each term t ∗ ∈ D H the value assigned
to t in M, and to each atomic formula P ∗ (t1∗ , t2∗ , . . . , tk∗ ), we assign the value which
M assigns to the atomic formula P(t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ). Then φ is satisfiable in M H . 

Definition 3.32 (The Herbrand domain)

The Herbrand domain for a closed formula φ is any non-empty finite subset TH ⊆
T (φ).

For φ of Example 3.11, an example of a domain is TH : {c, f (c)}.

We now give definition of the crucial notion of a Herbrand expansion. Given a
Herbrand domain, one interprets quantified closed formulae as well as propositional
formulae in this domain. We recall that α is the type of conjunctions, β the type of
disjunctions.

Definition 3.33 (Herbrand expansions)

For a closed formula φ and the finite set T = {t1 , t2 , . . . , tn } of closed terms, a
Herbrand expansion of φ over T , in symbols HE (φ, T ) is defined by structural
induction for all types of formulae as follows. As before γ, δ are generic symbols
for a formula of type γ, respectively, of type δ.

(i) HE (l, T ) = {l} for each propositional literal l;

(ii) HE (α1 ∧ α2 , T ) = HE (α1 , T ) ∧ HE (α2 , T );
(iii) HE (α1 ∨ α2 , T ) 
= HE (α1 , T ) ∨ HE (α2 , T );
(iv) HE (∀x.γ, T ) = t j ∈T HE (γ(t j ), T );

(v) HE (∃x.δ, T ) = t j ∈T HE (δ(t j ), T ).

Definition 3.34 (The Herbrand expansion)

For a closed formula φ, the Herbrand expansion of φ is the Herbrand expansion of
the Herbrand normal form φ H over the Herbrand domain.

Example 3.12 For φ and φ H of 13.6 and the domain T = {c, f (c)}, the Herbrand
expansion HE (φ, T ) is ¬Q( f (c), c) ∨ Q(c, c) ∨ ¬Q( f (c), f (c)) ∨ Q( f (c), c) ∨
¬Q( f ( f (c)), c) ∨ ¬Q( f ( f (c)), f (c)) and it is valid as it contains an occurrence
of a pair of contradictory literals.

The Herbrand theorem states that a closed formula of the language L is valid if
and only if there exists the Herbrand expansion of φ valid as a propositional formula,
thus reducing validity in L to validity in PL. We precede a proof of this theorem with
a more detailed look at consistency and satisfiability via Hintikka sets.

Definition 3.35 (FO consistency)

Concerning Definition 3.18, where the notion of consistency was introduced, we
restrict ourselves in cases of γ and δ types of closed formulae to closed terms, hence,
we modify the corresponding conditions in the notion of consistency. At the same
time we define consistency for collections of sets.
142 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Let Γ be the set of all sets of closed formulae of L. The collection Γ is said
to be the FO consistency property if and only if for each set Δ ∈ Γ , in addition to
properties for α and β types of propositional formulae, it possesses the following
properties for γ and δ types of quantified formulae; for each set Δ ∈ Γ , we require
the following:
(i) if γ ∈ Δ, then Δ ∪ {γ(t)} ∈ Γ for each closed term t of L;
(ii) if δ ∈ Δ, then Δ ∪ {δ(t)} ∈ Δ for some closed term t in L, which has no occur-
rence in Δ.

We now follow the path already delineated in Part I of meta-theory of FO as well

as in propositional logic: we extend Δ to maximal consistent set. The construction
is on the lines of the Lindenbaum lemma, with some modifications due to FO case.
We suppose that we have a countably infinite set of terms; if it is not the case then
we introduce a countably infinite set of constants, called parameters, disjoint to the
set of closed terms in L. We will denote these parameters with the generic symbol
p. They are used in the context of δ-formulae, when there is no closed term in L
available which has not been used yet. We will use the uniform symbol t in all cases
assuming that for particular δ-type φ a record is kept for the term or parameter used,
in order to eliminate parameters in the end. Elimination of parameters is discussed
at the end of the section.

Theorem 3.26 Each set Δ ∈ Γ is extendable to a maximal set Δ∗ which is FO

consistent.

Proof The proof is on lines of the proof of Lindenbaum’s Lemma: let (φn )∞
n=1 be an
enumeration of all closed formulae of L. We define a new sequence (Δi∗ )i=1
∞
:
(i) Δ1 ∗ = Δ1 ;
(ii) Δ∗n+1 = Δ∗n if Δ∗n ∪ {φn } ∈
/ Γ , else Δ∗n+1 = Δ∗n ∪ {φn } if φn is not of type δ;
∗ ∗
(iii) Δn+1 = Δn ∪ {φn } ∪ {φn (t)} if φn is of type δ and t is a closed term not used
yet (which is possible as we have countably many parameters).

Then, as in propositional case, Δ∗ = n Δ∗n is maximal consistent. 

Definition 3.36 (The Hintikka set)

We add to the conditions for propositional Hintikka sets, new conditions for γ and δ
types of formulae, and we appropriately modify conditions (H3) and (H4) in Defini-
ton 3.17. The FO Hintikka set H for a language L satisfies in addition to the propo-
sitional case, the conditions:

H(γ) if γ ∈ H , then γ(t) ∈ H for each closed term t of L;

H(δ) if δ ∈ H , then δ(t) ∈ H for some closed term t of L.

Hintikka sets provide a link to Herbrand models via the following result. It is a
specialization of Theorem 3.5.
3.14 The Theory of Herbrand 143

Theorem 3.27 For a closed formula φ of the language L, if φ ∈ H , then φ is valid

in a Herbrand model.
Proof First, we have to specify the Herbrand model M H = (D H , I H ). As D H , we
adopt the set of all closed terms of L. Then I H (t) = t for each closed term t of
L, hence, each term t is satisfiable in M H , hence, valid. For any atomic formula
P(t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ), we let I H (P(t1 , t2 , . . . , tk )) if and only if P(t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ) ∈ H .
Proof is by structural induction. Sentential cases are as in sentential logic. For
any atomic formula P(t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ) ∈ H , the interpretation is in M H by definition,
hence it is valid in M H . For a formula γ ∈ H , γ(t) ∈ H for each closed term in D,
hence, by hypothesis of induction, γ(t) is valid in M for each t, which means that γ
is valid in M. An analogous argument settles the case of δ. 
A particular case of consistency property is the Herbrand consistency.
Definition 3.37 (The Herbrand consistency property)
Consider the language L along with the set T of all closed terms obtained from L.
A collection Γ of sets Δ of closed formulae of L is a Herbrand consistency property
if the following conditions hold.
(i) all sets Δ are finite;
(ii) all formulae
 in all sets Δ are essentially universally quantified;
(iii) ¬HE ( Δ, D) is invalid for each finite domain D ⊆ T .
For HE please see Definition 3.33. It turns out that we get no new consistency
property.
Theorem 3.28 The Herbrand consistency property is an FO consistency property.
Proof Let T be the collection of all closed terms of L. We check the conditions for
FO consistency property.
First, as example for propositional cases, we consider a formula β. Suppose then
that Δ ∈ Γ , β ∈ Δ,  but Δ ∪ {βi } ∈
/ Δ for i = 1, 2 (recall that β is β1 ∨ β2 ). By
condition (iii), ¬HE ( Δ ∧ βi , Di ) is valid for some finite Di ⊆ T , for i = 1, 2.
We let D = D1 ∪ D2 , so ¬HE ( Δ ∧ βi , D) is valid for i = 1, 2. As
 
HE ( Δ ∧ β, D) ≡ HE ( Δ ∧ (β1 ∨ β2 ), D) ≡
 
HE ( Δ ∧ β1 , D) ∨ HE ( Δ ∧ β2 , D),

it follows that

¬HE (Δ ∧ β, D) ≡ ¬HE (Δ ∧ β1 , D) ∧ ¬HE (Δ ∧ β2 , D)

is valid, a contradiction, as β ∈ Δ ∈ Γ .
By condition (ii), only the case of γ type requires a proof. Suppose that Δ ∈ Γ ,
γ ∈ Δ and for aclosed term t, Δ ∪ {γ(t) ∈ / Δ. Hence, there exists a finite D ⊆ T ,
such that ¬HE ( Δ ∧ γ, D) is valid.
144 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

As γ has γ(t) as one of conjuncts, it follows that


HE ( Δ ∧ γ, D ∪ {t}) ≡

HE ( Δ, D ∪ {t}) ∧ HE (γ, D ∪ {t}).

This implies that

  
HE ( Δ, D ∪ {t}) ∧ HE ( Γ, γ(t), D ∪ {t}) ≡ HE ( Γ ∧ γ(t), D ∪ {t})
 
As ¬HE ( Γ ∧ γ(t), D ∪ {t}) is valid so is ¬HE ( Γ ∧ γ, D ∪ {t}), a contradic-
tion, as γ ∈ Δ ∈ Γ .
Corollary 3.4 If Γ is a Herbrand consistency property, then each set Δ ∈ Γ is
satisfiable.
Theorem 3.29 (Herbrand) Each closed formula φ is valid as a formula of language
L if and only if there exists a valid (tautological) Herbrand expansion.
Proof We use the Herbrand normal form, hence, the formulae are essentially exis-
tentially quantified.
Claim 1. We suppose that the formula φ is essentially existentially quantified. If φ
is valid, then HE (φ, D) is valid for some Herbrand domain D.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that HE (φ, D) is not valid for each domain D. Thus,
¬φ is a formula in a consistency property Δ as it satisfies Definition 3.37(i)-(iii),
notice in particular that ¬φ is essentially universally quantified and

¬HE (¬φ, D) ≡ ¬¬HE (φ, D) ≡ HE (φ, D)

is not any tautology for any domain D, hence, ¬φ is satisfiable, a contradiction.

The only thing more to do is to remove parameters. Let s be a substitution: for
each parameter p, let s( p) be a closed term of L; as E H (φ, s( p)) is a tautology, the
proof of Claim 1 is concluded.
Claim 2. For each closed formula φ, if φ is essentially existentially quantified and
D is a finite set of closed terms, then the formula HE (φ, D) ⊃ φ is valid.
Proof of Claim 2. Proof is by structural induction. It suffices to consider the δ
case. Suppose in virtue of hypothesis of induction that for each ti ∈ D the formula
E H (δ(ti ), D) ⊃ δ(ti ) is valid. Then, HE (δ, D) = HE (δ(ti ), D) ⊃ δ(ti ) ≡ δ(t).
It follows that if HE (φ, D) is valid, then φ is valid. This concludes the proof of the
Herbrand theorem. 
The impact of the Herbrand theorem is that Herbrand expansions form a recur-
sively enumerable set and if on reading elements of this set, we come to a proposi-
tional valid formula, then it means that the formula φ is valid; otherwise our search
3.15 The Gödel Completeness Theorem. The Henkin Proof 145

would go ad infinitum. The Herbrand theorem does express a form of the complete-
ness property of FO.
It will be only fair to state that the analysis of the Herbrand theory here has been
influenced by the exposition in Fitting [29]. The idea of FO consistency comes from
Fitting [29] as well.

3.15 The Gödel Completeness Theorem. The Henkin Proof

The proof of completeness theorem in Gödel [30] was followed by a novel idea of a
proof in Henkin [31] by creating models for sets of 1st order formulae as maximal
consistent sets. Simplified in Hasenjaeger [32], the proof is known as the Henkin-
Hasenjaeger proof.
From historic perspective, our exposition in this chapter goes back in historic
time: we have seen already the idea of maximal consistency as the implication for the
model existence, we have met the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, we have witnessed
the introduction of auxiliary constants called parameters, used to satisfy existentially
quantified formulae. On the other hand, in the Henkin proof we find the Lindenbaum
Lemma. The Henkin proof initiated a long series of results based on His idea. We
will see it in non-classical logics, modal and temporal, for example.

Theorem 3.30 (Gödel) First-order logic is complete.

Proof (Henkin [31]). The alphabet of the first-order logic language L is standard:
it consists of symbols ( ) f = ⊥ ⊃: the symbol f ‘false’ is used, following
Church [33] to denote falsity. The acronim ‘wf’ means ‘well-formed (’formula’), the
acronim ‘cf’ means closed (well-formed formula) instead of the original acronim
‘cwff’. Well-formed formulae are defined as usual: (1) if φ, ψ are wfs, then φ ⊃ ψ
is wf; (1’) if φ is wf, then ∀x.φ is wf. As usual, negation of φ is φ ⊃ f , ∃x.φ is
introduced as (∀x.φ ⊃ f ) ⊃ f .
The axiom system of the language L consists of the following schemes. We only
consider cfs.

(2) φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ);
(3) (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ((ψ ⊃ ξ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ));
(4) ((φ ⊃ f ) ⊃ f ) ⊃ φ;
(5) if x is not free in φ, then (∀x.(φ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ∀x.ψ);
(6) (∀x.φ) ⊃ ψ, where ψ results from substitution of free occurrences of x in φ by
y under proviso that x is independent of y (i.e., no free occurrence in x falls
into a sub-formula of φ of the form ∀y.ξ).
146 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Rules of inference of the system L are

(7) detachment (MP) ψ is inferred from φ and φ ⊃ ψ;
(8) generalization (Gen) ∀x.φ is inferred from φ for any individual variable x.
Deduction theorem. If Γ, φ  ψ, then Γ  φ ⊃ ψ (please see Sect. 3.21).
The derived formulae to be applied in the proof are as follows.
(9) (φ ⊃ f ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ);
(10) (φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ f )) ⊃ ((φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ f );
(11) (∀x.(φ ⊃ f )) ⊃ ((∃x.φ) ⊃ f );
(12) ((∀x.φ) ⊃ f ) ⊃ (∃x.φ ⊃ f );
(13) The replacement rule. Here wf formulae are allowed. If Γ is a set of wf formulae
each of which contains no free occurrence of individual variable y, and ψ results
by substitution in a wf φ of x for all free occurrences of y under proviso that
any of these occurrences is not bound in ψ, then if Γ  φ, then Γ  ψ.
The crucial notion in the proof is consistency, defined in the standard way: a set Γ
of formulae is consistent if it is not true that Γ  f , otherwise Γ is inconsistent. We
already know that any consistent set is satisfiable, and we obtained this result by the
method of Henkin applied earlier. As a side result, obtained is also a generalization
of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. 
Theorem 3.31 If a set Γ of cf’s of L is consistent, then Γ is satisfiable in a domain
of the same cardinality as cardinality of vocabulary of L.
Proof In order to be able to satisfy all existential formulae which will appear in the
constructs of the proof, one introduces countably infinite set {P(i) : i ∈ N}, each
P(i) = { pi j : j ∈ N}, each pi j a constant called parameter. Please observe that each
pi j has no occurrence in formulae of L, therefore any substitution with its use cannot
cause any inconsistency. Moreover, distinct pi j ’s are independent of one another.
We will use the Lindenbaum Lemma.
(I) For Γ = Γ0 , order cfs of L into a sequence (φ1j ) j , and apply the Lindenbaum
Lemma to obtain a maximal consistent set Δ0 with Γ0 ⊆ Δ0 ; then, add to Δ0 the
parameters from the set P(1).
(II) Order cfs in Δ0 , into a sequence, select the sub-sequence (ψq )q of formulae
of the form ∃x.χq (x) and for the formula ψq substitute p1q for each free occurrence
of x in χq (x), then add χq (x/ p1q ) to Δ0 .
Claim 1. Δ0 ∪ {χq (x/ p1q } is consistent.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that Δ0 ∪ {χq (x/ p1q )} is not consis-
tent, hence, Δ0 ∪ {χq (x/ p1q )}  f , and by Deduction rule, Δ0  χq (x/ p1q ) ⊃ f .
By replacement rule (13), Δ0  χq (x) ⊃ f and by (Gen), Δ0  (∀x.χq (x)) ⊃ f ,
hence by (11), and, (MP), Δ0  (∃x.χq (x)) ⊃ f . Yet, Δ0  ∃x.χq (x) by maximal
consistency of Δ0 , hence, by (MP), Δ0  f , a contradiction. It ends the proof of
Clam 1.
3.15 The Gödel Completeness Theorem. The Henkin Proof 147

(III) After all existential formula in Δ0 have underwent step (II), enlarge the
resulting set to a maximal consistent set Δ1 .
(IV) Repeat the steps (II), (III) with Δ1 using parameters in the set P(2) to obtain
a maximal consistent set Δ2 and then in the same manner sets Δi with use of P(i)
for i = 3, 4, . . ..
∞
Finally let Δ∗ = i=1 Δi . The set Δ∗ is maximal consistent and each formula
∗
∃x.χ(x) is in Δ along its substitution χ(x/ pi j ) for an appropriate pi j .
The model proposed for Δ∗  is actually the Herbrand model: its domain D is the
set of constants of the set L ∪ i P(i) and interpretation I sends each constant c
to itself: c I = c. For relational symbols, we assign the extent of them, i.e., to R n
the set of tuples (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) having the property that Δ∗  R n (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ).
Propositional symbols p are assigned the value T or F depending on whether Δ∗  p.

Claim 2. For each cf φ of L ∪ i P(i), the value assigned to φ is T if and only if
Δ∗  φ and it is in agreement with the semantic value of φ.
Proof of Claim 2. The proof is by structural induction on sub-formulae. For for-
mulae χ of type φ ⊃ ψ, we need to consider some cases.

(i) the assigned value of ψ is T; hence, Δ∗  ψ. By axiom scheme (2), Δ∗  φ ⊃ ψ,

hence, the assigned value to χ is T which is the semantic value of χ;
(ii) the assigned value of φ is F, hence, Δ∗  φ does not hold; then, Δ∗ ∪ {φ}  f
and by Deduction rule Δ∗  φ ⊃ f and, by the scheme (9), and (MP), Δ∗ 
φ ⊃ ψ, hence the value assigned to χ is T which agrees with the semantic value
of χ;
(iii) assigned values are T for φ and F for ψ; hence, Δ∗  φ and it is not that
Δ∗  ψ, i.e, as in (ii), Δ∗  ψ ⊃ f . By the scheme (10) and (MP) applied
twice, Δ∗  (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ f . Were Δ∗  φ ⊃ ψ true, we would obtain by (MP)
that Δ∗  f , impossible as Δ∗ is consistent. It follows that the assigned value
of χ is F and this agrees with the semantic value of χ. 

For a formula χ of type ∀x.φ, suppose that Δ∗  χ. Then, by axiom scheme (6) and
(MP), Δ∗  φ(x) for each x, hence, by hypothesis of induction, the assigned value of
φ(x) is T for each x and this means that χ has the semantic value T which agrees with
the assigned value; on the other hand, if Δ∗  χ does not hold, then Δ∗  χ ⊃ f ,
and, by the scheme (12), and (MP), Δ∗  ∃x.(φ ⊃ f ).
It follows that for an appropriate pi j , after substitution x/ pi j into φ the resulting
formula φ has the property that Δ∗  (φ ⊃ f ). This does exclude the possibility
that Δ∗  φ as such fact would imply by (MP) that Δ∗  f , which is impossible.
Thus, φ(x) is not satisfied for some x, hence the formula χ has the semantic value F
which agrees with the assigned value.
Suppose that cardinality of the alphabet of L is κ and that λ is the first ordinal
of that cardinality; replace in the above proof countable sequences with transfinite
sequences defined on the set λ and well-order by the Zermelo theorem sets of cf
formulae and sets of parameters. The result obtained is the generalization of the
148 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Löwenheim-Skolem theorem: any set Γ of cf formulae which is consistent has a

model of cardinality κ of the set of its symbols.
The conclusion: though we know already that satisfiability of consistent sets of
L means completeness, yet, it would be only fair to allow Master to conclude His
proof, especially that it is a bit different from already used by us.
Suppose that a cf formula φ of L is valid. Thus, φ ⊃ f is false, hence, not satis-
fiable, hence, not consistent. It follows that (φ ⊃ f )  f , hence, by Deduction rule,
 ((φ ⊃ f ) ⊃ f ) and the axiom scheme (4) along with (MP) the conclusion  φ
follows.
The case of a valid wf formula φ follows by passing to the closure φ which is
valid hence provable:  φ. From there, we prove  φ by means of the axiom scheme
(6) and (MP).

3.16 The Tarski Theorem on Inexpressibility of Truth

Deep philosophical and ontological consequences of theorems of Tarski and Gödel

force their discussion at this point.
In Sect. 1.7, a scheme has been included for those theorems, which now is going
to be filled with details in the framework of a formal system of arithmetic. We are
influenced by the exposition in Smullyan [34].

Definition 3.38 (Syntax of the arithmetic system L E )

The alphabet of the system L E consists of the following symbols

0 o , v ( ) ≤ = # ¬ ⊃ ∀

The intended meaning of symbols is that 0 explains itself, prime  denotes the suc-
cessor function, hence, 1 is 0 , 2 is 0 and so on, o means operation, ‘, serves to
denote arithmetic operations: o, is +, o, , is ·, o, , , is exp - exponentiation, same
device as to numerals is applied to the symbol v standing for ‘individual variable’, v,
stands for v1 , v, , for v2 and so on. Meanings of = and ≤ are obvious. The remaining
symbols are those for logical connectives and the universal quantifier; this form of
symbolics comes from Smullyan [34].
By this usage of primes and commas, the infinitely countable universe is encoded
by means of 13 symbols. The notion of a term requires an explication. We recall that
the shortcut cf means closed formula.

(1) variables and numerals are terms;

(2) if t1 , t2 are terms, then t1 , t1 + t2 , t1 · t2 , ex p(t1 , t2 ) are terms.

Formulae are defined by structural induction as follows:

3.16 The Tarski Theorem on Inexpressibility of Truth 149

(3) an atomic formula is any expression of the form t1 ≤ t2 or of the form t1 = t2 ,

for terms t1 , t2 ;
(4) if φ, ψ are formulae, then φ ⊃ ψ, ¬φ, ∀vi .φ are formulae for each variable vi .
As before, any occurrence of any vi in terms and non-quantified formulae is free and
each occurrence of vi in a formulae ∀vi .φ is bound. A formula is closed (abbreviated
cf) if all variables in it are bound.
The formal method of introducing numerals, with possibly many primes appended
to 0 is impractical, and we return to the symbolics known from Ch. I: we denote the
natural number n as n. For a formula P(v1 , v2 , . . . , vk ) we denote by
P(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) the result of substitution of n 1 , . . . , n k for, respectively, v1 , v2 , . . . ,
vk ; clearly, indices at v’s may be like i 1 , i 2 , and so on, and, n 1 , . . . , n k is the space-
saving notation for (n 1 , . . . , n k ).
A closed term is any term with no occurrences of variables. Such terms are: n
designating the natural number n, for each n, n 1 + n 2 designating n 1 + n 2 , n 1 · n 2
designating n 1 · n 2 , ex p(n 1 , n 2 ) designating n n1 2 and n  designating n + 1.

Definition 3.39 (Semantics of L E ) We recall the notion of a size of a formula as the

number of logical connectives and quantifiers in it. We define the notion of truth by
structural induction. Let c denotes any closed term. Then we have,

(5) an atomic cf c1 = c2 is true if and only if c1 and c2 designate the same natural
number n;
(6) an atomic cf c1 ≤ c2 is true if and only if ci designates a natural number n i for
i = 1, 2 and n 1 ≤ n 2 ;
(7) a cf ¬φ is true if and only if cf φ is not true;
(8) a cf φ ⊃ ψ is true if and only if either φ is not true or ψ is true;
(9) a cf ∀vi .φ is true if and only if for each natural number n, the cf φ(n) is true.

The notion of a valid formula follows: φ(v1 , v2 , . . . , vk ) is valid if and only if

φ(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) is true for each tuple (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ).
Substitution in L E is governed by the following rules. We assume the formula
φ(v1 ) and consider the substitution of vi for v1 .
(10) if a variable vi is not bound in φ(v1 ), then we substitute vi for each free occur-
rence of v1 in φ;
(11) if vi has bound occurrences in φ, then we pick the first v j not in φ and we substi-
tute v j for all occurrences of vi in φ and into the obtained formula we substitute
vi for free occurrences of v1 to obtain the formula φ(vi ). This definition extends
to formulae of few variables.
The symbol φ(v1 ) will denote a formula with the only free variable v1 .

Definition 3.40 (Formulae expressing sets of natural numbers)

A formula φ(v1 ) does express a set Q of natural numbers if and only if the equivalence
holds: φ(n) is true if and only if n ∈ Q.
150 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

In case of a formula of more than one free variable, a formula φ(v1 , v2 , . . ., vk )

does express a relation Q of arity k on k-tuples of natural numbers if and only if the
equivalence holds: φ(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) is true if and only if Q(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) holds.
Definition 3.41 (Arithmetic sets and relations)
A set of natural numbers is Arithmetic if it is expressed by a formula of the language
L E ; in case the formula has no symbol ex p, the set or relation are said to be arithmetic.
This notion extends to functions: a function f (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) is Arithmetic
if and only if the relation Q(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k , n k+1 ), which holds if and only if
f (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k ) = n k+1 , is Arithmetic.
Now, we introduce a Gödel style numbering of symbols, terms and formulae of
L E . This numbering differs from Gödel numbering in Chap. 1, as we do not use prime
numbers, but it is constructed at the fixed base. Such numbering with 9 symbols was
proposed in Quine [35], and in Smullyan [34] it was modified to 13 symbols. We
present this numbering.
Definition 3.42 (Gödel numbering)
We consider a base b greater than 1 and define concatenation m ◦b n as m expressed
in base b followed by n expressed in base b. For example, let b=2, m=32, n = 16,
hence, m in base 2 is 100000, n in base 2 is 10000, m ◦2 n = 10000010000=1040.
Let us observe that the length of n at base 2 is 5, and 32x25 + 16 = 1040. The general
formula is m ◦b n = m · b|n|b + n, where |n|b is the length of n in base b. We will
use symbols x, y, ... as variables for natural number arguments.
Theorem 3.32 The following relations are Arithmetic, including the relation x ◦b
y = z. Alongside relations, proofs that they are Arithmetic are included:
(i) let E(x, y, b) denote that x is b to the power of y. This relation is Arithmetic:
E(x, y, b) ≡ x = b y ;
(ii) the relation E(x, b): ‘x is a power of b’ is Arithmetic: E(x, b) ≡ ∃y.x = b y .
Let us observe that b|x|b is the smallest power of b greater than x;
(iii) the relation gr (x, y), read ‘y is the smallest power of b greater than x’ is
Arithmetic: gr (x, y) ≡ (E(y, b) ∧ ¬(x = y) ∧ x ≤ y ∧ ∀z.E(z, b) ∧ ¬(x =
z) ∧ x ≤ z) ⊃ y ≤ z);
(iv) the relation b|x|b = y is Arithmetic: b|x|b = y ≡ [(x = 0) ∧ (y = b) ∨ (¬(x =
0) ∧ gr (x, y)];
(v) x ◦b y = z ≡ x · b|y|b + y = z is Arithmetic. By induction, x1 ◦b x2 ◦b . . . ◦b
xn = y is Arithmetic.
Definition 3.43 (Numbering of primitive symbols of L E )
We assign, following the scheme in (Smullyan [34]), to primitive symbols of the lan-
guage L E the numbers and symbols in the following way (we present this assignment
in pairs [language symbol, assigned value]):

[0 1], [ 0], [( 2], [) 3], [o 4], [, 5], [v 6], [¬ 7], [⊃ 8], [∀ 9], [= X ]

[≤ X  ], [# X  ].
3.16 The Tarski Theorem on Inexpressibility of Truth 151

In order to assign the Gödel number to a string of symbols, we first represent the
string by the sequence of positions of consecutive symbols in the listing (A) and then
we express the obtained sequence in the base 13, for instance, the natural number n is
 
represented as the string 0  ... of 0 with n accent signs, represented as the sequence
of 1 followed by n zeros, i.e., in base 13 as 13n .
By E 0 is denoted the expression  , for n > 0, E n denotes the expression with the
Gödel number n; it follows that concatenation E n E m of expressions has the Gödel
number n ◦13 m.

Definition 3.44 (Gödel sentences)

A Gödel sentence for a set Q of natural numbers is a closed formula (for short: cf)
φ of L E with the property that if φ is true then its Gödel number is in Q and if φ is
false then its Gödel number is not in Q.

Following Tarski and Smullyan, we consider the formula φ(v1 ) where v1 is the
only free variable in φ and we define cf φ(n). The latter is equivalent to the for-
mula ∀v1 .(v1 = n ⊃ φ(v1 )), denoted in what follows φ[n]. We generalize the lat-
ter notation: for any expression E, the symbol E[n] will denote the expression
∀v1 .(v1 = n ⊃ E) which is a formula if E is a formula.
We define a function Λ whose value Λ(x, y) is the Gödel number of the expression
E x [y] which is ∀v1 .(v1 = y ⊃ E x ).
We recall the symbol gn(...) meaning ‘the Gödel number of (...)’.

Theorem 3.33 The function Λ(x, y) is Arithmetic.

Proof Indeed, gn(Λ(x, y)) = gn(∀v1 .(v1 =)) ◦13 13 y ◦13 8 ◦13 x ◦13 3, i.e., Λ(x, y)
is Arithmetic, hence, Λ(x, y) = z is Arithmetic. 

Definition 3.45 (The diagonal function)

The diagonal function is d(x) = Λ(x, x).

Theorem 3.34 The diagonal function is Arithmetic.

Proof Indeed, d(x) = gn(E x [x]). 

For a set Q of natural numbers, we let Q ∗ denote the set d −1 (Q), i.e., n ∈ Q ∗ if
and only if d(n) ∈ Q.

Theorem 3.35 For Arithmetic set Q, the set Q ∗ is Arithmetic.

Proof Indeed, x ∈ Q ∗ ≡ ∃y.(d(x) = y ∧ y ∈ Q). Let Q be expressed by the for-

mula φ(v1 ). The relation d(x) = y is Arithmetic, hence, it is expressed by a formula,
say, δ(v1 , v2 ). Then Q ∗ is expressed by the formula ∃v2 .(δ(v1 , v2 ) ∧ φ(v2 )). 

Theorem 3.36 For each Arithmetic set Q there exists a Gödel sentence.
152 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Proof Suppose that Q is Arithmetic, then Q ∗ is Arithmetic, hence, there exists a

formula expressing Q ∗ , let it be E(v1 ) and let e be its Gödel number. Then E[e] is
true if and only if e ∈ Q ∗ ≡ d(e) ∈ Q. As d(e) is gn(E[e]), the sentence E[e] is the
Gödel sentence for Q. 

Let T be the set of Gödel numbers of all true Arithmetic sentences (cf’s) of L E . The
theorem by Tarski [1] settles the question of Arithmetic of T in the negative.

Theorem 3.37 (Tarski). The set T is not Arithmetic.

Proof For an Arithmetic set Q, its complement −Q is Arithmetic: if φ(v1 ) expresses

Q, then ¬φ(v1 ) expresses −Q. Were −T Arithmetic it would have a Gödel sentence,
but then as −T consists of untrue sentences, such Gödel sentence would be true
if and only if it would be untrue, a contradiction, showing that the set T is not
Arithmetic. 

3.17 Gödel Incompleteness Theorems

We continue with the setting from Sect. 3.16. We address the Gödel incomplete-
ness theorem Gödel [36] following Smullyan [34]. We begin with axiomatization of
Arithmetic known as Peano Arithmetic. We continue from Sect. 3.16 with inclusion
of exponentiation into arithmetic operations and with the system of Gödel numbering
adopted there, and, we denote the system to be presented as L P E . In this case we
meet both logical axioms for 1st-order logic FO and arithmetic axioms. We begin
with logical axioms due to (Kalish, Montague [37]).

Definition 3.46 (Axiom schemes for L P E )

Logical axiom schemes
(A1) ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ p));
(A2) (( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ (( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )));
(A3) ((¬q ⊃ ¬ p) ⊃ ( p ⊃ q)); (A1)-(A3) are axiom schemes for PL.
(A4) ((∀vi .(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (∀vi .φ) ⊃ ∀vi ψ));
(A5) (φ ⊃ ∀vi .φ) if vi has no occurrence in φ;
(A6) (∃vi .(vi = t)) provided vi has no occurrence in the term t;
(A7) (vi = t) ⊃ (Φ1 ⊃ Φ2 ), where Φ1 , Φ2 are atomic formulae , Φ1 is arbitrary
φ1 vi φ2 , and, Φ2 is φ1 t φ2 : it follows that only one occurrence of vi can be
replaced by t.

Arithmetic axiom schemes

(A8) ((v1 = v2 ) ⊃ (v1 = v2 ));
(A9) (¬(0 = v1 ));
(A10) ((v1 + 0) = v1 );
(A11) ((v1 + v2 ) = (v1 + v2 ) );
3.17 Gödel Incompleteness Theorems 153

(A12) ((v1 · 0) = 0);

(A13) ((v1 · v2 ) = (v1 · v2 + v1 ));
(A14) ((v1 ≤ 0) ≡ (v1 = 0));
(A15) ((v1 ≤ v2 ) ≡ (v1 ≤ v2 ∨ v1 = v2 ));
(A16) (v1 ≤ v2 ∨ v2 ≤ v1 );

(A17) (ex p(v1 , 0) = 0 );

(A18) (ex p(v1 , v2 ) = (ex p(v1 , v2 ) · v1 ).
(A19) ((φ(0) ⊃ (∀v1 φ(v1 ) ⊃ φ(v1 ))) ⊃ ∀v1 φ(v1 )) (the principle of mathematical
induction).

A formula is refutable if and only if it is not provable. Our discussion assumes

that the axiomatization is sound: what is provable is valid.

Definition 3.47 (Gödel numbering for L P E )

We recall from Sect. 3.16 the notation x ◦b y and the base b=13. We go now a bit
further into this topic. We denote by the symbol (x)b the representation of the number
x in base b. We define the predicate pr e(x, y) which holds if the representation (x)b
is a prefix in the representation (y)b ; similarly, su f (x, y) will hold when (x)b is a
suffix in (y)b .

Lemma 3.1 The following relations are Arithmetic. We recall that the relation
ex p(x, y) denotes the expression x y .
(1) pr e(x, y) and su f (x, y):

pr e(x, y) ≡ (x = y) ∨ (x = 0 ∧ (∃z ≤ y) ∧ ∃(w ≤ y). ∧ E(w, b) ∧ (x · w) ◦b z = y

su f (x, y) ≡ (x = y) ∨ (∃z ≤ y.z ◦b x = y);

(2) the relation of a segment: seg(x, y) ≡ ∃z ≤ y. pr e(z, y) ∧ su f (x, z);

(3) sequences-related relations: from a standard k-tuple (φ1 , . . . , φk ), we induce
the sequence written down formally as the string

σ : # φ1 # φ2 # . . . #φk #

and gn(σ) which is called the sequence number. This new construct induces
some new relations. We recall that gn(#) = X  . Relations are:
(a) Seq(x), x is gn(σ) for some σ:

Seq(x) ≡ pr e(X  , x) ∧ su f (X  , x) ∧ (X  = x) ∧ (¬seg(X  X  , x)0∧

∀y ≤ x(seg(X  0y, x) ⊃ pr e(X  , y));

154 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

(b) I n(x, y), x is an element of a sequence σ with gn(σ) = y:

I n(x, y) ≡ Seq(y) ∧ seg(X  x X  , y) ∧ (¬seg(X  , x)),

(c) Pr ec(x, y, z), z = gn(σ), x, y in σ, x precedes y in σ:

Pr ec(x, y, z) ≡ I n(x, z) ∧ I n(y, z) ∧ ∃w.( pr e(w, z) ∧ I n(x, w) ∧ ¬I n(y, w)).

(4) relations which define terms and formulae: the relation F(t1 , t2 , t3 ) holds if and
only if t3 is one of t1 + t2 , t1 · t2 , ex p(t1 , t2 ), t1 . Then, an expression t is a term
if and only if there exists a proof t1 , t2 , . . . , tk , where each ti is a variable or a
numeral or F(t j , tl , ti ) holds with j, l < i.
For formulae, we let G(φ1 , φ2 , φ3 ) to hold in cases where φ3 is one of ¬φ1 ,
¬φ2 , φ1 ⊃ φ2 , for some vi , ∀vi φ1 , ∀vi φ2 . A φ is a formula if it is an element of a
sequence φ1 , φ2 , . . . , φk with each φi either an atomic formula or G(φ j , φl , φi )
holds with j, l < i.

These relations are Arithmetic; proof is given below. For an expression E, the
symbol E x denotes that x = gn(E). We embark on the second part of arithmetization
of L P E .
Forming sequences serve the purpose of replacement of inductive definitions of
terms or formulae with formal proof-like definitions. Let F(t1 , t2 , t3 ) be a relation
which holds if t3 is either t1 + t2 or t1 · t2 , or, ex p(t1 , t2 ). Then we say that t is a term if
and only if there exists a sequence t1 , t2 , . . . , tn called a term-forming sequence such
that each ti is either a variable or a numeral, or there exists an instance F(tk, tl , ti )
with k, l < i. The expression t is a term if there exists a term-forming sequence with
t as its element.
We treat formulae in a similar way: let G(φ1 , φ2 , φ3 ) holds if and only if φ3 is one
of: ¬φ1 or ¬φ2 , or, φ1 ⊃ φ2 , or, ∀vi .φ1 , or, ∀vi .φ2 , for some vi . A formula-forming
sequence is a sequence φ1 , φ2 , . . . , φm such that each φi is an atomic formula or it
satisfies G(φk , φl , φi ) for some k, l < i. A φ is a formula if it is an element of a
formula-forming sequence.
We list arithmetic and logical expressions and symbols for their Gödel numbers.
We consider expressions E x , E y and we list Gödel numbers for:

(i) gn(E x ⊃ E y ) is denoted as gn ⊃ (x, y);

(ii) gn(¬E x ) is denoted gn ¬ (x);
(iii) gn(E x + E y ) is denoted gn + (x, y);
(iv) gn(E x · E y ) is denoted gn · (x, y);
(v) gn(ex p(E x , E y )) is denoted gn ex p (x, y);
(vi) gn(E x ) is denoted gn  (x, y);
(vii) gn(E x = E y ) is denoted gn = (x, y);
(viii) gn(E x ≤ E y ) is denoted gn ≤ (x, y);
(ix) gn(z = o(x, y)) is denoted gn o (x, y).
3.17 Gödel Incompleteness Theorems 155

Expressions (i)–(ix) are Arithmetic, for instance, gn = (x, y) = 2 ◦13 x ◦13 η ◦13
y ◦13 3.
Now, we continue the list or relations necessary for the proof. In order to facilitate
the task of arithmetization, we borrow a trick: instead of I n(x, y) we will write xεy.
This will alow to write ∀yεx in some formulae below, instead of wrestling with the
problem of formulae ∀y I n(y, x) ∧ .. which would call for ⊃.

(5) ssub(x), x is a sequence of commas (subscripts)(recall that gn(, ) = 5):

(∃yseg(y, x)) ⊃ seg(5, x);
(6) var (x), E x is a variable: ∃yssub(y) ∧ x = 2 ◦13 6 ◦13 y ◦13 3;
(7) num(x), E x is a numeral: ex p(x, 13);
(8) F(x, y, z), the relation F(E x , E y , E z ) holds: z = gn + (x, y) ∨ z = gn · (x, y) ∨
z = gn ex p (x, y) ∨ z = gn  (x);
(9) Fseq(x), E x is a term-forming sequence: Seq(x) ∧ ∀yεx(var (y) ∨ num(y) ∨
∃z, w Pr ec(w, y, x) ∧ F(z, w, y));
(10) ter m(x), E x is a term: ∃y Fseq(y) ∧ xεy;
(11) a f or m(x), E x is an atomic formula: ∃y∃zter m(y) ∧ ter m(z) ∧
[(x = gn = (y, z)) ∨ (x = gn ≤ (y, z))];
(12) f all(x, y), E y is E x quantified universally: ∃zvar (z) ∧ y = 9 ◦13 z ◦13 x;
(13) G(x, y, z), the relation G(E x , E y , E z ) holds: z = gn ⊃ (x, y) ∨ z = gn ¬ (x) ∨
f all(x, z);
(14) Gseq(x), E x is a formula-forming sequence: Seq(x) ∧ ∀yεx(a f or m(y) ∨
∃z, w Pr ec(z, w, y) ∧ G(z, w, y));
(15) f or m(x), E x is a formula: ∃y.Gseq(y) ∧ xεy;
(16) mp(x, y, z), E z follows from E x and E y by means of (MP): z = gn ⊃ (x, y);
(17) der (x, y, z), E z follows from E x and E y by means od (MP) or from E x by
means of f all(x, z): mp(x, y, z) ∨ f all(x, z);
(18) pr oo f (x), E x is a proof: Seq(x) ∧ ∀yεx(A(y) ∨ ∃z, wεx.Pr ec(z, w, y) ∧
der (z, w, y));
(19) pr ov(x), E x is provable: ∃y( pr oo f (y) ∧ xεy);
(20) r e f (x), E x is refutable: pr ov(¬(x)).

The term A(y) denotes that y is an instance of an axiom scheme. We leave the
arithmetization of axiom schemes off. The Reader may fill this gap in at their will,
and we assume that A(y) is arithmetized. It follows that all formulae are arithmetic.
We denote by the symbol P the set of all Gödel numbers of provable formulae of
L P E and the symbol R will stand for the set of Gödel numbers of refutable formulae.

Theorem 3.38 (Gödel [36]) The system L P E is incomplete.

Proof As sets P and R are Arithmetic, both are expressed in L P E : P by (v1 ),

R by (v1 ). The formula ¬(v1 ) expresses the complement −. There exists a
formula Q P (v1 ) which expresses the set (−P)∗ . For its Gödel number q p , we have
that diagonalization Q P (q p ) is a Gödel sentence for the set −P. Then Q P (q p ) is
true but not provable. The sentence ¬Q P (q p ) is false and not provable. 
156 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

This proof which we owe to Smullyan [34] is probably the simplest. The orig-
inal proof in Gödel [36] was based on the notion of ω-consistency: a system is
ω-inconsistent if there exists a formula φ(x) such that the formula ∃x.φ(x) is prov-
able but for each n, the formula φ(n) is refutable. A system is ω-consistent if it is
not ω-inconsistent. Gödel’s formulation of incompleteness theorem was: ‘if Peano
Arithmetic is ω-consistent, then it is incomplete’. Rosser [38] proved incompleteness
of Peano Arithmetic under assumption of mere consistency.

3.18 The Rosser Incompleteness Theorem. The Rosser

Sentence

We consider an axiomatic system Σ about which it is assumed that it is consistent.

Definition 3.48 (Representation)

A formula Φ represents a set A if and only if A = {n : Φ(n) is provable}.

We recall that the symbol n encodes the natural number n in Σ.

Definition 3.49
We adopt or recall the following notation:
(P) the symbol P denotes the set of Gödel numbers of provable formulae;
(R) the symbol R denotes the set of Gödel numbers of refutable (i.e., not provable)
formulae;
(E n ) the symbol E n denotes that the Gödel number of the expression E is n;
(E n (n)) the symbol E n (n) denotes the Gödel number of E n (n) (cf. the di-
agonal function in sect. 15.);
(P ∗ ) the symbol P ∗ denotes the set {n : E n (n) is provable};
(R ∗ ) the symbol R ∗ denotes the set {n : E n (n) is refutable}.

Definition 3.50 (Separability)

For sets A, B, a formula Ψ (v1 ) separates A from B if and only if for each n ∈ A the
formula Ψ (n) is provable and for each n ∈ B the formula Ψ (n) is refutable.

Definition 3.51 (Enumerability)

A set A is enumerable if and only if there exists a formula A(x, y) such that n ∈ A
if and only if there exits k such that A(n, k) is provable.

We recall after Smullyan [34] an axiomatization due to R. Robinson [39].

Definition 3.52 (The Robinson axiomatization for Σ)

Axiom schemes (I)–(V) are the following:

(I) the scheme n + m = k for all triples (n, m, k) such that n + m = k;

(II) the scheme n · m = k for all triples (n, m, k) such that nm = k;
(III) the scheme m = m for all pairs n, m of distinct numbers;
3.18 The Rosser Incompleteness Theorem. The Rosser Sentence 157

(IV) the scheme v1 ≤ n;

(V) the scheme (v1 ≤ n) ∨ (n ≤ v1 ).
The first incompleteness result is the following (cf. [34]).

Theorem 3.39 Under assumptions about Σ, if a formula ¬F(v1 ) represents the set
P ∗ and f = gn(F(v1 )), then F( f ) is neither provable nor refutable.

Proof Since ¬F(v1 ) represents P ∗ , F(n) is refutable if and only if n ∈ P ∗ , for each
n. In particular, F( f ) is refutable if and only if f ∈ P ∗ . On the other hand, F( f ) is
provable if and only if f ∈ P ∗ . Thus, we have two cases: (a) F( f ) is provable and
refutable (b) F( f ) is neither provable nor refutable. The case (a) must be dismissed
by consistency assumption, hence, (b) remains. 

Theorem 3.40 Suppose that the formula Ψ (v1 ) separates the set A from the set B
in Σ. Then, Ψ (v1 ) represents a set C which contains A and is disjoint from B.

Proof By consistency property of Σ, C cannot intersect B. 

Theorem 3.41 If Ψ (v1 ) separates P ∗ from R ∗ and p is the Gödel number of Ψ (v1 ),
then the formula Ψ ( p) is undecidable.

Proof By consistency of Σ, Ψ (v1 ) represents the set Q of which, by symmetry with

respect to P ∗ and R ∗ , we may assume that R ∗ ⊆ Q and P ∗ ∩ Q = ∅. Then, for
p = gn(Ψ (v1 ),

(i) Ψ ( p) is provable if and only if p ∈ Q by definition of separability;

(ii) Ψ ( p) is provable if and only if p ∈ P ∗ by definition of P ∗ .
It follows that p ∈ Q ≡ p ∈ P ∗ , and by consistency, the only case possible is that
neither p ∈ Q nor p ∈ P ∗ , which implies that also p ∈ / R ∗ . This means that Ψ ( p)
is neither provable nor refutable in Σ. 

It is now desirable to have an explicit formula which separates two sets. Let us
observe that for given sets A, B it is sufficient to separate sets A \ B and B \ A.

Theorem 3.42 (The Rosser separation lemma)

Suppose that all instances of axiom schemes (IV) and (V) are provable in Σ and sets
A, B are enumerable. Then sets A \ B and B \ A are separable.

Proof Suppose that the set A is enumerated by the formula A(x, y) and the set B is
enumerated by the formula B(x, y).
Claim. The formula (∀y.A(x, y)) ⊃ (∃z ≤ y.B(x, z)) separates A \ B from B \ A.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that n ∈ B \ A; as n ∈ B, there exists k such that (i)
B(n, k) is provable (in Σ).
As n ∈ / A, A(n, m) is refutable for each m, hence, by (IV), the sentence ∀(y ≤
k)¬A(n, y) is provable, and, the formula y ≤ k ⊃ ¬A(n, y) is provable which is
158 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

equivalent to provability of A(n, y) ⊃ ¬(y ≤ k). By (V), the formula (ii) A(n, y) ⊃
(k ≤ y) is provable.
By (i) and (ii), the formula (iii) A(n, y) ⊃ (k ≤ y) ∧ B(n, k) is provable.
From (iii), we obtain the provable formula (iv) A(n, y) ⊃ (∃z ≤ y) ∧ B(n, z);
the inference rule (Gen) yields from (iv) the formula (v) ∀y(A(n, y) ⊃ (∃z ≤ y) ∧
B(n, z)).
Suppose now that n ∈ A \ B, hence, there exists k such that A(n, k) is provable
and for each m the formula B(n, m) is refutable. By (IV), the formula (vi) ∀(z ≤
k)¬B(n, z) is provable. This implies provability of A(n, k) ∧ ∀(z ≤ k)¬B(n, z) and
provability of
(vii) ¬(A(n, k) ⊃ ∃(z ≤ k).B(n, z)),

hence, (viii) A(n, k) ⊃ ∃(z ≤ k).B(n, z)) is refutable.

Finally, the formula ∀y.(A(x, y) ⊃ ∃z ≤ y.B(x, y) separates A from B. 

Theorem 3.43 If the system Σ is consistent, sets P ∗ and R ∗ are enumerable and
all instances of axiom schemes (IV) and (V) are provable in Σ, then Σ is incomplete
and the incompleteness is witnessed by the Rosser sentence

∀y.(A(h, y) ⊃ ∃(z ≤ y).B(h, z),

where A(x, y) enumerates P ∗ and B(x, y) enumerates R ∗ , and,

h = gn(∀y.(A(x, y) ⊃ ∃(z ≤ y).B(x, y)).

Proof By Theorem 3.42, P ∗ and Q ∗ are separated by the sentence ∀y.(A(x, y) ⊃

∃(z ≤ y).B(x, y)) and by Theorem 3.41, the sentence

∀y.(A(h, y) ⊃ ∃(z ≤ y).B(h, z)

is undecidable. 

The Rosser sentence is often paraphrased as the statement ‘if the given formula
is provable, then there is a shorter (i.e., with a smaller Gödel number) proof of its
unprovability’.

Theorem 3.44 If Peano Arithmetic is consistent, then it is incomplete.

3.19 Finite FO Structures

Definition 3.53 (Finite structures. 1st-order definability)

We assume a vocabulary V = {c1 , c2 , . . . , cl , P1 , P2 , . . . , Pm } consisting of constant
symbols ci and relational symbols P j of specified arity. The realization of V is a
3.19 Finite FO Structures 159

structure M = (D, I, A), where D is the domain of M, i.e., a non-empty set of

things, I is an interpretation which sends each ci to an element
c I ∈ D, and each relational symbol P to a relation P I ⊂ D a(P) , where a(P) is the
arity of P. The third ingredient is an assignment A which sends each individual
variable x into an element A(x) ∈ D, for each x in a countable set of individual
variables (xi )i . A structure M is finite when the domain D is finite.

We recall that
(i) individual variables and constants are terms; terms are denoted as t, s, . . .;
(ii) atomic formulae are expressions of the form t = s or Pi (t1 , t2 , . . . , ta(Pi ); a(Pi )
is the arity of Pi ;
(iii) formulae are expressions φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ⊃ ψ, ¬ψ, ∀x.φ, ∃x.φ in case φ and
ψ are formulae.
The notion of satisfaction under given interpretation I and assignment V in a
structure M = (D, I, V ) is defined in the standard for FO manner. The definition of
truth for a structure is also standard for FO. If a formula is true in a structure M,
them M is a model for the formula. A formula true in all models is valid. Otherwise
it is invalid.

Definition 3.54 (Pointed structures)

∞
For each (possibly infinite) sequence (di )i=1 of elements of the domain D, we call
−
→
the pair (M, {di : i = 1, 2, . . .}), usually denoted as (M, d ), a pointed structure.

Definition 3.55 (Interpretations, assignments and satisfaction in pointed structures)

−
→
The interpretation of an expression e in a pointed structure Md = (M, d ) will be
denoted as e Md . We list the rules for interpretations:

(i) for an individual variable xi : xiMd is di ;

(ii) for a constant symbol c, c Md is c I ;
(iii) an atomic formula t = s is interpreted as t Md = s Md ;
(iv) a relational symbol Pi is interpreted as P I ;
(v) an atomic formula Pi (t1 , t2 ,. . ., tn ) is interpreted as P I(t1Md , t2Md ,. . ., tnMd ).

The notion of satisfaction for pointed structures is defined in the standard way;
the symbol x/d means substitution for all free occurrences of variable x in a formula
by an element d ∈ D.

(vi) |= Md (t = s) if and only if t Md = s Md holds;

(vii) |= Md Pi (t1 , t2 , . . . , tn ) if and only if (t1Md , t2Md , . . . , tnMd ) ∈ P I holds;
(viii) |= Md φ ∨ ψ if and only if either |= Md φ or |= Md ψ;
(ix) |= Md φ ∧ ψ if and only if |= Md φ and |= Md ψ;
(x) |= Md ¬φ if and only if it is not the case that |= Md φ;
(xi) |= Md ∀x.φ if and only if for each d ∈ D, |= Md φ(x/d);
(xii) |= Md ∃x.φ if and only if for some d ∈ D, |= Md φ(x/d).
160 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Counterparts for φ ⊃ ψ and φ ≡ ψ follow by well-known valid equivalences

(φ ⊃ ψ) if and only if ¬φ ∨ ψ and φ ≡ ψ if and only if (φ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ φ).

Definition 3.56 (An isomorphism between structures)

Two structures M1 = (D1 , I1 ) and M2 = (D2 , I2 ) are isomorphic if there exists a
bijective mapping h from D1 onto D2 such that

(i) for each set {d1 , d2 , . . . , dn } ⊆ D1 and relation P I1 of arity n, the equivalence
holds: (d1 , d2 , . . . , dn ) ∈ P I1 if and only if (h(d1 ), h(d2 ), . . . , h(dn )) ∈ P I2 ;
(ii) h(c I1 ) = c I2 for each constant symbol c.

An isomorphism of structures M1 and M2 is denoted M1 ∼ = M2 . Isomorphic

structures satisfy the same formulae: M1 |= φ(d1 , a2 , . . . , dn ) if and only if M2 |=
φ(h(d1 , h(d2 ), . . . , h(dn )). In case φ is a closed formula, we have simply M1 |= φ if
and only if M2 |= φ.

Definition 3.57 (Class of models Cls − mod(φ))

Yet another form of expressing the existence of an isomorphism between structures is
by means of the notion of the class of models for a formula φ, denoted Cls − mod(φ).
For each closed formula (sentence) φ over a relational vocabulary V , if M1 ∼ = M2 ,
then M1 ∈ Cls − mod(φ) if and only if M2 ∈ Cls − mod(φ).

Definition 3.58 (Partial isomorphism between structures)

Two structures M1 and M2 are partially isomorphic if and only if there exists a
bijection f from a set dom( f ) ⊆ D1 onto a set r ng( f ) ⊆ D2 such that

(i) for each relation P I1 of arity n and each set {d1 , d2 , . . . , dn } ⊆ dom( f ),
P I1 (d1 , d2 , . . . , dn ) if and only if P I2 ( f (d1 ), f (d2 ), . . . , f (dn )) holds;
(ii) for each constant symbol c, if c I1 ∈ dom( f ) then f (c I1 ) = c I2 .

Domain dom( f ) and range r ng( f ) of a partial isomorphism f are isomorphic

under the isomorphism established by f . A particular case is when we select for
some k elements d11 , d21 , . . . , dk1 in D1 and d12 , d22 , . . . , dk2 in D2 such that the map-
ping f : di1 → di2 for i ≤ k and f (c I1 ) = c I2 for each constant symbol c is a partial
isomorphism, which case is denoted (d I1 )k1 ∼ = f (d I2 )k1 .
The notions of an isomorphism and a partial isomorphism relate two structures
on the level of relations and constant symbols. We need relations between structures
which deal with formulae. Such relation is induced by the notion of a quantifier rank.

Definition 3.59 (Quantifier rank of a formula)

For a formula φ of FO, the quantifier rank of φ, qr (φ) is defined by structural
induction:
(i) qr (xi ) = 0 = qr (c) for each xi and c;
(ii) qr (φ ∨ ψ) = qr (φ ∧ ψ) = qr (φ ⊃ ψ) = max{qr (φ), qr (ψ)};
(iii) qr (¬φ) = qr (φ);
(iv) qr (Qφ) = qr (φ) + 1, where Q = ∀, ∃.
3.20 Ehrenfeucht Games 161

It follows that quantifier rank of a formula is the number of quantifier symbols in

its prenex form. The class Q m collects formulae of quantifier rank not greater than
m. These classes are instrumental in definitions of relations between structures.

Definition 3.60 (The m-equivalence)

Two structures M1 and M2 are m-equivalent if and only if for each closed formula
φ with qr (φ) ≤ m, M1 |= φ if and only if M2 |= φ. The relation of m-equivalence
between structures is denoted M1 ≡m M2 .

We now define the crucial notion of FO-definability, opening the way up to assert-
ing whether a given class of structures can be axiomatized within FO. We recall that
Cls − mod(φ) is the collection of all structures which are models for φ.

Definition 3.61 (FO-definability)

A class C of structures is FO-definable if and only if there exists a formula φ of FO
such that C = Cls − mod(φ).

The following theorem brings forth the methodology for answering the FO-
definability question in the negative.

Theorem 3.45 For a class C of finite structures, if for each natural number m there
exist structures M1 and M2 such that: (i) M1 ≡m M2 ; (ii) M1 ∈ C and M2 ∈ / C, then
C is not FO-definable.

Proof Suppose that, to the contrary, C is FO-definable and let φ be the formula
with the property that C = Cls − mod(φ). Let m = qr (φ). As, by (i), M1 ≡m M2 ,
and, by (ii), M1 |= φ, it follows by Definition 3.60 that M2 |= φ, hence, M2 ∈ C, a
contradiction. 

In the light of Theorem 3.45, it is important to have a test for the relation ≡m . This
is supplied by Ehrenfeucht games Ehrenfeucht [40].

3.20 Ehrenfeucht Games

Definition 3.62 (The Ehrenfeucht game)

In the notation of Sect. 3.19, we consider pointed structures (M1 , (a)k1 ) and (M2 , (b)k1 ).
The Ehrenfeucht game G m (M1 , (a)k1 ; M2 , (b)k1 ) is played by two players: player p1
(called Spoiler) and player p2 (called Duplicator).

In each party of the game, players make m moves, beginning with the first move
by Spoiler, who selects an element either from D1 or from D2 to which
Duplicator responds with a choice of an element from the set not chosen by Spoiler in
its first move. This pattern is repeated m − 1 times and the play is terminated leaving
players with the pointed structures (D1 , (a)k1 (u)m
1 ) and (D2 , (a)1 (w)1 ), where (u)1
k m m
162 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

are elements chosen by players from the set D1 and (w)m 1 are the elements chosen
by players from the set D2 .
Duplicator wins the party if and only if the mapping f : (a)k1 (u)m1 → (b)1 (w)1 is
k m

a partial isomorphism. Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game G m (M1 , (a)k1 ;
M2 , (b)k1 ) if and only if it wins every party of the game.
An example of the winning strategy for Duplicator, which has a better position
as it always makes the second move in each ply, is when structures M1 and M2
are isomorphic under an isomorphism h, because then if Spoiler selects an element
u ∈ D1 , then Duplicator responds with h(u) ∈ D2 , and, for a choice of w ∈ D2 by
Spoiler, Duplicator responds with h −1 (w) ∈ D1 . This remark establishes

Theorem 3.46 If M1 ∼ = M2 , then Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game

G m (M1 , ∅; M2 , ∅).

By Definition 3.62, Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game

G 0 (M1 , (a)k1 ; M2 , (b)k1 )

if and only if the mapping f : (a)k1 → (b)k1 is a partial isomorphism. For m > 0, we
have the following properties to observe.

Theorem 3.47 The following statement holds for the Ehrenfeucht game, please
observe that the subscript m means m moves to be made: (i) if the Duplicator has
the winning strategy in the game

G m (M1 , (a)k1 ; M2 , (b)k1 ),

j j
then for each j < m the position (a)k1 (u)1 ; (b)k1 (w)1 establishes a partial isomor-
j j
phism f j : (a)k1 (u)1 → (b)k1 (w)1 .

Corollary 3.5 At each stage j < m of each party of the game G m , if Duplicator has
the winning strategy for the game G m , then there are moves extending the winning
strategy to G j−1 , viz.

(i) (forth) for each a ∈ A, there exists b ∈ D2 such that the pair (a, b) added to
the position of G j provides a partial isomorphism at the position of G j−1 ;
(ii) (back) for each b ∈ B, there exists a ∈ D1 such that the pair (a, b) added to
the position of G j provides a partial isomorphism at the position of G j−1 .

The next result Ehrenfeucht [40] paves the way from existence of the winning
strategy for Duplicator to m-equivalence of structures.

Theorem 3.48 If Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game G m (M1 , (a)k1 ;
M2 , (b)k1 ), then for each formula φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ) of quantifier rank less or equal
to m, M1 |= φ(a1 , a2 , . . . ak ) if and only if M2 |= φ(b1 , b2 , . . . , bk ).
3.20 Ehrenfeucht Games 163

Proof It is by induction on m.
Case 1. m = 0; Duplicator wins game G 0 in position (a)k1 ; (b)k1 if and only if f 0 :
(a)k1 → (b)k1 is a partial isomorphism and the thesis follows by definition of a partial
isomorphism.
Case 2. m > 0: as the class of formulae satisfying the thesis is closed on Boolean
connectives and negation, the only case is that of quantified formulae, so consider a
formula φ of the form ∃y.ψ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xk , y). Suppose that M1 |= φ(a1 , a2 , . . . ak ),
hence, M1 |= ψ(a1 , a2 , . . . ak , a) for some a ∈ D1 . As Duplicator has the win-
ning strategy in G m , by 18.4 (i), there exists b ∈ B such that Duplicator wins
G m−1 in position (a)k1 a; (b)k1 b. As qr (ψ) ≤ m − 1, by the hypothesis of induction,
M2 |= ψ(b1 , b2 , . . . , bk , b), i.e., M2 |= φ(b1 , b2 , . . . , bk ). By symmetry, the converse
follows as well. 

Corollary 3.6 (Ehrenfeucht [40])

Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game G m (M1 , ∅; M2 , ∅) if and only if
M1 ≡m M2 .

Ehrenfeucht games are also called Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games due to an earlier

result Fraïssé [41] about equivalence of the notion of m-equivalence and that of an
m-isomorphism.

Definition 3.63 (The notion of an m-isomorphism)

Structures M1 and M2 are m-isomorphic if and only if there exists a sequence {I j :
j ≤ m} of sets of partial isomorphisms between M1 and M2 such that the following
conditions hold:

(i) for each j ≤ m, for each a ∈ D1 , and, each h ∈ I j , there exists g ∈ I j−1 such
that g extends h and a ∈ dom(g); (i) is (forth property);
(ii) for each j ≤ m, for each b ∈ D2 , and, each h ∈ I j , there exists g ∈ I j−1 such
that g extends h and b ∈ r ng(g); (ii) is (back property). We denote the fact of
an m-isomorphism between M1 and M2 due to (I j )m 1 as (I j )0 : M1 ∼ M2 .
m

The theorem by Fraïssé (Fraïssé [41]) completes the picture.

Theorem 3.49 (Fraïssé)

Structures M1 and M2 are m-isomorphic if and only if M1 and M2 are m-equivalent.

Proof We outline the proof. First, we assume that structures M1 , M2 are m-

isomorphic via (I j ) j≤m . We consider n ≤ m.
Claim. For φ with qr (φ) ≤ n, h ∈ In , M1 |= φ(a0 , a1 , . . . , ak ) if and only if M2 |=
φ(h(a0 ), h(a1 ) . . . , h(ak )).
The proof od Claim is by structural induction. For an atomic formula
P(t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ) we use the forth and back properties of (I j ) s to build tuples
(a1 , a2 , . . . , ak ) of elements of D1 and (b1 , b2 , . . . , bk ) of elements of D2 such that the
164 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

correspondence (ai ↔ bi ) is a partial isomorphism and M1 |= P I1 (a1 , a2 , . . . , ak ) if

and only if M2 |= P I2 (b1 , b2 , . . . bk ).
For propositional formulae it is sufficient to consider formulae of the form ¬ψ
and ψ ∨ ξ. Suppose that φ is ¬ψ. By hypothesis of induction, ψ, ξ satisfy Claim.
Then,

M1 |= φ ≡ M1 |= ¬ψ ≡ ¬M1 |= ψ ≡ ¬M2 |= ψ ≡ M2 |= ¬ψ ≡ M2 |= φ.

In case of φ which is ψ ∨ ξ:

M1 |= φ ≡ (M1 |= ψ ∨ M1 |= ξ) ≡ (M2 |= ψ ∨ M2 |= ξ) ≡ (M2 |= φ.)

The case of quantified formula φ: it is sufficient to assume that φ is ∃x.ψ where

x may be assumed to be an individual variable xi . As qr (ψ) ≤ n − 1, Claim holds
for ψ with In−1 . By applying the forth and back properties of In−1 , we have the
sequence of equivalences: M1 |= φ(a0 , a1 , . . . , ak ), there is h ∈ In−1 with the prop-
erty that M2 |= ψ(h(a0 ), h(a1 ), . . . , h(ak )), and there is a ∈ D1 and g ∈ In−2 such
that M1 |= ψ(a0 , a1 , . . . , ak , a)) and M2 |= ψ(h(a0 ), h(a1 ), . . . , h(ak ), g(a)), i.e.,
M2 |= φ(h(a0 ), h(a1 ), . . . , h(ak )).
Suppose that M1 ≡m M2 . By the Ehrenfeucht Theorem 3.48, if Duplicator has the
winning strategy in the game G m then for each of its instances G m (M1 , (a1 , a2 , . . . ,
ak ); M2 , (b1 , b2 , . . . , bk ), the correspondence h : ai ↔ bi is a partial isomorphism.
Let G be the set of all pairs of tuples and partial isomorphisms resulting from winning
strategy for Duplicator. Then the sub-collection of isomorphisms in G m for each m
is Im . 

The corollary to theorems of Ehrenfeucht and Fraïssé is the equivalence of all

three notions involved in the above discussion: (i) existence of the winning strategy
for Duplicator in the game G m on structures M1 , M2 (ii) m-equivalence of M1 , M2
(iii) m-isomorphism of M1 , M2 .
We now apply the above results in proving non-definability of some typical prob-
lems in FO.

Example 3.13 The class EVEN of sets of even cardinality is not FO-definable.

Proof The relational vocabulary of EVEN=∅. For a given m, let us consider sets A
and B with |A| = 2k > m and |B| = 2k + 1. Obviously, A ∈ E V E N , B ∈ / EV E N.
In the game G m (A, B), Duplicator has the winning strategy: we prove it by induc-
tion on the number of moves: suppose that the position is after i − th move by
each player and Spoiler selects its (i + 1) − st, ai+1 , element from, say, the set
A. In case ai+1 has been already selected as an element a j , Duplicator selects
already selected element b j ∈ B, otherwise Duplicator selects any element in the
set B\{alr eady selected elements o f B}. By Theorem 3.45, the class EVEN is not
FO-definable. 
3.20 Ehrenfeucht Games 165

Example 3.14 The class EVEN(LO) of linear finite ordered sets of even cardinality
is not FO-definable.
Proof The relational vocabulary of EVEN(LO)={<, min, max} where < is a binary
linear ordering predicate and min, max are constants which in corresponding struc-
tures denote the least (l) and the greatest (g) elements. Given m, let us consider
ordered sets A, B of cardinalities |A| = 2k and |B| = 2k + 1. We suppose that after
i moves the position is (a)k1 ; (b)k1 . The inductive condition to be checked is:

(ind) if (|a p − aq | < 2k−i , then |b p − bq | = |a p − aq |) and if (|a p − aq | ≥ 2k−i ,

then |b p − bq | ≥ 2k−i ) and (a p < aq ≡ b p < bq ) for 1 ≤ p, q ≤ i.

The condition (a p < aq ↔ b p < bq ) guaranties partial isomorphism, the first two
allow for the winning strategy by Duplicator. The initial step 0 of induction can be
provided by prefixing (a)k1 by l A , g A and by prefixing (b)k1 by l B , g B . To prove it,
we consider the next ply i + 1. Suppose that Spoiler selects a ∈ A, the other case is
symmetrical. We consider cases in (ind).
Case 1. selected element a falls into an interval [a p , aq ] with no other already selected
element of A in it - we have a sufficient space to assume this, and then the correspond-
ing B-interval [b p , bq ] contains no already selected element of B. If |a p − aq | < 2k−i ,
then, by (ind), [b p , bq ] is of the same length as [a p , aq ] and Duplicator can find
b ∈ [b p , bq ] such that [a p , aq ] and [b p , bq ] are isomorphic.
Case 2. |a p − aq | ≥ 2k−i and, by (ind), |b p − bq | ≥ 2k−i . Either a falls in one of the
open intervals defined by the middle point of [a p , aq ] and Duplicator selects b in
same relative distances from b p and bq as a is to a p and aq , or, a divides [a p , aq ] into
equal halves and Duplicator selects midpoint of [b p , bq ]. In all cases this provides
winning strategy for Duplicator. 

Example 3.15 The class CONN of finite directed connected graphs is not FO-
definable.

Proof The relational vocabulary of CONN is {E}, where E is a binary relation

which in corresponding graph structures is interpreted as the edge relation e. Proof of
non-definability in this case exploits the result of Example 10, hence, the relational
vocabulary will be the union of the two particular vocabularies, i.e, it will be {<
, min, max, E}. Given a linear ordered set with ordering relation <, of sufficiently
large finite cardinality n, ordered as 1, 2, . . . , n, we connect by edges realizing the
predicate E, each element of the ordered set with its successor of the successor, i.e,
the i − th i element with the (i + 2) − nd element i + 2 in the cyclic order, and, in
particular, we create the edges (n, 2), (n − 1, 1), see Fig. 3.8. Making those pairs to
represent edges in the graph, we see that the graph is connected if and only if the
cardinality of the linearly ordered set is odd. Hence, the class of finite undirected
connected graphs is not FO-definable. 

The situation changes when we are allowed to quantify over sets represented
as, e.g., relations. Consider anew the class CONN of undirected graphs with the
166 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Fig. 3.8 Connectedness

example

relational vocabulary {E}, where E is a binary predicate interpreted in any graph as

the edge relation e. Consider a formula

φ : ∃P.{[∀x, y.(P(x, y) ↔ ¬(x = y)∧

∃k.∃x1 , x2 , . . . , xk .x = x1 ∧ y = xk ∧ ∀i ∈ [1, k − 1].E(xi , xi + 1))]∧

∃x.∀y.P(x, y)}

Then an undirected graph G is connected if and only if G ∈ Cls − mod(φ).

We meet here a formula in second-order logic (SO, for short), as P is a binary
predicate representing the binary reachability relation. We postpone a discussion of
SO to Chap. 8.

3.21 The General form of Deduction Theorem for FO

In Sect. 3.16, we applied the Tarski-Kalish-Montague axiomatization of FO, suitable

for the discussion of the incompleteness theorem. Now, we use another form of the
axiom system, more convenient, from which we deduce the general form of deduction
theorem. We have met deduction theorem by the Henkin proof of completeness of
FO, for closed formulae it has been the propositional deduction theorem. It turns out
that only φ needs to be closed.
The another set of axiom schemes for the first-order logic is the one in Mendel-
son [42].
(A1) φ → (ψ → φ);
(A2) (φ → (ψ → ξ)) → ((φ → ψ) → (φ → ξ));
(A3) (¬φ → ¬ψ) → (ψ → φ);
(A4) ∀x.φ(x) → φ(t), where the term t is independent of x (cf. Definition 2.6);
(A5) (∀x.(φ → ψ)) → (φ → ∀x.ψ), where x is not free in φ.
Inference rules are: Detachment and Generalization: if φ, then ∀x.φ.
Deduction theorem in predicate logic has the form as in propositional logic, but
the premiss should be a closed formula.
Theorem 3.50 For a set Γ of formulae, formulae φ and ψ with the formula φ closed,
Γ ∪ {φ}  ψ if and only if Γ  φ ⊃ ψ.
3.22 Craig’s Interpolation Theorem. Beth’s Definability Theorem 167

Proof If Γ  φ ⊃ ψ, then Γ ∪ {φ}  ψ by detachment.For the converse, a lemma

known from sentential logic is useful. 
Lemma 3.2  φ ⊃ φ.
Now, consider a proof ξ1 , ξ2 , . . . , ξk of ψ from Γ ∪ {φ}. As with sentential logic, the
idea of a proof is to show by induction on i that  φ ⊃ ξi for each i ≤ k. There are
few cases.
Case 1. ξi is φ. Then, by Lemma,  φ ⊃ ξi .
Case 2. ξi is an instance of an axiom, A. By (A1), A ⊃ (φ ⊃ A); as  A, detachment
yields φ ⊃ ξi .
Case 3. ξi is obtained by detachment from ξk , ξl : ξk ⊃ ξi with k, l < i. By hypothesis
of induction,
(i) φ → ξk ;
(ii) φ → (ξk → ξi ).
By (ii) and (A2),

 (φ ⊃ (ξk ⊃ ξi )) ⊃ ((φ ⊃ ξk ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξi ))

By (i), (ii), by applying detachment twice, we obtain  φ ⊃ ξi .

Case 4. ξi is obtained by Generalization from ξ j with j < i as ∀x.ξ j , hence,  φ ⊃ ξ j .
By Generalization,  ∀x.(φ ⊃ ξ j ). By (A5),  φ ⊃ ∀x.ξ j , i.e.,  φ ⊃ ξi .
For i = k the proof is concluded.

3.22 Craig’s Interpolation Theorem. Beth’s Definability

Theorem

The Craig interpolation theorem Craig [43] states that given closed formulae φ, ψ
such that the formula φ ⊃ ψ is valid, there exists a closed formula η, called an
interpolant, which satisfies two conditions:
(i) all non-logical symbols in η occur in φ ∨ ψ;
(ii) both formulae φ ⊃ η and η ⊃ ψ are valid.
We recall that non-logical symbols are those interpretable ones: symbols of constants,
functions and relations.
Please observe that the crucial condition is (i), otherwise we could have trivial
η’s, hence, it is (i) that makes proofs more difficult. In those proofs the principal
role is played by consistency: if there is no interpolant, then the set {φ, ¬ψ} is
consistent, in the contrary case the set is inconsistent. In the proof which we include
due to Halvorson, [44], out of many proofs, we meet familiar themes od maximal
consistency, the idea of the Lindenbaum Lemma and the Henkin construction.
168 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Theorem 3.51 If there is no interpolant for φ ⊃ ψ, then the set {φ, ¬ψ} is consistent.

Proof (Halvorson). We add to non-logical symbols in φ ∨ ψ a countably infinite set

P of parameters, no one of them in φ ∨ ψ. We recall that parameters are symbols of
constants which enter when the existential formulae are considered. We denote by
L1 the language of non-logical symbols in φ in the union with P, by L2 the language
of non-logical symbols in ψ in the union with P and let L1,2 = L1 ∩ L2 , hence, L1,2
is non-empty as it contains P.
It there were η over the language L1,2 such that φ ⊃ η ⊃ ψ was valid, then φ ⊃ η
and ¬ψ ⊃ ¬η would be valid. We would say that φ and ¬ψ are discerned by η. If
there exists such an η we would say that φ and ¬ψ are discerned.
Under our assumption in Theorem 3.51, φ and ¬ψ are not discerned.
We now need and echo of the Lindenbaum Lemma. We enumerate closed formulae
over the language L1 as (φn )∞ ∞
n=0 and (ψn )n=0 be an enumeration of closed formulae
over the language L2 .
We now imitate the Lindenbaum Lemma with elements of the Henkin proof of
completeness for two increasing sequences of sets (Q 1n )∞ 2 ∞
n=0 and (Q n )n=0 .
Their parallel construction is as follows.

(Step 0) Q 10 = {φ}, Q 20 = {¬ψ};

(Step n) if Q n ∪ {φn } and Q 2n are not discerned, then φn ∈ Q 1n+1 ;

if Q 2n ∪ {ψn } and Q 1n+1 are not discerned, then ψn ∈ Q 2n+1 ;

if φn is ∃x.χ(x) ∈ Q 1n+1 , then χ( p) ∈ Q 1n+1 for a new parameter p;

if ψn is ∃x.ξ(x) ∈ Q 1n+1 , then ξ(q) ∈ Q 1n+1 for a new parameter q.

 
Let Q 1 = n≥0 Q 1n and Q 2 = n≥0 Q 2n .
By construction and compactness, Q 1 and Q 2 are not discerned.
Both Q 1 , Q 2 are maximal consistent. Their consistency follows by theirs non-
discernibility. Let us prove maximality for Q 1 as a pattern for Q 2 . However, Q 2 will
have a role in the proof.
Suppose that, for some closed formula φn , we have φn ∈ / Q 1 and ¬φn ∈ / Q 1 . Let
¬φn be φm for some m > n (this inequality is arbitrary). As φn ∈ / Q , Q ∪ {φn } and
1 1

Q 2 are discerned by a closed formula ξ over the language L1 ∩ L2 , i.e., Q 1 |= φn ⊃ ξ,

Q 2 |= ¬ξ. By analogy, Q 1 ∪ {φm } and Q 2 are discerned by a closed formula χ, i.e.,
Q 1 |= φm ⊃ χ and Q 2 |= ¬χ.
It follows that Q 1 and Q 2 are discerned by ξ ∨ χ: as φn ∨ φm is valid, Q 1 |= ξ ∨ χ
and Q 2 |= ¬(ξ ∨ χ), a contradiction which proves that Q 1 and Q 2 are maximal
consistent.
The set Q 1 ∩ Q 2 is maximal consistent over L1,2 : for an arbitrary closed formula
δ over L1,2 , either Q 1 |= δ or Q 1 |= ¬δ and Q 2 |= δ or Q 2 |= ¬δ. As Q 1 and Q 2
are not discerned, they must agree either on δ or on ¬δ, which implies that Q 1 ∩ Q 2
is maximal consistent.
3.22 Craig’s Interpolation Theorem. Beth’s Definability Theorem 169

We now use the Henkin construction to provide models M1 for Q 1 and M2 for
2
Q (notice that existential formulae are already grounded by our use of parameters),
which actually are isomorphic over L1,2 as the model for Q 1 ∩ Q 2 . This yields the
common model M for Q 1 ∪ Q 2 ; as φ ∈ Q 1 and ¬φ ∈ Q 2 , hence both φ, ¬ψ ∈ M,
it follows that φ ⊃ ψ is not valid, a contradiction. Hence, there exists an interpolant
for the closed formula φ ⊃ ψ. The proof is concluded. 
The problem of how to find effectively an interpolant can be solved within any
paradigm for proof, e.g., tableaux, resolution, circuit theory. Let us employ tableaux.
We provide an analysis of this approach which applies also to the discussion
of Craig’s interpolation theorem in Chap. 2. For a formula φ ⊃ ψ the proof of its
validity is the closeness of each tableau for the formula ¬(φ ⊃ ψ), i.e., for the
formula φ ∧ ¬ψ. These two conjuncts fill the first two lines of the tableau. In order
to most easily describe the procedure for finding an interpolant form the tableau,
we adopt the markers proposed in Fitting [29], to wit, we mark formulae to the left
of ⊃ with the symbol L (left) and those to the right with R.
In the general setting, we have the formula which we represent in the marked
form as
(∗) Lφ1 , Lφ2 , . . . , Lφn , Rψ1 , Rψ2, . . . , Rψm .

Then, we define an interpolant for the marked set (*) as the interpolant for the formula

(∗∗) φi ⊃ ¬ψ j .
i≤n j≤m

This would yield for the original formula in the tableau format Lφ, R¬ψ the inter-
polant for the formula φ ⊃ ψ.
For the purpose of the further discussion, we shorten formulae: (*) to LΦ, RΨ and
(**) to Φ ⊃ ¬Ψ . We now propose interpolants for particular cases. Our discussion
encompasses the propositional case in Ch.II.
Case 1. LΦ, Lφ, L¬φ, RΨ : the formula (**) is Φ ∧ φ ∧ ¬φ ⊃ ¬Ψ , the interpolant
is ⊥;
Case 2. LΦ, Rφ, R¬φ, RΨ : the formula is Φ ⊃ ¬φ ∨ φ ∨ ¬Ψ , the interpolant
is ;
Case 3. LΦ, Lφ, R¬φ, RΨ : the formula (**) is Φ ∧ φ ⊃ ¬¬φ ∨ ¬Ψ , the inter-
polant is φ;
Case 4. LΦ, L¬φ, R(φ), RΨ : the formula is Φ ∧ ¬φ ⊃ ¬φ ∨ ¬Ψ , the interpolant
is ¬φ;
Case 5. LΦ, L(⊥): the formula is Φ ∧ ⊥ ⊃ ¬Ψ , the interpolant is ⊥;
Case 6. LΦ, R(⊥), the formula is Φ ⊃ , the interpolant is ;
Case 7. Obvious: if LΦ, L(), RΨ has interpolant φ, then φ is an interpolant for
LΦ L¬⊥, RΨ ; same for replacement /⊥, ¬⊥/¬ and L/R;
170 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Case 8. For φ of type α, if LΦ, Lφ1 , Lφ2 , RΨ has an interpolant ψ, then LΦ, L(φ),
RΨ has an interpolant ψ;
Case 9. For ψ of type α, if LΦ, Rψ1 , Rψ2 , RΨ has an interpolant η, then LΦ,
Rφ, RΨ has an interpolant η;
Case 10. For φ of type β, if LΦ, Lφ1 , RΨ has an interpolant χ and LΦ, Lφ2 , RΨ
has an interpolant ξ, then LΦ, Lφ, RΨ has the interpolant χ ∨ ξ: formulae in this
case are Φ ∧ φ1 ⊃ ¬Ψ , and Φ ∧ φ2 ⊃ ¬Ψ , hence,Φ ∧ (φ1 ∨ φ2 ) ⊃ ¬Ψ has the
interpolant χ ∨ ξ;
Case 11. For φ of type β, if LΦ, Rφ1 , RΨ has an interpolant η and LΦ, Rφ2 , RΨ
has an interpolant δ, then LΦ, Rφ, RΨ has the interpolant η ∧ δ; formulae in this
case are Φ ⊃ ¬φ1 , ¬Ψ and Φ ⊃ ¬φ2 , ¬Ψ , hence, Φ ⊃ ¬φ1 ∨ ¬φ2 ∨ ¬Ψ is φ ⊃
¬(φ1 ∧ φ2 ), ¬Ψ , hence, the interpolant is η ∧ δ;
Case 12. For a formula γ of type γ, quantified universally, suppose

(i) that η is an interpolant for LΦ, Lγ(c), RΦ where c has occurrences in Φ, then
η is the interpolant for LΦ, Lγ, RΨ ;
(ii) that η is an interpolant for LΦ, Lγ(c), RΦ where c has no occurrences in
Φ, then ∀xη(c/x) is the interpolant for LΦ, Lγ, RΨ , where x is an idividual
variable not in Φ, γ;
(iii) that η is an interpolant for LΦ, Rγ(c), LΨ and the constant c occurs in Ψ , then
η is the interpolant for LΦ, Rγ, RΦ;
(iv) that η is an interpolant for LΦ, Rγ(c), RΨ and c has no occurrence in Ψ , then
∃x.η(c/x) is the interpolant for LΦ, Rγ, RΨ .

We justify (i), suppose that η is an interpolant, hence, Φ ∧ γ(x) ⊃ η and η ⊃ ¬Ψ are

valid and all non-logical symbols in η are in Φ, γ(c) and in Ψ . As γ ⊃ γ(c) is valid,
Φ ∧ γ ⊃ Φ ∧ γ(c) is valid, hence, Φ ∧ γ ⊃ η is valid. As c is in Φ all non-logical
symbols in η are in Φ and γ and in Ψ .
For (ii), when c not in Φ, we have (a) η as an interpolant for LΦ, Lγ(c), RΨ ;
as γ ≡ ∀x.γ(c/x), the sentence Φ ∧ γ ⊃ ∀x.η(c/x) is valid; as ∀x.η(c/x) ⊃ η is
valid, ∀x.η(c/x) ⊃ ¬Ψ is valid. The problem of lack of c is solved by substitution
in η of a new individual variable x. It follows that ∀x.η(c/x) is the interpolant for
LΦ, Lγ, RΨ .
Cases (iii), (iv) are symmetric to cases (i), (ii).
Case 13. For a formula δ of type δ, quantified existentially, if LΦ, Lδ( p), RΨ has
an interpolant η, then LΦ, Lδ, RΨ has the interpolant η; similarly for the case
Lφ, RΨ, Rδ( p): an interpolant η is also the interpolant for Lφ, RΨ, Rδ. Here p is a
parameter new to formulae Φ, Ψ, δ. We know this the case with existential formulae
in many contexts like tableaux, completeness proofs, lately in the proof of Craig’s
theorem.

Example 3.16 Consider the closed formula Q:∀x.(P(x) ⊃ Q(x)) ⊃ ∀x.(P(x) ⊃

(Q(x) ⊃ P(x)).
3.22 Craig’s Interpolation Theorem. Beth’s Definability Theorem 171

The Reader will check please that the formula Q yields the signed biased set
{L(∀x(P(x) ⊃ Q(x))); R(¬(P(x) ⊃ (Q(x) ⊃ P(x))))} which after expanding the
tableau yields the interpolant (¬P(x) ∨ P(x)) ≡ .

We acknowledge the analysis in Fitting [29] which we followed in our exposition.

Definition 3.64 (Implicit definitions)

Let Γ be a set of closed formulae (sentences) and P a predicate of arity n, for some
n. Let P # be a predicate of arity n having no occurrence in Γ and Γ # be Γ in which
all occurrences of P are replaced with P # . We say that P is defined implicitly by Γ
if and only if

Γ ∪ Γ ∗ |= ∀x1 , x2 , . . . , xn .P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≡ P # (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).

For instance, Γ = {∀x.P(x) ⊃ Q(x), ∀x.(Q(x) ⊃ R(x)), ∀x.(Q(x) ⊃ (R(x) ⊃

P(x))} defines implicitly P(x).
Explicit definitions characterize a predicate directly by means of a formula.

Definition 3.65 (Explicit definitions)

In the notation of Definition 3.64: Γ defines a predicate P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) explicitly if
and only if there exists a formula φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) such that Γ |= φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn )
≡ P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).

Now, the Beth theorem Beth [8] states that each implicit definition induces an
explicit definition.

Theorem 3.52 (The Beth definability theorem) If a set Γ of sentences defines a

predicate P implicitly, then P has an explicit definition from Γ .

Proof (Craig [43]). One can foresee that the formula which will provide the explicit
definition of P is going to be an interpolant. Definition 3.64 supplies us with two
sets of formulae: Γ and Γ # and these formulae will provide us with a valid impli-
cation which will yield an interpolant defining P explicitly. The rest is the matter of
technique.
We begin, on the basis of the assumption in Theorem 3.52 and Definition 3.64
with

(i)Γ ∪ Γ # |= ∀x1 , x2 , . . . , xn .P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≡ P # (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).

By compactness, we find finite sets Δ ⊆ Γ and Δ# ⊆ Γ # such that

(ii) Δ ∪ Δ# |= ∀x1 , x2 , . . . , xn .P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≡ P # (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).

We now have, as P # has no occurrence in Δ and parameters p, p2 , . . . , pn are

new to (i), (ii):
 
(iii) Δ ∧ P( p1 , p2 , ... . . . , pn ) ⊃ ( Δ# ⊃ P # ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn )).
172 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

The valid implication (iii) and the Craig theorem supplies an interpolant
φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn ), i.e.,
 
(iv) Δ ∧ P( p1 , p2 , ..., pn ) ⊃ φ( p2 , p2 , ..., pn ) ⊃ ( Δ# ⊃ P # ( p1 , p2 , ..., pn ))

and all non-logical symbols in φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn ) are in

 
Δ ∧ P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ∪ Δ# ⊃ P # ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ))

which implies that φ does contain symbols of neither P nor P # .

The last remark’s importance will be evident in a moment: we may replace occur-
rences of P # with P in

φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ⊃ ( Δ# ⊃ P # ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ))

in order to obtain the valid sentence


(v) φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ⊃ ( Δ ⊃ P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn )).

By tautology p ⊃ (q ⊃ r ) ≡ q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ), (v) allows for


(vi) Δ ⊃ (φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ⊃ P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn )).

From (iv), we obtain


(vii) Δ ⊃ (P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ⊃ φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn )).

By (vi) and (vii),


(viii) Δ ⊃ (P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ≡ φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn )).

Finally,
(i x) Γ |= (P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ≡ φ( p2 , p2 , . . . , pn )).

Thus, it is valid that

Γ |= (∀x1 , x2 , . . . , xn .(φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≡ P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ))).

P is defined explicitly and this concludes the proof. 

We proceed to Problems section. Problem 3.7 is based on the theory of reduced

products in (Chang and Keisler [45]).
3.23 Problems 173

3.23 Problems

Problem 3.1 (Regular formulae. Satisfiability)

(after Smullyan [6], VII.1). Recall that γ is a generic symbol for universally quantified
formulae and δ denotes any existentially quantified formula. A regular formula is
any expression of the form γ ⊃ γ(a) or δ ⊃ δ(a).
Prove: (i) for each set Γ of closed formulae which is satisfiable, the set Γ ∪ {δ ⊃
δ(a)} is satisfiable for any parameter a which occurs neither in δ nor in any formula
in Γ .
(ii) for each set Γ of closed formulae which is satisfiable, the set Γ ∪ {γ ⊃ γ(a)}
is satisfiable for any parameter a.

Problem 3.2 (Regular sets)

(after Smullyan [6], VII.1). A finite set of closed formulae Γ is regular if and only
if it is defined by means of the following inductive scheme:
(i) the empty set is regular;
(ii) if the set Δ is regular, then the set Δ ∪ {γ ⊃ γ(a)} is regular and the set
Δ ∪ {δ ⊃ δ(a)} is regular under proviso that a has no occurrence in Δ or in δ.
Prove: If a set Ω of closed formulae is satisfiable and Γ is a regular set, then the set
Ω ∪ Γ is satisfiable under the condition that there is no formula δ ⊃ δ(a) ∈ Γ such
that a has an occurrence in a formula in Ω.

Problem 3.3 (Validity)

(after Smullyan [6], VII.1). For a regular set Γ and a closed formula φ such
 that φ
has no occurrence of any parameter a such that δ ⊃ δ(a) is in Γ , prove: if Γ ⊃ φ
is valid then φ is valid.

Problem 3.4 (Craig interpolation theorem)

For a valid formula χ : φ ⊃ ψ, prove: if the formula ψ is valid, then  is the inter-
polant for the formula χ and if the formula φ is unsatisfiable, then ⊥ is the interpolant
for χ.

Problem 3.5 (Craig interpolation theorem)

(after Smullyan [6], XV.1). One can extend the statement of Craig’s theorem to
sequents: an interpolant for the validsequent φ1 , φ2 , ..., φn → ψ1 , ψ2 , ..., ψm is the
interpolant for the formula i φi ⊃ j ψ j .
In the notation of ([6]), the interpolant φ is denoted as Γ →φ Δ.
Prove validity of the following rules:
(i) Γ, φ →φ δ, φ;
(ii) if Γ, ψ, χ →φ Δ, then Γ, ψ ∧ χ →φ Δ;
(iii) if Γ →φ Δ, χ and Γ →ψ Δ, ξ, then Γ →φ∧ψ Δ, χ ∧ ξ;
(iv) if Γ →φ Δ, χ, ξ, then Γ →φ Δ, χ ∨ ξ.
174 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Problem 3.6 (Post Correspondence Problem (PCP); Mortal Matrices Problem)

(after Floyd [22]). The problem of mortal matrices is the following: given a
finite set of matrices of dimension 3x3 M = {Mi : i ∈ I } and a pair ( j1 , j2 ) ∈
{1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}, the set M is ( j1 , j2 )-mortal if there exists a sequence <
Mi1 , Mi2 , . . . , Mik > of elements of M with the property that the element N j1 , j2
of the product N = Mi1 Mi2 . . . Mik is equal to 0.
Prove: the problem of mortal matrices is undecidable by reducing the Post corre-
spondence problem to it, precisely, for a given PCP, construct the system M such
that PCP has a solution if and only if the constructed M is (3, 2)-mortal. [Hint:
eventually, consult (Manna [23], Example 1-24) for construction of M].

Problem 3.7 (Reduced products of models for FO)

(see Chang and Keisler [45], 4.1.6) and Problem 2.17.
Let L be a first-order language over a vocabulary Σ. Let I be a non-empty set, F
a proper filter on I , and Mi be a model for L with the domain Ai for each i ∈ I . We
recall that the equivalence ∼ F is defined on Πi Ai as follows: f ∼ F g if and only if
{i ∈ I : f (i) = g(i)} ∈ F. The symbol [ f ]∼ denotes the class of f with respect to
the equivalence ∼.
We define a model for L in the reduced product Π F Mi : its domain is Π F Ai ; the
interpretation of relational symbols in L in Π F Mi is the following:
(i) each predicate symbol Pn of arity n in Σ is interpreted as a relation Pni on Mi ;
the predicate P is interpreted in Π F Mi as relation PnF which satisfies the instance
PnF ([ f 1 ]∼ , [ f 2 ]∼ , ..., [ f n ]∼ ) if and only if {i ∈ I : Pni ( f 1 (i), f 2 (i), ..., f n (i))} ∈ F,
for each n-tuple ( f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) of elements (threads) of Πi Ai ;
(ii) each function symbol h n of arity n is interpreted in each Mi as the function
h in from Min into Mi ; the function symbol h n is interpreted in Π F Mi as the function
h nF which is defined as follows:

h nF ([ f 1 ]∼ F , [ f 2 ]∼ F , . . . , [ f n ]∼ F = [< h in ( f 1 (i), f 2 (i), . . . , f n (i) >i∈I ]∼ ;

(iii) each constant symbol c is interpreted in Mi as ci ∈ Ai for each i ∈ I ; the

constant symbol c is interpreted in Π F Mi as the element [< ci >i∈I ]∼ of Π F Mi .
We assume now that F is an ultrafilter (i.e., a maximal proper filter, in this case
Π F Mi is called the ultrafilter).
Prove: (a) definitions of PnF and h nF factor through equivalence classes of ∼ F :
if f 1 ∼ F g1 , f 2 ∼ F g2 , …, f n ∼ F gn ) for any pair of tuples ( f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) and
(g1 , g2 , . . . , gn ), then {i ∈ I : Pni ( f 1 (i), f 2 (i), . . . , f n (i))} ∈ F if and only if {i ∈
I : Pni (g1 (i), g2 (i), . . . , gn (i))} ∈ F, and

< h in ( f 1 (i), f 2 (i), . . . , f n (i) >i∈I ∼ F < h in (g1 (i), g2 (i), . . . , gn (i) >i∈I .

(b) for each closed formula φ of L, Π F Mi |= φ if and only if {i ∈ I : Mi |= φ} ∈

F.
3.23 Problems 175

The following three problems concern Ehrenfeucht’s games and come from
(Kolaitis, Ph. G.: On the expressive power of logics on finite models. In: Finite
Model Theory and its Applications. Springer (2007)).

Problem 3.8 (Ehrenfeucht’s games)

The context: consider the cyclic graph G on 4 vertices a, b, c, d (for convenience,
imagine it as a border of the square with a in the left upper corner, and other vertices
in the clockwise order) and let the structure A be the domain A = {a, b, c, d} with
the relational vocabulary {E}. Let the graph H be constructed from two copies of the
graph G: G 1 with vertices u, v, w, t and G 2 with vertices u 1 , v1 , w1 , t1 in the same
locations and order as in G. Graph H is obtained by identifying pairs of vertices:w =
v1 and t = u 1 . The structure B has the domain B = {u, v, w = v1 , t = u 1 , w1 , t1 }
and the relational vocabulary {E} with the relational symbol E interpreted in both
structures as the edge e.
Prove that A and B are not satisfying the relation ≡3 by considering the formula
 
φ : ∃x1 .∃x2 .∃x3 . (xi = x j ) ∧ ¬E(xi , x j ).
i= j i= j

Problem 3.9 (Ehrenfeucht’s games

Continuing Problem 3.8, deduce from it that in the 3-rounds game on A, B, Spoiler
has the winning strategy, Outline a winning strategy for Spoiler.

Problem 3.10 (Ehrenfeucht’s games)

Continuing Problem 3.9, prove that in the 2-rounds game on A, B, Duplicator has
the winning strategy.

Problem 3.11 (Ehrenfeucht’s games)

We generalize the context of Problems 3.8, 3.9, 3.10. The construct H of Problem 3.8
will be called 2-ladder and it be denoted as L 2 and we define the (n + 1)-ladder L n+1
as the construct obtained from the n-ladder L n and the graph G by the construction
of Problem 3.8 i.e. by gluing together the base edge of L n with the top edge of G.
Prove: Given k, n, m explore winning strategies in the Ehrenfeucht game in k-rounds
on domains L n , L m .

Problem 3.12 (BDD; Binary Decision Diagrams)

BDD is a method for symbolic model checking and formal verification. Its operations
are the following.
For a formula φ, and c ∈ {0, 1}, we denote by the symbol φxi /c the formula whose
value on the argument tuple a n is φ(a1 , a2 , . . . , ai−1 , c, ai+1 , . . . , an ).
The Boole-Shannon expansion of the formula φ is the formula φ : (xi ∧ φxi /0 ) ∨
(xi ∧ φxi /1 ).
Prove: φ is semantically equivalent to φ .
176 3 Rudiments of First-Order Logic (FO)

Problem 3.13 (BDD)

For formulae φ, ψ, the operation of composition φxi ψ(a n ) is defined as φ(a1 , a2 ,
. . . , ai−1 , ψ(a n ), ai+1 , . . . , an ).
Prove: φxi /ψ is semantically equivalent to the formula (ψ ∧ φxi /1 ) ∨ ((¬ψ) ∧ φxi /0 ).
BDD allows for a form of quantification: ∀xi .φ is defined as φxi /0 ∧ φxi /1 and
∃xi .φ is defined as φxi /0 ∨ φxi /1 and ∃xi .φ.
Prove: φ is satisfiable if and only if ∃xi .φ is satisfiable for each xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.

Problem 3.14 (Generalized quantification)

We finally define generalized existential quantification over sets of variables by using
the recurrent set of conditions:
(i) ∃∅.φ is φ;
(ii) ∃(xi ∪ X ).φ is ∃xi .(∃X.φ).
Analogous conditions define the generalized universal quantification ∀X.φ.
Check which properties of FO quantification are preserved by the generalized
quantifications.

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Chapter 4
Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

4.1 Sentential Modal Logic (SML)

Modal logics address uncertainty about truth values of statements by introducing

and discussing the notion of possibility of truth in addition to the necessity of truth.
In this, modal logics trespass the boundary between the realm of dichotomy true-
false into the less transparent realm of certainly true-possibly true. As the latter is
less rigorous about truth and the notions of necessity and possibility are open to
various interpretations, the result is the existence of many variants of modal logics.
We will follow in this chapter some line of more and more complex interpretations
of necessity and possibility as well as their mutual relations.
Tradition of modal logics is as old as the tradition of sentential logic. In Aristotle,
we find modalities N (necessity) P (possibility), C (contingency: may be possible and
may be not possible). Some combinations of these modalities were added as prefixes
to assertoric operators A, E, O, I to form modal syllogisms. For instance, to A’s
in Barbara Aristotle would add one N and one P to form modal syllogism N Aab ∧
P Abc ⊃ Aac (cf. Smith [1]). Aristotle was also considering duality between N and
P as ¬N ≡ P ∨ ¬P.
The Stoic school (Diodorus Kronus, Philo, Chrysippus) considered four modal-
ities: necessity, non-necessity, possibility, impossibility as attributes of assertoric
statements. The value of attribute was dependent on the statement as well as on the
analysis of contingencies in the context of the statement. They regarded pairs neces-
sity - impossibility and possibility- non-necessity as contradictory (see Bobzien [2]).
Theory of modalities was vivid in medieval times, often influenced by theolog-
ical discourse, in approaches by Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Buridan,
Ockham, among others, (see Knuuttila [3]) leading to many views on modalities.
Modern modal logic owes its inception to Lewis [4] who proposed for this logic the
first axiomatic system. With the renewed by Carnap [5] idea of Leibniz of possible
worlds and the possible worlds semantics by Kripke [6], modal logic entered its
modern phase of development.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 179
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_4
180 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Modal logics described here play important roles as a basis for models for reason-
ing in system analysis, model checking, software verification, epistemic and doxastic
logics, agent systems. We adopt L as the symbol for necessity and M as the symbol
for possibility, departing from very often used symbols of box [] and diamond .
Basic modal operators express necessity (symbol L) and possibility (symbol M);
formula Lφ reads it is necessary that φ and the formula Mφ reads it is possible
that φ.

