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Acknowledgments
7
Introduction: The Project of
Feminist Methodology
8
particular disciplines and to stimulate ideas for alternative
approaches.
If feminist methodology is understood as investigating methods
and knowledge that generate strategies appropriate for feminist
research, we need some working definitions of feminism and
feminist research.
WHAT IS FEMINISM?
Feminism is a cluster of social ideals that continuously evolve and
change. It makes more sense to speak of multiple feminisms than
to speak of feminism simpliciter. Many alternative visions of a
feminist world exist, as do alternative histories of feminism. Some
visions are incompatible with each other and some histories find
feminist activism among people to whom the word and perhaps
the concept were unknown.
Feminism’s meanings are constantly in dispute. This is partly
because feminism is a comprehensive social ideal, like freedom,
justice, equality, and democracy, and so must always be
interpreted for specific contexts. It is also because feminism is a
politically potent term, and therefore disputes are sometimes
waged insincerely. For instance, some people may seek to
appropriate the term for their own advantage, and those who are
hostile to feminism may seek to discredit the term by caricaturing
its meaning. Although disputes about the meaning of feminism are
inevitable, they should not, in general, be deplored. Such debates
are indispensable to the health of feminism because they prevent
it from becoming a dead orthodoxy and enable it to develop as the
world changes. The continuing and often-impassioned disputes
about feminism’s meaning and history reveal the continuing
importance of feminist ideals in a world where gender remains a
primary category of social organization and a primary tool for
domination. They also indicate the vitality of the countless ongoing
struggles worldwide to end these forms of domination.
Even though feminism is a large tent, not all ideas and struggles
are appropriately lodged inside it. No definition of feminism is
uncontroversial or authoritative, but for the purposes of this book I
take feminism to be activity directed toward establishing gender
justice. What counts as gender justice also is disputed, but at a
minimum it means transforming social arrangements and systems
9
of thought that accord disproportionate honor, authority, and
power to whatever is coded culturally as masculine and that
simultaneously degrade and subordinate whatever is defined
culturally as feminine. Such arrangements and ideas typically
devalue female human beings and valorize males, although some
females may achieve honorific masculine status, at least in part,
and some males may be feminized. Because people always live
within multiple systems of social power and because cultural
constructions of sex and gender are always interwoven with other
systems of inequality based on categories such as class, caste,
religion, sexuality, and nation, feminist activism is typically
continuous, with activity directed to promoting justice on many
social dimensions related to gender.
Defining feminism as a commitment to gender justice means
that it cannot be reduced to a matter of personal ethics, choice, or
style. Instead, feminism is a commitment to social change. This is
sometimes obscured by misinterpretations of the “second wave”
U.S.-feminist slogan “the personal is political,” and by stereotypes
of feminists as preoccupied with “politically correct” conduct. “The
personal is political” was a powerful slogan expressing radical
insights. These included the insights that one’s so-called personal
life can be a site of injustice and domination whose inequities
stem from social arrangements rather than individual
personalities; that so-called personal problems therefore often
have systemic causes; and that so-called personal decisions
about matters such as sexuality, self-presentation, and eating
often have political significance. Although these insights were, in
their time, revolutionary, accepting them does not entail that
feminism can be equated with “lifestyle” choices. To the contrary,
taking seriously these insights suggests another popular slogan of
second-wave feminism: “There are no individual solutions.”
Personal choices are important, but feminism is more centrally
concerned with transforming the social contexts within which such
choices are made.
Social life is organized by institutions, structures, and practices.
Unjust social structures create systematically unequal advantages
or disadvantages for the members of different social groups. The
structures systematically restrict the life chances of individuals
who are assigned to devalued social categories, and render them
disproportionately vulnerable to violence, impoverishment, and
10
political marginalization. They also structure the options that are
socially available to individuals by assigning costs and benefits to
various choices. Feminists are especially concerned with how
people’s options are structured according to their gender. We ask
whether institutions present systematically different options to
people with varying gender, class, and racial-ethnic identities, and
whether the social costs of selecting particular options are higher
for some social groups than others. We are less interested in
individual decisions than in the ways those decisions are shaped
by structures that provide the menu of choices and set the social
prices of various options. Feminists seek a society in which all
people, whatever their social identity, have a fair range of social
options available at a reasonable personal cost.
