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Globalization and Media in the
Digital Platform Age
Global media expert Dal Yong Jin examines the nexus of globalization, digital media, and
contemporary popular culture in this empirically rich, student-friendly book.
Offering an in-depth look at globalization processes, histories, texts, and state pol-
icies as they relate to the global media, Jin maps out the increasing role of digital plat-
forms as they have shifted the contours of globalization. Case studies and examples focus
on ubiquitous digital platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, and Netflix, in tandem
with globalization so that the readers are able to apply diverse theoretical frameworks
of globalization in different media milieu. Readers are taught core theoretical concepts
which they should apply critically to a broad range of contemporary media policies, prac-
tices, movements, and technologies in different geographic regions of the world—North
America, Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia—with a view to determining how they
shape and are shaped by globalization.
End-of-chapter discussion questions prompt further critical thinking and research. Stu-
dents doing coursework in digital media, global media, international communication, and
globalization will find this new textbook to be an essential introduction to how media
have influenced a complex set of globalization processes in broad international and com-
parative contexts.
Dal Yong Jin is Professor of Communication at Simon Fraser University. His major
research and teaching interests are on Globalization and Media, transnational cultural
studies, digital platforms and digital gaming, and the political economy of media and
culture. He has published numerous books, including Korea’s Online Gaming Empire;
De-convergence of Global Media Industries; Digital Platforms, Imperialism and Political
Culture; New Korean Wave: Transnational Cultural Power in the Age of Social Media; and
Smartland Korea: Mobile Communication, Culture and Society. With Micky Lee, Jin also
published a textbook titled Understanding the Business of Global Media in the Digital Age
(2017). He is the founding book series editor of Routledge Research in Digital Media and
Culture in Asia.
Globalization and Media in the
Digital Platform Age
Dal Yong Jin

First published 2020
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2020 Taylor & Francis
The right of Dal Yong Jin to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him
in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks,
and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this title has been requested
ISBN: 978-0-367-35146-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-34360-6 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-33003-2 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
Contents
Preface ix
1 Globalization in the Age of Digital Platforms? 1

Is Globalization Dying? 1
Globalization in the Era of Digital Platforms 2
What Is a Digital Platform? 2
Definitions of Globalization 4
Keywords in Globalization 4
Three Paradigms to Globalization Studies 5
Modernization Approach 5
Critical Political Economy Approach 6
Cultural Globalization Approach 7
Six Dimensions in Globalization Studies 8
Economy 8
Politics 9
Culture 10
Technology 11
Global Consumption 11
Diaspora 12
How to Interpret Globalization: The World Is Flat vs. The World
Is Asymmetrical 13
Questions 15
2 Media History in the Age of Globalization 16

Oral Communication and Early Written Materials 17
The Printing Press and Capitalism 18
The Telegraph and the Electronic Media Era 20
Development of Broadcasting: The Core of Electronic Media 23
The Advent of the Digital Age 24
Digital Platform and Media Convergence Era 25
Evolution of Social Network Sites 27
Questions 29
vi Contents
3 Approaches to Globalization in the Age of Digital Platforms 30
Theorization of Globalization: Political Economy vs. Cultural Studies 30
Free Flow of Information 33
World-System Theory 34
Cultural Hybridization 35
Case Study: Hybridization in Japanese Popular Culture and the
Korean Wave 37
Glocalization/Localization 38
Regionalization 40
Transnationalization 41
Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy 42
Questions 44
4 From Cultural Imperialism to Platform Imperialism 45

Definitional Essay: The Discourse of the West vs. the East
in Media Studies 45
The Evolution of Imperialism 47
Cultural Imperialism 48
Is Imperialism Disappearing in the Era of Globalization? 50
Development in Local Culture 50
Peripheral Vision 51
Active Audience Theory 51
Counter-Reverse Cultural Imperialism 52
Emergence of Platform Imperialism 53
Increasing Dominance of American Platforms 54
Commodification of Data and Digital Platforms 55
Asymmetries in Digital Platforms 57
Questions 57
5 The Nation-State: Dead or Alive 59

The Formation of Nation-State in the 15th Century 60
Major Roles of the Nation-State 61
The End of Nation-State 62
What Is Replacing Nation-States? The Rise of Non-Nation Entities 63
Critiques to the Globalists 65
Balances between Nation-States and Globalization 66
Nation-States in the Media and Cultural Industries 66
Nation-State and Digital Platforms 67
Interplay between Nation-States and Platform Corporations 68
Questions 71
6 The Business of Global Media Industries 72

The Growth of the Global Media Industries 73
Major Media Corporations around the World 74
Alphabet (Google) 75
The Walt Disney Company 76
Corporate Convergence 77
Contents vii
The Emergence of De-convergence in the Media Industry 80
Case Study: De-convergence of News Corporation 81
New Wave of Media Convergence 82
Convergence between Digital Platform and Digital Platform 83
Convergence between Content Firms and Content Firms 84
Questions 85
7 Smartphones in the Era of Globalization 87

Smartphone Revolution in the Early 21st Century 88
Globalization in the Smartphone Era 90
Case Study: iPhone’s Globalization Process 92
Global Dominance of Android Operating System 93
Global Digital Divide in the Smartphone Era 95
Questions 97
8 Globalization and Broadcasting 98

Changes in the Global Broadcasting System 99
Global Trade of Television Programs 99
Global Television Formats 101
Case Study: Television Formats in the Korean Broadcasting Industry 103
Netflix as a Cultural Platform in the Broadcasting Industry 105
Growth of Netflix 107
Netflix as a Digital Platform 108
Globalization of Netflix in the Realm of Screen Media 108
Questions 110
9 The Cultural Politics of Film 111

Growth of the Global Film Markets 111
Globalization and Films 114
Global Trade of Films 114
Runaway Productions 114
Remaking of Films 115
Cultural Issues Embedded in the Globalization of Film 116
Hollywood vs. The Third Cinema 117
Hollywood as The First Cinema 117
Asian Cinema as The Third Cinema 119
Bollywood 119
Chinese Cinema 120
Mexican Cinema 122
Western Cinema vs. Third Cinema 123
Case Study: The (Indie) Film Industry in the Digital Platform Era 123
Questions 125
10 The Culture of Global Music 126