Definition 4.1 (Syntactic constituents of SML)

Sentential modal logic contains sentential logic at its core. Hence, any modal logic
we consider contains the countable possibly infinite set of atomic propositions
p1 , p2 , ..., pn , ... and we will use generic symbols p, q, r, ... to denote atomic propo-
sitions put into our formulae. Obviously, modal logics employ sentential connectives
∨, ∧, ¬, ⊃, ≡. With a slight freedom of language we may say that sentential logic
is the smallest modal logic which we denote as before SL.

SML applies the necessity symbol L and falsum ⊥.

Definition 4.2 (Dualities)

The set of syntactic constituents of SML contains the possibility symbol M defined
by duality Mφ ≡ ¬L¬φ and the verum symbol defined by duality as ≡ ¬⊥.

The formal buildup of SML begins with formulae. We define the recurrent set of
well-formed formulae and the symbol wf will denote that a formula is well-formed.

Definition 4.3 (Well-formed (wf) formulae of SML)

The set of wf formulae of modal logic (wffs) is defined as the least set which satisfies
the following conditions:

(i) pi is wff for each atomic proposition pi ;

(ii) ⊥ is wff;
(iii) if φ is wff, then ¬φ is wff;
(iv) if φ is wff and ψ is wff, then φ ⊃ ψ is wff;
(v) if φ is wff, then Lφ is wff.

From conditions (iii), (iv), (v), we infer that

(vi) if φ and ψ are wffs, then φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, Mφ, are wffs.

Definition 4.4 (Inference rules)

φ,φ⊃ψ
The set of inference rules contains detachment (MP): ψ
and Necessitation (N):
φ
Lφ
.

As necessity and possibility are notions admitting various interpretations, they

are defined by means of various axiom systems. We begin with the simplest, not
counting SL, modal logic K.
4.1 Sentential Modal Logic (SML) 181

Definition 4.5 (The axiom system K)

Axiom schemes for the system K are the following:
(K1) all sentential formulae valid in SL called tautologies of SML;
(K2) the scheme (K) L(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Lφ ⊃ Lψ);
(K3) the scheme Mφ ≡ ¬L¬φ.

Definition 4.6 (Normal modal logics)

A modal logic X is normal if and only if it contains all instances of axiom schemes
(K1) (K2),(K3) and is closed on inference rules (MP), and (N).

Definition 4.7 (The notion of a proof)

A proof of a formula φ in K is a finite sequence φ1 , φ2 , . . . , φn , each of which is an
axiom instance or is obtained from the preceding formulae in the sequence by means
of an inference rule, and φn is φ.

Theorem 4.1 Modal logic K is normal. The following formulae are provable in K:

(i) L(φ ∧ ψ) ≡ (Lφ) ∧ (Lψ);

(ii) M(φ ∨ ψ) ≡ (Mφ) ∨ M(ψ);
(iii) Lφ ⊃ (Lψ ⊃ Lφ);
(iv) (Lφ) ∨ (Lψ) ⊃ L(φ ∨ ψ);
(v) M(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (Mφ) ∧ (Mψ).

In Table 4.1 we prove the formula (i). In Table 4.2, we give a proof of the for-
mula (iii).

Table 4.1 Proof of (i)

p∧q ⊃ p SL
φ∧ψ ⊃φ Substitution
L(φ ∧ ψ ⊃ φ Necessitation
L(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ Lφ (K), detachment
L(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ Lψ As in (2)–(4) with ψ for φ
L(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (Lφ) ∧ (Lψ) SL (the one-way proof)
φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ ∧ ψ) SL, substitution
L[φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ ∧ ψ)] Necessitation
Lφ ⊃ L[ψ ⊃ (φ ∧ ψ)] (K), detachment
L(ψ ⊃ φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (Lψ ⊃ L(φ ∧ ψ)) (K)
Lφ ⊃ [Lψ ⊃ L(φ ∧ ψ)] (9), (10), SL
(Lφ) ∧ (Lψ) ⊃ L(φ ∧ ψ) (11), SL (the complete two-way proof)
182 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Table 4.2 Proof of (iii) p ⊃ (q ⊃ p) SL

φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ) Substitution
L[φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ)] Necessitation
[L(φ) ⊃ (Lψ ⊃ Lφ)] (K), detachment

4.2 Semantics of the Modal System K

Semantics for K is the possible worlds semantics due to Saul Kripke (the Kripke
semantics, the possible worlds semantics) (Kripke [6]). The notion of a possible
world goes back to Leibniz and possible world semantics was initiated in Carnap
[5], also in connection with the famous problem posed by Frege of ‘the Morning
Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’.
In Kripke semantics, we observe a fusion of the idea of a possible world with
the Tarski semantics. Kripke structures correspond in a sense to interpretations in
predicate logic.

Definition 4.8 (Kripke frames)

A Kripke frame for any modal logic is a pair S = (W, R), where

(i) W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;

(ii) R ⊆ W × W is a binary relation called the accessibility relation.

If R(w, w ) holds, then w is the world of an agent who recognizes w as a possible

world, in a sense, with a similar logical structure. One may say that whoever is in w,
knows the logical status at w and accepts it, and consults w about its own decisions.
A pointed frame is a pair F, w, where F = (W, R) is a frame and w ∈ W . Given a
frame F = (W, R), we define for each world w ∈ W its F-neighborhood N F (w).

Definition 4.9 (F-neighborhoods)

An F-neighborhood N F (w) = {w : R(w, w )}.

Definition 4.10 (An assignment)

Given a frame F = (W, R), an assignment is a mapping A which to each pair (w, p)
of a world w and an atomic proposition p assigns a truth value. Given A, a log-
ical status at each world is determined. The triple M = (W, R, A) is a structure.
Consequently, the pair (M, w) for w ∈ W is a pointed structure.

Definition 4.11 (The satisfaction relation)

The satisfaction relation, denoted |= (the Kleene symbol), is defined by structural
induction for pointed structures of the form (F, A, w) where F is a frame, A an
assignment and w ∈ W , by the following conditions:

(i) M, w |= p if and only if A(w, p) = 1;

(ii) M, w |= ⊥ for no world w;
4.2 Semantics of the Modal System K 183

(iii) M, w |= ¬φ if and only if it is not true that M, w |= φ;

(iv) M, w |= φ ⊃ ψ if and only if either it is not true that M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ;
(v) M, w |= φ ∧ ψ if and only if M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ;
(vi) M, w |= φ ∨ ψ if and only if either M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ;
(vii) M, w |= Lφ if and only if M, w |= φ for each w ∈ N F (w);
(viii) M, w |= Mφ if and only if M, w |= φ for some w ∈ N F (w).

The formula φ is true at the world w in the structure M if and only if M, w |= φ.

The formula φ is true in the structure M if and only if it is true at every world in that
model and we mark this fact as M |= φ. In this case M is said to be a model for φ.
Finally, the formula φ is valid, which is denoted |= φ, if and only if φ is true in every
structure proper for the given logic.
While prescriptions (i)–(vi) are familiar from the sentential calculus, (vii) and
(viii) are new as they tie the truth of a formula to the properties of the accessibility
relation. The question about the direction of the relation R (why from w to w ), can
be answered to the effect that the instance R(w, w ) occurs because the observer at
the world w has access to the logical status at the world w and regards this status
as plausible from their point of view (whatever this means). In plain words, one can
compare this situation to one in everyday’s life, when we seek advice as to a certain
decision from people we know and we know that their cases have been similar to the
one we face.

Example 4.1 Assume that a world w in a model M is such that N F (w) = ∅. Then
the formula L p ⊃ p is not true at w: if A( p, w) = 0, then p is false at w while L p
is true at w as the universal quantification of any formula over the empty set yields
us truth. The same argument shows the falsity of the formula L p ⊃ M p: one may
say that ‘what is necessary is impossible’.

Theorem 4.2 The formula (K) is valid.

Proof Consider a pointed structure (M, w). Suppose that the premiss L( p ⊃ q) and
the premiss L p are true at w. Then for each world w in the neighborhood N F (w),
formulae p ⊃ q and p are valid at w , hence, by detachment the formula q is valid
at w , and this implies that Lq is true at w so the formula (K) is true at w and
arbitrariness of (M, w) testifies to the validity of (K). 

Rules of inference: detachment (MP) and necessitation (N) as well as substitution

preserve validity and this fact implies

Theorem 4.3 Provable formulae of logic K are valid: Logic K is sound.

Example 4.2 We give exemplary proofs of validity for formulae (i),(ii) below.

(i) L(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Mφ ⊃ Mψ);

(ii) M(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Lφ ⊃ Mψ).
184 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Proof We prove (i). Suppose that L(φ ⊃ ψ) is true at a world w in a pointed structure
(M, w). The formula φ ⊃ ψ is true at each w ∈ N F (w). Suppose that the formula
Mφ is valid at w, hence, there exists a world w ∈ N F (w) such that the formula φ
is true at w . As the implication φ ⊃ ψ is true at w , the formula ψ is true at w by
detachment, which implies that the formula Mψ is true at w so the formula (i) is true
at (M, w) and in consequence, it is valid.
Now, we prove (ii). Suppose that the formula M(φ ⊃ ψ) is true at the world w
which implies that the formula φ ⊃ ψ is true at some w ∈ N F (w). Suppose that
the formula Lφ is true at w, hence, the formula φ is true at each world in N F (w).
By detachment, the formula ψ is true at w which shows that the formula Mψ is
true at w. 
There are schemes that are not valid in K.
Theorem 4.4 The following schemes are not valid in the modal system K:
(i) L(φ ∨ ψ) ⊃ (Lφ) ∨ (Lψ);
(ii) (Mφ) ∧ (Mψ) ⊃ M(φ ∧ ψ);
(iii) φ ⊃ L Mφ;
(iv) Mφ ⊃ L Mφ;
(v) M Lφ ⊃ L Mφ.
Proof Consider the set of possible worlds W = {w1 , w2 , w3 } with the assignment A:
A(w1 , p) = A(w3 , p) = A(w1 , q) = A(w2 , q) = 1 and A(w2 , p) = A(w3 , q) = 0;
the relation R has instances (w1 , w2 ), (w1 , w3 ), (w2 , w3 ), (w3 , w3 ). Then, in the
structure S1 = (W, R, A): (i) is not true at w1 , (ii) is equivalent to (i), (iii) is not
true at w1 , (iv) is not true at w1 . In this structure (v) is satisfied. In order to fal-
sify (v), we consider the structure S2 = (W , R A ) with W = {w1 , w2 , w3 , w4 },
R = {(w1 , w2 ), (w1 , w3 ), (w4 , w2 ), (w4 , w3 )} and any assignment A . Then, (v) is
not true at w1 . 
From the above it follows that properties of logic depend on properties of acces-
sibility relations. We already know that logic K does not set any demands on acces-
sibility relations in its models. For other logics, properties of the relation R are
instrumental. We gather below in pairs formulae of modal logic alongside types of
relations of accessibility which make the formulae valid.
Theorem 4.5 The following are pairs of particular formulae and accessibility rela-
tions which define Kripke structures in which formulae are true, hence, valid:
(i) (T) Lφ ⊃ φ: formula (T) is true in all structures in which accessibility relation
R is reflexive, i.e., R(w, w) for each w. Such structures are said to be reflexive;
(ii) (B) φ ⊃ L Mφ: formula (B) is true in all structures in which accessibility
relation is symmetric, i.e., if R(w, v) then R(v, w) for each v, w ∈ W . Such
structures are said to be symmetric;
(iii) (4) Lφ ⊃ L Lφ: formula (4) is true in all structures in which accessibil-
ity relation is transitive, i.e., if R(w, v) and R(v, u) then R(w, u) for each
w, v, u ∈ W . Such structures are said to be transitive;
4.2 Semantics of the Modal System K 185

(iv) (D) Lφ ⊃ Mφ: formula (D) is true in all structures in which accessibility is
serial, i.e., for each w there exists v such that R(w, v). Such structures are
called serial;
(v) (5) Mφ ⊃ L Mφ: formula (5) is true in all structures in which accessibil-
ity relation is Euclidean, i.e., if R(w, v) and R(w, u) then R(v, u) for each
w, v, u ∈ W . Such structures are said to be Euclidean;
(vi) (DC) Mφ ⊃ Lφ: formula (DC) is true in all structures in which accessibil-
ity relation is partly functional, i.e., if R(w, v) and R(w, u) then v = u, or,
functional, i.e., there exists v such that R(w, v) and for each u, if R(w, u)
then u = v, for each w, v, u ∈ W . Such structures are called partly func-
tional/functional;
(vii) (4C) L Lφ ⊃ Lφ: formula (4C) is true in all structures in which accessibility
relation is (weakly) dense, i.e., for each pair w, v, if R(w, v), then there exists
u such that R(w, u) and R(u, v). Such structures are said to be dense;
(viii) (G) M Lφ ⊃ L Mφ: formula (G) is true in all structures in which accessibility
relation is directed, i.e., for each triple w, v, u, if R(w, v) and R(w, u) then
there exists t such that R(v, t) and R(u, t). Such structures are called directed.

Proof We prove statements (i)–(viii). For (i): Consider a frame F = (W, R) in which
accessibility relation R is reflexive. Suppose that the formula Lφ is true at w ∈ W
which means that if w ∈ N F (w), then w |= φ. As R(w, w), w ∈ N F (w), hence,
w |= φ.
For (ii), suppose that a frame F = (W, R) is symmetric and the formula φ is true
at w ∈ W . We need to prove the truth of the formula L Mφ at w which means that
if w ∈ N F (w) then there exists w ∗ ∈ N F (w ) such that w ∗ |= φ. By symmetry, we
can take w ∗ = w which proves truth of the formula.
For (iii), suppose that Lφ is true at w ∈ W and the frame (W, R) is transitive.
Truth of L Lφ at w means that if w ∈ N F (w) and w ∗ ∈ N F (w ) then w ∗ |= φ. By
transitivity of R, w ∗ ∈ N F (w) and, by truth of Lφ at w, we have w ∗ |= φ which
proves the case.
Concerning (iv), suppose that a frame F = (W, R) is serial and consider the
formula (D): Lφ ⊃ Mφ. To prove its truth at w ∈ W , assume that the formula Lφ is
true at w which means that if w ∈ N F (w), then w |= φ. By the seriality property
of R, there exists w ∗ such that w ∗ ∈ N F (w), hence, w ∗ |= φ by which we conclude
that w |= Mφ.
For (v), consider a Euclidean frame F = (W, R) and suppose that the formula Mφ
is true at w ∈ W . There exists w with R(w, w ). If R(w, w ∗ ), then R(w ∗ , w ), hence,
w ∗ |= Mφ and this holds true for each w + such that R(w, w+ ) thus w |= L Mφ.
For (vi), assume that a frame F = (W, R) is functional and the formula Mφ is true
at w ∈ W . It suffices to consider the only w ∈ N F (w) satisfying the definition of
functionality. If w |= Mφ then w |= φ and, it being the only neighbor of w, w |= Lφ.
To treat the case (vii), assume the dense frame F = (W, R) and truth of the
premise L Lφ at w ∈ W . Suppose that w ∈ N F (w) and w |= L Lφ, hence, w |= Lφ.
Consider w ∗ such that w ∗ ∈ N F (w) and w ∈ N F (w ∗ ). Then w ∗ |= Lφ and w |= φ
by which w |= Lφ.
186 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

For (viii), assume a directed frame F = (W, R) and suppose that w |= M Lφ

for any w ∈ W . There exists w ∈ N F (w) such that w |= Lφ. Consider any w ∈
N F (w); as the relation R is directed, there exists t ∈ N F (w ) ∩ N F (w ) and t |= φ,
hence, w |= Mφ and w |= L Mφ. This concludes the case. 
It turns out that statements converse to (i)-(viii) above are true.
Theorem 4.6 In cases (i)-(viii) in Theorem 4.5, the converse is true, i.e., if the for-
mula is true for the frame, then the corresponding relation property holds in the
frame.
Proof The best way to prove the theorem is to argue in each case by reductio ad
absurdum (by contradiction), i.e., to assume that the relation R in the frame F =
(W, R) does not have the required property and prove that in that frame the formula
is not true. To this end, in each case we construct a falsifying structure. We consider
an atomic proposition p as φ and we endow our frames with appropriate falsifying
assignments.
Consider the structure S3 = (W, R, A) with W = {w1 , w2 , w3 }, R consisting of
instances (w1 , w2 ), (w3 , w1 ), (w3 , w2); the frame (W, R) is neither reflexive, nor
symmetric, nor, serial, nor, Euclidean, nor, functional. For the assignment A with
A(w1 , p) = 1, A(w2 , p) = A(w3 , p) = 0, the structure S3 falsifies (i), (ii), (iv), (v),
(vi).
Consider the structure S4 = (W, R, A), with W = {w1 , w2 , w3 , w4 }, R consisting
of instances {(w1 , w2 ), (w2 , w3 ), (w2 , w4 ), (w3 , w4 )} and an assignment A which
satisfies conditions A(w2 , p) = 1 = A(w4 , p), A(w3 , p) = 0. The frame is neither
transitive, nor dense, nor directed and the structure S4 falsifies (iii), (vii), (viii). 
Corollary 4.1 The following equivalences relate relational structures and modal
formulae:
(i) For any frame F, F |= Lφ ⊃ φ if and only if F is reflexive;
(ii) For any frame F, F |= φ ⊃ L Mφ if and only if F is symmetric;
(iii) For any frame F, F |= Lφ ⊃ L Lφ if and only if F is transitive;
(iv) For any frame F, F |= Lφ ⊃ Mφ if and only if F is serial;
(v) For any frame F, F |= Mφ ⊃ L Mφ if and only if F is Euclidean;
(vi) For any frame F, F |= Mφ ⊃ Lφ if and only if F is functional;
(vii) For any frame F, F |= L Lφ ⊃ Lφ if and only if F is dense;
(viii) For any frame F, F |= M Lφ ⊃ L Mφ if and only if F is directed.
Results in Corollary 4.1 reveal the close bond between modal logics and Kripke
structures. Properties of relations are not independent and their relationships allow
to establish relationships among logics. We offer some examples.
Theorem 4.7 For any frame F, F is a frame for (K). Hence, K is contained in any
modal logic.
Theorem 4.8 Any reflexive relation is serial. Hence, any frame for the formula (T)
is a frame for the formula (D). Hence, T extends D.
4.2 Semantics of the Modal System K 187

Theorem 4.9 Any relation R which is symmetric and Euclidean is transitive. Hence,
any model for (B5) is a model for (4). Hence (B5) extends (4).

Proof Consider a relation R on a set W of worlds which is symmetric and

Euclidean along with worlds w, w , w ∗ ∈ W and instances of the relation R:
R(w, w ), R(w , w ∗ ). By symmetry, instances R(w , w), R(w ∗ , w ) hold. Consider
the pair of instances R(w , w), R(w , w ∗ ); as the relation R is Euclidean, the instance
R(w, w∗ ) holds true which proves that the relation R is transitive. We argue as above
to conclude that (B5) extends (4). 

Theorem 4.10 The following are equivalent for any relation R:

(i) Relation R is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, i.e., it is an equivalence rela-
tion;
(ii) Relation R is reflexive and Euclidean;
(iii) Relation R is serial, symmetric and Euclidean;
(iv) Relation R is serial, symmetric and transitive;
(v) Relation R is reflexive, transitive and Euclidean.

Proof (i) implies (ii): given w with R(w, w ), R(w, w ∗ ), we have by symmetry that
R(w , w), R(w, w ∗ ) and transitivity implies R(w , w ∗ );
(ii) implies (iii): as R is reflexive, it is serial, consider R(w, w∗ ). By instances
R(w, w∗ ), R(w, w), it follows by the Euclidean property of R that R(w∗ , w) holds
true;
(iii) implies (iv): proof in 3.9;
(iv) implies (v): consider w, as R is serial there exists w∗ with R(w, w ∗ ). By
symmetry, R(w∗ , w) and transitivity yields from the last two instances that R(w, w),
i.e., reflexivity. If R(w, w∗ ), R(w, w ) then symmetry yields R(w ∗ , w) which along
with R(w, w ) yields by transitivity R(w ∗ , w ) proving the Euclidean property of R;
(v) implies (i): only symmetry needs a proof which is simple: from R(w, w∗ ),
R(w, w), R(w∗ , w ∗ ) we obtain by the Euclidean property that R(w ∗ , w). 

For a ∈ {K , T, B, D, 4, 5}, we denote by Fa1 a2 . . . ak the frame which satisfies

logics a1 , a2 , . . . ak .

Corollary 4.2 For any frame F, the following are equivalent:

(i) F = FK T B4 ;
(ii) F = FK T 5 ;
(iii) F = FK D B5 ;
(iv) F = FK D B4 ;
(v) F = FK T 45 .

From a plethora of possible combinations among relations and formulae of modal

logic, we single out some which may be called ‘canonical’. These are modal systems
K, T, S4, S5. We can now introduce explicitly axiom schemes for logics T, S4, S5.
To this end, we list some formulae which provide axiom schemes for these logics.
188 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Theorem 4.11 The following formulae are pairwise non-equivalent:

(1) (K) L(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Lφ ⊃ Lψ);

(2) (T) Lφ ⊃ φ;
(3) (4) Lφ ⊃ L Lφ;
(4) (5) Mφ ⊃ L Mφ.

Proof (K) holds true unconditionally in all frames, (T) requires reflexive frames,
(4) requires additionally to reflexivity also transitivity and (5) requires additionally
symmetry and simple examples show that no two of these frames are equivalent as
relational systems. 

Definition 4.12 (Normal system T of modal logic)

Axiomatization of the system T rests on the following axiom schemes (we will not
mention the present in all axiomatizations replacement Mφ = ¬L¬φ:
(SL) All tautologies (i.e., valid formulae of SL);
(K) L(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Lφ ⊃ Lψ);
(T) Lφ ⊃ φ.

Please observe that the scheme (T) implies the schema (T n ): L n+1 φ ⊃ L n φ, where
L is L, L n+1 is L(L n ) for n > 1.
1

System T is in our notational convention the system KT. Formulae of T are valid
in reflexive frames; we denote by the symbol F r the class of reflexive frames. Valid
formulae of T are also : φ ⊃ Mφ and, more generally, M n φ ⊃ M n+1 φ.

Definition 4.13 (Normal system S4 of modal logic)

System S4 adds to system T the axiom scheme
(4) Lφ ⊃ L Lφ.

Hence, in S4, we have Lφ ≡ L Lφ, more generally L n φ ≡ L n+1 φ with dual formulae
M n+1 φ ≡ M n φ for n ≥ 1. System S4 is in our notational convention, the system
KT4, hence, formulae of S4 are valid in reflexive transitive frames, the class of these
frames is denoted as F r t .

Definition 4.14 (System S5 of modal logic)

S5 is S4 augmented by the scheme:
(5) Mφ ⊃ L Mφ.

The dual formula is M Lφ ⊃ Lφ. System S5 is in our notation the system KT45,
hence, frames for S5 are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, i.e., equivalent, their
class is denoted F eq .
4.3 Natural Deduction: Analytic Tableaux for Modal Logics 189

4.3 Natural Deduction: Analytic Tableaux for Modal Logics

Analytic tableaux for modal logics differ essentially from tableaux for sentential
and predicate logics. The reason is obvious: in case of modal logics semantics is
defined via Kripke structures in which the main role is played by relations, hence,
their properties bear on the form of tableaux. We have therefore to discuss separately
particular cases.

Definition 4.15 (Tableaux for the modal logic K)

In case of K, no restrictions are imposed on the accessibility relation R. Suppose we
develop the signed analytic tableau and we proceed from the current development at
word w to the R-connected world w . If we have the formula TLφ at w, then we can
write Tφ at the child w .

If we have the formula TMφ at w then again w may satisfy T φ along with
consequences of the formulae up the tree on the branch from w to w : if TLφ is at
w, then we should have T φ at w prior to the expansion of T Mφ; similarly, if FLφ
occurs on the branch before w , we should add Fφ to w before expanding TMφ.
The rules for tableaux for K are then:
T Lφ F Lφ T Mφ F Mφ
Tφ
; Fφ ; T φ ; Fφ

with proviso about the order of expansions stated in Definition 4.15.

Example 4.3 We consider the formula φ : L(ψ ∧ ξ) ⊃ (Lψ) ∧ (Lξ). The tableau
develops as follows.
(1.) F [L(ψ ∧ ξ) ⊃ (Lψ) ∧ (Lξ)]
(2.) T [L(ψ ∧ ξ)]; at this step, we add the condition F[(Lψ) ∧ (Lξ)] which initiates
two branches into which we expand 2;
(3.) we develop left branch:
(4.) T [ψ ∧ ξ]; we continue development;
(5.) T ψ;6.
(6.) T ξ : at this point we add the consequent of FL(ψ)
6.’ we initiate the right branch by adding Fξ to (1.-6.);
(7.) F ψ
7.’ Fξ;
(8.) X: the left branch closes
X the right branch closes.

Definition 4.16 (Tableaux for the modal logic T)

In case of T, Kripke structures are reflexive. This means that any world w at which we
are with our development of a tableau, inherits consequents of the signed formulae
190 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

at the node for w, along with expansions of preceding formulae exactly as in case of
the modal logic K. The rules for T-tableau are as follows:
T Lφ F Mφ F Lφ T Mφ
T φ
; Fφ ; Fφ; Tφ

Example 4.4 We propose to discuss the tableau for the T-formula φ : L Lψ ⊃ Lψ.
The tableau develops as follows.
(1.) F L Lψ ⊃ Lψ;
(2.) T L Lψ
(3.) F L p : at this node, we first develop the content of line 2
(4.) T Lp
(5.) Tp
(6.) F p we develop the content of line (2.)
(7.) X: the branch closes.

Definition 4.17 (Tableaux for the modal logic S4)

Kripke structures for S4 are reflexive and transitive. Transitivity requires that we
should keep formulae T Lφ and F Mφ at the considered branch, neglecting other
signed formulae before expanding the current node.
Rules for S4-tableaux are
T Lφ F Mφ F Lφ T Mφ
T φ
; Fφ ; Fφ; Tφ

Example 4.5 The tableau for S4-formula φ : Lψ ⊃ L[(Lψ) ∨ (Lξ)].

(1.) F Lψ ⊃ L[(Lψ) ∨ (Lξ)]
(2.) T Lψ: it is kept for further usage;
(3.) F L[(Lψ) ∨ (Lξ)] from 1.;
(4.) F (Lψ) ∨ (Lξ): 1 and 3 are forgotten (may be crossed out);
(5.) F Lψ: by 4. and rules for ∨;
(6.) F Lξ: by 4. and rules for ∨;
(7.) F ψ: by 5.;
(8.) F ξ: by 6.;
(9.) T ψ: by 2.;
(10.) X: by 7.,9.: the branch closes.

Example 4.6 In figures below: Figs. 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, we sketch tableau trees for
K,T,S4-formulae.
The above rules for K,T,S4-tableaux come from (Fitting [7–9]). It will be useful
for the sequel to adopt notation already established in Fitting [9], viz., the rules TT Mφ
φ
and F Lφ
F φ
are called π-rules with the consequents in them denoted as π0 and rules
T Lφ
T φ
and FFMφφ
are called ν-rules with consequents denoted ν0 .
For a set Γ of modal formulae, we denote by Γ ∗ the set which is: {ν0 : ν ∈ Γ }
in case of K and T and {ν : ν ∈ Γ } in case of S4, this last definition is reflecting
transitivity of Kripke structures for S4.
4.3 Natural Deduction: Analytic Tableaux for Modal Logics 191

Fig. 4.1 A modal closed

K-tableau

Fig. 4.2 A modal closed

T-tableau

Definition 4.18 (Semi-analytic tableaux for the modal logic S5)

The case of S5 as well as any logic whose Kripke structures are symmetric is differ-
ent from those for K,T,S4. The condition of symmetry of the accessibility relation
induces new rules in addition to already standard ones.

Consider a world w such that w |= T φ, hence, w |= φ and for a world w such

that R(w, w ), also R(w , w), hence, w |= T Mφ.
Similarly, in the notation of the last paragraph, if w |= Fφ, then w |= F Lφ. We
add these two rules to our set of rules, to collect these rules under a common label, we
192 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Fig. 4.3 A modal closed

4-tableau

call them ε-rules in addition to known from Ch. 3 types α, β, γ, δ. We have therefore
the following rules:
T Lφ F Mφ F Lφ T Mφ
T φ
; Fφ ; Fφ; Tφ

and ε-rules:
T φ
; Fφ
T Mφ F Lφ

Example 4.7 We insert an example of a tableau for S5. We consider the formula
φ : L Mξ ⊃ Mξ.
(1.) F L Mξ ⊃ Mξ;
(2.) T L Mξ;
(3.) F Mξ: here we apply an ε-rule;
(4.) F L Mξ
(5.) X: tableau closes: expansion of 2. yields in two steps T ξ and expansion of 4.
yields in two steps F ξ on the single branch.

4.4 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics: Part I: K,T,S4

Definition 4.19 (Provability, satisfiability)

Let L be one of K,T,S4. A formula φ is tableau-provable if each tableau for Fφ is
closed. A set Γ of formulae is satisfiable if and only if there exists a Kripke structure
M and a world w in S such that M, w |= Γ . A tableau is satisfiable if and only if
there exists a branch whose set of formulae is satisfiable.
4.4 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics: Part I: K,T,S4 193

Theorem 4.12 (The extension lemma) For L in {K, T, S4}, if an L-tableau for φ
is satisfiable and it is modified by an application of a tableau rule for L, then the
resulting tableau is satisfiable.

Proof The proof is by structural induction. Different logic’s cases can be settled by
slightly different arguments. If a rule of type α or β is applied, then the proof goes
as in the sentential case. Suppose that the rule applied is, e.g., TT Mφ
φ
. Let w be the
world such that w |= T Mφ, then there exists w such that R(w, w ) and w |= Mφ
so the extended branch is satisfiable. Other cases are decided in a similar manner.

Theorem 4.13 (Soundness property) If a formula φ of either K or T,S4 is tableau

provable, then φ is valid.

Proof Provability of φ means that each tableau for Fφ is closed, hence Fφ is unsat-
isfiable by Theorem 4.12 and φ is valid. 

Completeness property of tableau calculus requires additional tools to which we

proceed with the completeness theorem in the end.

Definition 4.20 (Hintikka sets, Hintikka consistency property for modal logics K,
T, S4)
It turns out that it is convenient to consider families of sets of formulae. Hintikka
sets from Chap. 3 undergo modifications adapting them to modal contexts. Clearly,
the sentential context remains unchanged.

We define H ∗ below as follows: H ∗ = {ν0 : ν ∈ H } for K,T and H ∗ = {ν : ν ∈

H } for S4. In (H0)-(H5), α and β are names for types α, β and for formulae of those
respective types.
A family H of sets of modal formulae is a Hintikka consistent family if
(H0) if H ∈ H, then H contains no pair of conjugate formulae;
(H1) if H ∈ H, then H contains neither T ⊥ nor F formulae;
(H2) if H ∈ H and α ∈ H , then H ∪ {α1 , α2 } ∈ H;
(H3) if H ∈ H and β ∈ H , then either H ∪ {β1 } ∈ H or H ∪ {β2 } ∈ H;
(H4) for K,T,S4: if H ∈ H and π ∈ H , then H ∗ ∪ {π0 } ∈ H;
(H5) for T,S4: if H ∈ H and ν ∈ H , then H ∗ ∪ {ν0 } ∈ H.
We call each member of a Hintikka consistent family a Hintikka consistent set.

Theorem 4.14 Each Hintikka consistent set is satisfiable.

Proof The steps in proof are the following. Consider a family H of Hintikka sets.
First, use, e.g., the Lindenbaum Lemma (recalled below) to extend each Hintikka
set to a maximal Hintikka set. Consider the collection MaxCon(H) of maximal
Hintikka sets for H. Accept maximal Hintikka sets as possible worlds in a Kripke
frame H+ and complete the frame by a definition of the accessibility relation R H :
for two maximal Hintikka sets W and W , let R H (W, W ) if and only if W ∗ ⊆ W .
Then, a lemma follows. 
194 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Lemma 4.1 The accessibility relation R H has no conditions for K; it is reflexive for
T and transitive for S4.

Proof Reflexivity of R for T: consider a world W being a maximal Hintikka consis-

tent set along with ν0 ∈ W ∗ . There exists a ν ∈ W and by definition, W ∪ {ν0 } ∈ H+ .
As W is maximal, ν0 ∈ W , hence, W ∗ ⊆ W , i.e., R(W, W ). The argument for
S4 follows by reflexivity proved above and the relation W ∗ = (W ∗ )∗ . Lemma is
proved. 

It follows by Lemma, that H+ is a frame, respectively, for K,T,S4. It remains

to produce a Kripke structure satisfying sets of formulae in H by submitting a def-
inition of an assignment A. One verifies that the property of canonical models: if
φ ∈ MaxCon M, then Maxcon M |= φ holds in case of maximal Hintikka consistent
sets. This is done by structural induction beginning with atomic formulae T p, F p:
if T p ∈ MaxCon H then A(MaxCon H, p) = 1, otherwise A(Maxcon H, p) = 0;
if neither T p nor F p in Maxcon M, then we may assign any value be it 1 or 0 to p.
Please observe that maximality implies that each maximal Hintikka consistent
set W contains imminent sub-formulae of its formulae. For instance, if α ∈ W , then
W ∪ {α1 , α2 } ∈ H and as W is maximal, simply, α1 , α2 ∈ W . So, if W |= α1 , α2 ,
then W |= α. Similarly, for β ∈ W .
Consider the case ν ∈ W . One has to prove that if R(W, W ), i.e., W ∗ ⊆ W ,
then ν0 ∈ W . In case of K,T, ν0 ∈ W ∗ , hence, ν0 ∈ W . By arbitrary choice of W ,
W |= ν. In case of S4, with the above notation, ν ∈ W ∗ , hence, ν ∈ W and, by
Definition 4.12 (H5), W ∪ {ν0 } ∈ H, hence, ν0 ∈ W and as in case of K,T, W |= ν.
Finally, the case π ∈ W is to be considered. If π ∈ W , then by Definition 4.12,
(H4), W ∗ ∪ {π0 } ∈ H, hence, there exists a maximal Hintikka consistent set W
which extends W ∗ ∪ {π0 }, and then, π0 ∈ W . By hypothesis of induction, W |= π0
and as R(W, W ), it follows that W |= π.
By the above, each Hintikka consistent set H in H is satisfied in the canonical
model H+ , the world satisfying H is the maximal consistent extension of H .
A tableau for a finite set of signed formulae begins with a list of the formulae in
the set and proceeds as usual. For those sets, we have

Theorem 4.15 A finite set H of formulae is Hintikka consistent in a logic X=K,T,S4

if and only if no X-tableau for H closes.

Proof It suffices to prove that the family of finite sets with the property that no
tableau for them closes is a Hintikka consistent family H. Suppose H is a set with
this property and α ∈ H . Suppose that H ∪ {α1 , α2 } ∈/ H. Then there is a closed
tableau which contains a vertical sequence -α-α1 -α2 -Θ. Hence, before propagation
of α, we have a fragment −α − Θ of the tableau that closes. Thus, a contradiction.
Similarly, for other cases of β, ν, π. 

In consequence of the above considerations, we obtain the completeness theorem

for K,T,S4 tableaux.
4.5 Natural Deduction: Modal Sequent Calculus 195

Theorem 4.16 (The tableau-completeness theorem for K,T,S4)

If a formula is valid, then it is tableau provable.
Proof It is a proof by contradiction. Suppose that a formula φ is not tableau provable,
hence, there exists an open branch in a tableau for F φ and then, F φ is Hintikka-
consistent hence satisfiable, a contradiction. 
This concludes our excursion into the realm of modal tableaux for K,T,S4.
We now pass to the case of S5.
Definition 4.21 (The case of S5)
As before, S5, due to symmetry, involves ε-rules, transitivity and reflexivity of its
structures take all what was prescribed for K and T. As the result, for any set Γ of
S5-formulae, the set Γ ∗ is {ν : ν ∈ Γ } ∪ {π : π ∈ Γ }.
Theorem 4.17 S5 is weakly complete, i.e., it is complete when enhanced with the
ε-rules.
Proof We augment our definition of a Hintikka set with conditions:
(H6) if H ∈ H and ν ∈ H , then: H ∪ {ν0 } ∈ H;
(H7) if H ∈ H and π ∈ H , then: H ∗ ∪ {π0 } ∈ H;
(H8) if H ∈ H and π0 ∈ H , then: H ∪ {π} ∈ H.
We then proceed as in cases for K, T,S4 to build maximal consistent Hintikka sets
as canonical model and repeat the argument leading to completeness proof. 

4.5 Natural Deduction: Modal Sequent Calculus

We have met sequent calculus in Chaps. 2 and 3 and now we propose to meet it in case
of modal logics. We present the system for S4 developed in (Ohnishi and Matsumoto
[10]).
A sequent in modal logic is an ordered pair < Γ, Δ > of sets of modal formulae
which we write down as Γ ⇒ Δ. A sequent is valid if in each case when all formulae
in Γ are valid a formula in Δ is valid. In particular, if a sequent < ∅, φ > is valid
then φ is valid. The same concerns provability : if a sequent < ∅, φ > is provable,
then φ is provable. This is exactly the case of entailment
 (logical consequence) and

a sequent < Γ, Δ > is equivalent to the formula Γ ⊃ Δ.
We have been applying the idea of Smullyan of relating sequents to tableaux: a
sequent < Γ, Δ > is equivalent to the set of signed formulae {T γi : γi ∈ Γ } ∪ {Fδ j :
δ j ∈ Δ}. We now recall the aforementioned sequent system for S4.
Definition 4.22 The modal sequent system for S4:
1. Axioms: Γ, φ ⇒ φ, Δ;
Though rules for sentential part are already given in Chs. 2 and 3, yet we recall
them here for our convenience.
196 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

2. Rules for sentential connectives

Γ,φ,ψ⇒Δ
2.1 (left ∧) Γ,φ∧ψ⇒Δ
(right ∧) Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ ⇒Δ,ψ
Γ ⇒Δ,φ∧ψ
Γ,φ⇒Δ Γ,ψ⇒Δ
2.2 (left ∨) Γ,φ∨ψ⇒Δ
(right ∨) ΓΓ⇒Δ,φ∨ψ
⇒Δ,φ,ψ

Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ,ψ⇒Δ
2.3 (left ⊃) Γ,φ⊃ψ⇒Δ
(right ⊃) ΓΓ,φ⇒Δ,ψ
⇒Δ,φ⊃ψ
Γ ⇒Δ,φ Γ,φ⇒Δ
2.4 (left ¬) Γ,¬φ⇒Δ
(right ¬) Γ ⇒Δ,¬φ
3. Rules for modal connectives We recall that Γ ∗ = {ν : ν ∈ Γ } and we add
Γ ∗∗ = {π : π ∈ Γ }
∗
Γ,φ⇒Δ ⇒Δ∗∗ ,φ
3.1 (left L) Γ,Lφ⇒Δ (right L) ΓΓ ⇒Δ,Lφ
Γ ∗ ,φ⇒Δ∗∗ Γ ⇒Δ,φ
3.2 (left M) Γ,Mφ⇒Δ
(right M) Γ ⇒Δ,Mφ

Example 4.8 We give a sequent proof and a parallel tableau proof for the formula
Lφ ∧ Lψ ⊃ L(φ ∧ ψ).
The sequent proof
(S.i) φ, ψ ⇒ φ;
(S.ii) φ, ψ ⇒ ψ : axiom instances;
(S.iii) φ ∧ ψ ⇒ φ;
(S.iv) φ ∧ ψ ⇒ ψ;
(S.v) Lφ ∧ ψ ⇒ φ;
(S.vi) Lφ ∧ ψ ⇒ ψ;
(S.vii) Lφ ∧ Lψ ⇒ φ ∧ ψ;
(S.viii) Lφ ∧ Lψ ⇒ L(φ ∧ ψ);
(S.ix) ⇒ Lφ ∧ Lψ ⊃ L(φ ∧ ψ).

The tableau proof

(T.i)F ((Lφ ∧ Lψ) ⊃ L(φ ∧ ψ));
(T.ii)T Lφ ∧ Lψ;
(T.iii)F L(φ ∧ ψ);
T.(iv) T Lφ, T Lψ; F φ ∧ ψ;
(T.v) T Lφ, T Lψ; F φ
(T.v’) T Lφ,T Lψ, F ψ: branching;
(T.vi) T φ, T ψ, F φ;
(T.vi’) T φ,T ψ; F ψ
(T.vii) X: left branch closes;
X: right branch closes.
Please notice that tableau closes with the same sets of formulae as in axiom
instances for the sequent proof: the instance (S.i) in the Smullyan correspondence is
{T φ, T ψ, ; Fφ} and the instance (S.ii) in that correspondence is {T φ, T ψ; Fψ}.

This was the sequent set of rules for S4 modal logic. For logics K and T, modal
rules apply different sets Γ ∗ and Γ ∗∗ .
4.6 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics. Part II 197

Definition 4.23 (Modal sequent rules for K and T)

Modal sequent rules for K and T are the following:
Γ ∗ = {ν0 : ν ∈ Γ }; Γ ∗∗ = {π0 : π ∈ Γ }
Completeness of modal sequent calculus follows from completeness property of
modal tableaux via the Smullyan correspondence: a sequent Γ ⇒ Δ is valid if and
only if the tableau for the set T Γ , FΔ closes.

4.6 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics. Part II

Let us observe that the necessitation rule (N) allows for an extension of the formula
(K) to the rule (RK):
Definition 4.24 (The rule (RK))
γ1 ⊃ (γ2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ (γk )) ⊃ φ
(R K ) .
Lγ1 ⊃ (Lγ2 . . . ⊃ (Lγk )) ⊃ Lφ

To prove the rule (RK), observe that for k = 1 it suffices to apply necessitation and
then the rule (K); the rest follows by induction on k.
We denote by Σ = a1 a2 ...ak the signature of the logic in question, where a ::
K |T |D|B|4|5. The symbol Σ will denote the logic with the signature Σ. In our case
Σ is a generic symbol for signatures K, KT,KT4,KT45, KB. The symbol Σ φ,
equivalently, ∅ Σ φ denotes that φ has a proof in the logic Σ. There is a counterpart
for relative validity modulo sets of formulae, Γ Σ .
Definition 4.25 (Deducibility)
A formula φ is deducible from a set of formulae Γ within a logic with  the signature
Σ if there exist formulae γ1 , γ2 , . . . , γn ∈ Γ such that the formula i γi ⊃ φ is
provable in the logic Σ (we omit here some instances of axiom schemas).
Theorem 4.18 We list below some properties of relations Σ and Γ Σ which
denote provability and provability from a set Γ .
(i) If  SL φ, then Γ Σ φ. This is a symbolic rendering of the fact that SL is a
subset of any modal logic;
(ii) If φ ∈ Γ , then Γ Σ φ. This fact comes by our notion of a proof and the first
step in it; or by the tautology p → p;
(iii) If Γ Σ ψ and {ψ}  φ is a consequence of a tautology, then Γ Σ φ. This is
an instance of the tautology ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )];
(iv) Γ Σ ⊥ if and only if Γ Σ φ ∧ ¬φ for any formula φ. By (iii) and tautology
⊥ ≡ φ ∧ ¬φ;
(v) Γ Σ (φ ⊃ ψ) if and only if Γ ∪ {φ} Σ ψ. The one way implication (to the
right) follows by detachment. The reverse way is the deduction theorem and
the proof of it follows the lines of the proof for sentential logic;
198 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

(vi) If Γ Σ φ then Δ Σ φ for some finite subset Δ of Γ . This is the compactness

property of deduction and it follows from the finiteness of a proof;
(vii) Deducibility is monotone with respect to Σ and Γ , i.e., if Γ Σ φ and either
Σ extends Σ or Γ ⊆ Γ , then Γ Σ φ, respectively, Γ Σ φ.
Definition 4.26 (Consistency)
A set Γ is consistent with respect to Σ if and only if it is not true that Γ Σ ⊥, where
⊥ means the unsatisfiable formula (‘falsum’). The symbol Con Σ (Γ ) denotes the fact
that the set Γ is consistent with respect to Σ. The converse is denoted noCΣ (Γ ).
Let us observe that tautology p ⊃ (q ⊃ p ∧ q) implies that from Con Σ (Γ ) and
Theorem 6.1, (iv) it follows that any Σ-consistent Γ cannot contain both φ and ¬φ
for any formula φ.
Definition 4.27 (Maximal consistency)
A consistent set Γ is maximal consistent when there does not exist a consistent set
Δ such that Γ ⊂ Δ.
Each consistent set is contained in a maximal consistent set. This fact is known
as the Lindenbaum Lemma. We repeat the proof here for Reader’s convenience.
Theorem 4.19 (The Lindenbaum Lemma) Each Σ-consistent set Γ of formulae
extends to a maximal Σ-consistent set of formulae Γ + .
Proof We repeat proof from Ch. 2. The set of all formulae of Σ is countable,
hence, its formulae can be enumerated as φ0 , φ1 , . . . , φn , . . .. We define a sequence
Γ0 , Γ1 , . . . , Γn , . . ., where (i) Γ0 is Γ (ii) Γn+1 is Γn ∪ {φn } if this set is Σ-consistent
else Γn+1 is Γn . 
We set Γ + to be the union n≥0 Γn . Clearly, Γ + is Σ-consistent as every finite
set of formulas is contained in some Γn which is consistent by definition. For each
formula φn , exactly one of φn , ¬φn is by construction a member of Γ + , hence, Γ +
is maximal consistent. 
We denote a maximal consistent set Γ by the symbol MaxCon Σ (Γ ). Properties
of consistent sets result from properties of deducibility. We list the main of them.
Theorem 4.20 The following are properties of consistency.
(i) If Con Σ (Γ ) then noCΣ (Γ ∪ {φ ∧ ¬φ}). No contradiction can be an element
in consistent Γ by 6.1(iv);
(ii) Con Σ (Γ ) if and only if there exists a formula φ not deducible from Γ . Oth-
erwise Γ  ⊥. By (i);
(iii) Con Σ is anti-monotone, i.e., if Con Σ (Γ ) and Δ ⊆ Γ then Con Σ (Δ);
(iv) Con Σ (Γ ) if and only if Con Σ (Δ) for each finite subset Δ of Γ . This follows
from compactness property of deducibility;
(v) If Con MaxΣ (Γ ) and φ a formula then either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ .
Indeed, assume that neither φ nor ¬φ are in Γ . Then Γ ∪ {φ} Σ ⊥, hence,
by deduction theorem Γ Σ φ ⊃ ⊥ and, analogously, Γ Σ ¬φ ⊃ ⊥. From
tautology ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ((¬ p ⊃ q) ⊃ q) with ( p/φ), q/⊥) it follows that Γ Σ
⊥, a contradiction;
4.6 Meta-Theory of Modal Logics. Part II 199

(vi) If MaxCon Σ (Γ ) and Γ Σ φ then φ ∈ Γ . By property (v), as ¬φ cannot be

in Γ ;
(vii) If MaxCon Σ (Γ ), then φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if ψ ∈ Γ and φ ∈ Γ .
If φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ then by tautology ψ ∧ φ ⊃ ψ, and property (vi), ψ ∈ Γ ,
analogously φ ∈ Γ . The converse: if ψ, φ ∈ Γ , then by 6.1(ii), Γ Σ φ
and Γ Σ ψ. By tautology p ⊃ (q ⊃ p ∧ q) with ( p/φ) and (q/ψ), and by
6.1(iii), Γ Σ φ ∧ ψ, hence, φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ by (vi);
(viii) If MaxCon Σ (Γ ), then φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if either φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ .
Indeed, if φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ and neither φ ∈ Γ nor ψ ∈ Γ then by property (v), ¬φ ∈ Γ
and ¬ψ ∈ Γ , hence, ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ ∈ Γ , i.e., ¬(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ Γ , a contradiction;
(ix) If MaxCon Σ (Γ ), then (φ ⊃ ψ) ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ / Γ or ψ ∈ Γ .
By tautology (φ ⊃ ψ) ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ and property (viii). This condition is, by
property(v), equivalent to the condition: if φ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γ .

We consider modal logics containing the logic K, so in addition to the necessitation

rule, also the axiomatic schemes (K) and (RK) as well as all tautologies are present.
We begin preparations to a proof of completeness for modal logics.
Proof we are going to present exploits the idea in Henkin [11] by extending a
consistent set to a maximal consistent one and using the extension as a model for its
formulae. We record a consequence to the rule (RK).

Theorem 4.21 If Γ Σ φ then LΓ Σ Lφ, where LΓ is the set

{Lψ : ψ ∈ Γ }. Equivalently, if {ψ ∈ Γ : Lψ ∈ Γ } Σ φ, then Γ Σ Lφ.

Proof Deducibility of φ from Γ is a sequence ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψk , hence, the formula

ψ1 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (ψk ⊃ φ)) is provable and the rule (RK) implies that Lψ1 ⊃ (. . . ⊃
(Lψk ⊃ Lφ)) is provable, i.e., the sequence Lψ1 , . . . , Lψk is a deducibility witness
of Lφ from LΓ . 

We state this new rule:

Definition 4.28 (Rule (LRK))

ψ1 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (ψk ⊃ φ))
(L R K ) .
Lψ1 (⊃ . . . ⊃ (Lψk ⊃ Lφ))

The following fact (Chellas [12]) is of importance for our forthcoming discussion.

Theorem 4.22 For a MaxCon Σ (Γ ), if a formula φ has the property that φ belongs
in each MaxCon(Δ) with the property that {ψ : Lψ ∈ Γ } ⊆ Δ, then Lφ ∈ Γ .

Proof Suppose that the assumption of the theorem is true. It follows that φ belongs to
each maximal consistent set which contains the set {ψ : Lψ ∈ Γ }. We state a Claim.
Claim. For a set Γ of formulae and a formula φ, if φ in Δ for each
MaxCon Σ (Δ) which contains Γ , then Γ Σ φ for any normal Σ.
200 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Proof of Claim. Suppose that Γ Σ φ is not true. Then Γ = Γ ∪ {¬φ} is con-

sistent and this set extends to a Con MaxΣ (Δ). Then, ¬φ ∈ Δ, hence, φ ∈
/ Δ. Claim
is proved.
We return to the proof of the theorem. It follows from the Claim, that {ψ : Lψ ∈
Γ } Σ φ. By (LRK), Γ Σ Lφ, and maximality of Γ implies that Lφ ∈ Γ . 

Theorem 4.22 has a dual.

Theorem 4.23 For a MaxCon Σ (Γ ), and a formula ψ, Mψ ∈ Γ if there exists a

MaxCon Σ (Δ) with the property that {Mψ : ψ ∈ Δ} ⊆ Γ and ψ ∈ Δ.

Proof By duality between L and M. Suppose Mψ ∈ Γ , i.e.,¬L¬ψ ∈ Γ , hence,

L¬ψ ∈ / Γ . By Theorem 4.22, there exists a Con Max(Δ) such that (i) {ψ : Lψ ∈
Γ } ⊆ Δ and (ii) ¬ψ ∈
/ Δ.
For MaxCon(Γ ) and MaxCon(Δ), the following are equivalent:
(i) {ψ : Lψ ∈ Γ } ⊆ Δ;
(ii) {Mψ : ψ ∈ Δ} ⊆ Γ .
From (i) to (ii): suppose {ψ : Lψ ∈ Γ } ⊆ Δ) and ψ ∈ Δ. Then ¬ψ ∈ / Δ, i.e., L¬ψ ∈
/
Γ which implies that ¬L¬ψ ∈ Γ , i.e., Mψ ∈ Γ . The converse from (ii) to (i) is
proved on the same lines in the opposite direction.
We return to the proof of the theorem. The condition (i) in virtue of Claim can be
rewritten as (iii) {Mψ : ψ ∈ Δ} ⊆ Γ . Moreover, ¬ψ ∈ / Δ, i.e., ψ ∈ Δ. 

4.7 Model Existence Theorem and Strong Completeness

We continue with the assumption that our logics are normal. This concerns in partic-
ular logics K, T, S4, S5. We apply maximal consistent sets in order to define models
for modal logics.

Definition 4.29 (Strong completeness)

A modal logic Σ is strongly complete with respect to a set of frames F if for every
set Γ of formulae and a formula φ, if Γ |=F φ then Γ Σ φ.

A working paraphrase of this definition is given below.

Theorem 4.24 A modal logic Σ is strongly complete with respect to a class F of

frames if and only if each Σ-consistent set Γ of formulae is true on some frame
F ∈ F.

An argument justifying the paraphrase runs as follows: assume that Σ is not

strongly complete so by definition there are a set Γ and a formula φ such that
Γ |=F φ but not Γ Σ φ, hence, the set Γ ∪ {¬φ} is consistent but it is not true on
any frame in F. This argument appeared already in Chaps. 2 and 3.
4.7 Model Existence Theorem and Strong Completeness 201

This fact paves our way toward a proof of completeness: the idea is to build a
frame such that each world w in it would have the property that w  φ if
and only if w |= φ. Such property is immanent to maximal consistent sets and this
determines their crucial role in proofs of completeness as they provide worlds for
canonical structures.
Definition 4.30 (Canonical frames and structures)
A canonical frame for a normal modal logic Σ is a pair F Σ = (W Σ , R Σ ), where
(i) W Σ = {Γ : MaxCon Σ (Γ )};
(ii) R Σ (Γ, Γ ) ≡ (Lφ ∈ Γ ⊃ φ ∈ Γ ), equivalently, by duality, if φ ∈ Γ then
Mφ ∈ Γ for each φ;
(iii) A canonical structure for a normal modal logic Σ is a pair M Σ = (F Σ , AΣ ),
where AΣ ( p) = {Γ : p ∈ Γ }.
We denote worlds in canonical frames with capital letter W eventually endowed
with apostrophes, stars, etc. The condition in Definition 4.30(ii) tells the meaning of
the relation R Σ : if R Σ (W, W ), then formulae valid at w are possibly valid, i.e.,
plausible at w. This condition admits its converse in a sense.
Theorem 4.25 In conditions of Definition 4.30, for any formula φ, if Mφ ∈ Γ then
there exists a MaxCon Σ (Γ ) such that φ ∈ Γ and R Σ (Γ, Γ ).
Proof Suppose that Mφ ∈ Γ . The set Δ ={ψ : Lψ ∈ Γ } ∪ {φ} is consistent: was the
converse true, we would have a proof γ1 , . . . γn for ¬φ and by necessity, (K) and
maximality of Γ , we would have L¬φ ∈ Γ which by duality would be equivalent
to ¬Mφ ∈ Γ , a contradiction. By the Lindenbaum Lemma, the set Δ extends to a
MaxCon Σ (Γ ) which contains φ. 
The last step is to check that axioms of any normal modal logic Σ are valid in
canonical models. This is true for atomic propositions by definition; also tautologies
are valid as they are valid in all models. For a formula ψ: Mφ, validity at world Γ
follows from Theorem 4.25.
Theorem 4.26 (Strong completeness theorem for the modal logic K) K is strongly
complete with respect to class of all frames.
Proof Let Γ be a K-consistent set of formulae. Let MaxCon K (Γ + ) be an extension
of Γ . We have Γ + |= Γ . 
This argument extends to normal modal logics of signatures of the form KA where
A is a sequence of ai s.
Theorem 4.27 Logic KT is strongly complete with respect to reflexive frames.
Proof We show that canonical structure for KT is reflexive. For a canonical world
MaxCon K T (Γ ), assume that φ ∈ Γ . As Γ contains the formula Lφ ⊃ φ equivalent
to the formula φ ⊃ Mφ, by detachment, Mφ ∈ Γ , which implies that R K T (Γ, Γ ),
i.e., that R K T is reflexive. 
202 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Theorem 4.28 Logic KB is strongly complete with respect to symmetric frames.

Proof Let M K B be a canonical structure for K B and R K B (Γ, Γ ). Consider a for-

mula φ ∈ Γ . As the world Γ contains the formula (B): φ ⊃ L Mφ, it contains by
detachment the formula L Mφ hence Mφ ∈ Γ , i.e., R K B (Γ , Γ ).


Theorem 4.29 Logic K4 is strongly complete with respect to the class of transitive
frames.

Proof By pattern of preceding proofs, it suffices to show that canonical structure

for K4 is transitive. Suppose that R K 4 (Γ, Γ ) and R K 4 (Γ , Γ ∗ ) hold. Suppose that
φ ∈ Γ ∗ , hence, Mφ ∈ Γ and M Mφ ∈ Γ . As Γ contains the formula M Mφ ⊃ Mφ,
detachment yields Mφ ∈ Γ which witnesses that R K 4 (Γ, Γ ∗ ), i.e, transitivity of
R K 4. 

Corollary 4.3 Logic S4 is strongly complete with respect to the class of reflexive
and transitive Kripke frames, logic S5 is complete with respect to the class of Kripke
frames whose accessibility relations are equivalences.

Indeed, logic S4 is KT4 and logic S5 is KT45 which contains B.

This construction of proofs of completeness goes back to Henkin [11].

4.8 Small Model Property, Decidability

The main result on this topic for sentential modal logics is the finite model property
Ladner [13]. Roughly speaking, it means that if a formula φ is valid at some world w
in a structure M then it is valid at some world in a finite structure. On this occasion,
we will be introduced to a classical method in modal theory, the filtration.

Definition 4.31 (The idea of filtration)

We first show this method and the result on finite structures in the simplest case: we
consider the so-called basic modal logic in which we consider formulae of the form
Mφ with only occurrences of the modal functor M. An additional simplification is
that checking validity of the formula Mφ in a structure M at a world w requires
finding a world v such that R(w, v) and M, v |= φ which makes analysis of truth
especially convenient.

Method of filtration consists in identifying worlds having identical sets of true

formulae. One more notion we will need is the notion of a sub-formula of a formula
φ. We recall definition.

Definition 4.32 (Sub-formulae)

(i) if χ ∨ ψ, χ ∧ ψ, χ ⊃ ψ are sub-formulas of φ then, in each case, χ and ψ are
sub-formulae of φ;
4.8 Small Model Property, Decidability 203

(ii) if ¬ψ is a sub-formula of φ, then ψ is a sub-formula of φ, and, if Mψ is a

sub-formula of φ, then ψ is a sub-formula;
(iii) the formula φ itself is a sub-formula of φ.

This notion extends to sets of formulae. A set of basic modal formulae Γ is closed
on sub-formulae if for each formula in it all its sub-formulae are in the set Γ . We
denote the set of sub-formulae of a collection Γ of formulae by the symbol Sub(Γ ).
For instance if Γ = {M( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ∧ q); (r ∨ s) ⊃ (Mr ∨ Ms)}, then sub-
formula-closed set is the closure C(Γ ) of Γ , i.e., the set {M( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ∧
q), M( p ⊃ q), p ∧ q), ( p ⊃ q), p, q, (r ∨ s) ⊃ (Mr ∨ Ms)(r ∨ s), r, s,
(Mr ∨ Ms), Mr, Ms}.

Definition 4.33 (Filtered structures)

We can now present the idea of a filtration of a structure. Consider a structure
M = (W, R, A). Filtration introduces an equivalence relation ≈ on worlds in M
by letting w ≈ v if and only if M, w |= φ ≡ M, v |= φ for each formula φ in the
sub-formula-closed set Γ . We denote by the symbol [w]≈ the equivalence class of
the world w. The filtered through the relation ≈ structure M becomes the structure
M ≈ =(W ≈ , R ≈ , A≈ ), where
(i) W ≈ = {[w]≈ : w ∈ W };
(ii) R ≈ ([w]≈ , [v]≈ ) if and only if there exist w1 , v1 such that w1 ≈ w, v1 ≈ v and
R(w1 , v1 );
(iii) one more requirement: if R ≈ ([w]≈ , [v]≈ ) then for each sub-formula of the form
Mφ in Γ , if M, v |= φ then M, w |= Mφ;
(iv) A≈ ([w]≈ , p) = 1 if and only if M, w |= p.

The comparison of the set of worlds W to the set of worlds W ≈ shows that distinct
worlds in the filtered model have distinct sets of formulas true in them; hence, the
cardinality of the set W ≈ is not greater than the number of subsets in Γ which is
2|Γ | .
The next task is to prove that both structures, the structure M and the filtered
structure M≈ satisfy the same set of formulas from the set Γ .

Theorem 4.30 For each formula φ ∈ Γ , the following equivalence takes place,
under assumed properties in Definition 4.33(i)-(iv) of the filtered model: M, w |= φ
if and only if M ≈ , [w]≈ |= φ.

Proof Proof goes by structural induction. The first step is when φ is an atomic
proposition p. As valuations A and A≈ assign to p the same set of worlds, the
theorem holds for p. Hence, the theorem is true for sentential formulae and it remains
to consider the case of a basic modal formula, say Mψ in Γ . Suppose first that
M, w |= Mψ. There exists a world v in M with properties: (a) R(w, v) (b) M, v |= ψ.
As R(w, v) holds, by condition 7.3(ii), we have that R ≈ ([w]≈ , [v]≈ ). By inductive
assumption, as ψ ∈ Γ , we have that M ≈ , [v]≈ |= ψ and thus M ≈ |= Mψ.
The converse is proved along similar lines by use of the condition (iii): sup-
pose that M ≈ , [w]≈ |= Mψ. There exists a world [v]≈ such that R ≈ ([w]≈ [v]≈ )
204 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

and M ≈ , [v]≈ |= ψ; again, by inductive assumption, M, v |= ψ. By condition (iii),

M, w |= Mφ. 

Definition 4.34 (The size of a formula)

As already pointed to, both structures satisfy the same set of formulae. In order to
estimate the size of models, we define the size of a formula φ, denoted ||φ||, by the
following rules:

(i) || p||=1 for each atomic proposition p;

(ii) for formulae φ, ψ and a binary operator o ∈ {∨, ∧, ⊃}, ||φ o ψ|| = 1 + ||φ|| +
||ψ||;
(iii) for a formula φ and a unary operator o ∈ {¬, L , M}, ||oφ|| = 1 + ||φ||.

Recalling the definition of sub-formulae, we prove by structural induction that

|Sub(φ)| ≤ ||φ||, where Sub(φ) is the set of sub-formulae of φ.

Theorem 4.31 (Decidability of basic modal logic) If a formula φ of basic modal

logic is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite model. Therefore basic modal logic
is decidable.

All of these was under proviso that we have a relation R ≈ which satisfies conditions
(ii) and (iii) of Definition 4.33. It is necessary now to construct this relation.
There are three possible ways (Blackburn et al. [14]): in addition to Defini-
tion 4.33(ii) which defines the relation which we now denote as R ≈ I and to Def-
inition 4.33(iii) which defines the relation now denoted R ≈ II we may consider the
following condition (after Definition 4.33(iv)):

(v) R ≈
I I I ([w]≈ , [v]≈ ) if and only if for each modal basic formula Mψ ∈ Γ , if
M, v |= ψ ∨ Mψ then M, w |= Mψ.

Theorem 4.32 All three candidates for filtration accessibility relations are satisfy-
ing conditions (ii), (iii) of Definition 4.33.

Proof Clearly, R ≈ ≈
I satisfies condition (ii). For (iii), suppose that R I ([w]≈ , [v]≈ ) and
suppose that M, v |= ψ. Then there exist w1 , v1 such that R(w1 , v1 ) and M, v1 |= ψ,
hence M, w1 |= Mψ and thus M, w |= Mψ. Proofs for R ≈ ≈
I I and R I I I go along same
lines. 

It is in addition obvious that R ≈I does preserve reflexivity and symmetry while

R≈
II preserves reflexivity of relation R. R ≈
I I I preserves transitivity; in consequence,
we obtain

Theorem 4.33
(i) Any formula of the form p ⊃ M p (logic T) has a finite reflexive satisfying
structure;
(ii) Any formula of the form M¬M¬ p ⊃ p (logic B) has a finite symmetric satis-
fying structure;
4.8 Small Model Property, Decidability 205

(iii) Any formula of the form M M p ⊃ M p (logic 4) has a finite transitive satisfying
structure.

Theorem 4.34 Logics K, T, S4, B are decidable.

It remains to discuss the case of S5. Our notion here is that of bisimulation, which
constitutes the next step in factorization of a modal structure.

Definition 4.35 (Bisimulation)

We address here the technique of bisimulation in the case of S5, i.e, the accessibility
relation in this case is an equivalence ∼. We consider mainly pointed models of
the form M, w where M = (W, ∼, A) and w ∈ W . The technique we are going to
introduce has some affinities with filtration, viz., the first step in reducing a structure
M, w is to restrict it to the equivalence class of w, ie., the restricted structure is now
M∼ = ([w]∼ , R|[w]∼ , V |[w]∼ ). Clearly, for a formula φ of S5, w and w ∈ [w]∼ :
(i) M, w |= φ if and only if M∼ , w |= φ (ii) M, w |= φ if and only if M∼ , w |= φ.

A bisimulation between two structures M and M is a relation Λ ⊆ W × W

which satisfies conditions
(i) Λ is right-closed: for all w, w ∈ W , for each v ∈ W , if Λ(w, v) and R(w, w ),
then there exists v ∈ W such that Λ(w , v ) and R (v, v );
(ii) Λ is left-closed: for all v, v ∈ W , for each w ∈ W , if (*) Λ(w, v) and R (v, v )
then there exists w ∈ W such that Λ(w , v ) and R(w, w );
(iii) if Λ(w, v), then A(w) = A (v), where A(w) = { p : w |= p}.
For a reduced structure M∼ = ([w]∼ , V∼ = V |[w]∼ ) (no need to mention explic-
itly ∼), we carry the reduction further by picking out from [w]∼ worlds that have the
same values of A∼ : w ≡ w ∗ if and only if A∼ (w ) = A∼ (w ∗ ). We denote classes of
≡ by the symbol [.]≡ . Now, we establish a bisimulation between the reduced struc-
ture and its reduction by ≡ (the latter called also a simple model in (Halpern-Moses
[15]). The following theorem follows immediately from definitions.

Theorem 4.35 For each reduced structure M, there exists a simple model M and
a bisimulation Λ. Moreover, as the simple model is constructed within the reduced
model, the relation Λ has as the domain the world-set of M and as the range the
world-set of M .

Proof We indicate the construction of M = (W , A∼ ) and that of Λ. Worlds in W

are classes of ≡, all worlds are in relation R. For a world w of M and a world w
of M , we define Λ if and only if w ∈ [w ]≡ . Properties of right- and left-closedness
follow straightforwardly,hence, Λ is a bisimulation.
Now, we begin with a simple model M and a world w of it, and we construct a
simple model M ∗ .
(i) w ∈ W ∗ ;
(ii) for each sub-formula of φ of the form γ : Lψ, add to W ∗ a world wγ such that
¬ψ is valid at wγ in case Lψ is not valid at (M, w). 
206 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Theorem 4.36 For each sub-formula ψ of φ and each v ∈ W ∗ , M, v |= ψ if and

only if M ∗ , v |= ψ.

Proof It suffices to check the claim in case of a sub-formula of the form Lψ. The
proof is by structural induction. Suppose that M, v |= Lψ but M ∗ , v not. There is,
by (ii), z ∈ M ∗ such that ¬ψ is valid at z. By assumption of induction, M, z does not
satisfy ψ, hence, M, v does not satisfy Lψ, a contradiction. Proof of the converse is
straightforward. 

Theorem 4.37 Logic S5 is decidable: to check validity of φ it suffices to check a

finite set of worlds in the simple model.

4.9 Satisfiability, Complexity

Theorem 4.38 (Ladner [13]) The problem SAT(S5) of satisfiability for logic S5 is
NP-complete.

Proof As SL is contained in S5, by the Cook Theorem 1.53, SAT(S5) is NP-hard.

To prove its NP-completeness, one should provide an NP procedure for determining
satisfiability. Suppose φ is a formula of S5 and P(φ) is the set of atomic propositions
in φ. Guess a model M = (W, R, A) with |W | ≤ ||φ|| and guess valuations ( p, w) for
p ∈ P(φ). Please note that we restrict ourselves to simple models so the relation R is
immaterial (all worlds are connected via R). For p ∈ / P(φ) let by default V ( p, w) =
1. This guessing takes O(||φ||2 ) because both the number of worlds and the number
of atomic propositions in P(φ) are bound by ||φ||. Next, we check whether φ is
satisfied at some world in W .
We describe the labelling procedure common to many problems (e.g., in model
checking). We list all sub-formulae of φ in the order of increasing length. For each
sub-formula ψ and a world w, we label w either with ψ or ¬ψ depending on which
is valid at w. For Lψ we check each world for validity of ψ and for Mψ we check
worlds to find whether some of them validates ψ. Complexity of labeling is O(||φ||2 ).
φ is satisfiable if there will be a guess showing φ valid at some world. 

As proved in Ladner [13], SAT(K), SAT(T), SAT(S4) are PSPACE-complete.

4.10 Quantified Modal Logics (QML)

There is a huge bulk of literature on the so called de re and de dicto readings of a

sentence. Various interpretations abound Nelson [16].

Example 4.9 We consider two sentences:

(i) Sally believes that some people are good;
4.10 Quantified Modal Logics (QML) 207

(ii) Some people are such that Sally believes that they are good.
On the surface, both sentences carry the same message: Sally thinks that some
people are good. However, in the (i)-sentence, we have a modal operator ‘believes’
(which we may interpret as ‘it is possible for Sally’) which prefixes the statement
‘some people are good’ which is existentially quantified while in the (ii)-sentence
the quantified phrase ‘some people are such that’ precedes the modal phrase Sally
believes that ...’.
In case of (i)-sentence, the modal attitude depends on the reading of the dictum,
i.e., what was said to be believed. This form is the de dicto reading. In case of (ii)-
sentence, the case is brought forth first and presented to be believed or not, it is res/re
and the reading is de re.

Definition 4.36 (The Barcan formulae)

Sentences (i) and (ii) give rise to implication (i) ⊃ (ii) which converted into logical
form yield formulae

(1) M ∃x good(x) ⊃ ∃x M good(x); the dual form up to the sign of good(x) is

(2) ∀x L ¬ good(x) ⊃ L ∀x ¬ good(x).

General forms of (1) and (2) with a generic φ replacing good(x), respectively,
¬good(x), are Barcan formulae Marcus [17]

(i) M∃x φ ⊃ ∃x Mφ; the dual form is ;

(ii) ∀x Lφ ⊃ L∀xφ.

Definition 4.37 (The converse Barcan formulae)

In these formulae the antecedent and the consequent in Barcan formulae change
places:
(3) ∃x Mφ ⊃ M∃xφ;
(4) L∀xφ ⊃ ∀x Lφ.
Formulae (3) and (4) are converse Barcan formulae; clearly, they are dual to each
other.

The question now is to introduce proper syntax and semantics for interpreting
such formulae. Interpretations may vary, bordering on intensional approach, which
would demand that each possible world has its own domain of interpretation. We
begin with the assumption that the domain D for the sentential part of the syntax is
one and the same for all possible worlds.

Definition 4.38 (Syntax of quantified modal logic)

We have to knit tightly two structures: the structure for the sentential modal logic and
the structure for predicate logic. A possible way of building a structure which could
accommodate both modal sentential and predicate structures was shown in Kripke
[18], and a discussion of relevant aspects of model choice can be found in (Fitting,
Mendelson [19]).
208 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

There are two main kinds of models for quantified modal logic which depend
on a choice of the kind of domain assignment to possible worlds. One is called the
constant domain model and here a chosen domain D is assigned to each possible
world, the other called the variable domain model in which a functional assignment
gives distinct domains to distinct worlds. We will present the constant domain models
based quantified modal logic: the variable domain model requires some technical
changes in the exposition.
We denote by the symbol D a fixed domain which is a non-empty set of beings.
We impose a linear ordering (ai )∞1 on the domain D, calling it σ. We will keep a fixed
σ without mentioning it explicitly. We add the usual components of the sentential
modal logic and predicate logic in this new context:
(i) a set W of possible worlds, each w ∈ W a possible world;
(ii) an accessibility relation R ⊂ W × W ; 
(iii) a set P n of countably many relation symbols for each arity n ≥ 1; P = n P n ;
(iv)  n {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , . . .};
a countable set X of individual variables
(v) an interpretation I : W × P :→ 2 n D ; for each pair < w, Q >, where arity
of Q is n, I (w, Q) ⊂ D n is a relation of arity n;
(vi) an assignment A : X → D, A(xi ) is an element ai of the domain D;
(vii) symbols L , M of modal operators and ∀, ∃ of quantifiers as well as auxiliary
symbols.
A structure M for quantified modal logic is a quadruple < W, R, D, A > and the
pair F =< W, R > is the frame of M, D is the domain of the frame F.
An atomic formula is an expression of the form Q(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) where Q is an
n-ary relation symbol. Formulae are built in the usual way by means of sentential
connectives, and, generalization and necessitation rules, as we have witnessed in case
of Barcan formulae.

Definition 4.39 (The notion of satisfiability)

Given a structure M, a world w ∈ W , an interpretation I and an assignment A, a
formula φ is satisfied (true) at M, w, A which is denoted M, w, |= I,A φ when the
following conditions are fulfilled for specific forms of φ:

(i) M, w, |= I,A Q(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) if and only if I (w, Q)(A(x1 , A(x2 ), . . . ,

A(xn )) holds;
(ii) M, w |= I,A φ ∧ ψ if and only if M, w |= I,A φ and M, w |= I,A ψ;
(iii) M, w |= I,A φ ∨ ψ if and only if M, w |= I,A φ or M, w |= I,A ψ;
(iv) M, w |= I,A ¬φ if and only if it is not the case that M, w |= I,A φ;
(v) M, w |= I,A φ ⊃ ψ if and only if either M, w |= I,A ¬φ or M, w |= I,A ψ;
(vi) M, w, |= I,A Lφ if and only if M, w |= I,A φ for each w such that R(w, w );
(vii) M, w |= I,A Mφ if and only if M, w |= I,A φ for some w such that R(w, w );
(viii) M, w |= I,A ∀x.φ if and only if M, w |= I,A(x/a) φ for each a ∈ D, where
A(x/a) is the assignment A with a substituted for x;
(ix) M, w |= I,A ∃x.φ if and only if M, w |= I,A(x/a) φ for some a ∈ D.
4.10 Quantified Modal Logics (QML) 209

Definition 4.40 (Validity)

A formula φ is true in a structure M if and only if it is satisfied at every world in W
and φ is valid if it is satisfied in every structure.

Example 4.10 The converse Barcan formula in Definition 4.37(iii) is valid. Suppose
that: (i) M, w |= I,A ∃x Mφ(x). Then; (ii) for some a ∈ D, M, w |= I,A Mφ(a). Then;
(iii) for some world w ∈ W such that R(w, w ), it holds: M, w |= I,A(x/a ) φ(a );
Now, we consider the antecedent M∃x φ(x). Its validity requires that;
(iv) for some w ∈ W and for some a ∈ D, M, w |= I,A(x/a φ(a );
(v) Then, letting a to be a and w to be w makes the antecedent satisfied and
the converse Barcan formula (iii) is valid.

The essential assumption for the proof has been the constancy of the domain. A
simple generalization is the condition of monotonicity of models; let D(w) stands
for the domain at the world w; then, increasing monotonicity means that if R(w, w ),
then D(w) ⊆ D(w ). Obviously, constant domain models satisfy this condition.

Example 4.11 The converse Barcan formula (iii) is not valid when the monotonicity
condition fails. Suppose that W = {w1 , w2 }, D(w1 ) \ D(w2 ) = ∅, R(w1 , w2 ) is the
only instance of R, for some c ∈ D(w1 ) \ D(w2 ) P(c) is valid in w2 , then w1 |=
∃x M P(x) but w1 fails M∃P(x).

We recall facts about monotonicity of structures related to Barcan and converse

Barcan formulae. A structure is monotonically decreasing when R(w, w ) implies
that D(w ) ⊂ D(w).

Theorem 4.39 A frame F is monotonic increasing if and only if the Barcan converse
formula is true in each F-based structure.

Proof We can modify the proof in Example 4.10 to prove that in increasingly mono-
tonic case the converse Barcan formula is valid and Example 4.11 shows that when
a structure is not monotonically increasing, then the converse Barcan formula is not
true. This proves the theorem. 

Let us observe that reversing arrows of the relation R in the structure of Exam-
ple 4.11 shows falsity of the Barcan formula: M∃x P(x) ⊃ ∃x M P(x), in general the
converse Barcan formula p ⊃ q is valid in a monotonically increasing model if and
only if the corresponding Barcan formula q ⊃ p is valid in the dual model obtained
by reversing arrows of the relation R. This implies that a frame F is monotonically
decreasing if and only if the Barcan formula is valid in each F-based structure.
210 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

4.11 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for Quantified Modal

Logics

Definition 4.41 (Tableaux in the case of constant domain)

We assume the modal logic K for which we recall the modal tableau rules in Defi-
nition 4.15.
T Lφ
(i) Tφ
;
F Lφ
(ii) Fφ
;
T Mφ
(iii) Tφ
;
F Mφ
(iv) Fφ
.

We recall for reader’s convenience the rules for predicate logic in Chap. 3). We
recall that; stands for conjunction and , denotes disjunction.
T ( p∧q)
(v) For type α: T p;T q
F( p∨q)
F p;Fq
F( p⊃q)
T p;Fq
;
T ( p∨q) T ( p⊃q)
(vi) For type β: T p,T q F( p∧q)
F p,Fq F p,T q
;
T (¬ p) F¬ p
(vii) Fp Tp
;
(∀x.φ)
(viii) For type (γ): TT(φ(x/ p))
F(∃x.φ)
F(φ(x/ p))
;
(∃x.φ)
(ix) For type (δ): TT(φ(x/ p))
F(∀x.φ)
F(φ(x/ p))
.

In rules in (ix), the parameter p must be new to the branch.

Tableaux for quantified modal logic merge rules for both predicate and modal
logics.

Example 4.12 We give the tableau proof for the Barcan formula ∀x Lφ(x) ⊃
L∀xφ(x). Parameters are additional variables denoted p, q, r, ... in distinction to
quantifiable variables x, y, z, ..., which enter tableaux and replace variables x, y, z, ..
in steps in which the last quantifiers or modal operators are removed from a branch.
The announced tableau follows.
(1.) F [∀x Lφ(x) ⊃ L∀x φ(x)]
(2.) T [∀x Lφ(x)]
(3.) F L ∀xφ(x)]
(4.) T Lφ(x): from 2;
(5.) F ∀xφ(x): from 3;
(6.) T φ( p): from 4, use of parameter p;
(7.) F φ( p); from 5, use of the same parameter p as the rule in 5 is universal;
(8.) X: by 6,7, tableau closes.

This tableau is constructed for the constant domain models. Tableaux for variable
domain models require more attention. Obviously they contain constant domain
cases. We apply the device of prefixed tableaux Fitting [20] cf. Goré [21]. Prefixes
4.11 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for Quantified Modal Logics 211

are finite sequences of natural numbers in the form σ.n.m....k, where σ names a world
and σ.n etc. names a world accessible from that named σ. We reproduce prefixed
rules. We denote with coma, disjunction of formulae and with semicolon ; we denote
conjunction of formulae. Formulae separated by coma at a node will initiate forking
of the branch into two extensions, one formula in each extension, semicolon separated
formulae will both extend the current branch. With this notation, we state tableau
prefixed rules.
Definition 4.42 (Prefixed sentential logic tableau rules)
σφ∧ψ
(i) σφ;σψ
;
σφ∨ψ
(ii) σφ,σψ
;
σ¬(φ∧ψ)
(iii) σ¬φ,σ¬ψ
;
σ¬(φ∨ψ)
(iv) σ¬φ;σ¬ψ
;
σφ⊃ψ
(v) σ¬φ,σψ
;
σ¬(φ⊃ψ)
(vi) σφ;σ¬ψ
;
σ¬¬φ
(vii) σφ
;
σφ≡ψ
(viii) σφ⊃ψ;σψ⊃φ
;

Definition 4.43 (Prefixed predicate logic tableau rules)

σ∀xφ(x)
(ix) σφ( pσ )
;
σ¬∃xφ(x)
(x) σ¬φ( pσ )
;
σ∃xφ(x)
(xi) σφ( pσ )
;
σ¬∀xφ(x)
(xii) σ¬φ( pσ )
;
In these rules, pσ is a parameter associated with the world name σ; in rules (xi)
and (xii), parameter pσ must be new to the branch, this proviso is not obeyed by rules
(ix) and (x).
Definition 4.44 (Prefixed modal tableau rules)
σ Lφ(x)
(xiii) σ.n φ(x)
;
σ ¬Mφ(x)
(xiv) σ.n¬φ(x)
;
σ¬ Lφ(x)
(xv) σ.n ¬φ(x)
;
σ Mφ(x)
(xvi) σ.n φ(x)
.
In rules (xiii) and (xiv), the prefix σ.n should be applied if it is already on the
branch, in rules (xv) and (xvi), the prefix σ.n should be new.
Example 4.13 We give a proof tableau over K for the Barcan formula M∃xφ(x) ⊃
∃x Mφ(x).
212 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

(1) F [M∃xφ(x) ⊃ ∃x Mφ(x)] (1);

(1) T M∃xφ(x) (2);
(2) F ∃x Mφ(x) (3);
(1.1) T ∃xφ(x) (4) from (2);
(1.1) T φ( p1.1 ) (5) from (4);
(1) F Mφ(x); (6) from (3);
(1.1) F φ( p1.1 ) (7) from (6) by rule (xiv).
Tableau closes: X

Definition 4.45 (Hintikka family of sets for prefixed tableaux)

We have defined Hintikka sets in previous cases, now, we define them for quantified
modal logic. We assume the modal logic K.

A Hintikka family of sets H consists of sets denoted generically by the symbol

H such that each member of H satisfies conditions:
(H0) for any formula φ(x) at most one of φ(x), ¬φ(x) is in H ;
(H1) if σ¬¬φ ∈ H , then σφ ∈ H ;
(H2) if σφ ∧ ψ ∈ H , then σφ ∈ H and σψ ∈ H ;
(H3) if σφ ∨ ψ ∈ H , then σφ ∈ H or σψ ∈ H ;
(H4) if σ Lφ ∈ H , then σ.n φ ∈ H for each name σ.n ∈ H ; same for σ¬ Mφ;
(H5) if σ Mφ ∈ H , then σ.n φ ∈ H ; same for σ ¬ Mφ;
(H6) if σ∀x.φ ∈ H , then σφ( pσ ) ∈ H for each parameter pσ of σ; same for
σ¬∃x.φ(x);
(H7) if σ∃x.φ(x) ∈ H , then σφ( pσ ) ∈ H for some parameter pσ ; same for
σ¬∀x.φ(x).

Theorem 4.40 Each Hintikka set H in a Hintikka family H is satisfiable.

Proof Consider a Hintikka set H . The canonical model for H has the set of possible
worlds W defined as the set of prefixes of the formulae in H ; the accessibility relation
R is the set of pairs < σ, σ.n > for each prefix σ ∈ W , the domain function maps each
world σ ∈ W to the set of parameters pσ ∈ H . The interpretation I sends each pair
< P, σ >, where P is an n-place relation symbol, into the set {< p1 , p2 , . . . , pn >:
σ P( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) ∈ H }.
It remains to define an assignment A on the model M =< W, R, I >: A( pσ ) = pσ
for each parameter pσ . Now, we have to verify that M, σ |= A φ for each φ ∈ H . This
is done by structural induction. By the very definition, each atomic formula in H is
satisfied. Conditions (H1),(H2),(H3) settle sentential cases. Quantified formulae are
satisfied by (H6) and (H7) and modal formulae are satisfied by (H4),(H5) by virtue
of the model construction. Negated formulae are satisfied due to (H0) and (H1).
Suppose now that a formula φ is valid in all variable domain K-models and there
exists in the set T of all tableaux for Fφ a tableau T which is not closed. Hence,
there exists in T an open branch which is a Hintikka set, hence, satisfiable, which
shows that φ is not valid, a contradiction. This leads to completeness theorem for
tableaux. 
4.12 Sentential Intuitionistic Logic (SIL) 213

Theorem 4.41 (Tableau completeness for quantified modal logic K) If a formula φ

is true in all variable domain K-models, then each tableau for φ is closed, hence, φ
is provable.

4.12 Sentential Intuitionistic Logic (SIL)

SIL arose from intuitionism, a paradigm in foundations of mathematics and logic

initiated by Luitzen E.J. Brouwer for whom mathematics was a creation of mind and
truth meant provability, and existence meant effective construction. In particular,
the law of excluded middle p ∨ ¬ p accepted in classical logic and mathematics
was regarded as unacceptable from the intuitionism’s point of view as there are
statements such that neither they nor their negations are given any proof. In a similar
vein a part of mathematics could not be accepted by intuitionists. Regardless of
that, logic embraced intuitionistic ideas exposed in Heyting [22] when Gödel [23]
demonstrated that intuitionistic logic can be interpreted in models for modal logic
S4. In Problems section we outline the mapping of S4 into SIL due to Schütte [24].
Kripke [25] proposed classical models for intuitionistic logic, so we may continue
the topic of that logic within modal logics. In accordance with Gödel’s insight and
Kripke’s model, we adopt the S4 frame. Hence, the accessibility relation R is reflexive
and transitive.
We assume the sentential syntax, with a countable set of atomic propositions
p, q, r, ..., connectives ∨, ∧, ¬, ⊃, and, some auxiliary variables like parentheses
and punctuation marks. Well-formed formulae as well as sub-formulae and size of
them are defined in an already familiar manner.

Definition 4.46 (Sentential intuitionistic frame)

It is a frame F = (W, R) where W is a set of worlds and R is an S4-accessibility
relation, i.e., it is reflexive and transitive. We recall our notion of an F-neighborhood
of a world: N F (w) = {w : R(w, w )}.

Definition 4.47 (Intuitionistic sentential model. Satisfiability)

We define the relation |= for a sentential intuitionistic pointed structure frame
(W, R, A, w) denoted for short as (M, w) with M = (W, R, A); as intuitionistic
meaning differs from the classical one, we adopt the name ’accepts’ for the symbol
|=. The pair F = (W, R) is as before a frame.
(i)for each formula φ: if M, w |= φ, then M, w |= φ for each w ∈ N F (w);
(ii)M, w |= ;
(iii)M, w |= φ ∧ ψ if and only if M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ;
(iv) M, w |= φ ∨ ψ if and only if M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ;
(v) M, w |= ¬φ if and only if for each w ∈ N F (w), it is not the case that M, w |=
φ;
(vi) M, w |= φ ⊃ ψ if and only if for each w ∈ N F (w), if M, w |= φ, then
M, w |= ψ.
214 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

It follows from (ii) and (v) that w |= ⊥ for no world w. Please take heed of the fact
that truth of a formula at a world is coupled with its truth at all accessible worlds.

Definition 4.48 (Validity)

A formula φ is true in a frame(W, R) if and only if M, w |= φ for each w ∈ W .
A formula φ is valid if and only if φ is true in each sentential intuitionistic frame.
The status of signed formulae needs a comment and a definition of their relations to
negation. By 12.2(v), asserting negation of a formula at w needs a verification that
a formula is not accepted by all neighbors w of w, which would mean a disproof of
the formula. On the other hand, w |= Fφ means that no proof of φ is possible from
w. These statements are somewhat vague, so let us include formulae which point to
differences between ¬ and F:
(i) if M, w |= ¬φ, then M, w |= ¬φ by 11.2(i) (see a proof after 11.4);
(ii) if M, w |= Fφ, then M, w |= Fφ.

It turns out that intuitionistic tautologies are sentential tautologies. Indeed, it is

shown by a simple argument to the contrary. Suppose that φ is not any sentential
tautology, so for some assignment A, A(φ) = 0, consider the simplest one world
model (W = {w}, R(w, w)) with w |= p if and only if A( p) = 1. Then, for each
formula ψ, A(ψ) = 1 if and only if w |= ψ, hence, it is not the case that w |= φ.
A simple example, of W = {w1 , w2 } with instances of accessibility R(w1 , w2 ),
R(w1 , w1 ) and R(w2 , w2 ), and w2 |= p, shows that w1  p ∨ ¬ p does not hold,
hence, p ∨ ¬ p is not any intuitionistic tautology. It follows that intuitionistic sen-
tential tautologies are a proper subset of sentential tautologies.
Properties of intuitionistic satisfiability are distinct from those for previously
studied logics. It is evident in the treatment of negation in (v) above and the treatment
of implication in (vi) above: in order to assert truth of negated or implicational formula
at a world w, we need to check the truth or falsity of a formula at each world in the
neighborhood N F (w).
For a set of formulae Γ , we introduce the notation ΓT = {T φ : T φ ∈ Γ } and
Γ F = {Fφ : Fφ ∈ Γ }.
Yet another difference between classical and intuitionistic sentential logics is that
in the intuitionistic case each connective is independent of all others Wajsberg [26].
One can construct simple examples showing that (see, e.g., Fitting [9]). However,
negation and implication are related in a way similar to previous cases. The truth is
uniform over neighborhoods of worlds.

Theorem 4.42 The following are true in intuitionistic sentential logic:

(i) if M, w |= φ, then M, w |= φ for each world w ∈ N F (w) and each formula
φ;
(ii) if M, w |= Γ , then M, w |= ΓT for each world w ∈ N F (w);
(iii) if M, w |= Γ , then M, w |= Γ F , where w ∈ N F (w).

Proof Statement (i) is secured by condition in Definition 4.47(i). For (ii), suppose
that M, w |= Γ ; as ΓT ⊂ Γ , it follows that M, w |= ΓT and by Definition 4.47(i),
4.12 Sentential Intuitionistic Logic (SIL) 215

M, w |= ΓT . For (iii), it follows by Definition 4.47(v) by an argument similar to that

of (ii) with T replaced by F as subscript of Γ 
A comment may be advisable now concerning Definition 4.47(i). We have
bypassed here the standard way of requiring (i) for atomic propositions and extend-
ing it to formulae as in our (i) by structural induction. While it needs no comment
for disjunction and conjunction, the case of negation may be in need of some expla-
nation. Let M, w |= ¬φ, then by Definition 4.47(v), each w ∈ N F (w) satisfies Fφ,
by transitivity, N F (w ) ⊆ N F (w), hence, no world w ∈ N F (w ) satisfies φ, and this
by Definition 4.47(v) witnesses that w |= ¬φ.
Fitting [7] gives a useful interpretation of the intuitionistic scheme of Defini-
tion 4.47. One may regard each world as a repository of current knowledge and
R(w, w ) as expectance that world w visited in future may bring some additional
knowledge. In this sense, intuitionistic logic contains some elements of temporal
aspects as well as epistemic aspects. For instance, w |= ¬φ witnesses that the world
w imposes ¬φ if no other knowledge gathered in future can impose φ. This is certainly
motivated by temporal aspects of mathematical science in which some problems have
been decided after centuries.
In Definition 4.47, a distinction is observable in behavior of connectives with
respect to satisfaction: formulae of type α in the signed form, i.e., T (φ ∧ ψ), F(φ ∨
ψ), F(φ ⊃ ψ), F(¬φ) and formulae of type β (i.e., T (φ ∨ ψ), F(φ ∧ ψ), T (φ ⊃
ψ), F(¬φ) whose main connective is either ∨ or ∧, behave differently from formulae
of types α and β whose main connective is either ¬ or ⊃. We call the former case
‘positive’ and the latter case ‘negative’. For a formula φ, formulae φ1 and φ2 are
imminent sub-formulae, which in case of ¬ are identical : for ¬φ they are T φ, T φ
and in case of T ¬φ they are Fφ, Fφ. From 12.2, the following code of behavior can
be extracted.
Definition 4.49 (Code of behavior)
The rules are:
(i) for a positive formula φ of type α and each w ∈ W , w |= φ ≡ w |= φ1 and
w |= φ2 ;
(ii) for a positive formula φ of type β and each w ∈ W , w |= φ ≡ w |= φ1 or
w |= φ2 ;
(iii) for a negative formula φ of type α and each w ∈ W , w |= φ if and only if
w |= φ1 and w |= φ2 for some w ∈ N F (w);
(iv) for a negative formula φ of type β and each w ∈ W , w |= φ if and only if
w |= φ1 or w |= φ2 for each w ∈ N F (w);
We also add conditions which follows from an analysis in Beth [27] and in Fitting
[9]:
(v) for each atomic proposition p, for each w ∈ W , if w |= T p, then w |= T p for
each w ∈ N F (w); moreover, w |= , it is not the case that w |= ⊥, and only
one of the following holds true: w |= T p, w |= F p.
Now, we proceed to tableaux.
216 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

4.13 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for SIL

The system we propose to discuss comes from Beth [27] with modifications in Fitting
[7] which introduce signed formulae and standard, in the sense of Smullyan’s, usage
of trees.
Definition 4.50 (Tableau rules)
We state the rules for intuitionistic sentential tableaux. We use the symbol Γ to
denote non-active in a rule set of formulae.
Γ,T (φ∧ψ)
(∧) (T ∧) Γ,T φ;T ψ
;
Γ,Fφ∧ψ
(F ∧) (Γ,Fφ),(Γ,Fψ) ;
Γ,T (φ∨ψ)
(∨) (T∨) (Γ,T φ),(Γ,T ψ)
;
Γ,F(φ∨ψ)
(F ∨) Γ,Fφ;Fψ ;
(¬) (T ¬) Γ,T
Γ,Fφ
¬φ
;
Γ,F¬φ
(F ¬) ΓT ,T φ ;
Γ,T (φ⊃ψ)
(⊃) (T⊃) (Γ,Fφ),(Γ,T ψ)
;
Γ,F(φ⊃ψ)
(F ⊃) ΓT ,(T φ;Fψ) .
We recall that ΓT is defined as {T φ : T φ ∈ Γ }.
Example 4.14 A one-way De Morgan law ( p ∨ q) ⊃ ¬ (¬ p ∧ ¬q) has a tableau
proof.
1 F [( p ∨ q) ⊃ ¬ (¬ p ∧ ¬q)];
2 T ( p ∨ q) F ¬ (¬ p ∧ ¬q);
3 T ( p ∨ q) T (¬ p ∧ ¬q);
4 T ( p ∨ q) T ¬ p T ¬q;
5 T ( p ∨ q), F p, T ¬q;
6 T ( p ∨ q), F p, F q
7 left branch: T p, F p, F q X: branch closes;
8 right branch: T q, F p, F q X: branch closes.
We now consider the converse formula: ¬ (¬ p ∧ ¬q) ⊃ ( p ∨ q). The tableau is
the following.
1 F [¬ (¬ p ∧ ¬q) ⊃ ( p ∨ q)];
2 T ¬ (¬ p ∧ ¬q), F ( p ∨ q);
3 F (¬ p ∧ ¬q), F ( p ∨ q);
4 F (¬ p ∧ ¬q), F p, F q;
5 left branch: F ¬ p, F p, F q;
6 left branch continues: T p, F p, F q X: branch closes
7 right branch: F (¬q), F p, F q
8 right branch continues: T q, F p, F q X: branch closes.
4.13 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for SIL 217

Theorem 4.43 The tableau system of proof is sound: each provable formula is valid.
We recall that a formula φ is provable if the tableau for Fφ closes.
Proof To the contrary, suppose that a formula φ is provable but not valid. Then the
formula Fφ is satisfiable, i.e, there is a pointed frame (F, w) which satisfies Fφ.
The crux of the proof is in realization that each step in expansion of a tableau for Fφ
preserves satisfiability by checking each of tableau rules, for instance, if at a level
(n) of the tableau the satisfiable formula is T ψ ∧ ξ then the next level (n+1) contains
formulae T ψ and T ξ, both satisfiable. When the tableau branches conclude, the
tableau is open, contrary to the assumption that φ is provable. 

In order to attempt a completeness proof for intuitionistic tableau system, we enter

the already known track and define the Hintikka family for this case. We require of
these families to be consistent, i.e., no tableau for each set closes.
Definition 4.51 (The Hintikka family of sets)
Let H denote this family, it is a Hintikka intuitionistic family of sets if it is consistent
and if it satisfies the following conditions. Γ and Δ are generic symbols for members
of H.
(H0) no set Γ in H contains both T φ and F φ for some formula φ;
(H1) if T φ ∧ ψ in Γ , then T φ in Γ and T ψ in Γ ;
(H2) if F φ ∧ ψ in Γ , then F φ in Γ or F ψ in Γ ;
(H3) if T φ ∨ ψ in Γ , then T φ in Γ or T ψ in Γ ;
(H4) if F φ ∨ ψ in Γ , then F φ in Γ and F ψ in Γ ;
(H5) if T ¬φ in Γ , then F φ in Γ ;
(H6) if T φ ⊃ ψ in Γ , then F φ in Γ or T ψ in Γ ;
(H7) if F(φ ⊃ ψ) in Γ , then there exists Δ in H such that (ΓT ) ⊂ Δ, Tφ in Δ and
F ψ in Δ;
(H8) if F ¬φ in Γ , then there exists Δ in H such that (ΓT ) ⊂ Δ and T φ in Δ.
Theorem 4.44 Each Hintikka family is satisfiable.
Proof We take as the set W of worlds in a model the sets in the Hintikka family and
we define the accessibility relation R(Γ, Δ) as ΓT ⊂ Δ. The frame of the model is
this F = (H, R). It remains to define the satisfaction relation |=. In order to follow
on the Henkin idea of canonical models, we would like to secure the condition

(H) If T φ ∈ Γ ∈ H, then Γ |= φ

along with its dual condition

(-H) If Fφ ∈ Γ, then it not the case that Γ |= φ

We apply the idea already used with tableaux, viz., we begin with atomic formula
and for atomic formula P, we let Γ |= P if and only if P ∈ Γ and we extend |= by
structural induction. 
218 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

We provide an example:

T (φ ⊃ ψ) ∈ Γ ≡ ∀Δ((ΓT ⊆ Δ) ⊃ T (φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Δ)
≡
∀Δ((ΓT ⊆ Δ) ⊃ (F(φ) ∈ Δ ∨ T (ψ) ∈ Δ))
≡
∀Δ((ΓT ⊆ Δ) ⊃ Δ¬ |= φ ∨ Δ |= ψ))
≡
∀Δ((ΓT ⊆ Δ) ⊃ (Δ |= φ ⊃ ψ)
≡
Γ |= φ ⊃ ψ).

Theorem 4.45 The tableau system is complete: each valid formula is provable.
Proof The scheme for proof is standard by now. Suppose a formula φ is valid but not
provable. There is a model M for φ. Non-provability of φ provides an open tableau
for Fφ with open branches satisfying properties for Hintikka sets, hence satisfiable,
contrary to validity of φ. 

4.14 Consistency of Intuitionistic Sentential Logic

Following on the lines of previous cases, with necessary modifications, we recall

the property of consistency introduced in Fitting [7]. Some remarks on notions to
be used are in order. Connectives ∨, ∧ are called regular and connectives ¬, ⊃ are
called special. This distinction is caused by distinct behavior of two sets with respect
to satisfaction, as stated in Definition 4.47. A formula of type α is regular or special
depending on whether the main connective in it is regular or special. The symbol C T
stands for {T φ : T φ ∈ C}.
Definition 4.52 (Consistency property)
A family C of sets of signed formulae is consistency property if and only if each set
C in it has the following properties:
(i) C contains no pair of conjugate formulae and neither F nor T ⊥;
(ii) for a type β formula φ ∈ C, either C ∪ {φ1 } in C or C ∪ {φ2 } in C;
(iii) for a regular type α formula φ ∈ C, C ∪ {φ1 , φ2 } in C;
(iv) for a special type α formula φ ∈ C, T C ∪ {φ1 , φ2 } in C.
We now follow the line initiated in Henkin [11]. By applying appropriately mod-
ified Lindenbaum Lemma, each set C ∈ C can be enlarged to a maximal consistent
set MaxCon(C).
Definition 4.53 (The canonical structure)
We let W to be the family of all sets MaxCon(C) for C ∈ C. The accessibility relation
R is defined by letting R(MaxCon(C), MaxCon(C )) if and only if CT ⊆ C . In line
4.15 First-Order Intuitionistic Logic (FOIL) 219

with previous developments, for any signed atomic formula p we let MaxConC |= p
if and only if p ∈ MaxCon(C).