11
contrary, women have been studied for centuries and ideas of the
feminine have long been explored in the arts and humanities,
social sciences, and even physical sciences. Rather than focusing
on material different from that pursued in traditional fields of study,
the new feminist research often focused on the same material but
interpreted it differently. These new interpretations sometimes
challenged basic assumptions in existing disciplines and made it
impossible simply to “add women and stir” to incorporate them
into established systems of disciplinary knowledge. For instance,
a focus on women’s history revealed the limits of widely accepted
ways of categorizing historical periods; a focus on women’s
psychology revealed the male bias in prevailing conceptions of
“human” psychology; a focus on women’s art and literature
revealed that standards of artistic excellence were tilted toward
masculine sensibilities.
It quickly became evident that equating feminist research with
the study of women and the symbolically feminine was mistaken
for a second reason, namely, that women and men, masculinities
and femininities, are always constructed in relation to each other.
Feminist scholars recognized that incorporating feminist insights
about women and the feminine into existing systems of knowledge
requires simultaneously reexamining prevailing understandings of
men and the masculine. Indeed, they argued, incorporating these
insights ultimately requires rethinking much that had been taken
as distinctively human but that feminist research reveals to be
overtly or covertly masculine.
Feminist research cannot be identified primarily by its objects of
study. Although it often focuses on women, women’s productions,
and the symbolically feminine, it also often addresses men and
men’s productions, the symbolically masculine, animals, and other
aspects of the nonhuman world. It cannot even be identified by its
focus on gender disparities, since these, too, may be studied from
perspectives that are not feminist. In principle, the subject matter
of feminist scholarship has no limits; anything, from anthropology
to zoology, may be studied from a feminist perspective. To date,
most feminist research has occurred in the humanities, arts, and
the social and biological sciences, but no field of study is exempt
in principle from feminist scrutiny.
Just as feminist research is not to be identified with any
particular objects of study, neither is it identical to any specific set
12
of theories, doctrines, or knowledge claims. Although feminist
research has produced a body of scholarship and
counterscholarship that often challenges prevailing views in
various disciplines, the research itself is defined by no orthodox
substantive content. For instance, it would be a mistake to identify
feminist psychology with a commitment to the relational self, or
feminist ethics with the ethics of care. Although bodies of work
that many feminist scholars regard as canonical certainly exist,
the feminist canon is multiple and undergoes continual
transformation. Many developments that the feminist scholars of
yesteryear regarded as groundbreaking are seen by today’s
feminists as naive, incomplete, biased, or downright wrong.
Feminist research cannot be equated with any specific set, or
sets, of knowledge claims or orthodoxies.
Rather than being identified in terms of either its substantive
content or its objects of study, feminist research is distinguished
by its commitment to producing knowledge useful in opposing the
many varieties of gender injustice. Feminist research pursues
knowledge that is free from gender and related biases and so
does not lend itself to rationalizing oppressive constructions of sex
and gender. Instead of being a specific body of knowledge,
feminist research is a tradition of inquiry that seeks knowledge for
emancipation.
That feminist research has social commitments does not make
it unique; most research traditions are motivated by larger social
purposes, and their products are rarely if ever value-free.
However, feminist inquiry is unusual in being explicit about its
ethical and political stance, which motivates feminists to seek out
and challenge the social biases often lurking unnoticed in existing
knowledge claims. In the end, the tradition of feminist research is
uniquely distinguished by its dedication to promoting gender
justice both in knowledge and in the social world. This dedication
carries with it a commitment to opposing all those other injustices
that are inseparable from gender divisions.
The social commitments of feminist inquiry are manifested both
critically and constructively. Feminist research often confronts
scholarship that accepts the domination of the culturally masculine
over the culturally feminine and so rationalizes some men’s
dominance over other men and most women. It challenges
asymmetric and inequitable constructions of masculinities and
13
femininities. These are systematically related and gendered sets
of norms and symbols that are always interwoven with other
oppressive constructions, such as class, ethnicity, and nation.
These complex constructions rationalize unequal and exploitative
divisions of labor by assigning different tasks and values to
individuals categorized as biologically male and female, as well as
to those categorized as racially, religiously, or otherwise superior
and inferior. Feminist researchers seek to rethink the related ways
in which the symbolically masculine is overvalued and the
symbolically feminine is undervalued in specific cultures and
contexts, and they pursue new knowledge likely to be valuable in
the quest for gender equity. At its heart, therefore, feminist
research is a socially engaged tradition of intellectual work; it is
scholarship that seeks epistemic truth and social justice. Feminist
methodology is itself one type of feminist research.