Globalization and Music 127
The Global Music Industry in the 21st Century 127
YouTube as a Social Media Platform and Localization 129
viii Contents
Online Streaming Services and Globalization: European Spotify
Now Plays in Japan 131
The Global Rise of K-Pop in the Age of Social Media 132
Hybridization of K-pop around the Globe 134
Case Study: BTS and a Global Fandom 136
Questions 138
References 141
Index 161
Preface
The close relationship between Globalization and Media has been one of the most
significant subjects in communication studies since the mid-1990s. The linkages of
Globalization and Media have meticulously expanded due to the indispensable role of
media and culture in the globalization process. From popular culture like films and
television programs to digital technologies, including the Internet and smartphones,
media have facilitated and expedited the contemporary globalization process. A lthough
globalization in terms of the integration of the world into a single unit e xisted several hun-
dred years ago, even partially, new media have certainly played a key part in advancing
globalization over the past two decades.
In the early 21st century, the partnership between Globalization and Media has fun-
damentally changed with the emergence of digital platforms. Unlike traditional media,
like broadcasting and music, digital platforms, such as social media (e.g., YouTube),
smartphones and relevant apps, online streaming services (e.g., Spotify), and o ver-the-top
services (e.g., Netflix) have changed the contours of global cultural consumption and pro-
duction so that people heavily rely on these platforms. The Internet, as one of the most
significant digital technologies, has already resolved time and space constraints so that
it contributes to the growth of our global society. Digital platforms have furthermore
shifted our world because they allow people to connect with each other in real time; to
consume the same experiences while sharing them with friends; and to produce their own
cultural materials, as can be seen in the growth of YouTubers. For example, Netflix has in-
creased its role as a new exhibition outlet as people enjoy movies and television programs
on this particular platform instead of visiting theaters. Partially because of Netflix and
other over-the-top (OTT) services, movie theaters in North America have started to face a
new challenge as the number of movie-goers has slightly decreased. Likewise, Spotify has
changed global youth’s music consumption habits as many college students enjoy popular
music through online streaming music services instead of buying CDs. In all but a few
countries, like Japan and Germany, people around the globe primarily listen to music via
online digital platforms.
This book examines the nexus of Globalization and Media, focusing on digital plat-
forms as a reflection of the surge and influences of various platforms in our contemporary
society. This does not mean that we give up on studying the important role of tradi-
tional media in the globalization process. What I rather emphasize is the shifting milieu
surrounding Globalization and Media. As digital platforms have greatly increased their
impacts on our daily activities and cultural lives, it is time to critically interpret the crucial
relationship between globalization and digital platforms from various perspectives.
Given their short history, there are no available textbooks emphasizing digital platforms
and their roles in the globalization process. While several academic works on digital
platforms (Jin, 2015a; Srnicek, 2016; Gillespie, 2018; Steinberg, 2019) have just recently
x Preface
been published, providing important discourses and ideas, they have not focused on
lobalization yet. In particular, textbook-level discourses are still missing, despite the fact
g
that undergraduate and graduate students who study globalization need new perspectives
and directions. Therefore, I hope that these carefully documented discussions in the form
of a textbook will shed light on more recent trends in the shifting globalization process.
Some parts of the book have been developed from my original works. I have continued
to develop my research on globalization and published several relevant articles and books,
such as “Where Is Japan in Media Studies in the Post-Cold War Era: Critical Discourse of
the West and the East” (2009, in Social Science Research 22(1): 261–293); “Reinterpretation
of Cultural Imperialism: Emerging Domestic Market vs. Continuing U.S. Dominance”
(2007, in Media, Culture and Society 29(5): 753–771); and Digital Platforms, Imperialism
and Political Culture (2015, Routledge), although I have fundamentally advanced and
re-organized my perspectives with new cases and information. This current book project
is also made possible because of my teaching experience with Globalization and Media at
several institutions, including Simon Fraser University in Canada and Korea Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Students in my various classes have helped
me rethink the trajectory of globalization, and some students especially provided their
meaningful observations and ideas through presentations and discussions in classes.
I would like to express my thanks to the students who shared their ideas and opinions
together.
Meanwhile, I also want to thank a few media scholars who supported the book writing
process. Professor Kyong Yoon at the University of British Columbia Okanagan always
listened to my viewpoints and progresses while providing invaluable friendship. Professor
Ju Oak “Jade” Kim at Texas A&M International University provided some suggestions
and thoughts after reading the original table of contents and ideas. Marc Steinberg at
Concordia University in Canada and I have exchanged ideas on platform imperialism
and the increasing role of Asia-based digital platforms, which confirmed the necessity of
this book. Finally, I want to thank Erica C. Wetter, who has been very supportive since
our meeting on the book project during the 2018 IAMCR (International Association for
Media and Communication Research) conference held in Eugene, Oregon, in the USA.
Her effective editorship has been very helpful during the entire process. Without their
supports and interests, the resulting book would not be the same.
1 Globalization in the Age of Digital
Platforms?
Is Globalization Dying?
While globalization as a practice goes back to several hundred years ago, media globalization
as part of academic discourse mainly started to appear in the 1990s. With the rapid growth
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and relevant socio-economic dimen-
sions, including political, economic, and cultural elements developed during the same period,
globalization has become one of the most popular topics and theories in all academic fields,
and in particular in media studies. It is certain that “there was a period in which that word
globalization seemed to many people to capture the essence of what was going on around
them” (Rosenberg, 2005, 3). During the 1990s, many politicians, academics, and cultural pro-
ducers observed the spread of economic liberalization, the rise of new ICTs, the increased
salience of international organizations, and the resurgence of a cosmopolitan Human Rights
Agenda; many of them believed that “the world was opening up to a new form of intercon-
nectedness, and that a multi-layered, multilateral system of global governance was emerging”
(Rosenberg, 2005, 3). As Toby Miller and Marwan Kraidy (2016, 22) point out, “global media
studies, therefore, is an interdisciplinary rubric that emerged in the 1990s to describe the con-
vergence of areas of study traditionally known as international communication and compar-
ative media systems.” Global media studies reflects conceptual disciplinary and ideological
changes, and its name notwithstanding, the field remains dominated by a few major forces,
including the United States.
However, since around the mid-2000s, some theoreticians (Rosenberg, 2005) claim that
“the age of globalization is over” as the world has not seemed to follow what the globalists
predicted, which is the integration and/or interdependence of the globe, and consequently,
the decreasing role of the nation-state. In the 2010s, the opposing paradigm to globaliza-
tion has even become more pronounced. As can be seen with Brexit (British Exit) in Eu-
rope in late 2019 and the border wall issue between the United States and Mexico, which
is under consideration by President Trump’s administration, many parts of the globe are
dis-integrating and focusing on national priorities rather than global ones. The Guardian
of the United Kingdom (Sharma, 2016) indeed claims,
even if Brexit does not herald the unravelling of Europe or of the global economy, it is
the most important sign yet that the era of globalization as we have known it is over.
Deglobalization will be the new buzzword.
As such, global politics and economy have continued to shift their dynamics as both the
United States and the United Kingdom have changed their political and economic policies
starting in the 1980s. These two countries initiated and forced neoliberal globalization—
guaranteeing maximum profits to the private sector through deregulation, privatization,
2 Globalization and Digital Platforms
and liberalization while pursuing a small government function—but they have suddenly
changed direction to focus on the separation of their countries from global affairs. Since
they are the giants who decide the roles of nation-states in the global society, other small
countries may follow this trajectory once again, and perhaps deglobalization may be real-
ized in contemporary society.
However, globalization is not simple at all. While there is an increasing trend of national
priority movements, global citizens, from both the West (e.g. the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany) and the East (e.g., countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle
East, and Latin America) are still witnessing the borderless flow of information, people,
and capital, which facilitates the integration of the world into one single global unit. In
particular, in the realm of media and culture, the level of interconnectivity has increased.
Globalization has become more complicated than ever instead of disappearing as several
players, whether Western-based or non-Western-based actors, such as nation-states, in-
ternational agencies, transnational corporations, and even consumers, are increasingly
involved. How to comprehend globalization over the next decade or so, therefore, relies
on people’s understanding of two major elements: the directions of flow of people, culture,
and capital, and the role of major players in the globalization process.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Globalization in the Era of Digital Platforms

Unlike the political and economic milieu surrounding the contemporary world in the
early 21st century, globalization as a form of the integration of the globe into a single unit
in the field of media and ICTs has continued and even substantially grown. With the rapid
growth of digital platforms, such as social media (e.g., Facebook and YouTube), search
engines (e.g., Google), smartphones and their operating systems (e.g., Android and iOS),
digital games, and online streaming services (e.g., Netflix), the global cultural markets
have been closely connected and increasingly interdependent. On the one hand, some dig-
ital platforms have played a key role as cultural producers, and on the other hand, other
digital platforms have worked as cultural distributors, although the boundaries between
production and distribution, which were previously clearly separated, are getting blurry.
Digital platforms like Netflix, YouTube, and Facebook in the United States have es-
pecially increased their market shares around the globe to continue and extend their
hegemonic dominance. Although several emerging markets and cultural producers in
non-Western countries like Mexico, Brazil, India, and South Korea (hereafter Korea)
have developed their local-based popular culture and digital platforms to become a major
part of the global society, their roles are still limited. These countries furthermore utilize
American-based platforms, including YouTube, to disseminate their popular culture to
both regional and global markets. Regardless of shifting power dynamics in politics and
economy, the integrations in the realm of culture and technology have never stopped, and
therefore, globalization is alive and vivid in this particular context.
What Is a Digital Platform?

Digital platform is a buzzword in our daily lives. “The rise of digital platforms is hailed as
the driver of economic progress and technological innovation” (van Dijck et al., 2018, 1).
Whenever we turn on TV and read newspaper articles, it is not uncommon to learn about
digital platforms. From elementary school students to college students, watching YouTube
and using smartphones are very common and daily routines. “Individuals can greatly
Globalization and Digital Platforms 3
benefit from this transformation because it empowers them to set up businesses, trade
goods, and exchange information online while circumventing corporate or state interme-
diaries” (van Dijck et al., 2018, 1). Digital platforms heavily influence the contemporary
cultural industries and their popular culture. The digital platform has been a relatively
new concept in media studies; however, there are already several significant works of this
new concept and phenomenon.
A few media scholars (Gillespie, 2010, 2018; Hands, 2013; Jin, 2015a; Srnicek, 2016; Steinberg,
2017; van Dijck et al., 2018) have adopted and used the notion of platforms; however, they
barely developed any reliable definitions. In general, a platform describes the current use of
digital technology and culture, and it explains “the online services of content intermediaries,
both in their self-characterizations and in the broader public discourse of users, the press
and commentaries” (Gillespie, 2010, 349). As Gillespie (2010, 349) points out, intermediaries
like YouTube and Google provide “storage, navigation and delivery of the digital content of
others.” As Lev Manovich (2013, 7) also points out, “platforms allow people to write new soft-
ware,” and “these platforms, such as Google, Facebook, iOS, and Android, are in the center
of the global economy, culture, social life, and, increasingly, politics.”
These explanations, however, do not convey the true nature of digital platforms, which
can be explained in several different but interconnected ways. Most of all, as Van Dijck
(2013, 29) points out,
a platform is a mediator rather than an intermediary: it shapes the performance of so-