By means of structural induction which employs rules in Definition 4.47, we verify

that if φ ∈ MaxCon(C) then MaxCon(C) |= φ for each C ∈ C for each signed
formula φ. This defines all ingredients of the structure M =< W, R, |=>.

Theorem 4.46 Each consistent set of signed formulae is satisfiable.

This implies strong completeness of tableau proof system.

4.15 First-Order Intuitionistic Logic (FOIL)

First-order intuitionistic logic shares syntactic features with classical predicate logic:
a set of countably many individual variables denoted x, y, z, . . ., a countable set of
n-ary predicate symbols P1 , P2n , . . . for each n ≥ 1, sentential connective symbols,
quantifier symbols, and auxiliary symbols of parentheses and punctuation marks.
In addition, as usual in case of prefixed tableaux, there is a countable set I P of
individual parameters, i.e., non-quantifiable variables.
Atomic formulae are P jn (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ), each ai an individual variable or indi-
vidual parameter. Formulae are built in the standard recursive way, beginning from
atomic formulae, by means of sentential connectives and quantifiers.
Models for first-order intuitionistic logic (FOIL) presented here are due to Kripke
[25]. The notation presented here follows, with some modifications, one adopted in
(Fitting [7–9]).

Definition 4.54 (First-order intuitionistic models. Satisfiability, validity)

A frame for FOIL is a triple (W, R, P), where W, R is an S4 frame and P is a
mapping from W into the collection of non-empty sets of parameters.

A first-order intutionistic structure over a frame F = (W, R, P) is the tuple

(W, R, P, |=), where |= is a satisfaction relation. The mapping P is monotone:
if R(w, w ), then P(w) ⊆ P(w ).

Definition 4.55 (The first-order satisfaction relation)

The relation |= fulfills the following conditions. For w ∈ W , the symbol FI P (w)
denotes the set of formulae which contain only parameters from P(w).

(i) for each atomic formula α, and each w ∈ W : if w |= α, then α ∈ FI P (w);

(ii) for w, w ∈ W , and for each atomic formula α: if R(w, w ) and w |= α, then
w |= α;
(iii) for w ∈ W : w |= φ ∧ ψ if and only if w |= φ and w |= ψ;
(iv) for w ∈ W : w |= φ ∨ ψ if and only if φ ∨ ψ ∈ FI P (w) and (w |= φ or w |= ψ);
(v) for w ∈ W : w |= ¬φ if and only if ¬φ ∈ FI P (w) and w |= ¬φ holds for each
w ∈ N F (w);
220 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

(vi) for w ∈ W : w |= φ ⊃ ψ if and only if φ ⊃ ψ ∈ FI P (w) and if w |= φ, then

w |= ψ for each w ∈ N F (w);
(vii) for w ∈ W : w |= ∃xφ(x) if and only if w |= φ( p) for some p ∈ P(w);
(viii) for w ∈ W : w |= ∀xφ(x) if and only if w |= φ( p) for each w ∈ N F (w) and
each p ∈ P(w ).
The monotonicity condition of the mapping P may be interpreted as the reflection of
properties of mathematical knowledge: the once established truth remains true in the
future and knowledge is collected incrementally. Conditions (v) and (vi) reflect the
intuitionistic point of view on negation and implication: their truth is preserved by
future developments. Condition (viii) requires of universal quantification the confir-
mation of truth for all parameters met in future.

Theorem 4.47 For w ∈ W and a formula φ: (a) if w |= φ, then φ ∈ FI P (w) (b)

w |= φ for each w ∈ N F (w).

Proof (a) is encoded in conditions (iv)–(viii) and it may be verified by structural

induction. Verification of (b) may be done by structural induction beginning with
condition (ii). 

For a structure S = (W, R, P, |=), a formula φ is true in S if and only if w |= φ

for each w ∈ W such that φ ∈ FI P (w). A formula φ is valid if and only if it is true
in all structures. FOIL excludes as invalid some formulae of FO: an example is the
formula (∀x( p ∨ φ(x)) ⊃ ( p ∨ ∀xφ(x)).

4.16 Natural Deduction: FOIL-Tableaux

Definition 4.56 (FOIL tableau rules)

We attempt at recalling a proof of tableau-completeness and soundness of FOIL.
First thing is to introduce the tableau rules for FOIL in addition to rules given for the
sentential case. The symbol p denotes a parameter, and Γ means a set of formulae,
the symbol ΓT denotes the set {T φ : T φ ∈ Γ }. All formulae are signed. The new
rules for FOIL are as follows.
Γ,T ∃xφ(x)
(i) (T∃ ) Γ,φ( p)
(parameter p new);
Γ,F∃xφ(x)
(ii) (F∃ ) Γ,Fφ( p) ;
(iii) (T∀ ) Γ,T ∀xφ(x)
Γ,T φ( p)
;
Γ,F∀xφ(x)
(iv) (F∀) ΓT ,Fφ( p) , p new.
While in FO, the duality between ∃ and ∀ via negation holds without any restriction
on ∀, in FOIL, as witnessed by (i) and (iv), the case of F∀ is restricted by the change
of Γ into T Γ : this reflects the need to verify the truth of ∀ with respect to future
developments which may bring some changes to our current knowledge; to be on the
safe side, we restrict ourselves to true formulae which will stay true.
4.16 Natural Deduction: FOIL-Tableaux 221

Example 4.15 The formula ∀xφ(x) ⊃ ¬∃x¬φ(x) has a tableau proof.

(1) F[∀x φ(x) ⊃ ¬∃x ¬φ(x)];

(2) T∀x φ(x);
(3) F¬∃x ¬φ(x);
(4) Tφ( p): by (2) and 15.1(iii);
(5) T∃x ¬φ(x): by (3);
(6) T¬φ( p): by 15.1(i);
(7) Fφ( p): by (6);
(8) Tφ( p): by (2) and 15.1(iii), no restrictions on p so we may use p introduced in
(6);
(9) X: the branch closes.

We approach the completeness theorem for FOIL. We include a proof modelled

on the proof in Kripke [25] (see also Fitting [7]).

Definition 4.57 (FOIL notion of consistency)

A finite set C of signed FOIL formulae is consistent if no tableau for it closes; a set
of FOIL formulae is consistent if and only if each finite subset is consistent.

Definition 4.58 (Hintikka families)

We define the FOIL version of a Hintikka family H of sets of formulae. We denote
by the symbol P(H ) the set of constants and parameters used in formulae in H . We
regard elements of H as worlds and define the accessibility relation R as R(H1 , H2 )
if and only if H1,T ⊆ H2 and P(H1 ) ⊆ P(H2 ).

A family H is a Hintikka family if the following conditions hold for each set
H ∈ H:
(H0) H is consistent;
(H1) if Tφ ∧ ψ ∈ H , then Tφ ∈ H and Tψ ∈ H ;
(H2) if Fφ ∧ ψ ∈ H , then Fφ ∈ H or Fψ ∈ H ;
(H3) if Tφ ∨ ψ ∈ H , then Tφ ∈ H or Tψ ∈ H ;
(H4) if Fφ ∨ ψ ∈ H , then Fφ ∈ H and Fψ ∈ H ;
(H5) if T¬φ ∈ H , then Fφ ∈ H ;
(H6) if Tφ ⊃ ψ ∈ H , then Fψ ∈ H or Tψ ∈ H ;
(H7) if Fφ ⊃ ψ ∈ H , then for some H1 ∈ H such that R(H, H1 ): Fψ ∈ H1 and
Tφ ∈ H1 ;
(H8) if F¬φ ∈ H , then for some H1 ∈ H such that R(H, H1 ): Tφ ∈ H1 ;
(H9) if T∀xφ(x) ∈ H , then Tφ( p) ∈ H for each p ∈ P(H );
(H10) if F∀xφ(x) ∈ H , then there exists H1 ∈ H such that R(H, H1 ) and Fφ(a) for
some a ∈ P(H1 );
(H11) if T∃xφ(x) ∈ H , then Tφ(a) for some a ∈ P(H );
(H12) if F∃xφ(x) ∈ H , then Fφ(a) ∈ H for each a ∈ P(H ).
222 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

We prove that each Hintikka family H is satisfiable in a Hintikka structure which

for this case is M = (W, R, P, |=) such that each H ∈ H satisfies (i) if T φ ∈ H ,
then H |= φ and (ii) if Fφ ∈ H , then H |= φ does not hold. The Hintikka structure
which satisfies (i) and (ii) is called a Hintikka model.

Theorem 4.48 Each Hintikka family has a Hintikka model.

Proof Building a model begins with definitions of R and P as above, and, for atomic
φ, letting for each H ∈ H that H |= φ if and only if Tφ ∈ H . Then, |= is extended
by structural induction to all formulae: as an example, suppose that T∀xφ(x) ∈ H .
Steps in verification that H |= ∀xφ(x) are as follows:
(i) T∀xφ(x) ∈ H ;
(ii) for each H such that R(H, H ): T ∀x φ(x) ∈ H (by 14.2(viii));
(iii) for each H such that R(H, H ): T φ(a) ∈ H for each a ∈ P(H );
(iv) for each H such that R(H, H ): H |= φ(a) for each a ∈ P(H );
(v) H |= ∀x φ(x).
In case of F ∀x φ(x) ∈ H , we follow same lines except that we replace line (ii)
with line (ii’):
(ii’) there exists H such that R(H, H ) and F φ(a) ∈ H for some a ∈ I (H );
and we replace line (iii) with line (iii’): there exists H such that R(H, H ) and it
is not the case that H |= φ(a) for some a ∈ I (H );
and we replace line (v) with line (v’): H |= ∀xφ(x) does not hold.
We proceed by analogy in case of existential quantification. Sentential cases were
considered in case of the intuitionistic sentential logic. The symbol Par denotes the
countable (infinite) set of parameters. 

Definition 4.59 (Hintikka saturated sets)

(cf. Fitting [7–9]). A set of signed formulae H is a Hintikka saturated set relative to
a set Par of parameters (is a Par -saturated set) if and only if the following hold:
(i) if Tφ ∧ ψ ∈ H , then Tφ ∈ H and Tψ ∈ H ;
(ii) if Fφ ∧ ψ ∈ H , then Fφ ∈ H or Fψ ∈ H Tψ ∈ H ;
(iii) if Tφ ∨ ψ ∈ H , then Tφ ∈ H or Tψ ∈ H ;
(iv) if Fφ ∨ ψ ∈ H , then FTφ ∈ H and Fψ ∈ H ;
(v) if T¬φ ∈ H , then Fφ ∈ H ;
(vi) if Tφ ⊃ ψ ∈ H , then either Fφ ∈ H or Tψ ∈ H ;
(vii) if T∀x.φ(x) ∈ H , then Tφ( p) for each p ∈ Par ;
(viii) if F∃xφ(x) ∈ H , then Fφ( p) ∈ H for each p ∈ Par ;
(ix) if T∃xφ(x) ∈ H , then Tφ( p) ∈ H for some p ∈ Par .

Theorem 4.49 Each consistent set of signed formulae H with P being the set of
parameters in formulae of H and Q a countably infinite set ordered as (qn )∞
1 of
parameters, disjoint with P, extends to a (P ∪ Q)-saturated set H ∗ .
4.16 Natural Deduction: FOIL-Tableaux 223

Proof Proof of Theorem 4.49 resembles proof of the Lindenbaum Lemma, a sat-
urated extension is built inductively. Formulae in H can be made into a sequence
Φ : φ1 , φ2 , . . . and parameters in Q form a sequence Q : q1 , q2 , . . .. Disjointness of
Q with P secures preservation of consistency after substitution of any qi into for-
mulae of the form T ∃x.φ(x) ∈ H . Steps in construction of saturation are as follows.
(i) if Tφ ∧ ψ ∈ H
(ii) initialization: H0 = H ;
(iii) inductive step: suppose that Hn is already defined. Pick the first φ j which is
T ∃x ψ(x) and there is no p ∈ P such that T ψ( p) ∈ Γn∗ ; for qn , form the set
{Γn∗ , T ψ(qn )} and extend it to MaxCon P∪{q1 ,...,qn } ; call it Hn+1 ;

(iv) define H ∗ = n≥0 Hn .

We let R = P ∪ Q and R\ = P ∪ {q1 , q2 , . . . , qn }. By construction, MaxCon P H ∗ .

If a formula ξ : T ∃xφ(x) ∈ H ∗ , then, for some n, ξ appears at step n and Tφ(qn ) ∈
H ∗ , so H ∗ is saturated. 
Theorem 4.50 H ∗ supports a Hintikka family.
Proof (Fitting [7]) Split R  into countably infinite disjoint pairwise sets Z i = { pij :
i = 1, 2, . . .} and let Z n∗ = i≤n Z i . Declare Δn as the family of sets of formulae
which are Z n∗ -saturated.
Claim. The family H = {Δn : n ≥ 1} is a Hintikka family. Indeed, consider Ω ∈ Δn
for some n. Parameters of Ω form the set Z n . We check that conditions (H0)-(H12)
in Definition 4.58 are fulfilled. As Ω is Z n -saturated, hence, maximal consistent, the
following hold:
if T φ ∧ ψ ∈ Ω, then T φ ∈ Ω and T ψ ∈ Ω;
(i)
if F φ ∧ ψ ∈ Ω, then F φ ∈ Ω or F ψ ∈ Ω;
(ii)
if T φ ∨ ψ ∈ Ω, then T φ ∈ Ω or T ψ ∈ Ω;
(iii)
(iv)if F φ ∨ ψ ∈ Ω, then F φ ∈ Ω and F ψ ∈ Ω;
(v)if T φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Ω, then F φ ∈ Ω or T ψ ∈ Ω;
(vi)if T ¬φ ∈ Ω, then F φ ∈ Ω;
(vii)if T ∀xφ(x) ∈ Ω, then φ( p) ∈ Ω for each p ∈ Z n ;
(viii)if F ∃x φ(x) ∈ Ω, then F φ( p) ∈ Ω for each p ∈ Z n ;
(ix)if T ∃x φ(x) ∈ Ω, then T φ( p) ∈ Ω for some p ∈ Z n (by construction of H ∗ );
(x)if F¬φ ∈ Ω, then the set {T Ω, T φ} is consistent and it extends to a Z n+1 -
saturated set Z , so R(Ω, Z ) and T φ ∈ Z ;
(xi) if F φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Ω, then as in (x), we find Z such that R(Ω, Z ), T φ ∈ Z , F
ψ ∈ Z;
(xii) if F∀xφ(x) ∈ Ω, then, for some p ∈ I (Z n+1 ), the set {T Ω, Fφ( p)} is consis-
tent so it extends to some Z n+1 -saturated set W and as in (x), R(Ω, W ) and F
φ( p) ∈ W . Claim is proved. 
Theorem 4.51 (The Completeness Theorem for FOIL) FOIL is complete: what is
valid, is provable.
224 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Proof Consider a formula φ and suppose that φ is not provable, so the set {Fφ}
is Z n∗ -consistent for some n, hence, it extends to some Z n∗ -saturated set U , hence,
U ∈ H, and F φ ∈ U , a contradiction. 

4.17 Problems

Problem 4.1 (The formula G(k, l, m, n))

(after Chellas [12], 3.3). For given natural numbers k, l, m, n, the formula G(k, l,
m, n) is: M k L l → L m M n . Prove: formulae (D), (B), (T), (4), (5) are special cases
of G(k, l, m, n).

Problem 4.2 ((k, l, m, n)-directed structures)

Prove: the formula G(k, l, m, n) is valid in frames in which the accessibility relation
R is (k, l, m, n)-directed: if R k (u, w) and R m (u, v), then there exists z such that
R l (w, z) and R n (v, z).

Problem 4.3 (The formula L(m, n))

Prove: The formula L(m, n): L m φ ⊃ L n φ does encompass formulae (4) and (T).

Problem 4.4 (L(m, n)-linear structures)

Prove: the formula L(m, n) is valid in frames in which the accessibility relation R
satisfies the condition: if R n (u, v), then R m (u, v).

Problem 4.5 (Schemes Bc , 5c )

(after Chellas [12], 3.39). The formula (Bc ) is L M p ⊃ p and the formula (5c ) is
L M P ⊃ M p.
Prove: (a) the formula (Bc ) is satisfied in structures with the accessibility relation R
fulfilling the condition: for each w ∈ W there exists v ∈ W such that R(w, v) and if
R(v, u), then w = u;
(b) the formula (5c ) is satisfied in structures in which the accessibility relation R
has the property that for each w ∈ W there exists v ∈ W such that R(w, v) and if
R(v, u), then v = u.

Problem 4.6 (Transitive closure of accessibility) 

Recall that transitive closure of a relation R is T C R = ∞n≥0 R , where R = id,
n 0
ω ω
R n+1
= R ◦ R. We define an operator L as M, w |= L φ ≡ ∀v.(T C R(w, v) ⊃
n

M, v |= Lφ}.
Prove: (a) In structures with accessibility defined as T C R for any relation R, formulae
(K), (T), (4) are valid;
(b) If a relation R is symmetric, then under T C R the formula (B) is valid, a
fortiori, the structure is a model for S5;
(c) Define semantics for the operator M ω φ = ¬(L ω ¬φ).
4.17 Problems 225

Problem 4.7 (Intutionistic connections of the system B)

Prove: (a) the formula (B): p ⊃ L M p is equivalent to the formula (B’): p ⊃
¬M¬M p;
(b) in the formula (B’) of (a), replace the double symbol ¬M with the intuitionistic
negation sign ∼ and prove that the obtained formula p ⊃∼∼ p is the double negation
law of the intuitionistic logic.
Problem 4.8 (Truth and falsity modeled)
It is tacitly assumed that each world is endowed with full SL (we do not mention it
explicitly). Taking this into account, prove: (a) the formula L is valid in any normal
system; (b) the formula ¬(M⊥) is valid in any normal system.
Problem 4.9 Prove that in any normal modal system the formula M ≡ (L p ⊃
M p) is valid.
Problem 4.10 (The Leśniewski erasure mapping ι)
The mapping ι is defined on formulae of sentential modal logic as follows:
(i) ι(¬φ is ¬(ι(φ));
(ii) ι(φ ◦ ψ) is ι(φ) ◦ ι(ψ) for ◦ ∈ {∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡};
(iii) ι(Lφ) = ι(φ) = ι(Mφ);
(iv) ι(⊥) = ⊥.
The mapping ι erases all symbols of modal operators from formulae of modal logic.
Prove that ι transforms valid formulae of modal logic into valid formulae of sentential
logic and inference rules of modal logic into inference rules of sentential logic. Apply
this result in order to prove consistency of logics K, T, 4, 5, B, D.
Problems 4.11–4.19 are already in (Chellas [12]).
Problem 4.11 (Less discussed modal logics: KB)
Prove: (a) a normal modal logic is KB if it contains as valid the formula L(M p ⊃
q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ Lq) (b) the following is a rule of inference of KB: Mp⊃Lq
p⊃q
(c) the scheme
(4) is valid in KB if and only if the scheme (5) is valid in KB. Deduce that KB4 is
equivalent to KB5.
Problem 4.12 (Less discussed modal logics: KT5)
Prove that the following logics are identical: KT5, KTB4, KDB4, KDB5. [Hint:
Prove that KT5 contains B, 4, D.]
Problem 4.13 (Less discussed modal logics: KDB4)
Prove that the scheme T is valid in the modal logic KDB4.
Problem 4.14 (Less discussed modal logics: KD4, KD5)
Prove that the formula L M p ≡ L M L M p is valid in the normal modal logic KD4.
Prove that the formula L L p ≡ M L p is valid in the normal modal logic KD5.
Problem 4.15 (Less discussed modal logics: KTG4)
Prove that KTG4 contains KT4 and is contained in KT5.
226 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

Problem 4.16 (Modalities of normal modal logic S5)

A reduction law is an equivalence which reduces the number of modal symbols in a
formula. Prove that the following reductions are valid for the normal modal logic S5
(i) L L p ≡ L p;
(ii) M M p ≡ M p;
(iii) Mlp ≡ L p;
(iv) L M p ≡ M p.
A modality is a sequence of modal operator symbols. Apply reduction laws (i)-(iv) in
a proof that S5 has the following modalities: L, M, ¬L, ¬M (one may add formally
the empty modality ∅ and its negation ¬).

Problem 4.17 (Modalities vs. equivalence of logics: S5 vs. KD45)

Prove that KD45 has the same set of modalities as S5 but the formula L p ⊃ p is
valid in S5 and it is not valid in KD45.

Problem 4.18 (Modalities of KT4)

Prove the following reduction laws for KT4:
(i) L L p ≡ L p;
(ii) M M p ≡ M p;
(iii) L M L M p ≡ L M p;
(iv) M L M L p ≡ M L p.
Deduce that KT4 has the following modalities: L, M LM, ML, LML, MLM and
their negations (one may add the empty sequence and its negation).

Problem 4.19 (Modalities of K5)

(after Chellas [12]). Prove the following reduction laws for K5:
(i) L L L p ≡ L L p; M M M p ≡ M M p;
(ii) L M L p ≡ L L p; M L M p ≡ M M p;
(iii) M L L p ≡ M L p; L M M p ≡ L M p;
(iv) M M L p ≡ M L p; L L M p ≡ L M p.
Prove: the normal modal logic K5 has the following modalities: L, M, LL, MM,
LM, ML, their negations and the empty modality and its negation=negation ¬.

Problem 4.20 (Quantified modal logic)

Consider formulae:
(a) M∀xφ(x) ⊃ ∀x Mφ;
(b) ∃x Lφ ⊃ L∃xφ.
For formulae (a), (b), check that they form a pair like Barcan and converse Barcan
formulae and check their validity.
4.17 Problems 227

Problem 4.21 (SIL)

Prove or disprove validity of the following formulae of SIL:
(a) p∨ ∼ p;
(b) ∼∼ p ⊃ p;
(c) ∼∼ ( p∨ ∼ p);
(d) ( p ∨ q) ⊃∼ (∼ p∧ ∼ q);
(e) ∼∼ ( p ∨ q) ⊃ (∼∼ p∨ ∼∼ q).
Problem 4.22 (Truth sets)
(cf. Smullyan [28], Fitting [7]). An SL-truth set T satisfies the following conditions:
(a) φ∨ψ ∈T ≡φ∈T ∨ψ ∈T;
(b) φ∧ψ ∈T ≡φ∈T ∧φ∈T;
(c) ¬φ ∈ T ≡ φ ∈
/T;
(d) φ⊃ψ∈T ≡φ∈ / T ∨ψ ∈T.
Prove: (i) a formula φ of sentential logic is valid if and only if φ belongs in every
truth set; (ii) apply the notion of truth set and (a) to prove: each valid formula of
intuitionistic sentential logic is a valid formula of sentential logic.
Problem 4.23 (SIL into S4)
(Schütte [24], cf. Fiting [7]). Translation of formulae of SIL into formulae of S4 is
effected by means of the following function P:
(a) P(φ) = Lφ for each atomic formula φ;
(b) P(φ ∨ ψ) = P(φ) ∨ P(ψ);
(c) P(φ ∧ ψ) = P(φ) ∧ P(ψ);
(d) P(∼ φ) = L¬P(φ);
(e) P(φ ⊃ ψ) = L(P(φ) ⊃ P(ψ)).
Prove: a formula φ of sentential intuitionistic logic is valid in this logic if and only
if the formula P(φ) is a valid formula of the modal system S4.
Problem 4.24 (FOIL)
Prove: For each model (W, R, P, |=) for FOIL, for any w ∈ W , w |= φ if and only
if φ ∈ PI F (w).
Problem 4.25 (FOIL) For each model (W, R, P, |=) for FOIL, if w |= φ and w∗ ∈
N F (w), then w ∗ |= φ.
Problem 4.26 (FOIL)
Prove that the valid formula of FO: ¬¬[∀x.(φ(x) ∨ ¬φ(x))] is not valid as a formula
of intuitionistic logic.
Problem 4.27 (FOIL)
Prove that the valid formula of FO: ∀x.[( p ∨ φ(x)) ⊃ ( p ∨ ∀x.φ(x))], where p con-
tains no occurrence of x, is not valid as a formula of intuitionistic logic. [Hint: in
both cases,construct falsifying FOIL models].
228 4 Modal and Intuitionistic Logics

References

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Zalta, E.N.(ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-logic
2. Bobzien, S.: Stoic logic. In: Inwood, B. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Stoic Philosophy.
Cambridge University Press (2003)
3. Knuuttila, S.: Medieval Theories of Modality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2021 Edition), Zalta, E.N. (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/
modality-medieval/
4. Lewis, C.I.: A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley: University of California Press; reprinted:
Dover Publications (1960) (without Chs. 5, 6)
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19630090502
7. Fitting, M.C.: Intuitionistic Logic Model Theory and Forcing. North-Holland Publishing Co.,
Amsterdam (1969)
8. Fitting, M.C.: Model existence theorems for modal and intuitionistic logics. J. Symb. Logic
38, 613–627 (1973)
9. Fitting, M.C.: Proof Methods for Modal and Intuitionistic Logics. Springer Science+Business
Media, Dordrecht (1983)
10. Ohnishi, M., Matsumoto, K.: Gentzen method for modal calculi I, II. Osaka Math. J. 9, 113–130
(1957); 11, 115–120 (1959)
11. Henkin, L.: The completeness of the first-order functional calculus. J. Symb. Logic 14(3),
159–166 (1949)
12. Chellas, B.F.: Modal Logic. An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK
(1980)
13. Ladner, R.E.: The computational complexity of provability in systems of modal propositional
logic. SIAM J. Comput. 6(3), 467–480 (1977)
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UK (2001)
15. Halpern, J., Moses, Y.O.: A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowl-
edge and belief. Artif. Intell. 54(2), 319–379 (1992)
16. Nelson, M.: Propositional Attitude Reports. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2022 Edition), Zalta, E.N. (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/
prop-attitude-reports
17. Marcus, R.B.: A functional calculus of first order based on strict implication. J. Symb. Logic
11, 1–16 (1946)
18. Kripke, S.: Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16, 83–94
(1963)
19. Fitting, M.C., Mendelson, R.L.: First-Order Modal Logic. Springer Business+Media B.V, Dor-
drecht (1998)
20. Fitting, M.C.: Tableau methods of proof for modal logics. Notre Dame J. Form. Logic 13,
237–247 (1972)
21. Gorë, R.: Tableau methods for modal and temporal logics. In: D’Agostino, M., et al. (eds.)
Handbook of Tableau Methods. Kluwer, Dordrecht (1998)
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Press, 128–129 (1969))
24. Schütte, K.: Vollständige Systeme modaler und intuitionistischer Logik. Springer, Berlin (1968)
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Holland Publishing Co. (1965)
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Polish Acad. Sci. 132, 171, (1977))
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& Row Publishers, New York (1966)
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Chapter 5
Temporal Logics for Linear and
Branching Time and Model Checking

Temporal expressions had been with humanity from the beginnings. Once the oral
speeches or written texts begun, it was possible to record for contemporary and future
generations reflections on time. The Flood was perceived as a time related event: after
it time begun anew, time as a main factor was mentioned in earliest philosophy, e.g.,
in philosophy of Heraclitus of Ephesus, time flows bringing cycles of opposites, life
and death, way upward and way downward.
In the Bible, we see recognition of God’s time, eternal and not changing, and
the limited time of man, without past and without future ‘To every thing there is a
season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven; A time to be born, and a time
to die ... (Kohelet [1], 3:1,3:2).
Megaric and Stoic schools (Diodorus Cronus, Zeno of Elea) disputed the nature of
motion trying to resolve paradoxes they created which implicitly involved time as a
sequence of events. Into logic time came in Aristotle in connection with the problem
of future contingencies:‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow; there will not be any
sea battle tomorrow’. Analysis of those problem in Aristotle led Jan Łukasiewicz to
invention of many-valued logic Łukasiewicz [2].
Some medieval thinkers involved time in emerging dynamics (Nicolas d’Ore sme).
Avicenna (Ibn Sina) at the turn of 9th century CE considered temporal qualifications
to syllogisms: ‘at all times’, ‘at most times’, ‘at some time’.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 231
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_5
232 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

5.1 Temporal Logic of Prior

Modern temporal logic begun with introduction of formalized notion of time into
analysis of language, the work of Arthur Prior in Prior’s ‘Tense Logic’ Prior [3].
Prior’s tense operators listed below, reflect expressions for time events used in natural
language:

Definition 5.1 (The Prior tense operators) They are divided into past time operators
and future times operators.
Prior’s past time operators
(i) P: ‘... it has at some time been the case that...’;
(ii) H: ‘... it has always been the case that ...’.
Prior’s future time operators
(iii) F: ‘... it will at some time be the case that...’;
(iv) G: ‘... it will always be the case that ...’.
Pairs P, H and F, G are dual to each other.
(i) Pφ ≡ ¬H ¬φ;
(ii) Fφ ≡ ¬G¬φ;
(iii) H φ ≡ ¬P¬φ;
(iv) Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ.

Time may be modelled as continuous, but time may be as well modelled as discrete.
In Pnueli [4], modal logic of time was proposed as a tool in verification of programs
and in model checking, and, the linear time model (LTL) was proposed. Later on,
more complex models of time emerged, for instance, tree-like structures and then
we speak of branching time models (BTL) of which Computational Tree Model
(CTL) and its extension CTL* are most often discussed. These models find their
use in modelling various systems. In temporal logics one discusses long sequences
of moments of time called paths, which are modelled as infinite sequences of states
connected by instances of a transition relation.
In applications, temporal logics are often coupled with automatons and languages,
hence, we collected in Chap. 1 basic facts about grammars, formal languages and
automata. In the final part of this chapter, we give an account of model checking with
automata for linear and branching temporal logics. We begin with the linear discrete
model of time.

5.2 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)

Introduction of time aspect into computer science problems is owed to Kamp [5] and
Pnueli who discussed linear time which led to emergence of Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL). Linear temporal logic studies basically the behavior of systems over a single
5.2 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) 233

sequence of time moments modelled as an infinite path. LTL uses as the set of worlds
W in the simplest case the discrete set of natural numbers N. Let us call in this case
numbers—states. So we have the infinite sequence od states s0 , s1 , s2 , ..sn , .....
This means that LTL is concerned with events present and future. By a path,
denoted σ, we mean any infinite subsequence of states si0 , si1 , . . . , ..... However,
LTL can be enriched by addition of mirror operators symmetric with respect to
the state s0 to future time operators. This variant of LTL is denoted LTL+PAST; a
canonical model of time for LTL+Past is the set Z of integers.

Definition 5.2 (Syntax of LTL)

(i) LTL contains a countable set of atomic propositions of sentential logic SL; in
LTL oriented towards model checking, i.e., to computer science applications,
this set is denoted A P and it may consist of formulae, descriptors, etc.;
(ii) LTL makes use of temporal operators X (next), F (eventually), G (always), U
(until); the variant LTL+PAST employs additionally operators P (previous) and
S (since). As P mirrors X and S mirrors U, we exclude past operators from our
present discussion.

Definition 5.3 (Formulae of LTL) Well-formed formulae (wffs) of LTL are defined
by structural complexity as follows:
(i) all atomic propositions p ∈ A P are wffs;
(ii) falsum ⊥ (falsity) is the wff;
(iii) if φ is a wff, then Fφ, Gφ, Xφ are wffs;
(iv) if φ and ψ are wffs, then φ U ψ is a wff;
(v) If φ and ψ are wffs, then φ ⊃ ψ, and ¬φ are wfs.

From Definition 5.3 it follows in a standard way that if φ, ψ are wffs, then φ ∨ ψ,
φ ∧ ψ are wffs and verum  defined as ¬⊥ is a wff. We call valid formulae of
sentential logic SL tautologies in order to discern them from proper formulae of
LTL.

Definition 5.4 (Linear Kripke structures for LTL) LTL semantics borrows from
modal logic the notion of a Kripke structure as a set of worlds together with an
accessibility relation and an assignment on A P, which assigns to each world the set
of atomic propositions true in that world.
For purposes of LTL, this scheme has to be adapted to already mentioned
structure of an infinite sequence of moments of time. Let σ =< s0 , s1 , . . . , s j ,
. . . > be an infinite sequence of states and Σ be the set of elements of σ. The acces-
sibility relation is the successor relation Succ with instances of the form si → si+1
for i ≥ 0.

The functional space (2 A P )Σ is the space of all assignments si → X i ⊆ A P for

i ≥ 0. Each element of the space (2 A P )Σ is a mapping f : Σ → 2 A P called a trace.
Hence, f (Σ) is an ω-sequence (ω-word) over 2 A P . We denote the linear structure
defined by the mapping f by the symbol M f .
234 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Definition 5.5 (The relation of satisfaction) The pointed structure is the pair
(M f , si ), where si ∈ Σ. We define the relation M f , si |= φ by structural induction.
(i) M f , si |=  for each f and each si ;
(ii) for each atomic proposition p, M f , si |= p if and only if p ∈ f (si ) ;
(iii) M f , si |= φ ⊃ ψ if and only if either it is not true that M f , si |= φ or
M f , si |= ψ;
(iv) M f , si |= φ ∨ ψ if and only if either M f , si |= φ or M f , si |= ψ;
(v) M f , si |= φ ∧ ψ if and only if M f , si |= φ and M f , si |= ψ;
(vi) M f , si |= Xφ if and only if M f , si+1 |= φ;
(vii) M f , si |= φUψ if and only if there exists j ≥ i such that M f , s j |= ψ and
M f , sk |= φ for each i ≤ k < j;
(viii) M f , si |= Fφ if and only if there exists j ≥ i such that M f , s j |= φ;
(ix) M f , si |= Gφ if and only if for each i ≤ j, M f , s j |= φ.

Conditions (v)–(ix) in Definition 5.5 imply dependencies among temporal oper-

ators.

Theorem 5.1 The following equivalences hold.

(i) M f , si |= Gφ ≡ M f , si |= ¬ F¬φ;
(ii) M f , si |= X ¬φ ≡ M f , si |= ¬ Xφ;
(iii) M f , si |= Fφ ≡ M f , si |=  U φ;
(iv) M f , si |= Fφ ≡ M f , si |= φ∨ XFφ;
(v) M f , si |= Gφ ≡ M f , si |= φ∧ XGφ;
(vi) M f , si |= φ Uψ ≡ M f , si |= ψ∨ X(φ U ψ).

Proof For example, we prove (iii). Suppose that M f , si |= Fφ. Hence, there exists
j ≥ i such that M f , s j |= φ. By Definition 5.5(i), M f , sk |=  for each k. By Defi-
nition 5.5(vii), M f , si |=  U φ. The converse is proved along same lines. 

Definition 5.6 (Validity) A formula φ is true in the structure M f if and only if

M f , s0 |= φ; a formula φ is valid if and only if it is valid in each structure M f . As
usual, we denote truth at a structure M f as M f |= φ and validity as |= φ.

We denote by σ j the prefix < s0 , s1 , . . . , s j > and by σ j the suffix < s j ,

s j+1 , . . . > of σ. In accordance with our notational scheme, Σ j is the set of ele-
ments in σ j and Σ j contains elements of σ j . For f ∈ (2 A P )Σ , we denote by the
symbol f j the restriction f |Σ j and, correspondingly, we define the structure M f j .
Similarly, we define the prefix f j as the mapping f |Σ j and we define the structure
M fj .
We now list some additional valid formulae of LTL. In checking validity please
remember about detachment rule of inference.
5.2 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) 235

Theorem 5.2 The following formulae are among valid formulae of LTL.
I. Formulae involving F and G.

(I.i) FFφ ≡ Fφ;

(I.ii) GGφ ≡ Gφ;
(I.iii) FGFGφ ≡ FGφ;
(I.iv) FGFφ ≡ GFφ;
(I.v) GFGFφ ≡ GFφ;
(I.vi) GFGφ ≡FGφ;
(I.vii) FGφ ⊃ GFφ;
(I.viii) φ ⊃ Gφ;
(I.ix) (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Gφ ⊃ Gψ).
II. Formulae involving U

(II.i) φ U(φUψ) ≡ φUψ;

(II.ii) (φUψ)U ψ ≡ φUψ;
(II.iii) φU(φUψ) ≡ (φ Uψ)Uψ;
(II.iv) φUψ ≡ (ψ ∨ (φ∧ XφUψ)).
III. Distributive formulae

(III.i) F(φ ∨ ψ) ≡ F(φ)∨F(ψ);

(III.ii) F(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃F(φ)∧F(ψ);
(III.iii) G(φ ∧ ψ) ≡G(φ)∧G(ψ);
(III.iv) G(φ)∨G(ψ) ⊃G(φ ∨ ψ).
IV. Formulae involving G,X,F and G, F, U

(IV.i) φ∧G(φ ⊃ XFφ)⊃ GFφ;

(IV.ii) Gφ∧ Fψ ⊃ φ U ψ;
(IV.iii) X(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Xφ ⊃Xψ);
(IV.iv) GXφ ⊃ XGφ;
(IV.v) G(φ ⊃ ψ∧ Xφ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ Gψ).

We prove some typical cases.

Proof For (I.i): M f |=FFφ if and only if there exists j ≥ 0 such that M f j |=Fφ if
and only if there exists k ≥ j such that M f j k |= φ if and only if there exists k ≥ 0
such that M f k |= φ, i.e., M f |= Fφ.
For (I.iv): please observe that GFφ means that φ occurs at states of Σ infinitely
often so adding F once more does not change this behavior of φ. Formally,
M f |=FGFφ if and only if there exists j ≥ 0 such that M f j |= GFφ if and only
if for each k ≥ j there exists m ≥ k such that M f m |= φ if and only if for each p ≥ 0
there exists q ≥ p such that M f q |= φ if and only if M f |= GFφ.
For (IV.ii): M f |= Gφ if and only if φ is true at each si . M f |=Fψ if and only
if M f,si |= ψ for some si , hence, for j < i, M f , s j |= φ and M f , s j |= ψ which is
equivalent to M f , s |= φUψ. 
236 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Temporal logic LTL allows us to define some properties of systems.

Example 5.1 Consider the system of traffic lights with green, red, yellow lights.
We let A P = {green, red, yellow}. Let the mapping f assign to σ the sequence
(green, red, yellow)ω . Then the following formulae are valid:
(i) GF(green), respectively, GF(red), GF(yellow); the meaning is ‘infinitely often
red, same for green, yellow;
(ii) yellow⊃ F(red): after ‘yellow, at some time red’;
(iii) G(yellow ⊃ X red): ‘always, after yellow, next red’.

Definition 5.7 (Some properties of systems expressible in LTL)

(i) liveness G(action initiated) → F(action completed): always action initiated
and then at some time action completed;
(ii) fairness: GF(action initiated)→ GF(action completed): action initiated and
completed infinitely often;
(iii) safety: G(true) (called also invariant), ¬ F(failure): always correct, never fails;
(iv) stability: FG(true): after some time, always correct;
(v) response: p →Fq: ‘after p at some time q’;
(vi) precedence: p → qUr ; p then q after q r ;
(vii) causality: F p → Fq: if at some time p, then at some time q.

We may have other temporal operators. Examples are operators R and W.

Definition 5.8 (Operators R and W) W (called Weak Until) weakens condition

φUψ: if always φ, then ψ may not happen; the rendering is: φWψ is equivalent to
Gφ ∨ φUψ.
R (called Release) is defined as φRψ if and only if ¬(¬φU¬ψ). The reader will
please disentangle the meaning. [Hint: a plausible meaning is G ψ ∨ ψU φ ∧ ψ].

5.3 Computational Tree Logic (CTL)

Branching time logics model more sophisticated approaches to time in which one
allows that time may ramify in various directions, e.g., when at a given state one
has a non-deterministic choice of progression along distinct paths. Such cases are
modelled by transition systems. We recall here the notion of a transition system.

Definition 5.9 (Transition systems) A transition system is a tuple T = (S, A P,

→T , I, L), where
(i) S is a set of states which may be finite or infinite countable;
(ii) A P is a set of atomic propositions;
(iii) →T is a transition relation which maps a given state s to a set S(s) of successors
of s, i.e., →T : S → 2 S ;
5.3 Computational Tree Logic (CTL) 237

(iv) I is a set of initial states, all actions of a transition system begin in one of initial
states;
(v) L is an assignment of sets of atomic propositions to states, i.e, L : S → 2 A P .
Choice of L determines logical language L(s) at each particular state s. L may
be also called a valuation or a labelling.

A transition system is actually a directed graph which may possess various prop-
erties of directed graphs, i.e, be acyclic or cyclic, be a tree or a forest. A transition
system T is rooted when it has the unique initial state, and it is tree-like when it is a
tree.
A transition system is total when the transition relation →T is serial, i.e., each
state s has a successor s ∈→T (s). We assume that transition systems considered
here are total and rooted.

Definition 5.10 (Paths, traces) A walk in a transition system T is a sequence of

states (sq )q∈Q over a well-ordered set Q of indices such that each sq has a unique
successor sq . A walk may be infinite or finite; it is initial when its first state is the
initial state and it is maximal when it is not extendable to a proper super-walk. An
infinite walk is called a path.

For each state s, we denote by the symbol Path(s) the set of paths which begin
with s. Then s is the root for the fragment of transition system defined by Path(s). For
each π ∈ Path(s), s is denoted as f ir st (π). For each path π, the trace T race(π) is
the sequence (L(s))s∈π , (cf. Mazurkiewicz [6]).
We now introduce CTL: Computational Tree logic, which belongs in the family
of Branching Time Logics, whose structures allow for each state to begin distinct
paths, i.e, time ramifies in those models. This calls for another type of structures than
linear structures we have met in the case of LTL.

Definition 5.11 (Syntax of CTL) Formulae of CTL are divided into two categories:
state formulae and path formulae. State formulae describe the statuses of states and
path formulae describe the behavior of paths. In addition to known from LTL temporal
operators X, U, F, G, we find in CTL two path operators: A meaning ‘for all paths’
and E meaning ‘there exists a path’.

State formulae State formulae are denoted as φs , ψs , . . ., and the subscript s

means ‘at state s’.
(i) for each state s: each p ∈ A P induces the state formula ps ;
(ii) for each state s: falsum ⊥ induces the state formula ⊥s ;
(iii) if φs and ψs are state formulae, then φs ⊃ ψs is the state formula;
(iv) if φs is a state formula, then ¬φs is the state formula;
(v) if α p is a path formula, then Aα p is a state formula;
(vi) if α p is a path formula, then Eα p is a state formula.
Path formulae Path formulae are denoted as φ p , etc., and the subscript p means
‘for path p’.
238 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

(vii) If φs is a state formula, then Xφs is a path formula;

(viii) If φs , ψs are state formulae, then φs Uψs is a path formula.
From the above rules it follows that there is an interplay between state and path
formulae: path formulae prefixed with either A or E become state formulae and
state formulae prefixed with temporal operators become path operators. Let us also
observe that CTL does not allow for blocks of temporal operators known from LTL:
in CTL, each temporal operator must be prefixed with either A or E. Clearly, we
have a greater stock of formulae in CTL then listed in Definition 5.11(i)–(viii).

Theorem 5.3 If φs , ψs are state formulae, then (φ ∨ ψ)s , (φ ∧ ψ)s , (φ ≡ ψ)s , s

are state formulae and AFφs , AGφs , EFφs , EGφs are path formulae.

Proof Part for state formulae follows from laws of sentential logic: ( p ∨ q) ≡
(¬ p ⊃ q) and ( p ∧ q) ≡ ¬(¬ p ∨ ¬q), and, from duality s ≡ ¬⊥s .
For path formulae, we have AFφs is defined as A Uφs , EFφs is defined as E
Uφs ; AGφs is defined as ¬EF¬φs , EGφs is defined as ¬ AF¬φs .
For instance AF( ps ∨ qs )∧ EG( ps ⊃ qs ) is a well-formed state formula of CTL
(we do not discuss as of yet its validity). Now, there comes time for semantics of
CTL. We assume a rooted and total transition system T = (S, A P, →T , I, L). 

Definition 5.12 (Semantics of CTL) For a path π, we denote by the symbol π[i]
the i-th state in π. By the symbol T, s |= φ, we denote the fact that the state s in
the transition system T satisfies the formula φ, and analogous symbol will denote
satisfiability by a path π. The notation for a path is π : π[0], π[1], . . . , π[i], . . .,
where π[0] is f ir st (π).

Satisfaction relation for state formulae

(i) T, s |= p if and only if p ∈ L(s);
(ii) T, s |= s ;
(iii) T, s |= ¬φs if and only if it is not true that T, s |= φ;
(iv) T, s |= φs ⊃ ψs if and only if T, s |= ¬φs or T, s |= ψs ;
(v) T, s |= Eφ p if and only if there exists a path π ∈ Path(s) such that T, π |= φ p ;
(vi) T, s |=Aφ p if and only if for each path π ∈ Path(s), T, π |= φ p .

Satisfaction relation for path formulae

(vii) T, π |= Xφs if and only if π[1] |= φs ;
(viii) T, π |= φs U ψs if and only if there exists i ≥ 0 such that T, π[i] |= ψs and
T, π[ j] |= φs for each 0 ≤ j < i;
(ix) T, s |= AXφs if and only if for each π ∈ Path(s), π[1] |= φs ;
(x) T, s |= EFφs if and only if there exists π ∈ Path(s) and j ≥ 0 such that
π[ j] |= φs ;
(xi) T, s |= AGφs if and only if for each π ∈ Path(s) and for each j ≥ 0, π[ j] |=
φs .
5.4 Full Computational Tree Logic (CTL*) 239

Definition 5.13 (Satisfaction relation for transition systems) Semantics for CTL
does encompass the global satisfiability by transition systems. For a transition system
T , we let
(i) T |= φs if and only if T, s |= φs for each initial s ∈ I ; under our assumptions,
there is a unigue such s which we may denote root, so T |= φs if and only if
T, root |= φs ;
(ii) T |= AXφs if and only if for each path π ∈ Path(root), π[1] |= φs ;
(iii) T |= A φs U ψs if and only if for each path π ∈ Path(root), there exists i π ≥ 0
such that T, π[i π ] |= ψs and T, π[ j] |= φs for each 0 ≤ j < i π .

Counterparts to (ii), (iii) with A replaced by E define T |= EXφs and T |= Eφs Uψs
when we replace the phrase ‘for each π ∈ Path(root)’ with the phrase ‘for some π ∈
Path(root)’.

Example 5.2 We list some additional CTL-valid formulae:

(i) E(φUψ) ≡ [ψ ∨ (φ∧EXE(φUψ))];
(ii) A(φUψ) ≡ [ψ ∨ (φ∧AXA(φUψ))];
(iii) AG((φ∨EXψ) ⊃ ψ) ⊃(EFφ ⊃ ψ);
(iv) AG((φ∨AXψ) ⊃ ψ) ⊃(AFφ ⊃ ψ);
(v) A(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃(Aφ)∧(Aψ);
(vi) E(φ ∨ ψ) ≡ (Eφ) ∨ (Eψ);
(vii) AX(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃(AXφ ⊃ AXψ);
(ix) AGφ ≡ φ∧ AXAGφ;
(x) EGφ ≡ φ∧ EXEGφ;
(xi) Aφ Uψ ≡ ¬ [EG¬ψ∨ E(¬ψ U¬ψ ∧ ¬φ)].
Formula (xi) may seem hard to unveil, but it is only the first impression. By
equivalence ¬E F¬ ≡ AG, it reads

(xi’): Aφ Uψ ≡ AFψ ∧ ¬ E(¬ψ U ¬ψ ∧ ¬φ)].

The term AFψ asserts that ψ appears on each path at some state; the term ¬ E(¬ψ
U¬ψ ∧ ¬φ)] asserts that in no path the term ¬ψU ¬ψ ∧ ¬φ holds.
Consider an arbitrary path π. Let si be the fist state on π with the occurrence of
q. Then, at all preceding states, ¬ψ holds, hence φ holds, witnessing Aφ Uψ. The
converse is equally simple.

5.4 Full Computational Tree Logic (CTL*)

CTL* subsumes both LTL and CTL as it applies operators A and E which are in
CTL but not in LTL and it allows for blocks of temporal operators like in LTL but
not in CTL. As with CTL, formulae of CTL* are divided into state formulae and
path formulae.
240 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Definition 5.14 (Syntax of CTL*) We give separate rules for state and path formulae.

State formulae
(i) for each p ∈ A P, ps is a state formula;
(ii) ⊥s is a state formula;
(iii) if φs , ψs are state formulae, then φs ⊃ ψs is a state formula;
(iv) if φs is a state formula, then ¬φs is a state formula;
(v) if φ p is a path formula, then Eφ p is a state formula.

Path formulae
(vi) each state formula is a path formula;
(vii) if φ p , ψ p are path formulae, then φ p ⊃ ψ p is a path formula;
(viii) if φ p is a path formula, then ¬φ p is a path formula;
(ix) if φ p is a path formula, then Xφ p is a path formula;
(x) if φ p , ψ p are path formulae, then φ p Uψ p is a path formula.

Theorem 5.4 In CTL*, Fφ p , Gφ p , Aφ p , φs ∨ ψs , φs ∧ ψs are formulae.

Proof In CTL* which allows for blocks of temporal operators along with A,E, we
can define F,G as in LTL, i.e., Fφ p is  Uφ p , and, Gφ p is ¬F¬φ p , and, Aφ p as
¬E¬φ p . Sentential formulae follow in the standard way. 

CTL* allows for formulae like AFGE( p∨ Xq).

Definition 5.15 (Semantics of CTL*) Semantics for CTL* is defined on lines of

semantics for LTL. In particular, we recall that for a path π, the symbol π j denotes
the j-th suffix of π, i.e, the sub-path π[ j], π[ j + 1], . . .. Semantics is defined for state
formulae and for path formulae.

Satisfaction relations for state formulae

(i) T, s |= p if and only if p ∈ L(s);
(ii) T, s |= ¬φs if and only if it is not true that T, s |= φs ;
(iii) T, s |= φs ⊃ ψs if and only if either T, s |= ¬φs or T, s |= ψs ;
(iv) T, s |= Eφ p if and only if there exists a path π ∈ Path(s) such that T, π |= φ p .
Satisfaction conditions for φs ∨ ψs , φs ∧ ψs , Aφ p follow by definitions (ii) and
(iii).
Satisfaction relations for path formulae
(v) T, π |= φs if and only if T, π[0] |= φs ;
(vi) T, π |= ¬φ p if and only if it is not true that T, π |= φ p ;
(vii) T, π |= φ p ⊃ ψ p if and only if either T, π |= ¬φ p or T, π |= ψ p ;
(viii) T, π |= Xφ p if and only if π[1] |= φ p ;
(ix) T, π |= φ p Uψ p if and only if there exists j ≥ 0 such that T, π[ j] |= ψ p and
T, π[i] |= φ p for each 0 ≤ i < j.
5.5 Meta-theory of Temporal Logics 241

Satisfaction conditions for F and G follow by equivalences in Theorem 5.4

We list some CTL*-valid formulae.

Theorem 5.5 The following are valid formulae of CTL*.

(i) Aφs ⊃ φs ;
(ii) AXφ ⊃ XAφ;
(iii) AGφ ⊃ GAφ;
(iv) A(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃(Aφ ⊃ Aψ);
(v) Aφ ⊃ AAφ;
(vi) Aφ ⊃ AEφ.

5.5 Meta-theory of Temporal Logics

We begin with the linear temporal logic LTL and its decidability and we begin
with preliminaries. We recall the notion of a linear Kripke structure for LTL: let
σ =< s0 , s1 , . . . , s j , . . . > be an infinite sequence of states with Σ the set of elements
of σ. The accessibility relation is the successor relation Succ with instances of the
form si → si+1 for i ≥ 0.The set A P consists of atomic propositions.
A functional space (2 A P )Σ is the space of all assignments si → X i ⊆ A P for
i ≥ 0. Each element of the space (2 A P )Σ is a mapping f : Σ → 2 A P . Hence, f (Σ)
is an ω-sequence (ω-word) of subsets of A P.
We denote the linear structure defined by the mapping f by the symbol M f . We
denote by σ j the prefix < s0 , s1 , . . . , s j > and by Σ j the suffix < s j , s j+1 , . . . > of
Σ. For f ∈ (2 A P )Σ , we denote by the symbol f j the restriction f |Σ j . Similarly,
we define the mapping f j as f |Σ j .

Definition 5.16 (Periodic linear structures) A sequence σ of states is periodic if and

only if there exists a natural number k and a natural number j0 such that for each
j ≥ j0 s j = s j+k . The number k is an ultimate period of σ and the smallest k with
this property is called the ultimate period of σ. The number j0 is the prefix length
and k is the loop length. The same definition concerns infinite words.

The set Sub(φ) of a formula φ is defined by structural induction:

(i) Sub(⊥) = {⊥} and Sub() = {};
(ii) for any binary operator or connective ◦, Sub(φ ◦ ψ) = Sub(φ)∪ Sub(ψ) ∪{φ ◦
ψ};   
(iii) for any unary operator or connective , Sub( φ) = Sub(φ)∪{ φ};
Cardinality |Sub(φ)| does not exceed the size ||φ|| of φ, defined as the number of
nodes in the parse tree of φ.
We recall the negation ∼ which toggles between the formula and its negation.
(i) ∼ φ is ψ if φ is ¬ψ;
(ii) ∼ φ is ¬ψ if φ is ψ.
242 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

We recall the notion of the Fischer-Ladner closure of a formula φ (Fisher, Lad-

ner [7] ).

Definition 5.17 (The Fischer-Ladner closure) The Fischer-Ladner closure of φ,

denoted F LC(φ), is the smallest set which contains all sub-formulae of φ and their
negations by ∼. We observe that |F LC(φ)| ≤ 2 · |Sub(φ)|. Moreover
(i) if ψ ∈ Sub(φ), then {ψ, ∼ ψ} ⊆ F LC(φ));
(ii) if ¬ψ ∈ F LC(φ), then ψ ∈ Sub(φ).

A set Γ of formulae of LTL is closed if and only if Γ = F LC(Γ ) = {F LC(φ) :
φ ∈ Γ }. We define the consistency notion for a set Γ of formulae of LTL.

Definition 5.18 (SL-consistency) A set Γ of formulae is SL-consistent if and only

if the following requirements are met:

(i) Γ contains neither the pair ⊥,  nor any pair φ, ¬φ, nor, ψ, ∼ ψ;
(ii) if ¬¬φ ∈ Γ , then φ ∈ Γ ;
(iii) if φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ , then φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ ;
(iv) if φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ , then φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ ;
(v) if ¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ , then ∼ φ ∈ Γ or ∼ ψ ∈ Γ ;
(vi) If ¬(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ Γ , then ∼ φ ∈ Γ and ∼ ψ ∈ Γ .

In particular, FLC(φ) is SL-consistent.

Definition 5.19 (Maximal consistent sets) For a formula φ, a set Γ of formulae is

maximally consistent with respect to F LC(φ), which is denoted MaxCon φ (Γ ), if
the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) Γ contains neither the pair ⊥, ¬ nor any pair φ, ¬φ, nor, ψ, ∼ ψ;
(ii) for each ψ ∈ F LC(φ), dichotomy: either ψ ∈ Γ or ∼ ψ ∈ Γ holds;
(iii) for each ¬¬ψ ∈ F LC(φ), ψ ∈ Γ if and only if ¬¬ψ ∈ Γ ;
(iv) for each ψ ∧ ξ ∈ F LC(φ), ψ ∧ ξ ∈ Γ if and only if ψ ∈ Γ and ξ ∈ Γ ;
(v) for each ψ ∨ ξ ∈ F LC(φ), ψ ∨ ξ ∈ Γ if and only if either ψ ∈ Γ or ξ ∈ Γ .

Clearly, the number of maximal consistent sets does not exceed 2|Sub(φ)| , i.e., 2|φ| .
As with the Henkin idea of treating maximal consistent sets as elements in a model,
applied in Chap. 4, we define the successor relation between MaxCons.

Definition 5.20 (Transition relation between maximal consistent sets) The transition
relation Γ1 →T Γ2 between MaxCon(Γ1 ) and MaxCon(Γ2 ) holds if:

(i) if Xφ ∈ Γ1 then φ ∈ Γ2 ;
(ii) if ¬ Xφ ∈ Γ1 then ∼ φ ∈ Γ2 ;
(iii) if ψ1 Uψ2 ∈ Γ1 then either ψ2 ∈ Γ1 or (ψ1 ∈ Γ1 and ψ1 Uψ2 ∈ Γ2 );
(iv) if ¬(ψ1 Uψ2 ) ∈ Γ1 then ∼ ψ2 ∈ Γ1 and (∼ ψ1 ∈ Γ1 or ¬(ψ1 Uψ2 ) ∈ Γ2 ).
5.5 Meta-theory of Temporal Logics 243

An important example of a maximal consistent set is related to computations in

the structure M f . We define a relative closure of φ modulo M f i as

F LC M f i (φ) = {ψ ∈ F LC(φ) : M f i |= ψ}.

Theorem 5.6 The following hold true by semantic laws of LTL and Definition 5.20.
In the forthcoming case, we denote the transition →T by the symbol →φ .
(i) MaxCon(F LC M f i (φ));
(ii) for i ≥ 0, the relation F LC M f i (φ) →φ F LC M f i+1 (φ) holds.
By Theorem 5.6, the sequence S:(F LC M f i (φ) : i ≥ 0) is a linear structure con-
sisting of maximal consistent sets. Now, we state the crucial fact about small models
for a formula φ of LTL (Sistla and Clarke [8]).
It is obvious that, as the set FLC(φ) is finite, there exist minimal k, l such that k
is the prefix length and l is the loop length, i.e., the sequence (S) is the ultimately
periodic one. The problem consists in finding values of prefix length and loop length
depending on φ. This problem may be resolved to the effect stated in the theorem in
(Sistla, Clarke [8]) that follows.
Theorem 5.7 For each formula φ of L T L , if φ is satisfiable in M f , i.e., f (0) |= φ,
then it is satisfiable in a periodic model M f ∗ with the prefix length at most 2|φ| and
the loop length at most |φ| · 2|φ| .
Proof For the prefix of the periodic model, the number of sub-formulae of φ is
bounded from above by 2|φ| , hence, i = 2|φ| is sufficient for the length of the prefix.
For the loop, it has to accommodate the U formulae, their number bounded from
above by |φ|. Any two states satisfying distinct U-formulae can be separated in the
loop by all remaining sub-formulae, their number bounded from above by 2|φ| , hence,
the sufficient number of states in the loop is l = |φ| · 2|φ| . The size of the periodic
model is then bounded by |φ| + |φ| · 2|φ| . 
By Theorem 5.7, if a formula φ of LTL is satisfiable, i.e., if M f , σ[0] |= φ for
some f, σ, then there exists the transition system ({Γ j : j ≤ i + l}, →φ ) where each
Γi is maximal consistent and φ ∈ Γ0 . Hence, φ is satisfiable in the ultimately periodic
structure and LTL has the small model property. The conclusion is
Theorem 5.8 The problem of satisfiability of formulae in LTL is decidable. As valid-
ity problem is co-unsatisfiability problem, the validity problem is decidable.
We address the problem of model checking for LTL. Model checking problem
consists in decision whether, for a given transition system (T, s, →T , L) and an LTL
formula φ, T, s |= φ. The idea for solving this decision problem is to apply already
existing witness for satisfiability in the form of the ultimately periodic model, adapted
to the new setting of a transition system, and augmented with necessary additional
ingredients taking into account states in T . Formally, one considers the existence
of a sequence (Γ j , s j ) : j ≤ i + l) for some i < l, such that this sequence consists
of a prefix and a loop of the ultimately periodic sequence. Then the following are
satisfied.
244 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

(i) i ≤ |T | · 2|φ| and l ≤ |T | · |φ| · 2|φ| ;

(ii) sets Γ j are maximal consistent;
(iii) Γi = Γi+l ;
(iv) Γ j →φ Γ j+1 holds for each j;
(v) each formula ψ : ψ1 Uψ2 ∈ {Γ j : j < i + l} is fulfilled before i + l;
(vi) s0 = s and s j →T s j+1 for j < i + l;
(vii) for each atomic proposition p ∈ A P, p ∈ Γ j if and only if p ∈ L(s j ).
The factor |T | in (i) is due to the fact that we try to find a witness that the transition
system satisfies φ, hence, we explore various paths. The main result obtained exactly
on the lines of Theorem 5.7 is
Theorem 5.9 (Demri, Goranko, Lange [9]) There exists a path σ(s) beginning at
s ∈ T such that σ(s) |= φ if and only if there exists a witness (Γ j , s j ) : j ≤ i + l)
satisfying (i)–(vii) with φ ∈ Γ0 .
By Theorem 5.9, in order to check that a transition system (T, s, →T , L) satisfies
φ, one may examine ultimately periodic models (Γ j , s j ) : j ≤ i + l) bounded in
number by |T | · (|φ| + |φ| · 2|φ| ).
We address the problem of complexity of the satisfiability problem SAT(LTL). In
this respect, in (Sistla and Clarke [8]) the following result was obtained.
Theorem 5.10 The satisfiability problem SAT(LTL) is in PSPACE, hence, the deci-
sion problem of validity is in co-PSPACE = PSPACE.
Proof We know about the existence of a sequence Γ0 , Γ1 , . . . , Γi , . . . , Γi+l
such that
(i) each Γ j is a maximal consistent subset of F LC(φ);
(ii) Γ j →φ Γ j+1 for each j;
(iii) all formulae of the form ψUξ enter Γi+l if and only if they have been verified
before i + l;
(iv) φ ∈ Γ0 ;
(v) i ≤ |φ|, l ≤ |φ| · 2|φ| .
In order to control U-formulae, one keeps the record Rec(U ) of U-formulae which are
waiting for validity witness and the record Rec(U )∗ of U-formulae already verified.
As proved in (Sistla, Clarke [8]), M f |= φ if and only if φ has the witnessing systems
with Γ s as states and →φ as the transition relation.
One can use the witnessing system to subsequently guess:
(i) i 0 ∈ [0, 2|φ| ];
(ii) j0 ∈ [1, |φ| · 2|φ| ];
(iii) Γ0 , a maximal consistent set in F LC(φ) which contains φ;
(iv) for 0 < k < i 0 , guess maximal consistent Γk such that Γk−1 →φ Γk ;
(v) let Γ ∗ be the last set guessed for k;
(vi) for i 0 < j < i 0 + j0 , guess maximal consistent Γ j like in (iv) for (j–1)
and register sets Rec(U j ) = Rec(U j−1 ) ∪ {ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Γ j } and Rec(U j )∗ =
Rec(U j−1 )∗ ∪ {ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Γ j : ψ2 ∈ Γ j };
5.5 Meta-theory of Temporal Logics 245

(vii) let Γ ∗∗ be the last set Γ j and Rec(U )∗ be the last Rec(U j ) with Rec(U )∗∗ the
last Rec(U j )∗ ;
(viii) if Γ ∗ = Γ ∗∗ and Rec(U )∗ ⊆ Rec(U )∗∗ then accept else reject.
There are finitely many guesses, checking that the witnessing sequence consists of
maximal consistent sets, that transition relation satisfies conditions, and, checking
inclusions can be done in space polynomial in size of φ, hence, non-deterministic
polynomial space is sufficient. By the Savitch Theorem 1.59, the problem is in
PSPACE. 

Satisfiability and complexity for CTL and CTL*

Satisfiability problem for CTL is known to be EXPTIME-complete (Fischer,
Ladner [7]). Satisfiability problem for CTL* is known to be 2EXPTIME-complete
(Vardi, Stockmeyer [10]). Model checking for CTL is in PTIME. We sketch the
proof in Markey [11].

Theorem 5.11 Model checking for CTL is in PTIME.

Proof It is known that temporal operators EX,EU,AF define other operators and
all formulae of CTL can be thus expressed by means of them and of sentential
connectives. Consider as a model a Kripke structure M = (W, R, A) along with a
pointed structure (M, w0 ) for some world w0 ∈ W . Let φ be a formula of CTL. The
proof is using the labelling procedure.
(i) for each atomic proposition p, for each word w, world w is labelled with p if
and only if w ∈ A( p);
(ii) for Boolean formulae: w is labelled with φ ∧ ψ, respectively with φ ∨ ψ, if
and only if w is labelled with φ and ψ, respectively, w is labelled either with φ
or ψ; w is labelled with ¬φ if and only if w is not labelled with φ;
(iii) for a sub-formula EX ψ of φ, each world w is labelled with EX ψ if and only if
there exists a world w such that R(w, w ) and w is labelled with ψ; correctness
follows by semantics of EX;
(iv) for a sub-formula ψUξ of φ, we label with ψUξ all worlds already labeled
with ξ; next, we label with ψUξ each world labeled with ψ such that there
exists a world w such that R(w, w ) and w is labelled with ψUξ; clearly, this
is monotone operation on sets of formulae in a complete set of all subsets of
sub-formulae of φ so it reaches the fixed point by the Knaster-Tarski Theorem
1.2; correctness of this labelling follows by the valid formula of CTL: EψUξ ≡
ξ∧EXEψUξ;
(v) for a sub-formula AFψ of φ, we label with AFψ each world w either already
labelled with ψ or such that each world w with R(w, w ) is labelled with
AFψ; correctness of this labeling follows by the valid formula of CTL: AFψ ≡
ψ ∨ AXAFψ; as in (iv) , the Knaster-Tarski theorem ensures that the labelling
reaches the fixed point;
(vi) M, w0 |= φ if and only if w0 is labeled with φ.
246 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Table 5.1 Complexity of Logic Complexity

satisfiability decision problem
LTL PSPACE
CTL EXPTIME
CTL* 2EXPTIME
LTL(U) PSPACE
LTL(XG) PSPACE
LTL(F) NP
LTL(X) NP
LTL+PAST PSPACE

In order to conclude that model checking for CTL is PTIME-complete, one has
to show PTIME-hardness of it. In Markey [11] the proof is proposed by reduction
of the CIRCUIT-VALUE problem known to be log space PTIME-complete Ladner
[12] to the problem of model checking for CTL. 
The corresponding problem for CTL* is PSPACE-complete (Emerson and Lei
[13]).
Theorem 5.12 CTL* model checking is PSPACE-complete.
The idea for a proof: as for each world w in a Kripke structure, w |= L T L φ if and
only if w |=C T L ∗ Aφ, the idea of a proof is to apply LTL model checking along of a
reduction of formulae of CTL* to those of LTL. In that respect please see Schnoebelen
[14].
Some fragments of logics have been also explored for model checking, e.g., the
model checking problem for the logic L(F) is NP-complete (Sistla, Clarke [8]).
We include in Table 5.1 some results from literature.

5.6 Linear Time Logic with PAST (LTL+PAST)

The temporal logic LTL+PAST is LTL augmented with past operators which are in
a sense mirrored LTL operators. While it is possible to consider them in the standard
model of an infinite path, yet more natural is to enlarge the standard path by going
from the set of natural numbers N to the set of integers Z. For each state s in Z, we
denote by the symbol (←, s] the set of states preceding s in the set Z ordered by the
natural ordering ≤ and we denote by the symbol [s, →) the set of states following s
with respect to the natural ordering ≤.
We preserve temporal operators X,U, F,G with their semantics and we add new
operators Y, which mirrors X, S, which mirrors U, and operators F−1 , G−1 as past
counterparts to F and G.
Definition 5.21 (Syntax of LTL+PAST) Formulae of LTL+PAST are defined as fol-
lows:
5.7 Properties of Systems, Model Checking by Means of Automata 247

(i) falsum ⊥ is a formula;

(ii) atomic propositions of SL are formulae;
(iii) if φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula;
(iv) if φ, ψ are formulae, then φ ⊃ ψ is a formula;
(v) if φ, ψ are formulae, then Xφ, Yφ, φUψ, φSψ are formulae.
As we already know from the discussion of LTL, (ii), (iii), (iv) imply that formulae
of sentential logic are formulae of LTL+PAST, (i) implies that verum  is defined
as ¬⊥, and, F−1 φ, G−1 φ are formulae of LTL+PAST, F−1 φ defined as  Sφ, G−1 φ
defined as ¬F−1 ¬φ.
Definition 5.22 (Semantics of LTL+PAST) LTL semantics of formulae of sentential
logics remains unchanged, for temporal operators, we define it in the new framework
of the set Z of integers.
(i) Z, s |=Xφ if and only if Z, s + 1 |= φ;
(ii) Z, s |= φUψ if and only if there exists s ∈ [s, →) such that Z, s |= ψ and
Z, s ∗ |= φ for each s ≤ s ∗ < s ;
(iii) Z, s |=Yφ if and only if Z, s − 1 |= φ;
(iv) Z, s |= φSψ if and only if there exists s ∈ (←, s] such that Z, s |= ψ and
Z, s ∗ |= φ for each s < s ∗ ≤ s;
(v) Z, s |= F−1 φ if and only if there exists s ∈ (←, s] such that Z, s |= φ;
(vi) Z, s |= G−1 φ if and only if for each s ∈ (←, s], Z, s |= φ.

Please observe that for each state s ∈ Z, Z, s |= φ ≡ Z, s |= YXφ ≡ Z, s |= XYφ.

This allows to eliminate Y; in consequence, LTL+PAST is also denoted L(U,S,X)
(Sistla, Clarke [8]); as proved therein, satisfiability and model checking for L(U,S,X)
by means of periodic models are in PSPACE.

5.7 Properties of Systems, Model Checking by Means

of Automata

We suggest Chap. 1 which brings notions and facts about transition systems, finite
and infinite automata and regular expressions and languages. We give here some
insights into the vast area of model checking. The model checking problem consists
of verifying whether a transition system T satisfies a given formula φ.
The mentioned above in Definition 5.7 properties of systems are expressed by
LTL formulae and those properties can be represented by automata. We give simple
examples of LTL properties modeled by Büchi automata. In that case the alphabet
consists of formulae of LTL.
We give some examples of automata.
Example 5.3 The automaton B1 in Table 5.2 specifies the formula G p and the
language L(B1) is p ω . This is a safety property. The accepting state is in bold. The
initial state is marked with ∗.
248 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Table 5.2 Automaton B1 States q0 q1

p q0∗ ∅
¬p q1 ∅
 ∅ q1

Table 5.3 Automaton B2 States q0∗ q1

p q1 ∅
¬p q0 ∅
 ∅ q1

Table 5.4 Transition system States s0 s1

TS
Transitions s1 s0
Labeling L: ¬ on on

Table 5.5 Automaton B3 States q0 q1

¬on q1 q1
 q0 ∅

The automaton B2 in Table 5.3 specifies the formula F p. The language L(B2) is
(¬ p)∗ ( p)()ω . This is the property ‘eventually p’ a particular case of the liveness
property. Accepting state is in boldface.The initial state is marked ∗.

Example 5.4 (Model checking of a liveness property) We encode the property

‘infinitely many times on’ in a transition system T S in Table 5.4.

We encode the complement to the property ‘infinitely many times on’, i.e., the
property ‘from some time on, always ¬ on’ in a Büchi automaton B3 shown in
Table 5.5. The accepting state is printed inboldface. The initial state is q0 .
We define the synchronous product T S B3. We recall that the signature of T S
is (S, Act, →T S , I, A P, L) and the signature of B3 is (Q, 2 A P , →B3 , Q 0 , F). The
synchronous product has as its components
(i) the set of states S × Q;
(ii) the transition relation → defined as the smallest of relations satisfying the
following:
s1 →T S s2 , q1 →B3
L(s2 ) q2
(28) 
(s1 , q1 ) → (s2 , q2 )

(iii) the set of initial states I = {(s0 , q) : ∃q0 ∈ Q 0 .q0 →B3

L(s0 ) q};
(iv) the set of accepting states Q × F.
5.8 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for LTL 249


Table 5.6 Product TS B1
States (s0 , q0 ) (s0 , q1 ) (s1 , q0 ) (s1 , q1 )
Transitions (s1 , q0 ) ∅ {(s0 , q1 ), (s0 , q0 )} (s0 , q1 )

Let us observe that the demand that transitions in the synchronized product be
possible under labels of parallel transitions of TS, forces the condition that any
accepting run of B3 induces a path in TS which negates the condition ‘infinitely 
many times on’, ie., TS does not satisfy it. In Table 5.6 the product T S B1 is
shown.
There is no infinite path in the product which meets any of accepting states
(s0 , q1 ), (s1 , q1 ) infinitely many times. This proves that T S satisfies the property
‘infinitely many times on’.

5.8 Natural Deduction: Tableaux for LTL

We have met tableaux in Chaps. 2–4 for, respectively, sentential, predicate and modal
and intuitionistic logics, and now we embark on tableau satisfaction checking for
temporal logics. We begin with tableau method for LTL. Tableau construction for
LTL is definitely distinct from previously discussed by us constructions: first, LTL
deals with paths, next, among its operators are operators like φ Uψ and ¬ Gφ whose
satisfaction is verified in future. These features pose new problems for their rendering
in tableaux. We begin with a list of LTL-equivalences which will be useful in tableau
constructions.

Theorem 5.13 We recall the basic equivalences among operators of LTL.

(i) Gφ ≡ φ∧ XGφ;
(ii) ¬ Gφ ≡ ¬φ∨X¬Gφ;
(iii) φUψ ≡ ψ ∨ φ∧XφUψ;
(iv) ¬φUψ ≡ ¬ψ ∧ (¬φ ∨ ¬XφUψ);
(v) X¬φ ≡ ¬Xφ.

We also recall the classification of formulae of any logic into four types, two types
for sentential formulae and two types for formulae of logics with operators, these
types being α, β ,γ, δ. Types α, γ are conjunctive, meaning that formulae of those
types decompose into conjunctions, types β, δ are disjunctive, i.e., formulae of those
types decompose into disjunctions. Figure 5.1 recollects sentential formulae of types
α and β.
Equivalences in Theorem 5.13 allow for decomposition patterns of types γ (con-
junctive) and δ (disjunctive); these patterns are shown in Fig. 5.2. One more type of
formulae are successor formulae Xφ and X¬φ which propagate , respectively, as φ
and ¬φ. We call these formulae as being of type ε.
250 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Fig. 5.1 Sentential

decomposition forms: A
reminder

Fig. 5.2 Decomposition

forms for LTL

We recall the notion of sub-formulae of a formula. We call immediate sub-

formulae of a formula φ, the children of the root φ in the formation tree for φ.
For example for the formula Gφ, imminent sub-formulae are φ, X Gφ of conjunctive
type according to Theorem 5.13(i).

Definition 5.23 (Decomposition components) The set of decomposition compo-

nents, dc(φ), for short, of a formula φ contains φ and all formulae which are immediate
5.9 Tableaux Construction for Linear Temporal Logic 251

sub-formulae of φ as well as immediate sub-formulae of each formula ψ ∈ dc(φ).

For instance,
(i) dc(Gφ) = {Gφ, φ, XG φ};
(ii) dc(φUψ) = {φUψ, ψ, φ∧ XφUψ, φ, XφUψ}.

Among decomposition components are formulae which have come from disjunc-
tive types β and δ as well as from conjunctive types α and γ. The laws of distribution
allow to separate these formulae into disjoint sets: decomposition implicants.

Definition 5.24 (Decomposition implicants) A decomposition implicant for a for-

mula φ is any prime implicant in DNF form of dc(φ) from which φ is removed. We
denote prime implicants for φ by the generic symbol ιφ .

For example, decomposition implicants of the formula φUψ∧ Gξ in Theorem 5.13

are
(i) ι1φ : {φUψ, Gξ, ξ, XGξ, ψ};
(ii) ι2φ : {φUψ, Gξ,ξ, XGξ, φ, XφUψ}.

5.9 Tableaux Construction for Linear Temporal Logic

Let us consider a simple example. Suppose φ is G p. Semantic analysis would lead

to the following development of a tableau.
(i) {G p}; initial node;
(ii) { p, XG p}; decomposition implicant;
(iii) {G p}; extension to the next node. At this node, if we have wanted to produce
a witnessing tableau for φ, then node (ii) would be redundant: we treat it as
a semantic external remainder about φ. In the final version, we omit it. Our
tableau becomes
(iv) { p, XG p}
(v) { p, XG p}; goto (iv). In this way we produce an infinite path validating φ. The
moral is that we should produce an initial tableau with semantic nodes like (iii)
serving for prolonging paths and then we should remove them from paths of
their occurrences.
Thus, we call auxiliary, those semantic states, denoted Aux. In the final tableau
these auxiliary states are omitted: if a state is connected to an auxiliary state which
in turn is connected to the next state, then we bypass the auxiliary state and connect
the preceding state to the successor state. The root of a tableau is an auxiliary state
which contains the initial set of formulae and it is omitted in the final tableau as well.

Example 5.5 We show in Fig. 5.3 the initial tableau for the formula (G p) ∧
¬( pUq). We owe some explanations pertaining to the construction. We denote
252 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Fig. 5.3 The initial LTL-tableau

states as si for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 and we denote auxiliary states as AU X . We make use of

Theorem 5.13(i)–(v) in creating decompositions. In particular,

(iv) ¬( pUq) ≡ (¬q) ∧ ((¬ p) ∨ ¬q ∧ ¬(X( pUq)))

is responsible for children s0, s1 of the root Aux. The loop from s3 to the second
AU X stems from the provisos: the auxiliary state which would be obtained from s3
would be identical with this AU X . Crosses under s0 and s2 mean as usual that paths
through these states are contradictory, hence, closed: both states contain p and ¬ p.
We obtain the final tableau by elimination of auxiliary states: if for an auxiliary
state AU X , there exists a state s with transition arrow s → AU X , then add arrows
s → s for each state s for which the arrow AU X → s exists and remove AU X
and all arrows in and out of it.
5.9 Tableaux Construction for Linear Temporal Logic 253

Fig. 5.4 The final

LTL-tableau

The rules for elimination of states are:

(i) if a state s has no successor state, then remove s;
(ii) if a formula φUψ is in state s and there is no finite sequence of successor
states s = s0 → s1 → . . . → sn with ψ ∈ sn, where n ≥ 0 and φ in si for
each i < n, then remove s from the tableau Init(φ);
(iii) remove states with contradictory sets of formulae.
When these measures are taken, what remains is the final tableau for (φ).
Example 5.6 In Fig. 5.4, the final tableau for the formula (G p) ∧ ¬( pUq) is shown
obtained from the initial tableau for (G p) ∧ ¬( pUq). States s0 and s2 are removed
due to inconsistencies and loop at s3 is added in accordance with the rule for elimi-
nation of auxiliary states.
We recall that in tableaux from Chaps. 1–3, open branches of a tableau were
Hintikka sets and they were satisfiable. We need a counterpart to Hintikka sets from
Chaps. 1–3; in this case these sets represent labels of paths in the tableau, hence, they
are called Hintikka traces. A Hintikka trace is a trace for transition system modelled
on the structure N with the successor to n= n + 1.
Definition 5.25 (Hintikka traces) Let Γ be a dc-closed set of formulae with Γ =
dc(Γ ). A Hintikka trace H for the set Γ is a sequence (H(i) : i ∈ N) of subsets of
Γ with the following properties:
(H1) each H(i) is a decomposition implicant;
(H2) if a formula φ ∈ H(i) is of type (ε), then dcφ ∈ H(i + 1) for each i ∈ N;
(H3) if a formula φ U ψ ∈ H(i), then there exists j ≥ 0 with the property that
ψ ∈ H(i + j) and φ ∈ H(i + k) for 0 ≤ k < j, for each i ∈ N;
(H4) if Gφ ∈ H(i), then φ ∈ H(i + j) for j ≥ 0, for each i ∈ N;
(H5) if φUψ ∈ H(i), then either ψ ∈ H(i) or φ ∈ H(i) and φ Uψ ∈ H(i + 1), for
each i ∈ N;
254 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

(H6) if ¬(φUψ) ∈ H(i), then ¬ψ ∈ H(i) ∧ (¬φ ∈ H(i) ∨ ¬(φUψ) ∈ H(i + 1)),
for each i ∈ N;
(H7) if ¬(φUψ) ∈ H(i), then ¬ψ ∈ H(i + j) for each j ≥ 0 or ∃ j ∈ N such that
¬φ ∈ H(i + j) and ¬ψ ∈ H(i + k) for each 0 ≤ k ≤ j.

Conditions (H6) and (H7) offer two readings of ¬(φUψ) ∈ H(i), easy to compre-
hend. One may see that definition of Hintikka traces is fully consistent with semantics
of LTL, and, basically, we construct a transition system in which labelling is Hintikka
traces.
In order to induce a Hintikka trace from a formula φ, we need, according to (H1)–
(H7), to find decomposition components of φ. Let us consider a trace σ : Σ → 2 A P ,
where σ, A P are components of a transition systems over LTL, and, for each n,
we consider the set dc(φ)n = {ψ ∈ dc(φ) : σ[n] |= ψ}. Then, we verify that the
following holds.

Theorem 5.14 The sequence dc(φ)n )∞n=0 is a Hintikka trace and φ is satisfiable if
and only if φ ∈ dc(φ)n for some n.

Proof That (dc(φ)n )∞ n=0 is a Hintikka trace follows by Definition 5.25. If for some n,
φ ∈ dc − cl(φ)n , then σ, n |= φ. Suppose now that φ is satisfiable. The existence of a
Hintikka trace {H (n) : n ∈ N } with φ ∈ H (0) can be proved by structural induction:
by Definition 5.25(i), the thesis follows for the sentential formula φ and (ii) and (iii)
imply the thesis in cases of Xφ and ψ1 Uψ2 . 

A final tableau for a formula φ is open if and only if the tableau contains an infinite
path with φ in some state. Otherwise, a tableau is closed. Let us observe that each
path in the tableau is a Hintikka trace for some sub-formula of φ.

Theorem 5.15 (Tableau-completeness of LTL) LTL is tableau-complete, i.e, if a

tableau for φ is open, then φ is satisfiable.

(A sketch of the idea). Each path in a tableau is a Hintikka trace by Defini-

tion 5.25(H1)–(H6,7) and rules for tableau construction. Each formula in a state
of the path is satisfiable by Theorem 5.14, as satisfiability goes down each path,
hence, if φ is in some state of the path, then φ is satisfiable.
Tableaux for LTL go back to Wolper [15].

5.10 Tableaux for Computational Tree Logic CTL

We recall that in CTL temporal operators X,F,U,G are prefixed with path operators A,
E and can occur in well-formed formulae only in the prefixed form and that structures
for CTL are branched time models, e.g., trees. We recall that basic operators of CTL
are: EG, EF, E(φUψ), A(φUψ), EXφ, AXφ and their negations.
We recall CTL rules for decomposition of formulae.
5.10 Tableaux for Computational Tree Logic CTL 255

Theorem 5.16 The following equivalences hold for CTL:

(i) EGφ ≡ φ∧EXEGφ;
(ii) ¬EGφ ≡ ¬φ∨EX¬EGφ;
(iii) EFφ ≡ φ∨ EXEFφ;
(iv) ¬ EFφ ≡ ¬φ ∧ ¬ EXEFφ;
(v) E(φUψ) ≡ ψ ∨ (φ∧ EXE(φUψ));
(vi) ¬E(φUψ) ≡ ψ ∧ (¬φ ∨ ¬EXE(φUψ));
(vii) A(φUψ) ≡ ψ ∨ (φ∧AXA(φUψ));
(viii) ¬A(φUψ) ≡ ¬ψ ∧ (¬φ ∨ ¬AXA(φUψ));
(ix) EXφ, AXφ decompose into φ;
(x) ¬ EXφ, ¬AXφ decompose into ¬φ.
Local decomposition rules for types (γ), (δ), (ε) are provided in Fig. 5.5.
Basically, constructions of tableaux for formulae and sets of formulae of CTL follow
the lines of constructions for LTL, with auxiliary states, states, rules for decomposi-
tions and elimination of auxiliary states and states.
Example 5.7 Consider η: EGφ∧ EφUψ. Figure 5.6 presents the initialization Init(φ)
of the tableau for φ and Fig. 5.7 shows the final tableau for φ.
Understandably, Hintikka sets for CTL are more developed. The one of main
reasons is that CTL is a logic of branching time, hence, structures in this case are
transition systems. We consider a dc-closed set Γ of CTL formulae along with
a transition system H = (S, →T , H ), where H is a labelling of (S, →T ). H is a
Hintikka structure if the following conditions hold true.

Fig. 5.5 Decomposition forms for CTL

256 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Fig. 5.6 The initial CTL-tableau

Fig. 5.7 The final CTL-tableau

5.11 Non-deterministic Automata on Infinite Words 257

Definition 5.26 (CTL Hintikka structure) Each Hintikka structure (S, →, H) satis-
fies the following conditions:

(H1) each set H (s) is a decomposition implicant;

(H2) if φ: AXψ ∈ H (s), respectively, ¬ EXψ ∈ H (s), then ψ, respectively, ¬ψ in
H (s ) for each s ∈→ (s), for each s ∈ S;
(H3) if φ:EXψ ∈ H (s), respectively, ¬AX¬ψ ∈ H (s), then ψ, respectively, ¬ψ in
H (s ) for some s ∈→ (s), for each s ∈ S;
(H4) if EFφ ∈ H (s), then φ ∈ H (s ) for some s reachable from s by transitive
closure →∗ ;
(H5) if EφUψ ∈ H (s), then for some s with s →∗ s , where π(s, s ) is the path
from s to s , ψ ∈ H (s ) and φ ∈ H (s ∗ ) for each s ∗ on the path π(s, s ) from s
to the predecessor of s ;
(H6) if ¬EGφ ∈ H (s), then for each path π ∈ P AT H (s), there exists j such that
¬φ ∈ H (π[ j]);
(H7) if AφUψ ∈ H (s), then for each π ∈ P AT H (s) there exists j such that ψ ∈
H (π[ j]) and φ ∈ H (π[k]) for 0 ≤ k < j.

By (H1)–(H7), by semantic definitions, other conditions are fulfilled by Hintikka

structures. One obtains those conditions from decomposition equivalences.

Theorem 5.17 (Tableau—completeness for CTL) As with LTL, CTL is tableau-

complete; the proof goes along the lines outlined for LTL. From our discussion of
small model property for LTL it follows that CTL has also small model property.

Tableaux for CTL go back to (Emerson, Halpern [16]).

For tableaux for CTL*, please see (Reynolds [17, 18]).
Model checking by means of tableaux for LTL, CTL and CTL* is discussed in
(Clarke et al. [19]) and in (Demri et al. [9]). There is a number of automated tools for
LTL-satisfiability verification: NuSMV2 (Cimatti et al. [20]), Aalta (Li et al. [21]),
Leviathan (Bertello et al. [22]).

5.11 Non-deterministic Automata on Infinite Words

In Sect. 5.7, some Büchi automata are shown, which model some properties of reac-
tive systems. Now, we will discuss in a more systematic way the relations between
temporal logics and automata. We begin with a survey of automata on infinite words.

Definition 5.27 (Non-deterministic Büchi automata on words) We recall that a

Büchi automaton is defined as a tuple B = (Σ, Q, I, δ, F), where Σ is a finite
alphabet, Q is a finite set of states, I ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, δ : Q × Σ × Q is
a transition relation, and F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states.
258 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

We assume that δ is serial, i.e., for each pair (q, a) there exists q such that
(q, a, q ) ∈ δ. B is deterministic if and only if for each pair (q, a) there exists a
unique q such that (q, a, q ) ∈ δ. In this case, δ : Q × Σ → Q is a mapping, and
we write δ(q, a) = q . Otherwise, B is non-deterministic.
∞
A run of B is any sequence ρ = (qi , ai )i=0 such that (i) q0 ∈ I (ii) (qi , ai , qi+1 ) ∈ δ
∞
for each i ≥ 0. The sequence (ai )i=0 is the label of the run ρ, denoted l(ρ).
For each run ρ, and each state symbol q, we define the set O(q, ρ) = {i : qi = q};
this is the set of numbers of positions in ρ at which the state symbol is q. The set
in f (ρ) is the set {q : |O(q, ρ)| = ω}. The symbol |.| denotes cardinality of a set, ω
in this case denotes the cardinality of the set of natural numbers N.
As runs are infinite, their labels are infinite words over the alphabet Σ, i.e,
ω-words. We denote them with symbols w, v, u,. . ., sometimes primed. Non-
deterministic Büchi automata on infinite words will be marked as NBAω .

Definition 5.28 (Acceptance conditions. Languages defined by automata) For a run

ρ: it is Büchi accepted if and only if in f (ρ) ∩ F = ∅, equivalently, there exists q ∈ F
with |O(q, ρ)| = ω. For an accepted run ρ, the label l(ρ) is a word in the language
generated by NBAω , the language L(NBAω ) is the set of labels of runs accepted by
NBAω .

Definition 5.29 (Generalized Büchi automata) A generalized Buüchi automaton

differs from the standard in that it has a finite set of sets of accepting states
{F1 , F2 , . . . , Fk } for some natural number k.

The generalized Büchi acceptance is in f (ρ) ∩ Fi = ∅ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It turns

out that the generating power of generalized Büchi automata is the same as standard
Büchi automata, but, passing from generalized to standard Büchi automaton costs
an increase in the number of states.

Lemma 5.1 For a generalized Büchi non-deterministic automaton B with n states

and k acceptance sets, there exists a non-deterministic Büchi automaton B ∗ with
n · k states such that L(B) = L(B ∗ ).

Indeed, for B = (Σ, Q, I, δ, F1 , F2 , . . . , Fk ),, define the automaton B ∗ = (Σ,

Q , I , δ , F1 ), where
(i) Q = Q × {1, 2, . . . , k};
(ii) I = Q × {1};
(iii) δ ((q, i), a) = δ(q, a × {i} in case q ∈
/ Fi and δ ((q, i), a) = δ(q, a) ×
{(i mod k) + 1} in case q ∈ Fi ;
(iv) F = F1 × {1}.
Runs of the automaton B ∗ begin in Q × {1} and if successful, then visit each Fi
returning to F1 and so on. Infinite runs on F1 visit infinitely many times each F j for
1 < j ≤ k.
There are many other ideas for automatons on infinite words, especially in terms
of acceptance conditions; let us mention a few.
5.11 Non-deterministic Automata on Infinite Words 259

(i) The Rabin acceptance condition is a set {(Fi , G i ) : i = 1, 2, . . . , k}, where

Fi , G i ⊆ Q for each i and a run ρ is accepted if and only if there exists i such
that in f (ρ) ∩ Fi = ∅ and in f (ρ) ∩ G i = ∅;
(ii) The Parity acceptance condition is a sequence F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Fk = Q and
a run ρ is accepted if and only if the first i such that in f (ρ) ∩ Fi = ∅ is even;
(iii) The Muller acceptance consition is a set F1 , F2 , . . . , Fk of subsets of Q and a
run ρ is accepted if there exists i such that in f (ρ) = Fi .
A discussion of relations among those classes of automata can be found, e.g., in
Kupferman [23] in (Clarke et al. [24]) and in (Perrin, Pin [25]).
We embark now on some properties of non-deterministic Büchi automata termed
closure properties as these properties concern closure of the class of those automata
under union, intersection (cf. Choueka [26]) and complement operations.

Theorem 5.18 (Choueka) For non-deterministic Büchi automata B and B ∗ with

respectively, n and m states, there exists a non-deterministic Büchi automaton B ∪
with n + m states and such that L(B ∪ )=L(B) ∪ L(B ∗ ).

Proof Let B be (Σ, Q 1 , I1 , δ1 , F1 ) and B ∗ be (Σ, Q 2 , I2 , δ2 , F2 ) where we may

assume that Q 1 ∩ Q 2 = ∅. Then, B ∪ is defined as

(Σ, Q 1 ∪ Q 2 , I1 ∪ I2 , δ, F1 ∪ F2 ),

where δ(q, a) = δi (q, a) for q ∈ Q i for i = 1, 2. It follows that B ∪ has an accepting

run if and only if either B or B ∗ has an accepting run. 

A similar argument proves closure under intersection (Choueka [26]).

Theorem 5.19 (Choueka) For non-deterministic Büchi automata B and B ∗ with

respectively, n and m states, there exists a non-deterministic Büchi automaton B ∩
with 2 · n · m states and such that L(B ∩ )=L(B) ∩ L(B ∗ ).

Proof This time the product of two automatons must be defined in a more complex
way. We use the notation of Theorem 5.18. We let

B ∩ = (Σ, Q 1 × Q 2 × {1, 2}, I1 × I2 × {1}, δ, F1 × Q 2 × {1}),

where
δ((q1 , q2 , j), a) = δ1 (q1 , a) × δ2 (q2 , a) × f (q1 , q2 , j)

for the function f defined as follows:

f (q1 , q2 , j) = 1

if
[either ( j = 1) ∧ (q1 ∈
/ F1 )or ( j = 2) ∧ (q2 ∈ F2 )]
260 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

and
f (q1 , q2 , j) = 2

if
[either ( j = 1) ∧ (q1 ∈ F1 )or ( j = 2) ∧ (q2 ∈
/ F2 )].

Thus, runs of the product automaton oscillate between copies of either automaton
infinitely often. 
The problem of complementation is more difficult. Its solutions involved some
additional tools including graph-theoretical tools like Ramsey’s theorem. We outline
a proof in (Kupferman, Vardi [27]) which exploits a visualization of automatons in
the form of graph G of runs (gr G) defined for any automaton and each ω-word w.
Definition 5.30 (The graph grG of runs of an automaton NBAω ) The graph gr G for
∞
an automaton B = (Σ, Q, I, δ, F) and a word w = (ai )i=1 is defined as follows: (i)
∞ ∞
the set of vertices is V = i=0Q i × {i} where the sequence (Q i )i=0 is defined by
induction as Q 0 = I , Q i+1 = q∈Q i δ(q, ai+1 ).
The set of edges E is {((q, i), (q , i + 1)) : q ∈ δ(q, ai+1 }, i.e,
∞

E⊆ (Q i × {i}) × (Q i+1 × {i + 1}).
i=0

∞ ∞
The accepting condition is i=0 F × {i}: a run (qi , ai+1 )i=0 is accepted if and only
if (q, ai+1 ) ∈ F for infinitely many i’s.
The graph gr G for B and w represents all runs of B on w. It follows that acceptance
by B is equivalent to acceptance by gr G. We assume that our automaton has n states.
Definition 5.31 (The ranking function on grG) An accepted run must stabilize
on an even rank. Hence, the dichotomy: accepted—non-accepted is equivalent to
dichotomy: odd-even for runs. The ranking f is odd if and only if all runs are odd.
In this case, B is rejecting. It turns out that the converse is true as well.
The main result in (Kupferman, Vardi [27]) establishes the effect of odd runs.
Theorem 5.20 B is rejecting if and only if all runs are odd.
Proof One way it has been observed. We have to prove that if B is rejecting then all
path rankings are odd. Suppose to the contrary that there is a run ρ not having the
odd ranking. Then ρ stabilizes on the even rank, hence, infinitely many vertices on
ρ fall into F, i.e, ρ is accepting, a contradiction. 
Definition 5.32 (A level ranking) A level ranking is a function g : Q → {0, 1, . . . ,
2n, ⊥} such that the odd value of g(q) means q ∈ / F. For two level rankings g, g , and
q, q ∈ Q, g refines g if g (q ) ≤ g(q) any time when q = δ(q, a) for some a. Thus,
a level ranking g is constant on levels of the graph gr G for the given automaton. As
with ranking functions, level rankings diminish as they go to higher valued levels.
The set of even values of a level ranking g is denoted par (g).
5.12 Decision Problems for Automata 261

We now outline the proof in (Kupferman, Vardi [27]) on the existence of the
complementary automaton B − to the given B=(Σ, Q, I, δ, F).
Theorem 5.21 (Kupferman, Vardi) For the given NBAω B with n states, there exists
an NDAω B − on less or 2 O(nlogn) states and such that Σ ω \ L(B) = L(B − ).
Proof Let B − = (Σ, Q , I , δ , F ).
(i) Let Lrank be the set of level rankings on gr G and let variable P runs over sets
in 2 Q . Then Q = {(g, P) : g ∈ Lrank, P ∈ 2 Q };
(ii) I = {(g0 , ∅) : g0 (q) = 2n if q ∈ I, else g(q) = ⊥};
(iii) if P = ∅, then δ ((g, P), a) = {(g , P ) : g refines g, P = {q : q ∈ δ(q, a)
for some q ∈ P and g (q ) is even};

δ ((g, ∅), a) = {(g , q ) : g refines g, g (q )is even};

(iv) F = Lrank × {∅}.
On reading the consecutive k-th symbol ak of the input word w, the automaton B −
guesses the level ranking for the k-th level of gr G under the condition that it refines
the (k − 1)st level of gr G. The set P stores states with even ranks. This controls
those states so eventually paths through these states reach odd ranks emptying the
set P and then from the odd rank anew P is updated for visits in states with odd
ranks. The acceptance condition checks that there are infinitely many levels with
solely odd ranked states.
For the estimate of 2 O(nlogn) , observe that the number of sets P is 2n and number
of rankings is n O(n) = 2 O(nlogn) , hence, the number of states is at most 2 O(nlogn) . 

5.12 Decision Problems for Automata

Definition 5.33 (Three main decision problems) These decision problems for non-
deterministic Büchi automaton B are:
(i) The non-emptiness problem: whether L(B) = ∅;
(ii) The non-universality problem: whether L(B) = Σ ω ;
(iii) The containment problem: for B and B ∗ : whether L(B) ⊆ L(B ∗ ).
Let us observe that (i) and (ii) are equivalent in the sense that if L(B) = ∅, then
L(B ) = Σ ω for B in which accepting states are the complement of accepting states
in B.
For (iii), it is equivalent to (i) for L(B ∗ ) ∩ L(B − ) = ∅. For these reasons we
discuss (i) only. We remark only that complexities are distinct in each of these three
problems.
The emptiness problem was decided in (Vardi, Wolper [28]) as follows.
Theorem 5.22 The emptiness problem is decidable in linear time. It is an NL-
complete problem.
262 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Proof Consider NBAω (Σ, Q, I, δ, F). Recall the graph G with V = Q and E =
{(q, q ) : ∃a ∈ Σ.q = δ(q, a)}. A run ρ is accepting if and only if there exists a path
π beginning at qo ∈ I and ending at first q f ∈ F and continuing with a loop from
q f to some q f ∈ F; in other words, π is periodic due to finiteness of F and infinite
length of π.
Hence, the emptiness problem is equivalent to reachability problem for the graph
G. Let us observe that in f (ρ) is a strongly connected component (SCC) of G, i.e.,
a maximal strongly connected subset of V which means that each pair of vertices in
SCC is connected by a path.
Strongly connected components in a directed graph can be found in linear time
(|V | + |E|) by double depth search on the graph and its transpose, see, e.g., (Cor-
men et al. [29]). The reachability problem solution consists in selection of an SCC1
which contains an initial state, and an SCC2 which contains an accepting state and in
guessing a path from SCC1 to SCC2 in the reduced graph. This requires logarithmic
space: one has to keep in memory the initial state, the accepting state, the currently
guessed state, and the current number of steps, all requiring logarithmic space.
Actually, the non-emptiness problem is NL-complete. 

