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Extreme Wildfire Events
and Disasters
Root Causes and New Management
Strategies

Edited by

Fantina Tedim
Faculty of Arts, University of Porto, Porto,
Portugal; Charles Darwin University, Darwin,
Australia

Vittorio Leone
Faculty of Agriculture, University of Basilicata
(retired), Potenza, Italy

Tara K. McGee
Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences,
University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada
Elsevier
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Contributors

Miguel Almeida Forest Fire Research Centre of ADAI, University of Coimbra,

Coimbra, Portugal
Malik Amraoui Centre for the Research and Technology of Agro-Environmental
and Biological Sciences (CITAB), University of Tr
as-os-Montes and Alto Douro,
Vila Real, Portugal
José Aranha Centre for the Research and Technology of Agro-Environmental and
Biological Sciences (CITAB), University of Tr
as-os-Montes and Alto Douro, Vila
Real, Portugal
Davide Ascoli DISAFA Department, University of Torino, Grugliasco, Italy
Christophe Bouillon National Research Institute of Science and Technology for
Environment and Agriculture (IRSTEA), Risks Ecosystems Environment Vulnerabil-
ity Resilience (RECOVER) research unit, Aix-en-Provence, France
Marc Castelnou Bombers Generalitat.DGPEiS. DI., Barcelona, Spain; University
of Lleida, Lleida, Spain
Pedro Chamusca Centre of Studies of Geography and Spatial Planning (CEGOT),
University of Porto, Portugal
Fernando J.M. Correia Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, Porto,
Portugal
Michael Coughlan Institute for a Sustainable Environment, University of Oregon,
Eugene, OR, United States
Giuseppe Mariano Delogu Former Chief Corpo Forestale e di Vigilanza
Ambientale (CFVA), Autonomous Region of Sardegna, Italy
Paulo M. Fernandes Centre for the Research and Technology of Agro-Environmental
and Biological Sciences (CITAB), University of Tr
as-os-Montes and Alto Douro, Vila
Real, Portugal
José Rio Fernandes Centre of Studies of Geography and Spatial Planning
(CEGOT), University of Porto, Portugal
Carmen Ferreira Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, Porto,
Portugal
x Contributors

Holy Hardin Public Affairs Science and Technology (PAST) Fusion Cell, Argonne
National Laboratory, Lemont, IL, United States
Vittorio Leone Faculty of Agriculture, University of Basilicata (retired), Potenza,
Italy
Helena Madureira Centre of Studies of Geography and Spatial Planning (CEGOT),
University of Porto, Portugal
aes Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, Porto,
Catarina G. Magalh~
Portugal
Sarah McCaffrey Rocky Mountain Research Station, USDA Forest Service, Fort
Collins, CO, United States
Tara K. McGee Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, University of
Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada
Ant
onio Oliveira Centre for the Research and Technology of Agro-Environmental
and Biological Sciences (CITAB), University of Tr
as-os-Montes and Alto Douro, Vila
Real, Portugal
Joana Parente Centre for the Research and Technology of Agro-Environmental and
Biological Sciences (CITAB), University of Tr
as-os-Montes and Alto Douro, Vila
Real, Portugal
M
ario G. Pereira Centre for the Research and Technology of Agro-Environmental
and Biological Sciences (CITAB), University of Tr
as-os-Montes and Alto Douro, Vila
Real, Portugal; Instituto Dom Luiz, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
Luís M. Ribeiro Forest Fire Research Centre of ADAI, University of Coimbra,
Coimbra, Portugal
Dominic Royé University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela,
Spain
Fantina Tedim Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, Porto,
Portugal; Charles Darwin University, Darwin, NWT, Australia
Domingos X. Viegas Forest Fire Research Centre of ADAI, University of Coimbra,
Coimbra, Portugal
Gavriil Xanthopoulos Hellenic Agricultural Organization “Demeter”, Institute of
Mediterranean Forest Ecosystems, Athens, Greece
Acknowledgments

This work was prepared in the frame of the project ‘FIREXTR e Prevent and prepare
society for extreme fire events: The challenge of seeing the “forest” and not just the
“trees”’ (FCT Ref: PTDC/ATPGEO/0462/2014), co-financed by the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the COMPETE 2020 e Operational
Program Competitiveness and Internationalization (POCI Ref: 16702) and national
funds by the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), Portugal.
Extreme wildfire events: The
definition 1
Fantina Tedim 1,2 , Vittorio Leone 3 , Michael Coughlan 4 , Christophe Bouillon 5 ,
Gavriil Xanthopoulos 6 , Dominic Royé 7 , Fernando J.M. Correia 1 ,
Carmen Ferreira 1
1
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal; 2Charles Darwin
University, Darwin, NWT, Australia; 3Faculty of Agriculture, University of Basilicata (retired),
Potenza, Italy; 4Institute for a Sustainable Environment, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR,
United States; 5National Research Institute of Science and Technology for Environment and
Agriculture (IRSTEA), Risks Ecosystems Environment Vulnerability Resilience (RECOVER)
research unit, Aix-en-Provence, France; 6Hellenic Agricultural Organization “Demeter”,
Institute of Mediterranean Forest Ecosystems, Athens, Greece; 7University of Santiago de
Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