cial acts instead of merely facilitating them. Technologically speaking, platforms are
the providers of software, (sometimes) hardware, and services that help code social
activities into a computational architecture.
More specifically, digital platforms have various functions, which are connected. First,
the term “platform” designated something like a computing infrastructure, the hardware
basis for computational activities. Some people associate platforms with their compu-
tational meaning (Bodle, 2010), which is an infrastructure that closely supports the de-
sign and use of specific applications or operating systems in computer systems and/or
smartphones.
However, the platform extends beyond the computational domain (Jin, 2015a). Plat-
form has come to denote what we would call social media: sites or platforms as they were
known, on which users could post, contribute, share, and so on, to a particular web-based
and then app-based media interface—whether Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter (Steinberg,
2017). This trait does mean that the platform can be configured as a transactional or me-
diatory mechanism. In other words, digital platforms should be judged “by market forces
and the process of commodity exchange” (Dijck, 2012, 162). Platforms have both a direct
economic role as creators of surplus value through commodity production and exchange
and an indirect role through advertising (Garnham, 1997). In this paradigm, the platform
“signifies something akin to the mediation structure or intermediary that makes certain
kinds of transactions possible. This is also arguably the cultural dominant form of plat-
form” (Steinberg, 2017, 189). As some theoreticians argue (Feenberg, 1991; Salter, 2005),
technologies are not value neutral but reflect the cultural bias, values, and communicative
preferences of their designers. Platforms clearly reflect designers’ values and preferences
that are oftentimes at odds with the values and preferences of the users (Bodle, 2010).
As such, it is critical to comprehensively understand the notion of platforms. Putting
together these dimensions, we can consider that platforms have emerged not simply in a
functional computational shape, but with cultural values and communicational aspects
embedded in them. As the growth of new media cannot be separated from society, we
must address digital platforms as a complicated but interconnected whole (Jin, 2015a).
Digital forms of power are connected together through the three core pillars of digital
platforms: hardware, corporate sphere, and cultural and political values. Domination
over these three elements provides a great source of power to the United States over other
countries. As Moran and Punathambekar (2019) point out, due to American dominance
in the realm of digital platform, it is critical to understand the ways in which global digital
platforms like YouTube and Facebook penetrate in the early 21st century. A closer under-
standing of the technological functions, characters of platforms as a corporate sphere,
and their cultural values help people determine the distinctive prospects of platforms in
the globalization process, which has been closely related to imperialism theory.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Definitions of Globalization
Globalization is the major framework in international communication research in the
early 21st century. There are several features characterizing globalization. Most of all,
globalization implies the borderless flow of information between various countries. The
flow of information can be made possible as countries, international agencies, and trans-
national corporations work together to integrate and interconnect, which means that
many constituents attempt to converge their units, not politically but economically and
culturally to make one big umbrella. Marshal McLuhan (1964) especially termed the in-
tegration of the world into one village through the use of electronic media as a “global
village” in 1964. As for the definition, McLuhan (1964, 254) described the ways in which
electronic technology has contracted the globe into a village because of “the instantaneous
movement of information from every quarter to every point at the same time.” McLuhan’s
definition of global village certainly provides several important conceptual ideas for
understanding globalization, which are supported by media technology. Based on these
basic characterizations, we can identify several keywords explaining globalization below.
Keywords in Globalization
• Borderless flow of information
• Integration
• Interconnectivity
• Interdependence
• Convergence
• Global village
• Global economy
While the significant role of media technology plays a part, there are several different
dimensions expediting the globalization process, including flows of people and capital be-
tween various countries. People are moving from one country to another country, and
some corporations like McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Dunkin Donuts also have their stores
in many countries. Consequently, globalization, driven by the flows of people, culture, and
capital, conceptually makes a borderless, singular village. Globalization is thus a process
by which the global politics, economy, and culture are becoming a connected and interac-
tive whole (Giddens, 1999). However, as Anthony Giddens (1999) himself argued, “globali-
zation is a complex set of processes, not a single one,” mainly because the flows of these
elements occur in a more complicated way than in one simple direction. Ritzer (2007, 1)
also defines globalization as “an accelerating set of processes involving flows that encom-
pass ever-greater numbers of the world’s spaces and that lead to increasing integration and
interconnectivity among those spaces.” Robertson (1992, 8) already defined globalization
as a concept referring “both to the compression of the world and intensification of con-
sciousness of the world as a whole.” These scholarly definitions commonly emphasize the
compression of time and space and the interconnectivity of the world as a result.
What I want to emphasize furthermore are the players who develop the globalization
processes and the diversity of flows that shifts the globalization dynamics. Therefore, in
this book, globalization is not only the integration of the world as a whole, but also the
diversification of the processes in actors, flows, and dimensions in expediting global in-
terdependence. There are many different actors and directions in the globalization pro-
cess, and without understanding this complexity, people cannot fully comprehend the
real nature of globalization. Previously, forces of globalization were linked with a few
Western countries, in particular the United States, and they seemed to “subjugate weaker,
national/cultural identities” (Shim, 2006, 26). However, as the case of BTS—a globally
popular Korean boy band—in the late 2010s implies, several non-Western countries have
expanded their roles to become major actors, which potentially changes the directions of
cultural flows. This fundamental question requires us to contemplate who the major play-
ers are and in which directions people, capital, and culture flow. In this regard, we must
identify several major paradigms and dimensions when we analyze globalization.
Three Paradigms to Globalization Studies

Globalization refers to the process and context of our world becoming integrated. There are
several approaches explaining the globalization process, and mainly three major paradigms
constitute globalization discourses: modernization, critical political economy, and cultural
globalization, known as hybridization. As can be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, under these fab-
rics, there are several theoretical frameworks interpreting the globalization process.
Modernization Approach
One of the oldest approaches to globalization started with modernization theory in the 1960s.
Modernization theory called upon developing countries to learn from, and imitate, the West.
Since developing countries could use media to learn from the West, it is the media-oriented
version of globalization (Giddens, 1991; Curran, 2002; Shim, 2006). The project of moder-
nity, which was mainly developed in Europe starting in the 17th century, has been
largely concerned with making a break with the past by modernizing arts, literature,
culture and religion. The quintessential aspects of modernity include a respect for
individual freedom, the belief in human beings’ ability to decide their destiny, and the
adoption of science and technology.
(Habermas, 1990; Giddens, 1991; Neyazi, 2010, 911)
As Alberto Martinelli (2005, 101) especially argues, “globalization is one of the most visi-
ble consequences of modernity and has in its turn reshaped the project of modernity.” For
him, “modernization is a global process.”
Modernized countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
equipped with advanced technologies, cultures, and systems, especially demand devel-
oping countries to follow their leads. In other words, modernity summarizes the modern
transformation of social life, from pre-modern to modern, technologically, culturally,
politically, and economically, and modernization theory “called upon the developing
world to learn from and imitate the West” (Curran, 2002, 167).
The major issue here is that the modernization process flows from a few advanced and
modernized countries to less-developed countries, and one of the major areas that these
modernized countries ask developing countries to follow is their economic system, which
is capitalism, triggering some problems. As Robert McChesney (1998) criticized, globali-
zation is an outcome of modernity because it provides an aura of inevitability to the rise of
neoliberalism and corporate control of the media. “Globalization erodes the sovereignty
of the nation-state that has been the key institution and the basic element of structuration
of modern society” (Martinelli, 2005, 102). Again, modernity is closely related to media
and culture, as international communication systems could be used to spread the mes-
sage of modernity. International communication systems, prior to globalization studies,
could transfer the economic and political models of the West to the independent countries
after World War II (Thussu, 2006). Some believe that several ICTs and the media would
help transform traditional societies. Modernization as one major approach and media are
meticulously related and connected.
Critical Political Economy Approach

The second approach to Globalization and Media developed by critical political econ-
omists claims that globalization should be comprehended as one element of the trans-
formation of contemporary capitalism. This paradigm addresses “the centrality of the
economy as the prime mover of social and cultural change” (Ampuja, 2004, 68). In par-
ticular, “the new media and information technologies have made it possible for multi-
national corporations to extend their reach,” and “the media corporations (themselves
global entities) create a demand for commodities and deliver audiences to powerful
advertisers” (68).
From a critical political economy approach, one of the most important processes is
the concentration of power in the hands of transnational corporations and, in connec-
tion with this, the deregulation and liberalization of media systems throughout the world.
Under this circumstance, as Herman and McChesney (1997) clearly pointed out, since
the 1990s, the media markets have become truly global for the first time in history, and
they have been dominated by a few Western-based transnational corporations that hold
substantial economic and cultural power. At the same time, the developments in media
markets around the globe prove a constant imbalance of cultural flows, as several Amer-
ican media corporations and platforms, such as Walt Disney, Netflix, Google, and Apple
dominate both content production and distribution channels.
This approach emphasizes that the global integration of the world has been actualized
by a few Western countries, in particular the United States. For this perspective, globali-
zation is nothing but Americanization, which means that the United States as a major
force has greatly increased its influence in the global cultural markets. As can be seen
in the global film sector, films produced by Hollywood majors have continued to pene-
trate global box offices. As a result of the fearful lobbying by Hollywood majors, the U.S.
government has demanded non-Western countries, like Mexico, Korea, and China, to
open their national film markets, and therefore, the global film markets are controlled by
Hollywood with a few exceptions. As will be detailed in Chapter 4, cultural imperialism
as a major approach to globalization studies emphasizes that the world becomes a single
unit and tastes American popular culture in every corner of the world. This approach,
therefore, has focused on an asymmetrical power relationship between the United States
and the remaining countries in the globalization process.
For critical political economists, the essential feature of the globalization of media is
the ongoing commodification of culture. The main argument made by critical political
economists is that globalization is about the formation of a worldwide capitalistic system
that promotes the interests and values of powerful Western-based transnational corpora-
tions (Ampuja, 2004). This approach also discusses the globalization of media or culture
in terms of homogenization.
Cultural Globalization Approach

The third paradigm in Globalization and Media emphasizes the cultural elements of
globalization. This cultural paradigm was born mainly “out of critiques of the so-called
cultural imperialism thesis. Cultural globalization theorists argue that the globalization
of media is not leading to the homogenization of global culture under the auspices of
Western consumerism” (Ampuja, 2004, 67). For Roland Robertson (1995), a key cultural
globalization theorist, cultural globalization refers to a process in which the relations
between the local and the global are being re-organized instead of homogenized. At one
level, global transnational media corporations have to adjust their production so that
they meet the standards of local markets and their needs. On another level, local cul-
tural forms may become globally marketed phenomena. Robertson refers to this feature
as glocalization—the combination of globalization and localization.
The cultural paradigm emphasizes the idea that global cultural flows are multidirec-
tional and that this trend leads to a proliferation of new cultures—to a formation of new
kind of cultural forms, in which the local and global are mixed together in various ways.
Cultural globalization emphasizes different cultures to redefine itself as hybridization.
This process is devoid of Western domination, because, for example, in popular music,
new stylistic innovations can come from the third world. For the cultural paradigm, with
its conception of global culture as a new type of hybridization, “the earlier cultural impe-
rialism perspective, which emphasized the analytic separation of core and periphery, now
seems outdated” (Ampuja, 2004, 67).
For its representatives, a global cultural change is not a unitary process. Rather, it is com-
plex and a very paradoxical development. Cultural theorists see globalization typically in
a positive light: it creates new forms of cultural expression, and it offers new opportunities
for previously marginalized groups to be heard, thus promoting cultural diversification.
Many cultural globalization analysts claim that the dynamics of capitalistic markets foster
the freedom of cultural expression: globalization “pluralizes the world by recognizing the
value of cultural niches” (Waters, 1995, 136). Globalization is “hailed especially in the sense
that it frees local cultures from narrow national contexts” (Ampuja, 2004, 67).
This approach has two different dimensions, which are closely connected. On the one
hand, some claim that non-Western countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and India,
develop their own unique cultures and export them to other countries. On the other hand,
others argue that these non-Western countries are advancing hybridity in popular culture so
that they play a key role in the global markets. In other words, cultural firms in these coun-
tries are not only admitting and consuming Western cultures, but also developing hybrid
culture by mixing two different cultures between local and global and eventually penetrate
other countries, including the United States. Cultural globalization, also known as hybrid-
ity, rejects a one way cultural flow and argues that local cultural producers in these countries
are able to create popular culture by mixing local mentality and uniqueness with Western
and universal characteristics. Since local-based popular culture in this context has been
made through hybridization processes, contra-flow of local culture could not be done with-
out cultural globalization. In this transnational context of the nexus between the periphery
and the core, hybridity reveals itself as encouraging new practices of cultural expression: the
local appropriates the global, including global goods, conventions, and styles, including mu-
sic, film, and gaming and inscribes their everyday meaning into them (Bhabha, 1994; Young,
2003; Shim, 2006). As such, depending on one’s own different positions, globalization can be
understood differently. Admitting that diverse paradigms in globalization studies exist, it is
important to develop careful critical thinking to interpret Globalization and Media.
Six Dimensions in Globalization Studies

