1. G.R. No.

245469, December 09, 2020 ]

Heirs of Fedelina Sestoso Estella, represented by Virgilia Estella Poliquit, et al. vs. Jesus Marlo O. Estella,
et al.

Doctrine:

The Supreme Court reinforced the doctrine distinguishing between donations inter vivos and mortis
causa, emphasizing that the nature of the donation determines the applicable formalities for its validity.
Additionally, it reaffirmed the principle protecting the legitime of compulsory heirs, stating that any
disposition that impairs or diminishes the legitime shall be reduced insofar as it is inofficious.

Facts:

The legal dispute involves the questioning of the validity of a deed titled “Donacion Mortis Causa Kon
Hatag Nga Pagabalihon Sa Akong Kamatayon” executed by Julian Sestoso in favor of his grandson
Lamberto S. Estella, concerning three parcels of land in Cebu, Philippines. Petitioners, children of
Fedelina Sestoso Estella (Julian’s deceased daughter), sought the nullification of the deed, claiming it to
be fraudulent and prejudicial to their legitime as Julian’s heirs. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially
favored the petitioners, declaring the deed void for failing to comply with formal requirements for a
valid will.

However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, interpreting the deed as a donation
inter vivos and thus not subject to the formalities of a will. The case escalated to the Supreme Court,
challenging the nature of the donation and its impact on the compulsory heirs’ legitime.

Issues:

1. Whether the “Donacion Mortis Causa Kon Hatag Nga Pagabalihon Sa Akong Kamatayon” constitutes a
donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos.

2. Whether the donation is inofficious, hence prejudicing the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. It delineated that the deed in contention is a donation
mortis causa that substantially complied with the formal requirements prescribed by law for valid wills.

However, the Court found the donation inofficious as it impaired the legitime of Julian Sestoso’s
compulsory heirs. Consequently, the Supreme Court ordered the reconveyance of seven-eighths of the
one-half portion of the disputed land (or 7/16 of the entire property) back to the petitioners, the
children of Fedelina Sestoso Estella, thereby upholding the protection of legitime under Philippine law.

Class Notes:

– **Key Concepts**: Donation Mortis Causa, Donation Inter Vivos, Legitime, Inofficious Donation,
Testamentary Formalities.

– **Relevant Statutes**: Articles 805, 806 (Civil Code, formal requirements for wills); Articles 886, 887,
888 (Civil Code, defining legitime and compulsory heirs).

– **Application**: This case illustrates the critical distinctions between types of donations and their
implications on the inheritance rights of compulsory heirs. It underscores the inviolability of the legitime
in Philippine succession law, demonstrating that donations, even those completed under the guise of
mortis causa, must not detrimentally affect the compulsory heirs’ entitlements.

Historical Background:

This case provides insight into the complex arena of Philippine succession law, touching upon deeply
rooted principles of family rights and inheritance. By scrutinizing the nature of a contested donation and
adjudicating based on the protection of compulsory heirs’ legitimes, the decision mirrors the Philippine
legal system’s commitment to fairness and equity in familial relations and inheritance matters.

2. G.R. No. L-26270. October 30, 1969

Bonifacia Mateo, et al, v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.

Facts

Cipriano Lagua and his wife donated two parcels of land to their son Alejandro Lagua as a gift upon his
marriage to Bonifacia Mateo.

The couple took possession of the land after their marriage in 1917, although the title remained in
Cipriano's name. Alejandro passed away in 1923, and Cipriano began farming the land, initially giving
Bonifacia her share of the harvest. However, in 1926, Cipriano stopped providing her share and later
sold the land to his younger son, Gervasio Lagua.

Bonifacia and her daughter Anatalia filed a lawsuit to annul the deed of sale to Gervasio and recover
possession of the properties. The trial court declared the sale to Gervasio void and dismissed his
counterclaims.

The Court of Appeals later ordered a partial reconveyance of the land to Gervasio, declaring the
donation to Alejandro inofficious (exceeding the share allowed by law) and reducing it.