14
work is not explicitly attacked, it is often disregarded or
marginalized in mainstream academic disciplines, and
independent institutional bases of feminist scholarship are still
necessary. These institutions have now demonstrated their
distinctive importance as bases for new interdisciplinary work that
transcends the boundaries of older disciplines.
Many erstwhile “women’s studies” programs now include the
word “gender” in their names and a very few proclaim themselves
to be programs in feminist studies—a courageous move in today’s
political climate. Much feminist research emerges from these and
related programs, such as ethnic studies and sexuality studies,
but small groups of feminist scholars are also active in older
disciplines. Some feminist research is still done by activists, and
other research is done under the auspices of the United Nations,
by non-governmental organizations such as Oxfam, and in think
tanks such as the Institute for Women’s Policy Research and the
Women’s Research and Education Institute.
15
are compatible with feminist ethical/political principles, but in
addition, and as we shall see later, many feminist scholars have
argued that trustworthiness is likely to be increased when inquiry
is motivated by emancipatory aims and utilizes methods that are
just. Thus, epistemic truth and social justice often advance each
other.
Good intentions on the part of researchers do not guarantee the
worth of any particular research, even if the researchers proclaim
themselves feminist. In any field of endeavor, gaps may exist
between intention and execution. In practice, research proclaimed
as feminist may sometimes incorporate dominant social values,
rely on inadequate evidence, draw flawed inferences, or violate
feminist ethical principles. The best feminist research comes as
close as possible to meeting its sociopolitical, epistemic, and
ethical commitments, but success is always a matter of degree.
16
provide detailed instruction on employing the specific methods to
acquire knowledge in various disciplines, as noted earlier.
Readers whose work is based in one discipline may sometimes
feel at a loss when reading about research methods in other
disciplines. However, juxtaposing research in a range of
disciplines often reveals striking parallels and themes that
continue across several disciplines. Learning to recognize these
may illuminate work in one’s own discipline.
Several themes weave through many of the readings and all
sections of this book. One theme that emerges and is suggested
by the title of the book is the complex interrelationship between
social power and inequality on one hand, and the production of
knowledge on the other. Many readings illustrate how the
production of knowledge in many disciplines has been shaped by
inegalitarian assumptions and agendas and how the knowledge
produced has been used to rationalize, reinforce, normalize, and
naturalize social inequalities.
A second and related theme is the inseparability of research
projects and methods from social and ethical values. Since no
research can be value-free, readings expose the social and
ethical values that have been incorporated into past research
projects at various levels. They encourage researchers to be
aware of the value commitments that inevitably inform their
projects, and help them reflect on how these commitments can be
maintained at all levels of their research processes.
17
marginalized groups). The methods have also often been used in
violation of feminist ethical principles.
REFERENCES
Harding, Sandra, ed. 1987. Feminism and Methodology. Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
18
Jaggar, Alison M. 2007. “Teaching in Colorado: Not a Rocky Mountain High—
Academic Freedom in a Climate of Repression.” Teaching Philosophy 30, no.
2 (June):149–172.
19
Part I
FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF
METHODOLOGY
20
1
The Humanities
The humanities are a cluster of disciplines dedicated to studying
the human condition and the meanings of human life. In an
influential 1959 lecture and subsequent book, The Two Cultures,
British scientist and novelist C. P. Snow drew a sharp contrast
between the humanities and the sciences based on their
respective methodologies. He contended that the humanities and
the sciences comprised two distinct cultures in modern society
and that the breakdown of communication between them was a
major obstacle to solving the problems of the world. Snow’s work
was widely read and discussed in Great Britain and North
America, where the expression “two cultures” became popular
shorthand for the supposed contrasts between two
methodological approaches to understanding the world. Scientific
methods were understood as designed to screen out the influence
of emotion and value; they were seen as quantitative, precise,
systematic, and reliant on observations that could be replicated by
any properly situated observer. They produced knowledge
regarded as objective in the sense of invariant across time and
culture. By contrast, the knowledge produced in the humanities
was seen as expressing the distinctive insight and vision of a
unique human consciousness, and the methods of the humanities
were recognized as purposely utilizing emotion and value.
Although the knowledge produced in the humanities is often
valued for its universal meaning, it is infused simultaneously with
the subjectivity of specific individuals and with the values of
specific times and places.