1.1 Extreme wildfires: A true challenge for societies

1.1.1 An escalating worldwide problem
In the absence of human activity, wildfires are a natural phenomenon in many types of
vegetation cover and forest ecosystems, but their current manifestation around the
world is far from “natural.” Humans make them worse at every step; their activities
are becoming the predominant cause of fires and are increasing the available forest
fuels (e.g., planting inappropriate species for high-risk areas); by building next to or
inside forests, they increase the risk to people and property and contribute to the
risk of fire spread [1]. Notwithstanding escalating management costs, increased knowl-
edge, development of technological tools and devices, improvement of training, and
reinforcement of resources, wildfires continue to surprise us, largely because the afore-
mentioned social activities increase the likelihood of extreme fire behavior and im-
pacts. Climate change processes will further escalate the associated risk and costs.
Almost every year, wildfires of unprecedented size and intensity occur around the
globe. Many of them provoke massive evacuation, fatalities and casualties, and a
higher toll of damage, exceeding all previous records. These powerful wildfires repre-
sent a minority among all wildfires, but they create a disproportionately large threat to
firefighter crews, assets, natural values, societies, and their members [2]. Some coun-
tries such as Australia, United States, and Canada have a long history of these powerful
and often destructive phenomena [3e10].
With its abundant forests and extremely hot and dry climate, since European settle-
ment Australia has suffered from extremely deadly fire events; a long series starting in
1851 with Black Thursday [11], when fires covered a quarter of what is now Victoria.

Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-815721-3.00001-1

Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
4 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

The series of ferocious bushfires continued with 1st February 1898 Red Tuesday that
burned out 260,000 ha, caused the death of 12 people, and destroyed more than
2000 buildings in South Gippsland; then in 1926 in Gippsland, Eastern Victoria Black
Sunday, with 60 fatalities and widespread damage to farms, homes, and forests.
Finally, the series peaked with the 1939 Black Friday blaze in Victoria, which killed
71 people, destroyed more than 650 structures, and burned 1.5 to two million hectares.
Many years later, in 1983, in the Ash Wednesday bushfires, in Victoria and South
Australia, more than 22 fires burned about 393,000 ha and killed 75 people [12].
Then in 2009, Black Saturday fires become the worst in Australia’s history with
500 injured and 173 fatalities, far exceeding the loss of life from any previous bush-
fires. For southeastern Australia (one of the three most fire-prone landscapes on Earth
[13]), bushfires exhibit an abrupt increase in the frequency of pyrocumuloninbus
(pyroCb; according to the World Meteorological Organization, pyrocumuloninbus is
the unofficial name for cumulonimbus flammagenitus) events over the last decade
[10] and a bigger value of fire intensity and total power in GW [14].
The history of wildfire in the United States is peppered with stories of disaster and
destruction leading back into the 19th century [15]. From 1871 to 1918, wildfires in the
Midwestern states sparked by steam-powered machinery and fueled by the waste of
early industrial logging frequently engulfed whole settlements. Even if lack of evi-
dence prevents us from defining the biophysical severity of these historic fire disasters,
the contemporary context of severe wildfire disasters is nevertheless tied to this history
as a consequence of the fire suppression policy that emerged in that period. Toward the
end of this period (e.g., w1910), wildfire suppression policy became doctrine in the
United States as the federal government set out to protect its new National Forests
from fire. This proved especially challenging in the Western US where forests are
prone to large, stand replacing fires. Perhaps the first well-documented extreme fire
in the United States is the 1933 Tillamook Burn. The fire started in hot and dry weather
in locations characterized by carelessly left logging slash and burned 16,000 ha in the
first 10 days. When firefighters appeared to have it under control, the onset of gale-
force winds changed fire behavior abruptly. Within 20 hours, the fire burned an addi-
tional 97,000 ha. This fire produced a pyroCb cloud 12.9 km high [15]. Firefighters
were overwhelmed and helpless in their efforts to stop the blaze. It was only extin-
guished two weeks later by heavy rain. The burnt-over landscape of standing dead
trees provided fuel for additional catastrophic fires over the following 20 years. The
burn also left its legacy in the fire suppression landscape serving as the impetus for
the 10 a.m. policy whereby it became policy on National Forest to extinguish fires
by 10 a.m. the morning after they were reported.
Currently, in many parts of the United States, wildfires are fueled by a legacy of fire
suppression practices. These have contributed to the build-up of dense fuels in many
forests after the disturbance of old growth forests by logging [4,7]. Recent powerful
and disastrous wildfires in states as far apart as Tennessee (2016) and California
(2017e18) have also been attributed mainly to extreme weather events, specifically
co-occurrence of drought and high winds [3,9]. The 2016 Chimney Tops 2 Fire in Ten-
nessee killed 14 people and destroyed 1684 structures. The blaze was fueled by
drought conditions, 70 years of fire suppression, and gusting high winds. In the
October of 2017, the Nuns Fire in Northern California killed 42 people, destroyed
Extreme wildfire events: The definition 5