The dual problem of non-universality as well as the problem of containment are

decidable in exponential time and they are PSPACE-complete, cf. (Sistla, Vardi,
Wolper [30]).

5.13 Alternation. Alternating Automata on Infinite Words

Definition 5.34 (Alternation. The idea) Alternation may be viewed as an attempt

at introduction of regularity into non-determinism (Chandra, Kozen, Stockmayer
[31]). Consider an automaton on the set Q of states along with the collection
Bool ∨,∧ (Q) ofsentential formulae over Q written using only disjunction and con-
junction, i.e.,formulae in Bool ∨,∧ (Q) are monotone.
 
The extremal cases are the disjunction q q and the conjunction q q. In the first
case we have the fully existential case in the second case we have the fully universal
case. Between these cases are plethora of intermediate cases like (q1 ∧ q2 ) ∨ q3 .
In the realm of automata, the application of the transition relation δ(q, a) can
be defined as the condition (q1 ∧ q2 ) ∨ q3 which would mean that given a word w
induced at the step q, the word wa will be accepted either at q1 and q2 or at q3 .
Therefore, the appropriate notation for a transition will be δ(q, w) = (q1 ∧ q2 ) ∨ q3 .
A consequence of alternation introduced into an automaton is that in order to
realize the idea as above, we need the structure of labeled trees.

Definition 5.35 (Labeled trees) Trees are defined and discussed in Chap. 1. An
abstract tree T # over a set T is a set T # of finite sequences of elements of T such
that with each sequence s the set T # contains each prefix of s including the empty
prefix ε called the root of T # . If all sequences in T # are finite, then the tree is finite in
5.13 Alternation. Alternating Automata on Infinite Words 263

case the upper bound of lengths of all sequences is finite, otherwise the tree contains
sequences of any finite length.

For a sequence s, its length is the distance from the root, and sequences of the same
distance from the root form levels of the tree. A collection of sequences such that the
prefix relation orders this collection into a linear order defined as s ≤ s if and only
if s is a prefix of s , is called a path in the tree. In particular, {ε} is a path.
A maximal path is called a branch. A successor to a path p is the path p
such that p ≤ p and length of p is the length of p +1. Therefore, p = px
for an element x ∈ T . If p = px is a branch, then the element x is a leaf. Let
T = {x ∈ T : for some paths p,p’, p’=px}; elements of T along with the root are
vertices of the tree T # , the set of vertices of the tree T # is denoted V (T # ).
A labeling of a tree T # is a mapping L : A → V (T # ), where A is a set of symbols.
The pair (T # , L) is a labeled tree.

Definition 5.36 (Alternating automata on infinite words) An alternating automaton

A is defined as a tuple (Σ, Q, {q0 }, δ, F); please notice the singleton q0 as the initial
state corresponding to the root of a tree.

The components of the tuple are Σ, Q which are finite sets of, respectively, alphabet
symbols and states, the acceptance condition is F ⊆ Q ω , δ : Q × Σ → Bool ∨,∧ (Q),
q0 is the single initial state which corresponds to the root of the tree T # .
For a formula φ in Bool∨,∧ (Q), and δ(q, a) → φ, an implicant is a minimal
subset of Q satisfying φ. If φ is converted into the DNF then implicants of DNF are
implicants in the current sense.
For instance, consider the transition δ(q, a) → φ : [q1 ∨ q2 ∨ q3 ) ∧ (q4 ∨ q5 )].
The automaton has to make a non-deterministic choice from {q1 , q2 , q3 } and a non-
deterministic choice from{q4 , q5 } and it has  to perform two runs, one for each
choice. The DNF of φ is ( i=1,2,3 (qi ∧ q4 ) ∨ ( i=1,2,3 (qi ∧ q5 ) which prompts the
automation to a non-deterministic choice of one of the implicants, which is equivalent
to the former choice.

Definition 5.37 (Runs of alternating automatons) A run of A on a word w =

∞
(ai )i=0 ∈ Σ ω is drawing in a tree T # a dag G representing the flow of transitions.
As with trees, we will observe levels corresponding to isoclines of the same distance
from the root which is the pair (q0 , 0). Vertices of G are pairs (q, l), where l is a
level number. Formally:
(i) the set of vertices V (G)
∞⊆ Q× N;
(ii) the set of edges E ⊆ l=0 [(Q × {l}) × (Q × {l + 1})];
(iii) each (q, l) with l > 0 has a predecessor (q , l − 1), i.e., ((q , l − 1), (q, l)) ∈ E;
(iv) for each transition δ(q, al ) → φ, the set of chosen states {q : ((q, l), (q , l +
1)) ∈ E satisfies φ.

A run is accepting if and only if it meets the acceptance condition F, i.e, the word
w ∈ F. The language L(A) is the set of accepted words.
Acceptance conditions can be distinct, as with Büchi automata:
264 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

(i) alternating Büchi acceptance: F ⊆ Q and in f (w) ∩ F = ∅;

(ii) alternating generalized Büchi acceptance: a finite number of sets F1 , F2 , . . . , Fk ,
in f (w) ∩ Fi = ∅ for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.

Example 5.8 For our purpose in what follows it will be useful to give a small
example of the graph G in Definition 5.37.
The transition relation δ is as follows. For simplicity, our Σ = {a}:
δ(q0 , a) = q1 ∧ q2 ∨ q3 ;
δ(q1 , a) = q2 ∨ q4 ;
δ(q2 , a) = q2 ∧ q3 ;
δ(q3 , a) = q1 ∧ q2 ∧ q4 ;
δ(q4 , a) = .

Alternating automata due to their universal and non-deterministic components cor-

responding to universal and existential temporal operators are better suited to LTL
than Büchi automata. However, their expressional power is the same as that of non-
deterministic Büchi automata on infinite words. The reduction of A to N B Aω B is
at the cost of exponential blow-up (Miyano, Hayashi [32]).

Theorem 5.23 (Miyano, Hayashi) For any alternating Büchi automaton A, with
n states, there exists a non-deterministic Büchi automaton B with an exponential
number of states.

Proof (an outline, [9, 23])

The automaton B, at each state of its run, keeps the whole corresponding level of
the graph G of the run of A and when passing to the next state, it guesses the whole
next level of G. Hence, the number of all states of B should be at least 2 O(n) .
B has also to convert the acceptance condition for A into the Büchi acceptance
for B. This requires check-up of visiting accepting states of A to be positive that
each infinite path visits infinitely many of them.
The device which ensures this is the splitting of the set of all states {q : (q, l) ∈
V (G)} into disjoint sets A, B, where A is the set of states whose next state will be
accepting. If it is so, the accepting state is moved to the set B; when A = ∅ which
means that all paths met at least once an accepting state, the roles are reversed and
the state from B is moved to A to be the next state for the state waiting to meet an
accepting state.
Formally: for A = (Σ, Q, {q0 }, δ, F), B = (Σ, 2 Q × 2 Q , {q0 } × {∅}, δ , F =
{∅} × 2 Q ), the transition relation δ is defined as follows:
(i) when A = ∅, then δ ((∅, B), a) =

{(X \ F, X ∩ F) : X ⊆ Q, X |= δ(q, a) for each q ∈ B};

5.14 From LTL to Büchi Automata on Infinite Words 265

(ii) when A = ∅, then

δ ((A, B), a) = {(X \ F, X ∪ (X ∩ F)) : X, X ⊆ Q, X |= δ(q, a)

for each q ∈ A, X |= δ(q, a) for each q ∈ B}.

It follows that L(A) = L(B). 

5.14 From LTL to Büchi Automata on Infinite Words

We consider the translation from LTL to a non-deterministic Büchi automaton (Vardi,

Wolper [28]). This translation employs the extended closure of a formula. We recall
it here.

Definition 5.38 (The extended closure) The extended closure ECl(φ) is subject to
the following conditions:
(i) φ ∈ ECl(φ);
(ii) ψ ∈ ECl(φ) if and only if ¬ψ ∈ ECl(φ);
(iii) ψ ∧ χ ∈ ECl(φ) if and only if ψ ∈ ECl(φ) and χ ∈ ECl(φ);
(iv) if Xψ ∈ ECl(φ) then ψ ∈ ECl(φ);
(v) if ψUχ ∈ ECl(φ), then ψ ∈ ECl(φ) and χ ∈ ECl(φ).

Definition 5.39 (The generalized non-deterministic Büchi automaton) We define

the automaton B(φ) for an LTL formula φ whose set of states Q is the set of all
maximally consistent subsets of ECl(φ). The alphabet Σ is the power set 2 A P ,
where A P is the set of atomic propositions. We recall that the language L(φ) is the
set {π ∈ (2 A P )ω : π |= φ}.

The transition relation δ is defined as follows: for two MaxCon sets Γ, Δ and
a ∈ Σ, i.e., a ⊆ A P, Δ ∈ δ(Γ, a) if and only if
(i) a = Γ ∩ A P;
(ii) if Xψ ∈ ECl(φ), then Xψ ∈ Γ if and only if ψ ∈ Δ;
(iii) if ψUχ ∈ ECl(φ), then ψUχ ∈ Γ if and only if either χ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ and
ψUχ ∈ Δ.

Initial states are all states MaxConΓ such that φ ∈ Γ .

The set of acceptance sets consists of all MaxConΓψU χ such that either χ ∈ Γ
or ¬(ψU χ) ∈ Γ .
As ECl(φ) is of cardinality O(|φ|), Bφ has 2 O(|φ|) states. The number of accep-
tance sets is O(|φ|), and we know that the language accepted by generalized automa-
ton is equal to the language of an ordinary Büchi automaton. One checks that
L(φ) = L(Bφ ).
266 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

The exponential size of Bφ can be avoided if LTL is translated into an alternating

Büchi automaton. To that end, formulae of LTL are expressed in the positive normal
form, i.e., negation is applied exclusively to atomic propositions. This prompts the
recalling of the Release operator ψ Rχ defined as ¬(¬ψU¬χ). The semantics of R is
as follows: for each path π and each k ≥ 1, if π[k] does not satisfy χ, then there exists
1 ≤ i < k such that π[i] |= ψ. For instance, please check that the formula GF p is
equivalent to the formula ⊥R( U p).

Theorem 5.24 ([23]) For each LTL formula φ, there exists an alternating Büchi
automaton Aφ with O(|φ|) states and such that L(Aφ ) = L(φ).

Proof This time we apply the closure of the formula φ, which we denote φ. The
closure satisfies the following conditions:
(i) φ ∈ φ;
(ii) for ◦ ∈ {∨, ∧, U, R}, if ψ ◦ χ ∈ φ, then ψ, χ ∈ φ;
(iii) if Xψ ∈ φ, then ψ ∈ φ.
The automaton Aφ is defined as follows:
(i) the alphabet Σ = 2 A P ;
(ii) the set of states Q = φ;
(iii) the initial state q0 = φ;
(iv) the transition relation δ is defined for particular cases in the following way:

(a) δ( p, a) =  if p ∈ a, else ⊥;
(b) δ(¬ p, a) = ¬δ( p, a);
(c) δ(ψ ∧ χ, a) = δ(ψ, a) ∧ δ(χ, a);
(d) δ(ψ ∨ χ, a) = δ(ψ, a) ∨ δ(χ, a);
(e) δ(ψUχ, a) = δ(χ, a) ∨ (δ(ψ, a) ∧ (ψUχ));
(f) δ(ψRχ, a) = δ(χ, a) ∧ (δ(ψ, a) ∨ (ψRχ));

(v) acceptance F = {ψ Rχ : ψRχ ∈ φ}.

One proves by structural induction on φ that if Aφ is in state ψ, then it accepts
solely all paths that satisfy ψ. It follows that L(Aφ )=L(φ). 

5.15 LTL Model Checking

The problem of LTL model checking consists in verification whether a given structure
for LTL satisfies a given LTL formula φ. Concerning the structure, it is a Kripke
structure defined for this purpose as a tuple M=(A P, W, R, I, L), where
(i) A P is the set of atomic pripositions;
(ii) W is the set of worlds;
5.16 Model Checking for Branching-time Logics 267

(iii) I is the set of initial worlds;

(iv) R ⊆ W × W is an accessibility relation;
(v) L : W → 2 A P is a labeling mapping. It establishes a logic at each world.
∞
A computation by M is a sequence (L(wi ))i=0 where w0 ∈ I and R(wi , wi+1 ) for
∞
each i ≥ 0. We denote by π the path (wi )i=0 . Semantics of the Kripke structure
is defined in Chap. 4. We keep our standing assumption about the seriality of the
relation R. We recall in this new framework the result in (Sistla, Clarke [8]) already
mentioned by us.

Theorem 5.25 The LTL model checking problem is PSPACE-complete.

We outline the passage from Kripke’s structure M to a non-deterministic Büchi

automaton B. The automaton B is defined as a tuple (A P, W, δ, I, F = W ), where
the transition relation δ emulates the accessibility relation R as follows:
(i) δ(w, a) = {w : R(w, w )} if a = L(w), else δ(w, a) = ∅.
Then, model checking consists in verification whether L(M) ⊆ L(B); this question
is presented also in the form of disjointness of L(M) and the complement of L(B).
The complexity of the disjointness problem is |M| · 2 O(|φ|) .

5.16 Model Checking for Branching-time Logics

We now outline the problem of model checking for branching-time logics. In this
case, automata are a tree automata. Hence, we begin with them. Our exposition is
based on (Vardi, Wilke [33]) and also (Kupferman, Vardi, Wolper [35]).

Definition 5.40 (Alternating tree automata) We consider infinite trees ordered by

the successor relation of which we assume seriality, i.e, each vertex has a successor.
We may assume that the tree is built as a subset N∗ , i.e., its nodes are finite sequences
of natural numbers closed on prefixes, ordered by the immediate prefix relation.

We assume that a set Δ ⊆ N is the star number function which defines star numbers
of vertices: for a vertex x, Δ(x) is the number of successors to the vertex x. We
assume that the width of the tree is bounded from above, so the set Δ is finite and all
levels of the tree are of bounded size. For a tree T , and a set Σ, a Σ-labeling of T is
a mapping L : Σ → T which assigns to each vertex x a symbol L(x) in Σ. Usually,
Σ is taken as the set 2 A P of sets of atomic propositions, and, L establishes a logic at
each vertex.
We recall the known notions of a path in the tree and a branch of the tree.
We have already met the notion of an alternating automaton and the set Bool∨,∧ (Q)
of sentential formulae over Q written with use of only ∨ and ∧ connectives. We denote
by m the set of smaller than m natural numbers, i.e., m = {0, 1, 2, . . . , m − 1}.
268 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

An alternating automaton on infinite trees is represented by a tuple

A = (Σ, Q, q0 , δ, Δ, F)

Thomas [36], (Muller, Schupp [37]), where Σ, Q have the already established mean-
ing, q0 is the initial state, Δ is the star number function, F is acceptance conditions.
We denote by D the maximal value of Δ. The transition function δ is defined as: δ :
Q × Σ × D → Bool∨,∧ (N×Q); given a triple (q, a, n), δ(q, a, n) ∈ Bool∨,∧ (n ×
Q). The acceptance condition F may be the Büchi acceptance F ⊆ Q or already
mentioned by us Rabin’s acceptance, or, Parity acceptance, or, Büchi modified accep-
tance F ⊆ Q ω .

Definition 5.41 (Runs of alternating tree automata) For a labeled tree (T, L) and
an alternating tree automaton

A = (Σ, Q, q0 , δ, Δ, F),

a run of A is a tree (T , L ) with nodes of the form (x, q), where x ∈ N and q ∈ Q.

The initial node is (ε, q0 ). On reading a node x in T in a state q, the automa-

ton applies the transition rule δ(q, L(x), Δ(x)) = φ ∈ Bool∨,∧ (N×Q). Then a non-
deterministic choice of an implicant I of φ of the form,

(c1 , q1 ) ∧ (c2 , q2 )∧, . . . , ∧(cn , qn )

such that I |= φ, yields L (x, q) = (xci , qi ) and extends x to xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.

A run is accepting if all its infinite paths satisfy the acceptance condition. For
instance, given F ⊆ Q, a path π is accepted if and only if there is q ∈ F such that
infinitely many nodes in π are of the form (x, q). This is the Büchi acceptance. An
automaton A accepts a tree if and only if there is a run of it accepting the tree. The
language L(A) consists of all accepted trees. We now define weak alternating tree
automata after (Muller, Saoudi, Schupp [38]).

Definition 5.42 (Weak alternating tree automata) A variant of A, which we denote

A∗ , called a weak alternating tree automaton refines the Büchi acceptance condition
by partitioning Q into pairwise disjoint subsets Q 1 , Q 2 , . . ., Q n with the properties
that (i) Q i ⊆ F or (ii) Q i ∩ F = ∅ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.

In case (i), Q i is accepting, in case (ii) Q i is rejecting. On the set Q 1 , Q 2 , . . ., Q m an

ordering ≤ is imposed: if q ∈ δ(q, a, n), q ∈ Q i and q ∈ Q j , then Q j ≤ Q i . Each
infinite path gets ultimately into one and final Q i which determines its acceptance
or rejection.

Definition 5.43 (The Kripke structures treefied) Kripke structures we know from
modal logics, undergo some augmentation aimed at giving them a form plau-
sible for cooperation with automata. Therefore, the Kripke structure is a tuple
5.16 Model Checking for Branching-time Logics 269

K = (A P, W, R, w0 , L , Δ), where W and R are familiar set of worlds and an

accessibility relation, w0 is the initial world, L : W → 2 A P is a labeling. There
is also a star number function Δ : N→ W defined and with properties as above in
Definition 5.40.

The structure of the tree (T, V ) carried by K develops from w0 = V (ε), by recur-
rence: for v ∈ T , with R-successors w1 , w2 , . . . , wn of the node V (v), vi ∈ T and
V (vi) = wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.

Definition 5.44 (The model checking problem for branching-time logics) The model
checking problem is as for LTL: given a Kripke structure K = (A P, W, R, w0 , L , Δ)
and a formula φ determine whether K |= φ. The idea of this checkup is as follows:
build an alternating automaton A(φ, Δ) which accepts exactly all trees with the
function Δ which satisfy φ. Then build the product of treefied K with A(φ, Δ). Check
whether the Kripke tree (T, V ) in Definition 5.43 belongs in L(A(φ, Δ)) ∩ {(T, V )}.
If it is so, then K |= φ, if not K does not satisfy φ.

This procedure leads to the non-emptiness problem. We now recall the construc-
tion of the automaton A(φ, Δ) in [35].

Theorem 5.26 (CTL model checking) There exists a weakly alternating automaton
A(φ, Δ) whose language consists of all and only trees with the parameter Δ that
satisfy the given formula φ.

Proof The construction. We recall φ, the closure of φ consisting of all subformulae of

φ and their negations. By an R-formula, we mean the formula involving the Release
operator R. We recall that ψRχ is equivalent to ¬(¬ψU¬χ) and its semantics is that
for any path π either χ holds always or there is some state k on a path π such that
π[k] satisfies ψ and χ is satisfied for each state π[i] for i ≤ k.
The signature of A(φ, Δ), which we denote for short as Aφ,Δ , is (2 A P , φ, δ, Δ,
φ, F), where the accepting set F consists of all elements ψ Rχ ∈ φ. Other elements
are:
(i) the partition of Q = φ consists of sets {ψ} for ψ ∈ φ; the ordering on the
partition is: {ψ} ≤ {χ} if and only if ψ ∈ χ;
(ii) the acceptance condition F is the set of all formulae ψRχ ∈ φ;
(iii) the transition function δ is specified for the following cases:

(a) δ( p, a, k) =  if and only if p ∈ a for p ∈ A P, otherwise δ( p, a, k) = ⊥;

δ(¬ p, a, k) = ¬δ( p, a, k);
(b) δ(ψ ∧ χ, a, k) = δ(ψ, a, k) ∧ δ(χ, a, k);
(c) δ(ψ ∨ χ, a, k) = δ(ψ, a, k) ∨ δ(χ, a, k);
(d) δ(AX ψ, a, k) = k−1 (c, ψ);
c=0
(e) δ(E X ψ, a, k) = k−1 c=0 (c, ψ); 
(f) δ(AψU χ, a, k) = δ(χ, a, k) ∨ [(δ(ψ, a, k) ∧ k−1 c=0 (c, AψU χ))];
270 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking


(g) δ(EψU χ, a, k) = δ(χ, a, k) ∨ [(δ(ψ, a, k) ∧ k−1 (c, EψU χ))];
c=0
k−1
(h) δ(Aψ Rχ), a, k) = δ(χ, a, k) ∧ [(δ(ψ, a, k) ∨ c=0 (c, Aψ Rχ))];

(j) δ(E(ψ Rχ), a, k) = δ(χ, a, k) ∧ [(δ(ψ, a, k) ∨ k−1
c=0 (c, EψU χ))].

By structural induction on φ, one proves that for each accepting run r of Aφ,Δ on the
Kripke tree (Tk , Vk ), the run tree (Tr , r ) has the property that for every node (x, ψ)
of Tr , VK (x) |= ψ. It follows that for the initial node (ε, φ), ε satisfies φ. 
This means soundness of Aφ,Δ .
To prove completeness, suppose that (T, V ) is a tree with the spread Δ such that
(T, V ) |= φ.
It is to be proved that Aφ,Δ accepts (T, V ). An accepting run (Tr , r ) begins with ε
and r (ε) = (ε, φ). Throughout the run r , the property is kept that for each run node
(x, ψ), V (x) |= ψ. This property is carried to successors of a node by definition of
δ which reflects the semantics of CTL. So-called eventualities related to R, which
make the acceptance condition F, are eventually reached by infinite paths due to
appropriate parts of definition of δ. Finally, we have the theorem due to (Kupferman,
Vardi, Wolper [35]).
Theorem 5.27 The language of Aφ,Δ is non-empty if and only if the Kripke tree
structure with the parameter Δ in Definition 5.43 satisfies φ.
We kindly refer the reader to ([35]) for the proof.

5.17 Symbolic Model Checking: OBDD (Ordered Binary

Decision Diagram)

Symbolic model checking by means of OBDD is a sequel to BDD outlined in Problem

3.12. It is a form of representation of sentential formulae by means of graphs. An
OBDD diagram (or, a graph), is built over leaves representing truth values 0 and 1
(sketched as boxes) and of vertices representing atomic propositions in a formula.
Atomic propositions are ordered and this ordering is kept along each path from the
root to a leaf. Each non-leaf vertex v is representing an atomic proposition x and
it defines a sub-graph representing a sentential function in conformance with the
Boole-Shannon expansion (see Chap. 3). Each vertex issues two edges, one for the 0
value and one for the value 1. Usually, cf. Bryant [39], the edge labelled 0 is sketched
with a dashed line, and it is called lo(v) and the edge labelled 1 is drawn as a solid line
and it is called hi(v). Then, for a vertex v representing an atomic proposition x, the
formula φv defined by v is expressed by recurrence as (x ∧ φhi(v) ) ∨ ((¬x) ∧ φlo(v) ).
In Fig. 5.8, we sketch an OBDD for the formula φ : (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ) ∨ ((¬x1 ) ∧ x3 ).
In Fig. 5.8, we see dashed and solid lines and the ordering x1 > x2 > x3 which
repeats itself on each path from the root to leaves. Implementation of OBDD requires
proper representations of sets of states and transition relations as models of systems
are Kripke structures K = (S, R, L), where S is a set of states, R ⊆ S × S is a
5.17 Symbolic Model Checking: OBDD (Ordered Binary Decision Diagram) 271

Fig. 5.8 BDD(φ)

transition relation and L : S → 2 A P is an assignment of sets of atomic propositions

to states.
Definition 5.45 (OBDD representations of sets and transitions) Each subset X ⊆ S
is defined by its characteristic function χ X (s) which takes the value 1 on if and only
if s ∈ X , otherwise the value is 0. We assume that A P = { p1 , p2 , . . . , pk }.
k
An open complete description with respect to A P is the set of conjuncts i=1 li ,
k
where each literal li is either pi or ¬ pi . For each s ∈ S, we let f (s) = i=1 li (s),
where li (s) is pi in case pi ∈ L(s), otherwise li (s) = ¬ pi . The  mapping f can be
extended
 over sets of states and for X ⊆ S, we let f (X ) to be s∈X f (s). Then χ X
is s∈X f (s).
We now introduce BDD operations which produce graphs for sentential formulae,
the graph for a formula φ is denoted BDD(φ). These operations are (cf. Chaki,
Gurnfinkel [40]):
(i) -BDD(φ) yields BDD(¬φ);
(ii) BDD(φ)∧ BDD(ψ) yields BDD(φ ∧ ψ);
(iii) BDD(φ)∨ BDD(ψ) yields BDD(φ ∨ ψ);
(iv) ∃x. BDD(φ) yields BDD(∃x.φ).
The operation of quantification has been defined in Problem 3.12. BDD supports
substitution; to this end, one creates a copy of A P, A P = { p1 , p2 , . . . , pk }.
For a formula φ(xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xi j ), BDD(φ[xi1 ,xi2 ,...,xi j /xi ,xi ,...,xi ] creates the formula
1 2 j
φ(xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xi j ).
Substitution allows for definitions of quantifications, which we recall from
Sect. 3.22: ∀xi .φ is φ[xi /1] ∧ φ[xi /0] , ∃xi .φ is φ[xi /1] ∨ φ[xi /0] .
Formal treatment of formulae representations is done via API which we exemplify
on the case of our formula in Fig. 1: (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ) ∨ ((¬x1 ) ∧ x3 ). We use standard
notation: NOT for negation, AND for conjunction, OR for disjunction, VAR to denote
an atomic proposition. Then, we can write (cf. [39]):
272 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

(1.) φ1 is VAR(1);
(2.) φ2 is VAR(2);
(3.) φ3 is VAR(3);
(4.) φ4 is AND(φ1 , φ2 );
(5.) φ5 is AND(φ4 , φ3 );
(6.) φ6 is NOT(φ1 );
(7.) φ7 is AND(φ6 , φ3 );
(8.) φ8 is OR(φ5 , φ7 ).
It remains to represent the transition function R. We exploit to this end the mapping
f (s) into open complete description and substitutions of primed atomic propositions:

for f (s) we denote by f (s) the formula f (s)[ p1 , p2 ,..., pk / p1 , p2 ,..., pk ] .

With thus convention, for (s, t) ∈ R, we let f (s, t) = f (s) ∧ f (t) .
As with sets of 
states, the characteristic function of a transition relation R is given
by f (R) which is (s,t)∈R f (s, t). BDD(f(R)) is denoted R; similarly, BDD(f(X)) is
denoted X.

Definition 5.46 (Images and Preimages) In model checking, the dominating idea is
to explore the space of states by checking the set of successors as well as the set of
predecessors of a given set of states.

For a set X ⊆ S of states, the image of X under the transition relation R, is the
set Im(X,R)={t ∈ S : ∃s ∈ X.(s, t) ∈ R}. We need one more operation of rev.prime
(reverse prime), shortly, rp, which consists in substitution of pi for pi . The BDD
rendering of the image Im(X,R) is the formula BDDIm(X,R):

(∃{ p1 , p2 , . . . , pk }.X ∧ R)r p .

The preimage PREIm(Y,R)={t : ∃s ∈ Y : (t, s) ∈ R}. The BDD rendering of the

preimage PREIm(Y,R) is BDDPREIm(Y,r):

∃{ p1 , p2 , . . . , pk }.R ∧ Y .

Example 5.9 It is time to show examples on computing BDD objects defined in

Definition 5.45 and in Definition 5.46. Please consider a Kripke structure K in Fig. 5.9.
Let us compute some constructs.
f (s0 ) is p ∧ q;

Fig. 5.9 Kripke’s structure

K
5.17 Symbolic Model Checking: OBDD (Ordered Binary Decision Diagram) 273

f (s1 ) is p;
For X = {s0 , s1 }, f (X ) is (( p ∧ q) ∨ p) ≡ p;
For the transition relation R, f (R) is [( p ∧ q ∧ p ) ∨ ( p ∧ p )].
BDDImage for X = {s1 } is BDDIm(X,R)=(∃ p, q. p ∧ p ∧ p ,r p ≡ ( p ,r p ) ≡ p =
f (s1 ).
BDDPreimage for X = {s1 } is BDDPREIm(X,R)=∃ p , q .( p ∧ q ∧ p
∨ p ∧ p ) ≡ p ∧ p ∨ p = f (s0 , s1 ).

Definition 5.47 (Symbolic model checking for CTL via OBDD) We know that a base
for temporal CTL operators may be provided by EX, EG,EU, which proclaim the
existence of a path on which X, respectively, G, or U takes place. All these cases may
be model checked by beginning with the set of all states of a Kripke structure and
using BDDPREIm in order to find recursively preceding states from which a path is
initiated on which the formula for X or G, or U happens to be true.

An exception is the operator AG expressing the safety property (always true)

whose model checking requires checking all states so the checking procedure begins
with the initial states s0 and progresses through all states by means of BDDIm in
order to find successors to already checked states. Please recall that boldface denotes
BDD formulae.

OBDD Model checking safety property

MODEL− CHECKING− SAFETY− PROPERTY
(Kripke structure K=(S,R,L), s0 ∈ S, CTL formula AGp)
S =BDD for the set S of already explored states;
N=BDD for the set N of new states=successors to states in S .
Initialization: S =0, N={s0 }.
1. N=BDDIm(S , R)∧¬ S .
2. S =S ∨ N.
3. while N = 0 .
6. return S ∧ (¬ p=0.
Remarks on model checking CTL EX, EG, EU formulae (Chaki, Gurnfinkel [40]).
Recall that for the Kripke structure K, K |= φ if and only if K , s0 |= φ. Therefore
the function CHECKC T L (K , s0 , φ) can be recorded as the function SAT(CTL)(K , φ)
which returns the result of S0 ∧ ¬ S=0 for S=the set of states which satisfy φ.
SAT(CTL)(K , φ) is a general name for specialized variants depending on the
operator. The following list ([40]) contains all specializations.
(1.) if φ is p, then p.
(2.) if φ is ¬ψ, then SAT(CTL)(K , φ) is
¬ SAT(CTL)(K , ψ).
274 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

(3.) if φ is ψ ∧ χ, then SAT(CTL)(K , φ) is

SAT(CTL)(K , ψ)∧ SAT(CTL)(K , χ).
(4.) if φ is EXψ, then SAT(CTL)(K , φ) is
EX(SAT(CTL)(K , ψ)).
(5.) if φ is EGψ, then SAT(CTL)(K , φ) is
EG((SAT(CTL)(K , ψ).
(6.) if φ is E(ψUχ), then SAT(CTL)(K , φ) is
EU(SAT(CTL)(K , ψ), SAT(CTL)(K , χ)).
The function EX computes simply BDDPREIm of the set S(φ) of states which satisfy
φ, i.e., it returns BDDPREIm(S(φ), R).
The two remaining functions are more complex as they have to compute fixed
points (see the Knaster-Tarski theorem in Chap. 1 and a discussion of fixed point
logics in Chap. 8).
EG(K, S(φ))
1. while S(φ)= S ( S(φ) is the current set of states satisfying φ
2. S(φ):= S(φ)∧ BDDPREIm(S(φ), R)
3. return S(φ)
Returned S(φ) is the fixed point of the predecessor operator.
EU(K, S1 , S2 )
1. S := 0
2. while S = S
2. S:=S
3. S := S2 ∨ (S1 ∧ BDDPREIm(S, R)
4. return S
Tableaux for LTL and CTL in Sects. 5.9 and 5.10 serve as well as tools in symbolic
model checking (cf. [40]) for a discussion of the LTL case.

5.18 Problems

Problem 5.1 (Time modalities) Due to their meanings, the pair G, F of temporal
operators is equivalent to the pair L , M of modal operators. Please write the for-
mulae (K),(T),(4),(5),(B), (D), (L(n,m)), (G(k,l,n,m)),(Bc ), (5c ) from Sect. 4.16 in
the temporal context, i.e., by replacing L by G and M by F and applying temporal
equivalences.
Check validity of the obtained formulae and write valid temporal formulae defin-
ing temporal variants of logics K, T, S4, S5.

Problem 5.2 (Discretization of continuous time) Time is often perceived as contin-

uous, hence, its discretization makes it possible to pass to discrete time.
5.18 Problems 275

We consider the structure (R+ , <), where R+ = [0, ∞) and < is the natural
linear order. Let η : (an )∞ n=0 be a strictly increasing sequence of real numbers with
lim n→∞ = ∞. Let δ0 = [0, a0 ) and for n > 0, δn = [an−1 , an ). Let P be the count-
able set of atomic propositions and P <ω be the set of finite subsets of P. Let f be
an assignment which assigns to each δn a subset f (δn ) ∈ P <ω . The induced linear
order on the collection Δ = {δn : n ∈ N is the order on indices n. Define operators
G f,η , F f,η , X f,η , U f,η as follows:
(i) δu |= G f,η φ ≡ ∀δn ≥ δu .δn |= φ;
(ii) δu |= G f,η φ ≡ ∃δn ≥ δu .δn |= φ;
(iii) δu |= X f,η φ ≡ δu+1 |= φ;
(iv) δu |= φU f,η ψ ≡ ∃δn ≥ δu .δn |= ψ ∧ ∀δu ≤ δm < δn .δm |= φ.
Verify: which of LTL formulae in Theorem 5.2 are preserved in this new setting.

Problem 5.3 (LTL formulae) Disentangle the meaning of the formula

Fψ ⊃ φUψ.

Problem 5.4 (LTL formulae) The following are expressions of LTL involving dis-
tributivity wrt. U:
(i) φ U (χ ∨ ξ) ≡ ((φ U χ) ∨ (φUξ));
(ii) (χ ∧ ξ) U φ ≡ (χ U φ) ∧ (ξUφ);
(iii) ((χ ⊃ ξ U φ) ∧ (χ Uφ)) ⊃ (ξ U φ);
Prove validity of these formulae.

Problem 5.5 (CTL formulae) Prove validity of formulae involving the Release oper-
ator R:
(i) (AφRψ) ⊃ (ψ ∧ (φ∨ AXA(φ Rψ)));
(ii) (EφRψ) ⊃ (ψ ∧ (φ∨ EXE(φ Rψ)));
Verify whether converse implications to (i), (ii) are valid.

Problem 5.6 (CTL∗ formulae) Verify whether CTL∗ implications below, where φ
is a state formula, are valid:

(i) (EGAF φ) ⊃ (EGFφ);

(ii) (AFAGφ) ⊃ (AFGφ);
(iii) (EFAGφ) ⊃ (EFGφ).

Problem 5.7 (LTL+PAST formulae) Verify validity of the following LTL+PAST

formulae:
(i) (φSχ ∨ ξ) ≡ (φSχ ∨ φSξ);
(ii) (φ ∨ ψ)Sχ ≡ (φSχ ∨ φSξ);
(iii) Y(φSψ) ≡((Yφ)S(Yψ)).
276 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

Problem 5.8 (Periodic structures) Consider a model for LTL over the alpha-
bet {a, b} of the form M f in which the assignment f is given as the ω-word
(a)(a, b)(b)(a, b a, b b)ω . In the periodic form it has the prefix length=3 and the
loop length=3.
Prove validity of the following formulae:
(i) M f |= GFa;
(ii) M f |= GFa⊃ GFb;
(iii) GFaU b.

Problem 5.9 (Embedding of CTL into CTL∗ ) Verify the claim: each CTL formula
is a CTL∗ state formula.

Problem 5.10 (More CTL formulae) Verify validity of the following formulae ([9],
7.5.2):
(i) (AX(φ ⊃ ψ))⊃((AXφ)⊃ (AXψ));
(ii) (ψ ∨ (φ∧ EXE(φUψ)))⊃E(φUψ);
(iii) (ψ ∨ (φ∧ AXA(φUψ)))⊃A(φUψ).
(iv) EX;
(v) AG((ψ ∨ (φ∧ EX χ)) ⊃ χ) ⊃ (E(φ Uψ)⊃ χ));
(vi) AG((ψ ∨ (φ∧AXχ)) ⊃ χ) ⊃ (A(φUψ)⊃ χ));
(vii) (ψ∨ EXEFψ) ⊃EFψ;
(viii) (ψ∨ AXAFψ) ⊃AFψ;
(ix) AG((ψ∨EXχ) ⊃ χ) ⊃(EFψ ⊃ χ);
(x) AG((ψ∨AXχ) ⊃ χ) ⊃(AFψ ⊃ χ).

Problem 5.11 (LTL) For any sequence a=(an )∞ n=0 of natural numbers, define the
operator Fa as follows: for an LTL formula φ and a state sk , sk |= Fa φ if and only if
(i) sk+a0 |= φ;
(ii) ∀n.sk+i=0
n |= φ ⊃ sk+i=0
n+1 |= φ.

Define by means of Fa operators X, G, F.

Problem 5.12 (LTL) Define the operator G in terms of operators X and U.

Problem 5.13 (LTL; [9]) The axiomatic system for LTL consists of the following
axiom schemes
(A1) all tautologies (i.e., valid formulae) of sentential logic;
(A2) X(χ ⊃ ξ) ⊃ (Xχ ⊃Xξ) (the modal (K) for X);
(A3) X; truth is satisfied always;
(A4) X¬χ ≡ ¬ Xχ;
(A5) Gχ ⊃ (χ∧Gχ);
(A6) G(χ ⊃ ((ξ∧Xχ)) ⊃ (χ ⊃ Gξ);
(A7) (χ ∨ (ξ ∧ ξUχ)) ⊃ (ξUχ);
(A8) G((χ ∨ (ξ∧Xη)) ⊃ η) ⊃ ((ξUχ) ⊃ η),
5.18 Problems 277

and inference rules

(MP) the detachment rule;
(NX ) if φ, then Xφ;
(NG ) if φ, then Gφ.
Prove: the formula Gχ ⊃Xχ is provable in (A1)–(A8) with inference rules (MP) and
(N).

Problem 5.14 (LTL) Explain the meaning of the LTL formula Fχ ⊃ ξUχ; compare
it to the proposition in ([9], 6.2) of the operator B (Before): ‘if χ is satisfied, then ξ
is satisfied before χ.

Problem 5.15 (CTL) (after Emerson, Halpern [16]), Emerson, E. A.: Temporal and
modal logics. In: Leeuwen, J. van (ed.): Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science,
B. MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1990). Axiomatic system for CTL developed in [16],
consists of the following schemes:
(A1) all tautologies of sentential logic;
(A2) (K C T L ) AX(χ ⊃ ξ) ⊃ [(AXχ) ⊃ (AXξ);
(A3) EX (the realization of seriality of the underlying transition system);
(A4) (χ ∨ (ξ∧EXE(ξUχ))) ⊃E(ξUχ);
(A5) (χ ∨ (ξ∧AXA(ξUχ))) ⊃A(ξUχ);
(A6) AG((χ ∨ (ξ∧EXη) ⊃ η) ⊃ (E(ξUχ) ⊃ η);
(A7) AG((χ ∨ (ξ∧AXη) ⊃ η) ⊃ (A(ξUχ) ⊃ η).
Inference rules are (MP) and (N): if  χ, then AXχ.
The Deduction theorem: Γ ∪ {χ}  ξ ≡ Γ  χ ⊃ ξ.
Derive from (A1)–(A7) by means of (MP) and (N) the formula E(ξUχ) ≡ (χ ∨
(ξ∧EXE(ξUχ)).
[Hint: please consult eventually [9], 7.5.2.].

Problem 5.16 (CTL*) Prove semantically the following formulae of CTL∗ :

(i) A(χ ⊃ ξ) ⊃A(χ ⊃Aξ);
(ii) Aχ ⊃AAχ;
(iii) Aχ ⊃ χ;
(iv) Aχ ⊃AEχ;
(v) AXχ ⊃XAχ;
(vi) p ⊃A p, where p is an atomic proposition.
Schemes (i)–(vi) along with axiom schemes for LTL form the axiom system for
CTL∗ proposed by (Reynolds M.: An Axiomatization of Full Computation Tree
Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 66(3), 1011–1057 (2001)).

Problem 5.17 (CTL∗ ); (after [9]). Find, why the formula A(G p ⊃AG p) is not valid
in CTL∗ . Provide a falsifying structure.
278 5 Temporal Logics for Linear and Branching Time and Model Checking

The two following problems come from (Wolper, P.: Temporal logic can be more
expressive. Information and Control 56(1–2), 72–99 (1983)) and (Manna, Z.: Veri-
fication of sequential programs: Temporal axiomatization. In: Bauer, F. L., Dijkstra,
E. W., Hoare, C.A.R. (eds.). Theoretical Foundations of Programming Methodology.
NATO Sci. Ser. Reidel (1981)).

Problem 5.18 (LTL) (after (Wolper, Manna)). A slightly different set of axiom
schemes for a variant of LTL called PTL (the Propositional Temporal Logic) was
proposed in by Manna and analyzed by Wolper. These axiom schemes are
(MW1) F p ≡ ¬G¬ p;
(MW2) G( p ⊃ q) ⊃(G p ⊃Gq);
(MW3) X¬ p ≡ ¬X p;
(MW4) X( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (X p ⊃Xq);
(MW5) G p ⊃ ( p∧X p∧XG p);
(MW6) G( p ⊃X p) ⊃ ( p ⊃G p);
(MW7) G p ⊃ pUq;
(MW8) pUq ≡ q ∨ ( p∧X( pUq)).
Inference rules are (MP) and (NG ). This variant treats Until in a different way:
s0 |= pUq if and only if (i) either s |= p for each s ≥ s0 or (ii) there exists s ≥ s0
such that s |= q and s |= p for each s0 ≤ s < s. This latter interpretation (ii), which
is adopted for LTL, comes from (Gabbay, D., Pnueli, A., Shelah, S., Stavi, J.: The
temporal analysis of fairness. In: 7th ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming
Languages, 163–173 (1980).).
Derive the formula (G p) ⊃ p.

Problem 5.19 (Linear properties in LTL and Quantified LTL) (after Wolper). Prove:
(i) the formula
p ∧ G( p ⊃ X¬ p) ∧ G(¬ p ⊃ X p)

does not express the property: ‘every second state satisfies p’ (EVEN(p)) (ii) the
formula ∃q.q ∧ G(q ⊃ X¬q) ∧ G(¬q ⊃ Xq) ∧ G(q ⊃ p) expresses the property
EVEN(p).

References

1. Kohelet: In Alter, R.: The Hebrew Bible: A Translation with Commentary. W. W. Norton &
Company (2018)
2. Łukasiewicz, J.: On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle. Kraków (1910)
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Chapter 6
Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Many-valued logics play fundamental role in approximate reasoning by quantifying

the uncertain knowledge. One of motivations for development of those logics was
the problem of contingent statements posed by Aristotle in Metaphysics. The famous
contingent statement by Aristotle ‘tomorrow there will be a sea battle’ is an example.
The battle may be or may be not fought. This statement is neither certainly true
nor certainly false. There was need for a new logical apparatus which would catch
formally a new notion of logical truth and be a proposal for solving the problem of
contradictory statements Łukasiewicz [1].
In March 1918, in Farewell lecture at Warsaw University, Łukasiewicz [2]
announced that he created a new logic into which the truth value ‘I do not know’ was
incorporated. Łukasiewicz, on the verge of leaving the University for two years for a
duty of minister for education, emphasized in an emotional lecture that he created a
new logic liberating people from the dictate of two-valued logic which he regarded
as a sort of corslet on free thinking.
In 1920 Łukasiewicz was able to put the idea into a publication, the period 1918-
19 taken from him by state duties. He denoted the new value with the symbol ‘2’
later replaced by the value 21 due to computational convenience as simultaneously he
proposed truth formulae for negation ¬ and implication ⊃ in his 3-valued sentential
logic in Łukasiewicz [3] : we denote by A the assignment on atomic propositions
and we extend A to the valuation A∗ on formulae.

6.1 3-Valued Logic of Łukasiewicz (3 L ). Introduction

We denote by ¬ L the Łukasiewicz negation and by ⊃ L the Łukasiewicz implication.

Truth tables for these connectives are given in Table 6.1, respectively in Table 6.2.

Definition 6.1 (Assignments. The Łukasiewicz formulae) Suppose that the assign-
ment A is defined for atomic propositions. Its extension to formulae, A∗ , is defined on

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 281
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_6
282 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Table 6.1 The truth function of the Łukasiewicz implication

pq q=0 q=1 q= 1
2
p=0 1 1 1
p=1 0 1 1
2
p = 21 1
2 1 1

Table 6.2 The truth function of the Łukasiewicz negation

1
p 0 1 2
¬p 1 0 1
2

connectives ¬ L and ⊃ L by means of rules proposed by Łukasiewicz and visualized

in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The rules for assignment A∗ are the following:
(i) A∗ (¬ L φ) = 1 − A∗ (φ);
(ii) A∗ (φ ⊃ L ψ) = min{1, 1 − A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ)}.

Definition 6.2 (Other connectives of the logic 3 L ) We define connectives of 3 L

on the basis of implication and negation, whose valuations are given in Definition
6.1(i), (ii). We denote equivalence by the symbol ≡ at the same time allowing for
replacement of one side of the equivalence by the other side in any formula of 3 L .
The equivalence defined below is the semantical equivalence, based on values of
formulae. We denote this equivalence with the symbol ≡ A .

First, we register a relation between negation and implication. We denote by 0 the

constant whose value A∗ (0) is 0. Then, truth function of ¬ L φ is equal to truth function
of φ ⊃ L 0. Indeed, truth function of φ ⊃ L 0 is equal to min{1, 1 − A∗ (φ) + 0}=
1 − A∗ (φ). Hence,

¬ L φ ≡ A φ ⊃ L 0.

We introduce the connective ∨ called the strong disjunction. The truth function
of φ∨ψ is equal to the truth function of (¬ L φ) ⊃ L ψ. For given φ, ψ, truth function
A∗ (φ∨ψ) = min{1, 1 − (1 − A∗ (φ)) + A∗ (ψ)}=min{1, A ∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ)}. Hence

φ∨ψ ≡ A (¬ L φ) ⊃ L ψ.

The connective φ&ψ is called the strong conjunction. The truth function of φ&ψ is
equal to the truth function of ¬ L (¬ L φ∨¬ L ψ) which is equal to the truth function
of the formula φ ⊃ L ¬ψ. For given φ, ψ, truth function A∗ (φ&ψ = 1 − min{1, 1 −
A∗ (φ) + 1 − A∗ (ψ)}= max{0, A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ) − 1}.
6.1 3-Valued Logic of Łukasiewicz (3 L ). Introduction 283

In the above computation, we applied the duality (1) max{x, y} = 1 − min{1 −

x, 1 − y} valid for x, y ∈ [0, 1]. We obtain,

φ&ψ ≡ A ¬ L (¬ L φ∨¬ L ψ).

The lattice operator, the meet ∧ is defined as follows.

The truth function of φ ∧ ψ is equal to the truth function of φ&(φ ⊃ L ψ).
For given φ, ψ, the truth function A∗ (φ ∧ ψ) = max{0, A∗ (φ) + min{1, 1 −
A (φ) + A∗ (ψ) − 1} = min{A∗ (φ), A∗ (ψ)}.
∗

φ ∧ ψ ≡ A φ&(φ ⊃ L ψ).

The lattice operator, the join ∨, is defined as follows. The truth function of φ ∨ ψ
is equal to the truth function of ¬ L (¬ L φ ∧ ¬ L ψ). By duality (1), A∗ (φ ∨ ψ) =
max{A∗ (φ), A∗ (ψ)}. We put for the record the equivalence

(φ ∨ ψ) ≡ A ¬ L (¬ L φ ∧ ¬l ψ).

Formulae in (iv) and (v) tell us that the lattice order ≤ is preserved as the natural
order in the set of values of formulae. The connective & is dual to the implication ⊃ L
in the following sense, where A∗ (&) denotes the truth function of &, and A∗ (⊃ L ) is
the value of ⊃ L .

A∗ (x&y) ≤ z if and only if A∗ (x ⊃ L z) ≥ y. (6.1a)

In defining terms, the equivalence (6.1a) comes down to the equivalence:

max {0, x + y − 1} ≤ z if and only if min {1, 1 − x + z} ≥ y. (6.1b)

That (6.1b) actually holds can be verified by a simple calculations in two cases:
Case 1. max{0, x + y − 1} = 0, Case 2. max{0, x + y − 1} = x + y − 1. In Case 1,
x + y − 1 ≤ 0 and z ≥ 0, hence min{1, 1 − x + z} ≥ min{1, 1 − x} ≥ y. in Case 2,
x + y − 1 > 0 and x + y − 1 ≤ z, hence, 1 − x + z ≥ y and min{1, 1 − x + z} ≥
y, thus, in both cases (6.1b) has been shown to hold.
In algebraic theory, x ⊃ L y is the relative pseudo-complement of x with respect
to y (see Sect. 1.9).
Yet another duality bounds & and ∨:

(#) x A∗ (&)y = 1 − [(1 − x)A∗ (∨)(1 − y))].

We sum up our knowledge of connectives in the logic 3 L in Table 6.3

284 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Table 6.3 Connectives of L 3

Connective Defined as Valuation
¬L φ ¬L φ 1 − A∗ (φ)
φ ⊃L ψ φ ⊃L ψ min{1, 1 − A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ)}
φ∨ψ (¬ L φ) ⊃ L ψ min{1, A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ)}
φ&ψ φ ⊃ L ¬ψ max{0, A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ) − 1}
φ∧ψ φ&(φ ⊃ L ψ) min{A∗ (φ), A∗ (ψ)}
φ∨ψ ¬ L (¬ L φ ∧ ¬ L ψ) max{A∗ (φ), A∗ (ψ)}

6.2 T-Norms, T-Co-norms

It is now time to reveal in more detail the fabric of many-valued logic. The formula
max{0, x + y − 1} is the value TL (x, y) of the function TL : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1]
called the Łukasiewicz T-norm. T-norms go back to Menger [4] who introduced them
in his attempts at modeling uncertainty by means of probabilistic metric spaces.
The discussion of T-norms is postponed to a further section, let us mention here that
the duality (#) makes the set of values for many-valued logic into a residuated lattice
(see Sect. 1.9). The connective & is called the strong conjunction, and the dual ∨ is
called the strong disjunction. The meet and the join are then also called conjunction
and disjunction. The last operator of use in some algebras related to many-valued
logics is the difference , which interprets the composition of connectives
φ&¬ψ

with the value max {0, A∗ (φ) − A∗ (ψ)}. In particular, x ≤ y if and only if x y = 0.
If all these connectives are applied to a set A∗ of values then the structure
∗
(A , ¬ L , ⊃ L , &, ∨, , 0, 1) is denoted A L and called the Łukasiewicz residuated
lattice. In addition to Łukasiewicz many-valued logics, there are some other ‘clas-
sical’ many-valued logics. We focus here only on principal of them induced by
T-norms, i.e,

The Gödel logic induced by the minimum T-norm TM (x, y) = min{x, y}.

The Goguen logic induced by the product T-norm TP (x, y) = x · y.

Definition 6.3 (T-norms) By a T-norm T (x, y) we understand a function from the

square [0, 1] × [0, 1] into the unit interval [0, 1] which satisfies the following con-
ditions:
(T1) T (x, y) = T (y, x);
(T2) T (T (x, y), z) = T (x, T (y, z));
(T3) if x1 > x, then T (x1 , y) ≥ T (x, y) for every y ∈ [0, 1];
(T4) T (x, 0) = 0 and T (x, 1) = x.
6.2 T-Norms, T-Co-norms 285

Each T-norm T is then symmetric (T1), associative (T2), coordinate-wise increas-

ing (T3), and obeying boundary conditions (T4). It is obvious that besides the logic 3 L
with values in the set {0, 21 , 1}, the connectives defined in Theorem 6.1 are applicable
as well in the sets

{0, n−1
1
, . . . , n−2
n−1
, 1} producing the n-valued logic n L for each natural number
n > 2;

Q ∩ [0, 1] = { mn : 0 ≤ m ≤ n, n = 0} for natural numbers m, n, i.e, for rational

numbers in the unit interval [0, 1], producing the infinite-valued logic Q L ;

[0,1] producing the infinite-valued logic [0,1] L .

The same concerns logics induced by Gödel’s and Goguen’s T-norms.
Each T-norm T introduces a relative pseudo-complement ⇒T (called also the
residuum of T ) by means of the generalization of (6.1a).

x ⇒T y ≥ z if and only if T (x, z) ≤ y.

Definition 6.4 (Residual implications) For a T-norm T , the residual implication

induced by T (T-residuum) denoted ⇒T is defined by means of the duality: x ⇒T
y ≥ z ≡ T (x, z) ≤ y. In case of a continuous T-norm T , T -residuum can be defined
as

x ⇒T y = max{z : T (x, z) ≤ y}.

For each T-norm T , T -residuum is the semantic interpretation of the implication

⊃T .

Theorem 6.1 The following hold for residua of T-norms. In case x ≤ y, all residua
take on the value 1. We consider the case when x > y.

(i) for the Łukasiewicz T-norm , the value of the residuum x ⇒ L y is the value of
the Łukasiewicz implication: min{1, 1 − x + y};
(ii) for the product T-norm, the value of the residuum x ⇒ P y is xy ;
(iii) for the minimum T-norm, the value of the residuum x ⇒ M y is y.

Residuum allows us to define the negation operator:

¬T (x) ≡ A x ⇒T 0.

In Definition 6.2(ii), we have given the value of ∨ as min {1, A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ)}.
This function comes as dual to & via the equivalence φ∨ψ ≡ A ¬(¬φ&¬ψ).
This duality applied to any T-norm yields the dual function ST called T-co-norm:
ST (x, y) = 1 − T (1 − x, 1 − y).
286 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Table 6.4 T-norms, related residua and t-co-norms

T-norm Residuum t-co-norm
Łukasiewicz: max {0, x + y − 1} min {1, 1 − x + y} min {1, x + y}
Gödel: min {x, y} 1 for x ≤ y, else y max {x, y}
Goguen: x·y 1 for x ≤ y, else xy x+y−x·y

Table 6.5 T-norms, related negation operators

T-norm Negation
Łukasiewicz: ¬x = 1 − x
Gödel: ¬1 = 0, ¬x = 0 for x < 1
Goguen: ¬1 = 0, ¬x = 0 for x < 1

Obviously, any T-norm can be defined in terms of its T-co-norm: T (x, y) = 1 −

ST (1 − x, 1 − y). By this formula, any co-norm S defines the corresponding T-norm
TS . Properties of co-norms are dual to properties of T-norms: in particular, any co-
norm S is symmetric, associative and monotone increasing in each coordinate, the
only change are boundary conditions: S(x, 0) = x and S(x, 1) = 1. In Table 6.4, we
give principal T-norms, with their residua, T-co- norms, and in Table 6.5 we insert the
corresponding negations operators. We may observe the drastic negation for Gödel
and Goguen T-norms.
As already observed by us, the semantic value of the Łukasiewicz implication
is given by the residuum of the Łukasiewicz T-norm. The scheme outlined in Sect.
6.18 for the logic 3 L may be generalized to the case of an arbitrary T-norm T and its
residuum ⇒T .
The resulting logic is called the Basic Logic (BL-logic) in Hájek [5].

6.3 Basic Logic (BL)

Before proceeding with the logic 3 L , we give an account of the minimal many-valued
logic based on the above scheme, i.e., BL.
As with sentential logic, semantics of many-valued logic is determined by assign-
ments. Each assignment creates world in which a formula can be true; the designated
value for truth is 1. A formula true in all worlds is valid. A formula is satisfiable if
and only if its value is 1 in at least one world, otherwise the formula is unsatisfiable.
Let us observe that a formula is valid if and only if its negation is unsatisfiable.
In BL, the implication is ⊃T whose value is the residuum of T , and, strong
conjunction &T is just T . The constant is 0 is interpreted as 0. Other connectives are
defined from ⊃T and &T by means of equivalences:
 6.3 Basic Logic (BL) 287

(i) ¬T φ ≡ φ ⊃T 0;
(ii) φ ∧ ψ ≡ φ&T (φ ⊃T ψ);
(iii) φ ∨ ψ ≡ [(φ ⊃T ψ) ⊃T ψ] ∧ [(ψ ⊃T φ) ⊃T φ];
(iv) φ∨ψ ≡ ¬T (¬T φ&T ¬T ψ).

Definition 6.5 (Axiomatization of BL) Axiom system for BL comes from Hájek [5].
We reproduce it along with some provable formulae of BL referring to Hájek [5] for
a more complete account. Axiom schemes for BL are the following (≡ is defined as
⊃ & ⊃):
(A1) ((φ ⊃T ψ) ⊃T (ψ ⊃T ξ )) ⊃T (φ ⊃T ξ );
(A2) φ&T ψ ⊃T φ;
(A3) φ&T ψ ⊃T ψ&T φ;
(A4) (φ&T (φ ⊃T ψ)) ⊃T (ψ&T (ψ ⊃T φ));
(A5) (φ ⊃T (ψ ⊃T ξ )) ⊃T ((φ&T ψ) ⊃T ξ );
(A6) ((φ ⊃T ψ) ⊃T ξ ) ⊃T (((ψ ⊃T φ) ⊃T ξ ) ⊃T ξ );
(A7) 0 ⊃T φ.

The inference rule in BL is detachment (MP).

Theorem 6.2 All axiom schemes are valid. BL is sound.

Proof It consists in checking that value of each scheme is 1. We prove this for (A2).
We have

A∗ ((φ&T ψ) ⊃T φ) = min{1, 1 − max{0, A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ) − 1} + A∗ (ψ)};

we have two cases: if A∗ (φ) + A∗ (ψ) ≤ 1, then A∗ (φ&T ψ ⊃T φ) = min{1, 1 +

A∗ (ψ} = 1, else A∗ (φ&T ψ ⊃T φ) = min{1, 2 − A ∗ (φ)} = 1. 

Theorem 6.3 The following selected formulae are provable, hence, valid in BL.

(i) φ ⊃T φ;
(ii) φ ⊃T (ψ ⊃T φ);
(iii) (φ ⊃T (ψ ⊃T ξ )) ⊃T (ψ ⊃T (φ ⊃T ξ ));
(iv) (φ&T (φ ⊃T ψ)) ⊃T ψ;
(v) φ ⊃T (ψ ⊃T φ&T ψ);
(vi) φ&T (ψ&T ξ ) ≡T (φ&T ψ)&T ξ ;
(vii) (φ&T ψ) ⊃T φ ∧T ψ;
(viii) φ ⊃T (φ ∨T ψ);
(ix) (φ ⊃T ψ) ∨T (ψ ⊃T φ);
(x) (φ ⊃T ψ) ⊃T (¬T ψ ⊃T ¬T φ);
(xi) φ ⊃T (¬φ ⊃T ψ);
(xii) φ ⊃T ¬¬φ;
(xiii) (φ&T ¬φ) ⊃T 0;
 288 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

(xiv) ¬T (φ ∨T ψ) ≡T (¬T φ ∧T ¬T ψ);

(xv) ¬T (φ ∧T ψ) ≡T (¬T φ ∨T ¬T ψ);
(xvi) [(φ ⊃T ψ)&T (χ ⊃T ξ )] ⊃T [(φ&T χ ) ⊃T (ψ&T ξ )].

Theorem 6.4 (Deduction theorem for Basic Logic) If Γ ∪ {φ}  B L ψ then Γ  B L

φ n ⊃T ψ for some natural number n, where φ n is defined by recurrence as
φ&T (φ n−1 ), φ 1 being φ.

Proof Consider a proof α1 , α2 , . . . , αn of ψ from Γ ∪ {φ}.

One proves by induction that  B L φ n j ⊃T α j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
For α1 it is true as it is an axiom instance or φ. The essential case is when some α j
results by detachment from already proved αk and αk ⊃T α j and then by induction
hypothesis  B L φ n ⊃T αk and  B L φ m ⊃T (αk ⊃T α j ). Then by (xvi), φ n+m ⊃T
αk &T (αk ⊃T α j ) which by (iv) yields  B L φ n+m ⊃T α j . 

We define the constant 1 as 0 ⊃T 0.

6.4 Meta-Theory of BL

We recall a proof of completeness of BL couched in algebraic terms. Algebraic

approach to logics goes in its origins to George Boole and was continued by Linden-
baum and Tarski, Tarski and McKinsey, Stone, Henkin, Rasiowa and Sikorski (see
Rasiowa and Sikorski [6]), Chang [7], among others. Algebraic methods for proving
completeness use the prime filter theorem (Chap. 1, Theorem 1.68). We include the
proof for BL in Hájek [5]. First, some preliminary definitions.

Definition 6.6 (Residuated lattices) A residuated lattice is (abstractly) a tuple L =<

A, ∩, ∪, &, ⇒, 0, 1 >, where
(i) the substructure < A, ∩, ∪, 0, 1 > is a lattice (see Definition 1.82);
(ii) the substructure < A, &, 1 > is a commutative semigroup with the unit 1,
i.e. x&1 = x for each x ∈ A, & is associative and commutative; in our case it
is strong conjunction which is rendered by the continuous T-norm T ;
(iii) the duality x&z ≤ y ≡ x ⇒ y ≥ z holds for all triples x, y, z ∈ A.

Definition 6.7 (BL-algebras) A residuated lattice is a BL-algebra if it satisfies in

addition two conditions:
(iv) x&x ⇒ y = x ∩ y;
(v) (x ⇒ y) ∪ (y ⇒ x) = 1.

We postpone a discussion of properties of T-norms to Sect. 6.9, at this point, we give

a list of essential for this discussion properties of T-norms.
(vi) x ≤ (x&T x ⇒ y) ≤ y;
 6.4 Meta-Theory of BL 289

(vii) x ≤ ((y ⇒ x)&T y);

(viii) if x ≤ y, then (x&T z) ≤ (y&T z);
(ix) if x ≤ y, then (z ⇒T x) ≤ (z ⇒T y) and (y ⇒T z) ≤ (x ⇒T z);
(x) (x ∪ y)&T z = (x&T z) ∪ (y&T z);
(xi) (x ∪ y) = [(x ⇒T y) ⇒T y] ∩ [(y ⇒T x) ⇒T x].
Definition 6.8 (Linearly ordered lattices) A lattice L is linearly ordered if and only if
x ∩ y = x or x ∩ y = y for each pair x, y ∈ A. By duality, x ∪ y = y or x ∪ y = x.
Any linearly ordered BL-algebra satisfies x ∩ y = x&T (x ⇒T y) with the converse
also true.
Definition 6.9 (BL-algebras as models for BL) We consider assignments on atomic
propositions of BL in a BL-algebra L. For each atomic proposition p, an assignment
A assigns an element A( p) ∈ L. The assignment A is extended by structural induction
to the valuation A∗ on formulae of BL. We then have:
(i) A∗ (φ ⊃T ψ) = A∗ (φ) ⇒T A∗ (ψ);
(ii) A∗ (φ&T ψ) = A∗ (φ)& A∗ (ψ);
(iii) A∗ (φ ∨T ψ) = A∗ (φ) ∪ A∗ (ψ); A∗ (φ ∧T ψ) = A∗ (φ) ∩ A∗ (ψ);
(iv) A∗ (0) = 0; A∗ (¬T φ) = A∗ (φ) ⇒T 0;
Definition 6.10 (L-Validity) A formula φ of BL is L-valid if and only if A∗ (φ) = 1
for each assignment A on atomic propositions of BL.
Definition 6.11 (Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra of BL) For each formula φ of BL, we
define the class of provably equivalent formulae [φ]τ by letting: ψ ∈ [φ]τ if and only
if the formula φ ≡T ψ is provable in BL; we denote this relation by the symbol τ .
We denote by T L the collection of all classes of τ . The factorization is canonical,
i.e.,
(i) [φ]τ &τ [ψ]τ = [φ&T ψ]τ ;
(ii) [φ]τ ⇒τ [ψ]τ = [φ ⊃T ψ]τ ;
(iii) [φ]τ ∪τ [ψ]τ = [φ ∨T ψ]τ ;
(iv) [φ]τ ∩τ [ψ]τ = [φ ∧T ψ]τ ;
(v) 0τ = [0T ]τ ; 1τ = [1T ]τ .
It follows that factorization preserves properties of BL-algebra, i.e., T L is a BL-
algebra.
Definition 6.12 (Filters on residuated lattices) For a residuated lattice L, a filter F
(see Definition 1.9.4) is a subset of the domain A such that the following are satisfied:
(i) if x, y ∈ F, then x&y ∈ F (ii) if x ∈ F and x ≤ y, then y ∈ F.
Filter F is prime if and only if x ⇒ y ∈ F or y ⇒ x ∈ F for each pair x, y ∈ A. For
each pair x, y ∈ A, x and y are F-equivalent, if and only if both x ⇒ y, y ⇒ x ∈ F,
which is denoted symbolically as x ∼ F y.
The relation ∼ F is a congruence, i.e., [x] F ⊗ F [y] F = [x ⊗ y] F for each operation
⊗, and the same holds for 0, 1. We denote by L/ ∼ F the collection of equivalence
classes of ∼ F . The relation ≤ F is defined as x ⇒ y ∈ F.
290 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Theorem 6.5 L/ ∼ F is linearly ordered if and only if the filter F is prime.

Proof If the filter F is prime, then either x ⇒ y ∈ F which means that x ≤ y or y ⇒

x ∈ F, i.e., y ≤ x, hence, x ∩ y = x or x ∩ y = y, proving linearity. Conversely, if
x ≤ y, then x ⇒ y ∈ F, and if y ≤ x, then y ⇒ x ∈ F, hence, the filter F is prime.


We now come to the principal tool in algebraic proofs of completeness: the filter
separation theorem (cf. Theorem 1.68). We recall it in the current setting.

Theorem 6.6 (The filter separation theorem) For an L and x = 1, there exists a
prime filter F with x ∈
/ F.

For a proof, see proof of Theorem 1.68.

Definition 6.13 (Direct products of BL-algebras) For a BL-algebra L, we consider

the set of all prime filters F and for each F ∈ F, we consider the factored alge-
bra L/F. The direct product of the family {L/F : F ∈ F} is the Cartesian product
Π ∗ =Π {L/F : F ∈ F} (see Chap. 1 for Cartesian products).

We define an embedding E : L → Π ∗ by letting E(x) = {[x] F : F ∈ F}; indeed, if

x = y, then, e.g., ¬x ≤ y, i.e., x ⇒ y = 1 so for some prime filter F, [x] F = [y] F .
As operations in Π ∗ are defined coordinate-wise, E is an isomorphic embedding.

Definition 6.14 (Translation of BL into L) We translate BL by assigning to each

atomic proposition pi a variable xi and by translating ⊃T into ⇒, &T into &, ∨ into
∪, ∧ into ∩, 0 into 0, 1 into 1. Each formula φ of BL translates into the formula
< φ > of L.

Theorem 6.7 A formula φ of BL is L-valid if and only if A∗ (< φ >) = 1 holds

in L.

Indeed, the claim holds by Definition 6.11.

Theorem 6.8 (the completeness theorem for BL) If for each BL-algebra L, φ is
L-valid, then φ is BL-provable.

Proof If φ satisfies the assumption, then in the Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra L T , φ is

L T -valid, hence the equivalence φ ≡ 1 is BL-provable, thus, φ is
BL-provable. 

Remark 6.1 From the embedding E into Π ∗ in Definition 6.13, it follows that each
formula φ is valid in each BL-algebra if and only if it is valid in each linearly ordered
BL-algebra.

We have learned the fabric of algebraic proofs of completeness. We will meet it

again when we give, e.g., the Chang proof of completeness for the infinite-valued
logic [0,1] L .
6.5 Meta-Theory of 3 L 291

6.5 Meta-Theory of 3 L

Axiomatization of logic 3 L and the proof of its completeness were provided in Wajs-
berg [8]. Wajsberg’s axiom schemes are:
(W1) φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ);
(W2) (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ [(ψ ⊃ ξ ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ )];
(W3) [(φ ⊃ ¬φ) ⊃ φ] ⊃ φ;
(W4) (¬ψ ⊃ ¬φ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ).
We denote this system by the symbol (W). Inference rules are detachment and uniform
substitution. A formula is provable if it has a proof from axioms
by means of inference rules. The relation between syntax and semantics is provided
by properties of soundness and completeness; about them later on. It is easy to check
that axiom schemas (W1)–(W4) are valid and inference rules preserve validity, hence,
the system (W) is sound, i.e., each provable formula is valid.
We say that a set of formulae Γ proves a formula φ, Γ  φ, if and only if there
exists a proof of φ from Γ , i.e., a sequence φ0 , φ1 , . . . , φn , where (i) φ0 ∈ Γ or φ0
is an instance of an axiom scheme (ii) φn is φ (iii) each φi , 0 < i < n, is the result
of substitution into an axiom scheme or is in Γ , or, it is obtained from some φr , φs ,
r < s < i, where φs is φr ⊃ φi , by means of detachment.
Original proof of completeness of the system (W) was provided in Wajsberg [8].
We recall the proof provided in (Goldberg et al. [9]), carried out by the method of
canonical models, on the lines of the Henkin completeness proof in Chap. 3.
We comment on detachment rule: we will apply it in the form (D); the syntactic
consequence is denoted by .

(D)If Γ  φ and Γ  φ ⊃ ψ, then Γ  ψ

In particular, if formulae φ and φ ⊃ ψ are provable, then the formula ψ is prov-

able.

Definition 6.15 (Consistent and maximal consistent sets of formulae) A set Γ is

syntactically consistent if and only if there is no formula φ such that Γ  φ and
Γ  ¬φ; otherwise, Γ is inconsistent. A set Γ is maximal consistent if and only if
for each formula φ if Γ ∪ {φ} is syntactically consistent then Γ  φ.

As with sentential logic, proof of completeness requires a preparation in the form

of proofs of some necessary theses. We list below provable formulae established in
Wajsberg [8] to be used in the proof of completeness.
(W5) φ  ψ ⊃ φ;
(W6)  ¬φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ);
(W7) (φ ⊃ ψ)  [(ψ ⊃ ξ ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ )];
(W8) {φ ⊃ ψ, ψ ⊃ ξ }  φ ⊃ ξ ;
(W9)  ¬¬φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ);
(W10)  [(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ] ⊃ (¬φ ⊃ ψ);
292 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

(W11)  (¬¬φ) ⊃ φ;
(W12)  φ ⊃ (¬¬φ);
(W13)  φ ⊃ φ;
(W14)  (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (¬ψ ⊃ ¬φ);
(W15)  (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ((¬¬φ) ⊃ ψ);
(W16)  [(¬¬φ) ⊃ ψ] ⊃ [(¬¬φ) ⊃ (¬¬ψ)];
(W17)  (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ [(¬¬φ) ⊃ (¬¬ψ)];
(W18)  [φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ¬φ)] ⊃ (φ ⊃ ¬φ);
(W19)  [(φ ⊃ ¬φ) ⊃ ¬(φ ⊃ ¬φ)] ⊃ φ;
(W20)  [¬(φ ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ φ;
(W21)  [¬(φ ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ ¬ψ;
(W22)  [φ ⊃ [¬ψ ⊃ ¬(φ ⊃ ψ)];
(W23)  [(φ ⊃ ¬φ) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ ¬¬ψ)] ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ);
W(24)  [φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ ξ )) ⊃ (φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ );
(W25) ⊥ ≡ ¬(φ ⊃ φ) is unsatisfiable.
We will use (W1)–(W4) and (W5)–(W25) in the proof of completeness of the three-
valued logic 3 L . First, we establish properties of consistent and maximal consistent
sets of formulae and of the syntactic consequence .
Theorem 6.9 The following are basic properties of provability Γ  which we recall.
(i) monotonicity: if Γ  φ and Γ ⊆ Γ  then Γ   φ;
(ii) compactness: if Γ  φ then Γ   φ for a finite subset Γ  of Γ ;
(iii) If Γ  φ and Γ  (φ ⊃ ψ) then Γ  ψ;
(iv) if φ ∈ Γ , then Γ  φ;
(v) if  φ, then Γ  φ for each Γ , in particular Γ  φ for each φ in (W5)–(W25).
(vi) if φ is an instance of an axiom scheme, then Γ  φ for each Γ .
Theorem 6.10 (The deduction theorem) If Γ ∪ {φ}  ψ then Γ  φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ).
Proof Suppose that Γ ∪ {φ}  ψ and let ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn be a proof of ψ from Γ ∪
{φ}. We prove by induction on i the following Claim.
Claim. Γ  φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψi ) for each i ≤ n. Suppose then that Claim is true for i < j.
Consider the following cases.
Case 1. ψ j is φ. The formula φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ φ) follows from axiom scheme (W1) by
substitution (ψ/φ).
Case 2. ψ j is an instance of an axiom scheme or an element of Γ . Then Γ  ψ j by
Theorem 6.9 (v), (vi). By (W1), Γ  ψ j ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ j ).
By 5.2 (iii), Γ  φ ⊃ ψ j . Substitutions into (W1) of (φ/φ ⊃ ψ j ; ψ/φ) yield

Γ  (φ ⊃ ψ j ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ j )),

whence, by Theorem 5.2 (iii), Γ  φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ j ).

Case 3. ψ j is obtained by detachment from some ψk , k < j, and ψk ⊃ ψ j . By
inductive assumption, the following are true:
6.5 Meta-Theory of 3 L 293

(a) φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψk );

(b) φ ⊃ (φ ⊃ (ψk ⊃ ψ j )).

To prove Case 3, it is sufficient to apply (W24) with 5.2 (iii), (a) and (b). The proof
is concluded. 

Theorem 6.11 The following are basic properties of consistent and inconsistent
sets.
(i) a set of formulae Γ is syntactically inconsistent if and only if Γ  φ for each
formula φ;
(ii) a set Γ of formulae is syntactically inconsistent if and only if Γ  ⊥;
(iii) inconsistency of Γ ∪ {φ} implies that Γ  φ ⊃ ¬φ;
(iv) inconsistency of Γ ∪ {φ ⊃ ¬φ}, implies that Γ  φ.

Proof For (i): Suppose that Γ is inconsistent. Then Γ  φ and Γ  ¬φ for some
formula φ. We apply (W6) in order to obtain

Γ  (¬φ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)

and detachment applied twice yields Γ  ψ. The converse is obvious, if Γ  φ for

any φ, then for any φ, Γ  φ and Γ  ¬φ.
For (ii): if Γ  ¬(φ ⊃ φ), then Γ is inconsistent because of (W13) and Theorem
5.2.2 (v). The converse is obvious by (i).
For (iii): suppose that Γ ∪ {φ} is inconsistent; then Γ ∪ {φ}  ¬φ. By deduction
theorem, Γ  φ → (φ → ¬φ) and detachment yields Γ  φ ⊃ ¬φ.
For (iv): by (iii), Γ  [(φ ⊃ ¬φ) ⊃ (¬(φ ⊃ ¬φ))] and, by (W19), and detach-
ment, Γ  φ. 

Definition 6.16 (Semantic consistency) We call a set Γ of formulae semantically

consistent if and only if there exists an assignment A such that A∗ (φ) = 1 for each
φ ∈ Γ . We denote this fact as A∗ (Γ ) = 1. We say that a formula ψ is a semantic
consequence of the set of formulae Γ if and only if for each assignment A if A∗ (Γ ) =
1, then A∗ (ψ) = 1. We denote this fact by the symbol Γ |= ψ.

Theorem 6.12 (The strong completeness property) For each formula φ and a set of
formulae Γ of logic 3 L , Γ  φ if and only if Γ |= φ.

Proof From Γ  φ to Γ |= φ it is straightforward: axiom schemas are valid and

derivation rules preserve validity. Proof of the converse rests on
Claim: If a set Γ of formulae is syntactically consistent then Γ is semantically
consistent.
For the proof, we recall
(L) The Lindenbaum Lemma. Each syntactically consistent set Γ of formulae
can be extended to a maximal syntactically consistent set Γ ∗ .
294 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Lindenbaum Lemma can be proved exactly as in Chap. 2, by ordering all formulae of

3 L into a sequence φ1 , φ2 , . . . and by defining sequence (Γn )∞ n=0 by letting Γ0 = Γ
and Γn+1
 = Γ n ∪ {φ n+1 } if the latter set is consistent and Γ n+1 = Γn , otherwise. Then
Γ∗ = ∞ Γ
n=0 n is maximal consistent and Γ ⊆ Γ ∗
. 

Definition 6.17 (The canonical assignment) We apply Γ ∗ in definition of a canon-

ical assignment A on atomic propositions; for notational convenience, we use value
2 instead of 21 . Γ ∗ is maximal consistent set containing Γ obtained in (L).
(i) A( p) = 1 if and only if Γ ∗  p;
(ii) A( p) = 0 if and only if Γ ∗  ¬ p;
(iii) A( p) = 2, otherwise.

We now check the following properties about the valuation A∗ on formulae.

Theorem 6.13 The following holds.

(i) A∗ (α) = 1 if and only if Γ ∗  α;

(ii) A∗ (α) = 0 if and only if Γ ∗  ¬α;
(iii) A∗ (α) = 2, otherwise.

Proof The proof is by structural induction. The case of atomic propositions is already
settled in Theorem 6.13(i)–(iii). We have some cases to consider.
Case 1. α is ¬β and Sub-claim holds for β. If Γ ∗  ¬β, then by inductive assumption
A∗ (β) = 0, hence, A∗ (¬β) = 1. If Γ ∗  ¬¬β, then A∗ (¬β) = 0. In both cases
Sub-claim holds for α. If neither of two sub-cases holds, then, by Theorem 6.13(iii),
A∗ (β) = 2 and A∗ (α) = 2.
Case 2. α is β ⊃ γ and Sub-claim is true for β and γ . There are three sub-cases to
consider:
Sub-case 2.1. Γ ∗  (β ⊃ γ ). To obtain that A∗ (β ⊃ γ ) = 1, we have to discuss
three possibilities.
2.1.1 If A∗ (γ ) = 1 or A∗ (β) = 0, then A∗ (α) = 1;
2.1.2 If A∗ (γ ) = 0, then Γ ∗  (¬β) so A∗ (α) = 1;
2.1.3 The third sub-case is when neither of β, ¬β, γ , ¬γ has a derivation from
Γ ∗ , hence, A∗ (β) = 2 = A∗ (γ ), hence, A∗ (α) = 1.
Case 3. Next, we consider Γ ∗  ¬(β ⊃ γ ). By (W20) and (W21), Γ ∗  β and
Γ ∗  ¬γ , hence, A∗ (β) = 1, A∗ (γ ) = 0 so A∗ (α) = 0.
Case 4. Finally, we consider the case, when neither Γ ∗  (β ⊃ γ ) nor Γ ∗  ¬(β ⊃
γ ). By (W6), Γ ∗  ¬β is not true and (W1) implies that Γ ∗  γ is not true, hence,
A∗ (β) = 0 and A∗ (γ ) = 1.
Sub-case 4.1. First, let A∗ (β) = 1 so Γ ∗  β. By (W21), Γ ∗  ¬γ is not true, so
A (γ ) = 0 and finally A∗ (γ ) = 2, so A∗ (α) = 2; next, let A∗ (β) = 2, i.e., Γ ∗  β
∗

does not hold.

6.6 Some Other Proposals for 3, 4-Valued Logics 295

By maximality of Γ ∗ , Γ ∗ ∪ {β} is not syntactically consistent and, by Theo-

rem 6.11(iii), Γ ∗  (β ⊃ ¬β); was A∗ (γ ) = 2, we would have, by Theorem 6.11,
again, that Γ ∗  ¬γ ⊃ ¬¬γ and, by (W23), we would have that Γ ∗  (β ⊃ γ ), a
contradiction. It follows that A∗ (γ ) = 0 and A∗ (α) = 2.
All cases considered, Sub-claim is established. As Γ ⊆ Γ ∗ , if α ∈ Γ , then
∗
A (α) = 1 meaning that Γ is semantically consistent.
Now, let us suppose that Γ |= α. If A∗ (Γ ) = 1, then A∗ (α) = 1. Hence, A∗ (α ⊃
¬α) = 0, i.e., Γ ∪ {α ⊃ ¬α} is semantically inconsistent, hence, Theorem 6.11(iv)
tells us that Γ  α. This concludes proof of the strong completeness theorem. 

A concise interlude about some other proposals for 3- and 4-valued logics follows.

6.6 Some Other Proposals for 3, 4-Valued Logics

We recall here 3-valued logics of Kleene and Bochvar and the 4-valued modal logic
of Łukasiewicz.

Definition 6.18 (The logic 3 K of Kleene) The Kleene 3-valued logic 3 K Kleene [10],
whose values we denote as {0, 21 , 1} has the values of sentential connectives defined
as follows; for atomic propositions p, q, x denotes the value of p and y denotes the
value of q: then, negation ¬ p is defined as 1 − x, the value of conjunction p ∧ q is
defined as min{x, y}, the value of disjunction p ∨ q is max{x, y}.

Values of implication ⊃3 K are given in the Table 6.6.

In 3 K , the implication x ⊃3 K y from the value x to the value y is given by the
formula max{1 − x, y} which corresponds to the expression ¬ p ∨ q for p ⊃3 K q.

Definition 6.19 (The Bochvar logics) The Bochvar three-valued external logic 3 B E
(Bochvar [11]), treats values of 21 and 0 in the same way, hence truth tables for this
logic are simplified by omitting the value 21 . Hence, the negation ¬ B E is the classical
negation ¬, and truth tables for ∨ B E , ∧ B E , ⊃ B E are identical with truth tables for
classical ∨, ∧, ⊃.

Observe that values of formulae in the logic 3 B E are only 0 or 1. The class of
formulae valid in the logic 3 B E coincides with the class of formulae valid in sentential

Table 6.6 The Kleene implication

pq q=1 q=0 q= 1
2
p=0 1 1 1
p=1 1 0 1
2
p = 21 1 1
2
1
2
296 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Table 6.7 The truth table for conjunction ∧ B I

pq q=1 q=0 q= 1
2
p=0 0 0 1
2
p=1 1 0 1
2
p = 21 1
2
1
2
1
2

Table 6.8 The truth table for 4 L M

⊃L M (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) ¬L M
(1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0) (1, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)

logic SL; hence, the class of formulae unsatisfiable in the logic 3 B E coincides with
the class of formulae unsatisfiable in the sentential logic SL.
The Bochvar three-valued internal logic 3 B I Bochvar [11] is defined by truth
table for negation ¬ B I , identical with the truth table for the Łukasiewicz 3-valued
negation, so truth function of it is 1 − x, truth table for conjunction ∧ B I is shown in
Table 6.7. The following formulae (i), (ii) define disjunction and implication
(i) ( p ∨ B I q) ≡ ¬ B I (¬ B I p ∧ B I ¬ B I q);
(ii) ( p ⊃ B I q) ≡ (¬ B I p ∨ q).

Definition 6.20 (The Łukasiewicz 4-valued logic) The Łukasiewicz 4-valued modal
logic 4 L M Łukasiewicz [12] adopts as atomic propositions pairs ( p, q) of atomic
propositions of sentential logic, hence, formulae of 4 L M are pairs of formulae of SL.
Connectives of 4 L M are defined as coordinate-wise actions of connectives of SL, i.e.,
(i) ( p, q) ⊃ L M (r, s) is (( p ⊃ r ), (q ⊃ s));
(ii) ¬ L M ( p, q) is (¬ p, ¬q)

The set of values is T = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Valid formulae are those whose
value is constantly (1, 1). Table 6.8 brings the truth table for the logic 44 L M .
In addition to ¬ = N , with N (0) = 1, N (1) = 0, one can define three more
unary functions: V (0) = 1, V (1) = 1; F(0) = 0, F(1) = 0; S(0) = 0, S(1) = 1.
This allows for definitions of 16 binary functions on pairs of values 0, 1. Of them,
Łukasiewicz singled out the two as representing modal operators L , M:
(i) M(v( p), v(q)) is (V (v( p)), S(v(q)), where v( p) is the value of p;
(ii) L(v( p), v(q)) is N M N (v( p), v(q))
Check that tables, Tables 6.9, 6.10, below present truth tables for modalities M
and L.
6.7 The n-Valued Logic n L : The Rosser-Tourquette Theory 297

Table 6.9 The truth table for modality M

(v( p), v(q)) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0)
M(v( p), v(q)) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)

Table 6.10 The truth table for modality L

(v( p), v(q)) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0)
L(v( p), v(q)) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)

With respect to the criterion of acceptance, one may check that modal formulae
(K), (T), (4) are accepted but the formula (5) is rejected.
We now proceed with the general finite-valued Łukasiewicz logic. The value set
L n = {0, 1, n−11
, . . . , n−2
n−1
} makes with operations ∨, &, ∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬ and constants
0, 1 a finite algebra—the Łukasiewicz residuated lattice (see Chap. 1 for basic alge-
braic structures).

6.7 The n-Valued Logic n L : The Rosser-Tourquette Theory

Consider a natural number n > 2. We recall that the set of values for n-valued logic
is {0, n−1
1
, n−1
2
, . . . , n−2
n−1
, 1}. We denote these values by symbols 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, n.
For the two-valued (Boolean) sentential logic we have designated 1 as the truth value
and 0 as the designated falsity value, but for the case of n values, we may choose a
number 1 ≤ s < n and declare a formula α accepted when its truth value is always
less or equal to s for all assignments of truth values to sentential variables in α.
Otherwise, α is rejected.
This convention, due to (Rosser and Tourquette [13]), calls as well for modification
of truth functions so the smaller truth value corresponds to the greater degree of
acceptance: regardless of the choice of the threshold s, the truth value 1 signifies the
certainty of truth while the truth value n signifies certainty of falsity. We denote by
A the truth assignment on atomic propositions and A∗ denotes the extension of A to
valuation on formulae. Thus, we let

(i) A∗ (φ ⊃ ψ) = max{1, A∗ ψ) − A∗ (φ) + 1};

(ii) A∗ (¬φ) = 1 − A∗ (φ) + n
In addition to truth functions for implication and negation and disjunctions and
conjunctions, the scheme proposed in (Rosser and Turquette [13]) makes use of unary
functors Jk for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, whose truth functions jk satisfy conditions, where v
is a truth value (see (Rosser and Turquette [13]) for details of construction):
(iii) jk (v) = 1 if and only if v = k;
298 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

(iv) jk (v) = n when v = k.

Other functors are expressed as:
(v) φ ∨ ψ is (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ;
(vi) φ ∧ ψ is ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ).
The truth value function for ∨ is min{A∗ (φ), A∗ (ψ)}. The truth value for ∧ is
max{A∗ (φ), A∗ (ψ)}.
The inverted values of truth functions are in agreement with the convention that
value 1 means truth and value n means falsity. Given the acceptance threshold s,
φ ∧ ψ is accepted only if both φ, ψ are accepted while φ ∨ ψ is accepted when at
least one of φ, ψ is accepted.
To facilitate the comprehension of the axiom system in [13], we add that F1 , F2 , . . .
are connectives of which F1 is the implication ⊃ and F2 is negation ¬ as defined
above, while other connectives are serving other purposes beyond the proof of com-
pleteness for L n , like the SŁupecki connective F3 whose truth value function is con-
stantly 2 and which makes n L functionally complete (meaning that all truth tables
can be realized by these three functors). Each connective Fi has arity bi , i.e., its full
symbol is Fi (φ1 , . . . , φbi ). The value s < n is the acceptance threshold.
We have seen in formulae of deduction theorem that many-valued logics are used
to formulae longer than those used previously, hence, we introduce some shortcuts
for long formulae. We recall the symbol Γuv which is defined as follows:
(vii) Γuv φi ψ is ψ when u > v;
(viii) Γuv φi ψ is φv ⊃ Γuv−1 φi ψ when u ≤ v.
Thus, (vii), (viii) are shortcuts for chains of implications, e.g., Γ14 pi q is p4 ⊃ ( p3 ⊃
( p2 ⊃ ( p1 ⊃ q))).
Axioms schemes proposed in (Rosser and Tourquette [13]) are the following.

Definition 6.21 (Rosser, Tourquette) Axiom schemes for n-valued logic are:
(A1) ψ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ);
(A2) [φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ ξ )] ⊃ [ψ ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ )];
(A3) (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ [(ψ ⊃ ξ ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ )];
(A4) [Jk (φ) ⊃ (Jk (φ) ⊃ ψ)] ⊃ (Jk (φ) ⊃ ψ) for k = 1, 2, . . . , n;
(A5) Γ1n (Jk (φ) ⊃ ψ)ψ;
(A6) Jk (φ) ⊃ φ for k = 1, 2, . . . , s;
(A7) Γk=1
b
J pk (Pk )J f (Fi (P1 , P2 , . . . , Pb )), where b is arity of Fi , i runs over indices
of operators Fi , each p j is the value of atomic proposition P j - an argument
for Fi and f is the value f i ( p1 , p2 , . . . , pb ) for the value function f i of Fi and
values pi s of Pi s.

The derivation rule is the detachment rule: if p, p ⊃ q are accepted, then q is

accepted.
6.7 The n-Valued Logic n L : The Rosser-Tourquette Theory 299

Theorem 6.14 (The completeness theorem for n-valued logic n L ) For a formula φ
of n-valued logic, the formula is accepted if and only if it is provable from axiom
schemes A1–A7, i.e., |= φ ≡ φ.

Proof It is based on few claims. Its idea is in analogy to the Kalmár proof of SL
completeness in Chap. 2: elimination of atomic propositions. It will be convenient
to use small letters p, q, r, .... as denoting atomic propositions and then the symbol
V ( p) will denote the value of p.
Claim 1.  (q ⊃ r ) ⊃ [( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )].
Proof consists in substituting p/q ⊃ r , q/ p ⊃ q, r/ p ⊃ r in the scheme (A2)
and then applying detachment with the scheme (A3).
Claim 2.  q ⊃ q.
Proof consists in substitution into the scheme (A2) of p/q, q/ p, r/q which yields

(i) [q ⊃ ( p ⊃ q)] ⊃ [ p ⊃ (q ⊃ q)]

from which by the schema (A1) and detachment we get

(ii) p ⊃ (q ⊃ q)

Substitution p/A1 along with detachment brings q ⊃ q.

Claim 3. ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Γ1n ri p ⊃ Γ1n ri q).
Proof by induction: in case n = 0 we get Claim 2. Suppose Claim 3 to be true for
n = k, consider the case n = k + 1. By Claim 1 we have

(iii)  (Γ1k ri p ⊃ Γ1k ri q) ⊃ (Γ1k+1ri p ⊃ Γ1k+1ri q)

Apply to (iii) the schema (A3) and the inductive assumption.

Claim 4. Consider a sequence q1 , q2 , . . . , qk of formulae in which sentential variables
p1 , p2 , . . . , pl occur at least once each. Then

(i)  Γ1l pi r ⊃ Γ1k q j r.

Proof is by induction on k. In case k = 0 also l = 0 and we get  r ⊃ r by Claim 2.

Suppose Claim 4 true for k = m and let k = m + 1. Some cases are to be considered:
Case 1. l = 0, hence,  r ⊃ Γ1m q j r . From the schema (A1) we get

(ii)  Γ1m q j r ⊃ Γ1m+1 q j r

and from the last two facts we get Claim 4 by applying the scheme (A3).
Case 2. l > 0. As pl is some q j , by inductive assumption, we get
300 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

j−1
(iii)  Γ1l−1 pi r ⊃ Γ j+1
m+1
qi (Γ1 qi r );

Claim 1 gives
j−1
(iv)  Γ1l pi r ⊃ (q j ⊃ (Γ j+1
m+1
qi (Γ1 qi r ))).

Now, some sub-cases:

Sub-case 2.1 j = m + 1, then Claim 4 follows from (iv).
Sub-case 2.2 j < m + 1. From scheme (A2), we obtain
j−1 j−1
(v)  (q j ⊃ (Γ j+1
m+1
qi (Γ1 qi r ))) ⊃ (qm+1 ⊃ (q j ⊃ (Γ j+1
m
qi (Γ1 qi r )))).

By inductive assumption,
j−1
(vi)  (q j ⊃ Γ j+1
m
qi (Γ1 qi r )) ⊃ (Γ1m qi r ).

From (vi) and Claim 1, it follows that

j−1
(vii)  (qm+1 ⊃ (q j ⊃ Γ j+1
m
qi (Γ1 qi r ))) ⊃ (Γ1m+1 qi r ).

Now, Claim 4 follows by (vii), (v), (iv) and scheme (A3).

Claim 5.
 (Jk p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ ((Jk p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r )).

Proof uses the scheme (A2) which yields

(i)  (Jk p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ (q ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r )).

Claim 1 yields

(ii)  (q ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r )) ⊃ ((Jk p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r ))).

By scheme (A4) we get

(iii)  (Jk p ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r )) ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r ).

From (iii) and Claim 1, we obtain

(iv)  ((Jk p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r ))) ⊃ ((Jk p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Jk p ⊃ r )).

Now, (i), (ii), (iv) together with scheme (A3) prove Claim 5.
Claim 6.
p p p
 (Γ1 JV ( pr ) ( pr )(r ⊃ s)) ⊃ ((Γ1 JV ( pr ) ( pr )r ) ⊃ (Γ1 JV ( pr ) ( pr )s)),
6.7 The n-Valued Logic n L : The Rosser-Tourquette Theory 301

where V( pr ) denotes the truth value of pr .

Proof is by induction on p.
Case 1. p = 0. Apply Claim 2.
Case 2. p > 0. Suppose Claim 6 is true for p = k and consider p = k + 1. By
hypothesis of induction and Claim 1, we have

(i)  (JV ( pk+1 ) ( pk+1 ) ⊃

(Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )(r ⊃ s))) ⊃ (JV ( pk+1 ) ( pk+1 ) ⊃

((Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )r ) ⊃ (Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )s)).

Claim 5 implies

(ii) (JV ( pk+1 ) ( pk+1 ) ⊃ ((Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )r ⊃ Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )s))) ⊃

((Γ1k+1 JV ( pr ) ( pr )r ) ⊃ Γ1k+1 JV ( pr ) ( pr )s).

Now, from (i) we obtain

(iii)  (Γ1k+1 JV ( pr ) ( pr )(r ⊃ s)) ⊃ (JV ( pk+1 ) ( p) ⊃ ((Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )r ) ⊃

(Γ1k JV ( pr ) ( pr )s)).

We prove Claim 6 by applying schema (A3) together with (ii), (iii).

Claim 7. Suppose φ is a formula on sentential variables q1 , q2 , . . . , q p and
f φ (V (q1 ), V (q2 ), . . . , V (q p )) = V is its truth function value as a function of truth
p
values V (qi ) of qi ’s. Then  Γ1 JV (qi ) (qi )JV φ.

Proof is by induction on number of symbols in φ. Suppose Claim 7 be true for

number of symbols in a formula less than k and consider a formula φ with k symbols.
There are some cases to be considered.

Case 1. φ is qi so V is V (qi ). By Claim 4, we get

p
(i)  (JV (qi ) (φ) ⊃ JV (qi ) (φ)) ⊃ (Γ1 JV (qi ) (qi )JV (φ)).

Claim 7 follows by Claim 2.

Case 2. Suppose φ is F(q1 , q2 , . . . , qa ), where each qi occurs in F with truth func-
tions Vi for each i, and f (V1 , V2 , . . . , Va ) = V , the truth function of φ. Clearly,
a=arity(F).

Hypothesis of induction supplies us with

302 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

(ii)  Γ1a JVi (qi )JV j (q j ).

From scheme (A7), we get

(iii)  Γ1a JV j (q j )JV (φ).

Now, by (iii) and Claim 3, we obtain

(iv)  (Γ1a JV j (q j )JVa (qa )) ⊃ (Γ1a JV j (q j )(Γ1a−1 JV j (q j )JV (φ) )).

From (ii) we obtain

(v)  (Γ1a JV j (q j )JVa−1 (qa−1 )) ⊃ (Γ1a−2 JV j (q j )JV (φ)).

Claim 6 applied to (v) and then (ii) applied to the result, yield

(vi)  Γ1a JV j (q j )(JV(a−2) (q(a−2) ) ⊃ Γ1a−3 JV j (q j )JV (φ).

Claim 7 is obtained by repeating arguments leading to (vi) from (v).

Claim 8. If φ is accepted at all valuations (is valid), then  φ (the completeness
theorem).
First, by scheme A6 and Claim 3,

(i)  (Γ1a JV j (q j )JV (φ)) ⊃ (Γ1a JV j JV φ).

From (i), by Claim 7, we obtain

(ii)  JVa (qa ) ⊃ Γ1a JV j (q j )φ.

From (ii) and schema (A5), we get

(iii)  Γ1a−1 JVi (qi )φ.

From (iii) we get for p − 1,

(iv)  JVa−1 (qa−1 ) ⊃ Γ1a−2 JV j (q j )φ.

By the repetition of this argument, we obtain  φ and Claim 8 is proved.

Axiomatization with (A1)–(A7) axiomatizes n L completely.
Claim 8 demonstrates that any acceptable formula is provable from axiom schemes
A1–A7. 
6.9 Infinite-Valued Logics 303

6.8 The Post Logics

Definition 6.22 (The m-valued Post logic) For m ≥ 2, the Post logic Pm (Post [14])
has as the set of truth values the set {0, m−1
1
, m−1
2
, . . . , m−2
m−1
, 1}.

Values of connectives ¬ P , ∨ P , ∧ P are defined as follows: ¬ P (0) = 1, ¬ P (v) =

v − m−1
1
for v = 0, u ∨ P v =max {u, v}, u ∧ P v =min {u, v}. Post logic gave impulse
for Post algebras (see Rasiowa and Sikorski [6]).

6.9 Infinite-Valued Logics

We now continue our discussion of many-valued logics with infinite-valued logics.

As proved by McNaughton [15], the set of values for infinite valued logic should be
dense in the interval [0, 1] and contain 0 and 1. We will focus on the interval [0, 1]
as it plays the important role in fuzzy logic applications.
It will help in what follows if we have a deeper information on T-norms and their
residua.

Definition 6.23 (Strict and Archimedean T-norms, T-co-norms) For a T-norm T , we

define the T-co-norm as

ST (x, y) = 1 − T (1 − x, 1 − y).

A T-norm T is strict if it is strictly increasing: T (z, y) > T (x, y) whenever z > x

and T (x, z) > T (x, y) whenever z > y. One can see that TL is not strict. A T-norm
T is Archimedean if and only if T (x, x) < x for x ∈ (0, 1).

The T-norm TL is Archimedean: T (x, x) = max{0, 2x − 1} takes the value 0 for x ≤

1
2
and the value 2x − 1 for x > 21 . In the first case T (x, x) = x for x = 0, in the second
case T (x, x) = x implies x = 1. Clearly, it is always that T (x, x) ≤ T (x, 1) = x.
Each strict T-norm is Archimedean: T (x, x) < T (x, 1) = x for x = 0, 1.
In order to produce a strict T-norm, one has to turn to the product T-norm
TP (x, y) = x · y. The corresponding product T-co-norm is

S P (x, y) = 1 − (1 − x) · (1 − y) = x + y − x · y.

The third classical T-norm is the minimum T-norm TM (x, y) = min{x, y} with the
adjoint T-co-norm STM =max {x, y}.
The Łukasiewicz T-norm TL and the product T-norm TP are Archimedean. They
have some specific properties. We establish some basic properties of Archimedean
T-norms.
304 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Theorem 6.15 (Ling [16]) We define the sequence T n (x) : T 0 (x) = 1;

T n+1 (x) = T (T n (x), x) = T (x, T n (x)).
This sequence has the following properties:
(i) The sequence (T n (x))n is non-increasing for each x ∈ [0, 1]: T n+1 (x) =
T (T n (x), x) ≤ T (T n (x), 1) = T n (x);
(ii) For 0 < y < x < 1, there exists n such that T n (x) < y, which implies that
limn T n (x) = 0;
Suppose that 0 < y and y ≤ T n (x) for each n. Let z = in f n T n (x), so z =
limn T n (x) and y ≤ z. Then T (z, z) = limn (T n (x), T n (x)) = limn T 2n (x) =
z, a contradiction.
(iii) The set Tn (x) = {y : T n (y) = x} is closed and non-empty;

By continuity of T n (y) and the boundary values T n (0) = 0, T n (1) = 1.