Different academic disciplines focus on diverse elements in globalization studies; however,
the fields of media, culture, technology, and global consumption are commonly major inter-
ests. Including these dimensions, media studies also emphasizes several relevant areas as core
domains that media scholars, students, and practitioners analyze. Here are six major domains
that this book attempts to discuss as the most significant areas that people might find useful.
• Economy
• Politics
• Culture
• Technology
• Global consumption
• Diaspora
Economy
Some of the earliest discussions on globalization explore in great detail how the evolution
of international markets and companies led to an intensified form of global interdepend-
ence. These discussions point to the growth of international agencies, such as the Euro-
pean Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, now replaced by
the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement in 2018), and other regional trading blocs
(Steger, 2014). As one columnist for HuffPost (Sato, 2014) argues, “globalization was orig-
inally proposed as a way for developed countries to seek additional growth opportunities
abroad, after it became difficult to achieve economic growth domestically. It was prem-
ised on international competition and the pursuit of ever-increasing economic growth.”
Globalization is mostly witnessed in the realm of economy as the national economies of
all countries are now interconnected. Transnational corporations in both Western and
non-Western countries have increased their economic interdependence and worldwide
corporate enterprise. Countries around the world have also substantially developed a great
deal of economic exchange as they organize several economic agencies, including EU,
NAFTA, and now USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), the WTO (World
Trade Organization), and G20 (Group of Twenty). Of course, these economic entities do
not last forever as several countries attempt to exit from these international organizations
to pursue their own benefits.
In the case of Brexit, the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU. It was scheduled to
depart on March 29, 2019. European countries previously banded together
to promote trade, defend human rights, protect the environment and repel threats.
They sign treaties and join international groups, and each time they do, they give up
a bit of independence. That happened in a big way with the creation of the EU, a free-
trade zone and global political force forged from the fractious states of Europe.
(Hutton, 2017)
The question always was, could this extraordinary experiment hold together? The people
of the United Kingdom responded to this question in a June 2016 referendum, “shocking
the world by voting to leave the bloc they had joined in 1973.” For many, the EU was
expensive, out of touch, and a source of uncontrolled immigration (Hutton, 2017).
As U.S. President Donald Trump has also redirected the NAFTA system toward US-
MCA in 2018 in order to bring more benefits to the United States, these global economic
entities are in jeopardy, which suggests anti-global movements initiated by a handful of
Western countries. This does not mean a debacle of economic interdependence between
countries is imminent. Many small countries feel that they must continue to work together
so that they can benefit from the bigger markets rather than just their own small markets.
The world is already connected, and people acknowledge the importance of interdepend-
ence; therefore, they do not follow these two countries. Instead, they may stick together
to further develop a closer global economy than before. The United States and the United
Kingdom possibly continue to work independently, and these deglobalization movements
may not remain the mega trend in the long run in the global economy.
Politics
Until the early 2000s, in the field of communication studies, International Communi-
cation was one of the major courses that students took to study the dynamics of major
players in initiating the flows of information and cultural goods. However, starting around
the same period, International Communication as an academic course in the Department
of Communication in many universities disappeared as Globalization and Media has re-
placed this particular course. While there are several major differences between these
two classes, one of the primary areas differentiating them is the role of the nation-state.
In the International Communication class, the nation-state was one of the most power-
ful players as it mainly decided the flow of culture and information. In other words, the
international trade of television programs and music was decided by government poli-
cies, and the foreign exchange rates between countries were decided by the nation-states.
With the growth of economic integration and interdependence, however, several players,
in particular transnational corporations and international agencies, such as the WTO,
the USMCA, and EU, have rapidly increased their roles, resulting in the decreasing role
of the nation-state. Partially as a reflection of these new trends, Globalization and Media
has started to replace International Communication as a new core course in the field
of communication. As such, most of the debates on “political globalization involves the
weighing of conflicting evidence with regard to the fate of the nation-state,” as economic
globalization potentially leads to “the reduced control of national governments over eco-
nomic policy” (Steger, 2014, 7).
As several scholars (Strange, 1996; Sinclair, 2007) argued, the nation-state as a mean-
ingful unit in the global trade of culture and technology seemed to decline, as diverse
globalization processes, including the increasing role of transnational corporations and
the national markets, undermine the significant role of the governments. Harvey (2006)
especially points out that the nation-state has been challenged in global cultural trade,
although the pivotal role of the nation-state is still worthy of careful attention. In other
words, several globalization theorists predict the end of national boundaries and national
labels, including national corporations and national industries, which have brought about
the end of national economies. What they emphasize is that the reach of national regula-
tions and actions cannot control transnational organizations and global affairs (Ryoo and
Jin, 2018). As national economic policies cannot be as effective as they once were, many
countries have to rethink their identities because old politics are obsolete. For example,
after the Cold War ended in 1991, many people believed that nations no longer have en-
emies. In the neoliberal era, when the role of government must limit its power in order
to guarantee the maximum profit of corporations, nation-states around the globe have
developed deregulation, liberalization, and privatization.
However, as has been briefly discussed, the United States and the United Kingdom
have recently developed nationalistic political directions in global affairs in the 2010s.
The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 also changed
the course, as people began to think about terrorists as the new enemies and that
nation-states must protect their own citizens from their attacks. These new develop-
ments ask us to recast the roles of the nation-state as considered below, which will be
fully discussed in Chapter 5:
• Does globalization bring about the weakening of state power?

• Do nations lose some of the economic power they once had?
• Have the nation-states lost most of their sovereignty?
• If so, who and which agencies and organizations have replaced the nation-state?
• And therefore, are the nation-states still powerful?
Culture
While both economic and political domains are significant elements for the globalization
process, culture is one of the most fundamental dimensions as it nurtures globalization.
Cultural flows through television, films, and new media, such as the Internet and smart-
phones, have played a crucial role in increasing interdependence between countries and
people. Along with the technological domain, focusing on ICTs, culture and media would
be the drivers for globalization.
The flow of culture around the globe is not new. From the beginning of the 20th century,
several cultural products like films immediately started to flow beyond national bound-
aries. Later, television programs produced in a few countries, in particular in the United
States, were received in many parts of the planet. American music has also become pop-
ular in many countries. As such, Hollywood movies, American television programs, and
MTV, as well as CNN as a news channel, have become symbols of globalization.
Of course, there are several new developments as, at least, a few, if not many, countries
have advanced their own popular cultures to become part of the global markets. As
American and European citizens also admit these products, some Westerners enjoy very
similar local or regional options in their own territories. Starting in the early 1990s, and
in many cases in the early 21st century, once small and peripheral countries in the realm
of popular culture and media, such as Mexico, Brazil, India, Turkey, and Korea have
substantially advanced their own popular cultures and penetrated the regional markets,
and partially followed by the Western markets. Telenovelas developed by Mexico and
Brazil, Bollywood movies in India, and the Korean Wave in the 2010s are certainly inter-
esting local cultures that people in many countries enjoy. These countries have certainly
advanced their national images as some of the major powers in the realm of cultural
production.
In the 21st century, it is not important to identify the nationality of popular c ulture.
What is significant is that people around the globe are increasingly consuming culture
developed by other countries, and therefore, are culturally integrated. This does not
mean that all people accept other countries’ popular culture. Many people in Asia and
Latin America resist American culture, and some people in North America and Western
Europe are reluctant to receive popular culture from Asia and Latin America. Instead of
culturally becoming a global village, they prefer their own culture to other culture. In this
context, we have to address several key points in understanding the globalization process
in culture:
• What is the direction of cultural flow?