nearly 1355 buildings, and burned over 225,000 ha [16]. The Nuns Fire was started by
wind-damaged electrical and gas utilities and spread very fast fanned by seasonal
winds called the “Diablo winds,” with gusts of up to 110 km h 1. In July and August
of 2018, the Carr Fire burned over 92,000 ha. It destroyed 1604 structures and has been
blamed for at least eight deaths, including three firefighters [16]. Finally, the Camp
Fire ignited November 8, 2018, became California’s most destructive and deadliest
wildfire. Fueled by 20 m per second winds, the fire burned 40,000 ha in the first
two days, and the fire had burned over 62,862 ha; it destroyed 13,696 residences
and 4821 other structures, and killed at least 85 people in and around the town of Para-
dise, California [17].
Canada, similar to the United States, has its own long engagement with infrequent,
large, high-intensity, crown fires [5]. Their occurrence is an increasing concern [8].
The most destructive wildfires in terms of loss of lives and structures occurred between
1825 and 1938 [8]. In 1911, 1916, and 1922 fires destroyed multiple towns in Ontario,
killing more than 500 people [18]. The most significant loss of life occurred during the
1916 Matheson fire with probably 223 fatalities [19]. A reduced number of structures
have been destroyed since the 1938 Dance Township Fire [19]. In 2003, in British
Columbia, more than 338 structures and businesses were destroyed or affected, and
three operational staff lost their lives [20]. In 2011, the Flat Top Complex Wildfires
destroyed about 340 homes, six buildings with several apartments, three churches,
and 10 businesses, as well as affected the government center [8]. Sometimes these
extreme fires are characterized by long duration and substantial impacts. The devas-
tating Fort McMurray Horse River Wildfire in Alberta, which started on May 1st,
2016, and was declared out after 15 months, forced some 90,000 to flee the city of
Fort McMurray and nearby communities in the Regional Municipality of Wood Buf-
falo and destroyed 3244 residential and other buildings [21]. It burned and destroyed
some 589,552 ha of forest [22].
In the last few decades, this reality emerged in several countries, most notably in
Southern Europe and Southern America, including Greece (2007 and 2018), Portugal
(2003, 2005, and 2017), and Chile (2017). Chile and Portugal experienced, in 2017,
the worst fire season ever recorded, with unprecedented events of extreme fire
behavior. The 2017 fires in Chile were of unusual size and severity for the austral Med-
iterranean regions, affecting a total of 529,974 ha; four individual fires burned over
40,000 ha of land. They affected large extensions of exotic forest plantations of Pinus
radiata and Eucalyptus [23].
In Portugal, after the disastrous fire seasons of 2003 and 2005, 2017 brought the
most catastrophic season ever with 112 fatalities and wildfires that reached fireline in-
tensities (FLIs) of 80,000 kWm 1, rate of spread (ROS) of 15.2 km h 1, and several
episodes of downdraft that explain most of the loss of lives [24,25]. In Pedr
og~ao
Grande Fire (June 2017) most of the people (45 out of 66) died on the roads, overtaken
by the sudden, scaring, and extraordinary fire manifestations spreading with amazing
speed in a continuous artificial forest cover of Pinus and Eucalyptus.
In another Mediterranean country, Greece, the fire problem has been worsening
steadily, in spite of increased investments in firefighting personnel and resources. After
17 fires caused fatalities in 1993, and 16 fatalities in 2000, in 2007 Greece faced its
worst fire season in terms of burned area accompanied by numerous fatalities. In
6 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