(*) Let rn (x) = in f Tn (x) ∈ Tn (x).

It exists by property (iii).

(iv) rn (x) is continuous and decreasing:

By property (iii), Tn (rn (x)) = x, rn (x) is the right inverse to Tn (x) so it is

continuous and decreasing.
(v) If y < x, 0 < T n (x), then T n (y) < T n (x);

Proof by induction.
(vi) T (x, y) < min{x, y}: T (x, y) ≤ T (1, y) = y;

Was T (x, y) = y, we would have by induction that T (T n (x), y) = y, yet by

(ii), T n 0 (x) < y for some n 0 , hence, y = T (T n 0 (x), y) ≤ T (y, y) < y, a con-
tradiction.
(vii) rn (x) < rn+1 (x) for 0 < x < 1;

Suppose that 0 <rn+1 (x) ≤rn (x) < 1 for some x, n; then

0 < T n (rn+1 (x)) ≤ T n (rn (x)) = x < 1,

hence,

0 < x = T n+1 (rn+1 (x)) = T (T n (rn+1 (x)), rn+1 (x)) ≤ T (x, rn+1 (x)) < x,

a contradiction.
 6.9 Infinite-Valued Logics 305

(viii) limn rn (x) = 1 for 0 < x < 1;

Let s = limn rn (x). By property (vii), s > rn (x) for each n. We have x =
T n (rn (x)) < T n (s) for each n. Was s < 1 we would have T n (s) < 1 for each
n and by property (ii), we would find some m such that T mn (s) = T m (T n (s)) <
x, a contradiction.

Theorem 6.16 The superposition T m ◦ rn depends only on the fraction mn , i.e., T m ◦

rn = T km ◦ rkn for each k ≥ 1.

Proof Suppose to the contrary that T m ◦ rn = T km ◦ rkn for some k, m, n. Let

y = rn (x), z = rkn (x); then T k (z) ≥ y by definition (*). Hence, by our assump-
tion, T k (z) > y. Continuity of T k implies that y = T k (w) for some w < z, hence,
T kn (w) = T n (y) = x, i.e., w ∈ Tkn (x), a contradiction with w < z and z = rkn (x).
Let a ∈ (0, 1). Define a function h on the set of rational numbers in (0,1): h( mn ) =
T m (rn (a)). As superposition of continuous and decreasing functions, h is continu-
ous and decreasing. The function h satisfies the functional equation T (h(x), h(y)) =
h(x + y): let x = mn , y = kl . For the common denominator d, write x = dc , y = de ;
then T (h(x), h(y)) = T (T c (rd (a)), T e (rd (a)) = T c+e (rd (a)) = h( c+e
d
) = h(x + y).
By density of the set of rational numbers and continuity of h, the function
h extends in a unique way to a continuous and decreasing function g on [0,1].
Clearly, T (g(x), g(y)) = g(x + y). Let b satisfy g(b) = 0. Then g maps the inter-
val [0, b] onto [0,1] hence there exists a continuous decreasing function f : [0, 1] →
[0, b]. Letting x = f (u), y = f (v)) we obtain the representation for T : T (u, v) =
g( f (u) + f (v)). 

Theorem 6.17 (Ling [16]) Each Archimedean T-norm T admits the Hilbert-style
representation T (x, y) = g( f (x) + f (y)), where g : [0, a] → [0, 1] is a continuous
decreasing function and f is its inverse (called also a pseudo-inverse, when extended
to minus ∞ on the left and to ∞ on the right).

The function g is called the generator for T . We find for instance, the generator
for the Łukasiewicz T-norm.

Theorem 6.18 The generator for T-norm T L is g(x) = 1 − x with f (y) = 1 − y.

Proof Suppose f (1) = a. Then g(x) = 1 for x ∈ [0, a], hence 1 = TL (1, 1) =
g( f (1) + f (1)) = g(2a), hence, 2a ∈ [0, a], i.e. a = 0 and g maps [0, 1] onto [1, 0];
this makes g(x) = 1 − x a candidate for the generator with f (y) = 1 − y. Insert-
ing these hypothetical functions into functional equation g( f (x) + f (y)) we get
1 − [(1 − x) + (1 − y)] = x + y − 1 if x + y ≥ 1 and 0 if x + y < 1, i.e., we get
TL (x, y). 

The supposition that T is Archimedean is essential for the representation above,

as witnessed by the case of the minimum T-norm TM .
306 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Theorem 6.19 In any representation min{x, y} = g( f (x) + f (y)), the function f

is neither continuous nor decreasing.

Proof As g ◦ f = id, f is injective. Let f (0) = a, f (1) = b, suppose a > b. Since

0 = min{x, 0} = g( f (x) + f (0)) for every x, was f continuous, we would have g
constantly 0 on the interval [a + b, 2a]. For x close enough to 0, we would have a +
b < f (x) + f (x) ≤ 2a so x = min{x, x} = g( f (x) + f (x)) = 0, a contradiction
when x = 0. Hence, f cannot be continuous.
To show that f cannot be decreasing, we apply a theorem of Riemann which
states that any monotone function on a closed interval may have at most countably
many points of discontinuity (a jump at each such point and then the family of
disjoint open intervals must be countable). Was f decreasing, it would have a point
of continuity a ∈ (0, 1). Let the sequence (an )n be increasing and let limn an = a.
Then the sequence f (an )n is decreasing and limn f (a)n) = f (a).
As f (a) > 0, we find an such that (i) f (a) < f (an ) < 2 · f (a). Applying to (i) the
function g, we obtain a > an > g( f (a) + f (a)) = min{a, a} = a, a contradiction.
Thus, f cannot be decreasing. 

Definition 6.24 (Residua of continuous T-norms) The residuum ⇒T of a continuous

T-norm T is defined as: x ⇒T y = max{r : T (x, r ) ≤ y}. We recall the already
mentioned residua.

Suppose x ≤ y. Then T (x, r ) ≤ T (x, 1) = x ≤ y, hence, x ⇒T y = 1. Now let x >

y. For the Łukasiewicz T-norm, x + r − 1 ≤ y, i.e., r ≤ 1 − x + y, i.e., x ⇒ L y =
1 − x + y is the Łukasiewicz implication in case x > y.
For the product T-norm TP (x, y) = x · y, the residuum x ⇒ P y takes on the value
1 when x ≤ y and the value xy when x > y. This implication is called the Goguen
implication.
For the minimum T-norm TM = min{x, y}, the residuum x ⇒ M y takes on the
value 1 when x ≤ y and the value y when x > y. It is the Gödel implication.

Theorem 6.20 For each T-norm T , the residuum ⇒T satisfies the following prop-
erties:

(i) T (x, y) ≤ z ⇒T u ≡ x ≤ T (y, z) ⇒T u;

(ii) y ⇒T (z ⇒T u) = T (y, z) ⇒T u;
(iii) x ⇒T y = 1 ≡ x ≤ y;
(iv) x ≤ (y ⇒T u) ≡ (y ≤ (x ⇒T u);
(v) Let us fix a ∈ (0, 1). The function T (x, a) does preserve suprema;
(vi) ⇒T is non-increasing in the first coordinate and non-decreasing in the second
coordinate;
vii) For a fixed a ∈ (0, 1), a ⇒T x preserves infima and x ⇒T a changes suprema
into infima;
 6.9 Infinite-Valued Logics 307

(viii) x ≤ (x ⇒T y) ⇒T y;
(ix) T (x, y) ⇒T 0 = x ⇒T (y ⇒T 0).

Proof As T (x, y) is associative, we obtain a sequence

(a) x ≤ y ⇒T (z ⇒T u) ≡ T (x, y) ≤ z ⇒T u ≡ T ((T (x, y), z)) ≤ u

≡
T (x, T (y, z)) ≤ u ≡ x ≤ T (y, z) ⇒T u

Sequence (a) of equivalences proves (i) and (ii).

If x ⇒T y = 1 then T (x, 1) ≤ y, i.e., x ≤ y which proves (iii).
Commutativity of T implies:

(b) x ≤ y ⇒T u ≡ T (x, y) ≤ u ≡ T (y, x) ≤ u ≡ y ≤ x ⇒T u

which proves (iv).

For (v), consider a set S with s = sup S . Then T (s, a) ≥ T (x, a) for each x ∈ S.
Thus,
(c) T (sup, a) ≥ sup T (x, a)
S S

Also,
(d) T (sup, a) ≤ u ≡ sup ≤ a ⇒T u ≡
S S

∀x ∈ S.x ≤ a ⇒T u ≡ ∀x ∈ S.T (x, a) ≤ u

Now, letting u = sup S T (x, a), we get T (sup S , a) ≤ sup S T (x, a).
For (vi), we address for example the case of the second coordinate as proof for the
first coordinate goes along the same lines. Let a ≤ b and x ≤ y ⇒T a so T (x, y) ≤ b
and x ≤ y ⇒T b. Arbitrariness of x proves that y ⇒T a ≤ y →T b.
Concerning (vii), it follows by (v) and the duality between T and →T .
For (viii), we begin with obvious y ⇒T z ≤ y ⇒T z so T (y →T z, y) ≤ z thus
T (y, y ⇒T z) ≤ z and y ≤ (y ⇒T z) ⇒T z.
Property (ix) is proved on similar lines: z ≤ T (x, y) ⇒T 0 ≡ T (z, T (x, y)) ≤ 0,
i.e., T (T (z, x), y) ≤ 0 hence z ≤ x ⇒T (y ⇒T 0). 

We now begin an interlude on topological properties of T-norms and residua.

Properties expressed in terms of infima and suprema can be rendered in topological
language of continuity properties. For a sequence (xn )n, the lower limit lim inf xn is
the infimum of limits of all convergent sub-sequences (xn k ); the upper limit lim sup xn
is the supremum of limits of all convergent sub-sequences.
308 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

A function f is lower semi-continuous at x0 if and only if for each sequence (xn )

with limn xn = x0 , f (x0 ) ≤ lim inf f (xn ); dually, f is upper semi-continuous at x0
if and only if f (x0 ) ≥ lim sup f (xn ).
A simple and effective characterization is as follows: a function f is upper semi-
continuous (respectively, lower semi-continuous) if and only if the set {x : f (x) ≥ r }
is closed (respectively, the set {x : f (x) ≤ r } is closed) for each r .
Theorem 6.21 (i) Each T-norm T is lower semi-continuous and conversely each
commutative and associative function T with T (x, 0) = 0, T (x, 1) = x which is
lower semi-continuous is a T-norm (ii) Each residuum is upper semi-continuous and
each function which is non-increasing in the first coordinate, non-decreasing in the
second coordinate and upper semi-continuous is a residuum for some T-norm.
Proof Let us fix our attention on the case of T-norm T . Choose a number r and con-
sider the set {(x, y) : T (x, y) ≤ r }. Suppose that there exists a sequence (xn , yn )n
with the limit (x0 , y0 ) and that T (x0 , y0 ) > r , T (xn , yn ) ≤ r for each n. As T is
monotone, either xn < x0 or yn < y0 for each n. Suppose that (xn )n increases to
x0 and (yn )n decreases to y0 (we may assume this by passing to sequences (xn+ =
max{x1 , x2 , . . . , xn })n and (yn− = min{y1 , y2 , . . . , yn })n . Then sup T (xn , yn ) =
T (x0 , y1 ) ≤ r which implies by monotonicity of T that T (x0 , y0 ) ≤ r , a contra-
diction. 
Proofs of remaining claims go on similar lines.
Further results rest on theorems of (Mostert and Shields [17]) and Faucett [18]
concerning characterizations of T-norms TL and TP . An element x = 0 is nilpotent
with respect to T-norm T if and only if T n (x) = 0 for some n. For instance, for
Łukasiewicz ’s T-norm TL , we have TLn (x) = nx − n + 1, hence each x ≤ 1 − n1 is
nilpotent with respect to the given n.
Theorem 6.22 (Mostert, Shields) Each T-norm T having x = 0, 1 as the only solu-
tions to the equation T (x, x) = x and at least one nilpotent element is equivalent to
TL .
Theorem 6.23 (Faucett) Each T-norm T having x = 0, 1 as the only solutions to
the equation T (x, x) = x and having no nilpotent element is equivalent to T-norm
TP .
We define the notion of an equivalence: T-norms T, T ∗ are equivalent if and
only if there exists an automorphism Φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that T ∗ (x, y) =
Φ −1 (T (Φ(x), Φ(y))). Then, x ⇒∗T y = Φ −1 (Φ(x) ⇒T Φ(y)).
We state now an important result on a property of T-norm TL (Menu and Pavelka
[19]).
Theorem 6.24 (Menu, Pavelka) For each T-norm T, if the residuum ⇒T is contin-
uous, then T-norm T is continuous and it is equivalent to the Łukasiewicz T-norm
TL .
6.10 Infinite-Valued Logic [0,1] L of Łukasiewicz 309

Proof Suppose that ⇒T is continuous. First we check that the following statement
holds true.
Claim. y = (y ⇒T a) ⇒T a for y ∈ [a, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1). By 9.8 (viii), y ≤ (y ⇒T
a) ⇒T a. To prove the converse inequality, observe that the function h(x) = x ⇒T a
is continuous decreasing with h(a) = 1, h(1) = a, hence, there exists z ≥ a such that
y = z ⇒T a. Then

(a) y = z ⇒T a ≥ ((z ⇒T a) ⇒T a) ⇒T a = (y ⇒T a) ⇒T a

by the fact that the superposition (x ⇒T a) ⇒T a is increasing which implies that

y ≥ (y ⇒T a) ⇒T a and proves Claim. The corollary to this result is that the func-
tion ⇒T a is injective.
From Claim, it follows for a = 0 that

T (x, y) = (T (x, y) ⇒T 0) ⇒T 0 = ((x ⇒T (y ⇒T 0)) ⇒T 0

which proves that the T-norm T is definable in terms of its residuum and as such is
continuous.
Now, for the second part, consider the equation T (x, x) = x. Suppose there is a
solution x0 = 0, 1 and choose c, d such that c ≤ x0 ≤ d and c = T (x, u) for some u.
Then T (x, c) = T (x, T (x, u)) = T (T (x, x), u) = T (x, u) = c and c = T (x, c) ≤
T (d, c) ≤ T (1, c) = c so T (d, c) = c. This means that for c < x, the function ⇒T
c is not injective, a contradiction witnessing that no x = 0, 1 solves the equation
T (x, x) = x. Now one can refer to theorems by Mostert - Shields and Faucett: as
only TL has the continuous residuum, T-norm T is equivalent to TL . 

6.10 Infinite-Valued Logic [0,1] L of Łukasiewicz

This logic is based on Łukasiewicz’s T-norm and its residuum and on the Łukasiewicz
negation. Anticipating the problem of completeness, we want to say that the proof of
completeness for this logic is an intricate one. The announcement in Wajsberg [20]
was without proof and the first proof in (Rose and Rosser [21]) made use of linear
functionals on real vector spaces, which delineated sets of formulae, close to the
referred below approach by McNaughton. We prefer to include main lines of a proof
by Chang [7] which makes use of the algebraic technique of MV-algebras.
The Łukasiewicz truth functions for negation A∗ (¬ p) = 1 − A( p) and for impli-
cation A∗ ( p ⊃ q) = min{1, 1 − A( p) + A(q)} form the basis for semantics of the
infinite-valued logic [0, 1] L . The set of values W for this logic is a subset of the unit
interval [0,1]. As shown by McNaughton, the set W should be a dense subset of the
unit interval [0,1] with 0, 1 ∈ W . The obvious candidates are the set Q ∗ = Q ∩ [0, 1]
of the rational numbers in [0,1] and the whole unit interval [0,1]. We focus on [0,1] as
310 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

the set of values and we choose 1 as the designated value of acceptance. As already
pointed to, other functors are defined from negation and implication. The symbol TL
denotes the Łukasiewicz t-norm.

Definition 6.25 (Functors of infinite-valued logic [0,1) L )

(i) p&q is the strong conjunction with the value A∗ ( p&q) = max{0, A( p) +
A(q) − 1};
(ii) p ∧ q is the conjunction with the value A ∗ ( p ∧ q) = min{A( p), A(q)};
(iii) p ∨ q is the disjunction with the value A∗ ( p ∨ q) = max{A( p), A(q)};
(iv) p ∨q is strong disjunction with the value A∗ ( p∨q) = min{1, A( p) + A(q)};
(v) p ≡ q is equivalence with the value A∗ ( p ≡ q) = min{1 − A( p) + A(q),
1 − A(q) + A( p)};
(vi) if x ≤ y, then TL (x, x ⇒TL y) = x;
(vii) if x > y, then TL (x, x ⇒TL y) = y;
(viii) TL (x, x ⇒TL y) = min{x, y}.

The standard definition of equivalence is ( p ⊃ q) ∧ (q ⊃ p).

The strong conjunction φ&ψ can be expressed as ¬(φ ⊃ ¬ψ).

Definition 6.26 (Syntactic aspects of [0, 1)) As usual, we use the ‘turnstile’ symbol
 to signal that a formula is provable in the system, i.e, it admits a proof from
axiom schemes plus possibly a set Γ of formulae in which case we will use the
symbol Γ  .... The derivation rule is that of detachment. Łukasiewicz conjectured
in (Łukasiewicz and Tarski [22]) a famous set of axiom schemes which would make
[0,1] L a completely axiomatizable system. These axiom schemes have been:
(L1) (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ φ;
(L2) (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ [(ψ ⊃ ξ ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ξ )];
(L3) (φ ∨ ψ) ⊃ (ψ ∨ φ). Equivalently: ((φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ((ψ ⊃ φ) ⊃ φ);
(L4) (¬φ ⊃ ¬ψ) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ);
(L5) (φ ⊃ ψ) ∨ (ψ ⊃ φ).

The scheme (L5) was shown redundant in Meredith [23] and in Chang [24].
As shown in Hájek [5], the Łukasiewicz system (L1)–(L4) is equivalent to the
system BL+¬¬φ ⊃ φ which we will denote by BLDN.
Let us consider relations between BL and [0,1] L on the level of axiom systems in
Hájek [5].

Theorem 6.25 The following are relations among axiom schemes for BL and axiom
schemes for [0,1] L .
(i) BL implies (L1): the axiom schema (A2) gives (φ&ψ) ⊃ φ; the axiom schema
(A5): [(φ&ψ) ⊃ φ] ⊃ (φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ)) and detachment yield (L1).
(ii) (L2) is (A1).
6.10 Infinite-Valued Logic [0,1] L of Łukasiewicz 311

(iii) For (L3): as  B L φ ⊃ ¬¬φ (cf. Hájek [5], 2.2.(17)), it follows that  B L D N
φ ≡ ¬¬φ and by (Hájek [5], 2.2.(18’))  B L (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (¬ψ ⊃ ¬φ).
(iv) For (L4): from the axiom schema (A4) we get

¬φ&(¬φ ⊃ ¬ψ) ⊃ ¬ψ&(¬ψ ⊃ ¬φ),

hence,
¬φ&(ψ ⊃ φ) ⊃ ¬ψ&(φ ⊃ ψ),

so we get
¬(¬ψ&(φ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ ¬(¬φ&(ψ ⊃ φ))

which yields
((φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ((ψ ⊃ φ) ⊃ φ).

In particular, deduction theorem proved for BL is valid for [0,1] L .

Axioms (L1)–(L4) were shown to axiomatize completely the system [0,1] L in
(Rose and Rosser [21]) and in Chang [7]; the announcement of the completeness for
(L1)–(L5) was given in Wajsberg [20]. We will present a proof on lines of Chang’s
due to (Cignoli and Mundici [25]).

Theorem 6.26 The following inferences and formulae are among valid inferences
and provable formulae of the system [0,1] L .

(i) If Γ  p ⊃ q, Γ  q ⊃ r , then Γ  p ⊃ r ;
It follows by axiom schema (L2) and detachment.

(ii) If Γ  ( p ≡ q) and Γ  (q ≡ r ), then Γ  p ≡ r ;

By Theorem 6.25(vii) and definition of equivalence.

(iii) p ⊃ q, q ⊃ r  p ⊃ r ;
By (i).

(iv)  ( p ∨ q) ≡ (q ∨ p);
By (L3).

(v) If Γ  ( p ≡ q), then Γ  [( p ≡ r ) ≡ (q ≡ r )];

By (L2) and detachment, we obtain
(a) p ⊃ q  (q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )
and
(b) q ⊃ p  ( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ (q ⊃ r )

(vi)  p ⊃ (q ∨ p);
312 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

By substitution (q/q ⊃ p) into (L1);

(vii)  p ⊃ p ∨ q;
By (vi) and (L3).

(viii)  ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ (q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ));
By (vii), we obtain  q ⊃ (q ∨ r ) and by (L2) we obtain
(c)  ((q ∨ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )) ⊃ (q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ))
Substitution (q/q ⊃ r ) into (c) and an application of (L2) yield
(d)  ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ ((q ∨ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ))
From (c) and (d), (viii) follows by means of (L1);

(ix)  (q ⊃ r ) ⊃ [( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )];
By (viii) and (L2);

(x) Γ  ( p ≡ q) implies Γ  (r ⊃ p) ≡ (r ⊃ q);

Substitute ( p/q; q/ p) into (viii) to obtain
(e)  ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ≡ (q ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ))
and then substitute ( p/q; q/r ; r/ p) into (L2);
(xi)  p ⊃ p;
Substitute (q/ p) into (viii) and apply (L1) to obtain (f)  q ⊃ ( p ⊃ p). Substitute
for q any already proved formula and apply detachment;

(xii)  p ≡ p;
By (xi).

(xiii) ( p  q) ≡ ( p ⊃ q);
By (L1), into which substitutions ( p/q; q/ p) has been made and by (vii) in which
the functor ∨ was replaced by its definiens ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ q;

(xiv) q ≡ (q ∨ q);
Substitute ( p/q ⊃ q) into (xiii) and apply (xi);

(xv) p ⊃ r, q ⊃ r  ( p ∨ q) ⊃ r ;
By (L2),
(g) ((q ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ (( p ∨ r ) ⊃ (q ∨ r ))
and (L2) applied to (g) yields
(h) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ (( p ∨ r ) ⊃ (q ∨ r ))
and, by (L3), we obtain
(j) ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ((r ∨ p) ⊃ (r ∨ q))
6.10 Infinite-Valued Logic [0,1] L of Łukasiewicz 313

This implies
(k) ( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ (( p ∨ q) ⊃ (r ∨ q))
and
(l) (q ⊃ s) ⊃ ((r ∨ q) ⊃ (r ∨ s))
We digress here, to recall from (Rosser and Tourquette [13], 6.12. Claim 3) the valid
formula
(∗) (q ⊃ r ) ⊃ (Γi=1
m
pi q ⊃ Γi=1
m
pi r )
From (*), we obtain
(∗∗) Γi=1
m
pi q, Γi=1
n
si (q ⊃ r )  Γi=1
m
pi Γi=1
n
si r
Indeed, Suppose (ι) Γi=1
n
si (q ⊃ r ) and obtain via (viii) (κ) q ⊃ Γi=1
n
si r . Then (*)
yields
Γi=1m pi q ⊃ Γi=1
m
pi Γi=1
n
si r
Now, by (**), we obtain from (k) and (l) that (m)(( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ ( p ∨ q)) ⊃ ((q ⊃ s) ⊃
(r ∨ s)) which by (viii) yields
(γ ) ( p ⊃ r ) ⊃ ((q ⊃ s) ⊃ (( p ∨ q) ⊃ (r ∨ s))).
By applying (xiv) to (γ ), we conclude the proof;

(xvi)  ¬¬ p ⊃ p;
Begin with (L1) to obtain (α): (¬¬ p) ⊃ ((¬¬q) ⊃ (¬¬ p)) by substitutions
( p/¬¬ p; q/¬¬q).
Substitute in (L4) ( p/¬ p; q¬q) and apply to (α) to obtain (β): (¬¬ p) ⊃ ((¬ p) ⊃
(¬q)).
Apply again (L4) to (β) to obtain (δ): (¬¬ p) ⊃ (q ⊃ p).
(ix) applied to (δ) yields (η): q ⊃ (¬¬ p ⊃ p) and by substitution in (η) of (xi)
for q,i.e.,(q/ p ⊃ p), we obtain (xvi) by detachment.

(xvii)  p ⊃ ¬¬ p;
Apply (ix) to (xvi) to obtain (λ): ( p ⊃ ¬q) ⊃ ((¬¬ p) ⊃ (¬q)) and apply (L4) to
(λ) to obtain (μ): ( p ⊃ ¬q) ⊃ (q ⊃ ¬ p).
Substitution ( p/q; q/ p) in (xvi)) and repetition of above steps yield (ν): (q ⊃
¬ p) ⊃ ( p ⊃ ¬q) and (λ) and (ν) yield (π ): ( p ⊃ ¬q) ≡ (q ⊃ ¬ p). Substitution
q/¬ p) in (π ) yields  p ⊃ ¬¬ p.

(xviii)  p 𠪪 p;
By (xvi) and (xvii);

(xix)  ( p ⊃ q) ≡ (¬q ⊃ ¬ p);

314 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Obtain (ρ): ( p ⊃ q) ≡ ( p ⊃ ¬¬q) by (xviii) and (x). Then go to proof of (xvii)

and substitute (q/¬q) in formula (π ) to obtain (σ ): ( p ⊃ ¬¬q) ≡ ((¬q) ⊃ (¬ p)).
From (ρ) and (σ ) derive (xix).

(xx) Γ  p ≡ q implies Γ  (¬ p) ≡ (¬q);

By (xix).

6.11 Wajsberg Algebras

Definition 6.27 (Wajsberg algebras) A Wajsberg algebra, see (Font et al. [26]) is an
algebra W = (L , ⊃, ¬, 1) which satisfies the following conditions:

(WA1) 1 ⊃ x = x;
(WA2) (x ⊃ y) ⊃ [(y ⊃ z) ⊃ (x ⊃ z)] = 1;
(WA3) (x ⊃ y) ⊃ y = (y ⊃ x) ⊃ x;
(WA4) (¬x ⊃ ¬y) ⊃ (x ⊃ y).

(WA1) and (WA4) are direct renderings of Wajsberg’s axioms for 3 L .

Theorem 6.27 The following are properties of Wajsberg algebras.

(i) (x ⊃ x) = 1;
By (WA1), 1 ⊃ 1 = 1, by (WA2), 1 ⊃ (x ⊃ x) = 1, substitution (x/x ⊃ x) yields
x ⊃ x = 1 ⊃ (x ⊃ x), hence, x ⊃ x = 1;
(ii) If (x ⊃ y) = (y ⊃ x) = 1, then x = y;
(WA1) and (WA3) yield
x = 1 ⊃ x = (y ⊃ x) ⊃ x = (x ⊃ y) ⊃ y = 1 ⊃ y = y.
This property reveals the origins of Wajsberg algebra as the Tarski-Lindenbaum
algebra of 3-valued logic axiomatized by Wajsberg.

(iii) x ⊃ 1 = 1;
By (WA3), then by (i)(1), we get
(x ⊃ 1) ⊃ 1 = [(1 ⊃ x) ⊃ x] = x ⊃ x = 1
Using the obtained identity (x ⊃ 1) ⊃ 1 = 1, by (WA1) and (WA2), we obtain
1 = 1 ⊃ x = [(x ⊃ 1) ⊃ (1 ⊃ 1)] = x ⊃ (x ⊃ 1) ⊃ 1 = x ⊃ 1

(iv) x ⊃ (y ⊃ x) = 1;
By (WA1), (WA2), (iii), in some order, we get
1 = (y ⊃ 1) ⊃ [(1 ⊃ x) ⊃ (y ⊃ x)] = 1 ⊃ [x ⊃ (y ⊃ x)] = x ⊃ (y ⊃ x)
Yet another Wajsberg’s axiom scheme.
6.11 Wajsberg Algebras 315

(v) If x ⊃ y = 1 and y ⊃ z = 1, then x ⊃ z = 1;

Suppose that x ⊃ y = 1 = y ⊃ z and apply (WA2) to get
(x ⊃ y) ⊃ [(y ⊃ z) ⊃ (x ⊃ z)],
i.e., 1 = 1 ⊃ (1 ⊃ [(x ⊃ z)], hence, by (WA1), 1 = 1 ⊃ (x ⊃ z) and (WA1) applied
again yields 1 = x ⊃ z;

(vi) If x ⊃ (y ⊃ z) = 1 then y ⊃ (x ⊃ z) = 1;
Suppose that x ⊃ (y ⊃ z) = 1. Substitution (y/y ⊃ z) in (W2) yields
1 = [x ⊃ (y ⊃ z)] ⊃ {[(y ⊃ z) ⊃ z] ⊃ (x ⊃ z)} =
⊃ [(y ⊃ z) ⊃ z] ⊃ (x ⊃ z)
By applying (WA1) and (WA3), we obtain [(z ⊃ y) ⊃ y] ⊃ (x ⊃ z) = 1. (iv) yields
y ⊃ [(z ⊃ y) ⊃ y] = 1. Substitute in (v): (x/y; y/(z ⊃ y) ⊃ y; z/x ⊃ z). It obtains
y ⊃ (x ⊃ z) = 1;

(vii) (x ⊃ y) ⊃ [(z ⊃ x) ⊃ (z ⊃ y)] = 1;

By (vi) and (WA2).

(viii) x ⊃ (y ⊃ z) = y ⊃ (x ⊃ z);
(WA3) and (iv) yield
(a) y ⊃ [(y ⊃ z) ⊃ z] = y ⊃ [(z ⊃ y) ⊃ y] = 1
By (vii),
(b) [(y ⊃ z) ⊃ z] ⊃ {[(x ⊃ (y ⊃ z)] ⊃ (x ⊃ z)} = 1
Application of (v) obtains from (a), (b),
(c) y ⊃ {[x ⊃ (y ⊃ z)] ⊃ (x ⊃ z)} = 1
By (vi), (d)[x ⊃ (y ⊃ z)] ⊃ [y ⊃ (x ⊃ z)] = 1 follows.
By symmetry, (e)[y ⊃ (x ⊃ z)] ⊃ [x ⊃ (y ⊃ z)] = 1. The result follows from
(d) and (e) by (ii)
These are basic conclusions from (WA1)–(WA3). As (WA4) is concerned with
negation, we now recall some properties involving negation. The basic ones are:

(ix) (¬1) ⊃ x = 1;
By (iv), (¬1) ⊃ (¬x ⊃ ¬1) = 1, hence, by (WA4), (¬1) ⊃ (1 ⊃ x) = 1 and (WA1)
yields (¬1) ⊃ x = 1;

(x) (¬x) = x ⊃ ¬1;

316 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

By (WA1) and (WA4), (a) (¬x ⊃ ¬1) ⊃ x = (¬x ⊃ ¬1) ⊃ (1 ⊃ x) = 1.

(iv) implies (b) (¬x) ⊃ (¬¬1 ⊃ ¬x) = 1. By (W4), we obtain (c)(¬¬1) ⊃ ¬x) ⊃
(x ⊃ ¬1) = 1.
From (b) and (c), by (v), one obtains (d)(¬x) ⊃ (x ⊃ ¬1) = 1. By (viii), (d) implies
(e)x ⊃ ((¬x) ⊃ ¬1) = 1. (ii) and (a) together with (e) yield ( f ) x = (¬x) ⊃ ¬1.
Now, (WA1), (WA3), (f) and (ix) yield
(x ⊃ ¬1) = (¬x ⊃ ¬1) ⊃ ¬1) = (¬1 ⊃ ¬x) ⊃ ¬x = 1 ⊃ ¬x = ¬x

(xi) ¬¬x = x;
By (x), (WA1) and (WA3), (¬¬x) = (x ⊃ ¬1) ⊃ ¬1 = (¬1 ⊃ x) ⊃ x = 1 ⊃ x =
x;

(xii) x ⊃ y = ¬y ⊃ ¬x;
(WA4) and (xi) imply
1 = (¬¬x ⊃ ¬¬y) ⊃ (¬y ⊃ ¬x) = (x ⊃ y) ⊃ (¬y ⊃ ¬x).
The converse implication is (WA4) and then the thesis follows by (ii).
MV-algebras provide an environment for the Chang completeness proof. We will
see their important interrelations with Wajsberg algebras in what follows.

6.12 MV-Algebras

6.28 (MV algebras) An MV-algebra is an algebra (A, , ¬, 0) with
Definition
a binary , unary ¬ and a constant 0. This algebra should satisfy the following
conditions, see Chang [7], Mundici [27], Mundici et al. [28].
   
(MV1) x (y z) = (x y) z;
 
(MV2) x y=y x;

(MV3) x 0 = x;
(MV4) ¬¬x = x;

(MV5) x (¬0) = ¬0;
   
(MV6) ¬(¬x y) y = ¬(¬y x) x.

We are interested in MV-algebras thanks to Chang’s proof of completeness for the

infinite-valued logic of Łukasiewicz. For this reason anespecially interesting exam-
ple of an MV-algebra is the unit interval [0,1] with as min{1, x + y}, i.e., the
Łukasiewicz T-co-norm SL , ¬ as 1 − x, i.e, the Łukasiewicz negation, and, with 0
as 0 ∈ [0, 1].

In [0,1], we have x y = max{0, x + y − 1}, the residuum x ⇒ y =
min{1, 1 − x + y}, x y = max{0, x − y}, the ordering x ≤ y being the natural
ordering on the unit interval [0,1], and, with 0, 1 ∈ [0, 1].
6.12 MV-Algebras 317

It would be desirable to introduce into MV-algebras other constructs, already

announced, known from many-valued logics of Łukasiewicz.

Definition 6.29 (Secondary operators in MV-algebras) The following operators

augment MV-algebras.
 
(OT) x y = ¬(¬x ¬y);

(OM) x y = x ¬y;
(U) 1 = ¬0;

In our particular case, x y = max{0, x + y − 1}, i.e., it is the Łukasiewicz T-norm
TL ,denoted earlier as L, and, x y = max{0, x − y}, and, 1 ∈ [0, 1].

Theorem 6.28 We have further relations.

(A) ¬1 = 0;

By (MV4).
 
(B) x y = ¬(¬x ¬y);

By (MV4).

(C) x ¬x = 1;

By (MV6) 1 = ¬0.

An ordering in an MV-algebra is introduced via


(D) x ≤ y if and only if ¬x y = 1;

Theorem 6.29 The following are equivalent.


(i) ¬x y = 1;

(ii) x ¬y = 0;

(iii) y = x (y x);

(iv) y = x z for some z.

Proof Suppose (i) holds. By (OT) and (MV4),

  
¬x y = ¬(¬¬x ¬y) = ¬(x ¬y).

By (A), x ¬y = 0 which is (ii). The proof of converse is in reading
 backwards
the
and rewrite (MV6) as (x y)
proof from (i) to (ii). Suppose (ii) y = (y x) x.
As x y = 0, we obtain y = x (y − x), i.e., (iii) holds true. (iv) follows from (iii)
and (iii) implies directly (i). 

Theorem 6.30 The ordering ≤ is a partial ordering, i.e., it is reflexive, weakly anti-
symmetric and transitive.
318 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics


Proof Reflexivity means x ≤ x, i.e., x ¬x = 1 which is (C). Weak anti-symmetry
follows by (MV6) and identities x y = 0 = y x. Transitivity follows by (iv) in
Theorem 6.29.
Partial ordering≤ implies that
the complement ¬x is z that satisfies the system
of equations: (i) z x = 0 (ii) z x = 1.
Indeed, in the language of partial ordering ≤, these two conditions come down to
a double inequality ¬x ≤ z ≤ ¬x, hence z = ¬x. 
Theorem 6.31 We collect here important properties of the partial ordering ≤.
(i) x ≤ y if and onlyif ¬y ≤ ¬x;  
≤ y implies x
(ii) x  z≤y z and
x z≤y z;
(iii) x y ≤ z if and only if x ≤ ¬y z.

Proof For (i), by (MV4),

 
x ≤ y ≡ ¬x y = 1 ≡ ¬x ¬¬y = 1 ≡ ¬y ≤ ¬x

(ii) follows by (iv) in 12.4. For (iii), by (OM),

    
x y ≤ z ≡ ¬(x y) z = ¬x ¬y z=1

which implies by definition that x ≤ ¬y z. 
Theorem 6.31(iii) reminds us of duality between T-norms and their residua. Each
MV-algebra bears the structure of a lattice. The join and the meet in an MV-algebra
are expressed in the following theorem.

Theorem 6.32 The join in any MV-algebra is expressed as (i) x ∨ y = (x y) y
and the meet is rendered as (ii) x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y).
Proof The proof should show that x ∨ y is the least  upper bound of {x, y} under
the ordering ≤. By  Theorem 6.29,
 , y ≤ (x y) y and x ≤ x y) y as, by
(MV6),
 (x y) y = (y x)  x. Let x ≤ z and y ≤ z. By Theorem 6.29, (a)
¬x z = 1 and (b) z = (z y) y. The rest is a tedious calculation: we need to
show that ¬[(x y) y] z = 1. This is obtained by substituting the right-hand
of (ii) for z, applying (MV6) together with definitions of operators and finally using
(i). The proof for the meet follows by duality. 
Each MV-algebra possesses distributivity properties.
Theorem 6.33 The following hold in each MV-algebra.
  
(i) x (y ∨ z) = (x y) ∨ (x z);
  
(ii) x (y ∧ z) = (x y) ∧ (x z).
The algebraic completeness proof by Chang exploits the separation theorem and
it is immaterial whether it is formulated in the language of filters or ideals.
6.13 Ideals in MV-Algebras 319

6.13 Ideals in MV-Algebras


Definition 6.30 (MV-ideals) An ideal in an MV-algebra (A, , ¬, 0) is a set I ⊆ A
such that
(I1) 0 ∈ I ;
(I2) If y ∈ I and x ≤ y,then x ∈ I ;
(I3) If x, y ∈ I then x y ∈ I.
A filter F is a dual to the ideal I , as F = {x ∈ A : ¬x ∈ I }. It follows that it is
immaterial in what language one is carrying the discussion, ideals or filters. The
intersection of a family of ideals is an ideal, in particular for a subset X ⊆ A, there
exists a minimal ideal I (X ) containing X . Its explicit form is given as
  
I (X ) = {y ∈ A : ∃x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ∈ X.y ≤ x1 x2 ... xk }

for some natural number k.

    
We denote by k z the expression z z . . . z in which the symbol k
occurs k times. Then, the principal ideal I (z) is given as I (z) = {y ∈ A : y ≤ z}
for some k.
Combining the last two results, we get the formula for a minimal ideal J (I, x)
containing an ideal I and an element x ∈ A:

m 
J (I, x) = {y ∈ A : y ≤ ( x) z : z ∈ I, for some m}.

An ideal I is proper if and only if 1 ∈ / I . An ideal I is prime if and only if it is

proper and x y ∈ I or y x ∈ I for each pair x, y ∈ A. The separation property
by ideals is dual to this property for filters. It is the crucial property of ideals/filters,
essential in algebraic proofs of completeness.
Theorem 6.34 (The separation property) For each proper ideal I , if an element x
is not in I , then there exists a prime ideal J such that I ⊆ J and x ∈
/ J.
Proof By the Zorn maximal principle, there exists a maximal ideal J with I ⊆ J and
x∈/ J . Suppose that J is not prime, hence,
for some  y, z neither z y ∈ J nory
z ∈ J . Then x ∈ J (z y), hence, x ≤ k (z y) u and x ≤ l (y z) w
for some u, w ∈ J .
  m  m
Then, t = u w ∈ J and x ≤ t (z y) and x ≤ t (y z) for any
m ≥ k, l, hence,
 m  m
x ≤ [t (z y)] ∧ [t (y z)] =
 m m
t [ (y z) ∧ (z y)] = t

so x ∈ I , a contradiction. 
320 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

An MV-algebra is an MV-chain if the universe A is linearly ordered by the ordering

≤. In MV-chains, prime ideals are especially well positioned.
Theorem 6.35 In each MV-chain, every proper ideal I is prime.
Proof As x ≤ y or y ≤ x, we have x y = 0 ∈ I or y x = 0 ∈ I. 
Definition 6.31 (Homomorphisms of MV-algebras) A homomorphism h from an
MV-algebra W into an MV-algebra T is a mapping h : W → T preserving operations
and constants, i.e.,
 
(h1) h(x y) = h(x) h(y);
(h2) h(¬x) = ¬h(x);
(h3) h(0) = 0.
It follows that the image h(W ) is an MV-sub-algebra of T . From standard set-
theoretic facts the following follows.
Theorem 6.36
(i) The kernel K er (h)= h −1 (0) is an ideal;
(ii) more generally, if J is an ideal in T then h −1 (J ) is an ideal in W ;
(iii) x y ∈ K er (h) if and only if h(x) ≤ h(y);
(iv) The ideal K er (h) is prime if and only if T = {0} and the image h(W ) is an
MV-chain.
Definition 6.32 (Congruences modulo ideal) The congruence ∼ I induced on an
MV-algebra W by an ideal I , is
defined as
(Cong) (x ∼ I y) ≡ (x y) (y x) ∈ I .
The congruence ∼ I is an equivalence relation (reflexivity and symmetry
 are quite
obvious, transitivity follows by the property (x z) ≤ (x y) (y z), which
satisfies additional properties
 
(Cong1) if x ∼ I y, then x z ∼I y z;
(Cong2) if x ∼ I y, then ¬x ∼ I ¬y;
(Cong3) if x ∼ I 0, then x ∈ I .
We denote by the symbol [x]∼ I the equivalence class of x and by A/ ∼ I the collection
of all equivalence classes. By the congruence property, the canonical mapping h :
A → A/ ∼ I which sends x ∈ A to [x]∼ I ∈ A/ ∼ I is a homomorphism.

6.14 The Chang Representation Theorem

We begin with the notion of a Cartesian product PF of a family F = {As : s ∈

S} of MV-algebras. We denote this product by the symbol PAs for short. Ele-
ments of the product are threads x S =< xs >s∈S where xs ∈ As for each s ∈ S.
6.15 The Chang Completeness Theorem 321


The
MV-operations are performed coordinate-wise: < xs >s∈S < ys >s∈S =<
xs s ys >s∈S and analogously for , , ¬.
Relations among the Cartesian product and MV-algebras in the family F are
expressed by projections πs : P As → As defined as πs (< xs >s∈S ) = xs .

Definition 6.33 (Sub-direct products) We say that an MV-algebra A is a sub-direct

product of the family F : {As : s ∈ S} if there exists an injective homomorphism h :
A → P As such that the composition πs ◦ h : A → As is a surjective homomorphism
for each s.

A criterion for a sub-direct representation of an MV-algebra is given below.

Theorem 6.37  If I is a family of ideals such that (i) A is isomorphic to A/ ∼ I for

each I ∈ I (ii) I I = {0} then A is a sub-direct product of quotient MV-algebras
A/ ∼ I . The converse is also true.

Proof Suppose that I is a family of ideals that satisfy (i), (ii). Denote by h I : A →
A/ ∼ I the isomorphism existing by:
(i) for each I and let h : A → P A/ ∼ I be defined as h(x) =< h I (x) > I .
(ii) h is injective. 

We may now state the Chang representation theorem Chang [7].

Theorem 6.38 (Chang) Each MV-algebra A is a sub-direct product of MV-chains.

Proof By Theorem 6.36(iv) and the separation theorem, it is enough to take

as
 the family F P(A) of all prime ideals on A as, by the separation theorem,
P(A) = {0}. 

Let us observe, that each MV-chain is a distributive lattice with the meet x ∧ y =
min{x, y} and the join x ∨ y = max{x, y}.
Theorem 6.38 tells that any equation holds in all MV-algebras if and only if it
holds in all MV-chains. The next result is a breakthrough: any equation holds in all
MV-algebras if and only if it holds in the MV-algebra on [0,1].
We state the crucial result by Chang. The proof comes from (Cignoli and Mundici
[25]).

6.15 The Chang Completeness Theorem

Theorem 6.39 (Chang [7]) For each equation t = 0 in the language of MV-algebras,
it holds true in each MV-algebra if and only if it holds in the MV-algebra [0,1] which
is the Łukasiewicz residuated lattice.

We begin with algebraic prerequisites essential for the proof.

322 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Definition 6.34 (Lattice-ordered abelian groups (-groups)) For such group G and
0 < u, u ∈ G, [0, u] denotes
 the segment {x ∈ G : 0 ≤ x ≤ u}. For x, y ∈ [0, u],
we define operators: x y = u ∧ (x + y), ¬x = u − x.

Then, ([0, u], , ¬, 0) is an MV-algebra, denoted Γ (G, u); in particular, Γ (R, 1)
is [0,1] - Łukasiewicz MV-algebra.

Additional
 in Γ (G, u) are: 1 = u, x
constants and operators y=
¬(¬x ¬y) = (x + y − u) ∨ 0, x ¬y = (x − y) ∨ 0, x ≤ y if and only if
¬x y = u (cf. Theorem 6.29).

Definition 6.35 (Good sequences) For an  MV-algebra A, a sequence

a = (a1 , a2 , . . . , an , ..) is good if and only if ai ai+1 = ai for each i ≥ 1 and
an = 0 for n > q, for some q.
 
An example of a good sequence is (a1 a2 , a1 a2 ). A sum a + b, where a =
(a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) and b = (b1 , b2 , . . . , bm ) is c = (c1 , c2 , . . . , cn+m ), where
     
ci = ai (ai−1 b1 ) ... (a1 bi−1 ) bi .

Good sequences look especially simple in MV-chains: as in any MV-chain A,

x y = x if and only if x = 1 or y = 0, any good sequence is of  (1 , a)
the form
m

for some m and a ∈ A. The sum (1 , a) + (1 , b) = (1

m n n+m
, a b, a b). The
ordering: b ≤ a if and only if bi ≤ ai for each i if and only if there exists c such that
b + c = a.

Definition 6.36 (The Chang group G A of an MV-algebra A) We denote by the

symbol M A the set of all good sequences of elements of A. The group G A is the set
of equivalence classes of pairs of good sequences from the set M A .

The equivalence relation ∼ on the set M A2 of pairs of good sequences on A is defined

as follows: (a, b) ∼ (c, d)) if and only if a + d = c + b.
The neutral element in G A is 0 = ((0), (0)), group operations are (a, b) +
(c, d) = (a + c, b + d), ¬(a, b) = (b, a), (a, b) ≤ (c, d) if and only if (c, d) −
−(a, b) ∈ M A , where M A = {(a, (0)}.

Proof (Proof of the Chang completeness theorem) Letτ = τ (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , y) be a

term, i.e., a word over the alphabet (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , 0, , ¬). In the framework of the
Chang group G A , τ is defined as τ = τ (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , y), as a
word over the alphabet
(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , y, 0, −, +, ∨, ∧, ‘, ), where ¬x = y − x, x z = (y ∧ x + z.
For MV-chain A and a1 , a2 , . . . , an ∈ A and τ (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) an MV-term, the
sequence τ A (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) = τ G A ((a1 ), (a2 ), . . . , (an ), (1)) ∈ G A .
Suppose that the equation τ (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) = 0 does not hold in an MV A; by
14.3, we may assume that A is an MV-chain. We can find a1 , a2 , . . . , an ∈ A such
that τ (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) > 0; the corresponding equation in the Chang group G A is
6.15 The Chang Completeness Theorem 323

0 < τ G A ((a1 ), (a2 ), . . . , (an ), (1)) ≤ (1).

We consider a free group Σ= Z(1) + Z(a1 ) + . . . + Z(an ) = Zn+1 . We render

respectively 1, a + 1, a2 , . . . , an as elements Z 0 , Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ Zn+1 . Let P be the
set of non-negative elements in Zn+1 . Then x ≥ P y if and only if y − x ∈ P.
We list all sub-terms of τ G A ; τ0 = y, τ1 = x1 , . . . , τn = xn , τn+1 , . . . , τk = τ G A .
We extend the mapping y → Z 0 , x1 → Z 1 , . . . , xn → Z n to mapping τ j → Z j of
sub-terms of τ G A into elements of the linear group Zn+1 ordered by ≤ P .
We have by our assumption, that 0 ≤ P Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n ≤ P Z 0 ; 0 ≤ P Z k ≤ P Z 0 ;
0 = Z k = τ (Z 1 ,2 , . . . , Z n , Z 0 .
Let π be a permutation on the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} leading to ordering

Z π(0) ≤ P Z π(1) ≤ P . . . ≤ P Z π(k) .

 v j =k Z π( j) − Z π j−1 ; embed Z
n+1
Consider vectors into Rn+1 and consider the sub-
space P = { j = 1 λ j v j : λ j ≥ 0}. We let also N ∗ = −P ∗ , then P ∗ ∩ N ∗ = {0},
∗

P ∗ ∩ P = P ∗ ∩ Zn+1 . Concerning ordering ≤ P , we have Z i ≤ P Z j if and only if

Z j − Zi ∈ P ∗.

Lemma 6.1 Sets P ∗ and N ∗ can be separated by a hyperplane defined by a vector

w ∈ Rn+1 . Consider the sphere S = {t : ||t|| = 1} ⊂ Rn+1 . Was for each vector t
that hyperplane t ⊥ intersected both N ∗ and P ∗ on sets different from {0}, we would
have S disconnected, a contradiction.

Therefore, for some vector w = (γ1 , γ2

, . . . , γn+1 ), the hyperplane Πw : w · v =
0 is as wanted. We write Πw+ = {(ηi ) : i ηi γi ≥ 0}, then P ∗ ⊆ Πw+ and N ∗ ⊆
−Πw+ . Letting P  = Πw+ ∩ Zn+1 , we obtain a linearly ordered abelian group H =
(Zn+1 , ≤ P  ).
We have Z i ≤ P Z j if and only if Z j − Z i ∈ P ∗ if and only if Z j − Z i ∈
/ N ∗ if

and only if Z i ≤ P Z j . Therefore,
(i) 0 ≤P Z z , . . . , Z n ≤P Z 0 ,
(ii) 0 ≤P Z k ≤P Z 0 ,
(iii) 0 = Z k = τ H (Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n , Z 0 ).
H is isomorphic to the sub-group W  = Zγ1 + Zγ2 + . . . + Zγn+1 ⊂ R via the
isomorphism ι : (b1 , b1 , . . . , bn+1 ) → i bi γi . If we let k0 = ι(Z 0 ), k1 =
ι(Z 1 ), . . . , kn = ι(Z n ), kk = ι(Z k ), then we have 0 ≤ k1 , k2 , . . . , kn ≤ k0 and 0 <
kk ≤ k0 . For k0 = 1, we obtain kk = τ W (k1 , k2 , . . . , kn , 1) > 0.
For the MV-algebra Γ (W, 1), we have τ (k1 , k2 , . . . , kn ) = 0, i.e., the equation
τ = 0 is not satisfied in [0,1]. Chang’s theorem is proved. 
324 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

6.16 Wajsberg Algebras, MV-Algebras and the

Łukasiewicz [0,1] L Logic

We recall that Łukasiewicz residuated lattice A L on [0, 1] has operations
 x y=
max{0, x + y − 1}, residuum x → y = min{1, 1 − x + y}, x y = min{1, x +
y}, ¬x = 1 − x, x y = max{0, x − y}, and the ordering ≤ as the natural ordering
≤ in the interval [0,1].
Theorem
 6.40 (Wajsberg algebras  vs. MV-algebras) Given an MV-algebra
(A, , ¬, 0), letting x ⊃ y = ¬x y and 1 = ¬0, introduces in A the structure of
theWajsberg algebra. Conversely, given a Wajsberg algebra (A, ⊃, ¬, 1) and letting
x y = ¬x ⊃ y, 0 = ¬1, introduces in A the structure of an MV-algebra.
Definition 6.37 (Formulae over MV ) We are thus justified in considering MV-
algebras with operations ⊃, 1, and, ¬. For an MV-algebra A, we define the set
For m of formulae as follows
(Form1) each of countably many variables x0 , x1 , x2 , . . . , xk , . . . is in For m;
(Form2) if α ∈ For m then ¬α ∈ For m;
(Form3) if α ∈ For m and β ∈ For m then α ⊃ β ∈ For m.
Definition 6.38 (Assignments) An assignment V A : For m → A satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions.
(i) V A (¬α) = ¬Va (α);
(ii) V A (α ⊃ β) = V A (α) ⊃ V A (β)
An assignment V A satisfies a formula α if V A (α) = 1. We denote this case as V A |= α.
A formula α is valid (is a tautology) if and only if V A |= α for every A-assignment
V A . In this case, we write |= α. Semantic equivalence of formulae α and β means
that formulae α ⊃ β and β ⊃ α are valid.
Definition 6.39 (MV-terms) More general than formulae are MV-terms defined in
terms of variables. The inductive definition of a term parallels that of a formula.
(i) each variable xi and the constant 0 are terms;
(ii) if τ is a term, then ¬τ is a term;

(iii) if τ and σ are terms, then τ σ is a term.
For a term τ (x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ) and elements a1 , a2 , . . . , ak of the MV-algebra A, by
substitutions (xi /ai ) for each i, we obtain τ A (a1 , a2 , . . . , ak ) ∈ A. This defines a
function called the τ -function τ A : Ak → A.
An MV-algebra A satisfies a term equation τ = σ if and only if τ A = σ A . Return-
ing to V A assignments on A-formulae, we record a relation between term functions
and V A assignments.
Theorem 6.41 For an MV-algebra A, a formula α(x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ) and an
A-assignment V A , the following holds:

V A (α) = α A (V A (x1 ), V A (x2 ), . . . , V A (xk )).

6.17 The Completeness Theorem for Infinite-Valued Sentential Logic [0,1] L 325

6.17 The Completeness Theorem for Infinite-Valued

Sentential Logic [0,1] L

Definition 6.40 (The notion of a proof) A proof of a formula α is a sequence

γ0 , γ1 , . . . , γn = α of formulae with γ0 an instance of an axiom scheme, each γi
either an instance of an axiom scheme or obtained from some previous formula
γ j ⊃ γi by detachment.

We recall that the Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra is the quotient algebra by the rela-
tion ∼ defined as:
α ∼ β ≡ α ⊃ β∧  β ⊃ α

That ∼ is an equivalence relation stems from the symmetry α ∼ β ≡ β ∼ α, reflex-

ivity α ∼ α as α ⊃ α is a valid formula in Łukasiewicz’s algebra, and transitivity is
the consequence of the axiom scheme (L2). The relation ∼ is a congruence, i.e.,

(i) α ∼ β implies α ⊃ γ ∼ β ⊃ γ ;
(ii) α ∼ β implies ¬α ∼ ¬β.

Property (i) follows by the axiom scheme (L2), property (ii) follows by valid formulae
β ≡ ¬¬β and if (α ⊃ ¬¬β), then (¬β ⊃ ¬α), and, by (L4).
We denote by the symbol [α]∼ the equivalence class of the formula α. The quotient
algebra For m/ ∼ carries a structure of a Wajsberg algebra as well as that of an MV-
algebra.

Theorem 6.42 For m/ ∼ bears the structure of the Wajsberg algebra under the
interpretation:

(i) [α]∼ ⊃ [β]∼ = [α ⊃ β]∼ ;

(ii) ¬[α]∼ = [¬α]∼ ;
(iii) 1 = [Pr ovable]∼ where Pr ovable is the class of provable formulae.

A parallel result is

Theorem 6.43 For m/ ∼ bears the structure of the MV-algebra under the interpre-
tation:

(i) [α]∼ [β]∼ = [¬α ⊃ β]∼ ;
(ii) ¬[α]∼ = [¬α]∼ ;
(iii) 0 = ¬[Pr ovable]∼ .

The MV-algebra (For m/ ∼, , ¬, 0) is the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the
Łukasiewicz infinite-valued MV-algebra A L . The soundness of [0,1] L is shown along
standard lines: axiom schemes are valid, detachment preserves validity, hence, each
provable formula is valid. The converse is
326 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

Theorem 6.44 (The completeness theorem for [0, 1] L ) Each valid formula in [0,1] L
is provable.

Proof Let α(x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ) be a valid formula. We shorten [0, 1] L to L ∗ for con-

ciseness and readability sakes.
Clearly, (i) [α]∼ = α A ([x1 ]∼ , [x2 ]∼ , . . . , [xk ]∼ ). Suppose α is not provable. Then,
[α]∼ = 1, hence, by (i), α A ([x1 ]∼ , [x2 ]∼ , . . . , [xk ]∼ ) = 1. This means that α is not
valid in the MV-algebra A and the Chang completeness theorem implies that α is not
valid in [0,1], a contradiction. 

6.18 Remarks on Goguen and Gödel Infinite-Valued Logics

Definition 6.41 (The infinite-valued logic of Goguen) In this logic, the semantics of
the implication ⊃ is given by the formula A∗ ( p ⊃ q) = 1 in case A( p) ≤ A(q) and
A(q)
A( p)
in case A( p) > A(q).

Negation ¬ p is valued as A∗ (¬ p) = A∗ ( p ⊃ ⊥) = (A( p) ⊃ 0)= 1 for A( p) = 0

and 0 for A( p) > 0. The strong conjunction p&q is valued as A∗ ( p&q) = A( p) ·
A(q); the strong disjunction, p∨q, is valued A∗ ( p∨q) = A( p) + A(q) − A( p) ·
A(q).
Axiom schemes for this logic are axiom schemas A1-A7 of BL plus two specific
axioms, see Hájek [5]:
(G1) ¬¬ξ ⊃ ((φ&ξ ⊃ ψ&ξ ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)),
(G2) φ ∧ ¬φ ⊃ ⊥.

These axioms completely axiomatize Goguen’s logic see Hájek [5].

Definition 6.42 (The infinite-valued logic of Gödel) The implication is the Gödel
implication valued A∗ ( p ⊃ q) = 1 in case A( p) ≤ A(q) and A(q) in case A( p) >
A(q). The strong conjunction & is given by A∗ ( p&q) = min{A( p), A(q)}, the strong
disjunction is given by A∗ ( p∨q) = max{A( p), A(q)} and it follows that in Gödel’s
logic, we have

(i) (φ ∧ ψ) ≡ (φ&ψ)
(ii) (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ (φ∨ψ)

Axiom schemas for Gödel’s logic are those of BL and

(Gl) φ ⊃ φ&φ, see Hájek [5].
The consequence of (i) is that deduction theorem holds in the classical form: if
φ  ψ then  φ ⊃ ψ; the reason is that φ ≡ φ n for each natural number n ≥ 1.
Gödel’s logic is completely axiomatizable, cf. Hájek [5].
6.19 Complexity of Satisfiability Decision Problem for Infinite-Valued Logics 327

6.19 Complexity of Satisfiability Decision Problem for

Infinite-Valued Logics

We denote by the symbol SAT the satisfiability problem for sentential logic, by,
respectively, SAT(Gödel), SAT(Goguen), SAT(Luk), satisfiability problems for log-
ics of,respectively, Gödel, Goguen, Łukasiewicz . Following the idea in (Hájek [5],
6.2.2), we consider a set P = { p1 , p2 , . . . , pn } of atomic propositions and for an
assignment A on P, we denote by N (A) the set { pi ∈ P : A( pi ) = 0}. Formulae
undergo reduction: to each formula φ its reduction φ ∗ is assigned as follows
(i) ⊥∗ is ⊥, ∗ is ;
(ii) pi∗ is ⊥ if pi ∈ N (A), pi∗ is pi , otherwise;
(iii) (⊥ ⊃ φ)∗ is ;
(iv) (φ ⊃ ⊥)∗ is ⊥ if φ ∗ = ⊥;
(iv) (φ ⊃ ψ)∗ is φ ∗ ⊃ ψ ∗ in cases other than (iii) and (iv);
(v) (119) (φ&⊥)∗ is ⊥, (φ&ψ)∗ is φ ∗ &ψ ∗ in other cases.
It follows form (i)–(v) above that the following holds.

Theorem 6.45 For logics of Goguen and Gödel, for each formula φ and each assign-
ment A, either φ ∗ is ⊥ or φ ∗ contains no symbol ⊥.

Proof By structural induction starting with (i) and (ii). 

Theorem 6.46 A∗ (φ)=A∗ (φ ∗ ) and A∗ (φ ∗ ) = 0 if and only if φ ∗ is ⊥.

The consequence is Hájek [5]:

Theorem 6.47 SAT, SAT(Gödel), SAT (Goguen) are equivalent, hence, SAT (Gödel)
and SAT(Goguen) are NP-complete.

Proof If φ in SAT then φ in SAT(Gödel)and in SAT(Goguen). If φ in SAT (Gödel)

or SAT(Goguen), then for some assignment A, we have A∗ (φ) > 0 hence φ ∗ = ⊥
i.e., φ ∗ does not contain ⊥. Now, consider 0-1 assignment on φ; then A∗ (φ) = 1 so
φ ∈ S AT . 

For SAT(Luk), see Mundici [29], where a proof is given that SAT(Luk) is NP-
complete. We may here only outline the main ideas of this approach. The rest is just
calculations. The starting point is given by McNaughton’s result McNaughton [15]
about representation of formulae of [0,1] L by piece-wise continuous functions on an
n-cube (we are close here to the proof of completeness of [0,1] L in Rose and Rosser
[21]).

Theorem 6.48 Consider [0, 1] L with operators defined as above. For a formula
q( p1 , p2 , .., pn ), where pi s are atomic propositions, we denote by Q(x1 , x2 , ..., xn )
the value of q with x1 , x2 , .., xn being values of p1 , p2 , ..., pn . We regard x1 , x2 , . . . , xn
as coordinate values in the cube [0, 1]n . The question posed by McNaughton was
328 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

whether there is a correspondence between functions of the form Q(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn )

and continuous functions of some form on [0, 1]n . The result were two theorems.
Theorem A. For each function of the form
n
f (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) = min{1, max{0, b + m i xi }},
i=1

where b and all m i are integers, there exists a formula q( p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) such

that Q(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) = f (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).
The piece-wise structure of the function f is explained in Theorem B below.
Theorem B. Q(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn )= f (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) holds if the function f : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1] is continuous and there exists a finite collection of monomials h j (x1 , x2 , . . . ,
n j
xn ) = b j + i=1 m i xi with integer coefficients and such that for each (x1 , . . . , xn )
there exists h j such that f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = h j (x1 , . . . , xn ).

We denote the function f corresponding to a formula Q by the symbol f Q .

Elementary considerations show that the n-cube is divided into closed convex
regions with h j defined on the region R j and two regions are either disjoint or
having a common border of dimension (n-1) on which two monomials agree. In this
sense the function f Q is piece-wise linear.
We recall that for McNaughton functions,

(i) f Q f = max{0, f Q + f P − 1};
 P
(ii) f Q f P = min{1, f Q + f P };
(iii) f Q ∨ f P = max{ f Q , f P };
(iv) f Q ∧ f P = min{ f Q , f P };
(v) f Q ⊃ f P = min{1, 1 − f Q + f P };
(vi) for the Łukasiewicz [30] symbol A P Q ≡ (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ Q, f A P Q = f P ∨ f Q ;

(vii) for the Łukasiewicz symbol K P Q ≡ ¬(P ⊃ ¬Q), f K P Q = f P fQ;
(remark: in Mundici [29] K is denoted L after McNaughton [15]).
We need a lemma.

Lemma 6.2 (The Hadamard inequality) (cf. Hadamard [31]). For a matrix M with n
rows and n columns, whose all entries are bounded by a constant C, the determinant
det(M) satisfies the inequality |det(M)|≤ C n · n n/2 .

We recall that for a formula φ the size* of φ, size*(φ), is the number of symbols
in φ. The following couple of propositions come from Mundici [29].

Definition 6.43 (A function and a formula) The following pair define a formula ξn,t
 f n,t = f ξn,t . We denote by h the function h applied to itself t times,
t
and the
function
i.e. h ... h (t times). We define consecutive functions for i, n ≥ 1 and t ≥ 2:
6.19 Complexity of Satisfiability Decision Problem for Infinite-Valued Logics 329

(i) φi is Axi ¬xi with

f φi = xi ∨ (1 − xi );

(ii) ψi,t is (Aφi )t φ with the function

f ψi,t = (x ∨ (1 − x))t : [0, 1] → [0, 1];

(iii) ξn,t is
K ψ1,t K ψ2,t . . . K ψn−2,t K ψn−1,t ψn,t

with the Mc Naughton function

  
f ξn,t = f ψ1,t f ψ2,t ... f ψn,t =
 
(x1 ∨ (1 − x1 ))t ... (xn ∨ (1 − xn ))t .

Theorem 6.49 A formula φ is valid in sentential logic if and only if the formula
ξn,t ⊃ φ is valid in infinite-valued logic [0, 1] L .
We recall that by SAT we mean the satisfiability problem for sentential logic. As we
know SAT is NP-complete.
Theorem 6.50 SAT(Luk) is NP-hard: the reduction SAT≤ p SAT(Luk) is provided by
the mapping φ → ¬ξn,t ⊃ ¬φ.
Concerning the NP-membership of SAT(Luk), geometric considerations from piece-
wise linear geometry, along with the hadamard inequality have brought the following
estimates.
Their form comes by McNaughton’s Theorems 6.48, A, B: if a formula φ(x1 , x2 ,
. . . , xn ) is satisfiable, then the corresponding McNaughton function f φ takes on
(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) the positive value. As (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) is an element of a convex
compact region R which may be assumed to be a simplex, the affine f φ takes its
maximal, i.e., positive value at one of vertices, say, r .
The description of r is given as a solution to the system M of n affine equations,
hence r = ( ab1 , . . . , abn ) with b given as the determinant of the system M, whose value
may be estimated by means of the Hadamard inequality. As computed in Mundici
[29], coefficients of the equations which express facets of the simplex are bound by
2 · si ze∗ (φ) and clearly n ≤ si ze∗ (φ). These considerations lead to the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.51 For a McNaughton function f φ for a satisfiable φ, there exists in
∗
[0, 1]n a rational point r = [ ab1 , . . . , abn ] with f φ (r ) > 0 and b < 24·si ze (φ) .
2

As shown in Mundici [29], guessing r along with b satisfying the bound in The-
orem 6.51, can be done non-deterministically in polynomial time. This shows that
SAT(Luk) is NP-complete.
330 6 Finitely and Infinitely Valued Logics

An analogous reasoning carried out for any logic n L with n > 2 proves that
SAT(n L ) is NP-complete Mundici [27].

6.20 Problems

Problem 6.1 (Kleene’s logic 3 K ) Prove: (i) in the logic 3 K (i) ( p ∨ q) ≡ ¬(¬ p ∧
¬q) (ii) ( p ⊃ q) ≡ ¬( p ∧ ¬q).

Problem 6.2 (Kleene’s logic 3 K ) Prove that the detachment rule ( p ∧ ( p ⊃ q)) ⊃ q
is valid in 3 K .

Problem 6.3 (Kleene’s logic 3 K ) Prove that if a set of formulae Γ entails a formula
φ in Kleene’s logic, then Γ entails φ in sentential logic. Verify that the formula
¬( p ≡ q) entails in sentential logic the formula ( p ≡ r ) ∨ (q ≡ r ) but it is not true
that this entailment holds in the logic 3 K .

Problem 6.4 (Łukasiewicz’s logic 3 L ) Prove: each formula valid in the logic 3 L is
valid in sentential logic.

Problem 6.5 (Łukasiewicz’s logic 3 L ) Prove that the following formulae valid in
sentential logic are not valid in the logic 3 L :
(i) p ∨ ¬ p;
(ii) ¬( p ∧ ¬ p;
(iii) ( p ⊃ (q ⊃ r )) ⊃ (( p ⊃ q) ⊃ ( p ⊃ r )).

Problem 6.6 (Łukasiewicz’s logic 3 L ) Prove that entailment in the logic 3 L holds
in the sentential logic and detachment rule holds in 3 L .

Problem 6.7 (Bochvar’s internal logic 3 B I ) Prove: neither of binary connectives of

logics 3 K and 3 L can be defined in the logic 3 B I .

Problem 6.8 (Bochvar’s internal logic 3 B I ) Prove: No formula with an occurrence

of negation sign is valid in the logic 3 B L .

Problem 6.9 (Łukasiewicz’s logic 4 L M ) Verify whether modal formulae (D), (B),
(DC), (4C), (G) are valid in the logic 4 L M .

Problem 6.10 (Łukasiewicz’s logic [0,1] L ) (after Meredith [23]). Consider the orig-
inal set (L1)–(L5) of Łukasiewicz’s axiom schemes for the infinite-valued logic [0,1] L
and verify that following sequence of formulae in Polish notation is a proof of (L5)
from (L1)–(L4).
The following symbol are used: Apq is CC pqq (i.e., ( p ⊃ q) ⊃ q)) (disjunction);
(i) (L2); substitute into (L2): { p/C pq; q/Cqp; r/ p}; (ii) obtains;
References 331

(ii) CCC pqCqpC ApqCC pqp; apply 10.3(iv); substitute into (L2):
{ p/CC pqCqp; q/C ApqCC pqr ; r/CCqC pqCqp}; it obtains
(iii) CCC ApqCC pqpCCqC pqCqpCCC pqCqpCCqC pqCqp; apply 10.3(iv)
to obtain
(iv) CC pqCrq ≡ CCqpr p; substitute into (iv): { p/N p; q/N q; r/Nr }; it obtains
by 10.3(xix)
(v) CCqpCqr ≡ CC pqC pr ; substitute into (v): { p/q; q/C pq; r/ p}; it obtains
(vi) CCC pqCqpCCqC pqCqp; apply 103(viii) and (L1); it obtains
(vii) AC pqCqp, i.e. (L5).

Problem 6.11 (Natural implications) Consider the set T = {0, 21 , 1} and let the set
W ⊆ T be either {1} or {1, 21 }. The mapping i(x, y) : T × T → T is called a natural
implication if and only if
(i) the restriction i|{0, 1} is the classical implication of sentential logic;
(ii) if i(x, y) ∈ W and x ∈ w, then y ∈ W ;
(iii) for x, y ∈ T , if x ≤ y, then i(x, y) ∈ W .
Prove: for W = {1}, there exist six distinct natural implications and for W = {1, 21 }
there exist twenty four natural implications.

Problem 6.12 (The Łukasiewicz logic [0, 1] L ) For the sentential logic detach-
ment formula ( p ∧ (q ⊃ p)) ⊃ p, determine its truth function in [0,1] L and decide
whether it is valid.

Problem 6.13 (Archimedean t-norms) Find formulae for functions f, g in the

Hilbert style representation g( f (x) + f (y)) of the product t-norm P(x, y) = x · y.

Problem 6.14 (Łukasiewicz’s logic [0, 1] L ) Prove: for each formula φ of the logic
[0, 1] L , φ is valid in [0, 1] L if and only if φ is valid as a formula of sentential logic.

References

1. Łukasiewicz, J.: Über den Satz von Widerspruch bei Aristoteles. Bulletin Internationale de
l’Académie des Sciences de Cracovie, Classe de Philosophie (1910), 15–38. Also: On the
principle of contradiction in Aristotle. In: Review of Metaphysics 24 (1970/71), 485–509
2. Łukasiewicz, J.: Farewell Lecture at the University of Warsaw, March 7, 1918. The Polish
Review 13(3), 45–47 (1968). University of Illinois Press
3. Łukasiewicz, J.: On three-valued logic (in Polish). Ruch Filozoficzny 5 (1920), 170–171.
English translation. In: Borkowski, L. (ed.) Jan Łukasiewicz. Selected Works. North Holland
- Polish Scientific Publishers, Amsterdam-Warsaw (1970)
4. Menger, K.: Statistical Metrics. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 28, 535–537 (1942)
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5. Häjek, P.: Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic. Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht

(1998)
6. Rasiowa, H., Sikorski, R.: The Mathematics of Metamathematics. Polish Scientific Publishers
(PWN), Warszawa (1963)
7. Chang, C.C.: A new proof of the completeness of theŁukasiewicz axioms. Trans. Amer. Math.
Soc. 93, 74–80 (1959)
8. Wajsberg, M.: Axiomatization of the three-valued sentential calculus (in Polish, German sum-
mary). C.R. Soc.Sci. Lettr. Varsovie 24, 126–148 (1931)
9. Goldberg, H., Leblanc, H., Weaver, G.: A strong completeness theorem for 3-valued logic.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 15, 325–332 (1974)
10. Kleene, S.C.: J. Symb. Logic 3, 150–155 (1938)
11. Bochvar, D.A.: Mat. Sbornik 4, 287–308 (1938)
12. Łukasiewicz, J.: Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, 2nd edn.
enlarged. Oxford University Press (1957)
13. Rosser, J.B., Tourquette, A.R.: Many-Valued Logics. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amster-
dam (1952)
14. Post, E.L.: Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions. Am. J. Math. 43(3),
163–185 (1921). https://doi.org/10.2307/2370324
15. McNaughton, R.: A theorem about infinite-valued sentential logic. J. Symb. Logic 16, 1–13
(1951)
16. Ling, C.-H.: Representation of associative functions. Publ. Math. Debrecen 12, 189–212 (1965)
17. Mostert, P.S., Shields, A.L.: On the structure of semigroups on a compact manifold with
boundary. Ann. Math. 65, 117–143 (1957)
18. Faucett, W.M.: Compact semigroups irreducibly connected between two idempotents. Proc.
Amer. Math. Soc. 6, 741–747 (1955)
19. Menu, J., Pavelka, J.: A note on tensor products on the unit interval. Comment. Math. Univ.
Carol. 17(1), 71–83 (1976)
20. Wajsberg, M.: Beiträge zum Metaaussagenkalkül. Monat. Math. Phys. 42, 221–242 (1935)
21. Rose, A., Rosser, J.B.: Fragments of many-valued statement calculi. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.
87, 1–53 (1958)
22. Łukasiewicz, J., Tarski, A.: Untersuchungen über den Aussagenkalkül. C.R. Soc. Sci. Lettr.
Varsovie, Cl. III, 23, 39–50 (1930); also in: Borkowski, L. (ed.): J. Lukasiewicz: Selected Works.
Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. North-Holland Publisher, Amsterdam
and Polish Scientific Publishers (PWN), Warszawa (1970)
23. Meredith, C.A.: The dependence of an axiom of Lukasiewicz. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 87, 54
(1958)
24. Chang, C.C.: Proof of an axiom of Łukasiewicz. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 87, 55–56 (1958)
25. Cignoli, R.L.O., Mundici, D.: An elementary proof of Chang’s completeness theorem for the
infinite-valued calculus of Łukasiewicz. Stud. Logica. 58, 79–97 (1997)
26. Font, J.M., Rodriguez, A.J., Torrens, A.: Wajsberg algebras. Stochastica 8(1), 5–23 (1984)
27. Mundici, D.: MV-algebras. A short tutorial (2007)
28. Cignoli, R.L., d’Ottaviano, I.M., Mundici, D.: Algebraic Foundations of Many-Valued Rea-
soning. Springer Science + Business Media, B.V. Dordrecht (2000)
29. Mundici, D.: Satisfiability in many-valued sentential logic is NP-complete. Theoret. Comput.
Sci. 52, 145–153 (1987)
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tific Publishers (PWN), Warsaw (1966). (Reprinted from mimeographed notes by students of
Warsaw University (1929))
31. Hadamard, J.: Résolution d’une question relative aux determinants. Bull. Sci. Math. 17, 240–
246 (1893)
Chapter 7
Logics for Programs and Knowledge

In this chapter we meet sentential dynamic logic (SDL), epistemic logics, logics of
approximate containment of concepts couched in terms of mereology, and elements
of Data Analysis in the form of Boolean reasoning in the environment of data along
with the logic for functional dependence and the information logic.

7.1 Sentential Dynamic Logic (SDL)

SDL is a logic of programs/actions based on modal logic as an archetype. We begin

with regular PDL whose syntax is governed by regular expressions. Please see
Chap. 1 for an account of regular expressions. PDL renders actions or programs
in terms of relations input-output, disregarding intermediate stages. Nevertheless,
it is able to formally absorb structural programming’s block commands as well as
earlier formalizations like Hoare’s triplets.

Definition 7.1 (Syntax of regular SDL) Due to need for formalization of pro-
grams/actions, SDL imposes on SL additional ingredient which is separate formal-
ization of programs, related to sentential part by actions of programs on formulae.

Atomic propositions and atomic programs

Construction of SDL syntax begins with atomic propositions and atomic programs.
We are given a countable set of atomic propositions Π0 = { pn : n ≥ 0}, usually
denoted p, q, r, . . . and we are given a countable set Φ0 = {an : n ≥ 0} of atomic
programs, usually denoted a, b, c, . . .. We denote by ⊃ the sentential implication
and the symbol ⊥ is falsum representing the truth value 0.
Purely sentential formulae
The set Π0 of purely sentential formulae (ppfs) is obtained from atomic propositions
by means of sentential connectives ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡, ¬:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 333
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_7
334 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(i) each atomic proposition is a ppf;

(ii) if φ and ψ are ppfs, then φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ⊃ ψ, φ ≡ ψ, ¬φ are ppfs;
(iii) falsum ⊥ is a ppf.
As with SL, verum is the formula ¬⊥, hence, a ppf.
Non-sentential connectives acting on ppfs
These connectives act on ppfs:
(iv) necessity connective [ . ];
(v) test connective ?;
Connectives acting on programs
(vi) connective of composition of programs (.); (.) ; 
(vii) connective of non-deterministic choice between programs (.) (.);
(viii) connective of non-deterministic program iteration (.)∗ .
The set of formulae
The set Π of formulae is defined as the smallest set closed on the conditions:
(ix) all ppfs are formulae, i.e., Π0 ⊆ Π ;
(x) for a program π and a formula φ, the expression [π]φ is a formula;
(xi) for a program π and a formula φ, the expression π φ equivalent to ¬[π]¬φ is
a formula.
The set of programs
The set Φ of programs is the smallest set closed on the conditions:
(xii) each atomic program is a program, i.e., Φ0 ⊆ Φ;
(xiii) if π and ρ are programs, then π; ρ is a program;
(xiv) if π and ρ are programs, then π ρ is a program;
(xv) if π is a program, then π ∗ is a program;
(xvi) for a formula φ, the test φ? is a program.
Conditions (x), (xi), (xvi) witness the interplay of formulae and programs. SDL is
regular as operations in it are defined by regular expressions.
Before we formally introduce semantics for regular SDL, we convey intuitive
interpretations for the introduced constructs.
(i) box [.] resembles the necessity operator of modal logic, [π]φ means that φ is
necessarily true after the program π executes;
(ii) ‘(.);(.)’ denotes sequential execution, π; ρ means that ρ is executed after π is
executed;
 
(iii) ‘ ’ denotes random choice, π ρ means the non-deterministic choice between
π and ρ;
(iv) ‘(.)∗ ’ denotes non-deterministic iteration, π ∗ means ‘; applied to π a non-
deterministically chosen number of times;
(v) ‘(.)?’ denotes test of (.), φ? means: if φ is true, then continue, otherwise fail.
7.1 Sentential Dynamic Logic (SDL) 335

Definition 7.2 (Semantics of SDL) Semantics of SDL is modelled on the Kripke

semantics of possible words. There is a difference in terminology in comparison to
modal logics: instead of worlds, we speak of states, so we assume a set of states S.
The accessibility relation now connects input states to output states, in the sense that
a pair of states (s, t) as instance of the relation Rπ means that the program π executed
in state s can terminate in the state t. Hence, we can represent the relation Rπ as an
assignment A(π) ⊆ S 2 on pairs of states, for the pair (s, t) of states, A(π)(s, t) = 1
means that (s, t) ∈ Rπ .

In SDL, we have also to account for valuation on atomic beings; for atomic formulae,
we can define V ( p) as the set of all states at which p is valid, i.e., V ( p) ⊆ S.
SDL frames
By an SDL frame, simply a frame, we understand the triple (S, A, V ), where S is a
non-empty set of states, A is an assignment on atomic programs, i.e., for each atomic
program a, A(a) ⊆ S 2 , and, V is a valuation on atomic propositions, i.e., V ( p) ⊆ S.
Each choice of a frame determines semantics for formulae and programs. Mean-
ings in that semantics are assigned on lines close to those we have met at logics
SL,FO, SML. Assume a frame (S, A, V ).
Valuations on formulae
(i)V (¬φ) = S \ V (φ);
(ii)V (φ ∨ ψ) = V (φ) ∪ V (ψ);
(iii)V (φ ⊃ ψ) = [S \ V (φ)] ∪ V (ψ);
(iv) V (φ ∧ ψ) = V (φ) ∩ V (ψ);
(v) V (⊥) = ∅, V ( ) = S;
(vi) V ([π]φ) = {s ∈ S : ∀t ∈ S.[if (s, t) ∈ A(π) then t ∈ V (φ)]}.
This renders the meaning:‘after π is executed, it is necessary that φ is true;
(vii) V ( π φ) = {s ∈ S : ∃(s, t) ∈ A(π).t ∈ V (φ)}.
This renders the meaning: ‘there is an execution of π which terminates at a
state in which φ may be true’.
Assignments on programs
(viii) A(π; ρ) = {(s, t) ∈ S 2 : ∃w ∈ S : (s, w) ∈ W (π) ∧ (w, t) ∈ W (ρ)} = A(π)
◦ A(ρ),
 where ◦ denotes composition;
(ix) A(π ρ) = A(π) ∪ A(ρ);
(x) A(π ∗ ) = [A(π)]r,t .
The latter
symbol denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of A(π), i.e., the
relation n≥0 A(π)n , A(π)n denoting the composition of n copies of A(π);
(xi) A(φ?) = {(s, s) : s ∈ V (φ)}.

Definition 7.3 (Satisfiability and validity) We denote a frame (S, A, V ) by the sym-
bol F; then
(i) A pointed frame is a pair (F, s) with s ∈ S. A formula φ is true at a pointed
frame (F, s), which is denoted F, s |= φ if and only if s ∈ V (φ);
336 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(ii) a formula φ is true at a frame F if and only if F, s |= φ for each s ∈ S, which

is denoted as F |= φ;
(iii) a formula φ is valid if and only if φ is true in each frame. This fact is denoted
as |= φ;
(iv) a formula is satisfiable if and only if there exists a frame F such that F |= φ;
(v) A set Γ of SDL formulae is true at a frame F if and only if F |= φ for each
φ ∈ Γ and it is valid if it is true at each frame.
We state some basic valid formulae of SDL. Due to analogy between SDL operators
of necessity and possibility and those operators in modal logics, laws known from
SML transfer to SDL with the same proofs which we are thus at liberty to omit.
Theorem 7.1 The following SDL formulae are valid.
(i) [π](φ ∧ ψ) ≡ ([π]φ) ∧ ([π]ψ);
(ii) π (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ ( π φ) ∨ ( π ψ);
(iii) P DL(K ) : [π](φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ([π]φ ⊃ [π]ψ);
(iv) ([π]φ) ∨ ([π]ψ) ⊃ [π](φ ∨ ψ);
(v) π (φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ ( π φ) ∧ ( π ψ).
We now recall an axiomatic system for SDL due to Segerberg [1] and its inference
rules.
Definition 7.4 (Axiom schemes for SDL)
Axiom schemes
(A1) Contains all valid formulae of SL, called in this case tautologies in order to
discern them from proper formulae of SDL;
(A2) π  ⊥ ≡ ⊥. The dual (box) form is: [π] ≡ ;
(A3) π ρ φ ≡ π φ ∨ ρ φ. The dual form is: [π ρ]φ ≡ [π]φ ∧ [ρ]φ;
(A4) π (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ π φ ∨ π ψ. The dual form is: [π](φ ∧ ψ) ≡ [π]φ ∧ [π]ψ;
(A5) π; ρ φ ≡ π ρ φ. The dual form is: [π; ρ]φ ≡ [π][ρ]φ;
(A6) π ∗ φ ≡ φ ∨ π π ∗ φ. The dual form is: [π ∗ ]φ ≡ φ ∧ [π][π ∗ ]φ;
(A7) π ∗ φ ⊃ φ ∨ π ∗ (¬φ ∧ π φ). The dual form is: [φ ∧ [π ∗ ](φ ⊃ [π]φ)] ⊃
[π ∗ ]φ.
(A7) is called the axiom of induction: indeed, it states that if φ and any iteration
od π derives [π]φ from φ, then any iteration of π terminates with φ.
Inference rules
(D) Detachment: if φ and φ ⊃ ψ, then ψ;
(Gen) Generalization: if φ, then [π]φ.
Completeness of SDL
We recall the Kozen-Parikh proof of completeness (Kozen and Parikh [2]) The proof
follows the already met in the previous chapters idea of verifying that each consistent
formula is satisfiable. This proof covers the case of PDL without the test operator. It
begins with the notion of the Fisher-Ladner closure (Fisher and Ladner [3]).
7.1 Sentential Dynamic Logic (SDL) 337

Definition 7.5 (The Fisher-Ladner closure (FLC)) Consider a consistent formula φ.

The FLC for φ, denoted F LC(φ), is the smallest set closed on the following rules:
(FLC1) If ξ ∨ ψ ∈ F LC(φ), then ξ ∈ F LC(φ) and ψ ∈ F LC(φ);
(FLC2) If ¬ξ ∈ F LC(φ), then ξ ∈ F LC(φ);
(FLC3) If π ξ ∈ F LC(φ), then ξ ∈ F LC(φ);
(FLC4) If π ρ ξ ∈ F LC(φ), then π ξ ∈ F LC(φ) and ρ ξ ∈ F LC(φ);
(FLC5) If π; ρ ξ ∈ F LC(φ), then π ρ ξ ∈ F LC(φ);
(FLC6) If π ∗ ξ ∈ F LC(φ), then π ξ ∈ F LC(φ) and π π ∗ ξ ∈ F LC(φ).

Theorem 7.2 F LC(φ) is finite for each consistent formula φ.

Proof It goes by structural induction on the set of sub-formulae.

(i) F LC( p) = { p} for each atomic proposition p;
(ii) F LC(φ ⊃ ψ) ={φ ⊃ ψ} ∪ F LC(φ) ∪ F LC(ψ);
(iii) F LC( ) = { };
(iv) F LC(¬ψ) = F LC(ψ ⊃ ⊥) = {ψ ⊃ ⊥} ∪ F LC(ψ) ∪ {⊥};
(v) F LC(ψ ∨ ξ) = F LC(¬ψ ⊃ ξ);
(vi) F LC(ψ ∧ ξ) = F LC(¬(ψ ⊃ ¬ξ).
(vii) F LC([a]ψ) = {[a]ψ} (a an atomic program). F LC([π]ψ) = {[π]ψ} ∪
F LC(ψ);
(viii) F LC( π  ψ) = F LC(¬[π]¬ψ);

(ix) F LC([π  ρ]ψ) = {[π ρ]ψ} ∪ F LC([π]ψ) ∪ F LC([ρ]ψ).
F LC( π ρ ψ follows like in (viii);
(x) F LC([π; ρ]ψ) = {[π; ρ]ψ} ∪ F LC([π][ρ]ψ) ∪ F LC([ρ]ψ).
F LC( π; ρ ψ) follows;
(xi) F LC([π ∗ ]ψ) = {[π ∗ ]ψ} ∪ F LC([π][π ∗ ]ψ);
(xii) F LC([ψ?]ξ) = [ψ?ξ] ∪ F LC(ψ). 

The corresponding formulae for possibility operator . are obtained as in (viii).

The size of a formula ψ denoted |ψ| is defined as the number of non-parentheses
symbols in ψ. The size |π| of a formula π is defined analogously. One then employs
(i)-(xii) to prove by structural induction on sub-formulae that |F LC(φ)| ≤ |φ| and
|F LC([π]ψ)| ≤ |π|.
Due to finiteness of F LC(φ), it can be written down as a list of formulae
{ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψn }.
We meet here an open complete description already met in previous chapters
which we will meet in Chap. 8, though here it is called by an another name.

Definition 7.6 (FLC(φ)-atomic formulae) An FLC(φ)-atomic formula is a consis-

tent conjunction
σ : ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ . . . , ∧ψn ,

where each ψi is either ψi or ¬ψi . The set of FLC(φ)-atomic formulae is denoted as

A(φ). Then:
338 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(i) For each ψi ∈ F LC(φ) and σ ∈ A(φ), σ  ψi ∨ σ  ¬ψi . By the fact that
 ψi or ¬ψi occurs in σ and of the tautology p ∧ q → p;
either
(ii)  σψ  i σ ≡ ψi ;
(iii) ≡ σ.

Theorem 7.3 There exists an FLC(φ)-atomic formula σ such that  σ ⊃ φ.

Proof Indeed, as φ is consistent, it extends to a maximal consistent set C and then

C ∪ { }  φ so by deduction
 theorem for SL, C  ⊃ φ and as is consistent,
and, by 1.8(iii),  ≡ all σ σ, there exists at least one consistent σ such that
 σ ⊃ φ. 

Definition 7.7 (The Kozen-Parikh frame) The Kozen-Parikh frame is defined as

follows:
(i) the set of states S is defined as the set of FLC(φ)-atomic formulae,
{σ1 , σ2 , . . . , σ2n };
(ii) for each atomic program a, the assignment A(a) = {(σi , σ j ) : σi ∧ a σ j
is consistent};
(iii) for each atomic proposition p, the set V ( p) of states is given as {σi : σi ⊃ p}.

Theorem 7.4 SDL is complete.

Proof (Kozen, Parikh). The proof is split into three lemmas.

Lemma 7.1 For each program π, if σi ∧ π σ j is consistent, then

(σi , σ j ) ∈ A(π).

The proof is by structural induction and it rests on the axiom schema (A7):

π ∗ φ ⊃ φ ∨ π ∗ (¬φ ∧ π φ),

or, in the dual form (A7*):

φ ∧ [π∗](φ ⊃ [π]φ) ⊃ [π ∗ ]φ.

The first step hs been made in Definition 7.7(ii) for atomic programs a. Next, one
has to considerthe three cases:
(i) π is ρ ξ;
(ii) π is ρ; ξ;
(iii) π is ρ∗ . 
For case (i): suppose that σi ∧ ρ ξ σ j is consistent, hence, by (A3),

(a) (σi ∧ ρ σ j ) ∨ (σi ∧ ξ σ j )

is consistent, i.e., either

(b) σi ∧ ρ σ j
7.1 Sentential Dynamic Logic (SDL) 339

is consistent or
(c)σi ∧ ξ σ j

 of induction, either (σi , σ j ) ∈ A(ρ) or (σi , σ j ) ∈

is consistent, i.e., by hypothesis
A(ξ), hence, (σi , σ j ) ∈ A(ρ ξ).
For case (ii): suppose that σi ∧ ρ; ξ σ j is consistent, hence, by (A5),

(d)σi ∧ ρ ( ξ σ j )

is consistent. In order to introducean intermediate state between σi and σ j , we

introduce into (d) in the form of σ σ and then the axiom schema (A4) allows us
to write (d) in the form 
(e) σi ∧ ρ (σ ∧ ξ σ j ),
σ

so there exists σk such that

( f ) σi ∧ ρ (σk ∧ ξ σ j )

is consistent. By (A2),
(g) σk ∧ ξ σ j

is consistent and, by 1.2(ii),

(h) σi ∧ ρ σk

is consistent. By hypothesis of induction, (σi , σk ) ∈ A(ρ) and (σk , σ j ) ∈ A(ξ),

hence, (σi , σ j ) ∈ A(ρ; ξ).
For case (iii): suppose that σi ∧ ρ∗ σ j is consistent. Consider the smallest set
Γ ⊆ A of FLC(φ)-atomic formulae with the properties:
(*) if σ ∈ Γ and σ ∧ ρ σ  is consistent, then σ  ∈ Γ ;
(**) σi ∈ Γ .
By hypothesis of induction, for each pair (σ, σ  ) ∈ Γ 2 , if σ ∧ ρ σ  , then (σ, σ  )
∈ A(ρ). It follows by induction that for each σ ∈ Γ , (σi , σ) ∈ A(ρ∗ ). Hence, one
has to show thatσj ∈ Γ .
Consider γ : Γ . Then
( j) γ ∧ ρ ¬γ

is inconsistent as it is equivalent by (A4) to


(k) X∧ ρY
X ∈Γ,Y ∈Γ
/
340 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

and each term X ∧ ρ Y is inconsistent as Y ∈ / Γ . It follows that  γ ⊃ [ρ]γ

and, by (Gen), [ρ∗ ]γ ⊃ [ρ]γ. As  σi ⊃ γ, one obtains by (A7) that  σi ⊃ γ,
hence, σi ∧ ρ∗ ¬γ is inconsistent, hence, σ j ∈ Γ and (σi , σ j ) ∈ A(ρ∗ ). This proves
Lemma 7.1. 

Lemma 7.2 For each formula π ψ ∈ F LC(φ) and each FLC(φ)-atomic formula
σ, the following equivalence holds:  σ ⊃ π ψ if and only if there exists an FLC(φ)-
atomic formula σ  such that (σ, σ  ) ∈ A(π) and  σ  ⊃ ψ.

Proof From left to right it is straightforward, if we remember that ψ is one of ψi ’s

making F LC(φ) and σ, σ  are conjuncts containing in each position i either ψi or
¬ψi . From σ ⊃ π ψ it follows that for some σ  , it is true that σ ∧ π σ  is consistent
and σ  ⊃ ψ.
The opposite direction is proved by structural induction on π. Supposethat
(σ, σ  ) ∈ A(π) and  σ  ⊃ ψ. There are four cases: (a) an atomic a (b) (ρ ξ)
(c) (ρ; ξ) (d) ρ∗ .
For case (a): if π is a, an atomic program, then (σ, σ  ) ∈ A(a) means that σ ∧ a σ 
is consistent, and  σ  ⊃ ψ implies that σ ∧ a ψ is consistent, therefore,  σ ⊃
a ψ. 
For case (b): suppose that (σ, σ  ) ∈ A(ρ ξ), so either (σ, σ  ) ∈ A(ρ) or (σ, σ  ) ∈
A(ξ). Suppose it is the former. By rule (FLC(4)),
 ρ ψ ∈ F LC(φ) so, by hypothesis
of induction,  σ ⊃ ρ ψ, and  σ ⊃ ρ ξ ψ.
For case (c): suppose that (σ, σ  ) ∈ A(ρ; ξ), so (σ, σ ∗ ) ∈ A(ρ) and (σ ∗ , σ  ) ∈
A(ξ) for some σ ∗ . As in case(b),  σ ∗ ⊃ ξ ψ. By rules (FLC(5)) and (FLC(3)),
ξ ψ ∈ F LC(φ) and, by hypothesis of induction,  σ ⊃ ρ ξ ψ, hence, by (A5),

 σ ⊃ ρ; ξ ψ.

For case (d): suppose that (σ, σ  ) ∈ A(ρ∗ ) so for some sequence σ1 = σ,
σ2 , . . . , σn = σ  of states we have (σi , σi+1 ) ∈ A(ρ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Rea-
soning by backward induction from σn we prove that  σ ⊃ ρ∗ ψ. This concludes
the proof of Lemma 7.2. 

Lemma 7.3 For an LFC-atomic sub-formula σ and a formula ψ ∈ L FC(φ), σ |= ψ

if and only if  σ ⊃ ψ.

Proof It is by structural induction. For an atomic proposition p, the thesis follows

by definition of valuation V . Cases to consider are:
(i) ψ is α ∨ β;
(ii) ψ is ¬α;
(iii) ψ is π α.
For (i): follows by properties of |= and ;
For (ii): follows by (FLC(1)), (FLC(2));
For (iii):  σ π α if and only if, by Lemma 7.2., for some σ ∗ , (σ, σ ∗ ) ∈ A(π) and
 σ ∗ ⊃ α, hence, by hypothesis of induction, σ ∗ |= α but this means that σ |= π α.
7.1 Sentential Dynamic Logic (SDL) 341

As already observed, for the formula φ, there exists σ with the property that  σ ⊃ φ,
hence, σ |= φ. This proves completeness of SDL. 
An upshot of this proof of completeness is the fact that φ has the small model property:
F LC(φ) is finite. Hence, SDL is decidable. A more exact evaluation of cardinality
of a small model is obtained by the method of filtration. 

Filtration. Small model property for SDL

The method of filtration, known from modal logics, reminds of the Lindenbaum-
Tarski approach by forming quotient Kripke structures. It leads as we know from
φ
discussion of modal logics, to small structures of size at most 22 for each for-
mula φ satisfiable in a given original structure. The number of quotient structures is
φ
bounded by 22 and this doubly exponential size makes it impractical but theoretically
important.

Definition 7.8 (Filtration) We consider a Kripke structure  = (S, A, V ) and a

formula φ of SDL. We define an equivalence relation ∼ on states in S by letting:

∼ (s, s  ) if and only if s |= ψ if and only if s  |= ψ for each formula

ψ ∈ F LC(φ)

The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on the set S, and we denote by the symbol
S/ ∼ the set of equivalence classes [s]∼ of states in S:

S/ ∼= {[s]∼ : s ∈ S},

where [s]∼ = {s  :∼ (s, s  )}.

The relation ∼ factors in a natural way through an assignment A and valuation
V:

(i) (A/ ∼)(a) = {([s], [s  ]) : (s, s  ) ∈ A(a)} for each atomic program a;

(ii) (V / ∼)( p) = {[s]∼ : s ∈ V ( p)}.

A/ ∼ and V / ∼ defined in (i) and (ii), extend in the familiar way to programs and
formulae.
The quotient Kripke structure ∼ = (S/ ∼, A/ ∼, V / ∼) is the filtration of 
by F LC(φ).

The first task is to check that this quotient structure behaves correctly with respect
to formulae in F LC(φ). Postulates for a correct extension to F LC(φ) are brought
for in

Theorem 7.5 Let  = (S, A, V ) be a Kripke structure and φ a formula of SDL. In

the notation of Definition 7.8, for states s, s  ∈ S:
(i) s ∈ V (ψ) if and only if [s]∼ ∈ V / ∼ (ψ) for each ψ ∈ F LC(φ);
342 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(ii) for each formula [π]ψ ∈ F LC(φ), if (s, s  ) ∈ A(π), then ([s]∼ , [s  ]∼ )
∈ A/ ∼ (π);
(iii) for each formula [π]ψ ∈ F LC(φ), if ([s]∼ , [s  ]∼ ) ∈ A/ ∼ (π) and s ∈
A([π]ψ), then s  ∈ V (ψ).

Proof of Theorem 7.5 applies structural induction checking all possible cases. We
omit the proof advising interested readers to consult (Harel et al. [4], II.6.2).
The upshot of Theorem 7.5 is the theorem on existence of small structures for
SDL (Fisher and Ladner [3]).

Theorem 7.6 (The small structure (model) theorem) For a formula φ of SDL, if φ is
satisfiable, then there exists a filtered structure of size not greater than 2|φ| in which
φ is satisfiable.

Proof Let  be a Kripke model for φ and a state s such that s |= φ; then, in the
filtered structure, [s]∼ |= φ, by Theorem 7.5(i). In the quotient structure / ∼, each
state can be identified with a value assignment on atomic propositions in φ, hence,
size of the quotient structure is not greater than 2|φ| , |φ| being the number of symbols
in φ, i.e., the size of φ. 

Decidability, validity, complexity of SDL

Theorem 7.7 SDL is decidable: Indeed, it follows from the small model theorem:
for each formula φ, it suffices to check all Kripke structures of sizes not greater than
2|φ| in order to ascertain eventual satisfiability of φ.

Satisfiability in SDL is in NTIME (Fisher and Ladner [3]).

Theorem 7.8 Satisfiability of a formula φ can be checked in NTIME(c|φ| ) for some

constant c).