Issue

The primary issue was whether the donation propter nuptias (due to marriage) made by Cipriano Lagua
to his son Alejandro was inofficious and, therefore, subject to reduction to preserve the legitime of the
forced heir, Gervasio Lagua.

Ruling

YES. The Supreme Court held that donations propter nuptias, being acts of liberality, could be reduced if
they infringed upon the legitime of a compulsory heir.

Before reducing such a donation, the net estate of the deceased must be determined, including all debts
and charges, and the value of all donations subject to collation. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming
that the only properties left by Cipriano were the donated lots and in failing to consider the value of the
properties.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the reduction of the donation was set aside, and the case
was remanded for proper proceedings to determine the inofficiousness of the donation accurately.

Key Legal Principles

Donations Propter Nuptias: These are donations made in consideration of marriage. They are subject to
reduction if they infringe upon the legitime of compulsory heirs.

Inofficious Donations: A donation is inofficious if it exceeds the disposable portion of the donor's estate
and encroaches upon the legitime of forced heirs.
Collation: The process of adding the value of donations to the net estate to determine the total estate
value and compute the legitimes.

3. G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013

Maria Mendoza, et al. vs. Julia Policarpio delos Santos, substituted by her heirs, Carmen P. delos Santos,
et al.

Background: Exequiel Policarpio owned several properties, which he gratuitously transferred to his
daughter Gregoria Policarpio. Gregoria, who was childless and unmarried, inherited these properties
and later passed away.

Inheritance: After Gregoria's death, her mother, Julia Policarpio delos Santos, inherited these properties
as Gregoria’s nearest kin.

Dispute: Maria Mendoza and other petitioners, who are Gregoria’s first cousins, claimed that they
should inherit the properties based on the reserva troncal doctrine. They argued that since the
properties were originally from Exequiel and gratuitously acquired by Gregoria, they should revert to
relatives within the third degree of Exequiel upon Gregoria's death.

Court of Appeals Decision: The appellate court ruled that the properties were indeed subject to reserva
troncal, but it dismissed the petitioners’ claims as they were fourth-degree relatives, while the reserva
troncal doctrine only benefits relatives within the third degree.

Supreme Court Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It recognized
that the properties were reservable under reserva troncal but confirmed that the petitioners, being first
cousins and therefore fourth-degree relatives, could not claim the reserved properties. The Court held
that reserva troncal applies strictly to relatives within the third degree of the descendant who acquired
the property by gratuitous title from an ascendant.

Legal Principles: The ruling emphasized the importance of determining the degree of relationship when
applying reserva troncal. It underscored that only those within the third degree are entitled to benefit
from such reserved properties.
Facts:

In the case of Maria Mendoza, et al. vs. Julia Policarpio delos Santos, the central issue involved a dispute
over property inheritance. The case focused on the application of the reserva troncal doctrine, which
pertains to the reservation of properties acquired by gratuitous title within the family line.

Issue:

The main issue was whether the properties inherited by Gregoria from Exequiel should be reserved for
Gregoria's relatives within the third degree, as required by Article 891 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which deals with reserva troncal.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the properties in question were indeed subject to reserva troncal.
However, it clarified that the petitioners, who were Gregoria's first cousins, could not benefit from this
reservation. This is because first cousins are considered fourth-degree relatives, while reserva troncal
only applies to relatives within the third degree. The Court explained that the law grants this reservation
right exclusively to relatives within the third degree of the person from whom the property originally
came.

Relevant Details:

Ascendant or Brother/Sister: The person from whom the property was originally acquired by the
descendant (Gregoria received the property from Exequiel).

Descendant (Prepositus): The person who received the property by gratuitous title (Gregoria).

Reservor: The other ascendant who acquires the property by operation of law (Julia in this case).

Reservee: The relatives within the third degree from the prepositus, who should benefit from the
reservation.

Key Points:

The reserva troncal doctrine mandates that property acquired gratuitously must be reserved for
relatives within the third degree of the descendant/prepositus.

In this case, while the properties were correctly deemed reservable, the petitioners, being fourth-degree
relatives (first cousins), could not claim the reservation.