that dry year, and following three heat waves, the conditions became explosive be-
tween August 23 and 27 when a series of almost simultaneous very aggressive fires
in Peloponnese, Attica, and Evia escaped initial attack, overwhelming the firefighting
forces. They brought the burned area to approximately 270,000 ha of forest, olive
groves and farmland, more than 5 times the average. The death toll reached 78 people.
More than 100 villages and settlements were affected, and more than 3000 homes and
other structures were destroyed. The financial damage by some estimates reached five
billion US$ [26,27].
A second wildfire disaster hit Greece in 2018, in a seemingly “easy” fire season,
with unusually high precipitation until mid-July. On July 23, the first day with pre-
dicted very high fire danger due to expected extremely strong westerly winds, an
intense fire started at mid-day in western Attica, approximately 50 km west of Athens.
While firefighting efforts were concentrated there, a second fire started at 16:41 in
Eastern Attica, 20 km northeast of Athens. Fanned by a west-northwest wind of
45e70 km h 1 with gusts that exceeded even 90 km h 1, the fire first hit the settle-
ment of Neos Voutzas and then, moving with approximately 4.0 km h 1, spread
through the settlement of Mati, burning most homes in its path until it reached the
sea. Neither the ground forces that were slow to respond nor the aerial resources
that had to face the extreme wind could do much to limit the disaster. Many people
who tried to escape by running toward the sea were trapped by the fire on the steep
cliff above the water and lost their life. There were also fatalities among the hundreds
of people who managed to reach the water, either due to the effects of heat and smoke
or due to drowning. Although the burned area was only 1431 ha, 100 people lost their
lives, making this Eastern Attica Fire the second-deadliest wildfire in the 21st century,
after the Kilmore East Fire in 2009 in Victoria (Australia) that killed 120 people [28].
In North Europe, extraordinary wildfires can assume large size in areas normally
characterized by the relative absence of fires. For instance, the wildfire of V€astmanland
in central Sweden that started on July 31st, 2014, burned 13,800 ha of forest mainly
covered by wind-fallen trees. The wildfire caused one fatality and required French
and Italian water bombers to come and help fight the fire. More than 1000 people
and 1700 animals (cattle and sheep) were evacuated, and thousands of people were
prepared for evacuation when the fire approached towns. Approximately, 1.4 million
cubic meters of wood and 71 buildings were damaged or destroyed by the fire [29].
The growing incidence of such large-scale and disastrous fire events around the
globe makes it important to develop a method to classify and define them. Doing so
is an essential precursor to the development of a common international approach to
their study and to the development of the risk reduction and response capabilities
required to manage risk that will only increase in the coming decades, namely due
to climate change.

1.1.2 The need of a standardized definition

The aforementioned wildfires have captured the attention of the scientific community
and have been studied using different analytical approaches from a series of disciplines
(e.g., fire ecology, forestry, engineering, geography, anthropology, psychology, or
Extreme wildfire events: The definition 7

social sciences), benefiting from the technological advances in computer sciences,

remote sensing data, the development of software tools such as Geographical Informa-
tion Systems (GIS), and fire behavior and spread modeling; however, almost every
discipline has its own definition of these wildfires which seem to possess, by them-
selves, no intrinsic identity [30].
In the scientific literature, we found 25 terms to label these wildfires. This plurality
of terminology is accompanied by a diversity of descriptors covering fire behavior,
postfire metrics, impacts, and fire environment (Table 1.1). Furthermore, even where
the same term is used, no agreement on the descriptors used was found. Some of the
descriptors do not present quantitative thresholds, and, for the same descriptor, thresh-
olds are greatly variable and influenced, among other things, by the distribution of fire
sizes within each region or ecoregion, geographical conditions, and landscape vegeta-
tion composition [31].
Among the terms described in Table 1.1, extreme wildfire event (EWE) best cap-
tures the nature of wildfires that exhibit characteristics of extreme behavior manifesta-
tions with extremely high power and, frequently, unusual size, thus exceeding the
capacity of control even in the most prepared regions of the world. They cause major
negative socioeconomic impacts and undesirable environmental effects, if they occur
in areas of social concentration or environmental importance.
The term “extreme” is usually used as the top value of a range of categories or
“extreme values” of a statistical data set, exhibiting a typical heavy tailed distribution
of data. In this case what can be called extreme event can vary from region to region in
an absolute sense. This method of analysis is correct but does not contribute to under-
standing the identity of EWE. In contrast, the definition of EWE proposed by Tedim
et al.[31] is an attempt to create an overarching categorization, adopting selected attri-
butes of wildfire hazard. This approach was possible by using an interdisciplinary
approach and evidence from analyses of wildfire events in different regions of the
world.

1.2 EWE definition and rationale

1.2.1 EWE definition
The definition of EWEs by Tedim et al. ([31], p.10) is: “a pyro-convective phenome-
non overwhelming capacity of control (fireline intensity currently assumed
10,000 kWm-1; rate of spread >50 m/min), exhibiting spotting distance > 1 km, and
erratic and unpredictable fire behavior and spread. It represents a heightened threat
to crews, population, assets, and natural values, and likely causes relevant negative
socio-economic and environmental impacts.” Fig. 1.1 presents a visual representation
of the aforementioned definition, where all the components are considered. It is evident
that some EWEs can generate huge impacts and thus turn into a disaster, requiring pro-
longed socioenvironmental recovery and reinstatement of socioenvironmental re-
sources, amenity values, and cultural heritage.
Table 1.1 Descriptors used in scientific literature to label and characterize powerful and extraordinary wildfires.
Fire behavior Postfire metrics Consequences Fuel Fire environment

Rapid
Capacity Extreme FLI FRP ROS Spotting Simul- evolution/ Size of Duration Fire Impacts Relief Fuel Wind Wind Atmospheric Distance
of control phenomenab & FL taneous sudden burned severity efforts load and speed direction instability to WUI
Category Terms ignition changes area structure change

Size Extensive fire X

Extremely large X
fires
Very large fires X
Large fires X X X X
Large infrequent X
fires
Megafires X X X X X
Megablaze X
Megaburning X
Size and Fires of concern X X
duration
Fire behavior Extreme wildfire X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
eventa