Algorithm for checking satisfiability of a formula φ proposed in [3] is the following:

(1) guess a structure  = (S, A, V ) of size not grater than c|φ| ;
(2) guess a state s in S;
(3) check, whether s |= φ.
Model checking in (3) can be done in time polynomial in sizes of φ and  (cf.
[3]). It follows that complexity of validity checking is co-NTIME(c|φ| ).

7.2 Epistemic Logics

The case of a single reasoning agent

In this section, we propose a discussion of epistemic logics, a clone of modal logics
in which operators of necessity and possibility appear as operators of knowledge
and belief. Yet, it is not any direct translation consisting in mere symbol changing as
7.2 Epistemic Logics 343

notions of knowledge and belief have a wide spectre of applications, for instance, in
reasoning by teams of agents. We begin with epistemic logics for a single reasoning
agent.
Epistemic logic in its present formulation is constructed on the basis of modal
logics. It considers notions of knowledge and belief modelled usually by following
modal logic modelling of necessity and possibility. However, one can model knowl-
edge and belief separately which leads to strictly epistemic logics concerned with the
notion of knowledge (from knowledge = epistêmê in Greek) and to doxastic logics
(from doxa=belief in Greek) concerned with the notion of belief.
From Plato and Aristotle, epistêmê has been regarded as the knowledge of things
that ‘cannot be otherwise’, and this feature would exclude all possibilities of deliber-
ating about them contrary to techné which was encompassing changeable aspects of
reality allowing ‘calculations’ about them. Doxa was encompassing opinions about
reality not founded on its exact features, a kind of ‘knowledge for the laymen’.
Relations between knowledge and belief are studied in logical theories of knowl-
edge and we will give some account of basics in this area. We assume here that we
have read the chapter on modal logics so we are familiar with notation and technical
content of it. In epistemic logic, the necessity operator L is denoted by the symbol K
and the formula K φ is read ‘it is known that φ’. The dual operator ¬K ¬ is denoted
by the symbol K . In doxastic logic, the symbol for belief operator is denoted by B
and its dual is denoted by B . Thus, contrary to the usage in modal logics operators
K and B are not dual to each other but have their own dual forms and, though it is
possible that the two occur jointly in some contexts, yet they form parallel theories.
Both epistemic and doxastic logics are more difficult to be formalized than modal
logics due to the subjective understanding of notions of knowledge and belief. It was
an idea in Hintikka [5] that to be positive about validity of a statement in a certain
state one should check its validity in all achievable states and only the validity in
all those states could corroborate validity in the given state. Though the notion of a
possible state has a long history associated with names like Leibniz and Carnap, yet
the introduction of semantics of possible worlds in Kripke [6] opened up venues for
interpretations of notions of knowledge and belief in rigorous ways.
We concentrate on technical aspects of epistemic and doxastic logics. We recall
modal logics K, T, S4, S5. As knowledge and belief logics are built on the lines of
modal logics, we refer to Chap. 4 for formal introduction to syntax and semantics
of modal logics and we adapt them to the epistemic content by introducing epis-
temic logics, where the symbol (SL) denotes all valid formulae of sentential logic.
Notwithstanding this reservation, we shortly recall the syntax of epistemic logics.

Definition 7.9 (Syntax of epistemic logic I) Syntactic constructs of epistemic logic

encompass
(i) atomic propositions of sentential logic SL: p1 , p2 , . . . of which we have a count-
able set P and of the symbol ⊥ for falsum (unsatifiable);
(ii) connectives of sentential logic: ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡, ¬.

Relational vocabulary consists of the epistemic operator K .

344 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Well-formed formulae of epistemic logics (wf’s) are defined as follows, where

wfφ denotes that φ is well-formed:
(iv) all valid propositions of SL are wf; their set is denoted (PL);
(v) if wfφ and wfψ, then wfφ ∨ ψ, wfφ ∧ ψ, wfφ ⊃ ψ, wfφ ≡ ψ, wf¬φ;
(vi) if wf φ, then wf K φ.
In particular, verum defined as ¬⊥ is wf. We have the analogues of modal
logics for the epistemic case.

Definition 7.10 (Syntax of epistemic logic II. Logic EK) EK satisfies the axiomatic
schemes (SL) and (EK):

(i) (EK): K (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (K φ ⊃ K ψ);

Let us notice that (EK) is often introduced in the form

(ii) (EK) (K φ ∧ K (φ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ K ψ.
Thus, in the logic EK knowledge satisfies the statement ‘if it is known that φ
implies ψ, then if it is known that φ then it is known that ψ’.

Definition 7.11 (Epistemic logic ET ) The axiomatic schemes for ET are (SL), (EK)
and (ET):

(i) (ET) K φ ⊃ φ.

In the logic ET knowledge satisfies the statement: ‘If it is known that φ then φ is
true’, or, in a paraphrase ‘what is known is true’.

Definition 7.12 (Epistemic logic ES4) The logic ES4 is endowed with axiomatic
schemes (SL), (EK), (ET) and (E4):

(i) (E4) K φ ⊃ K K φ.

In logic ES4 knowledge observes the statement: ‘if it is known that φ then it is
known that it is known that φ’ - the statement witnessing the ‘positive introspection’:
‘they know that they know.’

Definition 7.13 (Epistemic logic ES5) We add one more axiomatic schema (E5) to
(SL), (EK),(ET),(E4):

(i) (E5) K φ ⊃ K K φ.

In logic ES5 knowledge obeys the property: ‘if it is not known that not φ then
it is known that it is not known that not φ’ - the statement witnessing the ‘negative
introspection’.

Definition 7.14 (Rules of inference) They are modal rules of inference with necessity
operator L replaced by the epistemic operator K :
7.2 Epistemic Logics 345

(i) Detachment rule (Modus Ponens, MP): if φ and φ ⊃ ψ, then ψ;

(ii) Epistemic necessitation rule (EN): if φ, then K φ.
In the same way we construct doxastic logics; here, we omit the interpretations,
as they will mimic the interpretations for knowledge logics with replacement of the
word ‘knows’ by the word ‘believes’. When we replace the epistemic operator K
with the doxastic operator B, we obtain logics DK, DT, DS4, DS5 with axiomatic
schemas parallelling schemas for epistemic logic in which the operator K is replaced
by the operator B.
Rules of inference for doxastic logics are in analogy to those for epistemic logics
with the only difference that the epistemic operator K is replaced with the doxastic
operator B, e.g., the rule (EN) Kφφ becomes the rule (DN) Bφ φ
.

Definition 7.15 (Semantics for epistemic and doxastic logics) Semantics is defined
on lines introduced in Chap. 4, i.e., it is the Kripke semantics of possible worlds. We
recall that a frame F is a pair (W, R), where the set W is a set of possible worlds
and the relation R is a binary accessibility relation on the set W . The meaning of the
instance R(w, w  ) is that being in the world w, we check the status of a statement φ
in worlds w which are possible for us to inspect.

A structure for epistemic logic is a pair (F, A) of a frame F and an assignment

A: P × W → {0, 1}. Thus, the assignment A sends each pair ( p, w) of an atomic
proposition p and a world w into a Boolean value 0 or 1. Once the assignment is
defined, all sentential formulae in all worlds gain a value of truth or falsity. We denote
by the generic symbol M the structure (F, A), i.e., (W, R, A). Given a world w ∈ W ,
a pointed structure is a pair (M, w) where M is the structure (W, R, A).
A Kripke structure for doxastic logic is defined on the same lines, except that we
use another symbol, say S, for the accessibility relation; this is important in cases
when we discuss a simultaneous occurrence of epistemic and doxastic logics in a
common set of possible worlds.

Definition 7.16 (The notion of satisfaction) Satisfaction conditions are exactly the
same as for modal logics with already mentioned change of operator symbols.

Epistemic as well as doxastic logics defined above are normal in the sense of Chap. 4
and they inherit all properties of modal logics on whose lines they have been defined.
In particular,

Theorem 7.9 Epistemic logics EK, ET, ES4, ES5 are strongly complete in, respec-
tively, frames that are universal, reflexive, transitive, equivalent. The same holds for
doxastic logics DK, DT, DS4, DS5.

Theorem 7.10 All epistemic and doxastic logics defined above have the small struc-
ture (model) property and are decidable.

Theorem 7.11 Satisfiability decision problems for EK, DK, ET, DT, ES4, DS4 are
PSPACE-complete, satisfiability problems for ES5, DS5 are NP-complete.
346 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Proofs for most NP-statements can be found in Chap. 4. Proofs for PSPACE-
completeness are to be found in Ladner [7] and in (Halpern and Moses [8]).
Epistemic-doxastic logics
It is of course interesting to consider the interaction of both types of logics in common
models. For a structure M = (W, R, S, A), and a world w ∈ W , we recall from
Chap. 4 the notion of an R-neighborhood N F (w) = {w  : R(w, w  )}, where F is a
frame (W, R). We define in the same manner the notion of an H -neighborhood for
the frame H = (W, S). We recall that truth in case of epistemic or doxastic logic is
understood as respective conditions
(i) M, w |= K φ if and only if M, w |= φ for each world w  ∈ N F (w);
Similarly, in case of a doxastic logic we have the condition
(ii) M, w |= Bφ if and only if M, w |= φ for each world w  ∈ N H (w).
Basic interrelations between the two types of logics can be expressed in some logics.
We mention hybrid logics due to Hintikka [5] and Lenzen [9].

Definition 7.17 (Epistemic-doxastic logics KB1-KB4) Logics KB1-KB4 are char-

acterized, respectively, by the following axiom schemes (KB1)-(KB4).

(KB1) K φ ⊃ Bφ;
This means that one believes in what they know.
(KB2) Bφ ⊃ K Bφ;
Each believer knows that they believe (‘positive introspection’);
(KB3) Bφ ⊃ B K φ;
Anyone who believes, believes that they know;
(KB4) (¬K φ) ⊃ B¬K φ;
Anyone who does not know believes that they do not know (‘negative intro-
spection’).

Theorem 7.12 Mixed logics (KB1)-(KB4) are satisfied under respective conditions:
(i) A sufficient condition for satisfiability of (KB1) in a frame (W, R, S) is S ⊆ R,
i.e., N H (w) ⊆ N R (w) for w ∈ W ;
(ii) A sufficient condition for satisfiability of (KB2) in a frame (W, R, S) is that
R, S satisfy the property RS-Euclidean: if R(w, v) then N H (v) ⊆ N H (w) for
all pairs w, v ∈ W ;
(iii) A sufficient condition for satisfiability of (KB3) in a frame (W, R, S) is that
R, S satisfy the property SR-Euclidean: if S(w, v) then N R (v) ⊆ N H (w) for
all pairs w, v ∈ W ;
(iv) A sufficient condition for satisfiability of (KB4) in a frame (W, R, S) is that
R, S satisfy the property: if S(w, u) and R(w, v) then R(v, u) for all triples
w, v, u ∈ W .

We have of course all modalities from Chap. 4 at our disposal. For the purpose of
quoting the next result we recall axiom schemes:
7.2 Epistemic Logics 347

(E5) ¬K φ ⊃ K ¬K φ; (D5)¬Bφ ⊃ B¬Bφ

(ED) K φ ⊃ ¬K ¬φ; (DD)Bφ ⊃ ¬B¬φ

Combinations of the above properties are possible as well. An interesting example

is quoted in Blackburn et al. [10].

Theorem 7.13 There exists a structure in which if knowledge satisfies (E5) and
belief satisfies (DD) then together with (KB1) they imply that the formula B K φ ⊃ K φ
is satisfied, i.e., ‘if one believes that knows then they know’.

Proof We outline a proof on semantic lines. Consider the accessibility relation R for
epistemic and S for the doxastic part, with R a Euclidean and S a serial accessibility
relations. Then each model with the union R ∪ S for those R and S satisfies (5) and
(D). In order to satisfy (KB1), there must be S ⊆ R, so R ∪ S = R. We select a
model in which R = S. Then models with R, S = R satisfy B K φ ⊃ K φ. 

From Definition 7.17 it follows that the addition of (KB3) to axiom schemes in the
outlined in Theorem 7.13 class of structures, satisfies the schema K φ ≡ Bφ which
means the collapse of knowledge as knowledge and belief coincide.
Epistemic logics for n agents
A simultaneous occurrence of knowledge and belief logics in a structure involves
two accessibility relations, R and S, and we could introduce two beings r, s with r
responsible for R and s for S. In such cases we speak of epistemic agents (agents, for
short). Given n agents, which we denote as 1, 2, . . . , n, we introduce n accessibility
relations R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn , the relation Ri pertaining to the agent i, for i ≤ n.
Kripke structures for this case are tuples of the form Mn = (W, R1 , R2 , . . . ,
Rn , A) where W is a set of worlds, A is an assignment, i.e., A maps the Carte-
sian product P × W into the set of truth values {0, 1}, hence, A( p, w) ∈ {0, 1} for
each pair ( p, w) ∈ P × W .

Definition 7.18 (Epistemic logic EKn) This logic extends the one-agent epistemic
logic EK. Like EK, it consists of two axiomatic schemes and two rules of inference.
Axiomatic schemes are
(i) all valid (tautological) schemes of sentential logic SL;
(ii) (EKi) K i (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ [(K i φ) ⊃ (K i ψ)] equivalently (K i φ ∧ K i (φ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ K i ψ
for i ≤ n.

Rules of inference are:

(iii) detachment: if φ and φ ⊃ ψ, then ψ;
(iv) epistemic necessitations (ENi): if φ, then K i φ for i ≤ n.

Theorem 7.14 The epistemic logic EKn is sound.

348 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Proof One proves on the lines for one-agent epistemic (modal) logics that the system
EKn is sound: given a structure Mn , one checks that
(i) Mn |= φ when φ is a valid formula of SL;
(ii) Mn |= ψ whenever Mn |= φ and Mn |= φ ⊃ ψ;
(iii) Mn |= K i (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (K i φ ⊃ K i ψ) for i ≤ n;
(iv) Mn |= K i φ whenever Mn |= φ.
We prove (iii) and (iv) as an example of reasoning in EKn. For (iii), suppose that
Mn , w |= K i (φ ⊃ ψ), hence, Mn , v |= φ ⊃ ψ at each v such that Ri (w, v). Suppose
that M, w |= K i φ so that M, v |= φ. By detachment, M, v |= ψ, hence, M, w |=
K i ψ. For (iv), suppose that Mn |= φ then, for each world w ∈ W , Mn , w |= φ, in
particular if Ri (w, v) then Mn , v |= φ, hence, Mn , w |= K i φ. 

Completeness of n-agent logics

We now address the completeness property for EKn. We consider the completeness
proof for EKn as an archetype for completeness proofs for other epistemic logics.
We recall from Chap. 4 some necessary notions and results proved there.

Definition 7.19 (Consistency of EKn) A formula φ of EKn is consistent if and only

if its negation ¬φ is not provable
 in EKn. A set Γ of formulae of EKn is consistent
if and only if the formula Δ is consistent for each finite Δ ⊆ Γ . Consistency
of Γ is denoted Con(Γ ). A set Γ of formulae is maximal consistent, which is
denoted MaxCon(Γ ), if there is no consistent set Δ such that Γ ⊂ Δ. Technically,
MaxCon(Γ ) if and only if adding to Γ any formula φ ∈ / Γ results in inconsistency
of the set Γ ∪ {φ}.

Theorem 7.15 We know from Chap. 4 that MaxCon(Γ ) has the following proper-
ties:
(i) if MaxCon(Γ ), then either φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ for each formula φ of EKn;
(ii) if MaxCon(Γ ), then φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ if and only if φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ for each pair
φ, ψ of formulae of EKn;
(iii) if MaxCon(Γ ), then if φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ , then either φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ for each pair
φ, ψ of formulae of EKn;
(iv) if MaxCon(Γ ), then if φ ∈ Γ and φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Γ , then ψ ∈ Γ for each pair φ, ψ
of formulae of EKn;
(v) if MaxCon(Γ ), then if Γ  φ, then φ ∈ Γ for each formula φ of EKn;
(vi) if MaxCon(Γ ), then ∈ Γ .

In order to facilitate the perception of these facts, we include standard proofs of

(i)–(vi). These proofs are based on the definition of consistency. Suppose that for a
formula φ neither φ nor ¬φ is in Γ . Then both Γ ∪ {φ} and Γ ∪ {¬φ} are inconsistent
and then Γ ∪ {φ ∨ ¬φ} is inconsistent, a contradiction because φ ∨ ¬φ is valid in
PL, hence Γ would be inconsistent. This is at the heart of the Lindenbaum Lemma:
adding successively φ or ¬φ to build a consistent set yields a maximal consistent set.
7.2 Epistemic Logics 349

If φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ and, was, say, φ ∈ / Γ , it would imply ¬φ ∈ Γ and would yield

inconsistency of Γ . If φ, ψ ∈ Γ then we must have φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ else ¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ ,
i.e., (¬φ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ Γ and,say, ¬ψ ∈ Γ , an inconsistency.
(iii) is provable on the same lines. If φ, (φ ⊃ ψ) ∈ Γ then (¬φ ∨ ψ) ∈ Γ and by (iii)
it must be ψ ∈ Γ as ¬φ ∈ Γ would cause inconsistency.
(vi) holds true as ¬ ≡ ⊥ cannot be in Γ .
(v) follows as φ ∈/ Γ would mean ¬φ ∈ Γ hence along with φ, Γ would prove falsity.
Completeness of EKn means that each valid formula of EKn is provable. Suppose a
formula φ is valid but not provable. Then the formula ¬¬φ is not provable and then
¬φ is consistent. If it was known that each consistent formula is satisfiable in some
model Mn then ¬φ would be satisfiable in some model Mn contrary to validity of φ.
Hence,in order to prove completeness of EKn, it suffices to prove
Theorem 7.16 If a formula φ of EKn is consistent, then it is satisfied in some
structure Mn .
Proof As each consistent formula belongs in some maximal consistent set, the way
of proof is to use the already known to us from Chap. 4 the technique of canonical
models due to Henkin in which worlds are maximal consistent sets. We recall from
Chap. 4 the rule (RK) which we reproduce here in the epistemic guise for each K i :

γ1 ⊃ (γ2 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (γk ⊃ φ)))

(RKi):
K i γ1 ⊃ (K i γ2 . . . (⊃ (K i γk ⊃ K i φ)))

We denote by Γ /K i the set {φ : K i φ ∈ Γ }. The canonical structure Mnc is a triple

(W c , R1c , R2c , . . . , RnC , Ac ), where
(C1) W c = {Γ : MaxCon(Γ )};
(C2) Ric (Γ, Γ  ) if and only if Γ /K i ⊆ Γ  ;
(C3) Ac ( p, Γ ) = 1 if and only if p ∈ Γ .
The main result is
Lemma 7.4 For each MaxCon(Γ ) and a formula φ of EKn, (Mnc , Γ ) |= φ if and
only if φ ∈ Γ .
Proof of Lemma The proof is by structural induction. For a sentential variable p,
Lemma is true by (C3). For a formula ¬φ, if ¬φ ∈ Γ then, by Theorem 7.15(i),
φ∈/ Γ so, by assumption of induction, φ is invalid, hence, ¬φ is valid, the converse
goes along the same lines. Proof for the case of φ ∧ ψ is analogous. The only harder
case is that of ψ of the form of K i φ. The theorem is true for φ by hypothesis of
induction. Suppose that ψ ∈ Γ for a MaxCon(Γ ). Then φ ∈ Γ /K i and it follows
that if Ric (Γ, Γ  ) then Mnc , Γ  |= φ, hence, Γ |= ψ. 
For the converse, suppose that (Mnc , Γ ) |= K i φ for some MaxCon(Γ ). Then
Γ /K i ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent: each maximal consistent set Γ  such that Ric (Γ, Γ  )
contains φ and was Γ /K i ∪ {¬φ} consistent, we would have some MaxCon(Γ ∗ )
with Γ /K i ∪ {¬φ} ⊆ Γ ∗ ,i.e, Ric (Γ, Γ ∗ ), a contradiction.
350 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Thus, there is a proof of ¬¬φ, i.e, of φ from Γ /K i : ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψk , φ and by

deduction theorem in PL we have

(∗) ψ1 ⊃ (ψ2 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (ψk ⊃ φ)))

from which, by (RKi), we obtain

(∗∗) K i ψ1 → (K i ψ2 → (. . . → (K i ψk → K i φ)))

As {K i ψ1 , K i ψ2 , . . . , K i ψk } ⊆ Γ it follows from (**) that K i φ ∈ Γ .

This concludes the proof of completeness of EKn. 
The case of logics ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n

Definition 7.20 (Epistemic logics ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n) Following known
cases of logics ET, ES4, ES5, and modal logic D, we extend them to the case of
n agents in the same way in which EK has been extended to EKn, so our Kripke
structures will be of the form Mn = (W , R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn , V ) and K i will be the
epistemic operator for the agent i. By analogy with modal cases, we assign some
rules to operators K i for i ≤ n:
(Tni) K i φ ⊃ φ;
(4ni) K i φ ⊃ K i K i φ;
(5ni) ¬K i φ ⊃ K i ¬K i φ;
(Dni) ¬K i ⊥;

Remark 7.1 Let us notice that the rule (Dni) is equivalent to known to us rule:
K i φ ⊃ ¬K i ¬φ. We offer a proof:
1. K i φ → ¬K i ¬φ;
2. K i ¬φ → ¬K i φ; PL
3. φ/⊥; substitution
4. K i → ¬K i ⊥; verum as ¬⊥
5. K i ; valid
6. ¬K i ⊥ detachment;
For the converse:
7. ¬K i ⊥;
8. ¬K i (φ ∧ ¬φ); PL
9. ¬[(K i φ) ∧ (K i ¬φ)]; property of the system K
10. ¬(K i φ) ∨ (¬K i ¬φ); PL
11. K i φ → ¬K i ¬φ.

With rules (Tni), (4ni), (5ni), and, (Dni), we define other epistemic logics for n agents
as satisfying the sets of axiomatic schemes.
7.2 Epistemic Logics 351

Definition 7.21 The axiom schemes for logics ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n:
The logic ETn satisfies axiom schemes (Kni),(Tni) for i ≤ n.
The logic ES4n satisfies axiom schemes (Kni, (Tni), (4ni) for i ≤ n.
The logic ES5n satisfies axiom schemes (Kni), (Tni), (4ni), (5ni) for i ≤ n.
The logic EKD45n satisfies axiom schemes (Kni, (4ni), (5ni), (Dni) for i ≤ n.

In analogy to the modal cases of Chap. 4, we check that corresponding results are
true for epistemic logics for n agents.

Theorem 7.17 Let symbols MnT,c , Mn4,c , Mn5,c , MnD,c denote that the canonical model
Mnc , validates, respectively, all instances of ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n. Then
(i) MnT,c is reflexive, i.e., Ric (Γ, Γ ) for each MaxCon(Γ ) and i ≤ n;
(ii) Mn4,c is transitive, i.e, Ric (Γ, Γ  ) and Ric (Γ  , Γ ∗ ) imply Ric (Γ, Γ ∗ ) for each
MaxCon{Γ, Γ  , Γ ∗ } and i ≤ n;
(iii) Mn5,c is Euclidean, i.e., if Ric (Γ, Γ  ) and Ric (Γ, Γ ∗ ) then Ric (Γ  , Γ ∗ );
(iv) MnD,c is serial,transitive and Euclidean, i.e., for each i ≤ n and for each world
Γ , there exists a world Γ ∗ such that Ric (Γ, Γ ∗ ) and conditions in (ii), (iii) are
also satisfied.

Proof We recall that S5 contains the formula (B) φ ⊃ K ¬K ¬φ so if we prove

that the canonical model for E Bn is symmetric, then (ii) along with (i) will show
that the canonical model Mn5,c is Euclidean. Let us observe that (i) the canonical
accessibility relation Ric can be defined equivalently as follows: Ric (w, v) if and only
if ¬K i ¬φ ∈ v implies φ ∈ w.
Suppose then that Ric (Γ, Γ ∗ ) and φ ∈ Γ . Detachment from the formula (B) for
i in Γ yields K i ¬K i ¬φ ∈ Γ , hence, ¬K i ¬φ ∈ Γ ∗ which by Remark I means that
Ric (Γ ∗ , Γ ).
For (i), suppose that the canonical model Mnc satisfies all instances of (Tni),i.e.,
at each Γ the formula K i φ ⊃ φ is valid. If Γ |= K i φ then Γ |= φ, i.e., Γ /K i ⊆ Γ
which means that Ric (Γ, Γ ), i.e., Mnc is reflexive which can be also denoted Mnc,r .
For (ii), suppose that the canonical model Mnc satisfies all instances of S4ni, i.e.,
at each Γ the formula K i φ ⊃ K i K i φ is valid. Then for MaxCon{Γ , Γ  , Γ ∗ } we
have that if Γ |= K i φ then Γ |= K i K i φ, hence, if Ric (Γ, Γ  ) then Γ  |= K i φ and
if Ric (Γ  , Γ ∗ ) then Γ ∗ |= φ, i.e.,φ ∈ Γ ∗ , so Mnc is transitive. We denote Mnc in this
case as Mnc,tr .
For (iv), we should consider the formula (ED). Suppose that Γ |= ¬K i ⊥. Consider
Γ /K i .
Claim. Γ /K i is consistent.
Indeed, suppose not. Then there is a proof of ⊥ from Γ /K i : φ1 ⊃ (φ2 ⊃ (. . . ⊃
(φk ⊃ ⊥))) and the rule (R K i ) yields K i φ1 ⊃ (K i φ2 ⊃ (. . . ⊃ (K i φk ⊃ K i ⊥))),
a contradiction. It follows that Γ /K i can be extended to a MaxCon(Γ ∗ ) and
Ric (Γ, Γ ∗ ) holds true which proves seriality of Mnc denoted now Mnc,s .
c,eq
We now denote by the symbol Mnc,r , respectively Mnc,tr , Mn , Mnc,e,s,tr canonical
models in which, respectively, all instances of ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n are
352 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

valid. Then, ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n are sound and complete with respect to,
c,eq
respectively, Mnc,r , Mnc,tr , Mn , Mnc,e,s,tr . Proofs of these facts parallel the proof for
EKn, with necessary modifications. 

We have justified

Theorem 7.18 Epistemic logics ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n are complete.

This model of multi-agent knowledge treats agents as independent from one

another: each i of them is endowed with a knowledge operator K i and each is reason-
ing on their own. However, there are inter-relations as distinct agents can have access
to common possible worlds. There is also possibility of agents sharing knowledge
and knowing knowledge of one another.
Group knowledge and common knowledge

Definition 7.22 (Group and common knowledge) There are two basic kinds of col-
lective knowledge for a group of agents: the group knowledge, when each agents
knows a formula φ, expressed as

(E) Eφ ≡ K i φ,
i≤n

when we discuss n agents, or, more generally, as


(EG) E G φ ≡ K i φ for a group G of agents from among 1, 2, . . . , n,
i∈G

and the common knowledge expressed as


(C) Cφ ≡ E k φ,
k≥1

where as usual E k means the sequence of length k of symbols E. Thus, Cφ means

Eφ ∧ E Eφ ∧ E E Eφ . . .. The reading of Cφ is ‘everyone knows and everyone knows
that everyone knows and ...’.

Concerning Cφ, we observe that for a frame Mn = (W, R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn ), reaching

a world v from a world w in order to satisfy E would mean that each relation Ri should
be allowed so the global accessibility relation in that case should be R E = i≤n Ri .
Then, the global accessibility relation for E k is R(k) = (R E )k , hence,
 the accessi-
bility relation for C, R C is the transitive closure Cl(R E ) = R C = k≥1 (R E )k . We
have thus two kinds of frames: frames F E = (W, R E ) and frames F C = (W, R C )
derived from frames Mn = (W, R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn ).

Definition 7.23 (Satisfaction for group and common knowledge) Rules for satisfac-
tion for group as well as for common knowledge are as follows:
7.2 Epistemic Logics 353

(i) Mn , w |= Eφ if and only if Mn , w |= K i φ for each i ≤ n;

(ii) Mn , w |= Cφ if and only if Mn , w |= E k φ for each k ≥ 1.
Satisfiability in terms of accessibility relations is expressed in the following forms:
(iii) Mn , w |= Eφ if Mn , v |= φ for each world v such that R E (w, v);
(iv) Mn , w |= Cφ if Mn , v |= φ for each v such that R(k)(w, v) for some k, i.e., v
is reachable from w in at most k applications of R E .
From (iii) and (iv), some properties of E and C follow.
Theorem 7.19 The following hold true for each structure Mn :
(i) Mn |= (Cφ ≡ E(φ ∧ Cφ));
(ii) if Mn |= (φ ⊃ E(φ ∧ ψ)), then Mn |= (φ ⊃ Cψ).
Proof For (i): suppose Cφ holds at w. This means that Mn , v |= φ for each world v
that is reached by some R(k) from w. Then, for k = 1, if v is reached by R E from
w then φ holds at v, hence Eφ holds at w. Clearly, if some world t is reached from
v by some R(k) then t is reached from w by R(k + 1) so Cφ holds at v, hence,
E(φ ∧ Cφ) holds at w.
For the converse, suppose that E(φ ∧ Cφ) holds at w and consider any v which
can be reached from w by some R(k). Take the world t on the path from w to v
which is the successor to w. Clearly, φ ∧ Cφ holds at t, hence, Cφ holds at t. As t
is reached from w, Cφ holds at w.
For (ii), suppose Mn |= φ ⊃ E(φ ∧ ψ). Let w be a world in Mn and Mn , w |= φ.
We apply induction on length of path from w. If R(w, v) then φ ∧ ψ holds at v.
Suppose that φ ∧ ψ holds at each world that can be reached from w by R(k) and let t
be reached from w by R(k + 1). Let z be the predecessor to t on path from w so, by
assumption of induction,φ ∧ ψ holds at z. As φ ⊃ E(φ ∧ ψ) holds at Mn , t inherits
φ ∧ ψ from z. We conclude that Mn , w |= Cψ so φ ⊃ Cψ holds true at Mn . 
We can interpret Theorem 7.19(i) by stating that each agent having common
knowledge about φ knows that everyone knows φ and knows that everyone has
common knowledge.
The property Theorem 7.19(i) along with the definition of E serves as additional
axiomatic scheme for common knowledge.
Theorem 7.20 The following are implied by Theorem 7.19(i), (ii).

(i) Eφ ≡ i≤n K i φ
(ii) Cφ ≡ E(φ ∧ Cφ);
Theorem 7.20(ii) provides an additional inference rule (IC):

(I C) if φ ⊃ E(φ ∧ ψ), then φ ⊃ Cψ

If we add 2.26 (i),(ii), and (IC) to EKn, ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n, then we
obtain systems of common knowledge ECKn, ECTn, ECS4n, ECS5n, ECKD45n,
354 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

respectively. One can expect that these systems are sound and complete with respect
to models Mn , and it is so.

Definition 7.24 Completeness is demonstrated in axiomatic systems which contain:

(1) axiom schemes proper for a given logic, e.g., K i (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (K i φ ⊃ K i ψ) for
ECKn and corresponding schemes
 for ECTn, ECS4n, ECS5n, ECKD45n;
(2) axiom scheme Eφ ≡ i≤n K i φ;
(3) axiom scheme Cφ ≡ E(φ ∧ Cφ);
(4) inference rules: (φ ⊃ E(φ ∧ ψ)) ⊃ (φ ⊃ Cψ) with detachment
and necessitation.

Theorem 7.21 Systems ECKn, ECTn, ECS4n, ECS5n, ECKD45n are complete.

We insert an outline of a proof for the system ECKn as a pattern for proofs for other
commnon knowledge systems.

Proof The idea for a proof is already familiar: one proves that if a formula φ is
consistent then it is satisfiable and the means for the proof is to construct maximal
consistent sets from φ in a manner resembling the Ladner construction of Chap. 4.
Some details of proof come from (Halpern and Moses [8]).
For a formula φ, we denote by SubC (φ) the set

Sub(φ) ∪ {E(ψ ∧ Cψ), ψ ∧ Cψ, K i (ψ ∧ Cψ) : Cψ ∈ Sub(φ), i ≤ n}∪

{K i ψ : i ≤ n, Eψ ∈ Sub(φ)}
∗
and we let SubC (φ)=SubC (φ) ∪ {¬ξ : ξ ∈ SubC (φ)}. Clearly, SubC∗ (φ) is finite.
∗
We consider maximal consistent subsets of SubC (φ) and we define the set
∗ ∗
MaxConC (φ) as the set of all maximal consistent sets in SubC (φ).
For MaxCon(Γ ) and MaxCon(Δ), we let, as in 2.19, Γ /K i = {φ : K i φ ∈ Γ },
and, we define the relation Ri (Γ, Δ) as Γ /K i ⊆ Δ.
The assignment A on atomic propositions is defined in the standard way:
A( p, Γ ) = 1 if and only if p ∈ Γ .
We should prove the claim:
∗
Claim. (MaxCon C (φ), Γ ) |= ψ if and only if ψ ∈ Γ . As usual, it is proved by
structural induction. By properties of maximal consistent sets, the claim holds for
atomic propositions, conjunctions, and disjunctions.
In case of a formula Eψ, by axiom scheme 2.29 (2), Eψ ∈ Γ if and only if
K i ψ ∈ Γ for i ≤ n and for Δ with Ri (Γ, Δ) we have ψ ∈ Δ and by the hypothesis
of induction Δ |= ψ, hence, Γ |= K i ψ for each i ≤ n and finally Γ |= Eψ. The
converse holds by maximality of Γ .
Finally, the case of Cψ remains. Suppose that Cψ ∈ Γ . By axiom scheme 2.29
(3) and detachment, E(ψ ∧ Cψ) ∈ Γ . Notice that if Δ is reached from Γ in one step
of R C , then ψ ∧ Cψ ∈ Δ. As MaxCon(Δ), ψ, Cψ ∈ Δ.
We extend this observation to an arbitrary Δ reached in k steps from Γ . Suppose
that for k and Δ, if from Γ to Δ are k steps of R C , then ψ, Cψ ∈ Δ, and consider the
7.2 Epistemic Logics 355

case of k + 1. Let Θ be on the path from Γ to Δ and Δ be at one step from Θ. By

hypothesis of induction, ψ, Cψ ∈ Θ and by the case k = 1, ψ, Cψ ∈ Δ. By structural
induction hypothesis, and by the principle of mathematical induction, Δ |= ψ for any
Δ reachable from Γ , hence, Γ |= Cψ.
Suppose now that Γ |= Cψ. Consider the finite set Ω of MaxCon(Δ)’s reachable
from Γ . In each such Δ, ψ holds true, hence, by the hypothesis of induction, ψ ∈
Δ for Δ ∈ Ω. As each Δ ∈ Ω is on some path from Γ , by repeating the above
reasoning, we arrive at the conclusion that Cψ ∈ Δ for each Δ ∈ Ω. By restraining
us to one step from Δ, we obtain that E(ψ ∧ Cψ) holds in each Δ reachable from
Γ . Suppose now that Cψ ∈ / Γ , hence, ¬Cψ ∈ Γ , hence, Γ |= ¬Cψ, ie., for some Δ
reachable from Γ w would have ¬ψ ∈ Δ, a contradiction. Thus Cψ ∈ Γ . The proof is
concluded. 

Satisfiability, validity, decidability of epistemic logics

In case of one agent, results on satisfiability are like those for classical modal logics:
as shown by Ladner [7], SAT(S5) and SAT(KD45) are NP-complete and SAT(K),
SAT(T), SAT(S4) are PSPACE-complete. These results were extended in [8]: it
was shown there that SAT(EKn), SAT(ETn), and also SAT(ES4n) are PSPACE-
complete regardless of the number n of agents while SAT for ES5n and KD45n are
PSPACE-complete for n ≥ 2. Passing to common knowledge, we enter the realm
of EXPTIME: such is complexity of SAT for ECKn, ECTn for n ≥ 1 and SAT for
ECS4n, ECS5n, ECKD45n for n ≥ 2, see [8].
We mention that the validity problem of deciding whether a formula is valid is in
co-class for the class of each logic as a formula is valid if and only if its negation is
unsatisfiable.
Decidability problem for epistemic logic is addressed in a way similar to that for
modal logics. We sketch the line of reasoning in the case of epistemic logics. First,
we recall the algorithm for checking satisfiability in finite models. For a finite model
Mn , the size of M, denoted |M| is defined as the sum of the number of worlds and of
the number of instances of accessibility relations. We recall the following theorem,
cf. [8].

Theorem 7.22 For a finite model M of size |M|, checking satisfiability of a formula
φ can be done in time O(|M| · |φ|) where |φ| is the length of φ.

Proof We form the set S F(φ) of sub-formulae of φ which we can list in the order
of increasing length. The cardinality |S F(φ)| is not greater than |φ|. We now begin
the labelling procedure: to each world w in M, we assign either ψ ∈ S F(φ) or ¬ψ
depending on which holds at w. In case of K i ψ ∈ S F(φ) we have to check all worlds
connected to w by some Ri . Finally, we check φ at each world. The complexity is of
order |M| · |φ|. 

The next step is to show the existence of finite models for EKn consistent formulae
(Halpern and Moses [8]).
356 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Theorem 7.23 (Finite model existence theorem) If a formula φ is an EKn consistent,

then it is satisfiable in a model Mn with the number of worlds not greater then 2|φ|
on the condition that all sentential variables in Mn not occurring in φ are assigned
permanent falsity in order to make them immaterial.
Proof We augment the set S F(φ) of sub-formulae of φ with negations of elements
of S F(φ) to obtain the set S F2(φ). We repeat the process of constructing canonical
models from consistent subsets of S F2(φ). For each consistent set Γ , we can apply
the Teichmüller-Tukey lemma (see Sect. 1.1.1.), to extend Γ to a maximal consistent
set Γ + (as consistency is the property of finite character). Cardinality of the set of
maximal consistent sets is not greater than the cardinality of all subsets of S F(φ)
(as for each ψ ∈ S F(φ) each maximal consistent set contains exactly one of the pair
(ψ, ¬ψ). Exactly like in case of canonical models for Kn, one proves that Γ + |= φ
if and only if φ ∈ Γ + . 
Corollary 7.1 Satisfiability, validity and provability problems for EKn are
decidable.
Some specializations allow to extend this result to ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n,
viz., preserving the basic construction, we have to introduce specialized accessibility
relations:
In case of ETn, Ri (Γ, Γ ∗ ) if and only if Γ /K i ⊆ Γ ∗ .
In case of ES4n, Ri (Γ, Γ ∗ ) if and only if Γ /K i ⊆ Γ ∗ /K i .
In case of ES5n, Ri (Γ, Γ ∗ ) if and only if Γ /K i = Γ ∗ /K i .
In case of EKD45n, Ri (Γ, Γ ∗ ) if and only if Γ /K i = Γ ∗ /K i and Γ /K i ⊆ Γ ∗ .
Then, one checks that the respective models are reflexive, transitive, Euclidean and
serial. Hence, problems of satisfiability, validity and provability are decidable for
logics ETn, ES4n, ES5n, EKD45n.

7.3 Mereology Based Logic for Granular Computing and

Fuzzy Reasoning

We now begin a discussion of many-valued logic in terms of partial containment

among concepts which are sets of things, in particular granules of knowledge. The
theory of concepts which we apply is mereology due to Leśniewski [11], see also [12].
Mereology is a theory of concepts/sets whose primitive notion is that of a part. This
choice of the primitive notion of the theory points in the direction and to footsteps of
Aristotle with his Syllogistics as well as to medieval scholars like Thomas Aquinas,
Duns Scotus and others.
Mereology of Leśniewski is defined for individual things and the notion of an
individual thing is defined in the Leśniewski Ontology Leśniewski [13] by means of
the Axiom of Ontology (AO). The form of (AO) uses the copula is which we meet
in Syllogistics written often also as ’esti’ ε meaning also is,
7.3 Mereology Based Logic for Granular Computing and Fuzzy Reasoning 357

(AO) (aεb) ≡ (∃cεa) ∧ ∀d, e[(dεa) ∧ (eεa) ⊃ (dεe)] ∧ ∀ f [( f εa) ⊃ ( f εb)].

From (AO), one can ascertain the characteristic of an individual thing: non-vacuous,
(cεa), one-element ((dεa) ∧ (eεa) ⊃ (dεe), hence, d = e). One can introduce the
relation = of identity by letting d = e if and only if (dεe) ∧ (eεd); in particular
a = a can be equivalently defined as aεa for each a.
We define on a non-empty domain Ω of individual things, the primitive notion of
mereology, the relation of a part π as a single element of the relational vocabulary od
mereology. In addition, we introduce a countable set of individual variables denoted
in practice as x, y, z, . . ..
Mereology
We give here the basic introduction to mereology: theory of concepts based on the
notion of a part. We adhere to the classical scheme of mereology due to Leśniewski
with some slight modifications. This theory concerns a binary predicate π read as
‘being a part of’. Inference rules are detachment and substitution.

Definition 7.25 (Part predicate) Part predicate π satisfies conditions:

(P1) ¬π(x, x);
(P2) π(x, y) ∧ π(y, z) ⊃ π(x, z);
(P3) for each pair x, y of individual things, π(x, y) ⊃ ¬π(y, x).

(P3) follows by (P1), (P2). Part predicate does express the notion of a proper part.
We postulate the notion of identity of things in terms of part relation.

Definition 7.26 (Identity) For things x, y, x = y if and only if ∀z.π(z, x) ≡ π(z, y).
Then by (P1)-(P3), the predicate = satisfies usual properties of reflexivity, symmetry
and transitivity which follows by (P2).

In addition to the predicate of part, we introduce two secondary predicates: those of

ingredient and overlap. Both are essential in construction of the theory of mereology.

Definition 7.27 (Ingredients, Overlap) The predicate of ingredient, denoted I (x, y)

and the predicate of overlap denoted Ov(x, y) are defined as follows:
(i) I (x, y) ≡ π(x, y) ∨ (x = y);
(ii) Ov(x, y) ≡ ∃z.I (z, x) ∧ I (z, y).

We introduce one more postulate.

Definition 7.28 (Postulate (P4)) ∀x, y.[∀z.(I (z, x) ⊃ ∃w.I (w, y) ∧ Ov(z, w))] ⊃
I (x, y).

Theorem 7.24 The following properties hold.

(i) (x = y) ≡ I (x, y) ∧ I (y, x);
(ii) I (x, x);
(iii) I (x, y) ∧ I (y, z) ⊃ I (x, z);
358 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(iv) (x = y) ≡ ∀z.(Ov(z, x) ≡ Ov(z, y));

(v) Ov(x, x);
(vi) Ov(x, y) ≡ Ov(y, x).
Proof For (i). By Definition 7.27(i),

I (x, y) ∧ I (y, x) ≡ [π(x, y) ∨ ((x = y)] ∧ [(π(y, x)) ∨ (y = x)]

which in turn is equivalent to

(π(x, y) ∧ π(y, x)) ∨ (π(x, y) ∧ (y = x)) ∨ (x = y) ∧ (π(y, x)) ∨ (x = y).

The first three implicants are false by (P1) and (P2), hence, I (x, y) ∧ I (y, x) ≡
(x = y).
For (ii). By Definition 7.27(i).
For (iii). By transitivity of π (Definition 7.25 (P2)).
For (iv). Suppose that Ov(z, x) ≡ O(z, y) for each thing z. Assume Ov(z, x).
There exists a thing t with I (t, z) and I (t, x). But also Ov(t, x), hence, Ov(t, y) and,
by (P4), I (x, y). By symmetry, I (y, x) follows, and by Definition 7.28(i), x = y.
For (vi), (vii): evident by Definition 7.27(ii). 
Definition 7.29 (The notion of a class) For a non-empty collection F of things in
Ω, the notion of a class Cls(F) obeys the conditions.
(Cl1) ∀x.(x ∈ F ⊃ I (x, Cls(F));
(Cl2) ∀x.[I (x, Cls(F)) ⊃ ∀y.(I (y, x) ⊃ ∃w ∈ F.Ov(y, w))].
Definition 7.30 (The class existence axiom (P5)) For each non-empty collection F
of things in any mereological space (Ω, π), there exists a class Cls(F).
Theorem 7.25 For each non-empty collection F of things in any mereological space
(Ω, π), there exists the unique class Cls(F).
Proof Assume that for some collection F there exist two classes Cl1 and Cl2 . Con-
sider a thing t with I (t, Cl1 ). By condition (C2), there exists a thing z such that
Ov(t, z) and I (z, Cl2 ). By property (P3), I (Cl1 , Cl2 ) and by symmetry, I (Cl2 , Cl1 ),
hence, by property (I2), Cl1 = Cl2 . 
Theorem 7.26 For each thing x, x = Cls({y : I (y, x)}).
Proof Suppose that I (z, x), hence, I (z, Cls({u : I (u, x)}), hence, I (x, Cls({u :
I (u, x)}). Conversely, if I (u, Cls({u : I (u, x)}), then there exist w, t with I (w, u),
I (w, t), I (t, x), hence, I (w, x) and I (Cls({u : I (u, x)}), x), hence, x = Cls({u :
I (u, x)}). 
Definition 7.31 (The universal class) Let Ω be the collection of all things con-
sidered. We define the universal class V by letting V = Cls({u : u ∈ Ω}). Then
x ∈ Ω ≡ I (x, V ). Equivalently, V = Cls{x : x = x ∧ x ∈ Ω}.
7.3 Mereology Based Logic for Granular Computing and Fuzzy Reasoning 359

Theorem 7.27 The universal class V has the following properties: (i) I (x, V ) holds
for each thing x ∈ Ω (ii) for each non-vacuous property F, the relation instance
I (Cls F, V ) holds.

Definition 7.32 (The notion of an element) A thing x is an element of a thing y which

is denoted el(x, y) if and only if there exists a collection F such that y = Cls F and
x ∈ F.

Theorem 7.28 For things x, y, the equivalence holds: el(x, y) ≡ I (x, y).

Proof If I (x, y), then x ∈ F = Cls{z : I (z, y)} and F = y, hence, el(x, y) holds.
If el(x, y), then there exists F such that y = Cls F and x ∈ F, hence, I (x, y). 

It follows that each thing is its own element, so there are no empty things in mereo-
logical universes.
The notion of a subset in mereology is defined as follows.

Definition 7.33 (The notion of a subset) A thing x is a subset of a thing y, denoted

sub(x, y) if and only if the condition holds: ∀z.I (z, x) ⊃ I (z, y).

Theorem 7.29 For each pair x, y of things, the equivalence holds : sub(x, y) ≡
I (x, y).

Proof Suppose that sub(x, y) holds; then for z = x, we obtain: I (x, x) ⊃ I (x, y)
and as I (x, x) holds by Property(I1), I (x, y) holds also. Conversely, if I (x, y) holds,
then for each thing z, from I (z, x), I (z, y) holds by property (I3), hence, sub(x, y)
holds. 

It follows that notion of an ingredient, an element, and, a subset are equivalent.

As for classes, we have the proposition which holds by class definition and (P4).

Theorem 7.30 (i) If ∅ = F ⊆ G, then I (Cls F, ClsG) (ii) if F = G, then Cls F =

ClsG. In the language of properties, if F ⊃ G, then I Cls F, ClsG) and if F ≡ G,
then Cls F = ClsG.

We now offer a glimpse into topology of mereological spaces by presenting

notions of an exterior thing, relative complement and complement.

Definition 7.34 (The notion of an exterior thing) A thing x is exterior to a thing y,

in symbols extr (x, y), if and only if ¬Ov(x, y). The predicate E(x) = extr (x, y)
has property (E): if for a non-vacuous collection F, a thing x is exterior to each thing
z such that z ∈ F, then extr (x, Cls F).

Definition 7.35 (The notion of a relative complement) For things z, y such that
ingr (y, z), a thing x is the relative complement to y with respect to z, if and only
if x = Cls{t : ingr (t, z) ∧ extr (t, y)}. The complement is denoted by the symbol
comp(y, z). This notion is defined if π(y, z) is defined.
360 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Definition 7.36 (the complement) For a thing x, the complement −x to x is

comp(x, V ).

We now follow Tarski [14] in presentation of the complete Boolean algebra with-
out the null element defined in the mereological universe Ω. First, we need additional
notions.

Definition 7.37 (The Tarski Boolean mereological algebra BT M (π)) For things x, y,
we let
(+) x + y = Cls({u : I (u, x) ∨ I (u, y));
(·) x · y = Cls({u : I (u, x) ∧ I (u, y));
(-) −x = comp(x, V );
(1) 1=V ;
(0) 0 is not defined.

Theorem 7.31 The universe Ω with the unit V and operations +, ·, − is a complete
Boolean algebra without the null element as mereology does not admit the empty
thing.

Proof It follows by straightforward checking of requirements for Boolean algebra

(see Chap. 1). Completeness follows by the class existence. 

Definition 7.38 (The mereological implication) For things x, y, we let

x → y ≡ −x + y.

The implication x → y is valid if and only if −x + y = V .

Theorem 7.32 The following are equivalent.

(i) I (x, y);
(ii) x · y = x;
(iii) x → y is valid.

Proof

(i) ≡ (ii): if I (x, y), then I (x, x) and I (x, y), hence I (x, x · y). Suppose now that
I (z, x · y), hence, there exist t, w such that I (t, z), I (t, w) and Ov(w, x · y), hence,
Ov(w, x) and by (P4), I (x · y, x), hence x · y = x.
(i)≡ (iii): Assume I (x, y), hence x · y = x, thus, x → y = −x + y = −(x · y) +
y = −x + −y + y = −x + V = V . Conversely, if −x + y = V , then (−x + y) ·
x = x · y = V · x = x. 

Corollary 7.2 The following are equivalent: I (x, y) ≡ x · y = x ≡ x → y = V .

Consistency of Mereology was proved by Leśniewski (cf. Lejewski [15]).

7.4 Rough Mereology. Rough Inclusions 361

7.4 Rough Mereology. Rough Inclusions

Rough mereology Polkowski [16], (Polkowski and Skowron [17]) adds to mereology
a ternary predicate μ(x, y, r ) defined for triples (x, y, r ), where x, y ∈ Ω, r ∈ (0, 1],
read as ‘x is a part of y to a degree of at least r ’. The predicate μ called rough inclusion
is defined by means of conditions:
(RM1) μ(x, y, 1) ≡ I (x, y);
(RM2) μ(x, y, 1) ⊃ ∀z, r.(μ(z, x, r ) ⊃ μ(z, y, r ));
(RM3) μ(x, y, r ) ∧ (s < r ) ⊃ μ(x, y, s).
Łukasiewicz [18] also in Borkowski [19] gave a logical rendering of classical proba-
bility calculus by assigning to a sentential unary formula on a finite domain a weight
defined as the fraction of the number of elements satisfying the formula to the num-
ber of elements in the universe. We follow up on the idea by considering the notion
of a mass assignment on a universe of things and constructing in this environment a
rough inclusion. The following theory is an abstract rendering of many-valued logic
and its applications in fuzzy computing. For a more detailed look at rough mereol-
ogy and its applications, consult (Polkowski, L.: Approximate Reasoning by Parts.
An Introduction to Rough Mereology, Springer Vlg. (2011)) and (Polkowski, L.:
Mereology in engineering and computer science. In: Calosi, C., Graziani,P.(eds.):
Mereology and the Sciences: Parts and Wholes in Contemporary Scientific Context.
Syntese Library 371. Springer Intl. Publishing, 217-293 (2014)).
We define the basic notion of a mass assignment Polkowski [20].

Definition 7.39 (Mass assignment) Given a mereological space (Ω, π) over the
relational vocabulary {π}, we define a mass assignment m which satisfies the
conditions:
(M1) (56) ∀x ∈ U.m(x) ∈ (0, 1];
We introduce a constant symbol Θ denoting the empty thing not in Ω in order
to be able to assign the mass=0.
(M2) m(Θ) = 0

Definition 7.40 (Axiom schemes for the mass assignment) The following are axiom
schemes Polkowski [20].
(M3) (x = V ) ≡ (m(x) = 1);
(M4) (x = Θ) ≡ m(x) = 0;
(M5) (x → y) ⊃ [m(y) = m(x) + m((−x) · y)].

Theorem 7.33 The following are provable consequences of schemes (M1)-(M5).

(T1) I (x, y) ≡ x · y = x;
(T2) I (x, y) ≡ x → y;
(T3) (x · y = x) ≡ (x → y);
(T4) (x = y) ⊃ (m(x) = m(y);
(T5) m(x + y) = m(x) + m((−x) · y);
362 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(T6) x · y = Θ ⊃ m(x + y) = m(x) + m(y);

(T7) m(x) + m(−x) = 1;
(T8) m(y) = m(x · y) + m((−x) · y);
(T9) m(x + y) = m(x) + m(y) − m(x · y);
(T10) I (x, y) ⊃ m(x) ≤ m(y);
(T11) (m(x + y) = m(x) + m(y)) ⊃ x · y = Θ;
(T12) I (x, y) ≡ m(x → y) = 1;
(T13) I (y, x) ⊃ x · (−y) = Θ;
(T14) I (y, x) ⊃ m(x → y) = 1 − m(x) + m(y);
(T15) m(x → y) = 1 − m(x − y).

Proof For (T1): already proved in Theorem 7.32;

For (T2): already proved in Theorem 7.32;
For (T3): already proved in Theorem 7.32;
For (T4): x = y implies x → y and y → x, hence, by (M5), m(x) = m(y) +
m(−y · x), and thus m(x) ≥ m(y). By symmetry, m(y) ≥ m(x) and finally m(x) =
m(y);
For (T5): substitution x/x + y in (M5) yields x → x + y true, hence, m(x +
y) = m(x) + m((−x) · (x + y)), i.e., m(x + y) = m(x) + m((−x) · y);
For (T6): Since x · y = Θ, (−x) · y = y, hence, m(x + y) = m(x) + m(y);
For (T7): by (T6), as x · (−x) = Θ, m(x) + m(−x) = m(V ) = 1;
For (T8): as x + (−x) = V and x · (−x) = Θ, y = x · y + (−x) · y, hence,
m(y) = m(x · y) + m((−x) · y);
For (T9): by (T5), m(x + y) = m(x) + m((−x) · y) and, by (T8), m(y) = m(x ·
y) + m((−x) · y), hence, (T9);
For (T10): I (x, y) ≡ x → y by 3.23, hence, by (M5), m(y) = m(x) + m((−x) ·
y), and by (M1), m(x) ≤ m(y);
For (T11): if m(x + y) = m(x) + m(y), then, by (T9), m(x · y) = 0, and by (M4),
x · y = Θ;
For (T12): By Theorem 7.32, I (x, y) ≡ x → y which is equivalent to x → y =
V and thus m(x → y) = 1;
For (T13): I (y, x) ≡ x · y = y, hence, y · (−x) = (y · x) · (−x) = y · (x · (−x))
= y · Θ = Θ;
For (T14): by (T13), y · (−x) = Θ, hence, m(x → y) = m(−x + y) and, by
(T6), m(−x + y) = m(−x) + m(y) and, by (T7), m(−x + y) = 1 − m(x) + m(y);
For (T15): m(x → y) = m(−x + y) = m(V − (x − y). As V = (x − y) +
(V − (x − y)), we obtain 1 = m(x − y) + m(V − (x − y)), and then, m(V − (x −
y)) = 1 − m(x − y).
Let us observe that (T14) yields an abstract form of the Łukasiewicz implication
in case m(x) ≥ m(y), complemented by (T12) in case m(x) ≤ m(y). (T15) is a new
formula valid for non-linear structures. (T7) defines the Łukasiewicz negation. 

We now introduce the notion of a rough inclusion: a similarity measure for mass
concepts based on approximate containment. It is the granular computing on an
abstract level.
7.4 Rough Mereology. Rough Inclusions 363

Definition 7.41 (Independence of things) We say that things x, y are independent,

I nd(x, y) in symbols, if and only if m(x · y) = m(x) × m(y).
Mass based rough inclusions on concepts
We define a rough inclusion (Polkowski [21]).
(RI1) μm (x, y, r ) ≡ m(x·y)
m(x)
≥ r;
The maximal rough inclusion μm 1 is defined as follows
(RI2) μm
1 is argmax r μm
(x, y, r ) = m(x·y)
m(x)
.
Theorem 7.34 The following are provable consequences of (M1)-(M5) and (RI1)-
(RI2).
(T16) I nd(x, y) ≡ I nd(−x, y);
(T17) I (x, y) ⊃ μm1 (x, y) = 1;
(T18) μm1 (x, y) = 1 ⊃ I (x, y);
(T19) I (x, y) ≡ μm1 (x, y) = 1 ≡ x → y = V ;
(T20) μm (x, y, 1) ∧ μm (z, x, r ) ⊃ μm (z, y, r );
(T21) μm1 (x, −y) = 1 − μ1 (x, y);
m

(T22) [m(x · y) + m((−x) · y) = m(y)] ⊃ I (x, y);

m(y)μm1 (y,x)
(T23) μm1 (x, y) = m(x)
(a simple Bayes’ formula);
μm
1 (x,y)
(T24) μm
= m(y)
;
1 (y,x) m(x)
(T25) I (x, y) ⊃ μ1 (y, x) = m(x)
m
m(y)
;
μm (x,y) μm
(y,z)) μ m
(x,z)
(T26) μm
1 1
= μ1m (z,x) ;
1 (y,x) μ1 (z,y)
m
1
(T27) The Bayes theorem: (+i= j yi · y j = Θ) ∧ (+i yi = V ) ⊃ μm
1 (z, x) =

m(x)μm 1 (x,z)
.
i m(yi )μ1 (yi ,z)
m

Proof For (T16): by (T8), m(y) = m(x · y) + m((−x) · y) = m(x) × (m(y) +

m(−x) · y), hence, m((−x) · y) = m(y) − m(y) × m(x) = m(y) × (1 − m(x)) =
m(y) × m(−x), i.e., I nd(x, y) ≡ I nd(−x, y).
For T(17): by (T1), I (x, y) implies x · y = x;
For (T18) by (T8), m(x) = m(x · y) + m(x · (−y)), hence, by assumption
μ1 (x, y) = 1, m(x · (−y)) = 0, and thus x · (−y) = Θ, i.e., I (x, y);
For (T19): by (T12) and (T18);
For (T20): by (T19), μ1 m(x, y, 1) ≡ I (x, y), hence, by (T1), x · y = x, hence,
(x · z) · (y · z) = (x · y) · z = x · z, hence, I (x · z, y · z) which implies by (T10) that
m(x · z) ≤ m(y · z);
For (T21): by (T8), m(x) = m(x · y) + m(x · (−y)), hence, m(x · (−y)) =
m(x) − m(x · y), thus μm 1 (x, −y) = 1 − μ1 (x, y);
m

For (T22): by (T8), m(y) = m(x · y) + m((−x) · y). From the premise in (T22)
we infer that m(x) = m(x · y), hence, μm 1 (x, y) = 1 and by (T18) I (x, y);
We now give an abstract version of the form of the Bayes theorem established by
Łukasiewicz. We begin with a simple formulation (T23).
μm
1 (y,x) μm
1 (x,y)
For (T23): μm 1 (x, y) = m(x) , hence, m(y) = m(x · y) = m(x) , hence (T23)
m(x·y)

follows;
364 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

For (T24): a paraphrase of (T23);

1 (x, y) = 1 and (T24) submits the result;
For (T25): I (x, y) implies mu m
For (T26): a straightforward computation;

We now address the Bayes theorem (T27). First some explanations: for a finite set Y
of things, +Y means the sum of things in Y .

Lemma 7.5 Let Y = {yi : i ≤ k} be a maximal set of pairwise disjoint things in U ,

i.e., yi · y j = Θ for i = j. Then +Y = V .

Claim 1. For each thing z ∈ U , z = Cls({z · yi : yi ∈ Y }).

Proof of Claim 1. Consider I (x, z). There exist y, w such that I (y, x), I (y, w),
w = z · yi for some yi , hence, Ov(y, z · yi ), thus I (z, Cls({z · yi : yi ∈ Y }). The
proof of converse goes along similar lines.
Claim 2. Cls({z · yi : yi ∈ Y }) = + yi ∈Y z · yi .
From Claims 1, 2 we obtain
(T28) z = + yi ∈Y
z · yi . Hence, 
(T29) m(z) = yi ∈Y m(z · yi ) = yi ∈Y m(yi )μm
1 (yi , z). 
The Stone theorem for mereological spaces
We now refer to the Stone representation of complete Boolean algebras which we
apply to our case of mereological spaces Polkowski [21]. The following section
requires from the reader some knowledge of notions of topology, which may be
found in Chap. 1. Our discussion is carried out in the language of mereology. We do
not introduce any topology in mereological universes, topology enters our discussion
via the Stone representation.
We recall now the Stone representation theorem which represents a complete
Boolean algebra B as a topological space of ultrafilters on B. In Chap. 1, we intro-
duced the Stone space and here we show that it can be defined in the mereological
setting.

Definition 7.42 (Filters) By a proper filter on the mereological space (Ω, π), we
understand a collection F of things such that
(i) if x, y ∈ F, then x · y ∈ F;
(ii) (ii) if x ∈ F and I (x, y) then y ∈ F;
(iii) Θ ∈ / F.

Definition 7.43 (Ultrafilters) An ultrafilter is a filter which is not contained properly

in any other filter.

By the Zorn maximal principle, each filter extends to an ultrafilter, i.e., a maximal
filter with respect to containment.

Lemma 7.6 I (x, y) ≡ x + y = y.

7.4 Rough Mereology. Rough Inclusions 365

Proof I (x, y) is equivalent to I (−y, −x), hence, to (−y) · (−x) = (−y), hence,
−(x + y) = (−y), i.e., x + y = y. 

The following properties of any ultrafilter F are of importance to us.

Theorem 7.35 Any ultrafilter F satisfies the following properties:

(i) for each thing x ∈ Ω, either x ∈ F or −x ∈ F;
(ii) F is prime, i.e., if x + y ∈ F then either x ∈ F or y ∈ F.

For completeness’ sake, we offer a proof.

Proof For (i), assume that for some thing x ∈ Ω, x ∈ / F and −x ∈/ F. For y ∈ F, was
x · y = Θ then I (y, −x) and −x ∈ F, a contradiction. It follows that x · y = Θ for
each y ∈ F, hence, the collection F ∪ {x} extends to a filter containing F properly,
a contradiction.
For (ii), it follows by (i): was x ∈
/ F and y ∈
/ F, we would have by (i) that −x ∈ F
and −y ∈ F, hence, (−x) · (−y) = −(x + y) ∈ F, a contradiction. 

We introduce some useful notions.

Definition 7.44 (Stone sets)

(i) the Stone space St (Ω) is the collection of all ultrafilters on Ω;
(ii) for x ∈ Ω, S(x) = {F ∈ St (Ω) : x ∈ F};
(iii) S(Ω)={S(x) : x ∈ Ω}.

We now state the Stone theorem and we recall the (Gleason [22]) theorem which states
that the space (St (Ω), S(Ω)) is extremely disconnected (see Chap. 1 for definition).
We recall proofs of those results rendering them in the language of mereology.

Theorem 7.36 (The Stone topology) The collection S(Ω) is an open-and-closed

base which induces on the set St (Ω) a Hausdorff compact zero-dimensional topol-
ogy.

Proof S(x) ∩ S(y) = S(x · y), hence, S has properties of a base. Each set S(x) is
clopen: S(x) = S(Ω) \ S(−x). Hence, St (Ω) is zero-dimensional.
St (Ω) is compact: let B, a collection of sets of the form of S(x) for x ∈ Δ ⊆ Ω, be
centered, i.e., for each finite sub-collection X ={x1 , x2 , . . . , xk } of Δ, there exists an
ultrafilter F with X ⊆ F. Let us consider a set Γ = Δ ∪ {z ∈ Ω: there exists x ∈
Δ with Π (x, z)}. Then Γ extends to an ultrafilter Ψ and Ψ ∈ B, i.e., St (U ) is
compact.
St (U ) is Hausdorff: let F = G for ultrafilters F, G. Assume, for the attention
sake, that x ∈ F \ G for some thing x. Hence, −x ∈ G and F ∈ S(x), G ∈ S(−x),
and, S(x) ∩ S(−x) = ∅. 

Theorem 7.37 The Stone space (St (Ω), S(Ω)) is extremely disconnected. We
remind that Cl denotes the closure operator.
366 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge


Proof Consider an open set G = {S(x) : x ∈ A ⊆ Ω}. For the class Cls A, con-
sider the clopen set S(Cls A).
As Π (x, Cls A) for each x ∈ A, it follows that G ⊆ S(Cls A), hence,
(i) ClG ⊆ S(Cls A). We claim that S(Cls A) ⊆ ClG.
Let us assume that, to the contrary, S(Cls A) \ ClG = ∅. Let an ultrafilter F
belong in S(Cls A) \ ClG; hence,
(ii) Cls A ∈ F.
There exists a neighborhood S(z) of F, i.e.,
(iii) z ∈ F,
(iv) S(z) ∩ S(x) = ∅
for each x ∈ A. It follows that
(v) z · x = θ for each x ∈ A, hence,
(vi) Π (x, −z) for each x ∈ A.
By (vi), Π (Cls A, −z), which implies that
(vii) −z ∈ F contradicting (iii).
Thus, S(Cls A) ⊆ ClG and finally we obtain that ClG = S(Cls A), i.e., ClG is
open. 

Consequences of mereological Stone representation for mereological spaces

By compactness of St (Ω), there exist  things x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ∈ Ω for a natural number
k with the property that St (U ) = {S(xi ) : i ≤ k}. Let K = {x1 , x2 , . . . , xk }. For
each thing x ∈ U , there exists a set I (x) ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} with the property that S(x) ∩
S(xi ) = ∅ if and only if i ∈ I (x).

Theorem 7.38 Each x = +i∈I (x) x · xi , where + and · are operations in the Tarski
algebra of mereology.

Proof Consider an arbitrary thing y with Π (y, x). Let F(y) be an ultrafilter con-
taining y; hence, x ∈ F(y). Let xi ∈ K be such that F(y) ∈ S(xi ). Then, y · xi = Θ
and i ∈ I (x). As Π (y · xi , x · xi ), it follows Π (x, +i x · xi ) by M3. Contrariwise,
assume for an arbitrary thing z that Π (z, +i x · xi ), hence, Π (z, x · xi ) for some
i ∈ I (x) and thus Π (z, x); by M3, Π (+i x · xi , x) and finally x = +i x · xi .
We call the set K = {x1 , x2 , . . . , xk } a base in Ω. As x · x j = Θ for j ∈ / I (x),
we can represent the thing x as x = +i=1 k
x · xi , or simply, x = +i x · xi . 

Theorem 7.39 (A compactness theorem) There exists a finite base in Ω consisting

of things x1 , x2 , . . . , xk for some k with the property that each thing x ∈ Ω admits
the representation x = +i x · xi .

We have an abstract formulation of inclusion-exclusion principle obtained by

repeated application of the property T9.
Letting yi = xi · j<i (−x j ) for i ∈ K , we obtain a base consisting of pairwise
disjoint things correspondingto the pairwise disjoint covering of St (Ω) by open and
closed sets S(yi ) = S(xi ) ∩ j<i S(−x j ) for xi ∈ K . The representation in Theorem
7.38 becomes as follows.
7.5 Knowledge as an Ability to Classify. Information/Decision Systems 367

Theorem 7.40 For each x, we have x = +i (x · yi ).

Proof On the basis of identity a + b = a + (b − a), it follows by induction that

+i=1
k
xi = +kj=1 y j . 

Corollary 7.3 The formula for m(x) becomes: m(x) = i m(x · yi ).

7.5 Knowledge as an Ability to Classify.

Information/Decision Systems

The aim of Data Mining as a part of the realm of Knowledge Engineering is to

extract from raw data a form of knowledge allowing to make decisions about the
observed reality. One of paradigms which serve this end is the rough set theory Pawlak
[23, 24].
The idea of rough set approach to uncertain knowledge consists in regarding
knowledge as an ability to classify things of the real world into disjoint categories on
the basis of certain features/attributes valued as numerical or symbolic. An example
can be the Iris data set Fisher [25] in which 150 flowers of Iris species were classi-
fied into three categories: setosa, versicolour, virginica by means of four numerical
features: sepal length, sepal width, petal length, petal width.
Consider a set of things Ω along with a finite set A of mappings into a non-empty
set V . Elements of the set A are called features, or, attributes, of things in Ω and the
set V is the value set. For v ∈ V , and a ∈ A, we call the inverse image a −1 (v), the
(a, v) − categor y of things. For a thing o ∈ a −1 (v), we write a(o) = v.
For each thing o, we form the set I n f A (o) = {a(o) : a ∈ A}, called the information
set of the thing o. For things o1 , o2 , we write I N D A (o1 , o2 ) if and only if I n f A (o1 ) =
I n f A (o2 ). The relation I N D A is an equivalence relation, and we denote by the symbol
 A the equivalence class of the relation I N D A containing thing o. Clearly, Ω =
[o]
{[o] A : o ∈ Ω}. The relation I N D fulfills the Leibniz Identitas Indiscernibilium
Principle: things have to be regarded as identical when no available tool can discern
them.
Let us observe that each set [o] A is definable: the decision problem ‘whether
x ∈ [o]A ? is decidable: it is enough to examine equations: a(x) = a(o) for a ∈ A. As
their number is finite, either for each a ∈ A we have a(x) = a(o) which implies that
x ∈ [o] A , or, for some a ∈ A, we find that a(x) = a(o) which means that x ∈ / [o] A .
For this reason, sets of the form [o] A are said to be exact concepts: they represent
the smallest certain atoms of knowledge. They induce a Boolean algebra (a field of
sets) consisting of unions of collections of exact sets with Ω as the unit, the empty
set as null element, and Boolean operations of sum, intersection and complement of
sets. We denote the Boolean algebra of exact sets induced by I N D A by the symbol
B(A). We denote by the symbol I A the structure {Ω, A, V, ∪, ∩, −, ∅}.
Let us observe that for each set B ⊆ A, we have the structure I B in analogy to
I A with the only difference that A is replaced by B in all of the above formulae
368 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

concerning IND. The corresponding Boolean algebra of exact sets  is B(B). As B ⊆

A, I N D A ⊆ I N D B . It follows that for each thing o ∈ A, [o] B = {[o ] A : o ∈ [o] B .

Definition 7.45 (Indiscernibility) The Leibniz ‘Identitas of Indiscernibilium’ Prin-

ciple (see Loemker [26]) states that if for two things, a, b, in spite of having available
all means to discern them, we cannot discern them, then we have to regard things
a, b, as identical.

In our case, tools are features in the set A, and if [o1 ] A = [o2 ] A , then we have to
say that o1 and o2 are identical which we express in the formula I N D A (o1 , o2 ).

Theorem 7.41 We collect the basic statements about the relation I N D X for X ⊆ A.
(i)for sets of features B, C ⊆ A, if B ⊆ C, then I N DC ⊆ I N D B ;
(ii)for sets of features B, C ⊆ A, I N D B∪C = I N D B ∩ I N DC ;
(iii)for sets of features B, C ⊆ A, I N D B = I N D B−C ∩ I N D B∩C ;
(iv) in the setting of (iii), for B = A and C = B, I N D A = I N D A−B ∩ I N D A∩B =
I N D A−B ∩ I N D B ;
(v) if I N D B = I N D A for B ⊆ A, then I N D A = I N D A−B ∩ I N D B = I N D B ,
hence, I N D B ⊆ I N D A−B .

A set B of attributes with the property Theorem 7.41(v) is called a semi-reduct of

the structure I A . It follows from (v) that a semi-reduct B determines functionally the
attribute set A \ B making this set redundant.
A semi-reduct B is said to be a reduct if it is minimal with respect to the property
of being a semi-reduct.

Definition 7.46 (Functional dependence) For sets B, C ⊆ A, we say that C depends

functionally on B, if I N D B ⊆ I N DC . In this case, there exists a mapping F :
Ω/I N D B → Ω/I N DC with the property that for each thing o ∈ Omega, there
exists o such that F([o] B ) ⊆ [o ]C .

Exact and inexact (rough) concepts

A concept is a subset of things in Ω. Two types of concepts pose themselves in the
aftermath of Definition 7.45: definable and non-definable. A concept is definable
when it is representable as a union of indiscernibility classes, otherwise it is non-
definable (inexact, rough).

Definition 7.47 (Approximations to inexact concepts) Consider a concept X ⊆ Ω.

The problem of description of X in terms available in I A can be solved with the idea
of approximations from below and from above by exact sets as only those sets are
describable in terms of features and their values. For the set of attributes B:

The B-lower approximation to X is the exact set B(X ) = {[o] B : [o] B ⊆ X };
dually,
The B-upper approximation to X is the exact set B(X )=Ω \ (Ω \ B(X )).
7.6 The Logic of Functional Dependence (FD-Logic) 369

Theorem 7.42 The list that follows contains the basic properties of approximations.
In the topological interpretation, the lower approximation B is the interior and the
upper approximation B is the closure of a concept in the partition topology which has
as a base for open sets the indiscernibility classes. For proofs of properties below,
please see Chap. 1 section Topology.
(i) X ⊆ B(X );
(ii) B(X ∪ Y ‘) = B(X ) ∪ B(Y );
(iii) B(B(X )) = B(X );
(iv) B(∅)1 = ∅;
(v) B(X ∩ Y ) = B(X ) ∩ B(Y );
(vi) B(B(X )) = B(X );
(vii) B(Ω) = Ω;
(viii) B(X ) ⊆ X ;
(ix) B(X ) = B(X ) if and only if X is exact;
(x) for each exact set Y and each set X , Y ∩ B(X ) ⊆ B(X ∩ Y );
(xi) a set X is inexact if and only if B(X ) = X = B(X ).

Definition 7.48 (Indecision sets (boundary sets) For each inexact set X , the set
Bd(X, B) = B(X ) \ B(X ) is the indecision set for X : each thing o ∈ Bd(X, B)
satisfies the condition X ∩ [o] B = ∅ = (Ω \ X ) ∩ [o] A , hence, the thing o has indis-
cernible, i.e., identical things o ∈ X and o" ∈
/ X , and thus the decision problem for
o cannot be solved.

In this way, the theory of rough sets formalizes the notion of vague knowledge.
In terms of knowledge representation, the lower approximation does represent cer-
tainty/necessity of membership in the set, the upper approximation does represent
the possibility of membership in the set. This modal logic is S5.

7.6 The Logic of Functional Dependence (FD-Logic)

We have defined above the notion of functional dependence between sets of features.
We now present a logic of functional dependence due to Rauszer [27].

Definition 7.49 (FD-algebra) We consider an information system A = (U, A) with

the set of things U and a set of features A. We denote by small letters a, b, . . . sets
of features which are subsets of the set A, only the full set of features preserves its
symbol A. We denote by the symbol IA the set {I N Da : a ⊂ A} ∪ {I N D A }. The
set IA is closed on set intersection ∩ and it is endowed with the unit 1=I N D∅ and
the relative pseudo-complement ⇒ defined for each pair a, b as the greatest I N Dc
such that I N Da ∩ I N Dc ⊆ I N Db .

An FD-algebra is any subset M of the set IA closed on the unit 1, relative pseudo-
complement ⇒ and the intersection ∩.
 370 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Definition 7.50 (Terms) The set of terms is the smallest set containing each a for
a ⊆ A and closed on set-theoretic operations ∪, ∩, \. Terms of the form a are
called elementary. The empty term is denoted as falsum ⊥. We denote the set of
terms as T .

Definition 7.51 (Formulae) The set of formulae of FD-logic is built from terms: for
a term t, the expression ι(t) is an elementary formula. The intended meaning of ι(t)
is I N Dt . Formulae form the smallest set containing elementary formulae and closed
on conjunction ∧ and implication →.

Definition 7.52 (Sequents) A sequent of terms is an expression Γ  Δ where Γ

and Δ are finite sequences of terms. A sequent of formulae is an expression of the
form Φ ⊃ α where α is a formula and Φ is a finite sequence of formulae.

Definition 7.53 (Axiom schemes and inference rules for FD-logic) Axiom schemes
for FD-logic are:
(A1) a  a;
(A2) ⊥  a.

Substitution is among rules of inference. Rules of inference for terms are rules of
Gentzen [28] for sentential logic; included is the cut rule which can be eliminated
but it is kept here to simplify arguments. These rules come from Rauszer [27].

Definition 7.54 (Sequent rules for terms) These rules are as follows
Δ,c,d a,a,Γ Δ,b,b
(i) (str) a,ΓΓ Δ,b
Δ
; a,b,Γ
b,a,Γ Δ,d,c
; a,Γ Δ,b ; these sequents are Gentzen structural
rules of Thinning, Contraction, Interchange;
(ii) (cut) Γ Δ,a;a,Θ
Γ,ΘΔ,
;
Δ;b,Γ Δ
(iii) (∪ ) a,Γa∪b,Γ Δ
;
Γ Δ,a,b
(iv) ( ∪) Γ Δ,a∪b ;
a,b,Γ Δ
(v) (∩ ) a∩b,Γ Δ
;
Γ Δ,a;Γ Δ,b
(vi) ( ∩) Γ Δ,a∩b ;
Γ Δ,a
(vii) (− ) −a,Γ Δ
;
Γ,aΔ
(viii) ( −) Γ Δ,−a .

Inference rules for formulae are Gentzen rules for the fragment of intuitionistic
sentential logic expressible in terms of conjunction and implication.

Definition 7.55 (Sequent rules for formulae) These rules are the following:
β,β,γ,δ,Φ⊃α
(ix) (str*) η,β,δ,γ,Φ⊃α
;
Φ⊃α;α,Ψ ⊃β
(x) (cut*) Φ,Ψ ⊃β ;
α,β,Φ⊃γ
(xi) (∧ ⊃) α∧β,Φ⊃γ ;
(xii) (⊃ ∧) Φ⊃α;Φ⊃β
Φ⊃α∧β
;
7.6 The Logic of Functional Dependence (FD-Logic) 371

Φ⊃α;β,Φ⊃γ
(xiii) (→⊃) α⊃β,Φ⊃γ
;
α,Φ⊃β
(xiv) (⊃→) Φ⊃α→β

The specific rule (FD) provides a link between term rules and formulae rules.

a  b, Δ
(FD) ,
Δ∗ , ι(b) ⊃ ι(a)

where for Δ : a1 , a2 , . . . , ak , Δ∗ is ι(a1 ), ι(a2 ), . . . , ι(ak ).

A proof of a sequent S: Φ ⊃ α is a finite sequence of sequents S0 , S1 , . . . , Sm
such that S0 is an instance of an axiom schema, Sm is S and each Si is obtained by
means of an inference rule from some preceding sequents. A sequent having a proof
is provable. A formula α is provable if the sequent ⊃ α is provable.

Definition 7.56 (Semantics of FD-logic) For FD-algebra M, we define an assign-

ment AM . We let IM to be the set {a ⊆ A : ι(a) ∈ M} and we define AM as a
homomorphism from the set T of terms into IM .

Now, we define a valuation V AM on formulae: for an atomic formula ι(a), we let

V AM (ι(a)) = ι(AM (a)).

We extend V AM over formulae by letting

V AM (α ∧ β) = V AM (α) ∩ V AM (β);

V AM (α → β) = V AM (α) ⇒ V AM (β).

The assignment AM and the valuation V AM extend over sequents of terms as well
as over sequents of formulae.
For a sequence Γ of terms, we denote by the symbol δ(Γ ) the union of terms in
Γ , and by γ(Γ ) the intersection of terms in Γ .
For a sequence Φ of formulae, the symbol σ(Φ) will denote the conjunction of
formulae in Φ. With this notation, we let,

AM (Γ  Δ) = −AM (γ(Γ )) ∪ AM (δ(Δ));

V AM (Φ ⊃ α) = V AM (σ(Φ)) ⇒ V AM (α)).

The notion of validity is defined as follows: a sequent Γ  Δ is true at an assign-

ment AM if and only if AM (Γ  Δ) = A and the sequent Γ  Δ is valid if and
only if it is true at each assignment.
A sequent Φ ⊃ α is true at a valuation V AM if and only if V AM (Φ ⊃ α) = 1 M
and it is valid if and only if it is true at each valuation in every FD-algebra M over
the information system A.
372 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Rules of Gentzen system preserve validity, so the only rule to be checked in this
respect is the rule (FD). We consider

a  b, Δ
(F D) .
Δ∗, ι(b) ⊃ ι(a)

Suppose that the premise a  b, Δ is true, i.e,

(i) − AM (a) ∪ AM (b) ∪ AM (a1 ) ∪ AM (a2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ AM (ak ) = A,

where Δ is the sequence a1 , a2 , . . . , ak .

For validity of the consequent Δ∗ , ι(a) ⊃ ι(b), we have the condition

k
(ii) I N D AM (ai ) ∩ I N D AM (b) ⇒ I N D AM (a) .
i=1

From (i) and (ii), we obtain

k
(iii) I N D AM (ai ) ∩ I N D AM (b) ⇒ I N D AM (a) = I N D⊥ = 1M ,
i=1

which witnesses validity of the rule (FD).

Theorem 7.43 FD-logic is sound: For each formula α of (FD)-logic, if α is provable

then α is valid.

Before we embark on a proof of the converse, we comment on the Lindenbaum-

Tarski algebra (LT-algebra) of terms and formulae. For terms, LT-algebra is the
Boolean LT-algebra of sentential logic. Let us consider the canonical assignment on
terms AM,c (a) = a, hence, AM,c (a  b) = A if −a ∪ b = A, i.e., if a ⊆ b, hence,
I N Db ⊆ I N Da . We obtain the following result.

Theorem 7.44 a  b is provable if and only if a ⊆ b if and only if I N Db ⊆ I N Da .

The LT-algebra for formulae, LTF, is defined in an analogous way: for formulae
α, β, α ∼ β if and only if ⊃ α → β and ⊃ β → α are provable. LTF-algebra con-
tains classes [α]∼ with [α]∼ ≤ [β]∼ if and only if ⊃ α → β is provable, with the meet
[α]∼ ∩ [β]∼ = [α ∩ β]∼ and the pseudo-complement [α]∼ ⇒ [β]∼ = [α → β]∼ .

Theorem 7.45 By (FD)-rule, a  b is provable if and only if ι(b) → ι(a) is prov-

able, i.e., if and only if I N Db ⊆ I N Da .

We define the canonical FD-algebra F D0 = {I N Da : a ⊆ A} in which the meet ∩

is defined as I N Da ∩ I N Db = I N Da∪b , the pseudo-complementation ⇒ is defined
as I N Da ⇒ I N Db = I N D−a∩b and the unit 1 = I N D⊥ .
We define a mapping h : L T F → F0 by letting h([ι(a)]∼ ) = I N Da . We obtain
7.7 Boolean Reasoning in Data Analysis 373

Theorem 7.46 The mapping h is an isomorphism as witnessed by the properties

(h1) If [ι(a)]∼ = [ι(b)]∼ , then h([ι(a)]∼ ) = h([ι(b)]∼ );
(h2) h([ι(a)]∼ ∩ [ι(b)]∼ ) = h([ι(a)]∼ ) ∩ h([ι(b)]∼ );
(h3) h([ι(a)]∼ ⇒ [ι(b)]∼ ) = h([ι(a)]∼ ) ⇒ h([ι(b)]∼ ).
Proof Concerning (h1), if h([ι(a)]∼ ) = h([ι(b)]∼ ), then I N Da = I N Db and ι(a) ⊃
ι(b) and ι(b) ⊃ ι(a) are witnessing that [ι(a)]∼ = [ι(b)]∼ .
For (h2): one proves that both ι(a) ∩ ι(b) → ι(a ∪ b) and ι(a ∪ b) → ι(a) ∩ ι(b)
are provable. We prove the first one, the second’s proof is similar.
1/ a  a, b  b; we begin with axiom instances.
2/ a  a, b, b  a, b; we apply the rule (str).
3/ a ∪ b  a, b; by the rule (∪ ).
4/ ι(b), ι(a) ⊃ ι(a ∪ b); by the rule (FD).
5/ ι(a) ∩ ι(b) ⊃ ι(a ∪ b); by the rule (∩ ⊃).
6/ ⊃ ι(a) ∩ ι(b) ⊃ ι(a ∪ b); by the rule (⊃→).
We have now
h([ι(a)]∼ ∩ [ι(b)]∼ ) = h(ι(a ∪ b)) =

I N D(a ∪ b) = I N Da ) ∩ I N D(b) = h([ι(a)]∼ ) ∩ h([ι(b)]∼ )

whence (h3) follows by (h2) and previous theorems. 

We may now prove the completeness theorem for (FD)-logic Rauszer [27].
Theorem 7.47 FD-logic is complete.
Proof Let us suppose that a formula α is not provable in FD-logic, hence, the LTF-
class of α is different from 1 and this implies that h([α]∼ ) = I N D⊥ , hence, for a
valuation defined on α as h([α]∼ ), we get that this valuation does not take on α the
value 1 F0 , i.e., α is not valid. 

7.7 Boolean Reasoning in Data Analysis

We have met with information systems which in the form of data tables record for
us raw knowledge about a given process, state of a system. Knowledge encoded in
information systems is biased by subjectivity of attribute choice, method of record-
ing, errors of measurement, nevertheless it serves as a basis for making decisions.
Contrary to preparing an information system, decisions are made by so called experts
assumed to have a more profound knowledge of the specific topic represented in the
information part of a larger system called the decision system. The decision system
is a tuple DS = (Ω, A, W, d) where (Ω, A, W ) is an information system as defined
above and d is a new feature, not in the feature set A, called the decision. Though we
denote it with a single letter d, yet it may be a many-dimensional vector of decision
attributes, encoded for simplicity by a single letter.
374 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Table 7.1 The partial decision system PLAY

Day Outlook Temperature Humidity Wind Play
1 Sunny Hot High Weak No
2 Sunny Hot High Weak No
3 Overcast Mild High Weak Yes
4 Rainy Mild High Weak Yes
5 Rainy Cool Normal Weak Yes
6 Rainy Cool Normal Strong No
7 Overcast Cool Normal Strong Yes

In this section, we discuss information and decision systems with the problem
of indispensability of features on mind, and we offer solutions to this problem for
information and decision systems based on Boolean reasoning.
The idea for Boolean form of reasoning came from Boole [29], the role of impli-
cants was first pointed to in Blake [30].
Example 7.1 Table 7.1 brings seven records from a well-known PLAY data set due
to J.Ross Quinlan. Four features: Outlook, Temperature, Wind, Humidity are features
of a day on which the decision Play is taken whether to play outdoor tennis or not to
play.

Definition 7.57 (Descriptors) The feature-value format of this table calls for an
adequate representation of things, which are days, in a logical format. To this end,
we apply descriptors in the form (q, vq ) where q is a feature and vq ∈ W is a value
of q. For instance, (Outlook, Sunny) is a descriptor. Descriptors are elementary
formulae. Formulae are built from descriptors
 by means of sentential connectives
∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬. In particular, the formula q∈A (q, vq ) represents a record in an infor-
mation system (Ω, A, W ) which semantically may denote a thing in Ω or a virtual
thing possibly existing outside Ω. For instance, the formula (Outlook, Sunny) ∧
(T emperatur e, H ot) ∧ (H umidit y, H igh) ∧ (W ind, W eak) is the description of
day no.1. These formulae are called information formulae. Decision on day no.1 is
described by the descriptor (Play, N o).
Definition 7.58 Formulae are interpreted in the set Ω, the meaning [(q, vq )] of a
descriptor (q, vq ) is the set {u ∈ U : q(u) = vq }. In symbolic form of decision rules,
we replace the implication horseshoe ⊃ sign with used in the context of decision rules
implication symbol →. Interpretations of formulae are given by structural induction:
(i) [α ∧ β] = [α] ∩ [β];
(ii) [α ∨ β] = [α] ∪ [β];
(iii) [¬α] = U \ [α];
(iv) [α ⊃ β] = [¬α ∪ β].
In the same way we define the meaning of formulae of the form (d, vd ).
A formula α is valid if and only if [α] = Ω.
7.7 Boolean Reasoning in Data Analysis 375

Definition 7.59 (Decision rules) A crucial task is to relate information formulae to

decision descriptors. The tool for this tasks are decision rules which are formulae of
the form, where B ⊆ A, 
(q, vq ) → (d, vd )
q∈B

For instance,

(∗) (Outlook, Sunny) ∧ (T emperatur e, H ot) ∧ (H umidit y, H igh)∧

(W ind, W eak) → (Play, N o)

is the decision rule induced by day no.1. In this manner, each row of the decision
system provides a decision rule.
According to our definition of truth, the implication α → β is valid if and only if
[α → β] = Ω if and only if (Ω \ [α]) ∪ [β] = Ω if and only if [α] ⊆ [β].
We obtain

Theorem 7.48 A decision rule α → β is valid if and only if [α] ⊆ [β].

For our example (*) of a decision rule, we find that

[(Outlook, Sunny) ∧ (T emperatur e, H ot) ∧ (H umidit y, H igh)∧

(W ind, W eak)] = {1, 2}; [(Play, N o)] = {1, 2, 6},

hence, the decision rule (*) is valid.

Definition 7.60 (Problem I: Reduction of knowledge in information systems) Given

an information system I A = (Ω, A, V ) determine reducts of the system I A .

We recall a basic algorithm for finding reducts based on Boolean reasoning,

 due to
(Skowron and Rauszer [31]). We recall
 that for a formula in DNF: φ : i j Pi j ,
prime implicants are sub-formulae j Pi j . For each feature q, the symbol q ∗ denotes
the Boolean atomic proposition corresponding to q.

Algorithm A: Reducts in information systems (Skowron and Rauszer [31])

Input: an information system I A = (Ω, A, W )
Output: the set of all reducts

(Step 1) Introduce into Ω an ordering: Ω = {o1 , o2 , . . . , ok };

(Step 2) create the discernibility matrix M = [ci j ]i,k j=1 , where ci j = {q : q(oi ) =
q(o j )};  
(Step 3) form the sentential formula f M : i< j,ci j =∅ ( q∈ci j q∗);
(Step 4) convert f M to DNF normal form f MD N F ;
376 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(Step 5) for each prime implicant π = πi1 ,i2 ,...,im : q ∗i1 ∧q ∗i2 ∧ . . . ∧ q∗im read
off the attribute set
r (π) : {qi1 , qi2 , . . . , qim };

(Step 6) output the set of reducts {r (π) : an implicant π}.

Example 7.2 We find reducts for data in Table 7.1. For simplicity let us already
introduce atomic propositions for attributes in Table 1: o for Outlook, t for Temper-
ature, w for Wind, h for Humidity. Then the minimal set of entries into the matrix
M is as follows:
{o}
{w} {o, w}
{t, h} {t, h, w} {o, t, h, w}
{o} {o, t, h} {o, t, h, w} {t, h, w}
{o, t} {o, t} {o, t, h} {o, t, h, w} {o, th, w}
∅ {o, t} {o, t} {o, t, h} {o, t, h, w} {o, t, h, w}

c12 = ∅; c13 = {o, t};c14 = {o, t}; c15 = {o, t, h};c16 = {o, t, h, w}; c17 = {o, t, h, w}
c23 = {o, t}; c24 = {o, t}; c25 = {o, t, h}; c26 = {o, t, h, w}; c27 = {o, t, h, w}
c34 = {o}; c35 = {o, t, h}; c36 = {o, t, h, w}; c37 = {t, h, w}
c45 = {t, h}; c46 = {t, h, w}; c4,7 = {o, t, h, w}
c56 = {w}; c5,7 = {o, w}
c67 = {o}

The full formula f M would be the conjunction of disjunctions for all entries. We
can simplify its form by recalling some valid formulae of sentential logic, viz., the
absorption law: p ∧ ( p ∨ q) ≡ p and the idempotency law: p ∧ p ≡ p. On the basis
of the former, we eliminate any disjunction of length at least 2 containing the variable
o as well as any disjunction of length at least 2 containing the variable w.
Next, we use the idempotency law to retain only one occurrence of o and w. We
get the following equivalent form of the formula f M :

(o) ∧ (t ∨ h) ∧ (w)

which after application of the distribution law becomes

f M : (o ∧ t ∧ w) ∨ (o ∧ h ∧ w).

We obtain two prime implicants from which we read two reducts

R1 = {Outlook, T emperatur e, W ind}, R2 = {Outlook, H umidit y, W ind}.

Theorem 7.49 Algorithm A finds correctly all reducts of an information system.

7.7 Boolean Reasoning in Data Analysis 377

Proof For a set of features B ⊆ A, we define an assignment A B on Boolean atomic

propositions corresponding to attributes in A: A B (q∗) = 1 if q ∈ B, otherwise
A B (q∗) = 0.
Suppose that the discernibility formula f M is true underthe valuation Va , i.e.,
Va ( f M ) = 1. This implies that for each ci j = ∅ the clause q∈ci j q∗ is true under
Va , hence, there exists q ∈ ci j such that Va (q∗) = 1 which implies that q ∈ a. The
upshot of this is that I nda ⊆ I nd A and as I nd A ⊆ Ia by property (IND1) in 1.2(i),
we obtain I nda = I nd A which means that a satisfies the first condition for a reduct.
Now, the minimality condition has to be proved.  Theformula f M is equivalent
to its DNF, hence Va ( f MD N F ) = 1. Let f MD N F be k∈K lm=1k
q∗km . There exists k
such that Va (q∗km ) = 1 for each 1 ≤ m ≤ m k , hence, qmk ∈ a for each 1 ≤ m ≤ m k .
It follows that I nda = I nd A if and only if there is a prime implicant R of DNF of
the formula f M such that a contains all attributes whose corresponding variables are
in R. Clearly, a minimal a must contain exactly attributes whose variables are in R.
This proves minimality and correctness of the Algorithm A. 

Definition 7.61 (Problem: Reduction of knowledge in decision systems) We now

consider the related problem of reduction of knowledge in decision systems. In this
case, we are focusing on decision rules, hence, we consider for a set B ⊆ A of
attributes, the B-positive region of decision d in the set Ω of beings which is defined
as follows:
P O S B (d) = {q ∈ U : [q] B ⊆ [q]d }.

We call a set B ⊆ A a decision-related reduct of the decision system DS =

(Ω, A, W, d) if B is a minimal set of attributes with the property that P O S B (d) =
P O S A (d). This condition means that the set B of feature induces all valid decision
rules of the system DS. We recall an algorithm for finding decision-related reducts.

Algorithm B: Decision-related reducts in decision systems (Skowron and Rauszer

[31])
Input: a decision system (U, A, W, D)
Output: the set of decision-related reducts

(Step 1) introduce into Ω an ordering: Ω = {o1 , o2 , . . . , ok };

(Step 2) create the relative discernibility matrix M = [c∗i j ]i,k j=1 where ci∗j = {q ∈
A ∪ {d} : q(oi ) = q(o j )};
(Step 3) for each [ci∗j ], if d(u i ) = d(u j ) then [ci∗j ] ← ∅, else [ci∗j ] ← [ci∗j ] \ {d};
 
(Step 4) form the sentential formula f M : i< j,c∗i j =∅ ( q∈c∗i j q∗);
(Step 5) convert f M to DNF f MD N F ;
(Step 6) for each prime implicant πi1 ,i2 ,...,im : q ∗i1 ∧q ∗i2 ∧ . . . ∧ q∗im read off the
attribute set
r (π) : {qi1 , qi2 , . . . , qim };

(Step 7) output the set of decision-relative reducts {r (π) : implicantπ}.

378 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

We go back to Table 7.1. The decision d = Y E S is taken on days 3, 4, 5, 7 and

decision d = N O is taken on days 1, 2. According to Algorithm B, we nullify cells
c34 , c35 , c37 , c45 , c47 , c57 , c12 .
One checks that the sentential formula f M in this case is: o ∧ w, hence, the
decision-relative reduct is {Outlook, W ind}.

Theorem 7.50 Algorithm B finds correctly all decision-related reducts for any deci-
sion system.

Proof For a subset B ⊆ A of attributes, we define a valuation VB on Boolean atomic

propositions q1 ∗, q2 ∗, . . . , qn ∗ corresponding to attributes in A: q1 , q2 , . . . , qn by
letting Va (q∗) = 1 if and only if q ∈ B. Then, we have the condition stemming from
the assumption that VB ( f M ) = 1 :

[d(u i ) = d(u j ) ⊃ ∃q ∈ B.q(u i ) = q(u j )]

for each pair u i , u j .

Thus, by contraposition, we have the inclusion I N D B ⊆ I N D A ∩ I N Dd . This
means that for each indiscernibility class [o] B , we have the inclusion [o] B ⊆
[o] A ∩ [o]d , hence, if [o] A ⊆ [o]d then [o] B ⊆ [o]d , which implies that P O S B (d) =
P O S A (d). Minimality of B with respect to this property follows by considering
f MD N F . 

One should be aware that finding a reduct of minimal cardinality is NP-hard

(Skowron and Rauszer [31]).
We consider the next problem of finding minimal decision rules in a decision
system. A decision rule is minimal if it is valid and its premiss as a set of descriptors
is minimal: when we remove from it a descriptor, the rule ceases to be valid. An
algorithm for inducing minimal rules is based on Boolean reasoning. For a decision-
relative matrix of discernibility M and each object oi , we denote by M(oi ) the set
of entries ci j for j < i (in case when we consider the lower triangular matrix [ci j ]
where i > j).

Definition 7.62 (Problem: Find the set of minimal decision rules) We give the algo-
rithm due to Pawlak and Skowron (Pawlak and Skowron [32]).

Algorithm C: Minimal decision rules (Pawlak and Skowron [32])

From the matrix M(oi ), construct the discernibility function f oi and its set of prime
implicants I (oi ). For each prime implicant I ∈ I (oi ), write the minimal decision
rule r I : q∈I (q = q(u i )) → (d = d(u i )).

Example 7.3 From Table7.1, we read off the following local decision-related
reducts and induced minimal rules:
(Rule 1) I1,2 : {Outlook, T emperatur e}; r1,2 : (Outlook = Sunny)∧
(T emperatur e = H ot) → (Play = N o).
7.7 Boolean Reasoning in Data Analysis 379

(Rule 2) I3 : {Outlook, T emperatur e}; r3 : (Outlook = Over cast)∧

(T emperatur e = Mild) → (Play = Y es).
(Rule 3) I4 : {T emperatur e, H umidit y, W ind}; r4 : (T emperatur e = Mild)∧
(H umidit y = H igh)∧ (W ind = W eak) → (Play = Y es).
(Rule 4) I5 : {W ind}; r5 : (W ind = W eak) → (Play = Y es).
(Rule 5) I6 : {O}; r6 : (Outlook = Rainy) → (Play = N o).
(Rule 6) I7 : {O}; r7 : (Outlook = Over cast) → (Play = Y es).

We have dealt till now with discrete attribute sets. In case attributes are continuous,
one obtains a discrete case by a discretization process which converts each continuous
attribute into a discrete-valued one. The principal notion is that of a cut.

Definition 7.63 (Cuts) We assume that attribute values are real. Reduction of car-
dinalities of value sets is desirable when those cardinalities are large. Discretiza-
tion consists in a partition of value set of each attribute into classes on the basis
of natural ordering of real numbers. Suppose that values of some attribute q are
v1 < v2 < . . . < vk .

The partition process is effected by means of cuts, i.e., values in-between values
v j . A set c1 < c2 < . . . < cm of cuts for an attribute q defines a new
decision system with the feature c(q) whose values are now names of partition classes
usually expressed as consecutive numbers according to the natural ordering on reals,
i.e., c(q)(x) = j if and only if q(x) ∈ [c j , c j+1 ) with c(q)(x) = 0 when q(x) < c1
and c(q)(x) = m + 1 when q(x) > cm . We denote by c(A) the new set of attributes
obtained from the set A.