These widely accepted accounts of the contrasts between
methodology in the humanities, on the one hand, and the
sciences, on the other, are embodied in the administrative
structure of contemporary knowledge-producing institutions and
funding agencies. Today, humanities disciplines include
philosophy, the classics, literature, literary criticism, comparative
literature, art, art history, art criticism, art theory, music, and
21
musicology. Cultural and area studies of regional interdisciplinary
fields such as American Studies, East Asian Studies, and Middle
Eastern Studies are also often categorized as humanities
disciplines, although they include methods characteristic of the
social sciences. Another borderline discipline is history,
traditionally regarded as central to the humanities but moving
increasingly in the direction of social science. It should also be
noted that several disciplines categorized administratively as
social sciences, such as cultural anthropology, sociology, political
science, archaeology, and parts of economics, in fact often include
qualitative descriptions and analyses of the types regarded as
characteristic of the humanities.
Administrative distinctions among disciplines do not reflect
natural divisions among kinds of knowledge; instead, they are
historically and culturally contingent artifacts, which inevitably
incorporate a degree of arbitrariness and stereotyping. One theme
running through this book is that the supposed contrasts between
methodologies in the sciences and the humanities are often
overdrawn; in particular, that the methods used in the social
sciences include more humanistic and evaluative elements than is
commonly supposed. However, the present chapter includes
methodological reflections from disciplines of philosophy, history,
and literature, generally categorized as humanities. These
disciplines are quite diverse but reflection on their methods
reveals some parallels across the disciplines as they have
evolved over the past four decades in response to feminist
challenges.
22
proving themselves through distinctively masculine adventures; if
women in literature had adventures, the critics noted, they were
typically sexual adventures. Feminist philosophers pointed out
that Western philosophy imagined the ideal human as male; the
ideal knower was a man of reason; the ideal citizen was a male
property-owning warrior. If philosophers discussed women as
knowers, it was generally to derogate their reasoning capacities
by portraying them as emotional and intuitive; if they noticed
women’s work, which made possible the leisure and wealth of the
ideal male citizen, they represented it as closer to nature than
men’s and less than fully human.
Feminists responded to these exclusions by revising the
humanities to include women and the culturally feminine. Feminist
critics began to focus on portrayals of women and gender in
literature and also to study the work of women writers. Feminist
philosophers began to challenge philosophical construction of the
feminine as inferior to the masculine and to recuperate the work of
long-forgotten women philosophers. A few women had always
been present in traditional histories, mostly warriors and queens
(or warrior queens) such as Joan of Arc, Catherine the Great,
Cleopatra, and Boadicea; however, feminist historians began to
focus also on more ordinary women in those spheres of life
culturally defined as feminine. They supplemented diplomatic and
military histories with social and family histories.
Feminist work in the humanities was conceived originally as a
project of inclusion and balance. Its values were those of equality
and androgyny, and it insisted that women were as fully human as
men, including being as capable of participating in humanities
scholarship. However, the feminist project of expanding the
humanities canon provoked queries about why male-dominant
ideals of humanity had been presented and accepted for so long.
Could it be because most artists and humanities scholars had
been male, producing art and knowledge for overwhelmingly
masculine audiences? Methodological questions began to be
raised about the “male gaze” of artists and audiences and about
what it might mean to “read as a woman.” Philosopher Janice
Moulton argues that philosophy’s dominant method, the adversary
paradigm, reflects values that are culturally masculine; she points
out some limitations of this method, which facilitates silencing
people with less social power and confidence, including many
23
women. Feminist concerns about exclusion developed into
concerns about bias and misrepresentation.
GYNOCENTRIC METHODOLOGY
Feminist scholars of the 1970s and early 1980s quickly
discovered that expanding the canon required more than simply
inserting materials dealing with or authored by women. In an
often-quoted phrase, feminist scholarship is not just a matter of
adding women and stirring. As Joan Kelly-Gadol points out,
women’s lives cannot always be understood through categories
developed to make sense of men’s lives; for instance, periods
traditionally categorized as times of progress in Western history
were often times when the status of women declined. Declaring
that women are fully human means more than insisting that
women are capable of performing men’s activities and living up to
male standards; this simply pushes women into a masculine mold.
Some argued that the male-biased ideals that have pervaded the
Western humanities must be challenged and supplemented or
even replaced by more gynocentric ideals.
Gynocentric feminist scholarship sought to transfer women from
the margins to the center of the humanities. Its methodology
called for rebuilding the humanities from women’s perspective.