Firestorm X
Area fires X
 Sudden Blow-up X X X X X X
changes
Conflagration X X
of behavior
Eruptive fire X X
Generalized blaze X X X X
flash
Mass fires X
Mass blazes X
Relevant Catastrophic fires X X
impacts
Disaster-fire X X
Disasters X X
Disastrous fires X X
Social disaster X X
Socially disastrous X X
fires
Natural disaster X X

And also extreme wildfire, extreme bushfire event, extreme fire event, extreme fire.
a

It includes high level of energy, chaos, nonlinearity, mass spotting, eruptive fire behavior, vorticity-driven lateral spread, violent pyroconvective activity.
b
10 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

An EWE is a very complex process, and the thresholds used in its definition result
from a deep analysis of the state of fire science. EWEs are characterized not just by
their scale but also by their erratic and unpredictable behavior. The latter reflects
how, as fires become more extreme, their complex patterns of interaction with the
ecological, forest, agricultural, and built environments influence their behavior [32];
each of its physical attributes is related and influence each other in a concrete way
and creates feedbacks. However, if the fire is above 10,000 kWm 1 but the ROS is
40 m min 1 instead of over 50 m min 1, as proposed in the definition, can we still
classify the fire as EWE? The answer is affirmative because the most socially relevant
EWE attribute is the FLI that precludes any effort to control the fire, and in the example
presented, the value is above the threshold. Future measurements of EWEs will help to
validate and to adapt the selected thresholds.
EWEs are increasingly frequent events that exhibit non-instantaneous extreme
behavior for at least several hours, but normal fires [31] too can have punctual man-
ifestations of extreme fire behavior (e.g., fire whirls) because of the combination of
several conditions, for instance, the influence of topography; they can create local sit-
uations that explain the entrapment of firefighter crews with tragic end.
From the natural hazards field, it has been shown that risk perception is influenced
by the physical characteristics of the hazard [33]; thus, a good understanding of EWEs
is fundamental to decrease their impacts.
A complete understanding of the EWE definition is easier if we discuss its rationale,
valorizing: The physical properties of EWE; the duration of an EWE; the size; the con-
sequences; and the fact that an EWE does not necessarily create a disaster. Fig. 1.2 helps
to make clear this discussion; it depicts how physical properties of fires interact with

Figure 1.1 The visual representation of EWE definition.

Extreme wildfire events: The definition 11

human dimensions, i.e., human actions, residential development patterns (RDPs), and
WildlandeUrban Interface (WUI) characteristics, in the context of socioecological sys-
tems [34], where wildfires occur, thus influencing fire behavior and its consequences.

1.2.2 EWE definition rationale

1.2.2.1 The physical properties of EWEs
The pillar of EWE definition are physical attributes concerning the pyroconvective na-
ture of the phenomenon and fire behavior which result from the interaction of human
and natural systems. It is evident from Fig. 1.2 that, after the fire outbreak, fire progres-
sion and spread are influenced by the interaction and feedback between the fire envi-
ronment (characterized by several factors, such as fuel load and characteristics,
existence of drought, and weather conditions), topography, human activities (e.g.,
land use options, land management, the use of prescribed burning, fire suppression ac-
tions), and WUI characteristics and RDPs.
The scientific community identifies as the main physical fire properties FLI, flame
length (FL), and ROS, which can all be expressed in quantitative terms. Another
important fire property which is expressed qualitatively is the presence or not of

Figure 1.2 EWE definition rationale. The red bars represent fires with different FLI. The longer
the bar, the higher the intensity. The impacts of fires result from the interaction and feedbacks
between the physical characteristics of fires and the vulnerability of exposed elements. A
wildfire becomes an EWE when its features exceed the capacity of control (10,000 kWm 1).
The letters a, b, c, and d, respectively, indicate (a) fire under control capacity (i.e. a normal fire)
but affecting a vulnerable area provoking a disaster; (b) an EWE turning into a disaster; (c) an
EWE; and (d) a wildfire below the capacity of control (i.e. a normal fire).
12 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