Definition 7.64 (Generalized decision) A generalized decision δ DS (o) for a thing o

in a decision system DS = (Ω, A, W, d) is the set of decision values whose indis-
cernibility classes intersect the indiscernibility class of o:

(δ) δ DS (o) = {vd ∈ W : [vd ]d ∩ [o] A = ∅}.

The decision system DSδ = (U, A, W, δ DS ) is deterministic.

Definition 7.65 (Consistency, cut-reducts) A set C of cuts is consistent with respect

to the decision system DS = (Ω, A, W, d) if and only if the generalized decision
δ DS is equal to the generalized decision δc(DS) for the decision system c(DS) =
(Ω, c(A), W, d). A consistent set of cuts is irreducible if and only if any proper
subset of it is not consistent. A consistent set of cuts is a cut-reduct if it is minimal
with respect to cardinality among consistent sets of cuts.
380 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Definition 7.66 (Problem: Find cut-reducts for a decision system with continuous
values of attributes)

Algorithm D: Optimal cuts in continuous—valued information systems (Nguyen [33]).

(Step 1) We consider a decision system DS = (Ω, A, W, d). As with decision-relative reducts,
we consider pairs of objects oi , o j with i < j and d(oi ) = d(o j ). We denote their set by
Dis(DS). For each attribute q ∈ A, we list values of q as the ordered set of increasing
q q q
values V al A : v1 , v2 , . . . , vkq . The first idea of cuts is to use midpoints in each interval
q q
q q q v j +v j+1
[v j , v j+1 ), i.e, c j = 2 for j = 1, 2, . . . , qk−1 ;
(Step 2) for each pair oi , o j ∈ Dis(DS) and each attribute q ∈ A, we denote by min(q, i, j) the
value min{q(oi ), q(o j )} and by max(q, i, j) the value max{q(oi ), q(o j )};
q q q
(Step 3) with each interval [v j , v j+1 ), we associate a sentential variable p j . For each pair oi , o j
and each attribute q ∈ A, we define the formula
 q q q
ψ(q, i, j) : { p j : [v j , v j+1 ) ⊆ [min(q, i, j), max(q, i, j)]};

(Step 4) for each pair oi , o j ∈ Dis(DS), we define the formula


φ(i, j) : {ψ(q, i, j) : q ∈ A};
Finally, we let

f cut : {φ(i, j) : φ(i, j) = f alsum};
(Step 5) in the now standard way, we find prime implicants of the formula f cut . Then one proves
H.S. Nguyen [33].

q
Theorem 7.51 (i) if the set I of atomic propositions of the form p j is a prime
DN F
implicant of f cut , then the set of cuts C(I ) defined by the
q q
q v j + v j+1
if p j ∈ I , then the cut ∈ C(I )
2
is a consistent set of cuts; (ii) if I is a prime implicant of minimal length among
DN F
prime implicants of f cut , then the set C(I ) of cuts is optimal.

Example 7.4 Consider Table 7.2.

From Table 7.2, we read pairs in the set Dis(DS) : (1, 2), (1, 6), (2, 4), (2, 5),
(3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 6), (5, 6). We simplify notation: q1 = a, q2 = b.
Intervals and variables for attribute a : [0.4, 0.6), p1a ; [0.6, 0.8), p2a ; [0.8, 1.0),
p3 ; [1.0, 1.2), p4a .
a

Intervals and variables for attribute b : [1.0, 1.2), p1b ; [1.2, 1.4), p2b ; [1.4, 1.6),
b
p3 .
7.8 Information Logic (IL) 381

Table 7.2 The decision system minimal

Object q1 cut q1 c(q1 ) q2 cut q2 c(q2 ) d
x1 0.4 − 0 1.0 − 0 1
x2 0.6 0.5 1 1.2 1.1 1 0
x3 0.6 − 1 1.4 1.3 2 0
x4 0.8 0.7 2 1.2 − 1 1
x5 1.0 0.9 3 1.6 1.5 3 1
x6 1.2 1.1 4 1.0 − 1 0

Formulae φ(i, j):

φ(1, 2) : p1a ∨ p1b ;

φ(1, 3) : p1b ∨ p2b ;
φ(1, 6) : p1a ∨ p2a ∨ p3a ∨ p4a ;
φ(2, 4) : p2a ;
φ(2, 5) : p2a ∨ p3a ∨ p2b ∨ p3b ;
φ(3, 4) : p2a ∨ p2b ;
φ(3, 5) : p2a ∨ p3a ∨ p3b ;
φ(4, 6) : p3a ∨ p4a ∨ p1b ;
φ(5, 6) : p4 a ∨ p1b ∨ p2b ∨ p3b .

The formula f cut after an application of absorption and idempotency laws becomes:
p2a ∧ p3a ∧ p4a ∧ p1b . Optimal cuts are: 0.7, 0.9, 1.1.

We have demonstrated solutions by means of Boolean reasoning to some of the

most basic problems in Data Analysis.
We now continue our exposition of logics for knowledge with the intensional
and modal tint in decision systems by recalling the Information Logic (IL) from
Vakarelov [34].

7.8 Information Logic (IL)

We recall that an information system is defined as a triple (U, A, W ) where U is

a set of things/objects, A a set of attributes, and W a set of attribute values. In the
present case, we assume that each attribute q maps each u ∈ U into the set 2W , i.e.,
q(u) ⊆ W for each u ∈ U .
This assumption allows for new relations on the set U , which provide the relational
vocabulary of IL.
382 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Definition 7.67 (Relational vocabulary of IL. Syntactic constituents) Relational

vocabulary of IL consists of relational symbols I, C, T and of 0-arity constant D,
whose intended meanings are the following.

(I) I (u, v) if and only if q(u) = q(v) for each q ∈ A: indiscernibility over the set
A of attributes;
(C) C(u, v) if and only if q(u) ⊆ q(v) for each q ∈ A: informational inclusion;
(T) T (u, v) if and only if q(u) ∩ q(v) = ∅ for each q ∈ A: informational tolerance;
(D) D(u) if and only if |q(u)| = 1 for each q ∈ A. D = {u ∈ U ; D(u)} is the
deterministic set.

Theorem 7.52 The following are properties of relations I, C, T, D:

(P1) C(u, u);
(P2) C(u, v), C(v, w) imply C(u, w);
(P3) T (u, v) implies T (v, u);
(P4) T (u, v) implies T (u, u);
(P5) T (u, v),C(u, w) imply T (w, v);
(P6) D(u), C(v, u) imply D(v);
(P7) D(u), T (u, v) imply C(u, v);
(P8) I (u, u);
(P9) I (u, v) implies I (v, u);
(P10) I (u, v),I (v, w) imply I (u, w);
(P11) I (u, v) implies C(u, v);
(P12) D(u), D(v), T (u, v) imply I (u, v).

By the generalized information system, we will understand the relational system

(U, I, C, T, D) of the relational type (2, 2, 2, 1), i.e., with binary relations C, T, I
and the unary relation D, which altogether satisfy properties (P1)-(P12).
We construct a logic IL. Its language is built of a countably many atomic proposi-
tions in a set V ar ; sentential connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃; modal functors [I ], [C], [T ];
sentential constant D; auxiliary symbols: dots,parentheses, commas.
The set of formulae F is defined as the smallest set containing all atomic propo-
sitions and the constant D and closed on sentential connectives and modal functors.

Definition 7.68 (Semantics of the information logic IL) For a relational system M =
(U, I, C, T, D), we define an M-valuation VM : V ar → 2U from the set V ar of
variables into the power set of U and relative to VM , we define the satisfaction
relation u |=VM α for u ∈ U and α ∈ F by structural induction:
(S1) u |=VM p if and only if u ∈ VM ( p);
(S2) u |=VM D if and only if u ∈ D;
(S3) u |=VM α ∨ β if and only if u |=VM α or u |=VM β;
(S4) u |=VM α ∧ β if and only if u |=VM α and u |=VM β;
(S5) u |=VM ¬α if and only if u |=VM α is not true;
(S6) u |=VM [R]α if and only if ∀v ∈ U.(R(u, v) ⊃ v |=VM α), for R = I, C, T .
7.8 Information Logic (IL) 383

A formula α is valid in M under VM if and only if u |=VM α for each u ∈ U ; α is

valid in M, denoted M |= α if α is valid in M under every valuation VM ; α is valid if
and only if α is valid in M for each generalised relation system M = (U, I, C, T, D)
satisfying (P1)-(P12). The symbol |= α denotes that α is valid.
Now, we render properties (P1)-(P12) in the language of IL. The symbol < R >
denotes the dual modal functor ¬[R]¬ and verum is denoted .

Theorem 7.53 Consider a generalized relational system M = (U, I, C, T, D) of

type (2, 2, 2, 1) and formulae α1 − α12 . For each i ≤ 12,the formula αi is valid in
M if and only if the corresponding property (Pi) is satisfied in M.
(a1) α1 : [C]α ⇒ α;
(a2) α2 : [C]α ⇒ [C][C]α;
(a3) α3 : α ∨ [T ]¬[T ]α;
(a4) α4 :< T > ∧ [T ]α ⇒ α;
(a5) α5 :< C > [T ]α ⇒ [T ]α;
(a6) α6 :< C > D ⇒ D;
(a7) α7 : D∧ < C > α ⇒ [T ]α;
(a8) α8 : [I ]α ⇒ α;
(a9) α9 : α ∨ [I ]¬[I ]α;
(a10) α10 [I ]α ⇒ [I ][I ]α;
(a11) α11 : [C]α ⇒ [I ]α;
(a12) α12 : D ∧ [I ]α ⇒ [T ](D ⇒ α).

Proofs are standard verifications.

Definition 7.69 (Axiom schemes for the information logic IL)

(Ax1) all valid formulae of PL;
(Ax2) axiom schemes of the form [R](α ⇒ β) ⊃ ([R]α ⇒ [R]β): the modal for-
mula (K) for R = I, C, T ;
(Ax3) axiom schemes α1 − α12 . α1 , α2 are axiom schemas for modal logic S4 (infor-
mation containment), α8 − α10 are axiom schemas for the modal logic S5
(logic of indiscernibility).

Inference rules for logic IL are: detachment, substitution and necessitation for
[I ], [C], [T ].
We denote by the symbol T h(I L) the theory of (IL), i.e., the set of provable
formulae of (IL). We impose on T h(I L) a pre-order ≤ on the set F by letting α ≤ β
if and only if α ⊃ β ∈ T h(I L). We define the notion of a filter with respect to the
ordering ≤.

Definition 7.70 (Filters in the information logic IL) A filter F is a subset of the set
F which satisfies the following properties.
(F1) ∈ F;
(F2) α ∈ F, α ≤ β imply β ∈ F;
(F3) α, β ∈ F imply α ∧ β ∈ F;
384 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

(F4) ⊥ ∈
/ F.
For a filter F, we let [R]F = {α ∈ F : [R]α ∈ F} for R = I, C, T . We observe
that
Theorem 7.54 For each filter F, [R]F is a filter.
Proof For F1: as ∈ F and, by necessitation, ⊃ [R] , [R] ∈ F, hence, ∈
[R]F. For property (F3), suppose α, β ∈ [R]F. Then [R]α, [R]β ∈ F, hence, by
property (F3), [R]α ∧ [R]β ∈ F and by property of the modal system K, [R](α ∧
β) ∈ F and thus α ∧ β ∈ [R]F, so [R]F satisfies property (F3).
To check on property (F2), suppose that α ∈ [R]F, α ⊃ β ∈ T h(I L). By neces-
sitation, [R](α ⊃ β) ∈ T h(I L), and by formula (K) of the modal system K,

[R](α ⇒ β) ⊃ ([R]α ⇒ [R]β)

from which by detachment we get that

[R]α ⇒ [R]β ∈ T h(I L).

As [R]α ∈ F, it follows by property (F2) that [R]β ∈ F, i.e.,β ∈ [R]F, fulfilling

property (F2) with [R]F. Property (F4) is fulfilled by [R]F by its definition. 
Definition 7.71 (Prime filters) A filter F is prime if and only if α ∨ β ∈ F implies
that either α ∈ F or β ∈ F. It is a known fact (see Chap. 1) that given a filter F and
α∈ / F, there exists a prime filter G separating α from F, i.e., F ⊆ G and α ∈ / G.
Let P be the family of all prime filters on F.
Definition 7.72 (The relation ρ(F, G)) For R = I, C, T , we define a relation ρ R on
P by letting ρ R (F, G) if and only if [R]F ⊆ G. This relation is instrumental for the
following result.
Theorem 7.55 For a prime filter F and α ∈ T h(I L), [R]α ∈ F is equivalent to
ρ R (F, G) ⊃ α ∈ G for each prime filter G.
Proof Suppose [R]α ∈ F. Thus α ∈ [R]F and from ρ(F, G) it follows that α ∈ G.
Conversely, suppose that for each prime filter G the implication ρ R (F, G) ⊃ α ∈ G
holds true. Was [R]α ∈/ F, we would have by separation property a prime filter G
with [R]F ⊆ G and α ∈ / G, a contradiction. 
For the constant D, we form a unary relation ρ D by letting ρ D (F) if and only if
D ∈ F.
Theorem 7.56 (Vakarelov [34]) The relational vocabulary

M = (ρ I , ρC , ρT , ρ D )

induces a generalized information system which satisfies properties (P1)-(P12).

7.9 Pavelka’s Fuzzy Sentential Logic 385

Proof As proofs of each property (Pi) follow along similar lines, we include after
[34] a proof of the property (P7). Suppose to the contrary that (P7) does not hold.
We thus have prime filters F, G such that (i) F ∈ D (ii) TF ⊆ G (iii) CF ⊆ G not
true. By (i), D ∈ F and by (iii) there exists α ∈ [C]F \ G thus [C]α ∈ F, hence,
D ∧ [C]α ∈ F. By the axiom schema (a7), [T ]α ∈ F, hence, α ∈ [T ]F and (ii)
implies that α ∈ G, a contradiction. Property (P7) is satisfied. 

We now define a canonical valuation V c on formulae in F O R M: V c (α) = {F ∈

P : α ∈ F}. The property of canonical models is preserved in this environment
Vakarelov [34].

Theorem 7.57 For each prime filter F and a formula α, F V c α if and only if
α ∈ F.

Proof By structural induction on α. For a sentential variable p, the equivalence

follows by definition of the satisfaction relation V c . For α of one of the forms
β ∨ γ, β ∧ γ, ¬β the equivalence follows by definition of satisfaction relation and
by properties of prime filters that with β and γ they contain β ∧ γ, β ∨ γ and
exactly one of β or ¬β for each β. In case of α being [R]β, the thesis holds by
Theorem 7.55. 

We may finally prove the completeness of IL Vakarelov [34].

Theorem 7.58 (The completeness theorem for IL) The following are equivalent for
each formula α:
(i) α ∈ T h(I L);
(ii) α is valid.

Proof The implication from (i) to (ii) is true as inference rules preserve validity
and axiom schemas are valid. To prove the implication from (ii) to (i), argue to the
contrary by supposing that α ∈ / T h(I L). Since T h(I L) is a filter, there exists a prime
filter F with the properties (a) T h(I L) ⊆ F (b) α ∈ / F. By Theorem 7.57, it is not
true that F V c α meaning that α is not valid. Hence, (ii) implies (i). This concludes
the proof of completeness of IL. 

7.9 Pavelka’s Fuzzy Sentential Logic

In Sect. 7.3 and in Sect. 7.4, we have discussed the rough mereological logic of con-
cepts which brought elements of the fuzzy theory of concepts at the same time high-
lighting the motivations which led Jan Łukasiewicz to the choice of his many-valued
connectives. In this passage we outline the basic ingredients of sentential fuzzy logic
scheme due to Pavelka [35]. We consider a complete lattice L = (L , ∪, ∩, ⇒, 0, 1), a
countable set V ar of atomic propositions and sentential connectives ∨, ∧, ⊃. Formu-
lae of the logic form the set F which is the smallest set closed on atomic propositions,
386 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

 
and closed under ∨, ∧, ⊃. We denote by , the l.g.b., respectively, g.l.b. of sub-
sets of l. For a chosen set A ⊆ F called the set of axioms, we consider the mapping
A : F → L.
Each mapping F → L is an L-fuzzy set.
Inference rules are of the form R = (R1 , R2 ) such that for some k ∈ N, R1 : F k ⊇
dom R1 → F, R2 : L k → L, under the proviso that the following conditions hold:

(C) R2 (a1 , a2 , . . . , ai−1 , j {ai j }, ai+1 , . . . , ak ) =

j {R2 (a1 , a2 , . . . , ai−1 , ai j , ai+1 , . . . , ak )}.

For X : F → L, condition

(R) χ X (R1 ((x1 , x2 , . . . , xk )) ≥ L R2 (χ X (x1 ), χ X (x2 ), . . . , χ X (xk )),

where χ is the characteristic function. It follows from (C) that R2 is isotone.

The set L F of mappings of the set F of formulae into the domain L of the lattice
is partially ordered by coordinately-wise induced ordering on L:

For A, B ∈ L F , A ≤ B if and only if ∀x.(χ A (x) ≤ L χ B (x)).

Actually, due to completeness of L, the set L F is completely ordered, i.e.,

χZ (x) = {χ X (x) : X ∈ Z}.

It follows that for a family M of sets satisfying (R), and for x = (x1 , x2 , . . . ,
xk ) ∈ dom R1 ,
χZ (R1 (x)) = {χY (R1 (x)) : Y ∈ M} ≥

{R2 (χY (x1 ), χY (x2 ), . . . , χY (xk )) : Y ∈ M} ≥

R2 ( {χY (x1 ) : Y ∈ M}, . . . , {χY (xk ) : Y ∈ M}) =

R2 (χ M (x1 ), . . . , χ M (xk )).

One may now define for each X : F → L, a set C S (X ) : F → L as the smallest

set which satisfies the following conditions:

(i) {A, X } ≤ C S (X );
(ii) C S (X ) satisfies (R) for each inference rule R.
The notion of syntactic consequence to the degree of at least a denoted X  S,a x,
read ‘x is the syntactic consequence of X to the degree of at least a’ is defined as
follows, for X ∈ L F , x ∈ F, a ∈ L,

X  S,a x if and only if χC S (x) ≥ L a.

7.10 Problems 387

The semantic factor is introduced by a family E ⊆ L F of L-fuzzy sets. Associated

with E is the semantic consequence mapping CE : L F → L F defined as follows:

CE (X ) = {Y ∈ E : X ≤ Y }.

The semantic consequence denoted X |=E,a x and read ‘x is the semantic con-
sequence of X to the degree of at least a’, for X ∈ L F , x ∈ F, a ∈ L, is defined as
follows:

X |=E,a if and only if χCE(X ) (x) ≥ L a.

The following two theorems come from Pavelka [35].

Theorem 7.59 If x  S,ai xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ) ∈ dom R1 ,

then X  S, R2 (a1 , a2 , . . . , ak )R1 (x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ).

Theorem 7.60 X |=E,a x if and only if from Y ∈ E, Y ≥ X it follows that

χY (x) ≥ L a.

7.10 Problems

Problem 7.1 (SDL) Prove validity of the following formulae:

(i) (φ 
⊃ ψ) ⊃ ([α]φ ⊃ [α]ψ);
(ii) [α β]φ ≡ [α]φ ∧ [β]φ;
(iii) [φ?]ψ ≡ (φ ⊃ ψ);
(iv) [α∗ ]φ ≡ φ ∧ [α][α∗ ]φ;
(v) [α∗ ]φ ≡ [α∗∗ ]φ ≡ [α∗ α∗ ]φ;
(vi) [α∗ ]φ ⊃ φ.

Problem 7.2 (SDL) Hoare triples are expressions of the form {φ}π{ψ} which encode
the statement: ‘if a program π executes in a state satisfying φ, then if it terminates
then it terminates in a state satisfying ψ. In SDL this rule is expressed as φ → [π]ψ.
Prove in SDL the composition rule: if {φ}π{ψ} and {ψ}ρ{ξ}, then {φ}π; ρ{ξ}.

Problem 7.3 (SDL) In SDL, basic block commands of structured programming can
be expressed. Check that expressions below render correctly the block commands:

(i) abort is rendered as ⊥?;

(ii) skip is rendered as ?;
(iii) while α do a is rendered as ((α?; a)∗ ; ¬α?);

(iv) if α then a else β is rendered as ((α?; a) (¬α?; b));
(v) repeat a until α is rendered as (a; ((¬α; a)∗ ; α?)).
388 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Problem 7.4 (SDL) (after Manna [36]). The possibility of infinite looping for a
program can be expressed in SDL at the cost of additional notions. A strong notion
of looping for a program a at state s is Ra (s, s). The other way is to introduce
an additional predicate in f (also denoted ∞), the formula in f (a) meaning that a
program a can  enter an infinite loop. Prove properties of in f :
(i) inf(a b) ≡ in f (a) ∨ in f (b);
(ii) inf((a; b)) ≡ in f (a) ∨ a b;
(iii) in f (a ∗ ) ≡ a ∗ in f (a) ∨ Δ(a) where Δ(a) is an operator semantically
defined as the set {s ∈ S : ∃{sn : n = 0, 1, ...}.s0 = s ∧ ∀n.Ra (sn , sn+1 )}.

Problem 7.5 (SDL) (after Manna [36]). A program a is correct when on beginning
the execution in a given state, it terminates in a desired state. Verify that the condition
¬in f (a) means that the program a terminates after a finite number of steps. Verify
that the correctness of the program a can be rendered as α ⊃ ¬ inf(a) ∧ [a]β.

Problem 7.6 (SDL) Prove that SDL does not observe the compactness property:
there exists a countable set Φ of formulae which is not satisfiable and yet each finite
subset of Φ is satisfiable. Give an example of Φ with this property. [Hint: eventually,
please consult [4]].

Problem 7.7 (SDL. Downward preservation theorem) Prove: if A(π) ⊆ A(ρ), then
[ρ](φ) ⊃ [π](φ) for any formula φ.

Problem 7.8 (SDL. Upward preservation theorem) Prove: if A(π) ⊆ A(ρ), then
π (φ) ⊃ π (ρ) for any formula φ.

Problem 7.9 (Epistemic logic) Suppose that in a Kripke structure M, the world w
is terminal, i.e., {v : R(w, v)} = ∅. For any formula φ determine the logical truth
value of the formula K φ at w, i.e., is M, w |= K φ true? If yes, does that mean
omniscience?

Problem 7.10 (Epistemic logic) Prove that the formula ¬K Φ ⊃ K ¬Φ is valid in

Kripke structures in which the relation R is functional: for each world w there exists
a unique world v such that R(w, v).

Problem 7.11 (Epistemic logic) (after Chellas [37]). A formula φ is modally closed
if it contains no occurrence of any free atomic proposition.
Prove: if  is a model for the logic ES5 and a formula φ is modally closed, then
 |= (φ ≡ K φ).

Problem 7.12 (Common knowledge) Prove:

(i) Cφ ⊃ φ;
(ii) CCφ ≡ Cφ;
(iii) Cφ ⊃ ECφ;
(iv) C(φ ⊃ Eφ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ Cφ)
7.10 Problems 389

Problem 7.13 (Common knowledge) Follow the proof in Theorem 7.24 and prove
completeness of logic ECTn. [Hint: In case of need, consult (Halpern and Moses
[8])].

Problem 7.14 (Information systems. Functional dependence I) We say that a func-

tion f : X → Y is dependent on functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k , each f i : X → Y , if there
exists a function F : X → Y such that f (x) = F( f 1 (x), f 2 (x), . . . , f k (x)) for each
x ∈ X. k
Prove: f depends functionally on f 1 , f 2 , ..., f k if and only if i=1 f i−1 ( f i (x)) ⊆
−1
f ( f (x)) for each x ∈ X . [Hint: See eventually (Polkowski [38], 10)].

Problem 7.15 (Functional dependence II) For sets X, Y and a family F of functions
from X into Y , the fiber product of F is the function Δ F : X → Π f ∈F Y defined as
Δ F (x) =< f (x) : f ∈ F >.
For families F, G of functions from X into Y , we say that G depends functionally
on F if and only if there exists a function Φ : Π f ∈F Y → Πg∈G Y such that ΔG (x) =
Φ(Δ F (x)) for each x ∈ X . We denote the fact of functional dependence of G on F
with the symbol F ⇒ G.
Prove the following properties of the relation ⇒:
(i) if G ⊆ F, then F ⇒ G;
(ii) if F ⇒ G and G ⇒ H , then F ⇒ H ;
(iii) if F ⇒ G and F ⇒ H , then F ⇒ G ∪ H ;
(iv) if F ⇒ G and H ⇒ K , then F ∪ H ⇒ G ∪ H .

Due to Rauszer’s FD-logic couched in intuitionistic logic, we allow ourselves the

liberty of inserting some problems on intuitionistic logic.

Problem 7.16 (Sentential intuitionistic logic) Prove: a formula φ ∨ ψ is valid in SIL

if and only if either φ is valid or ψ is valid.

Problem 7.17 (Sentential intuitionistic logic (SIL)) Suppose τ is a topology on a

non-emptyset X . We recall (see Chap. 1) that open an closed sets are related by dual-
ity: Cl A = X \ I nt (X \ A) and I nt A = X \ Cl(X \ A). For sentential intuitionistic
logic, one defines a valuation V of formulae of the logic in the space (X, τ ) as follows:

(i) V ( p) is an open subset of X ;

(ii) V (φ ∨ ψ) = V (φ) ∪ V (ψ);
(iii) V (φ ∧ ψ) = V (φ) ∩ V (ψ);
(iv) V (φ ⊃ ψ) = I nt[(X \ V (φ)) ∪ V (ψ)];
(v) V (¬φ) = I nt[X \ V (φ)].

Prove: If φ is a valid formula of SIL, then for each valuation V satisfying (i)-(v),
V (φ) = X .

Problem 7.18 (FOIL) Prove that the formula ¬[∀x.φ(x)] ⊃ ∃x.[¬φ(x)]. is not
valid in FOIL.
390 7 Logics for Programs and Knowledge

Problem 7.19 (Dependence spaces; (Novotný and Pawlak [39]) A dependence

space is a set X with the operation ∗ such that x ∗ x = x, x ∗ y = y ∗ x, x ∗ (y ∗
z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ z. An equivalence relation R is a congruence on X if and only if
x Ry ∧ z Rt ⊃ x ∗ z Ry ∗ t. The symbol [x] R denotes the equivalence class of x.
Each semi-lattice is ordered by partial order : x y ≡ x ∗ y = y.
Prove: is a partial order;
A closure operator C : X → X satisfies the following properties: (C1) x C(x),
(C2) (x y) ⊃ (C(x) C(y)), (C3) C(C(x)) = C(x). Closure C induces a con-
gruence RC as x RC y ≡ C(x) = C(y).
Prove: RC is a congruence.
For x ∈ X , select in the equivalence class [x] R the -maximal element C R (x).
This defines the closure induced by R.
Prove: (i) C R is a closure, (ii) RC R = R and C RC = C.
An element x ∈ X is R-independent if and only if x is -minimal element in
[x] R .
Prove: (i) An element x is R-independent if and only if for each y: (y x) ∧ (y =
x) ⊃ (¬x Ry);
If x is R-independent and x ∈ [y] R , then we say that x is R-independent with
respect to y. In this case we say that x is an R-reduct of y. We now consider a set
2 A of subsets if a set A along with semi-lattice operation of union ∪ of sets. (2 A , ∪)
is endowed as well with intersection ∩ and difference of sets, hence, with additive
relative pseudo-complement x ⇒ y such that y ∪ (x ⇒ y) = x. Then the order
becomes the inclusion ⊆.
We say that an element y is R-redundant in an element x if and only if (x ⇒ y)Rx.
Prove: The intersection of all reducts of x is the set of all not R-redundant singleton
subsets of x. [Hint: See eventually Polkowski [38]].

Problem 7.20 (Pavelka’s fuzzy logic) Prove Theorems 7.59, 7.60.

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Chapter 8
Beyond FO Within SO

8.1 Introduction: Expressive Power of FO. Recapitulation

In Sects. 3.19 and 3.20, we discussed problems of expressive power of FO. The
general formulation of the problem for FO was: given a class F of closed formulae
and a class M of FO structures, determine properties which can be expressed by
formulae in F within structures in M. We discussed the problem EVEN and the
problem CONN of connectivity for finite graphs showing that these problems cannot
be expressed within FO.
We deem it useful if we recapitulate in a nutshell tools and results described in
Sects. 3.19, 3.20 as a first step before entering the realm of logics stronger than FO.
We restrict the topic to finite structures.

Definition 8.1 (Finite FO structures) An FO finite vocabulary Σ consists of finitely

many relation symbols P1 , P2 , . . . , Pn of respective arities n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n n and of
finitely many constant symbols c1 , c2 , . . . , ck . An FO finite structure is a finite set A
along with an interpretation I which is mapping each relation symbol Pi of arity n i
onto a relation RiI ⊆ Ani and it is mapping each constant symbols c j onto an element
c Ij ∈ A.

Finite FO structures miss some properties of FO. For instance compactness  prop-
erty: consider the set T = {φn : n ≥ 1} of formulae where φn : ∃x1 , x2 , . . . xn . i< j
(xi = x j ). Each finite subset of T is satisfiable in a finite structure, but T is not.
It follows that not all properties are expressible within FO. An other example
is reachability property REACH: for a graph G and two distinct vertices s and t
decide whether there exists a path which connects s and t. Consider the vocabulary
Σ = {E, c1 , c2 }, where the relational symbol E is interpreted in a set A as the edge
relation e and c1 , c2 are interpreted as s and t respectively. Suppose that a formula φ
expresses the set of graphs in which there is a path joining s and t.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 393
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4_8
394 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Consider, for each n ≥ 1, the formula φn : ¬∃x1 , . . . , xn .E(c1 , x1 ) ∧ E(xn , c2 ) ∧

∀i=1
n−1
E(xi , xi+1 ), and, define the set T of formulae as {φn : n ≥ 1} ∪ {c1 = c2 , ¬
E(c1 , c2 ), φ}. The set T is consistent as by compactness property of FO, each finite
subset of T is satisfiable, hence, T is satisfiable in a model M. Then, s and t cannot
be connected by any path of finite length.
In order to decide the problem of expressiveness we need systematic tools. One
of them is Ehrenfeucht games [1] presented in Sect. 3.20. We recall the setting.
Definition 8.2 (Ehrenfeucht games) We recall that the Ehrenfeucht game G m (A, B)
is played in m rounds between two players called Spoiler and Duplicator on structures
A, B with domains A and B and over a common vocabulary Σ. Before we state rules
of the game, we recall the notion of a partial isomorphism.
We recall the notation: for a finite sequence (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) ∈ A∗ , we write shortly
(ai )n1 and similarly for finite sequences over B.
Definition 8.3 (A partial isomorphism) The pair ((ai )n1 ; (bi )n1 ) defines a partial
isomorphism between A, B if and only if (i) ai = a j if and only if bi = b j for
i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n (ii) for each sub-sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k of indices, (ai j )kj=1 is in a
relation R A on A if and only if ((bi j )kj=1 is in the corresponding relation R B on B
(iii) ai is c A in A if and only if bi is c B in B for each constant symbol c.
Now, we recall the rules of Ehrenfeucht games. Rules of the game are as follows:
each round out of their number m is opened by a move by Spoiler, who picks an
element in A or in B to which Duplicator responds with a choice of an element in the
opposite set and these moves are repeated m − 1 times, to produce elements (ai )i=1m

in A and (bi )i=1 in B .

m m m

Duplicator wins the game G m (A, B) if and only if ((ai )i=1

m
; (bi )i=1
m
) defines a
partial isomorphism, otherwise, Spoiler wins.
One of players has the winning strategy if it can win each game G m (A, B) for
each strategy of the opponent.
We recall the notion of the quantifier rank.
Definition 8.4 (Quantifier rank of a formula) For a closed formula φ of FO, the
quantifier rank of φ, qr (φ) is defined as follows:
(i) qr ( p) = 0 for each atomic proposition p;
(ii) qr (φ ∨ ψ) = qr (φ ∧ ψ) = qr (φ ⊃ ψ) = max{qr (φ), qr (ψ)};
(iii) qr (¬φ) = qr (φ)
(iv) qr (Qφ) = qr (φ) + 1, where Q = ∀, ∃.
It follows that quantifier rank of a formula is the number of quantifier symbols in its
prenex form. The class Q m collects formulae of quantifier rank not greater than m.
These classes are instrumental in definitions of relations between structures.
Definition 8.5 (m-equivalence) Structures A and B are m-equivalent, in symbols
A ≡m B, if and only if for each closed formula φ in Q m , A |= φ if and only if
B |= φ.
8.1 Introduction: Expressive Power of FO. Recapitulation 395

The importance of this notion becomes evident when we state the following result
Ehrenfeucht [1].
Theorem 8.1 The following are equivalent.
(i) Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game G m (A, B);
(ii) A ≡m B.
For a proof please see Sect. 3.20.
Remark 0. We focus on Duplicator because of the following result on the method-
ology of the Ehrenfeucht game (see Sect. 3.20 for a proof): (*) a property Q is not
expressible in FO if and only if there exist for each m structures X, Y such that
X ≡m Y , X |= Q and ¬(Y |= Q) and of its dual.
(**) property Q is definable in FO if and only if there is r such that if structures
A and B are respectively A in Q and B not in Q, then the spoiler has the winning
strategy in the game G r on A and B.
In Sect. 3.20, examples are given of problems EVEN, CONN which are not
expressible in FO on basis of the criterion (*). The statement (*) poses the problem
of means for deciding the relation A ≡m B. We begin with the criterion due to Hanf
[2]. We recall the context in which Hanf criterion is introduced.
Remark 8.1 The decision problem for a given m ∈N whether Duplicator has a
winning strategy in Ehrenfeucht’s game on given finite structures A and B is in P;
the decision problem: given m ∈N and finite structures A and B, decide whether
Duplicator has a winning strategy, is PSPACE-complete, see (Kolaitis [3], 2.4.4,
2.4.5).
Hanf’s criterion is set in the metric structure of Gaifman’s graph Gaifman [5] to
which we now proceed.
Definition 8.6 (The Gaifman graph of a structure) Consider a structure A with the
domain A and with relational symbols Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k interpreted as R1A , R2A , . . . , RkA .
The Gaifman graph G(A) is the structure with vocabulary E A on the domain A, where
for x, y ∈ A, E A (x, y) holds if and only if
(i) either x = y;
ni
(ii) or, there exists RiA of arity n i and (ai )i=1 such that RiA (a1 , a2 , . . . , ani ) holds
ni
and x, y are elements of (ai )i=1 .
Condition (ii) defines an undirected graph and condition (i) add loops which are not
allowed in undirected graphs, so we get a hybrid graph.
For instance, consider a single binary relation R; the formula φ R (x, y) ≡ (x =
y) ∨ (R(x, y) ∨ R(y, x)) describes in FO the graph G(A).
Definition 8.7 (Topological structures in Gaifman graphs) In a Gaifman graph, one
may define a topological structure by introducing the notion of a neighborhood based
on the notion of distance. The notion of distance is as usual for graphs, i.e, as the
length of the shortest path, which can be defined by induction as
396 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(i) d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y;

(ii) d(x, y) = r + 1 if and only if there exists z such that d(x, z) = r and E A (z, y).
Conditions (i), (ii) can be expressed by means of an FO formula, denoted, say,
φrd (x, y). Then, we can define formulae φ≤r ≥r
d (x, y), φd (x, y), and analogously for
< r , and > r .
A general form of FO formula φrd (x, y) can be

(x = y) ∨ φd(r −1) (x, z) ∧ E A (z, y).

We define a closed ball about x of radius r ∈N as B(x, r ) = {y : d(x, y) ≤ r }; an

open ball of radius r about x is B(x, r ) = {y : d(x, y) < r }. These notions can be
expressed in FO: (y ∈ B(x, r )) ≡ (φ≤r d (x, y)).
Localization of an FO formula χ(x, y) about x within the radius r is a for-
mula χ B(x,r ) (x, y) which satisfies the condition A |= χ B(x,r ) (a, b) ≡ B(x, a) |=
χ B(x,r ) (a, b) for each pair a, b in domain of X . The local character of χ B(x,r ) (x, y)
is expressed by the equivalence

∃y.χ B(x,r ) (x, y) ≡ φ≤r

d (x, y) ∧ χ B(x,r ) (x, y).

Each ball B(x, r ) can be regarded as a structure B(x, r ) with the universe B(x, r ),
relational symbols P restricted to interpretations restricted to B(x, r ) and constants
within B(x, r ). We denote by τ (B(x, r )) the isomorphism type of B(x, r ) in the sense
that isomorphic structures B(x, r ) and B(y, s) satisfy the condition τ (B(x, r )) =
τ (B(y, s)). In the sequel we denote by the generic symbol τ any isomorphism type
of a closed ball.
A sentence is basic local for a given r if it is of the form:
 
∃x1 , x2 , . . . , xn . (φ>2r
d (x i , x j )) χ B(xi ,r ) .
i< j i

The distance value 2r comes form the triangle inequality: if y, z ∈ B(x, r ), then
d(y, z) ≤ 2r , hence, the condition d(xi , x j ) > 2r guarantees that xi , x j belong in
disjoint balls. This explains the adjective ‘local’.
We state the first of theorems on locality properties of FO Gaifman [5].
Theorem 8.2 Each FO closed formula is equivalent to Boolean combination of
basic local formulae.
For a proof, please consult, e.g., (Ebbinghaus and Flum [4]).
In this context, the Hanf theorem proposes a criterion for m-equivalence. A type
of a ball B(x, r ) is an isomorphism type of the sub-structure B(x, r ); same for
B(x, r ). This means that balls B(x, r ) and B(y, r ) are of the same type if structures
(B(x, r ), x) and (B(y, r ), y) are isomorphic.
Before addressing the Hanf locality theorem, we recall the notion of witnessing
sequences for Ehrenfeucht games from Chap. 3.
8.1 Introduction: Expressive Power of FO. Recapitulation 397

For structures (A, (a)k1 ) and (B, (b)k1 ), with respective domains A, B and for
j
j ≤ m, we denote by (s)1 elements of the domain A selected by players after the
j
j − th round and we denote by (d)1 elements of the domain B selected by players
after the j − th round. The following statement holds.
(i) if Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game G m (A, (a)k1 ; B, (b)k1 ),
j j
then, for each j ≤ m, the position ((a)k1 (s)1 ; (b)k1 (d)1 ) establishes a partial
isomorphism.

Theorem 8.3 At each stage j < m of each party of the game G m , if Duplicator has
the winning strategy for the game G m , then there are moves extending the winning
strategy from G j to G j−1 , viz.

(i) (forth) for each a ∈ A, there exists b ∈ B such that the pair (a, b) added to the
position of G j provides a partial isomorphism at the position of G j−1 ;
(ii) (back) for each b ∈ B, there exists a ∈ A such that the pair (a, b) added to the
position of G j provides a partial isomorphism at the position of G j−1 .

The next result paves the way from existence of the winning strategy for Duplicator
to m-equivalence of structures.

Definition 8.8 (m-witnessing sequences; m-isomorphism) For structures A and B

over a relational vocabulary Σ, we call a witnessing m-sequence a sequence denoted
(I j ) j≤m of sets with properties

(i) each set I j is a set of partial isomorphisms from A to B;

(ii) each pair I j+1 , I j has properties (forth) and (back) defined in Theorem 8.3.

Structures A and B are said to be m-isomorphic, denoted X ∼m Y , if there exists a

witnessing m-sequence for them. The theorem by Fraïsse [6] makes this observation
formal.

Theorem 8.4 For structures A and B, for each m, A ∼m B if and only if A ≡m B.

We have then equivalences: Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game

G m (A, B) if and only if A ≡m B if and only if A ∼m B. Please see Sects. 3.19
and 3.20 for proofs of these equivalences.
Now, we are ready for the Hanf theorem (Hanf [2] for infinite structures, (Fagin
et al. [7]) for finite structures).

Theorem 8.5 For structures A and B and a natural number m, A ≡m B if there

exists a natural number q such that the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) Balls of radius 3m in either structure contain less than q vertices for each type
τ of 3m -balls;
(ii) Either both structures have the same numbers of 3m balls of each type τ or
each structure has more than qm elements with 3m balls of each type τ .
398 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Proof We apply the Fraïssé theorem and we demonstrate the m-equivalence of struc-
tures by constructing a witnessing m-sequence. This sequence is constructed as
follows:
m− j m− j
(i) I j is f : (ai )i=1 → (bi )i=1 which is a partial isomorphism from A to
B and structures (B({ai : i ≤ m − j}, 3 j ), {ai : i ≤ m − j}) and (B({bi : i ≤ m −
j}, 3 j ), {bi : i ≤ m − j}) are isomorphic.
The element Im = f : ∅ → ∅ satisfies (i), hence, one has to show that the sequence
(I j ) has the extension properties (forth) and (back). As they are symmetric to each
other, it is sufficient to consider the property (forth).
Consider f : (ai )i≤m−( j+1) → (bi )i≤m−( j+1) in I j+1 with isomorphic via an assign-
ment f structures
(B((ai )i≤m−( j+1) , 3 j+1 ), (ai )i≤m−( j+1) )

and
(B((bi )i≤m−( j+1) , 3 j+1 ), (bi )i≤m−( j+1) ).

We need to find a, b extending I j+1 to I j . Consider an a ∈ A. There are two cases.

Case 1. a is relatively close to some ai , i.e., a ∈ B((ai )i≤m−( j+1) , 2 · 3 j ). Then letting
m− j
a = am− j and forming the extended sequence (ai )i=1 we have that B((ai )i≤m− j , 3 j )
⊆ B((ai )i≤m−( j+1) , 3 j+1 ), hence, the isomorphism f defines b = f (a) which extends
m− j+1
the sequence (bi )i=1 by b = bm− j leading to I j .
m−( j+1)
Case 2. a ∈/ B((ai )i≤m−( j+1) , 2 · 3 j ). Thus balls B(a, 3 j ) and B((ai )i=1 , 3 j ) are
disjoint. By the isomorphism f , balls
i=m−( j+1)
B((ai )i=1 , 2 · 3j)

and
i=m−( j+1)
B((bi )i=1 , 2 · 3j)

contain the same number of balls of radius 3 j isomorphic to the ball B(a, 3 j ). The
number of these balls is not greater than the number of ai ’s times q, i.e, ≤ q · m.
As the number of balls isomorphic to B(a, 3 j ) is by assumption of the theorem
greater than q · m, there exists b ∈ B such that B(b, 3 j ) is isomorphic to B(a, 3 j )
m−( j+1)
/ B((bi )i=1
and b ∈ , 2 · 3 j ). This b = bm− j completes I j . 

Hanf’s theorem essentially states that FO-isomorphisms of structures are deter-

mined by local structures encapsulated in ball-neighborhoods.
The Hanf approach was taken up in (Fagin et al. [7]) which brought a simpler
criterion for m-equivalence (i.e., for Duplicator’s permanent winning G m ’s).
First, preliminaries; they are of course like those given before Gaifman’s theorem.
Consider a structure A with the domain A and a language L with relational vocabulary
consisting of relational symbols R1 , R2 , . . . , Rn interpreted in A as relations RiA of
arities n i , respectively.
8.1 Introduction: Expressive Power of FO. Recapitulation 399

We say that elements x, y in A are adjacent if either x = y or there exists a relation

Ri and a tuple (x)n1i = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xni ) with x = xi , y = x j for some i, j such that
Ri ((x j )nj=1
i
) holds. For a subset Y of A, we define the sub-structure A|Y with relations
Ri |Y .
A closed ball about x of radius r is defined by induction beginning with B(x, 1) =
{x} and then B(x, r + 1) to be the set of elements adjacent to some element of B(x, r ).
The r -type of an element x is the isomorphism type of B(x, r ): elements x, y are of
the same r -type if and only if (B(x, r ), x) and (B(y, r ), y) are isomorphic, and each
isomorphism maps x to y.
We say that two structures A, B are r, m-equivalent if and only if for each r -type
ρ either they have the same number of type ρ elements or each of them has at least m
elements of type ρ for r ≤ m. Structures A and B are r -equivalent if for each r -type
ρ they have the same number of elements of type ρ.

Remark 8.2 By definition, if r1 < r2 , then r2 -equivalent structures are also r1 -

equivalent.

Remark 8.3 By degree of x in A is understood the number of elements adjacent to

x save x. Suppose that degrees of elements in a ball B(x, r r) are not greater than f
and greater than 1. Then, the size of B(x, r ) is at most 1− f
1− f
< f r (just the sum of
r −1
the geometric progression 1 + f + f + ... + f ).
2

We now state the theorem by (Fagin et al. [7]) on Hanf-like conditions for winning
strategy by Duplicator.

Theorem 8.6 For each pair q, f of natural numbers, there exist natural numbers
r, m such that if any structures A and B whose elements have degrees bound by f
are r, m-equivalent, then Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game G q (A, B),
i.e., A ∼
=q B. Moreover, r depends only on q.

Proof ([7]) We let r = 3q−1 and m = q · f r −1 . Consider structures A with the

domain A and B with the domain B which are r, m-equivalent with degrees of
elements in both bounded by f . We claim that Duplicator has the winning strategy
in the game G r on A and B.
The idea of proof is to show by induction that after j elements have been
j j
selected : (ai )1 in A and (bi )1 in B, the condition:


j

j
( j) A| B(ai , 3q− j ) is isomorphic to B| B(bi , 3q− j ),
i=1 i=1

under an isomorphism which maps each ai to the corresponding bi .

Case 1: j = 1. Let a1 be the Spoiler choice from A; let ρ be the R-type of a1 . By
r, m-equivalence of A and B, one can find in B an element with the r -type ρ and it
is the choice by Duplicator.
400 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Case 2: induction step. Suppose that j < q and the condition (j) holds. Let Spoiler
select a j+1 in A. We have to assure that Duplicator selects b j+1 in B in order to
satisfy the condition (j+1). There are some sub-cases.
j
Sub-case 2.1. Suppose that a j+1 ∈ i=1 B(ai , 2 · 3q− j−1 ). As


j
(∗) B(a j+1 , 3q− j−1 ) ⊆ B(ai , 3q− j ),
i=1

Duplicator selects b j+1 corresponding to a j+1 under the isomorphism of case (j).
Sub-case 2.2. Suppose that 2.1 does not hold. Let 3q− j−1 -type of a j+1 be ρ. Let
j
jρ be the number of elements in i=1 B(ai , 2 · 3q− j−1 ) with type ρ.
j
For each a ∈ i=1 B(ai , 2 · 3q− j−1 ), we have


j
(∗∗) B(a, 3q− j−1 ) ⊆ B(ai , 3q− j ).
i=1

j
It follows that jρ is the number of elements with type ρ in i=1 B(ai , 3q− j ). By
j
analogy, jρ is the number of elements in i=1 B(bi , 2 · 3q− j−1 ) having type ρ. Our
claim is now the following.
Claim. jρ < m. As 2 · 3q− j−1 < 3q−1 = r , we have 2 · 3q− j−1 ≤ r − 1. By Remark
8.3, the size of B(ai , 2 · 3q− j−1 ) is less than f r −1 , hence, all j balls have total size
less than j · d r −1 < r · d r −1 = m. Hence, jρ < m.
It follows from Claim, that A contains at least jρ + 1 elements with type ρ (to
jρ of them, we add a j+1 ). By r, m-equivalence of A and B and Remark 8.2, A, B
are 3q− j−1 , m-equivalent as 3q− j−1 < r . As jρ + 1 ≤ m, B contains at least jρ + 1
j
elements with type ρ. As i=1 B(bi , 2 · 3q− j−1 ) contains jρ elements of type ρ, there
j
exists an element b j+1 with type ρ not in i=1 B(bi , 2 · 3q− j−1 ) and let Duplicator
select b j+1 . This choice satisfies the condition (j+1).
By induction, the condition (q) holds, hence Duplicator wins the
game G q . 
As r, m-equivalence implies r equivalence and parameter r depends on q only,
the result of Theorem 8.6 can be modified to the theorem.
Theorem 8.7 For each natural number q there exists a natural number r such that
if any two structures A, B are r -equivalent, then Duplicator has the winning strategy
in game G q on A and B.
Combining Theorem 8.7 with Gaifman’s and Ehrenfeucht-Fraïsse’s theorems, we
can assert that two finite structures A, B are isomorphic if and only if they agree on
all closed FO formulae.
To show an application, we include an argument from [7] on non-expressive ness
of connectedness in FO.
8.2 Syntax and Semantics of Second-Order Logic (SO) 401

Example 8.1 Connectedness in the class of finite graphs is not FO-definable. We

apply the statement dual to statement (*) in Remark 0 : (**) a property Q is definable
in FO if and only if there is q such that if structures A and B are respectively A in
Q and B not in Q, then the spoiler has the winning strategy in the game G q on AX
and B.
Select then q in (**) and parameter r existing by Theorem 8.6 and consider the
graph G 0 which is a cycle with 4r vertices and the graph G 1 which is a disconnected
union of two disjoint sub-graphs G 10 and G 11 each of which is a cycle on 2r ver-
tices. Clearly, G 0 and G 1 are r -equivalent, hence, to the contrary, Duplicator has the
winning strategy.

8.2 Syntax and Semantics of Second-Order Logic (SO)

Definition 8.9 (Syntactic structure of SO) SO adds to the syntax of FO countably

many predicate variables X 1k , X 2k ,. . ., X kj , . . . of arity k, for each k > 0, each X kj
encoding a relation of arity k. Vocabulary of SO contains FO-relational symbols,
SO-relational symbols and constants.

Formal definition of syntactic constituents follows:

(i) Terms are FO-individual variables x1 , x2 , . . . , xk , . . . and constants
c1 , c2 , . . . , c j , . . .;
(ii) Atomic formulae of SO are

(a) t = t  where t, t  are terms;

(b) P(t), where P a predicate symbol in relational vocabulary and t is a set of
terms as numerous as arity of P;
(c) X (t) where X is an SO predicate variable and t a set of terms of cardinality
equal to arity of X .

(iii) Formulae of SO are closed under Boolean connectives and FO-quantification;

we denote by x, X, respectively, a tuple of FO-variables and a tuple of SO-
variables and then if φ(x, Y, X) is an SO-formula, then ∃Y.φ(x, Y , X) and
∀Y.φ(x, Y, X) are SO-formulae. Clearly, elements of tuples x and X are free
in φ.

Definition 8.10 (Semantics of SO) A structure A for SO is a set A along with

individual variables and constants of FO, relational symbols of FO, relational symbols
of SO. FO semantics remains; for SO-formulae:
(i) A |= X (t1 , t2 , . . . , tk ) if and only if there exists C ⊆ Ak such that (t1A , t2A ,
. . . , tkA ) ∈ C;
(ii) A |= ∃Y.φ(x, Y, X) if and only if there exist a1 , a2 , . . . , a j with j = |x|, there
exist B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm with m = |X|, each Bi ⊆ Ani , n i the arity of X i ∈ X, and,
there exists C ⊆ A p , where p the arity of Y , such that A |= φ(a, C, B);
402 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(iii) A |= ∀Y.φ(x, Y, X) if and only if there exist a1 , a2 , . . . , a j with j = |x|, there

exist B1 , B2 , . . . , Bm with m = |X|, each Bi ⊆ Ani , n i the arity of X i ∈ X, and,
for each C ⊆ A p , where p the arity of Y , A |= φ(a, C, B).
The formula ∃!x.φ(x) means that there exists a unique x satisfying φ; it is the
shortcut for ∃x.φ(x) ∧ ∀x, y.φ(x) ∧ φ(y) ⊃ x = y.
Theorem 8.8 The following are among semantic equivalences in SO.
(i) (¬∃X.φ) ≡ ∀X.¬φ;
(ii) (¬∀X.φ) ≡ ∃X.¬φ;
(iii) (φ ∨ ∀Y.ψ) ≡ ∀Y.(φ ∨ ψ) if Y is not free in φ;
(iv) similarly to (iii) with ∃ in place of ∀ and ∧ in place of ∨;
(v) ∃x.Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q k .φ(x) ≡ ∃X.Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q k .(∃!x.X (x) ∧ ∀x.(X (x) ⊃ φ(x)));
(vi) ∀x.Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q k .φ(x) ≡ ∀X.Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q k .(∃!x.X (x) ∧ ∀x.(X (x) ⊃ φ(x))).
Equivalences (i)–(vi) allow to transform any formula φ of SO into the prenex form:
Q 1 Q 2 . . . Q l q1 q2 . . . qm .ψ, where Q i ’s are SO-quantifiers, q j ’s are FO-quantifiers,
and the matrix ψ is quantifier free.
Prenex forms of SO formulae allow for further stratification of formulae into
classes. The basic distinction is between unary predicates and predicates of arities
greater than 1.
Definition 8.11 (Monadic SO logic (MSO)) Monadic second order logic (MSO)
does encompass formulae in which second-order quantifiers bound only unary rela-
tional symbols, i.e., names for subsets of the structure domain.
Further selection of classes concerns the prenex forms: formulae of the form
∃X 1 . . . ∃X k .φ, where φ does not contain second-order quantifiers form the ∃MSO
class and formulae of the form ∀X 1 . . . ∀X k .φ with φ without any occurrence of
second-order quantifiers form the ∀MSO class. The class ∃MSO is also denoted Σ11
and the class ∀MSO is denoted Π11 . In the aftermath of the Fagin Theorem 8.18,
∃MSO is also called monadicNP.
Definition 8.12 (MSO Ehrenfeucht games) We have as in FO, two players, Spoiler
and Duplicator, who are playing on two structures with the same relational vocab-
ularies, A and B. In an m-round party of the Game G m , Spoiler selects either an
element of A or B or a subset of either A or B, and Duplicator responds with either
an element of the other domain or with the subset of the other domain.
After m moves, players select elements a1 , a2 , . . . , ak ∈ A, b1 , b2 , . . . , bk in B,
subsets C1 , C2 , . . . , Cm−k of A and subsets D1 , D2 , . . . , Dm−k of B.
Definition 8.13 (MSO winning strategies) Duplicator wins this party if and only if
f : (a)k1 → (b)k1 is a partial isomorphism between structures (A, C1 , . . . , Cm−k ) and
(B, D1 , . . . , Dm−k ). Otherwise, Spoiler wins the party.
Duplicator has an m-winning strategy if an only if it wins every party of the game
Gm .
8.2 Syntax and Semantics of Second-Order Logic (SO) 403

Definition 8.14 (MSO-rank) For a formula φ of SO, the SO-rank of φ denoted

qr S O (φ) is like FO-rank except the case of φ in the form either ∃X.φ or ∀X.φ with
a relational symbol X , in which cases qr S O (φ) = 1 + qr S O (ψ). We define the class
M S O[k] as the collection of all MSO-formulae of MSO-rank less or equal to k.

Definition 8.15 (m-equivalence) We say that structures A and B are m-equivalent if

and only if they agree on MSO[k], i.e., for each closed formula φ in MSO[k], A |= φ
if and only if B |= φ.

Definition 8.16 (MSO-definable classes) For an MSO formula φ the class Cls-
mod(φ) of φ-definable structures consists of all MSO-structures A such that A |= φ.

Like with FO-case, the notion of the class Cls-mod(φ) is easier to be characterized
in the negative.

Theorem 8.9 (The methodology of Ehrenfeucht’s MSO games)

(i) A class C of structures with a relational vocabulary Σ is not MSO-definable
if and only if for each m there exist structures A and B over Σ such that (i) A ∈ C;
(ii) B ∈/ C; (iii) A ≡mM S O B.
(ii) the dual criterion is : A class C of structures over a relational vocabulary Σ
is MSO-definable if and only if there exists a natural number m such that for every
two structures A and B over Σ if A is in C and B is not in C, then Spoiler wins the
MSO game G m on A and B.

Proof is essentially the same as for FO-case in Sect. 3.20.

Definition 8.17 (Class EVEN) EVEN is the class of all finite sets having an even
number of elements.

Theorem 8.10 The class EVEN is not MSO-definable.

Proof In this case the vocabulary Σ is the empty set. Let sets A, B be given. One
proves by induction that if |A| > 2k and |B| > 2k , then A ≡kM S O B, i.e., Duplicator
has the winning strategy in k moves. Suppose the thesis be true for k and consider
A, B of cardinalities greater than 2k+1 .
Suppose Spoiler selects in its first move a set X ⊆ A.
Case 1. |X | ≤ 2k . Then Duplicator can select a set Y ⊆ B such that |X | = |Y |, hence,
X, Y are isomorphic and thus X ≡kM S O Y . As A \ X, B \ Y are of cardinalities greater
or equal to 2k , hence, by the hypothesis of induction, A \ X ≡kM S O B \ Y .
Playing on pairs X, Y ; A \ X, B \ Y , Duplicator has a winning strategy in k + 1
moves by combining winning strategies on pairs X, Y and A \ X, B \ Y .
Analogous, by symmetry, is the case when |A \ X | ≤ k. So, the only remaining is
Case 2. |X | > 2k and |A \ X | > 2k . Suppose that Duplicator selects a subset Y ⊆ B
with |Y | > 2k and |B \ Y | > 2k .
By the hypothesis of induction, Duplicator has a winning strategy from X, Y as
well as from A \ X, B \ Y in k moves, i.e., A ≡k+1
M SO
B. 
404 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Let us observe that EVEN is SO-definable, for instance, by the formula

∃X.∃Y.∃F.∀x.(x ∈ X ∨ x ∈ Y )∧
∀x, y.(x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ Y ⊃ ¬(x = y)) ∧ ∀x.∃y.(x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ Y ∧
∀x.∃!y(F(x, y) ∧ ∀y.∃!x.F(x, y))

which represents a given set as the disjoint union of two subsets of the same cardi-
nality. We need to this end second-order predicates X, Y, F.

8.3 Graph Structures in MSO

We have shown in Sect. 3.20 that the class of undirected connected finite graphs,
usually denoted CONN, is not FO-definable. With MSO, the situation is twofold:
CONN is not ∃MSO-definable and it is ∀MSO-definable.
The aim of this section is to prove the non-definability in ∃MSO of the property
of finite graphs to be connected. The proof we give rests on the Hanf Theorem 8.5
which in a sense ‘geometrizes’ the logical content.
We now focus on finite graphs. We recall that a graph is connected if and only
if any two vertices are connected by a path; the distance ρ(u, v) between vertices u
and v is the length of the shortest path from u to v (we discuss undirected graphs) if
such a path exists, otherwise the distance is ∞. A (closed) ball about u of radius r is
the set B(u, r ) = {v : ρ(u, v) ≤ r }. 
For a finite set C, the ball B(C, r ) is defined as the union c∈C B(c,r ) . A ball B(u, r )
type is the isomorphism type of the ball B(u, r ). Hence, u in A and v in B have the
same isomorphism type of ball or radius r about them if structures (B(u, r ), u) and
(B(v, r ), v) are isomorphic.
The following result is due to Fagin [8].
Theorem 8.11 The class CONN of finite connected graphs is not definable in ∃MSO.
Proof Suppose to the contrary that there exists unary predicates P1 , P2 , . . ., Pk such
that for a formula φ : ∃P1 ∃P2 . . . ∃Pk .ψ, the class CONN of finite connected graphs
is Cls − mod(φ).
The graph structures which are m-equivalent but one is connected and the other is
not, are: a cyclic graph G, and two disjoint cyclic subgraphs G 1 , G 2 obtained from
G. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k be sets implementing predicates P1 , . . . , Pk in the graph G
we are going to define. Then we claim that G, X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k |= ψ. Observe that
X i ’s being sets, they do not affect isomorphism types of balls in G. In order to
construct required graphs, we observe that each local structure about any vertex in
a cyclic graph is a linear arc, hence, for a given m, and a ball B(a, 3m ) the ball
contains 2 · 3m + 1 elements. Assuming the cardinality of the cyclic G to be at least
2 · (2 · 3m + 1) (as all 3m -balls are isomorphic), we find in G two ‘antipodal’ vertices
a, b with disjoint and isomorphic 3m balls.
8.3 Graph Structures in MSO 405

Fig. 8.1 Graphs G 1 , G 2

Letting a∗, b∗ be vertices preceding a, respectively b in the cyclic order, we

remove edges (a∗, a) and (b∗, b) from G adding edges (a∗, b) and (b∗, a) and we
produce by this two disjoint cyclic graphs G 1 , G 2 , see Fig. 8.1.
One checks that G and the union G 1 ∪ G 2 contain the same number of isomorphic
balls of the radius of 3m , hence, by Hanf’s theorem G, X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k and G 1 ∪
G 2 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k are m-isomorphic, hence, by the Fraïssé theorem they are m-
equivalent, and the Ehrenfeucht theorem implies that the class of finite connected
graphs is not ∃MSO-definable. 
Please observe that one can also apply the proof in Theorem 8.6.
In order to prove the definability of CONN in ∀MSO, one produces the formula
which does express the fact that the given graph G cannot be divided into two
subgraphs without any connection between them:

¬[∃H.(∃x.H (x) ∧ ∃y.¬H (y)∧

∀x, y.(H (x) ∧ ¬H (y) ⊃ ¬E(x, y).

The second of many problems studied for graphs with respect to MSO is REACH:
the problem of reachability. For a graph G (undirected or directed), reachability is the
question whether given two vertices s and t, there exists in G a path from s to t in case
of a directed graph or a path between s and t in case of an undirected graph. REACH
discerns between ∃MSO and ∀MSO. We recall that undirected graphs cannot have
loops.
The following fact was announced by (Kanellakis).
Theorem 8.12 REACH is expressible in ∃.MSO for undirected graphs.
Proof (Ajtai and Fagin [9]) Given an undirected graph G and its vertices s, t along
with a unary predicate P (by necessity s = t), we produce three formulae φ, ψ, χ
which express the following
(i) φ does express that P(s) ∧ P(t);
(ii) ψ does express that both s, t are connected each to exactly one vertex satisfied
by P;
406 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(iii) χ does express that each v such that P(v) ∧ (v = s) ∧ (v = t) is connected

to exactly two elements w, z such that P(w) ∧ P(z).
The formula ξ : φ ∧ ψ ∧ χ defines a shortest path from s to t. 

We now define Ajtai-Fagin games (Ajtai and Fagin [9]) for ∃MSO.

Definition 8.18 (Ajtai-Fagin games) These games introduce a new ingredient into
Ehrenfeucht’s second-order games: a feature of ’color’. For structures A with the
domain A and B with the domain B over a common finite vocabulary Σ, for selected
natural numbers c, r , we define the c, r -second order game G c,r . Ajtai-Fagin game is
localized on a given class Cls − mod(φ); we recall that it is the class of all structures
which are models for the formula φ. Rules of the game are as follows.
(i)Spoiler selects natural numbers c, r ;
(ii)Duplicator chooses a structure A ∈ Cls − mod(φ);
(iii)Spoiler selects subsets (unary relations) S1 , S2 , . . . , Sc of the domain A;
(iv) Duplicator responds with a choice of a structure B not in Cls − mod(φ) along
with subsets D1 , D2 , . . . , Dc of the domain B;
(v) Spoiler and Duplicator play a party of the Ehrenfeucht game G r on structures
(A, S1 , S2 , . . . , Sc ) and (B, D1 , D2 , . . . , Dc ).

Analysis of the game G c,r requires a new notion of a type t yper,k . We recall that
F O[k] is the set of FO formulae of quantifier rank at most k.

Remark 8.4 For a finite vocabulary Σ, and a given natural number r , there are in
the class FO[k] over Σ finitely many formulae with free variables x1 , x2 , . . . , xr .

The proof of Remark 8.4 goes by induction on k: for k = 0, we have finitely many
atomic formulae and their Boolean combinations are also finite in number. Assuming
hypothesis of induction for k, we find that a formula φ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xr ) in FO[k+1] is
a Boolean combination of formulae of the form ∃xr +1 .ψ(x1 , x2 , . . . , xr ) with ψ in
FO[k], hence, the number of formulae of the form φ is finite.

Definition 8.19 (Typesr,k ) We continue with the vocabulary Σ and a structure A over
Σ. For a tuple a = (ai )ri=1 and r, k, we let t yper,k (A, a)={φ ∈ F O[k] : A |= φ(a}.
A t yper,k (A) is the class of functions in t yper,k (A, a) for a of length r .

By Remark 8.4, the number of distinct classes t yper,k is finite.

Theorem 8.13 The following are equivalent for a class Cls − Mod(φ):

(i) Duplicator has the winning strategy in the Ajtai-Fagin game for Cls − mod(φ);
(ii) Cls − mod(φ) is not definable in ∃MSO.

Let us also state the dual: Cls − mod(φ) is definable in ∃MSO if and only if there
are parameters c, r such that Spoiler has the winning strategy in the Ajtai-Fagin G c,r
for Cls − mod(φ).
8.3 Graph Structures in MSO 407

Proof (On the idea in Immerman [10]) Consider the case of Cls − mod(φ), where
φ is of the form ∃C1 , C2 , . . . , Cc .ψ and ψ is an FO formula of quantifier rank r .
The winning strategy for Spoiler is in the following steps: it chooses c, r , and for
the choice of a structure A ∈ Cls − mod(φ) by Duplicator, Spoiler chooses subsets
S1 , S2 , . . . , Sc in the domain A of A such that (A, S1 , S2 , . . . , Sc ) |= ψ.
Duplicator chooses then a structure B not in Cls − mod(φ). Irrespective of the
choice of subsets D1 , D2 , . . . , Dc of the domain B of the structure B, the structure
(B, D1 , D2 , . . . , Dc ) does not satisfy φ. Hence, Spoiler wins the game.
Suppose Cls − mod(φ) is not expressible by ∃MSO. We have to show that Dupli-
cator wins. Spoiler chooses c, r . By Remark 8.4, The maximal set Γ of pair-wise
non-equivalent formulae of forms ∃C1 , C2 , . . . , Cc .ψ with ψ an FO formula of quan-
tifier rank r is finite.
Consider the set

Δ = {ξ ∈ Γ : for each structure B ∈

/ Cls − mod(φ), B |= ¬ξ}.

Define the formula δ as ξ∈Δ ξ. The formula δ belongs in ∃MSO as disjunction
distributes over existential quantification. As δ does not express Cls − mod(φ),
there exists a structure A satisfying φ such that A |= ¬δ.
Then, Duplicator chooses A. In return, Spoiler selects subsets S1 , S2 , . . . , Sc of
the domain A along with a formula η satisfied by (A, S1 , S2 , . . . , Sc ). Let E to be the
formula ∃.C1 , C2 , . . . , Cc .η. As A |= E, E ∈
/ Γ . Hence, there exists a structure B not
in Cls − mod(φ) such that B |= E. Duplicator chooses B and colors D1 , D2 , . . . , Dc
such that (B, D1 , D2 , . . . , Dc ) |= E. As the result, Duplicator wins. 

We know that REACH is expressible in the class of finite undirected graphs cf.
Theorem 8.12. To the contrary, the problem dREACH: to determine whether a path
exists from s to t in a directed graph G is not expressible in ∃MSO (Ajtai and
Fagin [9]). (Arora and Fagin [11]) gave a few proofs for this statement, all based on
characteristics of directed graphs. Due to excessive length of all necessary arguments,
we include a sketch of the proof in (Arora and Fagin [11]). The proof reminds of the
Hanf theorem in requirements for the graph G D which will be chosen by Duplicator.
Let us quote them.

Proof The graph G D is on n vertices ordered as v1 , v2 , . . . , vn . The intended s = v1

and the intended t = vn . The path from s to t consists of edges < vi , vi+1 > for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. There are also ‘backedges’ possible of the form < vi , v j >
with i > j. The requirements for the proof to go are as follows (Arora, Fagin, op.cit.
7.1): Let c, d, q, m be natural numbers and let ε > 0. For a satisfactorily large natural
number n, there exists a graph G D on n vertices with a path from s to t with backedges
such that:
(i) for each vertex v of G D , the ball of radius m about v contains less that n ε
vertices;
(ii) for each cycle of less than m vertices, the number of vertices in the cycle is less
than n ε ;
408 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(iii) for each coloring of vertices of G D by spoiler, when an edge e is removed from
the path from s to t, then with the probability 1 − ε each vertex is d, q-colored
in G D − {e} as in G D . 

Definition 8.20 (m-type) For m vertices v1 , v2 , . . . , vm , we consider conjunctions

in L in which vertices v replace variables x such that (i) for i, j, only one of
vi = v j or vi = v j occurs as a conjunct (ii) for each relational symbol R of
arity k and each choice of tuple vi1 , . . . , vik where i u ≤ m, each u, only one of
R(vi1 , . . . , vik ),¬R(vi1 , . . . , vik ) is a conjunct. A vertex v has a positive occurrence
in an m-type T if it occurs in a tuple v such that R(v) is a positive conjunct in T .

The notion of an m-type is an attempt at description of inner relations among

vertices with respect to relations interpreted in L.

Definition 8.21 (The (d, q)-color) Let L be a language of logic with a finite rela-
tional vocabulary and m be the maximum of arities of relational symbols.

For a vertex v, (d, 0)-color of v is a set of descriptions, for each relational symbol R
of arity k, whether the tuple (v)k1 belongs in R.
For q > 0, (d, q)-color is defined by induction. Then, (d, q + 1)-color of v
includes (d, q)-color of v plus descriptions for each choice of (d, q)-colors c1 , c2 , . . . ,
cm−1 and each m-type T of a tuple of m vertices which does include v of whether
there are from 0 to d choices of tuples < v1 , v2 , . . . , vm−1 > such that the tuple
< v, v1 , v2 , . . . , vm−1 > is of m-type T and each vi has (d, q)-color ci .

Proof (Continued) As with Hanf theorem, the notion of (d, q)-color tries to capture
the inner structure of a graph, but not in geometric terms of distance but in logi-
cal relations encoded in a given logical language. Requirements (i)-(iii) allow for
carrying out the proof.
Consider the class R of directed (s, t)-connected graphs. In the (c, r )-game Dupli-
cator selects a graph G D with a path from s to t as described in the context. For a
forward edge e =< vi , vi+1 > for some i, we consider the graph G eD which is G D
with e removed, which breaks down the path s-t, hence, G eD is not in R.
There exists a G D such that for each coloring by Spoiler, there exists an edge e
such that G eD can be colored in the same way as G D and Duplicator has the winning
strategy in the Ehrenfeucht game G r . Thus, R is not in ∃MSO. 

Definition 8.22 (Alternating graphs) An alternating graph AG = (V, E, A, s, t) is

a graph in which the set V of vertices is partitioned into the subset A of universal
vertices and the subset V \ A of existential vertices. Let PGa (x, y) mean that there
exists in G an alternating path from x to y. A vertex v is existential if it has the
property: if there exists an edge (x, y) such that PGa (y, z) for some z, then PGa (x, z)
holds. A vertex v is universal if (i) there is and edge (x, y) for some y (ii) if for each
edge (x, y), PGa (y, z), then PGa (x, z).
8.4 Strings in FO and MSO 409

Definition 8.23 (Class a-REACH) a-REACH={G : PGa (s, t)}.

We quote a result on a-REACH due to (Immerman [10], 3.26).

Theorem 8.14 a-REACH is PTIME-complete.

We have given examples of structures like sets, graph structures as viewed by

MSO, now, we consider linear structures like strings, notably languages. Their behav-
ior discerns between FO and MSO and the Büchi theorem shows an analogy between
MSO and automata.

8.4 Strings in FO and MSO

Consider a finite alphabet A (for grammars and languages, see Chap. 1), of cardinality
m. We recall that A∗ denotes the set of finite sequences of elements of A (called
strings, or, words over A when we speak of a language). The empty word is denoted
ε. Subsets of A∗ are called languages, denoted generically as L.
We need to represent words in a language as structures. For each symbol a ∈ A, we
introduce a unary predicate Pa , and the relational vocabulary will be (<, {Pa :∈ A}),
where < represents the relation ordering A.
For a string w, we denote by Aw the structure (w, Paw1 , Paw2 , . . . , Pawm ) where A =
{a1 , a2 , . . . , am } is an ordered alphabet. For w = ai1 ai2 . . . aik , each Paw returns the
positions of the symbol a in w. For instance, for Σ = {a, b, c} and w = abbccaacb,
Paw = {1, 6, 7}, Pbw = {2, 3, 9}, Pcw = {4, 5, 8}.
We can convert these values into a Parikh vector giving the number of occurrences
of the symbol in w, in our case the Parikh vector is [3, 3, 3]. Clearly, if a given symbol
a does not occur in w then the corresponding Paw takes on the value ∅ and the position
in the Parikh vector for a is 0.

Definition 8.24 (Languages defined by formulae) For a formula φ of MSO (or, FO),
over the relational vocabulary Σ, one says that the language L over Σ is defined by
φ if and only if L = {w : Aw |= φ}. We let in that case L = L φ .

One says that the language L over Σ is MSO-definable (respectively, FO-

definable) if there exists a formula φ of MSO (respectively, of FO) such that L = L φ .
In case of MSO, it turns out that a language is MSO-definable if and only if it is
regular. This is the fundamental theorem due to Büchi [12].

Theorem 8.15 A language L over Σ is MSO-definable if and only if it is regular.

Proof (Ladner [13]) We apply here the known to us result that a language is regular
if and only if it is accepted by DFA (deterministic finite automaton), see Chap. 1.
Suppose that the language L is regular and it is accepted by a DFA =(A, Q, q0 , tr, F).
One has to describe actions of DFA on words in L in terms of MSO formulae. Those
actions include beginning in the state q0 , passing from state to state in accordance
410 8 Beyond FO Within SO

with the transition function tr : Q × Σ → Q, terminating in an accepting state in

the accepting set F. The symbol succ(x, y) means that y is the successor to x. Let
w be a word in L. Let states of DFA be {q0 , q1 , q2 , . . . , qk }.
In order to construct the formula defining L, we consider sets X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X k
which for the corresponding states q0 , q1 , . . . , qk describe the positions of symbols
in w. The first formula asserts that these sets form a partition of the set of symbols
in w:
(i) φ1 : ∀x.∃i.(x ∈ X i ∧ ∀ j.(¬( j = i) ⊃ ¬(x ∈ X j )));
The next formula asserts that the DFA begins in state q0 ;
(ii) φ2 : (∀x.∀a ∈ Σ.(Paw (x) ∧ ∀X  .¬(x  = x) ⊃ x  > x) ⊃ X qi (x)), where qi =
tr (q0 , a);
The next formula asserts that DFA works in accordance with the transition function tr ;
(iii) φ3 : ∀x, y, i, a.(succ(x, y) ∧ Paw (y) ∧ X i (x) ⊃ X tr (qi ,a) (y));
The next formula asserts that an accepting state of DFA is reached;
(iv) φ4 : ∀x.∀y.(y ≤ x ⊃ ∃i.qi ∈ F ∧ x ∈ X i );
The formula
(v) φ : ∃X 0 , X 1 , . . . X k .φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ φ3 ∧ φ4 certifies that L = L φ .
Now, for the closed formula φ of MSO, we have to provide a DFA which accepts the
language L φ . The proof goes along lines already applied by model checking.
Consider a closed MSO formula of quantifier rank k. We enumerate as
ι0 , ι1 , . . . , ιm all isomorphism types of closed formulae over Σ of rank k, i.e., for a
type ιi there exists a closed formula φi of rank k such that Aw |= φi if and only if φi
defines type ιi . By Remark 8.4, we know that the number of types is finite.
 We define F as the set of isomorphism types ιi consistent with φ, hence, φ ≡
ιi ∈F φi . The definition of an automaton Ω accepting L φ is as follows:

(vi) states of the automaton Ω are isomorphism types ι0 , ι1 , . . . , ιm ;

with ι0 as the isomorphism type of the string ε;
(vii) the set F is the set of final states;
(viii) the transition relation tr is defined as ι j ∈ tr (ιi , a) if and only if ιi is an
isomorphism type of Aw and ι j is an isomorphism type of Awa
Claim 1. The automaton Ω is a DFA.
Proof of Claim 1. One needs to prove that for each type ιi and each a ∈ A, there
exists a unique ι j ∈ tr (ιi , a). We observe that
(ix) if Aw1 ≡kM S O Aw2 , then Aw1 a ≡kM S O Aw2 a From this one obtains contradiction
with the supposition that words w1 and w2 satisfy
8.4 Strings in FO and MSO 411

(∗)Aw1 ≡kM S O Aw2

but for some a ∈ A, Aw1 a is of type ιi , Aw2 a is of type ι j and (∗∗)ιi = ι j . Type ιi is
defined by the formula φi , type ι j is defined by the formula φ j . By the assumption
(*) (ix), Aw2 |= φ j , hence, ιi = ι j , contrary to the supposition (**). Hence, Ω is a
DFA.
Claim 2. For each word w, the automaton Ω on input w, terminates in the state ιi
which is the type of Aw .
Proof of Claim 2. Proof is by induction, the first step consists in the observation that
on the empty word, Ω terminates on the state ι0 defined as type of Aε . The inductive
step follows by the definition of transition function: if type of Aw is ιi , then type of
Awa is ι j = tr (ιi , a). Finally, Ω accepts a word w if type of Aw is ιi ∈ F, i.e., by
definition of F, ιi is the type of φ, hence, Aw |= φ, i.e., w ∈ L(φ). 

We define the class of star-free regular languages as languages defined by reg-

ular expressions (uv), (u ∪ v), (−u), ∅, a for each a ∈ A, where (−u) defines the
language A∗ \ L(u). More precisely,

(i) L(∅) = ∅;
(ii) L(a) = {a};
(iii) L(u ∪ v) = L(u) ∪ L(v);
(iv) L(−u) = Σ ∗ \ L(u);
(v) L(uv) = L(u)L(v).

For an alphabet of even number of symbols a1 , a2 , . . . , a2k , the regular language

L = (a1 a2 . . . a2k )∗ is not star-free as EVEN is not FO-definable. On the other hand,
the language (a ∪ b)∗ apparently using star if star-free over the alphabet {a, b} as it
is simply −∅.
The counterpart of the Búchi theorem for FO is the following result due to
(McNaughton and Papert [14]).

Theorem 8.16 A language L is FO-definable if and only if it is regular star-free.

Proof (Ebbinghaus and Flum [4]) First, proof that each regular star free language
is FO-definable. It goes by induction on the complexity of regular expression which
defines the language. Empty language is defined by ∅, the singular language {a} is
defined by the expression ∃!x.(x = x) ∧ ∀x.Pa (x). The language −L is defined by
¬φ where φ defines L. The language L 1 ∪ L 2 is defined by the expression φ1 ∨ φ2 ,
where φi defines L i for i = 1, 2.
This leaves concatenation L 1 L 2 . Let φi define L i for i = 1, 2. We need to glue in
some way φ1 and φ2 .
Consider a string s in L 1 L 2 . Let p be the number of the last position in s which has
come from L 1 . Given a sub-formula ∃y.ψ of φ, for a variable x which does not occur
in φ1 or φ2 , replace the quantifier ∃.y with ∃y ≤ x and by analogy, in φ2 replace ∃.y
with ∃y > x. Then, Ms |= ∃x.φ1 (x) ∧ φ2 (x) if and only if s ∈ L 1 L 2 .
412 8 Beyond FO Within SO

In order to prove that each star-free language is FO-definable, we augment models

Ms with a constant max defined by the FO formula ηmax (x) : ∀y.¬(y > x). Proof is
by induction on the quantifier rank k of a closed formula φ.
For k=0, we have Boolean combinations of closed formulae ⊥, , Pa (max): ⊥
defines the empty language ∅,  defines the full language L, and, Pa (max) defines
the language L{a}.
Suppose that the theorem is true for the quantifier rank k and consider a formula
∃x.φ(x) of quantifier rank k + 1. We recall that there are finitely many isomorphism
types of each rank, hence, we enumerate as to , t1 , . . . , tm all isomorphism types of
closed formulae of quantifier rank k.
We consider pairs (ti , t j ) with the property that there exists a string s ∈ L such
that for some position p in the domain of Ms the following hold:
(i) Ms |= φ( p);
≤p
(ii) t ypek (Ms ) = ti ;
>p
(iii) t ypek (Ms ) = t j .
The proof will be completed when the following Claim is proved. We collect pairs
(ti , t j ) in a set T .
Claim 3. For each string v, Mv |= ∃x.φ(x) if and only if there exists in v a position
p with the property that a pair (ti , t j ) ∈ T satisfies (ii) and (iii) in Definition 4.3.
If Claim 3 holds, then the language defined by the formula ∃x.φ is star-free. This
follows by the observation that ti and t j are definable by an FO formula of rank
k,respectively ψi and ψ j , hence, by thehypothesis of induction, languages L(ψ1 )
and L(ψ2 ) are star-free. As L(∃x.φ) = (ti ,t j )∈T L(ψ1 )L(ψ2 ) and concatenation as
well as sum of star-free languages are star-free, we have that L(∃x.φ) is star-free.
First, let Mv |= ∃x.φ; then (ii),(iii) are satisfied with v for some p, (ti , t j ). For the
converse, suppose that v satisfies (ii),(iii) with some p, (ti , t j ).
As (ti , t j ) ∈ T , there exists a string s with parameter p ∗ , such that s satisfies (i)-
≤p ≤ p∗ > p∗
(iii) with p ∗ , (ti , t j ). Then, Mv ≡k Ms and Mv ≡k Ms , hence, (Mv , p) ≡k
p

(Ms , p ∗ ), and as qr (φ) = k, we obtain Mv |= φ( p) and thus Mv |= ∃x.φ(x). This

concludes the proof. 

8.5 Theorems of Trakhtenbrot and Fagin

The completeness property of FO implies that the set of valid FO formulae is recur-
sively enumerable (see Chap. 1) as one can enumerate all proofs of valid formulae.
The case is different for SO. We say that an SO formula is finitely satisfiable over a
relational vocabulary Σ if and only if it is satisfied by some finite structure. An SO
formula is finitely valid over Σ if it is satisfiable by all finite structures over Σ.
Satisfiability problem for finite structures is resolved in the negative by the fol-
lowing theorem due to Trakhtenbrot [15].
8.5 Theorems of Trakhtenbrot and Fagin 413

Theorem 8.17 (Finite unsatisfiability over SO) For each relational vocabulary Σ
containing a binary predicate symbol, the problem of finite satisfiability over Σ is
undecidable.

Proof (Trakhtenbrot [15]) The idea of the proof is to describe a Turing machine TM
in terms of FO by constructing for each TM a formula ΦT M such that ΦT M is finitely
satisfiable if and only if TM halts on empty initial word.
We represent TM as a tuple (Σ, Δ, Q, δ, q0 , Q acc , Q r ej ), where Σ is the input
alphabet, Δ = {0, 1} is the tape alphabet, Q is the set of states, δ is the set of instruc-
tions of TM, q0 is the initial state, Q acc is the set of accepting states, and, Q r ej is the
set of rejecting states. Blank cells are represented by 0.
The relational vocabulary Σ consists of ordering relation symbol <, min which
is the constant symbol interpreting the first element with respect to <, binary tape
predicates T0 and T1 with arguments being a position p on tape and the number of
computation step t for occurrence of respectively 0 or 1, binary predicates Hq for
each state q, Hq ( p, t) shows the position p of Head when machine is at step t and
in state q.
The formula ΦT M is the conjunction of closed formulae:
(i) formula Φ1 : it does express that ordering < is linear and min is its first element;
(ii) formula Φ2 : Hq0 (min, min) ∧ ∀p.T0 (p, min); the initial state is q0 and the
tape contains only blanks (zeros);
(iii) formula Φ2 : ∀ p, t.(T0 ( p, t) ⊃ ¬T1 ( p, t)); at each position and at each step, the
cell may contain either zero  (be blank) or 1; 
(iv) formula Φ3 : ∀t.∃!. p.( q∈Q Hq ( p, t)) ∧ ¬∃ p.¬∃t.( q=q  (Hq ( p, t) ∧ Hq 
( p, t))); at each 
position and at each step, TM is in only one state;
(v) a collection Φ4 : I ∈δ Φ I of closed formulae, one for each instruction I of TM
which does express the change in instantaneous description of TM under the
instruction I ; we omit these formulae as they are quite obvious and examples
are given in Chap. 1in section on Computability;
(vi) a formula φ5 : ∃ p, t. q∈Q acc ∪Qr ej Hq ( p, t); it expresses that at ( p, t) TM reaches
a halting state.
Then, TM halts on the empty input if and only if ΦT M has a finite model consisting
of values of the final configuration. As the Halting problem is undecidable so is the
satisfiability problem over finite models. 

A corollary follows for finitely valid closed formulae.

Corollary 8.1 For each relational vocabulary Σ with at least one binary predicate,
the set of finitely valid closed formulae is not recursively enumerable.

Proof As set of finitely satisfiable closed formulae is recursively enumerable

which is shown by enumerating all pairs consisting of a finite structure over Σ
and a closed formula and printing the formula if it is satisfied by the structure. Was
the set of finitely valid closed formulae recursively enumerable, the complement
to the set of finitely satisfiable closed formulae would be recursively enumerable,
414 8 Beyond FO Within SO

hence, the set of finitely satisfiable closed formulae would be recursive i.e. decidable,
a contradiction. 
The interplay between SO and the NP complexity class was discovered by Fagin
[8, 16]. His result brings forth a logical characterization of the complexity class NP.
The context of this result is as follows.
As with MSO, for SO we have an analogous notation: ∃SO is the class of SO
formulae in which second-order quantifiers are exclusively existential ones, and,
∀SO contains formulae in which second-order prefix consists solely of universal
quantifiers.
Theorem 8.18 (Fagin)) ∃SO = NP.
Proof A witness for satisfiability of a formula ∃.C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck .φ with φ a first
order formula along with a selected structure A can be checked in polynomial time
(cf. Immerman [10] for details). This shows that ∃SO ⊆ NP.
The converse is proved on lines similar to those used in the proof of the Trakhten-
brot theorem: we have to render NP in logic ∃SO. We select a natural number k such
that for any structure of n elements, the encoding of it in Turing Machine requires
size of no more than n k .
We owe then information on encodings. Assume a relational vocabulary Σ con-
sisting of elements a1 < a2 < . . . < an , where < is a linear ordering on A.
For a relational symbol Pi of arity pi , we consider all arrangements of elements
of A resulting from ordering <, their number n pi . Let us denote elements of this
ordering as a1 , a2 , . . . , an pi .
For each j ≤ n pi , define the j-th bit of the encoding E(Pi ) as 1 in case a j ∈ Pi ,
else 0. To inform the machine about the size of A, the string 0n 1 is used, hence,
the full encoding of the structure A is the concatenation of all encodings, m pi i.e,
0n 1E(P1 )E(P2 ) . . . E(Pm ). The size of this encoding is (n + 1) + i=1 n . The
parameter k is sufficiently large to make n k greater than the size of the encoding.
Turing machine TM is a non-deterministic one-way polynomial time machine
(Q, Σ, Δ, δ, qo , Q acc , Q r ej ) already introduced in proof of Theorem 8.17.
That TM accepts encodings of structures over Σ is witnessed by a formula Λ of
the form ∃L , T0 , T1 , T2 , Hq0 , Hq1 , . . . , Hqm−1 φ, where Q = {q0 , q1 , . . ., qm−1 } and φ
is a closed formula in the vocabulary Σ ∪ {L , T0 , T1 , T2 } ∪ {Hq : q ∈ Q}.
Let us observe that by the nature of encodings, position p and time t refer to
segments conforming to lengths of a’s.
As with Theorem 8.17 we give interpretation of predicates:
(i) L is a linear order on the domain of the structure;
(ii) T0 , T1 , respectively, indicate at given p, t whether the symbol is 0 or 1, T2
indicates that at ( p, t) is blank;
(iii) Hq ( p, t) tells that at time t, TM is in state q and Head is at position p.
Λ must conform to computation of TM on encoding of the structure and its
halting. We can borrow from proof of Theorem 8.17. the following closed
formulae and define Λ as their conjunction:
8.6 FO+Inductive Definitions. Fixed Point Logics 415

(iv) the closed formula asserting that L is a linear ordering;

(v) the closed formula asserting that for each instantaneous description of TM:
each cell contains exactly one tape symbol, there is only one state symbol in it,
it is possible for TM to reach an accepting state;
(vi) closed formulae asserting that predicates Ti and Hq are compatible with move-
ments of TM; given an instruction (q, a) →δ (q  , a  , s ∈ {le f t, right}), the for-
mula γ(a, a  , q, q  , s) describes the passage from the current instantaneous
description to the new one. For each pair (q, a) which is a prefix of an instruc-
tion in δ, we
 take into account non-determinism of TM, hence, the formula is
γ(q, a) = (q,a)→δ (q  ,a  ,s) γ(a, a  , q, q  , s);
(vii) the closed formula describing the initial instantaneous description of TM; here
two auxiliary formulae are used: κ( p) such that A |= κ( p) if and only if
E(A)( p) = 1 and ι( p) such that A |= ι( p) if and only if the position p is
beyond area taken by encoding of A. The formula may be like this:

∀ p, t.[(¬∃t  < t) ⊃ (κ( p) ≡ T1 ( p, t)) ∧ (ι( p) ≡ T2 ( p, t))].

Due to this construction, A satisfies Λ if and only if TM has an accepting computation

on the encoding E(A). 
Fagin’s theorem initiated the area of research known as Descriptive Complexity
(see Moschovakis [17], Immerman [10]).

8.6 FO+Inductive Definitions. Fixed Point Logics

Inductively defined relations give first-order logic more expressive power and locate
first-order logic augmented by them between first-order and second-order logic. This
yields more information about relations of first-order to second-order logic. The idea
of incorporating fixed points into logic was put forth in (Chandra and Harel [18]).
Example 8.2 (Transitive Closure (TC)) We know that the property CONN of a
graph being connected is not expressible in FO. We define the relation TC of tran-
sitive closure on the class of directed finite graphs. The inductive definition of
TC begins with the binary relation E of an edge, and we let T C(x, y) ≡ [(x =
y) ∨ ∃z.E(x, z) ∧ T C(z, y).
Theorem 8.19 TC is not definable in first-order logic.
Proof Indeed, were TC expressible in FO by a formula φ, CONN would be express-
ible by means of the formula ∀x, y.φ(x, y). 
Definition 8.25 (Fixed point operators LFP, GFP) We recall the fixed-point the-
orem Theorem 1.2 due to Knaster-Tarski; it asserts the existence of a fixed point a
for an isotone (i.e., monotonically increasing) auto-mapping f : A → A on a com-
pletely ordered lattice (A, ≤).
416 8 Beyond FO Within SO

The fixed point in this case is obtained as the l.u.b. of the sequence

(∗) 0, f (0), f ( f (0)), . . . , f k (0), . . . ;

as certainly 0 ≤ f (0), the sequence (*) is increasing and a = l.u.b. of the set { f k (0) :
k ≥ 0} satisfies the condition a = f (a) which defines a fixed point F P0 ( f ). Clearly,
for each x ∈ A such that x ≤ f (x), and this inequality holds in the context of the
Knaster-Tarski theorem, the procedure may be repeated yielding the sequence (∗)x :
( f k (x))∞
k=0 and the fixed point l.u.b.{ f (x) : k ≥ 0} denoted F Px ( f ).
k

In case 0 < x, each term in sequence (*)is smaller than the corresponding term
in the sequence (∗)x , hence, F P0 is not greater than F Px : FP(0) is the least fixed
point denoted LFP(f) or simply LFP. Consider, under same assumptions, for a finite
A, the set (ai )i∈I of fixed points along with a = l.u.b.{ai : i ∈ i}. Were a ≤ f (a),
it would yield a fixed point b ≥ a, hence, b = a and a = f (a) so a is the greatest
fixed point of f , denoted GFP( f ).
This abstract version underwent an adaptation to the particular but most important
case of the complete Boolean field 2 A of the set of all subsets of a set A.
A mapping Φ : 2 A → 2 A is isotone if X ⊆ Y implies Φ(X ) ⊆ Φ(Y ) for X, Y ⊆
A. Then Φ has the least fixed point LFP(Φ) defined as the least upper bound of the
sequence ∅, Φ(∅), Φ 2 (∅), . . ., i.e., as the set ∞n=0 Φ n
(∅).
As shown by Knaster and Tarski, for any isotone Φ, the containment X ⊆ Φ(X )
holds, and beginning with any X , we can define an increasing sequence (Φ n (X ))∞ n=0
of sets with l.u.b.{Φ n (X ) : n ∈ N} being a fixed point of Φ. Hence, we witness the
existence of a non-empty set Fi x(Φ) of fixed  points of Φ.
Clearly, LFP(Φ)= {X : Φ(X ) = X }= {X : Φ(X ) ⊆ X }. To see that the last
equality holds, consider the family of sets F(Φ)={X : Φ(X ) ⊆ X } and let Y =

F(Φ). Then Y ⊆ X for each X ∈ F(Φ), hence Φ(Y ) ⊆ Φ(X ) ⊆ X , hence
Φ(Y ) ⊆ Y , and as Φ ( Y ) ⊆ Φ(Y ), Φ(Y ) ∈ F(Φ), hence Φ(Y ) = Y and Y is LFP.
We denote by GLP(Φ) the set {X : Φ(X ) = X }={X : X ⊆ Φ(X )}, the largest
fixed point of Φ. The proof of the last equality follows the lines of the respective
proof for LFP.
The Logic LFP is (FO+LFP+ GFP). As LFP and GLP are dual to each other,
which we demonstrate later on, we focus on LFP, omitting GLP from the styling of
the logic.
Definition 8.26 (Positive occurrences) We say that a relational symbol R occurs
positively in a formula φ if and only if each occurrence of R in φ is in the scope of an
even number of negation signs. This condition secures that formulae with R induce
isotone mappings.
Definition 8.27 (Syntax and semantics of LFP) Consider a relational vocabulary Σ
of a finite structure A over the domain A. For a relational symbol R ∈ / Σ, a formula
φ(R, x), defined over Σ ∪ {R}, in which R is positive, and a tuple x of variables,
of length equal to arity of R, the formula [LFP R,x .φ](t) is a formula of LFP, where
t is a tuple of terms of the same arity as that of x. Similarly, a formula of LFP is
[GFP R,x .φ](t).
8.6 FO+Inductive Definitions. Fixed Point Logics 417

Semantics of LFP
Free variables in the above LFP formulae are those free in φ and in t; variables in
x are bound. Assume that free variables are interpreted in the domain A and t is
A
interpreted as t .
We denote by Φ(φ) the operator on the domain A induced by φ (called the exten-
sion (or update) operator), defined for a subset C of A as Φ(φ)(C) = {x : (A, C, x |=
A
φ}. Then: A |= [LFP R,x .φ](t) if and only if t ∈ LFP(Φ(φ)); the analogous defini-
tion holds for A |= [GFP R,x .φ](t).
We can now address duality between LFP and GFP. This duality is expressed by
the formula
GFP R,x .φ](t ≡ ¬[ LFP R,x .¬φ(R/¬R)]((t).
The familiar to us relation of transitive closure can be defined in LFP:

T C(u, v) ≡ [LFP R,x,y .E(x, y) ∨ ∃z.E(x, z) ∧ R(z, y)](u, v).

Definition 8.28 (The logic (FO+LFP); FO(LFP)) FO(LFP) is created by adding

LFP R,x and GFP R,x operators to FO for each formula φ, relation R and a finite set
X defined in Definition 8.27.

We have already observed that TC is FO(LFP)-definable by the formula

ψ(a, b) ≡ LFPφ R,x,y (a, b),

where R(a, b) ≡ (a = b) ∨ ∃z.E(x, z) ∧ R(z, y) for the edge relation symbol E. It

follows immediately that CONN is FO(LFP)-definable by the formula ∀a, b.ψ(a, b).
As an exemplary applications of FO(LFP), we quote the theorem by Immerman
[19] and Vardi [20].

Theorem 8.20 Over ordered finite structures, FO(LFP)=PTIME.

Proof We include a short argument from (Immerman [10], 4.10), though based on
a few additional facts to be gathered from, e.g., (Immerman [10]).
A more elaborate proof on lines of proofs of Trakhtenbrot and Fagin theo-
rems can be found in Libkin [26]. Proof is divided into few claims. The role
of the alternating reachability a-REACH which is PTIME-complete (see Immer-
man [10], 3.26) calls for introducing it into FO(LFP) via an inductive definition.
Recall that the relational vocabulary in this case consists of an edge relation sym-
bol E, unary relation symbol A for universal vertices. Then, φ(R, x, y) ≡ (x =
y) ∨ (∃z.E(x, z) ∧ R(z, y)) ∧ (A(x) ⊃ ∀w.(x, w) ⊃ R(w, y)).
Then, a-REACH= [LFP R,x,y φ](s, t). As FO(LFP) contains a-REACH, by
PTIME-completeness of a-REACH (see Immerman [10], 3.26), FO(LFP) contains
all P problems and as FO(LFP) is closed on first-order reductions (please see Immer-
man [10], 3.11), it follows that PTIME⊆ FO(LFP). On the other hand, for each
formula [LFP R,X .φ] on a structure A of size n, the iteration φiR,A (∅) must stop up to
418 8 Beyond FO Within SO

i = n k , hence the formula φ requires a polynomial number of steps for evaluation,

hence it is in PTIME and FO(LFP)⊆ PTIME. 

We close for the time being the theme of LFP with the result that demonstrates
that FO(LFP) contains FO and is contained in ∃MSO.

Theorem 8.21 FO(LFP) ⊆ ∃MSO.

Proof It is given by the formula:

[LFP R,x .φ] ((t) ≡ [∀R.(∀x.(φ(R, x) ⊃ R(x)) ⊃ R(t))]. 

There are some other concepts of fixed points. The constructions of those fixed
points rely on some forms of monotonicity extracted from the context of the Knaster-
Tarski theorem.
We begin with the notion of inductive fixed points (Gurevich and Shelah [21]).

Definition 8.29 (Inductive fixed points (IFP)) IFP, inductive fixed point is defined
for any relation symbol R of arity n, new to the relational vocabulary Σ of a structure
A and not necessarily isotone in a formula φ(R, (xi )n1 ).
In [21], a mapping f (R) = {(ai )n1 : φ(R, (ai )n1 ) is called inductive if and only if
the sequence of iterates f i (∅) is increasing. In that case, the g.l.b. of this sequence
is a fixed point called Inductive Fixed Point and denoted IFP. Logic FO endowed
with those operators is denoted (FO+ IFP) or, for short, FO(IFP).

The other feature of the Knaster-Tarski theorem is the relation x ≤ f (x). Such
mappings are called in (Gurevicz and Shelah [21]) inflationary.

Definition 8.30 (Inflationary mappings) A mapping f is inflationary if and only if

x ≤ f (x) for each x; clearly, such f is inductive and yields an IFP.

The symbol x n stands for a tuple (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ).