• What is cultural imperialism and does cultural imperialism theory explain the con-
temporary flow of popular culture?
• How can we understand the increasing role of the small cultural markets (e.g., Mexico
and Korea) in the global market?
Technology
The technological domain is important as ICTs are the drivers for globalization. ICTs
have expedited the connection/interaction of countries and played a key role in creating
a global village. Starting with the telegraph, developed in the mid-19th century, several
different new media technologies, including telephone, satellite, the Internet, social me-
dia, and smartphones have substantially advanced a borderless global entity. High school
and college students from the world in the United States and Canada simply connect with
their families back home via instant mobile messengers like WeChat, Kakao Talk, Line,
WhatsApp, and Facebook Messenger. In the late 2010s, teens and people in their twenties
engage in eSports (electronic sports) anytime and anyplace, and for them, national bound-
aries are meaningless.
Meanwhile, the expansion of ICTs has also been crucial for the growth of European
capital as in the case of the telegraph and the expansion of American capital in the case
of telephones and smartphone technologies. The availability of fast and reliable informa-
tion actualized by the expansion of ICTs has been created within the overall context of
capitalism in the early 21st century. Winseck and Pike (2007) discussed, with the example
of the global expansion of cable and wireless companies (e.g. Western Union, Eastern Tel-
egraph Company, Commercial Cable Company, Anglo American Telegraph Company or
Marconi) in the years 1860–1930, that at the time of Lenin there was a distinct connection
between communication, globalization, and capitalist imperialism. They argue that
the growth of a worldwide network of fast cables and telegraph systems, in tandem
with developments in railways and steamships, eroded some of the obstacles of ge-
ography and made it easier to organize transcontinental business. These networks
supported huge flows of capital, technology, people, news, and ideas which, in turn,
led to a high degree of convergence among markets, merchants, and bankers.
(Winseck and Pike, 2007, 1–2)
In the 2010s, digital platforms, including Google, YouTube, Netflix, and smartphones
have certainly taken a pivotal role in the globalization process. People around the world
have connected on these digital platforms as people enjoy music, film, and television pro-
grams through them, while global citizens instantaneously communicate through mobile
instant messengers like WhatsApp, WeChat, Kakao Talk, and Line.
Global Consumption
People throughout the world in the early 21st century experience the same or similar goods
and services due to the integration of the planet. Although the global flows of popular
culture and food are not new, people consume some foods and cultures originated in other
countries in our own countries or enjoy them while traveling to other countries. For exam-
ple, people do not need to visit the United States to enjoy Disneyland anymore as there are
now several Disneyland parks, including in Paris, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. People also en-
joy Starbucks coffee in more than 70 countries (Knoema, 2018), and McDonald’s is present
in almost every corner of the world (close to 120 countries). More importantly, whenever
they turn on their televisions, people in many countries can enjoy American music, film,
dramas and news on MTV, HBO, Netflix, and CNN in addition to their countries’ cable
channels. This kind of global consumption has been known to contribute to Americaniza-
tion as these cultural products flow from the United States to the rest of the world.
Of course, sometimes, Asian and Latin American foods also arrive in North A merica
and Europe. One of the most significant examples is the California roll invented by
Hidekazu Tojo who was born and trained as a chef in Japan. After learning the basic
skills at home in southern Japan, he travelled to Osaka to study the intricacies of being
a Japanese chef, before moving to Vancouver in 1971 (White, 2012). Here he eventually
created a new type of sushi for North Americans and established Vancouver as a sushi
capital, at least for Vancouverites. Tojo stated,
When I came to Vancouver, most Western people did not eat seaweed, so I tried to
hide it. I made the roll inside out. People loved it. A lot of people from out of town
came to my restaurant—lots from Los Angeles—and they loved it. That’s how it got
called the California roll. I was [going] against Japanese tradition with the inside-out
roll, but I liked it, and my customers liked it. And so it spread all over—even into
Japan.
(White, 2012)
Diaspora
The sixth domain in globalization studies is diaspora, symbolizing the flows of people in
several different forms, like immigration, study abroad, and refugee, which constitute the
integration and interconnectivity of the world. What is interesting is that the flows of peo-
ple have mainly occurred as people in non-Western countries to Western countries unlike
other previous five domains. People from countries like Mexico and China move to North
America and Western Europe to pursue a better life and opportunity.
In fact, the United States has been the top destination for international migrants since
at least 1960, with one-fifth of the world’s migrants living there as of 2017. According to
American Community Survey (ACS) data, more than 43.7 million immigrants resided in
the United States in 2016, accounting for 13.5% of the total U.S. population of 323.1 million.
When 1.49 million foreign-born individuals moved to the United States in 2016, India was
the leading country of origin, with 175,100 arriving in 2016, followed by 160,200 from China/
Hong Kong, 150,400 from Mexico, 54,700 from Cuba, and 46,600 from the P hilippines.
India and China surpassed Mexico in 2013 as the top origin countries for recent arrivals. In
contrast, Canadian arrivals dropped 19%: 38,400 in 2016, versus 47,300 in 2015 (National
Policy Institute, 2018).
This trend is a bit different in Canada. According to the Census of Population in
Canada (Statistics Canada, 2016), among the recent immigrants to Canada, people
from the Philippines were the largest, followed by India and China. Until the mid-2000s,
Chinese were the largest; however, people from the Philippines and India accounted for
27.7%. Unlike the United States, people from the Middle East, including Iran and Syria,
also made large segments as a reflection of the liberal immigration policy enacted by the
current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
Many refugees have also moved mainly from non-Western countries to Western coun-
tries like the United States, Canada, Germany, and France. In 2015 and 2016, the refugee
crisis dominated the global news due to a sharp rise in the number of people coming to
Europe to claim asylum. After the Arab uprisings of 2011, the number of people coming
to Europe to seek asylum began to rise. In particular, during Syria’s civil war in the 2010s,
hundreds of thousands of people have died, and about 5.1 million Syrians fled the country
as refugees (The Guardian, 2018).
Overall, globalization has continued to happen mainly because of these six domains,
and the following chapters discuss their major characteristics in conjunction with several
theoretical frameworks.
How to Interpret Globalization: The World Is Flat vs. The World

Is Asymmetrical
Globalization itself has been complicated as can be seen thus far; it is not possible to
simply identify its characteristics. As several approaches and dimensions discussed thus
far explain, it is not possible to categorize globalization from either a positive or negative
aspect. In particular, when we discuss the power relationships between several players,
including the West and the East, the debates on globalization can be easily convoluted.
In this regard, two of the most compelling ideas in interpreting globalization were de-
veloped by Anthony Giddens (1999) and Benjamin Barber (1992). On the one hand, during
his lecture on BBC in 1999, Giddens divided globalization processes into two different
groups known as the skeptics, which are mostly against globalization processes, and the
radicals, which are mostly for globalization processes. The skeptics believe that globaliza-
tion is not real as the economic integration is mainly regional, not global, while the radi-
cals consider that globalization is real and happening because the global market is much
more developed and bigger than it was several decades ago. For the radicals, nations have
lost most of the sovereignty they once had, and politicians have lost most of their capabil-
ity to influence events, while for the skeptics, governments still intervene in economic life
and the welfare states remain intact.
Based on this dichotomy, Giddens (1999) sided with the radicals by saying that
the level of world trade today is much higher than it ever was before and involves a
much wider range of goods and services. But the biggest difference is in the level of
finance and capital flows. Geared as it is to electronic money—, the current world
economy has no parallels in earlier times.
The problem with skeptics and radicals is that both have not properly understood the
concept of globalization and its implications for us. Both also see the phenomenon almost
solely in economic terms. As discussed, globalization is political, technological, and cul-
tural, as well as economic, and globalization is a complex set of processes, not a single
one. However, Giddens’s notion of globalization ignored the long history of globalization,
which had preceded industrialization, and he had recent economic integration in mind
(Briggs and Burke, 2009, 268).
On the other hand, Barber (1992) envisioned globalization as the war between the op-
posing ideologies of McWorld (forces of the free market, consumerism) and Jihad (a type
of Holy War). McWorld (MacDonald’s, Microsoft, Mac Computer) represents for glo-
balization, while Jihad represents against globalization. Barber believes that all national
economies are vulnerable due to the inroads of transnational corporations within which
global trade is free and access to banking is open. In many parts of the world, transnational
corporations such as MacDonald’s, CNN, and Apple “increasingly lack a meaningful na-
tional identity that neither reflects nor respects nationhood as an organizing or regulative
principle.” In contrast to this, however, several small countries in the Middle East and
Eastern Europe fiercely attempt to protect their own identities. Their major goal
is to redraw boundaries, to implode states and resecure parochial identities: to es-

cape McWorld’s dully insistent imperatives. The mode is that of Jihad: war not as an
instrument of policy but as an emblem of identity, an expression of community, and
end in itself.
(Barber, 1992)
However, both destroy the nation-state and the democracy. McDonald’s needs to expand
and merges with others and destroys nationhood. MacWorld therefore throws nations
into one homogeneous global theme park. Jihad has fragmented the nation in retreating
to the local identities. Both hurt civil society and belittle democratic citizenship. “Jihad
delivers a different set of virtues: a vibrant local identity, a sense of community, solidarity
among kinsmen, neighbors, and countrymen, narrowly conceived. But it also guarantees
parochialism and is grounded in exclusion” (Barber, 1992) (Table 1.1).
It is not prudent to consider globalization simply as a winner or a loser game. As glo-
balization has continued to grow, we are already deeply influenced by the globalization
process, and therefore, it is not time to choose either pro-globalization prospects or
anti-globalization prospects. In particular, in the realm of media and digital technology,
the process of globalization in the late 2010s has been much different from the early 2000s
due to the emergence of digital platforms. Until the late 2000s, global flow in culture
mainly occurred through global trade, and therefore, material possessions. Back then,
people had to buy or borrow cultural products in order to enjoy them; however, in the
2010s and 2020s, people simply use various digital platforms like YouTube, and therefore,
there is no need to possess cultural products such as films, television programs, and music.
Global platforms’ strategies are different from traditional cultural industry corpora-
tions. Over the past several decades, one of the major discourses in globalization in the
field of culture has been the potential homogenization, and therefore, elimination of local
identity due to the dominant role of Western cultural industries. However, in the era of
digital platforms, they are developing glocalization models (see Chapters 3 and 8). For
example, Netflix has continued to penetrate the global cultural market. While selling their
cultural products, these platforms provide funds to local cultural producers. The border-
less flow of capital has substantially increased in the 2010s, and therefore, their global
market dominance also seems to continue to increase.
Table 1.1 M
acWorld vs. Jihad
MacWorld Jihad
For globalization Against globalization

Forces of the free market A type of Holy War
Consumerism/demand integration and Bloody Holy War on behalf of partisan identity
uniformity
Driven by universalizing markets Driven by parochial hatreds: parochial community
to protect itself from the cosmopolitan universal
standards of the West
Destroy nationhood Fragment the nation in retreating to the local
Source: (See Barber, 1992).