spotting; however, when present, it is further described by frequency, distance, and ac-
celeration of spot fires. Less frequently used fire properties are smoke and radiant heat
that are the main killers [35] and convective phenomena that increase the extremeness
of the event. Whereas convective activity is included in the definition, local fire
weather, smoke, and radiant heat are not considered because of the impossibility to
establish thresholds that could have worldwide representativeness.
FLI is the pivotal fire behavior parameter and can be determined from measure-
ments or observations of ROS and fuel consumption [36] or alternatively from FL, us-
ing simple equations [37]. FLI influences the capacity of control, and the value of
10,000 kWm 1 is currently accepted as the threshold of impossibility of control
[38e40]. Beyond 10,000 kWm 1, it is well accepted that even heavy water bombers
are ineffective [41], and fire control is not possible with current day technology and
technical resources [42]. With an increasing FLI, the quantity of water required as
an extinguishing agent to contain the flames grows. In addition, fire intensity influ-
ences the pattern of fire severity throughout the affected area [43,44] and the resistance
of the structures, consequently acting on the losses and the number of fatalities.
ROS is important to firefighting strategy and fire size [45] affecting the capacity of
suppression and the ability to move away from a fire safely [2]. ROS is dependent on
the type, load and continuity of fuel, topography, and weather conditions (mainly wind
velocity). The higher the ROS, the wider the spread of wildfire, thus increasing the
perimeter of flames [46]. ROS can reach values of about 20 km h 1 [47]; it is consid-
ered extreme when it is  3 km h 1 [47], and is often augmented by massive spotting.
ROS affects deployment of crews and resources, the efficacy of the suppression oper-
ations with cascade effects on the impacts induced by the arrival of a fire front: Deci-
sions to stay and defend assets or leave, and evacuation of people and animals. This
shows the importance of societal and community responses. The more the people
have acted to prepare land/properties (e.g., community wide defensible spaces can
create fire breaks to slow fire spread, increase efficacy of suppression), the more the
time crews will have to respond and reduce localized risk; this can make it easier
for them to plan where they can deploy limited resources.
FL influences the ability of a fire to cross barriers and so spread in discontinuous
fuels [48], reach canopies [49], and affect radiation load on buildings [2,50].
Spotting activity (i.e., the ignition of new fire starts outside the fire perimeter by
firebrands of bark, needles, twigs, pine cones, acorns, moss, or larger embers launched
from a primary fire, conveyed by the convective column and landing on receptive fuels
[51e53]) acts to carry fire across gaps in vegetation (firebreaks, agricultural fields,
etc.) and to ignite buildings [50,54]. In EWEs the powerful convection column, the
strong prevailing wind and/or the hot downdrafts from the column and the preheated
dead fuels result in spotting distances sometimes exceeding 10 or more kilometers,
rendering all preventive efforts to create horizontal fuel discontinuity useless
[2,52,53,55,56]. Rapid acceleration of spot fires, due to high wind and very dry fuels,
can sharply increase the risk of firefighter entrapment [56]. In the presence of species
with loose fibrous bark (e.g., E. obliqua and E. macrorhyncha) a concentrated short
distance spotting is the main fire propagation mechanism, while the firebrands respon-
sible for long-range spotting are long ribbons of decorticating bark of some smooth-
Extreme wildfire events: The definition 13

barked eucalypt species, such as E. viminalis, E. globulus, and E. delegatensis [56].

Long-range spotting requires a strong upward motion by the buoyant plume to trans-
port relatively large firebrands several kilometers above the ground and high winds
aloft to transport fuel particles for extended distances downwind [56].
EWEs are violent pyroconvective phenomena, for which a large integral of instan-
taneous energy release (IIER) or magnitude is required [57]. Pyroconvective activity
and the creation of a pyroCb occur when a very intense fire generates heat, moisture,
gases, and particles, in the form of a plume with an upward movement, powered by the
amount of energy released by the combustion, integrated by the latent heat released
when vapor condensation occurs [6,57e59]. When the vertical upward motion ceases,
convective updrafts can reverse and become downdrafts, which hit the ground and
spread out, in all directions, so inducing changeable wind direction and becoming
responsible for the erratic fire spread [60], with implications for firefighters’ and people
safety. Rarely, a pyroCb produces downbursts, which are gusty, erratic, and intense
winds causing unpredictable changes in fire intensity, FL, ROS, direction of fire
spread, and ember spotting [61].
The level of threat a fire represents to society is thus strongly influenced by the char-
acteristics of fire behavior. For instance, a fire with an FL of 0.5 m in any context
cannot produce intensities that overwhelm the capacity of suppression, whereas the
radiant heat of flames that leap 100 m above the tree line, as in Australia in 2009,
can kill from 300 m [62].
An EWE definition that focuses on the physical attributes of a fire can be used in
any part of the world because it is not place-dependent as the fire process is the
same everywhere. At same time, presenting the capacity of control as a threshold to
define an EWE, it is possible to understand the limitations of suppression capacity re-
sources and systems (much less than 10% of the fire intensity spectrum observed in
wildfires [55]), considering that the highest FLI record so far can be
150,000 kWm 1 for 2009 Kilmore and Murrundindi Victorian fires [63]). This does
not mean that this value represents the maximum FLI that a fire can reach.
In addition, it is possible to have an absolute scale of fire power with the result that,
independent of geographical and cultural context, an EWE is an EWE anywhere in the
world, regardless of the variability of consequences. This supports the importance of
including complementary social response capability (e.g., household and community
actions on vegetation management, creation of defensible spaces, increase house resis-
tance, physical and mental preparedness) that can slow fire spread, reduce fire intensity
and sources of spotting to some extent, and reduce the risk to dwellings and mainly to
people.