A simple way to obtain an inflationary mapping from an operator f related to
the formula φ(R, x n ) is to consider f  (R) = {x n : R(x n ) ∨ φ(R, x n )}. The opera-
tor f  is inflationary and yields an IFP. We may add to FO the relation symbol
[IFP R,x .(R(x) ∪ φ(R, x))].
The inflationary fixed point is denoted [IFP R,x .φ](x). Its semantics is defined as
follows:
A |= [IFP R,x .φ](t)

if and only if t ∈ n (R ∪ ( f  )n ). In the general case of infinite structures, the expo-
nent n would become an ordinal number α.
Gurevich and Shelah [21] suggest yet another means for obtaining an inflationary
mapping from any mapping f over ordered finite structures; for any mapping f :
A → A, consider f  (x) = max{x, f (x)}. Then, f  (x) ≥ x and f  is inflationary,
yielding IFP(f’). In case f is isotone, IFP( f  )=LFP( f ).
8.6 FO+Inductive Definitions. Fixed Point Logics 419

Definition 8.31 (Partial fixed points) The final possibility for a finite domain A of
cardinality n is that for a mapping f : 2 A → 2 A the sequence

(X 0 = f (∅), X 1 = f ( f (∅)), . . . , ...)

stabilizes at some k − th step, i.e., X k = X k+1 for some k < 2n . This means that
we have reached stability and we call X k the partial fixed point of f , denoted PFP;
otherwise, when for each k < 2n , we obtain that X k = X k+1 , we declare the absence
of partial fixed points.
Clearly, in the classical case of an isotone mapping f , LFP=IFP=PFP.
There is difference in treatment of LFP in comparison to IFP and PFP. The
Trakhtenbrot theorem implies that the property of being isotone is undecidable.
Steps X i in iteration of the mapping f are called stages. In particular X i is the
i − th stage. The stage comparison theorem (Moschovakis [17]) relates stages of
computation of a fixed point.
For a finite structure A, and a computation f (∅) = X 0 , f 2 (∅) = X 1 , . . ., where
f realizes φ(R, X ) with positive occurrence of R, we denote by [φ] the first k such
that X k = X ∞ = n X n which is the computed fixed point, be it LFP or IFP. For a
tuple x, we denote by the symbol [x]φ the first index k such that x ∈ X k if such k
exists, otherwise [x]φ = [φ] + 1.
Two relations ≺φ and φ defined in this context are:
(i) x ≺φ y ≡ [x]φ < [y]φ ;
(ii) x φ y ≡ [x]φ ≤ y]φ ∧ [x]φ ≤ [φ].
Theorem 8.22 (The stage comparison theorem) For an LFP formula φ, relations
≺φ and φ are LFP-definable.
For proof please see, e.g., (Moschovakis [17]).
In (Gurevich and Shelah [21], Appendix, Theorem 2), we find the following result.
Theorem 8.23 ([21]) For any finite structure, for an FO(LFP) formula φ(R, X ),
there exists a FO(LFP) formula π(φ, X ) which expresses the inductive fixed point of
the operator R → {X : R(X ) ∨ φ(R, X )}.
Corollary 8.2 ([21]) On finite structures IFP=LFP.
This result was strengthened to the full generality in Kreutzer [22].
Theorem 8.24 On any structure, each IFP-formula is equivalent to an LFP-
formula.
The equivalence in 8.24 can be formulated as:

{[IFP R,x .φ](x)} ≡ φ({y : y ≺φ x}, x).

We quote two more results on fixed point logics FO(LFP), FO(IFP) which capture
complexity classes due to Immerman [19] and Vardi [20].
420 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Theorem 8.25 Over ordered finite structures, FO(LFP) = FO(IFP) = PTIME.

In Vardi [20] we find the following theorem.

Theorem 8.26 Over ordered finite structures, FO(PFP) = PSPACE.

We return to fixed point logics in what follows.

8.7 Logics with Counting (FO+Count)

Introduced in (Immerman and Lander [23]), counting possibility for FO gives FO

tools for expressing numerical properties: we have witnessed, e.g., the inability to
express in FO the property EVEN. Counting quantifiers provide this possibility. They
are introduced in two possible ways, see Etessami [25] and Libkin [26, 27].

Definition 8.32 (FO+Count) One way to introduce counting is to equip FO with

symbolic-numerical quantifiers like ∃≥i .φ(x) which expresses the existence of at
least i elements a of the domain A such that φ(a) holds. They fall into the realm of
generalized quantifiers, see Mostowski [24].

Numerical aspect of (FO+Count) calls for a numerical domain which is usually

the finite prefix {0, 1, 2, m . . . , n − 1} of the set N alongside with a finite domain
A = {ao , a1 , . . . , an−1 } for an FO structure A.
Therefore, (FO+Count) adds to the finite relational structure of FO with a domain
{a0 , a1 , . . . , an−1 }, a numerical structure with the domain {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, ternary
relation symbols +, × and constants min, max denoting respectively 0, n − 1. We
denote a tuple of variables (xi )i=1 k
by the symbol x k . The symbol x will denote a
finite tuple without any mention of its length.
The same convention applies to numerical tuples.

Definition 8.33 (Terms of (FO+Count)) Terms of (FO+Count) are of two sorts:

symbolic and numerical.
(i) terms of the symbolic sort are already familiar;
(ii) terms of numerical sort are variables i, j, ... and min, max.

Definition 8.34 (Formulae of (FO+Count)) Formulae of (FO + Count) are con-

structed as follows:
(i) for numerical sort terms t1 , t2 , t3 , expressions +(t1 , t2 , t3 ), ×(t1 , t2 , t3 ) are
numerical sort formulae; the meaning of +(t1 , t2 , t3 ) is t3 = t1 + t2 and the
meaning of ×(t1 , t2 , t3 ) is t3 = t1 × t2 ;
(ii) for a formula φ(x, i), the expression ∃≥i .φ(x, i) is a formula in which ele-
ments of x are free; the meaning of this formula is that the number of tuples a
substituted for x and satisfying φ for the given i is at least i;
8.7 Logics with Counting (FO+Count) 421

(iii) for a formula φ(y, x, i), the expression ∃≥i y.φ(y, x, i) in which the variable y
is bound, means that the number of elements a substituted for y and satisfying
φ(a, a, i  ) for a given x/a and a given i/i  is at least i.

The exemplary case is EVEN: the formula expressing the even number of
elements:

∃i.∃ j.(+( j, j, i) ∧ ∃≥i .xφ(x) ∧ ∀k.(k > i ⊃ ¬∃≥k x.φ(x))).

In this logic one can compare cardinalities of sets.


Definition
 8.35 (Infinitary connectives) Infinitary connectives are i∈I φi (x),
i∈I φ(x) in which all free variables of all φi are in
 x and I ⊆N; the semantics
of infinitary connectives is as usual: satisfaction
 of i∈I φ(a) requires satisfaction
of at least one of φi (a) and in case of i∈I φi (a) all of φi (a) need to be satisfied.

Definition 8.36 (The infinitary logic (FO+Count)in f ) This logic augments

(FO+Count) by adding to (FO+Count) infinitary connectives of Definition 8.35.

As the set I may be infinite, the power of this logic is too great for finite structures: it
is easy to write for each finite structure A a formula φA such that any finite structure
B which satisfies φA is isomorphic to A. Then for a class C of finite structures, the
formula C∈C φC is satisfied by each C ∈ C.
For this reason, the logic (FO+COUNT)in f has to be modified in a sense. On of
the means for modification is the notion of a rank, parallel to the notion of quantifier
rank in FO or in ∃MSO, which curtails the set of available formulae. The other is to
make up by enlarging the numerical domain to the whole set of natural numbers N.
We apply first the second of means.

Definition 8.37 (The logic(FO+Count)in f,ω ) The subscript ω informs about enlarg-
ing the set of numerical symbols to the set N. This causes some changes in syntax
and semantics. In formulae ∃i x.φ, the variable i may now take any numerical value
from N. A new class of numerical terms are terms of the form: #x.φ for a formula φ
and symbolic term x.

Semantics of the term #x.φ in which x is bound is: for φ(x, y, i) and y/b, i/ j the
number #x.φ(x, b, j) is the number of tuples a which satisfy φ(a, b, j).
Logic (FO+Count)in f,ω , can express each property of finite models and its power
has to be diminished by the first of the means: a reduction of the set of allowed
formulae. This is done with help of the notion of a rank.

Definition 8.38 (Rank in infinitary counting logic) Rank is defined by the following
rules.
(i) rank(t)=0 for a term t or numerical symbol k ∈ N;
(ii) rank(φ) = 0 for any symbolic atomic formula;
(iii) rank (t1 = t2 ) = max{rank(t1 ), rank(t2 )} for terms t1 , t2 ;
422 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(iv) rank (¬φ)=rank(φ);

(v)  + |x|;
#x.φ = rank(φ)
rank 
(vi) rank i φi = rank i φi = supi {rank(φi )};
(vii) rank ∀x.φ = rank ∃x.φ = rank ∃≥i x.φ = rank(φ) +1;
(viii) rank ∀i.φ = rank ∃i.φ = rank(φ).
∗
Logic (FO+Count)in f,ω implements the idea of a finite rank cf. Libkin [26].

∗
Definition 8.39 (The logic(FO+Count)in f,ω ) It is the logic with infinitary connec-
tives which is allowed only terms and formulae of finite ranks.
∗
The logic (FO+Count)in f,ω contains FO, (FO+ Count) and it allows to define
cardinalities of subsets of Cartesian products of finitely many copies of N. Actually,
see (Libkin [26], 8.10): every property of finite ordered sets can be expressed in
∗
(FO+Count)in f,ω .
∗
As with FO and MSO, the expressive power of (FO+Count)in f,ω can be charac-
terized by means of a game analogous to Ehrenfeucht games for FO and MSO cf.
Hella [28], Libkin [26].

Definition 8.40 (Bijective Ehrenfeucht games) As with Ehrenfeucht games, the

bijective Ehrenfeucht game BGm in m rounds is played on structures A, B with
respective domains A, B over a common vocabulary Σ. The players are Spoiler and
Duplicator. The rules are slightly different from those ‘standard’:

(i) if |A| = |B|, then Spoiler wins;

(ii) if |A| = |B|, the party of BGm is played:
(a) in each round 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Duplicator selects a bijection f i : A → B to which
Spoiler responds by a choice of an element ai ∈ A and Duplicator closes the round
with bi = f (ai ) ∈ B. It is forbidden to use any b more than once;
(b) the effect of m rounds is the pair (ai )i=1m
, (bi )i=1
m
of subsets of A and B,
respectively, where ai ’s and bi ’s are in one-one correspondence;
(c) Duplicator wins a party of the game if and only if the correspondence ai ↔ bi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m is a partial isomorphism;
(d) Duplicator has a winning strategy in case it wins each party of the game BGm .

As with earlier Ehrenfeucht games, the effect of Duplicator’s winning strategy in the
∗
game BGm is an agreement of A and B on closed formulae of (FO+Count)in f,ω of
↔
rank m, denoted A ≡m B.

Theorem 8.27 The following are equivalent.

(i) Duplicator has a winning strategy in the game BGm on A and B;
(ii) A ≡↔
m B.
8.7 Logics with Counting (FO+Count) 423

Proof We include a proof. The proof is close to earlier proofs for Ehrenfeucht games
and we include it to show some new features of the counting logic. We denote by m
the rank of a formula and by q the length of a tuple x.
1. Proof that (i) implies (ii). By induction on m. For m = 0 we have the case of
the Ehrenfeucht game so the implication holds. Suppose that the implication holds
for a given m and consider the case of m + 1.
Assume that (∗) A ∼ =↔m+1 B holds. Consider a closed formula ψ : ∃nx.φ(x) for
some n ∈N and assume that A |= ψ. There exist a1 , a2 , . . . , an ∈ A such that A |=
φ(ai ), each i. By (*),there exists a bijective mapping f : A → B with the property
that (A, a) ∼ =↔ ∼↔
m (B, f (a)) for a ∈ A, hence, in particular, (A, ai ) =m (B, f (ai )) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
By hypothesis of induction, (A, ai ) ≡↔ m (B, f (ai )), each i ≤ n and A |= φ(ai )
implies B |= φ( f (ai )). As all f (ai ) are pairwise distinct, B |= ∃nx.φ(x). The con-
verse is obtained when we replace f with f −1 and repeat the argumentation. As each
closed formula of rank m + 1 is a combination by Boolean and counting operators
of formulae ∃nx.φ(x), the proof from (i) to (ii) is concluded.
2. Proof that (ii) implies (i). We recall the notion of a type of a formula. For a
q
structure A and a tuple a = (ai )i=1 of elements of the domain A of A, and for a
given m, the m, q-type of a, t ypem,q (a), is the set {φ : rank(φ) ≤ m ∧ A |= φ(a)}.
0,q
Returning to the proof, let (ξi (x))i∈N be an enumeration of all formulae that
define types of tuples for x of q elements. Each such formula is the conjunction of
a final set of atomic formulae and their negations valued on x (it is what is called a
complete open description, cf. VIII.11). We proceed by induction on rank m.
m+1,q
We define the enumeration (ξi (x))i∈N all of all extension formulae of the
following form (we recall that ∃!x... means that there exists a unique x satisfying ...):
m,q+1 m,q+1
(∗∗) [∃! f 1 y.ξi1 (x, y) ∧ . . . ∧ ∃! f p y.ξi p (x, y)]∧

p m,q+1
[∀y.∃ j=1 ξi j (x, y)],

where p ∈N, (i 1 , i 2 , . . .
, i p ) ranges over tuples over N.
It follows that |A| = { f i : i ≤ p}. For the pair (A, a ∈ Aq ), there exists a unique
m,q m,q
ξi such that A |= ξi (a).
It is the task now to verify the following Claim.
Claim. If for structures A and B, m ∈N, m-tuples a over A and b over B, there exists
a formula ξi (x) such that A |= ξi (a) and B |= ξi (b), then (A, a) ∼ =↔
m,q m,q m,q
m (B, b).

Proof of Claim. We prove the inductive step from m to m + 1, case m = 0 is like in

Ehrenfeucht’s game. Assume the hypothesis of induction for m. Consider the exten-
m,q+1 m,q+1 m,q+1
sion formula (**) ξi (x). Observe that if A |= ξi (a) and B |= ξi (b),
then |A| = |B|.
For each j ≤ p, define A j as the set

m,q+1
{a ∈ A : A |= ξi j (aa)}
424 8 Beyond FO Within SO

and
m,q+1
B j = {b ∈ B : B |= ξi j (bb)}.

It follows that |A j | = f j = |B j |. Let f : A j → B j be a bijection which extends

to a bijection f  : A → B. For each a ∈ A, if for some j, A |= ξi j
m,q+1
(aa), then
m,q+1
B |= ξi j 
(b f (a)). By the hypothesis of induction, (A, aa) = ∼ (B, b f  (a)).
↔
m
It follows that f  witnesses that (A, a) ∼ =↔m+1 (B, b). The implication (ii) to (i)
follows. 

We now consider FO augmented with inductive relation TC of transitive closure.

8.8 FO+Transitive Closure (FO+TC)

The relation TC of transitive closure cf. Definition 8.2 is

T C(x, y) ≡ [(x = y) ∨ ∃z.E(x, z) ∧ T C(z, y)]

on a class of directed finite graphs with vocabulary {E}, where E is interpreted as the
relation e of an edge. This archetypal example can be extended to any binary relation
on a (finite) universe. In Theorem 8.19, we found that TC was not FO-definable.

Definition 8.41 (The logic (FO+TC))

The syntax of (FO+ TC)
For a formula φ(x, y, z) with x, y of length k, the formula
[T C x,y .φ(x, y, z)](s, t) where s, t are tuples of terms of length k is an (FO+TC)
formula.
Free in [T C x,y φ(x, y, z)](s, t) are z and free variables in s, t.
The semantics of (FO+TC)
For a structure A, for a k-tuple a with z/a, and for k-tuples a1 for s and a2 for t, the
graph G is defined on the set V = Ak = Pi=1 k
A with the set of edges {(b, c) : A |=
φ(b, c, a)}.
Then A |= [T C x,y φ(x, y, a)(s, t) if and only if (s, t) ∈ T C(G).

Let us observe that CONN is definable in (FO+TC) by the formula

∀a, b.[T C x,y (E(x, y) ∨ E(y, x))(a, b)].

We recall that NL is the class of languages accepted by a non-deterministic Turing

machines with two tapes, input and work, and using log(|input|) space. The main
result concerning (FO+TC) is due to Immerman [29].
8.9 Logics with a Finite Number of Variables 425

Theorem 8.28 Over ordered structures, (FO+TC)=NL if TC occurs solely in not

negated sub-formulae.

TC has a counterpart: DTC, the deterministic transitive closure operator (DTC)

and the corresponding fact Immerman [29].

Definition 8.42 (DTC) DTCφ=[TC(Dφ), where Dφ is the deterministic form of φ:

Dφ(x, y) ≡ φ(x, y) ∧ ∀z.[(z = y) ∨ ¬φ(x, z)].

Theorem 8.29 (FO+DTC)=L, the deterministic counterpart to NL.

We now introduce a new class of games, called pebble games, which correspond
to logics with finitely many individual variables.

8.9 Logics with a Finite Number of Variables

Pebble games Immerman [30], Poizat [31] are a variant of Ehrenfeucht’s games as
the criterion for winning strategy is a partial isomorphism of obtained structures in
each round of each party. The context and rules of the game are similar to those in
Ehrenfeucht’s games.

Definition 8.43 (The setting and moves in pebble games) For two (finite) structures
A and B over domains, respectively, A and B, and for a given parameter k, Spoiler
and Duplicator play parties of the game G kP (A, B) which may last for some number
n of rounds, or go for infinitely many rounds, hence, we have, respectively, games
k,in f
G k,n
P (A, B) or G P (A, B).
Players begin with a set of k pairs of pebbles

( p1 (A), p1 (B)), ( p2 (A), p2 (B)), . . . , ( pk (A), pk (B)).

Moves by players are as follows: moves by Spoiler consist in taking a pebble for a
chosen index 1 ≤ i ≤ k from either A or B (let us denote the chosen set by X and
the other set by Y) and placing it on an element of the chosen set X in case pi (X )
has not been used yet; otherwise, Spoiler can leave the pebble on the already chosen
element of X or pick it and place on an another element of X ;
Response by Duplicator consists in picking the pebble pi (Y ) and placing it on
some element of the domain Y .
The alternating moves by Spoiler and Duplicator last for some n rounds or go for
infinite number of rounds.
The effect of each round j is a pair (a j , b j ) in A × B, and the effect of a sequence
of m rounds is a partial relation Rm = {(a j , b j ) : j ≤ m}.

Definition 8.44 (Winning strategies) After a prescribed number of rounds, either n

or ω, Duplicator wins the party if after each sequence of m rounds for m = 1, 2 . . . , n
426 8 Beyond FO Within SO

each relation Rm establishes a partial isomorphism between (a j )mj=1 and (b j )mj=1 in

case of the game G k,n P or the relation Rm establishes a partial isomorphism between
k,in f
(a j )mj=1 and (b j )mj=1 for m → ∞ in case of the game G P . Duplicator has a winning
strategy if and only if they win every party.
Example 8.3 Consider sets X and Y with min{|X |, |Y |} ≥ k. Duplicator has the
k,in f
winning strategy in G P (X, Y ) which consists in keeping the condition that for
each pair (i, j), pebbles pi (X ), p j (X ) are placed on the same element of X if and
only if pebbles pi (Y ), p j (Y ) are placed on the same element of Y . This secures a
partial isomorphism of set structures |X |, |Y |.
As with formerly discussed variants of Ehrenfeucht’s games, pebble games charac-
terize certain logics. We show one quite natural variant due to Ion Barwise [32].
Definition 8.45 (Logics of finitely many variables) For a given k ∈N, let FOin
k
f,ω
denote FOin f,ω restricted to formulae with at most k variables.
ω
Continuing this line of specializations, we denote by FOin f,ω the union
∞ k
k=1 FO in f,ω .
ω
The expressive power of FOin f,ω allows it to subsume LFP, IFP, PFP as proved in
(Kolaitis and Vardi [33]).
ω
Theorem 8.30 LFP, IFP, PFP⊆ FOin f,ω .

Proof The argument is as follows. Consider a monotone (isotone) formula φ(x k , R)

with R of arity k. Suppose that φ is defined on variables x k = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xk ) and
additional variables v1 , v2 , . . . , vm . The generic tuple z k = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z k ) exploits
z i s from variables in x k and in {v1 , v2 , . . . , vm }.
Stages of computation of a single fixed point are expressed by the sequence φn (x k ):
(i) φ0 (x k ) ≡ ⊥;
(ii) φn+1 (x k ) is φ(x k , R) in which each occurrence of R(z k ) is replaced by

∃y k .((y k = z k ) ∧ (∃x k (x k = y k ) ∧ (φn (x k )))).


Then, the formula n φn (x n ) expresses the inductive fixed point either LFP R,x k
or IFP R,x k .
The case of PFP R,x k is different: as we know this fixed point is obtained when the
sequence of iterates of φ(x k , R) stabilizes at some finite stage m, i.e., ∃m.(φm (x k ) =
φm+1 (x k )). Hence, we consider ψn : ∀x.(φn (x) ≡ φn+1 (x)). Then [PFP R,x .φ](y) ≡
∃n.(ψn ∧ φn (x)). 
For finite structures A and B over a common vocabulary Σ, we denote by A ∼
in f,ω
=n,k
k,n
B the fact that Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game G P ; similarly,
A∼
in f,ω
=in f,k B holds if and only if Duplicator has the winning strategy in the game
k,in f
GP .
8.10 Definability Versus Locality 427

The symbol A ≡inf,ω

n,k B means that A and B agree on FOin f,ω formulae of rank
k
in f,ω
less than or equal to n and similarly, A ≡in f,k B holds if and only if A and B agree
k
on formulae of FOin f,ω .

Theorem 8.31 (i) A ≡inf,ω ∼inf,ω

n,k B if and only if A =n,k B;
inf,ω
(ii) A ≡in ∼
f,k B if and only if A =k,in f B.

The proof is on lines of former proofs for this kind of statements, notably it applies
a version of forth-and-back property, k-forth-and-back property, due to Ion Barwise.
For a proof, due to its length, consult, e.g., (Libkin [26], 11.5). We insert a corollary
to 8.31.
ω
Corollary 8.3 EVEN is not definable in FOin f.

ω
Proof Suppose that a formula φ ∈ F Oin f defines EVEN. For a natural number k
such that φ ∈ F Oin f , consider a set X with |X | = k and a set Y with |Y | = k + 1.
k

By Example 8.3, Duplicator has the winning strategy. By Theorem 8.31, X |= φ ≡

Y |= φ, a contradiction. 

8.10 Definability Versus Locality

We recall the notion of a Gaifman graph. For a structure A with domain A and a
vocabulary of finitely many relational symbols R1 , R2 , . . . , Rk interpreted as rela-
tions R1A , R2A , . . . , RkA , the Gaifman graph G(A) is the graph (A, E) with vertices
as elements of the domain A and edges defined as follows. For x, y ∈ A, E(x, y)
holds if and only if

(i) either x = y or,

ni
(ii) there exists RiA of arity n i and (ai )i=1 such that Ri (a1 , a2 , . . . , ani ) holds and
x, y are among a1 , a2 , . . . , ani .

Thus, G(A) defines an undirected graph and condition (i) add loops.
For instance, consider a single binary relation R; the formula φ R (x, y) ≡ (x =
y) ∨ (R(x, y) ∨ R(y, x)) describes in FO the graph G(A).

Definition 8.46 (Gaifman’s metric structure revisited) In a Gaifman graph, one may
introduce a topological, actually a metric, structure by introducing the notion of a
distance and of a neighborhood. The notion of distance is as usual for graphs, i.e, as
the length of the shortest path, which can be defined by induction as a function d:

(i) d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y;

(ii) d(x, y) = r + 1 if an only if there exists z such that d(x, z) = r and E(z, y).
428 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Conditions (i), (ii) can be expressed by means of an FO formula, denoted φrd (x, y).
Then, we can define formulae φ≤r ≥r
d (x, y), φd (x, y), and analogously for < r , and
> r . A general form of FO formula φd (x, y) can be
r

(x = y) ∨ φ≤(r
d
−1)
(x, y) ∨(∃R k .∃(a1 , a2 , ...ak ) ∈ R k ∧ ∃i, j.(x = ai ∧ y = a j )).

We define a closed ball about x of radius r ∈N as B(x, r ) = {y : d(x, y) ≤ r };

an open ball of radius r about x is B(x, r ) = {y : d(x, y) < r }. These notions can
be expressed in FO: (y ∈ B(x, r )) ≡ (φ≤r d (x, y)).
We denote by the symbol a k any tuple (a1 , a2 , . . . , ak ) of elements of the
domain A.
The distance function d can be extended over tuples of elements: for tuples (ai )k1
and (b j )m
1 , the distance δ((ai )1 , (b j )1 ) is defined as min i, j {d(ai , b j )}.
k m

Definition 8.47 (A Query) For a class C of structures over a common vocabulary Σ,

a query Q on C of arity m assigns to each structure A ∈ C a set Q(A) ⊆ Am such
that for any two structures A and B if h is an isomorphism between A and B, then
Q(B) = h(Q(A)).

A Query Q is FO-definable if and only if there exists a formula φ with the property
that Q(A) = {a m : φ(a m )}.

Definition 8.48 (Σn structures) A finite structure Σn is Σ which contains a finite

number of relational symbols and it is augmented with n additional constants
c1 , c2 , . . . , cn .

Definition 8.49 (Structures induced within balls) Each ball B(x, r ) does induce the
structure N A (a n , r )}, where the domain is B(a, r ), a n = (a1 , a2 , . . . , an ) interprets
constants ci for i ≤ n, and each relation R A is restricted to B(a, r ).

Definition 8.50 (Correspondence between structures) For structures (A, a n ) and

(B, bn ), we define a bijective correspondence ≡r : (A, a n ) ≡r (B, bn ) if and only
if there exists a bijective mapping f : A → B such that for each c ∈ A, structures
N A (a n c, r ) and N B (bn f (c), r ) are isomorphic. Any isomorphism maps each ai
to bi .

We now introduce notions of localities based on, respectively, Hanf and Gaifman
theorems.

Definition 8.51 (Hanf-locality) A Query of arity m is local in Hanf sense if and

only if there exists r ≥ 0 and such that for any two structures (A, a m ) and (B, bm ),
if (A, a m ) ≡r (B, bm ), then a m ∈ Q(A) ≡ bm ∈ Q(B).

The numerical parameter hlr plays the role of a rank cf. (Libkin [26]).

Definition 8.52 (The Hanf locality rank hlr) hlr(Q) is the least r which fulfills
Definition 8.51.
8.10 Definability Versus Locality 429

Theorem 8.32 (Hanf locality based criterion for definability) A Query Q in a lan-
guage L is not FO-definable if
(i) each query definable in language L is Hanf-local;
(ii) query Q is not Hanf-local.

An example of non-Hanf-local Query is connectivity. To demonstrate this, consider

the Query Q and suppose it does define connectivity. Let hlr(Q)=r . Consider a cyclic
graph G with 2k vertices, where k > 2r + 1, and its division into two cyclic sub-
graphs G 1 , G 2 of cardinalities k each. Then G and G 1 ∪ G 2 have isomorphic r -
neighborhoods, hence, they both satisfy Q, G is connected and G 1 ∪ G 2 is not. It
follows that connectivity is not Hanf-local.

Definition 8.53 (Gaifman-locality) A query Q of arity m > 0 is local in the sense of

Gaifman if there exists r ≥ 0 such that for each structure A and each pair of m-tuples
a 1m and a 2m , if structures N A (a 1m , r ) and N A (a 2m , r ) are isomorphic, then a 1m ∈ Q(A)
if and only if a 2m ∈ Q(A).

The least r with the property in Definition 8.53 is denoted glr(Q) and it is called the
Gaifman locality rank.

Theorem 8.33 (Gaifman locality based criterion for definability) An m-query Q in

a language L is not definable if
(i) each m-query definable in L is Gaifman-local.
(ii) the query Q is non-Gaifman-local.

An example of non-Gaifman-local query is transitive closure TC. Suppose that a

Query Q defined transitive closure TC. Let glr(Q)=r . Consider a linearly ordered
directed graph G of length 2r + 1 with end vertices u, v, of which u is the first
and v is the last in the ordering of G. For tuples {u, v} and {v, u}, consider their
r -neighborhoods, which are disjoint segments of length r , hence, both tuples satisfy
Q, yet (v, u) is not in TC.
The difference between Hanf and Gaifman localities is twofold: Hanf locality
relates two structures while Gaifman locality is concerned with one structure and
Hanf locality treats m-queries for m ≥ 0 (in case m = 0, queries are called Boolean)
and Gaifman locality is defined for non-Boolean queries.
We use the symbol ∼ in order to denote the isomorphism of structures. We address
the relation between Hanf’s and Gaifman’s localities. The following results come
from (Libkin [26]; 4.9, 4.12) and Libkin [34].

Theorem 8.34 If A ≡r B and N A (a, 3r + 1) ∼ N B (b, 3r + 1), then

(A, a) ≡r (B, b).

Proof In order to define a bijection f : A → B which would satisfy

Definition 8.50, we consider first the isomorphism h : N A (a, 3r + 1) → N B (b,
3r + 1). The restriction h|N A (a, 2r + 1) → N B (b, 2r + 1) is an isomorphism.
430 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Due to assumptions about radii, for each isomorphism type τ of a neighborhood

of radius r , the number of elements in A \ N A (a, 2r + 1) that realize type τ equals
the number of such elements in B \ N B (b, 2r + 1). This implies the existence of
a bijective mapping g which satisfies 10.5 on the pair A \ N A (a, 2r + 1) and B \
N B (b, 2r + 1).
The mapping f (c) = h(c) for c ∈ N A (a, 2r + 1) and f (c) = g(c) for c ∈ / N A (a,
2r + 1) satisfies the requirement. 

A corollary follows.

Corollary 8.4 For m > 0, if a query Q is Hanf-local, then Q is Gaifman-local.

Proof For a structure A and an m-query Q with hlr (Q) = r , consider a 1 , a 2 ∈ A,

with the property that N A (a 1 , 3r + 1) ∼ N A (a 2 , 3r + 1).
By Theorem 8.34, (A, a 1 ) ≡r (A, a 2 ), hence a 1 ∈ Q(A ≡ a 2 ∈ Q(A). 

Theorem 8.35 It follows from Theorem 8.34 that if

(A, a) ≡3r +1 (B, b),

then
(A, ac) ≡r (B, b f (c))

for each c ∈ A and for some bijective mapping f : A → B.

Theorem 8.36 All FO-definable queries are Hanf-local.

Proof Suppose that a query Q is defined by a formula φ. The proof is by induction

on rank(φ). In case rank(φ) = 0, a and b satisfy the same atomic propositions, hence,
they form a partial isomorphism between A and B, hence, hrl(Q) = 0.
Suppose that for φ of rank = k, the theorem holds. Consider φ of rank = k + 1.
It has been observed that such φ is a Boolean combination of formulae of the form
∃z.φ(x, z). As Boolean combinations of formulae of any rank p preserve the rank
p, one may focus on a single formula ∃z.φ(x, z) and prove that
(*) hlr(Q(∃z.φ(x, z))) ≤ 3r + 1 whenever hlr (Q(φ)) = r .
In order to prove (*), suppose that (A, a) ≡3r +1 (B, b). It follows by 10.13, that there
exists a bijective mapping f : A → B with the property that (A, ac) ≡r (B, b f (c))
for each c ∈ A.
Thus, A |= φ(ac ≡ B |= φ(b f (c). But this is equivalent to (A |= ∃z.φ(a, z)) ≡
(B |= ∃z.φ(b, z)), i.e., Q(a) ≡ Q(b). 

The consequence is that each non-Boolean query is Gaifman-local.

8.11 0-1 Laws 431

8.11 0-1 Laws

These laws introduce a probabilistic factor into logic. They resemble, in the FO
entourage, the probabilistic interpretation of satisfiability in sentential logic by
Łukasiewicz, extended by Polkowski to mass assignments in the framework of mere-
ology (see Chap. 7). Let us outline the context. We consider finite models. Let P be
a finite set of relational symbols and let Mn denote the set of all P-structures with
domains of cardinality n. Let Mn be the generic denotation for a structure in Mn .
Consider a Mn -sentence φ. Define an estimate μn (φ) of probability that a ran-
domly selected in Mn structure will satisfy φ. Assuming the uniform probability
distribution, we let
|{Mn ∈ Mn : Mn |= φ}|
μn (φ) = .
|Mn |

Definition 8.54 (Probability μ) For a formula φ over n Mn , we define the prob-
ability of φ as
μ(φ) = lim n μn (φ).

Definition 8.55 (0-1 law) A language L obeys the 0-1 law if for each L-formula φ
either μ(φ) = 0 or μ(φ) = 1.
That FO obeys the 0-1 law was proved independently by (Glebskii et al. [35]) and
by Fagin [36]. We include a proof by Fagin [36].
Definition 8.56 (Complete open descriptions) We denote by the symbol xn an n-
tuple (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) of individual variables. We consider vocabulary P, and we
introduce constants 1, 2, . . . , n, . . . interpreted as, respectively, 1, 2, . . . , n with the
proviso that each j for j > n is interpreted as n.
For a set {x1 , x
2 , . . . , x m } of individual variables, denoted as xm , we define a
formula C(xm ) as {χ : χ ∈ C}, where C contains for each relational symbol P in
the vocabulary P and each tuple zk selected from xm either the conjunct P(zk ) or
the conjunct ¬P(zk ) and only one of the two.
The formula C(xm ) is called a complete open description.
Definition 8.57 (Extending formulae) An extension to C(xm ) is the formula
C E(xm , y) in which besides all conjuncts of C(xm ) new conjuncts involving pred-
icates from P on variables {x1 , x2 , . . . , xm , y} and conjuncts y = xi for each i are
present.
We define now extension formulae Gaifman [37].
Definition 8.58 (Extension formulae) An extension formula is of the form,
 
φG : ∀xm (( xi = x j ) ∧ C(xm )) ⊃ ∃y.(( y = xi ) ∧ C E(xm , y)).
i= j i

We denote as TG the set of all extension formulae φG .

432 8 Beyond FO Within SO

We depart for a while from the main track in order to recall the notion of a complete
theory.

Definition 8.59 (A complete theory) A theory T is a collection of formulae in a

language L. A theory T is complete when it is satisfiable and for each formula φ
either T |= φ or T |= ¬φ. Clearly, T is maximal consistent.

The Łoś -Vaught test, see, e.g., Łoś [38] sets a criterion for a theory to be complete.

Theorem 8.37 (Łoś–Vaught test) If a theory T is satisfiable, has no finite model,

is categorical in cardinality κ ≥ min{ω, |L|} (which means that any two models of
cardinality κ are isomorphic), then T is complete.

Proof Suppose that a theory T satisfies assumptions yet it is not complete. hence,
for some formula φ of L it is not true that T |= φ and it is not true that T |= ¬φ,
hence, both sets T ∪ {¬φ} and T ∪ {φ} have models, which must be infinite. By the
upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, both sets have models in cardinality κ, which
contradicts the assumption that T is categorical in κ. 

Theorem 8.38 TG is complete.

Proof We check all assumptions in Definition 8.59. TG is satisfiable, the structure of

random graph (RG), to be discussed in Sect. 8.12 below, provides a model. TG has
no finite model. That TG is categorical in ω, will be proved in Sect. 8.12. 

We now return to the main track by stating and recalling a proof of the Fagin’s
theorem Fagin [36] leading to the conclusion that FO satisfies the 0-1 law.

Theorem 8.39 (FO satisfies the 0-1 law) For any FO-sentence ψ over the vocabulary
P, if TG |= ψ, then μn (ψ) converges to 1.

Proof Without loss of generality, one may assume that the vocabulary P = {P}. By
maximal consistency of TG , to be proved finally in Theorem 8.42, it is sufficient to
prove the following
Claim. If φ ∈ TG , then μn (φ) →n 1.
The idea of proof is the following: as μ(φ) + μ(¬φ) = 1, if we prove that μ(¬φ =
0), then by compactness property,  we find a finite set T = {ψ1 , ψ2 , . . . , ψq } in TG
such that T |= φ, hence, ¬φ ⊃ (¬T ) and then μ(¬φ) ≤ μ(¬ψ1 ) + μ(¬ψ2 ) +
. . . + μ(¬ψq ) = 0 + . . . + 0 = 0, hence, μ(φ) = 1.
Proof of Claim. We pass to negation: let φ∗ (xm ) be the formula

C(xm ) ∧ ∀y.(( i (y = xi ) ⊃ ¬C E(xm , y).

Negation of CE is related to y and it is sufficient to consider the formula

2m+1
χ(y) : ¬( i=1 αi ),
8.11 0-1 Laws 433

where for i = 1, 2, . . . , m,
(2i-1) α2i−1 is P(i, y) in case P(xi , y) is a conjunct in C E(xm , y);
(2i-1*) α2i−1 is ¬P(i, y) in case ¬P(xi , y) is a conjunct in C E(xm , y);
(2i) α2i is P(y, i) in case P(y, xi ) is a conjunct in C E(xm , y);
(2i)* α2i is ¬P(y, i) in case ¬P(y, xi ) is a conjunct in C E(xm , y);
(2m+1) α2m+1 is P(y, y) in case P(y, y) is a conjunct in C E(xm , y);
(2m+1)* α2m+1 is ¬P(y, y) in case ¬P(y, y) is a conjunct in C E(xm , y).
For n > m and an extension formula φG of 11.5,

 μn (¬φG ) = 
= μn (∃x1 x2 ...xm ( i= j (xi = x j ) ∧ C(xm ) ∧ ∀y.(( i y = xi ) ⊃ ¬C E(x m , y))))

= μn (∃x1 x2 ...xm ( i= j (xi = x j ) ∧ φ∗ (xm ))) =

≤ all substitutions xi /ai μn (φ(a1 , a2 , . . . , am )) = Πn−m+1
n μn (φ(1, 2, . . . , m))

≤ n μn (φ(1, 2, . . . , m)) ≤ n μn (∀y.(( i y = xi ) ⊃ χ(y)))
m m


(due to provability of (φ(1, 2, . . . , m) ⊃ ∀y.(( i y = xi ) ⊃ χ(y))) =

1
n m Πi=m+1
n
μn (χ(i)) = n m (1 − )n−m
22m+1
(the last estimate due to the number of conjuncts in which xi may appear; let q =
1 − 22m+1
1
)=
n m q n−m →n→∞ 0

(to see this let n = x and apply the l’Hôpital rule with the real number x for m times
to get m!q n after returning to n; q n tends to 0 at infinity).
As μ(¬φ) = 0, μ(φ) = 1. The proof is concluded. 

The converse to Theorem 8.39 holds true.

Theorem 8.40 If μ(φ) = 1, then TG |= φ.

Proof It holds by completeness of TG : suppose that μ(φ) = 1 and ¬(T |= φ). Then,
by completeness, T |= ¬φ and by 11.9, μ(¬φ) = 1, hence, μ(φ) = 0, a contradic-
tion. 

Now, we may extends the results of Theorems 8.39 and 8.40 over FO.

Theorem 8.41 (Fagin loc.cit.) If φ is an FO-formula of predicate logic and without

constant and function symbols, then either μ(φ) = 1 or μ(φ) = 0.

Proof (Fagin, op.cit.) For a formula φ the dichotomy holds: either T |= φ or T |=

¬φ, hence, by Theorem 8.39, either μ(φ) = 1 or μ(φ) = 0. 

Finally, the result may be extended over formulae of FO by regarding function

symbols as relational symbols.
434 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Remark 8.5 The Fagin theorem does not hold for FO+ordering, counting possibil-
ities as witnessed by query EVEN. An interesting consequence of the Fagin theorem
is the existence of finite models of almost (i.e., save for a finite of them) any finite
cardinality for finite sets of extension axioms.
Theorem 8.42 (Fagin loc.cit.) For any finite set TG∗ ⊆ TG there exists a natural
number n 0 such that for each n ≥ n 0 TG∗ has a model of cardinality n.
Proof Suppose that |TG∗ | = k. As μ(¬φ) = 0 for each φ ∈ T ∗ , there exists n 0 with
the property that for each n ≥ n 0 and each φ ∈ TG∗ , the inequality μn (¬φ) < k1 . As

μn ( ¬φ) ≤ μn (¬φ) < 1,

φ∈T ∗ φ∈T ∗


it follows that μn ( φ∈T ∗ φ) > 0 for n ≥ n 0 .
It follows by Theorem 8.42 that each extension axiom has models of almost any
finite cardinality with exception of only finitely many finite cardinalities of models.
It is called the co-finite spectrum property. 

8.12 BIT Relational Symbol. Random Graph

Definition 8.60 (BIT, random graph) The relation BIT on N×N which interprets
the predicate BIT is BIT(i,j)=1 if and only if the j-th bit in the binary expansion
of i is 1. BIT(i,0) means that i is odd. It is known that (FO+ BIT) = (FO + PLUS,
TIMES), i.e., BIT introduces arithmetical operations into FO structures (and vice
versa) cf. (Immerman [10]).
A random graph (RG) (Erdös, Rényi [39]), Radó [40] is the graph on vertices
in the set V =N and edges are defined by means of BIT as follows: (i, j) ∈ E ≡
BIT(i, j) = 1.Clearly, j < i and RG is directed.
When working with RG, our single relational symbols is E interpreted as the
relation e. Extension axioms acquire the following form: for n > m, the extension
formulae are of the form

 
n 
m 
n
φ RG : ∀xn ( (xi = x j )) ⊃ (∃y.( (y = xi ) ∧ E(y, xi ) ∧ (¬E(y, xi ))).
i= j i=1 i=1 i=m+1

We need to prove that the set TRG of extension formulae of the form φ RG is
categorical in ω (the proof will obey TG as well).
Theorem 8.43 TRG is categorical in cardinality ω.
Proof The proof makes use of the known from our discussion of the Ehrenfeucht-
Fraïssé theory forth-and-back technique. This time, our Ehrenfeucht game is to be
infinite.
8.13 Games on Graphs and Transition Systems 435

Let (M, E) be another model for TRG . Suppose that after m moves the players
achieved a partial isomorphism ((ai )m 1 ; (bi )1 ) and Spoiler selects ai+1 ; as RG sat-
m

isfies TRG , Duplicator can select using an appropriate extension formula, bi+1 such
that E(a j , ai + 1) ≡ M |= (b j , bi + 1) for each j ≤ i. In this way, we provide an
isomorphism between RG and M. 
As with Theorem 8.39, we have a specialization: T (RG) |= φ ≡ μ(φ) = 1. As
TR G is recursively axiomatizable, being complete, it is decidable.
Decidability of T (RG) implies that: for a sentence φ of FO, the decision problem
whether μ(φ) = 1 is decidable.
Example 8.4 SO does not obey 0-1 law. The following is an example Fagin [36]:
consider an n-structure and a single binary relational symbol P. For the formula
φ : ∃P.[∀x.∃!y.((x = y) ∧ P(x, y) ∧ P(y, x))]. (! means ‘the unique’), we have
(i) μn (φ) = 0 for n odd and
(ii) μn (φ) = 1 for n even.

8.13 Games on Graphs and Transition Systems

We have already witnessed the role which strategic games play in the theory of
models: Ehrenfeucht games, bidirectional games, pebble games are vital in studies
of many aspects of finite structures and FO structures. One may call these games
symbolic even if some of them like pebble games visualize their context. Yet, strategic
games from the beginning exploited graphs as witnessed by trees of games in the
sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern. Notions and concepts like that of a strategy, of
deterministic game, value of the game, were elaborated in that milieu.
We have here an occasion to discuss games in a more general fashion, in order to
single out their common features.
The existence of important games on transition systems like Parity games prompts
us to dedicate some space to this topic.
Definition 8.61 (The architecture of a game on a graph) In spite of differences
among various games on graphs, there are basic common solutions to construction
of the stage for the game. First a graph G = (V, E) is given and next two players
enter, player 1 and player 2, so it is a 2-person game. Graph G is directed, pointing
at direction of moves from a position to the next position, and the set V of vertices
is partitioned into two non-empty subsets V1 and V2 , with the intent that player 1
makes moves at vertices in V1 and player 2 makes moves at vertices in V2 .
There is a vertex vinit which is the starting point for a play of the game; a play is
then a sequence vinit , v1 , v2 , . . . of vertices, and each pair (vi , vi+1 ) is an edge in the
set E. Limiting cases are when each player plays solely on own vertices so the play
goes on V1 × V1 ∪ V2 × V2 and when each player may be compelled to select a move
leading into the territory of the opponent so the play goes on V1 × V2 ∪ V2 × V1 .
436 8 Beyond FO Within SO

The signature for the game Γ is then (G, V, E, V1 , V2 ).

Definition 8.62 (Strategies) A strategy of a player i is their plan for making

moves; for each vertex in own territory player chooses a move and the set of pairs
{(v, move(v)) : v ∈ Vi , (v, move(v)) ∈ E} is the strategy for the player, so actually
move : Vi → V is a function. Each player realizes the own strategy and the play
terminates.

Definition 8.63 (Winning strategies, positions and regions) Once a criterion for win
in a play is defined, one can discuss the notion of a winning strategy. A player has
a winning move strategy if and only if player wins every party of the game playing
accordingly to the strategy move. A winning position is the position vinit from which
player has a winning strategy. A winning region for a player is the set of its winning
positions.

For the game Γ played on the graph G, we denote as (Γ, v) the party of Γ with
v = vinit . There are Queries about graph games and we address the Query GAME
cf. Grädel [41].

Definition 8.64 (The Query GAME) For a finite graph G, GAME

{(Γ, v) : Player 1 has the winning strateg y in gameΓ f r om v}.

We denote by the symbol v → the set of successors of v, i.e., w ∈ v →≡ (v, w) ∈

E. For a set W ⊆ V , we define the set → W as the set {v ∈ V1 : (v →) ∩ V1 =
∅} ∪ {v ∈ V2 : (v →) ⊆ W }. In order to decide GAME, we begin with the set of
winning terminal positions W0 and move back in history of the game by defining
sets Wn of vertices from which Player 1 has a winning strategy in at most n moves.
Having Wn defined, we let Wn+1 =→ Wn until Wn+1 = Wn which means no more
winning positions back in time. In effect, winning regions for both Players are found.
Finiteness of the graph guarantees that the query is in P. Actually, it requires a
linear time: it requires the in-depth-search of G and marking of winning positions
for each Player, so the complexity is O(|V | + |E|).

Definition 8.65 (Parity game) A Parity game is a game played on transition systems
and their importance stems from their role in model checking for mu-calculus. Its
signature is (G, V , E, V1 , V2 , P, f ), where the relational symbol P is new and
it denotes a finite set of priorities called also ranks, a subset of N. Additionally,
a function f : P → V is given which is an assignment of priorities to vertices of G.

The result of a play is a sequence p : v0 , v1 , . . . of positions with the accom-

panying sequence F p : f (v0 ), f (v1 ), . . . of priorites.
By means of priorities a set Acc ⊆ V ω is defined and a player wins if its sequence
of positions is in Acc. In Sect. 8.14, these provisos will be specified. Theorem due to
(Emerson and Jutla [42]) and Mostowski [43] decrees that each position is winning
for some player.
8.14 Modal μ-Calculus (Lμ ) 437

Theorem 8.44 (Positional Determinacy Theorem) For each Parity game, the set of
positions can be split into two disjoint sets W1 , W2 such that Player 1 has a positional
strategy f winning on W1 and Player 2 has the positional strategy g which is winning
on W2 .

Example 8.5 GAME is definable by means of an LFP formula: GAME is expressed

in LFP as [LFP W,x .φ](x) with

φ(W, x) = (V1 (x) ∧ ∃y.E(x, y) ∧ W (y)) ∨ (V2 (x) ∧ ∀y.(E(x, y) ⊃ W (y))).

Actually, GAME is LFP-complete Dahlhaus [44]. By Theorem 8.23, GAME is

PTIME-complete. We recall one more argument for this statement.
We recall from Chap. 2 the problem SAT-HORN of satisfiability of sentential
Horn formulae which is PTIME. We can now point to an another argument for this
statement. A theorem by Grädel [41] concerns SAT-HORN vs. GAME.

Theorem 8.45 SAT-HORN is equivalent to GAME by linear in time and logarithmic

in space reductions.

For a proof, please consult Grädel [41].

8.14 Modal µ-Calculus (Lµ )

Introduced in Kozen [45], Lμ adds to sentential modal logic SML fixed-point opera-
tors LFP and GFP. We recall that SML is a rendition of FO in a modified guise with
universal operator defined as necessity, denoted by us L, and existential operator
defined as possibility, denoted by us M. Chapter 4 brings a discussion of SML.
The logical language in which we define mu-calculus contains a set P =
{ p, q, r, . . .} of atomic propositions, a set V ar = {X, Y, Z , . . .} of variable names,
both sets potentially infinite, and a set L = {a, b, c, . . .} of labels (often called
actions).
In order to establish a general setting for Lμ , we adopt as our Kripke models of
Chap. 4 labelled transition systems (see Chap. 1). A labelled transition system (alias
a labelled Kripke model), is a structure T = (S, tr, L, A), where S is a set of states,
tr: S × L × S is a transition relation, A is an assignment P → 2 S , and L is a set of
labels. The usual notation for instances of transitions is s −
→a t for a ∈ L and s, t ∈ S.
Second-order variables are mapped to subsets of the set S of states: X → S X .

Definition 8.66 (Formulae of L μ ) Formulae of Lμ are defined as the smallest set Fm

which satisfies conditions:

(i) for each p ∈ P, pin Fm ;

(ii) ¬ p ∈ Fm for each p ∈ P;
(iii) for each X ∈ V ar , X ∈ Fm ;
438 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(iv) if φ, ψ ∈ Fm , then φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ ∈ Fm ;
(v) if φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula;
(v) for modal symbols L , M, and a ∈ L, if φ ∈ Fm , then L a .φ, Ma .φ ∈ Fm ;
(vi) for φ ∈ Fm , X ∈ V ar , and, symbols μ, ν, expressions μX.φ, ν X.φ ∈ Fm .

Instead of  and ⊥, in that area symbols tt for  and ff for ⊥ are used.

Definition 8.67 (Semantics of L μ ) Meanings of mu-formulae depend on the tran-

sition system T with its assignment A and on the valuation V : V ar → 2 S . For
each formula φ ∈ Fm , we define its meaning as a set of states {s ∈ S : T , V, s |= φ}.
Semantic rules are the following:
(a) T , V, s |= p ≡ s ∈ A( p), T , V, s |= ¬ p ≡ s ∈ S \ A( p);
(b) T , V, s |= X ≡ s ∈ V (X );
(c) T , V, s |= φ ∧ ψ ≡ T , V, s |= φ and T , V, s |= ψ; the analogical condition
holds for ∨ in place of ∧;
(d) T , V, s |= L .aφ ≡ ∀t ∈ S.s −→
a t ⊃ T , V, t |= φ;
−
→
(e) T , V, s |= M.aφ ≡ ∃t ∈S.s a t ∧ T , V, t |= φ;
(f) T , V, s |= μX.φ ≡ s ∈  {S  ⊆ S : ∀t.T , V [X/S  ], t |= φ ⊃ t ∈ S  };
(g) T , V, s |= ν X.φ ≡ s ∈ {S  ⊆ S : s ∈ S  ⊃ T , V [X/S  ], s |= φ.

The symbol V [X/S  ] denotes the modification of valuation V which maps X to S 

and is like V on all other variables.
While rules (a)–(e) are known from modal logic and are easy to grasp, the last two
rules are more esoteric. They follow from the understanding that μX realizes LFP
and ν X realizes GLP, hence, μ starts from the empty set and builds LFP upwards
and ν starts from the set S and builds GLP downwards.
The isotone (monotone) operator in question is a mapping which for any formula
φ(X ) with a free X maps the set S  to the set satisfying φ when X is interpreted as
S  . The notation V [X/S  ] does express this substitution of S  for X .
From semantic rules it follows that some dualities take place. Notably, De Mor-
gan laws, double negation law and the dualities ¬Ma .φ is L a .(¬φ) and ¬L a .φ is
Ma .(¬φ). We single out the following dualities:
(h) ¬ν X.φ(X ) is μX.¬φ(¬X );
(j) ¬μX.φ(X ) is ν X.¬φ(¬X ).
It follows that for all T , V, φ, T , V, s |= ¬φ if and only if it is not true that
T , V, s |= φ.
Double usage of negation in (h) and ( j) secures that X is positive in both formulae,
hence fixed points can be induced.
In addition, some useful notation is added, for instance, for C ⊆ L, L C .φ means
L a .φ for each a ∈ C. In particular, L L .φ means L a .φ for each a ∈ L.
 Let us observe that the condition in (f) is like in definition of LFP in Sect. 8.6 as
{X : Φ(X ) ⊆ X } and it holds dually for (g). Hence, μ realizes LFP and ν realizes
GFP. Accordingly, one may write: T , V, s |= μX.φ if and only if s ∈ LFP(Φ(φ))
and T , V, s |= ν X.φ if and only if s ∈ LFP(Φ(φ)).
8.14 Modal μ-Calculus (Lμ ) 439

It follows that, intuitively, μX expresses that some event may eventually materi-
alize, i.e., the liveness property. In literature one may find the phrase: ‘mu is finite
looping’ in the sense that μ allows only finitely many steps. In contrast, by duality, ν
is ‘an infinite looping’and it does express the safety property. We know that temporal
logics provide the language in which these properties are expressed, hence, it comes
as no wonder that Lμ contains CTL*, CTL and LTL.
Lμ , by usage of monadic second order variables, belongs in MSO. Let us bring a
few examples on CTL formulae and system properties expressed in Lμ .

Example 8.6 Let us consider some Lμ formulae, cf. (Bradfield and Stirling [46]);
(Bradfield and Walukiewicz [47]).
(1.) ν X. p ∧ L a .X .
(2.) μX. p ∨ L a .X .
(3.) μX. p ∨ (q ∧ Ma .X ).
(4.) μX. p ∨ (q ∧ ML X ).
(5.) ν X.(μY. p ∨ ML .Y ) ∧ L L .X .
Using metaphors of finite or infinite looping, we disentangle the intended meaning
of formulae 1-5.
For formula 1., the meaning is ‘p holds always on each infinite a-path’, i.e. AG p.
For formula 2., the meaning is ‘p eventually holds on each a-path’, i.e., AF p.
For formula 3., the meaning is ‘on an a-path q holds until p holds’.
For formula 4., the meaning is ‘on some path q holds until p holds, i.e. EqU p.
For formula 5., the meaning is ‘on each path it is possible always that p holds’,
i.e. AGEF p.

Decidability of Lμ was settled by (Streett and Emerson [48]).

Theorem 8.46 Modal mu-calculus has the small model property: for each satisfiable
formula there exists a finite model of size exponential in the size of the formula, hence,
mu-calculus is decidable.

We abstain from the proof, carried in the setting of automata (Street, Emerson) or
tableaux (Bradfield, Stirling).

Definition 8.68 (Approximations to μX, ν X . Unfolding) In the general case, fixed

points are obtained in the results of transfinite sequences (see Chap. 1) of approxi-
mations (μα X.φ(X )), respectively (ν α X.φ(X )) defined by transfinite induction as
(0) (μ0 X.φ(X )) = ∅;
(α+1) μα+1 X.φ(X ) = φ(μα X.φ(X ));

(λ) μλ X.φ(X ) = α<λ μα X.φ(X ) for a limit ordinal λ;

ν X , (0) becomes ν 0 X. phi(X ) = S and the case of limit λ becomes

In case of 
ν X.φ(X ) = α<λ ν α X.φ(X ).
λ

As μX.φ(X ) determines the fixed point, μX.φ(X ) is equivalent to its unfolding

φ(μX.φ(X )).
440 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Our metaphor of looping tells that the formula μX.L a X means that there are only
finite length a-indexed paths. We may see approximations over ω:
(1) μ0 X.L a X : ∅, ⊥ (or, ff);
(2) μ1 X.L a X : L a .∅, s in this set if and only if s has no a-edge;
(3) μ2 X.L a X : L a .L a .∅, s in this set if and only if s has no a-path of length 2;
(4) ....
Definition 8.69 (Well-named formulae. Alternation depth) A formula is well-named
if and only if bound and free variables are distinct and if each variable can be bound
in a formula at most once. For a formula φ, and variables X, Y , we write X ≤φ Y if
X is free in a sub-formula (.)Y.ψ(Y ) with μ or ν in place of dot (.).
The alternation depth of a mu-variable X in a formula φ is the maximum of lengths of
linearly ordered by the relation ≤φ sequences (X i )i such that X 1 = X , even indexed
X i s are ν-variables and odd-indexed variables are μ-variables. For ν-variables the
definition mirrors that for mu-variables. The alternation depth of a formula φ, denoted
ald(φ), is a maximal alternation depth of variables bound in φ.
This definition is explained simply in [47], ald(X) is the number of alternations
between mu and nu in the prefix of the formula. In [47] we find examples, e.g., the
formula
μ.X (νY.( p ∧ Ma .Y )) ∨ Ma .X has ald(X)=1
and for the formula
νY.μX.( p ∧ Ma .Y ) ∨ Ma .X , ald(X)=2.

8.15 µ-Calculus Model Checking

Definition 8.70 (Parity games in model checking via L μ ) We return to parity games.
For the purpose of the next section, we introduce a bit more general and at the same
time better adjusted to mu-calculus case notion of a graph game played by two players
on the graph G. The signature of the game is

(V, V1 , V2 , →⊆ V × V, Acc),

where V is a set of positions (= vertices of G), V1 , V2 are positions in which players 1

and 2 make their moves, → is a relation of the next move, v → v  means that player
making a move at v lands in v  . Acc is the set of infinite sequences of positions.
As with Ehrenfeucht’s games, players bear names, player 1 will be called E,
player 2’s names will be A (literature variants are Eve, Adam or Eloise, Abelard...).
The reason is that E will make moves at disjunctions and existentially quantified
formulae, A, to the contrary, at conjunctions and universally quantified formulae.
The set Acc introduces conditions for the win.
8.15 μ-Calculus Model Checking 441

Parity condition for a win is the following: given a set M = {0, 1, . . . , m} ⊆ N,

∞
and an assignment A : V → M, we let Acc = {(vi )i=0 : limsupi A(vi ) is even}. Due
to finiteness of M, limsupi A(vi ) is simply the largest value among A(vi ) s which
occurs infinitely many times in the sequence.
For a formula φ, the closure of φ is the set φ of all sub-formulae of φ closed on
unfolding. Game G depends in the general case on the transition system T , a valuation
V on variables, and on a formula φ of mu-calculus as the aim of the game is to verify
whether φ holds in a state s of T , and for this reason we denote formally the game
as GV (T , φ). We shorten this symbol to G as usually other symbolic ingredients are
well known.
Positions in the game G are pairs (s, ψ) where s ∈ S and ψ ∈ φ. The rules are
constructed in order to secure the equivalence T , V, s |= ψ if and only if E has a
winning strategy from the position (s, ψ).
Rules of the game: We assign positions to E and A. Position assignment is as
follows:
(1) for (s, p): if s ∈ A( p): to A; if s ∈/ A( p): to E;
(2) for (s, X ): if s ∈ V(X ) to A; else to E;
(3) for (s, ¬ p): if s ∈ A( p): to E; if s ∈
/ A( p): to A;
(4) for (s, χ ∨ ξ): to E with move either to χ or to ξ;
(5) for (s, χ ∧ ξ): to A with move either to χ or to ξ;
(6) for (s, Ma .χ): to E who moves to all t such that s −→a t and to the position (t, χ);
(7) −
→
for (s, L a .χ): to A who moves to all t such that s a t and to the position (t, χ);
(8) for (s, μX.χ(X )): to either E or A who move to the unfolding
(s, χ(μX.χ(X )));
(9) for (s, ν X.χ(X )): to either E or A who move to the unfolding
(s, χ(ν X.χ(X ))).
Priorities (ranks) are assigned on the basis of alternation depth. Formulae of the
form μX.φ(X ) are given odd priority and formulae of the form ν X.φ(X ) will have
even priorities. This reflects the looping status of these formulae. Preference is given
to infinite looping. Formulae proposed in ([47]) for assignment of priorities are:
)
(ν) R(ν X.φ(X )) = 2 ·  ald(X
2
;
)
(μ) R(μX.φ(X )) = 2 ·  ald(X
2
 + 1;
(0) 0 in other cases.
It follows that priority of a sub-formula is not greater then that of the formula. All this
preparations serve the purpose of introduction of the criterion for model checking in
(Bradfield and Walukiewicz [47]).
442 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Theorem 8.47 (Model checking by Lμ ) For each closed mu-formula φ, T , s |= φ

if and only if E has a winning strategy from the position (s, φ) in the game G.

Proof We restrict ourselves to an outline of the proof, a more complete discussion is

to be found in ([47]) along with an extensive bibliography to which a really interested
reader can turn for the full information.
Consider a formula μX.φ(X ) and suppose that T , s |= μX.φ(X ). By 14.2.(vi),
there exists the smallest ordinal number α such that

T , V, s |= μα X.φ(X ).

Hence, α is non-limit, α = β + 1. Letting [μβ X.φ(X )]Vβ = Tβ to denote the meaning

of μβ X.φ(X ) under T , Vβ , where Vβ assigns to X the set of states which satisfy
μβ X.φ(X ), we obtain that T , Vβ , s |= φ(X ).
By inductive assumption, E has the winning strategy from the position (s, φ(X ))
in the game G with the valuation Vβ . From there, for some state s ∗ ∈ Vβ (X ), the
position (s ∗ , X ) is winning. This means that E has the winning strategy from the
position (s ∗ , μX.φ(X )) in the game G with Vβ . The winning strategy for E at the
position (s, μX.φ(X )) is to unfold to (s, φ(μX.φ(X ))) and from there go to the
winning strategy in position (s, φ(X )).
The converse implication can be justified by considering a winning position
(s, μX.φ(X )) for E. By priority assignment rules, the priority of the position is odd,
let its value be m. By rules of the game, and the winning condition, on each winning
path there are finitely many positions of priority m, i.e, positions (s ∗ , μX.φ(X )). Let
us single out these positions by the name of outlying. For each outlying position we
assign a number ρ such that the position has ρ outliers on the winning path from it.
We write for a position π: o(π) = ρ.
We induct on ρ in order to prove Claim:
Claim. For a position π = (s ∗ , μX.φ(X )), if o(π) = ρ, then T , V, s ∗ |= μρ X.φ(X ).
Proof of Claim. For a position π with ρ = 1; from π, E has a winning strat-
egy with no outliers. Then, E has a winning strategy in game G with the val-
uation V 1 from the position (s ∗ , φ(X )). By hypothesis of induction, T , V 1 , s |=
μ1 X.φ(X ). Continuing this mode of reasoning, for an outlier π # = (s # , μX.φ(X ))
of o(π # ) = m + 1, E has a strategy winning from (s # , φ(X )) in the game G with
the valuation Vm = V m [X/{s ∗∗ : o((s ∗∗ , μX.φ(X ))) ≤ m}]. By hypothesis of induc-
tion, T , Vm , s |= φ(X ) and by induction on ρ, Vm ⊆ {s + : T , V, s + |= μm X.φ(X ).
The conclusion is that T , V, s |= μm+1 X.φ(X ). The converse implication
follows. 
8.16 DATALOG 443

8.16 DATALOG

We have met Horn clauses on many occasions and now we meet them in a logical
structure of DATALOG.

Definition 8.71 (Syntax of DATALOG) Consider a structure A with the relational

vocabulary Σ. Rules of DATALOG are Horn decision rules written in a form of an
implication P(x) : −γ1 (x, y), γ2 (x, y), . . . , γn (x, y). Relation symbol P is called
the head of the rule, its premiss is the body.

Heads of rules do not occur in the vocabulary Σ, each of the formulae γi is an atomic
formula R(x, y) for a relational symbol R ∈ Σ or an atomic formula P(x, y) for P
a head of some rule. A set of rules is a DATALOG program along with a head Q of
a rule in the program which is the predicate computed by the program.
Definition 8.72 (Semantics of DATALOG) Consider a DATALOG program:

P1 (x) : −γ1,1 (x, y1 ), γ1,2 (x, y1 ), . . . , γ1,n (x, y1 ).

Pk (x) : −γk,1 (x, yk ), γk,2 (x, yk ), . . . , γk,n (x, yk ).

In this program heads P j may be each a head to few rules. Suppose that a head P j is
a head to rules

P j (x)u : −γu,1 (x, yu ), γu,2 (x, yu ), . . . , γu,n (x, yu )

for u = 1, 2, . . . , ju . Suppose that head predicates are P1 , P2 , . . . , Pk , among them

Q, with arity of Pi = n i , each i.
For chosen sets Y1 , Y2 , . . . , Yk , where Yi ⊆ Ani for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, one defines
the fixed point operator F(Y1 , Y2 , . . . , Yk ) as the value (Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z k ), where, for
the subset of rules with the header P j ,

ju

n
Z j = {a ∈ An j : A, Y1 , Y2 , . . . , Yk |= ∃yu . γu, j (x, yu ).}
u=1 j=1

Let us denote for precision’s sake the program as PROG. Then the opera-
tor F will be denoted more precisely as F(PROG) and it will induce the fixed
point LFP(F(PROG)) as the limit of the sequence F(PROG)(∅), F(PROG)2 (∅), . . .
LFP(F(PROG))=(LFP(P1 ), …, LFP(Pk )).
We have obtained a simultaneous fixed point LFPsim . It turns out that LFPsim
is equivalent to a single LFP. The argument for this statement bears the name of
the Bekić lemma. The context is usually set in the case of two operators for trans-
parency’sake. We consider first the case of set operators.
444 8 Beyond FO Within SO

Theorem 8.48 (The Bekić lemma) For sets A, B consider mappings F : 2 A × 2 B →

2 A and G : 2 A × 2 B → 2 B and the mapping (F, G) acting coordinate-wise. Suppose
that F, G are isotone, hence, there exist the pair of least fixed points (LFP(F),
LFP(G)).
For a fixed subset X ⊆ A, let the mapping G X be defined on 2 B as G X (Y ) = G(X, Y ).
Thus, LFP(G X ) is defined.
Claim. For the mapping Ψ (X ) = F(X,LFP(G X )), there exists LFP(Ψ ) and
LFP(Ψ )=LFP(F).
Proof of Claim. The mapping Ψ is isotone. As

G LFP(F) (LFP(G)) =

G(LFP(F), LFP(G)) = LFP(G),

we have

(i) LFP(G LFP(F) ) ⊆ LFP(G);

(ii) Ψ (LFP(F)) = F(LFP(F), LFPG LFP(F)

⊆
F(LFP(F), LFP(G)) = LFP(F).

It follows that
 LFP(Ψ )⊆ LFP(F) because of (ii) and the known to us definition
LFP(Ψ ) = {Z : Ψ (Z ) ⊆ Z }. It remains to prove the converse inclusion. The proof
that LFP(F)⊆ LFP(Ψ ) is by induction on stages F α of construction of LFP(F).
For ordinal number α = 0, the inclusion holds. Suppose that hypothesis of induc-
tion for α holds and consider α + 1.
We have F α+1 =F(F α , G α ) ⊆ F(LFP(Ψ ), LFP(G LFP(Ψ ) ) = LFP(Ψ ).
Similarly,

G α+1 ⊆ G(LFP(Ψ ), LFP(G LFP(Ψ ) )) = LFP(G LFP(Ψ ) ).

As for limit ordinals, we have the union, the inclusion holds. We conclude the proof
of the Claim.
Returning to DATALOG, we consider the case of relation operators. Again, it is
sufficient to restrict ourselves to the case of two operators. We consider the system
A and two formulae (a) R(x = φ(R, Q), (b) Q(y) = ψ(R, Q).
The system Γ : (a), (b), induces over A two operators:
(i) F : (R, Q) → {a : A |= φ(R, Q, a)};
(ii) G : (R, Q) → {a : A |= ψ(R, Q, a)}.
In the notation of Claim, we have A |=LFP(R)(a) if and only if (a) ∈LFP(F). Fol-
lowing the notation of Claim, we define the mapping G R : Q → G(R, T ) and the
mapping Ψ : R → F(R, LFP(G R )) defined via the formula φ(R, [LFP Q,y .ψ]).
8.17 Problems 445

It follows that A |= [LFP R,x .φ(R,[LFP Q,y .ψ])](a) if and only if, by Claim,

a ∈ LFP(Ψ ) = LFP(F.)

Finally, [LFP R ](a) is equivalent to [LFP R,x .φ(R,[LFP Q,y .ψ])](a) and analogously
[LFP Q ](b) is equivalent to [LFP Q,y .ψ(R,[LFP R,x .φ])](b).
Thus, DATALOG programs can be expressed in LFP. As for complexity of DAT-
ALOG, and of LFP it is known the following, (cf. Grädel [41]). The input structure
for a program Π is the collection of predicates that appear only in the bodies of
rules along with constants. DATALOG programs can be evaluated in PTIME with
respect to the size of the input structure and the problem of program evaluation is
EXPTIME-complete.

8.17 Problems

The first two problems come from (Boolos, Burgess, Jeffrey. Computability and
Logic 4th.ed. Cambridge UK (2002)).

Problem 8.1 (SO rendering of the Leibniz Principle) We recall the Leibniz Identitas
of Indiscernibilium Principle from Chap. 7: if all available properties give the same
value true or false on things x, y then x and y are to be regarded as identical.
Show that the following formula of SO: ∀X.(X (x) ≡ X (y)) ≡ (x = y) gives the
formal rendering of the Leibniz Principle.

Problem 8.2 Prove the following weakening of the formula in Problem8.1:

∀X.(X (x) → X (y)) ≡ (x = y) as the rendering of the Leibniz Principle of Identitas
Indiscernibilium.

Problem 8.3 The compactness principle is obeyed by FO: a set Γ of formulae is sat-
isfiable if and only if each finite subset Δ ⊆ Γ is satisfiable. Prove that compactness
property is not valid in the realm of finite models.

Problem 8.4 Prove that the class EVEN is definable in SO.

Problem 8.5 Define in FO the property of a finite undirected graph being complete.

Problem 8.6 Prove that the following queries are FO-definable in the class of all
graphs.
(a) There exists in the graph G an isolated vertex;
(b) There exists a vertex in the graph G with at leat k adjacent vertices for k ≥ 2;
(c) There is a path of length 2 between vertices u, v in the graph G.

Problem 8.7 Prove that the following queries are definable in ∃MSO in the class of
all graphs.
446 8 Beyond FO Within SO

(a) The graph G is DISCONNECTED (i.e., it is a union of two of its sub-graphs

with no edge between them).
(b) The graph G is 2-COLORABLE (i.e., two colors suffice in order to color
vertices in such way that no two adjacent vertices are colored with the same color).

Problem 8.8 (Ebbinghaus and Flum [4]) Consider the set Q of rational numbers
in (0, 1) and the set Z of integers with their natural orderings. Prove that in the
Ehrenfeucht 3-move game G 3 on Q, Z Spoiler has the winning strategy.

Problem 8.9 (The Łoś-Tarski theorem) Cf. (Ebbinghaus and Flum [4]). The Łoś-
Tarski theorem states: if a closed formula φ is extension-invariant, i.e., if A |= φ and
A ⊆ B, then B |= φ, then φ is expressible as a formula built from literals with use
of ∨, ∧ and ∃.
Prove: The Łoś-Tarski theorem fails over finite models of FO.

Problems 8.10 and 8.11 are from (Gurevich, Y.: Toward logic tailored for com-
putational complexity. In: Computation and Proof Theory, Richter, M. et al., eds.,
Springer. Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1104, 175–216 (1984)).

Problem 8.10 (Beth definability) The Beth definability theorem cf. Sect. 3.22 states
that in FO implicit definability is equivalent to explicit definability.
Prove: Beth theorem fails over finite models for FO. [Hint: Consider a query P on
finite structures: P is unary and it returns the number of evenly indexed elements in
a linear order].

Problem 8.11 (Craig interpolation) Prove: The Craig interpolation theorem cf.
Sect. 3.22 does not hold over finite models for FO.

Problem 8.12 Prove: the property of a finite graph to be acyclic is not expressible
in FO. [Hint: Apply Ehrenfeucht’s games].

Problem 8.13 (Libkin [26], 3.17) A block world is a finite union of finite disjoint
linearly ordered structures. Apply Ehrenfeucht games to show that theory of block
worlds is decidable, in other wording, it is expressible in FO that a structure is a
block world.

Problem 8.14 Prove: transitive closure TC is not FO-definable. [Hint: apply Hanf
locality].

Problem 8.15 Prove the estimate: lr (Q) ≤ 3 · hlr (Q) + 1. [Hint: (Libkin [26],
4.11)].

Problem 8.16 (Balanced binary trees). Cf. (Libkin [26], p. 53). A tree (T, <) is
binary when each non-leaf node has at most 2 children. A tree is balanced when all
branches (i.e., maximal linearly ordered subsets) have the same length. Apply the
Hanf locality test to prove that the query whether a graph is a binary balanced tree
is non-FO-definable.
8.17 Problems 447

Problem 8.17 (Same distance from the node (same generation)) Given a node c in
an undirected graph, decide for two nodes a, b whether they are at the same distance
from c.
Prove: the Query Q(samedistance) is non-FO-definable by applying the Gaifman
locality test. [Hint: cf. (Libkin [26], p. 53)].

Problem 8.18 is from (Rabin, M.: Decidability of second-order theories and

automata on infinite trees. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 141,
1-35 (1969)).

Problem 8.18 (MSO and finite trees) Prove: the MSO theory of finite trees is
decidable.

Problem 8.19 (0-1 law) We consider the set Mn of all finite structures with domain
of n elements over a common relational vocabulary Σ.
For a property P, we define the quotient

|{A ∈ S : A |= P}|
μn (P) = .
|S|

This is the probability that a randomly chosen structure in S has P. The asymptotic
probability μ(P) = lim n→∞ πn (P). A logic L satisfies the 0-1 law if for each Boolean
Query (a property P) either π(P) = 0 or π(P) = 1.
Prove: (a) The property EVEN for sets can not be defined;
(b) over a vocabulary {P 1 } with a single unary relational symbol P 1 , the Query
PARITY(P 1 )(A) meansthat |{a ∈ A : P 1 (a)}| is even. For structures in Mn , prove
that μn (PARITY(P 1 ))= k even,k≤n bn(n, k) and π(PARITY(P 1 ))= 21 ; bn is the bino-
mial coefficient;
(c) the property ISOL(G): ‘there is an isolated node in a graph G on n nodes’
bn(n−1,2)
holds with μn ≤ n·22bn(n,2) , hence μ(I S O L(G)) = 0.

Problem 8.20 (0-1 law) If the vocabulary for a class of finite structures contains
function or constants symbols, then 0–1 law may not hold. Prove it by showing that
for a constant a and a unary relational symbol P one has μ(P(a)) = 21 .

Problem 8.21 (L μ ) Disentangle the meaning of the following Lμ formulae.

(a) ν X.μY.M.a((φ ∧ X ) ∨ Y .
(b) μX.νY.( p ∧ L .a(X ) ∨ ((¬ p) ∧ L a .(Y )).
(c) μX.νY.L a .X ∧ L − a.Y , where L-a. means ‘all actions but a’.
[Hint: cf. (Bradfield and Stirling [46])].

Problem 8.22 (Pebble games) Consider the structure Am = (A, ≤) which is the
linearly ordered set of m elements.
(a) Prove that for m < n, Spoiler has the winning strategy on the pair Am , An
in the 2-pebble game (recall that the isomorphism in the pebble game means that
448 8 Beyond FO Within SO

the corresponding pebbles are on the corresponding places with respect to the linear
order).
(b) Prove that for each k and adequately large m, n, Duplicator wins in the Ehren-
feucht game on Am , An . [Hint: cf. Kolajtis [3]].

Problem 8.23 (Pebble games) Consider the complete graph G m on m vertices.

Prove: (a) Spoiler wins the (m+1)-pebble game on G m , G m+1 .
(b) Duplicator wins the m-pebble game on G m , G m+1 .
(c) Determine the outcome of Ehrenfeucht games with
m and m + 1 rounds on G m , G m+1 . [Hint: cf. Kolajtis [3]].

A couple of problems that follow concern SO. Some are suggested in (Enderton. A
Mathematical Introduction to Logic. Harcourt, Academic Press (2001)).

Problem 8.24 (The relation comprehension formula) Let P denote an SO variable

of arity n which is not free in the formula φ. Prove that the formula:
∃P.∀x1 , x2 , . . . , xn .[P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≡ φ]
is valid.

Problem 8.25 (Infiniteness of a set) Write a second-order formula which expresses

the fact that a set is infinite. [Hint: Try to formalize the existence on the set of a
transitive, irreflexive relation whose domain is the set or do formalize the existence
of an SO function variable which maps in the one-to-one fashion the set into itself].

Problem 8.26 (Skolem functions) Write a second-order formula ψ which would

express the existence of a Skolem function for the first-order formula
χ : ∀x.∃y.φ(x, y) and prove that χ |= ψ and ψ |= χ.

Problem 8.27 (The principle of mathematical induction) Write a second-order for-

mula which would express the principle of mathematical induction, i.e., that a set
(realized as a second-order variable) which contains 0 and with each element contains
it successor, contains all elements of the set.

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Author Index

A Chandra, A.K., 262, 415

Aaronson, S., 26 Chang, C.C., 105, 174, 311, 321–323, 326
Ackerman, W., 71, 88 Chellas, B.F., 199, 388
Ajtai, M., 407 Choueka, Y., 259
Arora, S., 43, 407 Church, A., 72, 74, 88, 106, 107, 136, 145
Aspvall, B., 102 Cignoli, R.L.O., 311, 321
Cimatti, A., 257
Clarke, E.M., 243, 257, 259, 267
B Cook, S.A., 42
Baader, F., 131 Cormen, Th.H., 262
Bachmann, P., 37 Craig, W., 94, 108, 167
Barak, B., 43
Barnett, D., 356
Barwise, I., 427 D
Bernays, P., 75 Dahlhaus, E., 437
Bertello, M., 257 Davis, M., 23–25, 33, 34, 100, 101
Beth, E., 80, 106, 121, 171, 216 Demri, S., 244
Blackburn, P., 204, 347 D’Ottaviano,I.D.M., 321
Bloem, R., 259 Dowling, W.F., 102
Bobzien, S., 62, 179
Bocheński, I.M., 62
Bochvar, D.A., 296 E
Boolos, G.S., 129 Ebbinghaus, H.-D., 162, 396
Borkowski, L., 361 Ehrenfeucht, A., 161, 163, 396
Bradfield, J., 439, 441, 447 Emerson, E.A., 246, 257, 436, 439
Bryant, R.E., 270 Erdös, P., 434
Büchi, J.R., 18, 409 Etessami, K., 420
Burgess, J.O., 129

F
C Fagin, R., 399, 406, 407, 412, 415, 433
Carnap, R., 182 Faucett, W.M., 309
Carroll, L., 97 Fisher, M.J., 242, 342
Chaki, S., 273 Fisher, R.A., 367

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 451
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4
452 Author Index

Fitting, M., 81, 92, 94, 106, 107, 145, 169, J

171, 190, 207, 210 Jaśkowski, J., 77, 81, 116
Floyd, R.W., 136, 174 Jeffrey, R.C., 129
Flum, J., 396 Jutla, C., 436
Font, J.M., 314
Fraïssé, R., 163
Frege, G., 71 K
Friedman, J., 138 Kalish, D., 152
Kalmár, L., 88, 89
Kamp, J., 232
Keisler, J.H., 105, 174
G
Kelley, J.L., 12
Gödel, K., 34–36, 145, 152, 155, 213
Kleene, S.C., 27, 31, 71, 295
Gaifman, H., 398, 431
Knaster, B., 4
Gallier, J.H., 105, 133 Knuuttila, S., 179
Gentzen, G., 79, 80, 126 Kogan, D.I., 431
Gleason, A.M., 365 Kohelet, 231
Glebskii, Y.V., 431 Kolaitis, Ph.G., 175, 395, 426
Goldberg, H., 291 König, D., 13
Goré, R., 210 Kozen, D.C., 262, 336, 342, 437
Goranko, V., 244 Kreutzer, S., 419
Grädel, E., 437 Kripke, S., 182, 207, 213, 345
Greenlaw, R., 102 Kropitz, P., 26
Grumberg, O., 257 Kupferman, O., 259–261, 267
Gurevich, Y., 419 Kuratowski, C., 12
Gurnfinkel, A., 273

L
H Ladner,R.E., 202, 242, 246, 342, 346, 355,
Hadamard, J., 329 409
Hájek, P., 326 Lander, E., 420
Haken, A., 99, 108 Landweber, C.H., 21
Halpern, J., 205, 257, 346, 354, 355 Lange, M., 244
Halvorson, H., 167 Leblanc, H., 291
Hanf, W., 396 Lei,C.-L., 246
Harel, D., 342, 415 Leiserson, C.E., 262
Hasenjaeger, G., 145 Lejewski, C., 360
Hausdorf, F., 12 Lenzen, W., 346
Hayashi, T., 264 Leśniewski, S., 356
Hella, L., 422 Levin, A., 42
Henkin, L., 145, 199 Lewis, C.I., 179
Libkin, L., 417, 420, 422, 429
Henzinger, Th.A., 259
Li, J., 257
Herbrand, J., 73, 139, 145
Ling, C.-H., 305
Heyting, A., 213
Liogonki, M.I., 431
Hilbert, D., 71, 88
Loemker, L., 368
Hintikka, K.J.J., 82, 121, 343, 346
Łoś, J., 432
Hoover, J., 102
Löwenheim, L., 125
Horn, A., 132
Łukasiewicz, J., 61, 62, 71–73, 76, 77, 88,
89, 231, 284, 297, 310, 330, 362

I
Immerman, N., 409, 414, 417, 419, 425, 434 M
Indrzejczak, A., 77, 117 Manna, Z., 136, 137
Author Index 453

Marcus, R.B., 207 R

Markey, N., 245 Radó, T., 26
Matsumoto, K., 195 Ramón y Cajal, S., 103
Mazurkiewicz, A., 237 Ramsey, F.P., 13, 14, 45
McCulloch, W., 103 Rasiowa, H., 47, 76, 77, 79, 118, 288
McNaughton, R., 303, 411 Rauszer, C.M., 370, 375, 377, 378
Mendelson, E., 166 Rényi, A., 434
Menger, K., 284 Reynolds, M., 257
Menu, J., 308 Rickey, V.F., 356
Meredith, C.A., 72, 310 de Rijke, M., 204, 347
Meyer, A.R., 42, 46 Rivest, R.L., 262
Miyano, S., 264 Robinson, J.A., 95, 131
Montague, R., 152 Robinson, R., 156
Moschovakis, Y.N., 415, 419 Rodriguez, A.J., 314
Moses, Y., 205, 346, 354, 355 Rose, A., 327
Mostert, P.S., 309 Rosenblatt, F., 104
Mostowski, A.W., 420, 436
Rosser, J.B., 158, 311, 327
Muller, D.E., 268
Rozenberg, G., 34
Mundici, D., 316, 321, 327, 329
Russell, S., 133
Ruzzo, W., 102
N
Narendran, P., 131
Nelson, M., 206 S
Nguyen, H.S., 380 Salomaa, A., 17, 23, 34, 135, 138
Norvig, P., 133 Saoudi, A., 268
Novotný, M., 390 Savitch, W., 45
Schmidt-Schauss, M., 131
Schnoebelen, Ph., 246
O Schöning, U., 133
Ohnishi, M., 195 Schulz, K., 131
Schupp, P.E., 268
Schütte,K., 213, 227
P
Scott, D., 138
Papadimitriou, C., 45, 46
Segerberg, 336
Papert, S., 411
Shelah, S., 418
Parikh, R., 338
Shields, A.L., 308
Pavelka, J., 308, 387
Sikorski, R., 47, 76, 77, 79, 118, 288
Pawlak, Z., 367, 378, 390
Peled, D.A., 257 Sipser, M., 138
Perrin, D., 259 Sistla, A.P., 243, 262, 267
Pin, J., 259 Skolem, Th., 125, 128
Pitts, W., 103 Skowron, A., 361, 377, 378
Plass, M.F., 102 Smith, R., 179
Pnueli, A., 232 Smullyan, R.M., 34, 77, 80, 82, 106, 117,
Poizat, B., 425 121, 126, 148, 152, 156, 173, 216
Polkowski, L., 361, 363, 364, 390 Snyder, W., 131
Post, E., 88, 137, 303 Srzednicki, S., 356
Prior, A., 232 Stein, C., 262
Putnam, H., 101 Stirling, C., 439
Stockmeyer, L., 42, 46, 245, 261, 399
Stone, M.H., 54, 58
Q Streett, R.S., 439
Quine, W.v.O., 150 Surma, S.J., 356
454 Author Index

T Venema, Y., 204, 347

Talanov, V.A., 431
Tarjan, R.E., 102
Tarski, A., 34, 73, 115, 152, 310, 360 W
Thomas, W., 268 Wajsberg, M., 214, 291, 311
Tiuryn, J., 342 Walukiewicz, I., 439, 441
Torrens, A., 314 Weaver, G., 291
Tourquette, A.R., 298 Wilke, Th., 267
Trakhtenbrot, B., 414 Wolper, P., 254, 261, 265, 267
Tukey, J., 12
Turing, A.M., 21
Tychonoff, A., 57
Y
Yedidia, A., 27
V
Vakarelov, D., 381, 385
Vardi, M.Y., 245, 260, 261, 265, 267, 398, Z
419, 426 Zermelo, E., 11
Veith, H., 259 Zorn, M., 12
Index

A Axiom, 2
Acceptance Church’s system, 72
Büchi, 19 Frege’s system, 71
Algebra Hilbert-Ackerman’s system, 71
BL, 289 Hilbert’s H2 system, 71
Boolean, 54 Kalish-Montague’s system, 152
Lindenbaum-Tarski, 75 Łukasiewicz’s system, 72
MV, 316 Mendelson’s system, 166
Tarski Boolean mereological, 360 Meredith’s, 72
Wajsberg, 314 modal system K, 180
Algorithm modal system S4, 188
(A) for DNF, 70 modal system S5, 188
(B1) for CNF, 70 modal system T, 187
(B2) for CNF, 70 of choice, 2
Davis-Logemann-Loveland, 101 of infinity, 2
Davis-Putnam, 101 Polkowski’ system for mass assignment,
Nguyen H.S. for optimal cuts, 380 361
Pawlak-Skowron, 378 Rauszer’s system for FD-logic, 370
perceptron learning, 104 Rosser-Tourquette’s system for n L , 298
Skowron-Rauszer for reducts, 375 R. Robinson’s system, 156
for decision-related reducts, 377 Segerberg’s system for SDL, 336
Approximation, 368 Vakarelov’s system for logic IL, 384
lower, 368 Wajsberg’s system for 3 L , 291
upper, 368
Automaton
alternating, 262
on trees, 267 B
on trees–weak, 268 Bisimulation, 205
Büchi, 19 BIT, 434
generalized, 258 Boolean algebra, 54
non-deterministic, 257 Bound, 4
DFA, 16 g.l.b, l.u.b, 4
NFA, 16 upper, lower, 4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 455
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
L. T. Polkowski, Logic: Reference Book for Computer Scientists,
Intelligent Systems Reference Library 245,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42034-4
456 Index

C NL, 40
Chaining NP, 41
backward, 97 NPSPACE, 42
forward, 98 P, 38
Chang group, 322 PSPACE, 42
Class, 358 X-hard, 38
CLS-Mod(φ), 406 Computation, 22
FO[k], 406 Concept/set, 368
MSO[k], 403 definable, 368
universal, 358 non-definable, 368
Clause, 69 Connective, 62
Horn, 96, 132 composition of programs, 334
Complement, 50 infinitary, 421
pseudo, 51 modal L, M, 180
relative, 359 necessity [.], 334 
relative pseudo, 51 non-deterministic choice , 334
Completeness non-deterministic program iteration (.)*,
basic logic BL, 290 334
epistemic logics, 346 of sentential logic, 62
common, 353 Peirce’s, 64
n agents, 348 Sheffer’s, 64
FD-logic, 373 strong conjunction, 282
FO, 145 strong disjunction, 282
FOIL, 223 temporal operators F,G,X,U, 235
infinite-valued logic [0, 1] L , 325 test ?, 334
Gödel, 326 Consistency, 85, 198
Goguen, 326 Herbrand, 143
information logic IL, 376 maximal, 86
predicate logic, 120 Cut rule, 118
predicate sequent calculus, 126
SDL logic, 338
sentential logic, 88 D
sentential sequent calculus, 84 DATALOG, 443
sentential tableau calculus, 83 Decidability
strong for K, T, S4, S5, 210 of modal logic S5, 206
strong for SL, 88 of modal logics K, T, S4, 205
strong for three-valued logic 3L, 293 of temporal LTL, 243
tableau for CTL, 257 Decomposition diagram, 79, 118
tableau for LTL, 254 Detachment rule (MP), 72
tableau for modal logics, 195
tableau for predicate logic, 124
tableau for QML K, 213 E
tableau for SIL, 217 Element, 359
Complete open description, 431 Equipollence, 6
Complexity class, 38 Expressibility, 35
co-X, 45 Expression
DTIME, 38 diagonal, 35
E, 45 ω-regular, 19
EXPTIME, 45 regular, 18
L, 40 Extended closure, 265
NDTIME, 44 Extending formula, 431
NE, 45 Extension formula, 431
NEXPTIME, 45 Exterior thing, 359
Index 457

F bijective, 422
Falsity, 65 MSO, 402
falsum, 65 Parity, 436
Filter, 48 in model checking, 440
maximal, 48 Pebble, 425
prime, 49 Good sequence, 322
Filtration, 202 Grammar, 16
for SDL, 341 regular, 16
Fisher-Ladner closure, 242, 337 Graph, 13
Fixed point, 4 alternating, 408
GFP, 415 dag, 14
IFP, 418 directed, 14
LFP, 415 Gaifman’s, 395
PFP, 419 random, 434
FO-definability, 161 undirected, 13
Formula
atomic, 113
Barcan, 207 H
Barcan converse, 207 Herbrand expansion, 141
Łukasiewicz for many-valued logic, 281 Hintikka family, 212, 217, 221
provable, 73 Hintikka saturated sets, 222
purely propositional, 333 Hintikka structure for CTL, 257
refutable, 35 Hintikka traces, 253
size of, 67 Homomorphism, 48
sub-, 66 MV-algebras, 320
well-formed, 62, 113, 180
well-named, 440
Function, 3 I
arithmetic, 151 Ideal, 48
bijective, 3 in MV-algebra, 320
busy beaver, 26 maximal, 48
computable, 23 prime, 49
counter-image, 3 Implicant, 69
diagonal, 35, 151 Indiscernibility, 368
domain, 3 Induction
image, 3 mathematical, 6
injective, 3 structural, 67
isotone, 4 transfinite, 10
lower (upper) semi-continuous, 308 Inference rule
mapping, 56 detachment, 72, 146, 336
continuous, 56 epistemic necessitation, 345
range, 3 FD-rules, 370
recursive, 24 generalization, 146, 336
partial, 23 necessitation, 180
primitive, 24 replacement, 72
total, 3 substitution, 72
Functional dependence, 368, 369 Ingredient, 357
Instruction, 22
Interpolant, 92, 168
G
Game
Ajtai-Fagin, 406 J
Ehrenfeucht, 161, 394 Join, 4
458 Index

K Łukasiewicz [0,1] L , 309

Knowledge 4 L M , 296
as ability to classify, 367 modal quantified QML, 206
common, 352 modal sentential SML, 179
group, 352 SML+LFP+GLP (modal (Lμ ) calcu-
Kripke structure, 182 lus), 437
linear, 233 modal (4), 184
treefied, 268 modal (4C), 185
modal (5), 185
modal B, 184
L modal D, 185
Language modal DC, 185
defined by formula, 409 modal G, 185
L(α), 18 modal K, 182
L(FA), 16 modal S4, 188
ω-regular, 20 modal S5, 188
regular, 17 modal T, 187
X-complete, 38 monadic SO (MSO), 402
Lattice, 4, 47 ∃MSO, 404
distributive, 49 n-valued n L , 297
of Stoics, 62
filter ordered, 52
Post’s finite valued, 303
linearly ordered, 289
predicate monadic, 139
relative pseudo-complemented, 52
program, 133
residuated, 288
second-order, 401
Stone’s, 54
∃SO, 414
Literal, 69
sentential, 62
Locality
sentential dynamic SDL, 333
Gaifman, 429
temporal CTL, 236
Hanf, 428
temporal CTL*, 239
Logic
temporal LTL, 232
basic BL, 286
temporal LTL+PAST, 246
Bochvar’s 3 B E , 3 B I , 295
three-valued 3 L , 281
circuit, 102 threshold, 102
epistemic, 342 Logical consequence, 96, 116
epistemic-doxastic, 346
epistemic for n agents, 347
FD-, 369 M
First-Order (FO), 111 Meet, 4
k
FOin f,ω , 426 M-equivalence, 161, 162, 394
FO+Count, 421 Mereology, 356
FO+Count–(FO+Count)in f (FO+Count)in f , rough, 368
421 Minimization, 23
FO+Count–(FO+Count)in f (FO+Count)in f,ω , M-isomorphism, 163
421 Model, 68
FO+LFP, 416
FO+TC, 424
Gödel, 327 N
Goguen, 326 Neighborhood, 55
infinite-valued logic [0,1] L , 309 Normal form
information IL, 381 conjunctive (CNF), 69, 130
intuitionistic first-order FOIL, 219 disjunctive (DNF), 69, 130
intuitionistic sentential SIL, 213 Herbrand, 141
Kleene’s 3 K , 295 Kleene, 31
Index 459

negative, 127 TQBF, 42

prenex, 128 Transitive Closure (TC), 415
Skolem, 129 Product
Herbrand Cartesian, 3, 6
Normal modal system, 181 direct of BL-algebra, 290
Number reduced, 172
cardinal, 6, 9 Program, 334
Gödel numbering, 28, 153 Proof, 73
natural, 5 provability, 73
ordinal, 11 relative, 73
Smullyan’s numbering, 148 Property
compactness , 85
of systems, 236
O causality, 236
Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD) fairness, 236
diagram, 270 liveness, 236
images and Preimages, 272 precedence, 236
representation of sets and transitions, 271 response, 236
Ordering safety, 236
complete, 4 stability, 236
linear, 4 small model, 202, 243, 257
partial, 4 tableau completeness, 125
strict, 4 strong completeness, 126, 201, 202
Overlap, 357 sequent calculus, 84

P
Pair Q
ordered, 3 Quantifier rank, 160, 394
unordered, 2 Query, 428
Part, 356
Polish notation, 75
Predicate R
Kleene, 27 Reducibility, 38
recursively enumerable, 31 Karp, 38
undecidable, 33 log-space, 41
Problem (also under language) Reduct, 368
aREACH, 409 decision-related, 377
CNF-Contra-UR, 38 semi-reduct, 368
CONN, 165, 404 Relation
DGA, 41 arithmetic, 150
dREACH, 407 binary, 3
EVEN, 164, 403 directed, 3
EVEN(LO), 164 Euclidean, 3
GAME, 436 functional, 3
Post’s PCP, 136 linear, 3
REACH, 405 reflexive, 3
SAT(3-CNF), 41 serial, 3
SAT(BSR), 45 symmetric, 3
SAT(CNF), 41 transitive, 3
SAT(Gödel), 327 closure, 3, 352, 424
SAT(Goguen), 327 Residual implication, 285
SAT(Luk), 327 residuum, 306
SAT(i ), 47 Resolution rule, 95, 131
460 Index

refutation, 95 consistent, 36
satisfiability, 67, 116 formal, 34
SLD, 133 L E , 148
unsatisfiability, 67 L P E , 152
Rough rewriting, 15
concept/set, 368
inclusion, 361
mereology, 361 T
Tableau, 81
branch of, 82
S closed, 82
Sentence intuitionistic FOIL rules, 220
decidable, 36 intuitionistic sentential rules, 216
Gödel, 36, 151 modal ε rules, 195
Rosser, 158 modal logic K rules, 189
undecidable, 33 modal logic S4 rules, 190
Sequent, 77 modal logic S5 rules, 191
calculus for FO, 117 modal logic T rules, 189
modal sequent calculus, 197 modal quantified rules, 210
system K, 77 open, 81
Set, 1 predicate rules, 123
algebra, 2 prefixed tableau rules, 211
arithmetic, 150 sentential rules, 92
boundary, 56 temporal CTL rules, 254
closed, 55 temporal LTL rules, 249
computable, 23 T-co-norm, 286
containment, 1 Term in FO, 113
diagonal, 35 Theorem
Hintikka’s, 82, 124, 142, 193 Bekić Lemma, 444
identity, 2 Beth definability, 171
open, 55 Bradfield-Walukiewicz, 441
recursively enumerable, 32 Büchi, 409
Stone, 364 Cantor, 6
Structure, 5 Cantor-Bernstein, 7
domain quad, 5 Chang completeness, 321
assignment, 115 Chang completeness for [0, 1] L , 326
Herbrand, 141 Chang representation, 320
FO structure, 115 Choueka, 259
domain of, 115 Church, 136
finite, 159, 393 compactness of mereological spaces, 366
finite—pointed, 159 completeness of FOIL, 223
finite–pointed—isomorphism, 160 completeness of modal tableau calculus,
finite–pointed—isomorphism– 193
partial, 160 completeness of temporal CTL tableau
interpretation, 115 calculus, 257
Kozen-Parikh, 338 completeness of temporal LTL tableau
periodic, 241 calculus, 254
topological, 55 Craig interpolation, 94, 167
Hausdorff, 56 Dedekind-McNeille, 5
vocabulary, 5 deduction for FO, 166
Substitution rule, 72, 115 deduction for many-valued logic, 288
System Demri, Goranko, Lange, 244
complete, 36 Ehrenfeucht, 163
Index 461

Emerson, Jutla on positional determi- Robinson, J.A., 131

nacy, 437 Rosser incompleteness, 156
Emerson, Lei, 246 Rosser separation Lemma, 157
Fagin on 0-1 law, 432, 433 Rosser-Tourquette on completeness of
Fagin on co-finite spectrum, 434 n L , 299
Fagin on CONN, 404 Savitch, 45
Fagin on NP, 414 Sistla, Clarke, 244
Fagin-Stockmeyer-Vardi, 399 Stone, 58
Faucett, 308 Streett-Emerson, 439
filter separation, 50, 290 strong completeness of SL, 88
Fisher-Ladner, 342 Tarski on non-definability of truth, 34,
Fraïssé, 163 152
Gaifman, 396 Teichmüller-Tukey, 12
Gödel completeness, 145 Trakhtenbrot, 412
Gödel incompleteness, 34, 35, 152, 155 Tychonoff, 57
Goldberg-Leblanc-Weaver, 291 Vakarelov on IL, 385
Grädel, 437 Vardi on FO+LFP, 417
Gurevich-Shelah, 418 Vardi-Wolper, 261
Hájek on completeness of BL, 288 Zermelo, 11
Halpern-Moses, 355 Zorn, 12
Hanf, 397 Theory
Herbrand, 144 complete, 432
Herbrand-Tarski on deduction, 73 Herbrand’s, 139
Immerman on FO+LFP, 417 ZFC, 2
König, 13 T-norm, 284
Kalmár, 89 Archimedean, 303
Kleene, 27 strict, 303
enumeration, 32 Topological space, 56
Knaster-Tarski, 5
compact, 57
Kolaitis-Vardi, 426
connected, 58
Kozen-Parikh, 338
disconnected, 58
Kreutzer, 419
extremely, 58
Kupferman-Vardi, 260, 261
totally, 58
Kupferman-Vardi-Wolper, 270
metric, 58
Kuratowski-Hausdorff, 12
Stone, 58
Libkin, 429
Transition system, 236
Lindenbaum Lemma, 86, 198, 293
Tree, 13
Ling, C.-H., 305
Łoś–Vaught test, 432 formation, 66, 113
Löwenheim, 125 Truth, 65
McNaughton A, B, 327 table, 65
McNaughton-Papert, 411 verum, 65
Menu-Pavelka, 308 Turing machine, 21
Miyano-Hayashi, 264 k-tape, 37
Mostert-Shields, 308 1-tape, 37
Mostowski A.W. on positional determi-
nacy, 436
Mundici, 328, 329 U
Ramsey, 13 Unification, 131
Rauszer, 373 validity, 67, 116