Only relatives within the third degree, such as siblings or nephews/nieces, have a right to the reserved
property under reserva troncal
4. G.R. No. L-34395. May 19, 1981

Beatriz l. Gonzalez v. Court of First Instance of Manila (branch v), et al.

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. CFI OF MANILA, et al., Respondents

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were
represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races. Mrs.
Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena
Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose
(sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probate was
affirmed by the CA.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be
inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration
that the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz.

Issue: whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.

Held:

In reserva troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant
or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by
him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said
property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant
(prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an
ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of
law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3)
a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant .

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or
prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who
obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who
is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by

affinity are excluded. Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient
gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession.

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve
and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came.
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. She was
a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives
within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did
not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

5. G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006 ]

Dy Yieng Seangio,et al, vs. Hon. Amor A. Reyes, et al.

Dy Yieng Seangio,et al, vs. Hon. Reyes, et al.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006

Doctrines:

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified; Maltreatment of a parent by a child
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of the latter.

It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession; Holographic wills,
being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, should be construed more liberally than
the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator.

A holographic will must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself—it is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Facts:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo
executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.

In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay
ng maiwanag na pagiisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana
ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya
ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim
siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya
at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng
babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at
stockholders ng China Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center
of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat
at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi.

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code.

According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted
as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the disinheritance is valid.

(2) Whether the holographic will is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The disinheritance is valid. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that
the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court
believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(6)Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;

(2) Yes. The will is valid. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.

In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules
of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention
of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated
in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator.

In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance
with law in the form of a holographic will.

6. G.R. No. 7890, September 29, 1914

Filomena Pecson vs. Rosario Mediavillo

FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et al.,

plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. 7890. September 29, 1914. EN BANC. JOHNSON, J.

The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly
fixed by law. . If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil
Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has
been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the
causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by
express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the
reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person
deny it."

FACTS

Sometime prior September 17, 1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to
the CFI of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the
legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Hon. Moir, judge, found that the will
had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition.

Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion alleging that;

1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa
Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is
and the second was a grandchild of the latter.

2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the
testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect
and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the
derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which show suffers in
periodical attacks. Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited his granddaughter Rosario Mediavillo from his
deceased daughter, Teresa, because Rosario was grossly disrespectful to him and because on one
occasion, she raised her hand against him.

During the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had
eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa
Pecson; that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in question. The
will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision in the will for the said
Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs in said will. It appears that Teresa had been
married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the will in question she
died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, as her heirs. It
also appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs of the
said Teresa Pecson, her husband, Basilio Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin
Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the will in question was
made.

The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosariobecame insane in 1895, when she went
to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she
disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14 years old, and shortly
afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited
by her grandfather. The lower court therefore decrees that the part of the will is contrary to law and
sets it aside as being of no force or value whatever.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the
disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. (YES)

2. Whether or not the courts erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin
Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of the one seventh of this estate pertaining to
Joaquin Mediavillo. (YES)

RULING

1. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756
and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in which
the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the
disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or
causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes
mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the
disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to
inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be
supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the
truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the
disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the
truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The
right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause

is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:

Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted,
should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.

It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a
disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance was
without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however,
to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to show
that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It appears from the
record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from
a young man — that she had received a letter from him — and that her grandfather,

Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man;
that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her
grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that
very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them,
except for very brief periods, up to the present time.

The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter
lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible for
the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.

As for the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa Pecson, the mother of Rosario
Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her husband Basiliso
Mediavillo, and that said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave onehalf of the
inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that would have gone to
Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso
Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court we think error was committed. Theappellant relies
upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his contention that the lower

court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:

The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the whole or half blood.

The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and 936 of the Civil
Code. Article 935 provides that:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from
him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

Article 936 provides that:

The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If one of them only survive, he or she
shall succeed to the son's entire estate.

It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment
of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there
were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or
mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a
descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the lower
court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the
estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.

7. G.R. No. 207407****, September 29, 2021 ]

Raquel Estipona, et al. vs. Estate of Anacleto Aquino, et al.