1.2.2.2 The duration of an EWE

A wildfire classified as an EWE requires that in some moment, it presents the charac-
teristics and the critical thresholds contained in the definition. To reach them, it is
necessary for fire to spread for some time to gain energy potential which depends
on several conditions (e.g., amount and state of the fuel, weather conditions, atmo-
spheric instability), but this can occur shortly after the fire outbreak. In Pedr
og~ao
14 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

Grande (2017, Portugal), the fire took just 2 hours to assume the characteristics of an
EWE, although the maximum intensity occurred about 6 hours after the fire outbreak;
most of the losses and fatalities occurred in less than an hour [25].
The period when the fire exhibits violent behavior and when most damage occurs is
a relatively short interval, although these periods can recur in close succession [64]. In
the Tasmania fire of 7 February 1967, in just 5 hours, 226,500 ha, or 85% of the total
area of 264,000 ha, burned causing extensive damage. The remaining 36,000 ha
burned over a period of several weeks afterward [65].
EWEs can persist over prolonged periods of time, but this cannot be a defining char-
acteristic, as it strongly depends on the continuity and amount of fuels and persistence
of favorable weather conditions. Black Friday fire in Australia (w36,000 kWm 1),
1939, is considered one of the worst events in the country but did not burn for a
long time because of sudden weather changes, namely rainfall [66]. Kilmore East
fire (2009, Victoria, Australia) burned nearly 100,000 ha and destroyed more than
2200 buildings in the first 12 h. The fire merged with the Murrindindi fire, burning
approximately 400,000 ha over a period of 3 weeks [56].
As the duration of a wildfire is variable even in the same country because it is
dependent on the fire environment, it is not possible to determine a threshold that could
be used worldwide.

1.2.2.3 The constraints of wildfire size

EWEs as a pyroconvective phenomenon would most certainly be large, but size is not a
suitable descriptor of this type of events as it is a very weak and misleading attribute.
As a rule of thumb, the diameter of the flaming zone can be a rough measure of the
height to which the convection column resists, mixing with the air it is passing through
as it rises [58]. At the point of pyroCb onset, the flaming zone is unusually large and
flame-front intensity is simultaneously great [67]. In the EWE of Pedr
og~ao Grande
(2017, Portugal), the highest intensity (up to 60,000 kWm 1) with a downburst phe-
nomenon occurred about 6 hours after the fire outbreak, when the fire was only about
3799 ha out of 29,354 ha; in 1 hour (from 8 to 9 p.m.), the fire burned 4459 ha [25].
There is a strong inverse correlation between the probability of containing wildfires
and fire size and intensity. An attempt to quantify this relationship for initial attack
crews in Canada was made by Hirsch and Martell [40] and Hirsch et al. [68], and
although not formally documented, the same type of relationship exists for suppression
activities by air tankers (K. Hirsch pers. com.).
Size and severity do not have a direct correlation, as the latter reflects the interaction
between landscape characteristics and fire behavior. Even very-high-intensity fires
create an heterogenous pattern of burning severity inside the affected area [44,69].
Size tells us little about losses which depend on the affected area characteristics,
and, mainly on the vulnerability of the exposed population and assets. For instance,
in the northern California wildfire event in October 2017, the Tubbs Fire burned
14,895 ha, destroyed 5636 structures, and damaged 317 ones, while Nuns Fire was
a larger event (burned 22,877 ha) with lower destruction (it destroyed 1355 structures
and damaged 172 ones) [9]. The Eastern Attica Fire (Greece, 2018) is another excellent
Extreme wildfire events: The definition 15

example of a wildfire that provokes huge destruction and loss of lives, while it only
burned 1431 ha because it stopped when reached the sea.
Finally, size can also be the result of wildland fire use, which is an accepted fire
management practice in areas where naturally caused wildfires are not a threat to as-
sets, homes, or people as it happens in the United States.
As fire sizes vary tremendously around the world, selection of an absolute fire size
for EWE at world level is difficult to establish or even impossible, as it is place-
dependent.

1.2.2.4 EWE consequences are place-dependent

Although the quantitative metrics used in our definition are solely based on the phys-
ical attributes of the wildfires, we do not ignore that context matters. Thus, in Fig. 1.2
we depict the influence of factors affecting fire behavior and their threat to society. The
role of the context is indirectly present in its influence on the physical characteristics of
fire (e.g., land/forest use practices at commercial, community and regional levels of
analysis) and, directly, in the human actions that influence fire behavior (e.g., defen-
sible space), as well as the impacts on crews, population, assets, natural values, socio-
economic activities, and environment.
Sometimes fire consequences have been used to define extreme events. However,
the integration of consequences in the definition of extreme is not consensual and in
our opinion is inadequate. Recent and specialized literature finds the introduction of
impacts in the definition of extreme events very concerning because if the purpose
is reducing the losses and impacts and these are included in the definition, how is it
possible to assess the efficiency of management or resilience to extreme events? [70].
The impacts of extreme events are governed not only by the physical properties of
the hazard but also by the characteristics of places (e.g., the characteristics of the WUI)
and people’s preparedness. The physical attributes of EWEs (Fig. 1.2) characterize the
level of threat and act as triggers on vulnerable societies and ecosystems [71,72]; be-
tween these two components, there is a loop [73], but it is not adequate to integrate
impacts in the definition of EWE. If we do not establish a differentiation between
EWE and its impacts, we become unable to address how prevention, and mitigation
has decreased vulnerability and increased the efficacy of social and economic recovery
post-event.