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seen him deliberately reading through his love-letter. As it was, he
looked into the fair, open face and knew him for a humbug; though
he could not imagine why he should have read it, nor how it could
advantage him to befriend a miserable, sordid, reprobate, and
degraded outcast such as Lucian de Saumarez.
Dr. Maude came hard on the heels of the returning Simpson; he
did not resort to Bob Sawyer’s tactics to increase the reputation of
his practice. Farquhar met him in the hall and brought him in, and the
patient overheard an edifying fragment of conversation.
“Well, I couldn’t very well leave him out in the road, poor chap, so I
had to bring him along.”
“And he will probably recoup himself from your plate-chest.”
“What a cynic you are! I never thought of such a thing,” said
Farquhar, laughing.
“Your innocence must stand in your way sometimes, I should
think.”
“I never knew it do so. I believe, myself, that trust begets
trustworthiness.”
“Ah, you’re a philanthropist,” said Maude, walking into the room.
The patient lay quiet, apparently unconscious. “I expected that it was
this fellow you’d got hold of,” Maude said, without surprise. “He came
to me an hour ago. I told him to go to Alresworth infirmary; I suppose
he had an attack while waiting for the ’bus.”
“Well, I think you might have let him wait in the surgery.”
“He’s probably a thief. I don’t profess to be a philanthropist,
myself.”
“Philanthropist, indeed!” said Farquhar. “It’s not philanthropy I’m
feeling for you, doctor.”
“I dare say,” Maude responded, proceeding with his analysis of
Lucian’s bones.
“You persist in crediting me with virtues I don’t possess.”
“Modesty’s your great fault; every one knows that.”
“Well, yours isn’t over-amiability, anyhow,” returned Farquhar,
again laughing.
Satirical compliments are more difficult to meet than most forms of
attack, but Farquhar’s unconsciousness was a perfect piece of
acting. Lucian wondered whether Maude knew the motive of his
philanthropy. As a fact, Maude knew nothing and suspected merely
because Farquhar was a virtuous person; he would have believed
that the Apostle Peter got himself martyred for a consideration, and
canonised by a piece of celestial jobbery. Being put to rebuke, he
confined his conversation to the subject of Lucian’s illness, and in a
short time the prodigal was installed in the best room and fed with
the fatted calf under the form of tinned essence of beef.
III
THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND IS MAN
For several days Lucian was kept dumb by the tactics of his host,
who walked punctually out of the room as soon as the invalid opened
his lips. In half an hour he would return to the chafing guest; and
then, if Lucian remained silent, he heard the paper read aloud, but if
he dared to speak he was once more left to himself. As Lucian was
eminently gregarious and hated his own society, the discipline
achieved its object. He was treated like a royal guest, and repaid his
host by vivisecting his character. The ground of his suspicions
seemed trivial, but was substantial. Feeling the letter in its old place,
Lucian sometimes wondered if he had dreamed that scene. But, no,
he knew it was real; for the reason that he had seen on Farquhar’s
face as he read an expression which he could never have imagined.
What he suspected was not very clear; but Lucian had an inquisitive
disposition, and his interests at this time were limited in number.
Hence his exaggerated curiosity.
The church at Monkswell was heated by pipes which on mild days
brought the temperature up to seventy degrees Fahrenheit, and in
cold weather left the air in such a condition that to uncover his bald
head was a severe trial of the parson’s faith. The weather had
changed, and Farquhar, coming in after service on Sunday
afternoon, went straight to the fire to warm his hands. He was an
exemplary church-goer.
“Cold?” inquired Lucian, who was now allowed to talk a little.
“Bitterly. The snow-wind’s blowing; we shall be white to-morrow, if I
don’t err.”
“Gale at seventy miles an hour, temperature twenty degrees below
zero; yes, I’ve tried that out in Athabasca, and it didn’t suit me,” said
Lucian, whose rebellious body appreciated luxury though his hardy
spirit despised it.
“My faith, no! but I’m not sure that twenty degrees below isn’t
better than a hundred and twenty above.”
“That’s a nice preparation for the bad time coming,” said the
incorrigible Lucian. “Talking of which, what was that devilry you used
when you carried in my fainting form?”
“Devilry, indeed! It was massage.”
“Not the ordinary, common or garden English massage, sonny;
I’ve tried that.”
“Massage is massage all the world over, I should have said.
However, I learned mine in Africa.”
“And who was your moonshee?”
“An old Arab sheikh who wore immaculate robes, and carried a
dagger with a handle of silver filigree and a very sharp point, with
which he prodded his slaves when they failed in their duties. Are you
satisfied now?”
“No, not in the least; but I didn’t expect to be. Who’s old Fane?”
“My dear fellow,” said Farquhar, mildly, “your mind reminds me of a
flea. Mr. Fane is a farmer hereabouts, a kind of local squire.”
“Is he well off?”
“Tolerably, I believe. Why do you ask?”
“Old curmudgeon!” said Lucian. “Stingy old miserly murderer!”
“One at a time, I beg,” said Farquhar.
“Well, he may be an angel incognito, but his war-paint’s unco guid,
that’s all.”
“How has he roused your righteous wrath?”
Lucian related Mrs. Searle’s story, waxing eloquent over her
wrongs, and illustrating his points with rapid foreign gestures, as his
manner was. Farquhar compressed his lips, which already joined in
a sufficiently firm line. “I know those houses,” he said; “they are unfit
for habitation. I tried to get them condemned a year ago. Want a
copper, do they? They’ll never get it from Fane.”
“I wish he’d tried what starvation’s like, that’s all.”
“Have you?”
“Have I? I was a thousandaire till I was four-and-twenty,” said
Lucian, clasping his lean, brown hands behind his head—“but since
then, devil a penny have I had to spend! My head is bloody but
unbowed beneath the bludgeonings of Fate—W. E. Henley. I’m
proud to say I could take the shine out of Orestes.”
Farquhar sat down by the fire and pulled the tea-table towards
him. He was very useful at an afternoon party: could always
remember the precise formula for every person’s several cup. “How
did you lose your money?” he inquired, flavoring his own tea with
lemon, in the Russian style.
“Sixteen thousand in one night playing écarté, sonny. No, don’t
preach; I never gamble now I’ve got no money. Besides, on that
memorable occasion my circumstances were exceptional.”
“Exceptionally bad, I should think. What did you do?”
“What did I do? Commenced author, and I flatter myself I should
have made a decided hit, only I was overtaken by what another
distinguished author calls Bluidy Jack. The medico swore it was the
writing brought it on. I also swore, in many tongues, and had a
second go; I held on gallantly for three months, and then went to a
hospital, and a nurse fell in love with me. ‘Those lips so sweet, so
honey-sweet—’ We swore fidelity. I shared with her my fortune—we
broke a sixpence. She had three hundred a year and a large soul.
Inconstant creature! On getting my ticket-of-leave from the hospital I
introduced her to my chief pal; and would you believe it? the base
villain borrowed my first fiver to elope with her with.”
“Good Heavens, de Saumarez!” said Farquhar, laughing against
his will, “you don’t mean to tell me that all this is true?”
“True? True? Every blessed word of it. I then tried to ’list, but
couldn’t pass the medical. So I got another pal and started as a
tomato-johnny in Guernsey. We’re Guernsey people, you know,” he
added, his voice taking a different intonation. “I’ve a certain affection
for it, too; there I’ll hope to lay these carious old bones of mine when
I’ve done with them. Mighty poor crops they’ll make, too. Well, I
thought Guernsey, being my own, my native land, might be a sort of
all-inclusive mascot for me. But, Lord bless you, sonny, it rained
thunderbolts! Give you my word, no sooner were our glass-houses
up than there arrived a record shower of aerolites; sticky, shiny, black
things they were, for all the world like liquorice. Two-thirds of the
panes went. As I didn’t want to wreck the bosom friend’s boat, we
dissolved partnership, and Jonah went off on his own.”
Farquhar could himself corroborate this story; he remembered the
meteoric shower, which had attracted some attention.
“The stars in their courses came out of them to fight against me,
you see. Well, I went back to town and held horses. I fared
sumptuously every day at coffee-stalls, or at Lockhart’s when I was
in funds. I draw a veil over this period. I was submerged. Then, in
hospital, I met a very decent fellow who got me a berth in Miss Inez
Montroni’s travelling company, where I lived gaily on a pound a week
till that memorable Sawbath which I broke by knocking up. I was
discovered by a kind angel: adsum. Are you insured against fire?”
“Oh, I’m not afraid of ill-luck!” said Farquhar.
“Aren’t you, now? I detect a kind of arrogance, a sort of healthy
scepticism in your tone, my friend. I wonder what you are afraid of?
Not much, I guess.”
“Was your ill-health hereditary?” asked Farquhar, who as a
temperance advocate studied the question of transmission.
“Don’t know. My parents died ere I was born, and never saw their
son, you see. I inherited my bad luck, anyway.
‘Oh, Keith of Ravelston,