TOPIC: When the property bequeathed or devised has been pledged or mortgaged

DOCTRINES

GR: The estate is obliged to pay the debt.

XPN: If the testator provides otherwise.

However, any other charge such as easements and usufruct, with which the thing bequeathed is
burdened, shall be respected by the legatee or devisee.

FACTS

Decedent Anacleto Aquino died leaving a last will and testament. A certain Victor L. Espinosa, as
petitioner, filed a petition for the probate of the decedent's will with the RTC. The probate court
approved the decedent's Huling Habilin at Pagpapasya.
Raquel Estipona and Spouses Alberto Co and Lulu Co filed with the probate court their Claims against
the Estate of Anacleto Aquino with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They alleged therein that
before his death, Anacleto Aquino obtained two (2) loans: one from claimants Spouses Rafael and
Raquel Estipona in the amount of P300,000.00 and another from Spouses Jessie and Roselyn Cacanando
also in the amount of P300,000.00 which he used to pay his loan with the Rodriguez Rural Bank, Inc. in
the amount of P500,000.00. As security for the two loans, Anacleto Aquino executed a REM in favor of
Spouses Rafael and Raquel Estipona and Spouses Jessie and Roselyn Cacanando covering Apartment
Unit No. 632.

The probate court approved the will of Anacleto which ordered that the estate, real and personal
property of the testator, be distributed in accordance with the will. In the will, the three-door
apartment, which includes the two apartment units that are the subject matter of the claims of
petitioners, was devised to Anacleto's four grandchildren: Jessica E. Jose, John Benedict E. Jose, Albert
John Espinosa and Francis John Espinosa.

ISSUE

Whether or not the P600,000 loan of decedent Anacleto secured by the REM as a money claim may be
filed against his estate.

RULING

YES. The P600,000 loan of decedent Anacleto secured by the REM as a money claim may be filed against
his estate because such loan, which decedent Anacleto Aquino obtained from spouses Rafael and
Raquel Estipona and spouses Jessie J. and Roselyn Cacanando and secured by the REM, the payments
made in relation to unit 632 in the name of decedent Anacleto Aquino by Raquel Estipona, and the
payments made by spouses Rafael and Raquel Estipona in relation to unit 632A are recognized as claims
for money against the testate estate of Anacleto Aquino under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Under Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due not due or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be
set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has
against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and
mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor
of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as
though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims
not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.

Under Rule 87 of the Rules, a "money claim" is any claim for money or debt or interest thereon. As used
in some statutes relating to the allowance and payment of claims against a decedent's estate, the term
"claims" include every species of liability which an executor or administrator can be called on to pay or
provide for payment out of the general fund of the estate or refer to such debts or demands against the
decedent as might have been enforced against him/her in his/her lifetime by personal actions for the
recovery of money, and on which only a money judgment could have been rendered.

The loan secured by the REM is clearly a money claim against Anacleto's estate. According to the REM,
Anacleto, the mortgagor, received P600,000.00 from the mortgagees and was given a one-year period
from the signing of the REM renewable for the same period of time, to pay the said loan.

Apparently, of the P600,000.00 borrowed by Anacleto, P300,000.00 came from spouses Estipona and
the other P300,000.00 came from spouses Cacanando. Since there are two creditors, the loan of
Anacleto to the mortgagees is a joint obligation and is divided into two equal shares as there are two
creditors who lent equal amounts with each debt or credit being distinct from one another.

While there may be a genuine issue on the validity and enforceability of the sale in favor of Raquel over
unit 632, the credit of P300,000.00 in favor of spouses Estipona should still be reflected as a "money
claim" against Anacleto's estate but subject to the resolution of the ownership issue. The credit of
P300,000.00 in favor of spouses Cacanando should likewise remain as a "money claim" against
Anacleto's estate.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent's estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and distribute the residue.

To avoid the money claims of petitioners herein from being barred forever pursuant to Rule 86, they
should be allowed to be filed against the estate of Anacleto.