The new canon would be informed not only by feminist critiques of
androcentrism but also by distinctively feminine perspectives,
methods, and values. Thus, in the 1980s the ethics of care was
promoted as a distinctively feminine way of doing ethics. A classic
example of the gynocentric approach is artist Judy Chicago’s
heroic-scale installation, The Dinner Party, which features an
enormous triangular table set for thirty-nine women. The
installation utilizes media that are culturally associated with the
feminine, porcelain plates and intricate textiles, and each plate
features an image based on the butterfly, symbolizing the central
core of a vagina.
Gynocentric feminist methodology was also known as
“difference feminism.” It recognized that gender differences are
also inequalities, so that men and whatever is categorized as
masculine receive disproportionate honor, authority, and power,
and women and whatever is culturally defined as feminine are
degraded and subordinated. Gynocentric feminist methodology
24
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Yale Literary
Magazine (Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 8, May 1923)
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.
Author: Various
Language: English
The
Yale Literary Magazine
Conducted by the
Students of Yale University.
May, 1923.
New Haven: Published by the Editors.
Printed at the Van Dyck Press, 121-123 Olive St., New Haven.
ESTABLISHED 1818
Contents
MAY, 1923
EDITORS
BUSINESS MANAGERS
It has been usual, in the past, for Editors of The Yale Literary
Magazine to express themselves as strongly opposed to something,
when engaged in writing a leader. Two recent leaders have varied
this procedure to the extent of declaring the opposition of their
authors to opposition, but the principle of being opposed to
something remains. At the present moment, it occurs to us that it
might be interesting to suppose correct a few of the pessimistic
opinions held by that rather noisy group whom we shall call The
Troubled Spirits. On the basis of these suppositions, we shall then
try to show that, bad as things are, there still remain a few bright
spots lurking in unsuspected corners of the very evils whose
existence we are admitting, for the sake of argument.
A convenient starting point may perhaps be found in the
Compulsory Sunday Chapel question. It can be urged that the two
services now provided prevent anyone from claiming that he is
forced to listen to propaganda in the form of a sermon, on Sunday.
But The Troubled Spirits, whose positions we are now admitting,
regard the matter differently. If we are correctly informed, they
consider it a fact, however unpleasant, that the average Yale student
feels a very real, if unofficial, compulsion to attend whichever
Sunday service is held at a later hour than the other. The Troubled
Spirits defy the University to hold the short service at eleven o’clock,
and the long one at ten—believing that their position would be more
than vindicated by the lack of attendance at the earlier service. In
short, so far as The Troubled Spirits are concerned, Sunday service
is at eleven o’clock, and contains a sermon varying in length from
twenty minutes to half an hour.
But after allowing all that, and allowing, too, that the visiting
clergymen are attempting to foist opinions of their own upon the
undergraduate body, there is still something to be said. In the first
place, we imagine that The Troubled Spirits, on leaving college, will
perform their undoubted duty of attacking Christianity with every
resource in their power. Hence, were we in their place, we should
ask nothing better than to have all the foremost of our enemies
brought before us, at great expense, and exposed in such a manner
that we could most easily detect the flaws in their armor, which we
were later to pierce.
Secondly, there will be certain of The Troubled Spirits whose ardor
will evaporate on leaving college, and who will allow the public
opinion of their friends and relatives to force them to church again
every Sunday. To these we should like to say that observations upon
the sermons of more than one pitifully underpaid clergyman have
convinced us, from The Troubled Spirits’ point of view, that in this
respect “the worst is yet to come”. However stupid and unthinking
The Troubled Spirits may find the highly cultured, and in many cases
highly paid, gentlemen who speak at Yale, they will find the less
highly paid, and not infrequently less cultured, type of man to whom
they are destined, infinitely more stupid, and perhaps positively
unpalatable. The flowers of rhetoric, when blended skillfully into a
delicately fragrant and perfumed discourse, are, indeed, far more
expensive than a bouquet of orchids—few of us will ever be able to
afford them again. And so, after a lapse of years, I can imagine an
old and embittered Troubled Spirit attempting a Drydonian
paraphrase to this effect:—
ARTHUR MILLIKEN.
The Bells of Antwerp
Why do you call to me,
Bells of the centuries, mellowed with yearning and joy o’er the
ages?
What is your secret that charms each new listener back to life’s
pages
Men scrawled out in blood and carousel, love and the brine of
the north wind?
...
...
MORRIS TYLER.
Rhapsody