The sorrows of thy line!’”
“It hasn’t depressed your spirits.”
“Oh, I don’t believe in letting trouble beat you.”
“You talk as though trouble were a living personality.”
“So it is; a force inimical, to be conquered, held down, and
trampled into the earth.”
“I don’t see how you’re going to conquer trouble. It has its way,
and that’s all.”
“It’s not all. Trouble will make a man despair, or drink, or gamble,
or go mad, or maybe even shoot himself. Well, I’d defy it to make me
deflect a hair’s-breadth from myself, come all the shafts of fate. As
long as I’ve lips I’ll grin.”
“That’s how you take things?” said Farquhar. “Well, it’s not my
way.” His face lighted up with a heady defiance, his lips shut in a
straight line, his eyes sparkled with quite unregenerate fire.
“What is your way, then?”
Farquhar’s expression went instantly out, and he lowered his
eyelids. “Well, you know, things are different for you and me,” he
said, diffidently. “I’m lucky in having a religious faith to fall back on.”
“Oh, I do like you!” said Lucian, after a few seconds, smitten with
an admiration which was not wholly admirable. He solemnly
stretched out his hand. “Sonny, you’re a great man,” he declared. “I
wish I had your cheek. Shake!”
Farquhar smiled politely, deprecated the compliment, and evaded
the point at issue; and shortly afterwards conveyed himself out of the
room on the plea that the invalid had done enough talking. It was
fortunate for him that the language of the eye cannot be put in as
evidence, for Lucian knew that he had detected, in Farquhar’s too
candid orbs, a tacit acknowledgment of all the deceit wherewith he
was desirous of charging him.
Next morning in country and city men awoke to a white, silent
world under a dome of blue, immaculate sky. There was no wind;
and the breath of horse and rider hung still in the air after Noel
Farquhar as he rode up to Burnt House. A huge sweep of bare,
white country lay outspread, sparkling in the sun; the hedges were
so thickly thatched with snow that they did not break the even
whiteness of the prospect. The miserable little group of black,
wooden cottages, Farquhar’s goal, was discernible a great way off;
they were so lonely that when Farquhar rode back an hour later only
his own tracks, black where the crushed snow had melted,
confronted him upon the road.
The day passed, and several beside, and a week later the soiled
rags of the snow still lingered under hedges and by tussocks in the
fields when Farquhar took another morning ride, this time in the
direction of Fanes. The house lay low; its E-shaped façade, built of
bright-red brick and ornamented with facings of freestone, and with
diagonal bands of dark brown crossing one another, looked across
shaven lawns and wide gravel paths to a stream formally laid out
with cascades and little islands, in summer bright with roses. Some
noble trees sprang from the lawn; in particular, a most beautiful silver
birch, whose slight, tapering branches sustained a colony of ragged
black blots, which were the nests of the rooks of Fanes. The birds
took toll from all the orchards around, and were almost as well hated
as their owners.
Mr. Fane had a thin, tall figure, with stooping shoulders and
forward-thrusting head. A pair of keen, cold eyes looked suspiciously
forth from under penthouse brows; self-sufficiency had compressed
his lips, selfish study had hollowed his cheeks, and his thin, even
voice, precise in enunciation even to pedantry, was the true index of
a steadfastly unamiable character. The Fanes enjoyed great
unpopularity; father, son, and daughter, they were all shunned like
lepers. Old Fane had married abroad; no one heard his wife’s
maiden name, and when he came back as a widower nobody cared
to ask. The two children grew up as they would. The son, Bernard,
was notoriously a poacher; the daughter was a beauty, a wild rider,
untutored and untamed, and shared, so it was said, her brother’s
heinous crimes in the preserves. It was this business which shut off
the young Fanes from the society of their peers. Once in past years
they had made their appearance at the first meet of the season, but
they never went again; and thenceforward avoided society more
scrupulously than society avoided them.
All this happened before Noel Farquhar came to The Lilacs. He
had more than once tried to make friends with young Fane, and had
been snubbed for his pains; and thus to this hour matters stood.
Nobody knew much about them, but they possessed a fearsome
reputation, which caused nervous ladies to skip nimbly over fences
when they saw Bernard Fane approaching on his big black horse.
Eumenes Fane received in his library, a long, low room walled with
books. One case held tier on tier of novels in their native French,
both old and new; another was devoted to theology, and put a row of
Blair’s most unchristian sermons across the middle shelf as a gilded
breastplate against the assaults of modern heresies. Mr. Fane was a
ferocious Calvinist; he felt it his duty to go in for hell, and wished to
exact consent in the same beliefs from his children, his servants, and
in ever-widening circles from the ends of the earth. Over the mantel
hung an interesting old design in black and white, which represented
the Last Day: a small queue of saints in stained-glass attitudes
ascending the celestial mountains under the convoy of woolly
angels, a large corps of sinners being haled out of their tombs by
demons armed with three-pronged spears, which they used as
toasting-forks. His Satanic Majesty was gleefully directing their
operations, amid tongues of realistic flame. On the card-board mount
of the picture the following verse was inscribed in youthful round-
hand:
Perdition is needful; beyond any doubt

Hell fire is a thing that we can’t do without.
Saltpetre and pitchforks with brimstone and coals
Are arguments new to rescue men’s souls.
We must keep it up, if we like it or not,
And make it eternal, and make it red-hot.
Mirabelle Fane.
The signature seemed to indicate that Mr. Fane was not always
implicitly obeyed by his children.
He remained sitting when Farquhar was announced, and looked
as forbidding as possible. Farquhar bowed, and looked as pleasant
as possible. The interview promised to be unconventional.
“You are Noel Farquhar?”
“That’s my name, sir,” said Farquhar, always particularly respectful
to an elderly man.
“You write to me that you have made some alterations in my
cottages at Burnt House,” continued old Fane, referring to a letter in
his hand.
“I have, sir; and I hope you will forgive my officiousness in acting
without your leave.”
“I understand that you have put in a copper.”
“It hasn’t damaged the property; I’ll answer for that; and it was
pretty badly wanted. If you’d looked at the place yourself—”
“Where is the copper set?”
“As a lean-to on the last house.”
“What are the dimensions?”
Farquhar supplied him with precise particulars. “I happened to
hear the story from one of your tenants, and I ordered the thing at
once, without a thought of the landlord’s right in the matter. When I
did remember, it was too late; the work was begun. I can assure you,
sir, that it actually adds to the value of the property.”
“So I supposed. What should you say at a guess is the rental
worth of the improvement?”
“Oh, something very small; not more than sixpence a week, sir.”
Mr. Fane made an entry in his book. “Thank you; I am much
obliged to you. Good-morning.”
“You’ll overlook my indiscretion?”
“Overlook it? Indiscretion? I am a poor man, and you have put into
my pocket three shillings a week, Mr. Farquhar; I am greatly
indebted to you.”
“I have put into your pocket three shillings a week?”
“The additional rent of the six houses, you understand.”
“You mean to raise the rent?”
“Certainly. Indiscriminate charity is against my principles.”
“But, sir, they’ll never be able to pay it.”
“I shall, I hope, find other tenants who will.”
“And the charity is mine, Mr. Fane.”
“And the houses are mine, Mr. Farquhar. Would you be so good as
to let yourself out? The men are out on the farm. You cannot well
miss your way.”
Farquhar took up his hat and retired. He really could not attempt to
argue the matter, and was aware that he had been neatly outwitted.
So great a philanthropist should have been saddened by thoughts of
the Searles, victims of his blunder; but Noel Farquhar, as he walked
down the hall, was smiling, in candid appreciation of the nice
precision of his defeat.
IV
MY ACTIONS ALWAYS HARMONISED

WITH MY OWN SWEET VOLITION;
I ALWAYS DID WHAT I DEVISED
AND RARELY ASKED PERMISSION.
Ere he was able to let himself out, however, he was recalled.