Since unit 632 has been devised in Anacleto's will, the probate court is minded that the applicable
provision is Article 934 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise something pledged or mortgaged to secure a
recoverable debt before the execution of the will, the estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the
contrary intention appears.

The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or mortgaged after the execution of the will.

Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which the thing bequeathed is burdened, passes with it
to the legatee or devisee.
Since Anacleto devised in his will unit 632, which had been mortgaged prior to the execution of his will,
his estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless a contrary intention appears.

8. G.R. No. L-2920 January 23, 1951

In the Testate Estate of Don Isidro Aragon, deceased.

Josefa a. vda. de claudio, et al. vs. crisanto aragon,

Facts:

• The case involves the Testate Estate of Don Isidro Aragon.

• Isidro Aragon left a will that included certain legacies in favor of Josefa Aragon Vda. de Claudio,
Ramon Diokno, and Menandro Quiogue.

• Instead of probating the will, the heirs executed a document agreeing to distribute the
properties of the deceased among themselves according to the terms of the will.

• The soap factory, burdened with the payment of the legacies, was supposed to be sold at a price
of not less than P116,500.

• However, the property was not sold, and the legacies remained unpaid.

• The legatees filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Manila, requesting that the rentals
earned by the property be deposited with the court to pay the legacies and that a writ of execution be
issued to pay the balance of the legacies against the factory of soap.

• The court ordered the legatees to submit a petition for the probate of the will instead of
granting their motion.

• The will was subsequently admitted to probate and Crisanto Aragon was appointed as the
administrator of the estate.

• The legatees then moved for the sale of the property at public auction to pay the legacies.

• The administrator requested to sell the property at the best obtainable price, as agreed upon by
the heirs.

• The court granted the administrator four months to sell the property, with the understanding
that if it remained unsold, it would be sold at public auction.

• The administrator later requested an additional three months to sell the property, which was
granted by the court.

• The legatees objected to the extension and insisted on the sale of the property at public auction.

• The court denied their request and granted the administrator's motion to reduce the legacies in
proportion to the price at which the property may be sold.
• The legatees filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the court.

Issue:

Whether the court has the power and authority to reduce the legacies under the law.

Held:

• No. The lower court erred in ordering the reduction of the legacies in the light of the facts
obtained in this case.

• The legacies do not impair the legitime of the forced heirs and, therefore, cannot be validly
reduced.

• The legitime of the forced heirs consists of two-thirds of the estate, and the testator cannot
deprive them of this legitime except in cases specifically determined by law.

• All testamentary dispositions are deemed valid if they do not exceed the one-third free disposal
reserved by law to the testator.

• From the foregoing it should be noted that the testator burdens the factory of soap, with the
land, equipment and furniture belonging thereto, with the payment of the legacies and directs that it be
sold, to pay the legacies, at a price of not less than P116.500. This is the only pertinent provision on this
matter. The testator does not say that if the property is not sold at that price, the legacies will be
reduced accordingly.

He merely directs that the legacies be paid from the proceeds of the sale, including all the expenses
incident to the probate of the will, and that the balance be divided among the heirs. The mere fact that
the testator has fixed the price at which the property will be sold, is not indicative of an intention to
reduce the legacies if the property is sold at a lesser price.

It is merely a statement of his desire to have the property sold at such price in the hope of obtaining
greater profit for the benefit of the heirs. It cannot be presumed that the testator wanted to have that
price serve as the basis for the payment of the legacies considering the fact that he must be presumed
to know that material values are fluctuating in nature.

This is a contingency which he is presumed to have in mind when he decided to make the legacies. If
notwithstanding his knowledge of this contingency, that is, his knowledge that the price may go down,
he did not impose any condition nor limitation on the amount of the legacies to be paid, it must be
because of his desire that they be paid in full even if the property charged with their payment be sold at
a lesser price. A different interpretation would be capricious and arbitrary.
No other interpretation is warranted in the absence of a clear proof to the contrary. This interpretation
is fair and is in line with the rule laid down in Art. 675 of the Civil Code.