“Mr. Noel Farquhar!”
Farquhar turned, and saw on the stairs a girl with a small head
and a crown of chestnut hair. She came leisurely down with her hand
on the balustrade, planting each foot lightly but with decision; her
gait was very characteristic. The light was from behind and left her
features dark. When she had reached the hall, “I want to speak to
you,” said she, calmly; “please to come in here.”
Farquhar held his peace and followed her into another low room,
littered with more books and with Miss Fane’s somewhat masculine
appurtenances—a pair of dogskin gloves, a hard felt hat, and a
riding-whip among them. Armorial bearings were carved upon the
lintel and traced again in silver upon the uprights of the andirons,
across which logs were lying, in primitive style. The girl went first to
the fire and stooped to warm her hands before she confronted him.
“Have you been talking to my father?”
“Am I speaking to Miss Fane?”
“Of course; why do you ask such a question as that?”
“Because I really was not sure; I thought you were younger.”
“Most people know us by sight, though we are too wicked to be
received,” returned Miss Fane, indifferently. “I don’t know whether
you mistook me for a servant. However, that doesn’t matter; have
you been speaking to my father?”
“I came by appointment on a business matter, Miss Fane.”
“About those cottages at Burnt House. You should have written to
my brother Bernard; he manages the farm, and he is reasonable to
deal with. Does my father mean to raise the rents?”
“He said such was his intention, but I hope he will think better of
it.”
“Oh no, he won’t. Are you going to acquiesce, and let your
protégés be evicted?”
“I can hardly make Mr. Fane lower the rents, can I?”
“You could make up the difference yourself.”
As this was precisely what Farquhar had determined to do, he
was, of course, struck by her intelligence. But he did his alms in
modest secrecy. “I dare say they will find the extra sixpence,” he
said.
“They can’t. Searle drinks, and the others are as bad, or worse.
They’re helpless.”
Farquhar did not answer her. She had just moved into the sunlight,
and he was startled by her beauty. No flower-loveliness was hers,
delicate and evanescent; she glowed like a jewel with colour, the
brighter for the sunlight which illumined the rich damask of her
cheeks, the rich whiteness of her brow, the rich hazel of her eyes,
the rich chestnut of her hair. Dolly Fane possessed in its full
splendour the misnamed devil’s beauty, the beauty of colour, vitality,
youth. Her lips were virginally severe, her figure slight, girlishly
formed, not yet mature; she was not so old, nor yet so self-
possessed, as she wished to appear.
“Well, if you are giving in there is no more to be said,” she added,
with a slight contemptuous movement which was plainly a prelude to
showing him out.
Farquhar hastily cast to the winds his modest reserve. “I am not
giving in; I do mean to make up the difference,” he said.
“You do?” said Dolly, fastening her eyes upon him.
“You’re very charitable, Miss Fane,” said Farquhar, smiling.
“Not in the least. I am sorry for Mrs. Searle; but I did not ask you
for that reason. I wanted to see what you are like. You’ve spoken to
my brother Bernard once or twice, haven’t you?”
“I have; but he did not seem interested in my conversation.”
“Oh, that’s Bernard’s way; he always thinks people mean to
patronise him. You know London well, don’t you?”
“I’ve lived a good deal in town, certainly.”
“Should I pass muster in society?”
“Pass muster?” Farquhar repeated. It was not easy to abash him,
but this young beauty, with her odd questions, contrived to do it.
“Yes. I know I am behaving in an unusual way now, but have I the
accent and the appearance of a lady?”
“Most certainly you have.”
“Do you think so? Should I get on in town? Do you think I am
sufficiently presentable to be an actress?”
“An actress? Yes, I should say you were.”
“You’ve not seen me act, of course; I can do it. And I’ve a
passable voice, and I’m fairly good-looking. Books say that theatre-
goers will put up with poor acting for the sake of a pretty face; is that
true?”
“It depends on the prettiness of the face. It would be true in your
case.”
“I don’t in the least want compliments. I want the plain truth.”
“And I’m giving it.”
“Oh,” said Dolly, evidently disconcerted. He had checked her for
the minute, and she remained silent, though fresh questions were at
her very lips.
“Are you fond of acting?” Farquhar asked, to loosen her tongue.
“Are you burning to play Juliet?”
“Juliet? Oh no! I’d like to be Cleopatra or Lady Macbeth, though.
Some one powerful and perhaps wicked; but not like La Dame aux
Camélias, or Iris, or Agnes Ebbsmith. If I threw the Bible in the fire, I
should keep it there.”
“And make it eternal, and make it red-hot,” suggested Farquhar.
“Did you read those lines? Aren’t they good? Years ago I wrote
them there, and father never could make me rub them out, though
he tried with his riding-whip. But that wouldn’t interest you. On your
honour, do you think I should have a chance on the stage?”
“On my honour, I do. But why do you want to go? I should have
thought you’d too much sense to be stage-struck.”
“I’m not stage-struck, but I want to leave this place, and that
seems the simplest way. We are badly off. I never see any one
except my brother. I do not know how to behave. I have never had
the chance of speaking to a gentleman before: which was why I
called you in and asked you these questions. I expect no girl you
know would have done it, would she?”
“You’re right—she wouldn’t; the more fool she, if she wanted the
answer as badly as you did.”
“Exactly,” said Dolly; “for, after all, it doesn’t matter what you think
of me.”
Farquhar slightly altered his whole bearing. He leaned against the
chimney-piece and looked her in the face. “My opinion does matter,
you know,” he said. “I’ve some influence, which I could use either to
promote or to frustrate your interests. I know plenty managers, and
so forth, and I’m popular.”
“It does not matter,” Dolly corrected swiftly; “for I would under no
circumstances consent to be beholden to you for anything beyond
the piece of truth you’ve already given me.”
“You’re independent.”
“I hope so.”
“I’d much like to teach you to obey.”
“Mathematicians have always wanted to square the circle.”
“You’ve a will of your own; you’re worth talking to.”
“Is this how a gentleman speaks to a lady?”
“No, it’s how a man speaks to a woman.”
Dolly glanced out of the window. “That’s my brother Bernard with
his dogs. He stands six foot three, and he’s the best wrestler in
Kent.”
“Meaning you’d set him to turn me out? He’d never do it.”
“Do you think you’re as strong as Bernard?”
“Stronger,” answered Farquhar, stretching out his arm. Pride of
strength was in that gesture, and more than pride—arrogance.
Dolly had a primitive admiration for strength, and his self-
confidence tingled through her veins. She liked him the better that he
was dangerous to handle; she was more at her ease that they were
outside convention.
“At least, you’re not stronger than Bernard plus half a dozen men
whom I could call in a minute,” she remarked, evenly. “Wouldn’t it be
wiser to make no fuss, but go?”
Farquhar started, passed his hand across his eyes, and looked at
her earnestly, as though her words had wakened him. “Miss Fane, I
believe I’ve been saying the most outrageous things!” he exclaimed.
“Haven’t I? I don’t know what possessed me. What have I said?”
“A little harmless nonsense, that’s all,” Dolly assured him.
“I must ask you to forgive me. To tell the truth, I’d a touch of
sunstroke out in Africa, and since then I’m not my own master at
times. I’m literally out of my wits. I don’t know what I’ve said, but
nothing was farther from my mind than any rudeness to you—to any
lady. You will believe that?”
“Perhaps. Good-bye.”
“You won’t punish me by declining to speak to me?”
“We aren’t likely to meet. Your friends don’t know me.”
“We shall meet, if you allow it. Will you?”
“Will I, now?” said Dolly. She went and threw open the door.
“Good-morning.”
Farquhar pleaded, but his words were wasted. Not a word more
would Miss Fane say, and at last he took up his hat and walked out.
When she had watched him out of sight, Dolly went bareheaded
across the lawn to a tool-shed under the trees, round which circled a
numerous company of dogs, ranging from a smart terrier up to a
huge grave brute, half bloodhound, half Great Dane, of the breed
which Virginian planters used in the good old days for tracking down
their runaway slaves. Within, Dolly found the tall young fellow whom
she had pointed out to Farquhar. He was darker than his sister, and
not so handsome, but the two were plainly slips of the same tree.
Bernard’s manners needed attention. When his sister appeared he
did not lay down his saw, which produced an ear-piercing rasping
and ratching such as denied conversation. Dolly put her hand on his
and arrested his work by force.
“Well, what did that chap Farquhar want?” asked Bernard, without
resentment.
Dolly related Farquhar’s doings at Burnt House, and the sequel.
Bernard’s comment was: “I guess he must be an ass,” and he took
up his saw to resume work, but was once more summarily stopped
by his sister. These incidents were stages in the conversation; as
people of quick wits often do when they live together, these two were
in the habit of expressing themselves by signs.
“He’s going to pay the difference himself, and not let father know,”
Dolly explained.
“Then I guess he’s only a soft. But how did you hear?”
“I called him into the parlour and asked. I asked him whether I
should succeed on the stage.”
A pause, during which Bernard framed, and discarded as useless,
a reproof. “What did he say?”
“He said I should.”
“I don’t see you can count that. I guess it wouldn’t be good
manners for him to tell you you wouldn’t.”
“He did mean it. He wasn’t particularly polite.”
“What did he do?”
“Oh, nothing actually rude. It was odd,” said Dolly, reflectively. “At
first he was—oh, Bernard, you know what I mean: turned out on a
pattern and polished, like all the other gentlemen we’ve seen. I was
rather nervous; but I meant to go through with it. Then his manner
seemed to break in half. He was almost brutal. I must say I rather
liked that; it was raw nature. And quite at the end he apologised, and
said that he’d had sunstroke in Africa. Do you think that likely to be
true?”
“I couldn’t say,” said Bernard. “I know he’s been in Africa.”
“What! out at the front? How painfully ordinary!”
“You do it very well,” said Bernard, with admiration. “That was just
like the woman in the black frills at Merton’s. You’d soon be as good
as they are. Farquhar wasn’t volunteering, though; he was up farther
north, where they get miasma.”
“Oh,” said Dolly, leaning her elbows on the bench and her chin on
her clasped hands. “Do you like him, Bernie?”
“Not if he was rude to you; though I guess swells generally are
cads, like in books.”
“He wasn’t exactly rude. He was primitive. I should say he was
very strong, and rather wicked, and subtle; not like us. We’re quite
simple, simplex, one-fold; we mean what we say and do what we
mean, you and I.”
“I should hope so,” said Bernard, who was not troubled by
uncertain ethics.
“Noel Farquhar doesn’t, then; I’m sure of it. He is very strong. He
says he is stronger than you are.”
Bernard stretched out a brawny arm. “He’s six inches shorter,
anyway. At that rate he’d have to be a Hercules to lick me.”
“I’d like you to wrestle with him. I’d like to see him thrown.”
“Hullo, Dolly!”
“And I mean to meet him again.”
“I know that isn’t the proper thing. You ought to get introduced
first.”
“I can take care of myself. He interests me.”
“You’ll be falling in love with him if you don’t look out.”
“That I never should do. But he might fall in love with me.”
“Shouldn’t think that was likely.”
“Why not? We Fanes are as good a family as any in England. And
I’m handsome: Bernard, you said I was.”
“Yes, but you aren’t like the woman in the black frills,” said
Bernard, measuring his sister by the only standard of taste he knew.
“Besides, I guess Merton’s morally sure you were out poaching last
time with me, and he and Farquhar are as thick as thieves. Girls
oughtn’t to poach.”
“There are some people who don’t class that among the seven
deadly sins, and he’s one; I know it. He has wild blood, as we have.”
“But would you marry him if he wanted you to?”
“I’m not sure. I might. He could give me what I want—experience.”
“I don’t see why you aren’t contented here,” said Bernard, bending
to his work again.
“I dare say not,” retorted Dolly, pacing the shed. “You’re
phlegmatic. You’re content with the rind of life. Bitter or sweet, I
mean to taste the core.”
“I expect, you know, you’ll come to awful grief.”
“Perhaps. But so I’ve lived my life first, I’ll not complain.”
“Well,” said Bernard, “I never saw you in heroics before, and I
guess I don’t care if I never do again.”
Then he returned to his work, and drowned Dolly’s aspirations in
the harsh duet of squeaking saw and dissentient wood.

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(eBook PDF) Globalization and Media in

the Digital Platform Age

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ISBN: 978-0-367-35146-5 (hbk)

1 Globalization in the Age of Digital Platforms? 1

2 Media History in the Age of Globalization 16

4 From Cultural Imperialism to Platform Imperialism 45

5 The Nation-State: Dead or Alive 59

6 The Business of Global Media Industries 72

7 Smartphones in the Era of Globalization 87

8 Globalization and Broadcasting 98

9 The Cultural Politics of Film 111

10 The Culture of Global Music 126

Globalization in the Era of Digital Platforms

What Is a Digital Platform?

a platform is a mediator rather than an intermediary: it shapes the performance of so-

Three Paradigms to Globalization Studies

Critical Political Economy Approach

Cultural Globalization Approach

Six Dimensions in Globalization Studies

• Does globalization bring about the weakening of state power?

• What is the direction of cultural flow?

How to Interpret Globalization: The World Is Flat vs. The World

is to redraw boundaries, to implode states and resecure parochial identities: to es-

For globalization Against globalization

Source: (See Barber, 1992).

THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND IS MAN

‘Oh, Keith of Ravelston,

Perdition is needful; beyond any doubt

MY ACTIONS ALWAYS HARMONISED

Ere he was able to let himself out, however, he was recalled.

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