9. G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

Morente vs. dela Santa

ELENA MORENTE, Petitioners, -versus - GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-3891, EN BANC, December 19, 1907, WILLARD, J.

There being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we
cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. The Court held that the legacy
contained in the will therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case arose under article 797
of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but we think that it may be argued
from what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such
condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.

FACTS:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de
la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone;

should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by
me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother
Vicente or his children should he have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is
one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix.

Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the
will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she
alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-
mentioned be annulled.
The objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner.
The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper and from that holding the husband did
not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena Morente, appealed.

In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, as we understand it,
that the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that
at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof
could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the court below is not
accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all
rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the
husband since the death of the testatrix.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legacy of dela Santa may be forfeited.

RULING: NO. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made
conditional and Article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be
validly imposed upon the widow or widower.

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters.

It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building.

It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again.

To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the
legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the
testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the
property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall
incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the
property contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed.

It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother
of the testatrix.

We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we
cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit
the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in
reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of
the will. The Court held that the legacy contained in the will therein mentioned was not conditional. It is
true that case arose under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this
case, but we think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a
testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the
will.

10. G.R. No. 42737. August 11, 1936.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. PEDRO AGUAS, ET AL.

1. "RESERVA TRONCAL" ; KIND OF RELATIONSHIP REFERRED TO IN THIS RESERVATIONS. — Court

decisions as well as the unanimous opinion of commentators interpret article 811 of the Civil Code in the
sense that the reservation referred to therein concerns only legitimate relationship and, therefore,
excludes illegitimate relationship.

2. ID.; ID. — When the Civil Code speaks of ascendants, descendants and relatives, without specifying
whether they are legitimate or natural, it should be understood as referring to legitimate ones, because
to the Code the general rule is the legitimate relationship and the natural or illegitimate relationship is
the exception.

3. ID.; RESERVABLE CHARACTER OF A PROPERTY; RESOLUTORY CONDITION OF THE RESERVOR’S RIGHT

OF OWNERSHIP. — The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant
reservor’s right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor’s death
there are relatives having the status provided in article 811, the property passes, in accordance with this
special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question, not
being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the
property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of succession.

FACTS:

This appeal was taken by Teodoro Santos, Amado L. Santos, Mercedes Santos and Bartola Santos from
an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in cadastral case No. 4, G. L. R, O. Cadastral Record
No. 127, ordering the cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 4811 of the deceased Lucina Guesa
to the land designated as lot No. 2450-B of the cadastral case in question, and the issuance of another
certificate in favor of the appellee Cayetano Guesa. The appellants' petition, which was denied by the
court, sought the issuance of the new certificate in their name, alleging that they were the ones favored
by the reservation to which the land described in said certificate of title was subject.
The land in question had belong to Isidro Santos. He donated it to Tomas Santos upon whose death,
which took place on April 29, 1927, the property was inherited by the latter's legitimate son, Romeo
Santos. Upon the death of Romeo Santos on April 23, 1928, it passed to his legitimate mother Lucina
Guesa to whom transfer certificate of title No. 4811

was issued with the notation that the property was subject to the provisions of a

rticle 811 of the Civil Code.

Lucina Guesa died on April 14, 1933, and was succeeded by her legitimate father Cayetano Guesa as sole
heir.

Tomas Santos was an adulterous son, and the appellants and petitioners are the legitimate children of
Isidro Santos. Therefore, the appellants are not legitimate relatives of Romeo Santos, although, with
relation to him, they are within the third degree and belong to the same line.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reservation established by article 811 of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant
reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives within said
degree and belonging to the line above- mentioned, without distinction between legitimate, natural and
illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children.

RULING:

NO. The provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relatives. Is every ascendant,
whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the
properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it
speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the
same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the
legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner
shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they
refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the
legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, — and as we
will see also article 812, — continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and
children in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the
parents, other descendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the
place which article 811 occupies in the Code is proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if
there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of articles 938, which states that the
provision of article 811 applies to intestate succession which is just established in favor of the legitimate
direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural
parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not
allude directly or

indirectly to that provision.