1.2.2.5 EWE and disaster

Tedim et al. [31] clearly differentiated an EWE from a disaster recognizing that (1) not
all EWEs produce huge consequences because not all EWEs will affect people and so-
cietal resources; it is important to consider whether an event will impact vulnerable
people and assets. Losses of social assets may be exacerbated by factors such as loca-
tion, building materials, design, and communities urban planning [45,74e76]; and (2)
normal fires can also produce huge consequences because of inadequate management
or control actions (e.g., lack of resources, lack of coordination, wrong instructions and
16 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

evaluation of situations), lack of preparedness by individuals and concerned commu-

nities, or poor land management.
The circumstances around fatalities are related to (1) people’s attitudes and
behavior, for instance, last-minute decision to evacuate or escape, lack of awareness
and preparedness [77e79]; (2) spatial and environmental conditions [6,14,28]; and
(3) entrapments and burnover [80e82].
For instance, in Canada, fires that exhibit extreme fire behavior occur each year.
Throughout the boreal, many of these fires start naturally (and have been doing so
for centuries) but have little direct negative impact on people or ecosystems although
their behavior is extreme. If the Fort McMurray Horse River Fire of 2016 had started
50 km east of where it did, it would have had little social and/or economic impact and
not have been on the national and international news for months. It most likely would
have been comparable to the 2011 Richardson Fire that was 100e150 km north of Fort
McMurray and burned roughly the same amount of area (w500,000 ha) but was in no
way seen as a disaster.
On the other hand, sometimes small but intense fires can cause damage to homes
and people. An example could be the Tubbs Fire, in 2017, in California; it was not
the largest wildfire but was the most destructive (at the time) as it moved downslope
into the city of Santa Rosa and the surrounding communities [9]. In 1994, of the fires
around Sydney (Australia), the most destructive was one of the smallest: With just
476 ha, and with a maximum intensity about 6650 kWm 1, the Como-Janelli Fire pro-
voked four fatalities and the loss of 99 houses [14,45]. The Mount Carmel Fire in
December 2010, in Israel, burned about 4000 ha but claimed 44 lives.
Another excellent example is the 2018 wildfire disaster in Eastern Attica in Greece
already described.

1.3 A wildfire classification: Integrating fire intensity

with potential consequences
The wildfire classification proposed by Tedim et al. [31] is not the first one developed.
Byram [83] was the first to come up with the idea of measuring fires by their rate of
heat release [84]. Rather popular wildfires classifications have been proposed
[38,79e90], all of them mainly based on measurable parameters of fire behavior,
such as FL and FLI. Some of these classifications are integrated with narrative, inter-
pretation of fire behavior, type of fire, and suppression interpretation [40]. These clas-
sifications only refer to fires below the threshold of 10,000 kWm 1 [86,87,89,91], so
they cannot be applied to EWEs. In other cases, the upper limit is > 10,000 kWm 1
[38,92], a value which only represents the lower 10% of the fire intensity spectrum
observed in wildfires [56] and cannot be applied to EWE, which cover the remaining
90%, precautionarily considering the upper limit of FLI in 100,000 kWm 1
[84,93,94]. The purpose of the classifications described earlier was to provide informa-
tion on firefighting productivity and effectiveness of suppression to support planning
and tactics.
Extreme wildfire events: The definition 17

Gill (1998) [84] proposed a classification based on seven categories of fire intensity
to facilitate the communication of the nature of fire variation, the highest one being
between 35,000 and 100,000 kWm 1, as it was supposed the fires could not go
over level 7. The recent values of intensity of about 150,000 kWm 1 provided by Tol-
hurst [63] for Victorian fires in Australia, 2009, confirm that EWEs are unpredictable
phenomena that can evolve to unknown limits, especially considering the influence of
climate change.
In France, a prototype of wildfires classification proposed by Lampin-Cabaret et al.
[95] is based on intrinsic physical measurement of the phenomenon and its conse-
quences. It has a posteriori purpose and no predictive character; it classifies fires
depending on the effects and damage found on standard elements of the fire environ-
ment (vegetation, people, buildings, and infrastructures) but does not characterize the
level of risk of forest fire hazard, nor the economic consequences of the event.
More recently, exploratory studies were conducted to support the development of a
bushfire severity scale to provide a warning for potential losses of properties and human
lives [6]. These studies recognize the importance of fire power to explain its destructive
potential, as a stronger relationship exists between community loss and the power of a
fire [6,14,96]. In addition, these studies demonstrate that the current fire danger scale
used to assess the probability for fire occurrence and the spread dynamics as well as
the difficulty of control do not adequately reflect the destructive potential of a fire [6].
The wildfire classification proposed by Tedim et al. [31] recognizes the importance
of fire power to explain the losses, but it does not only focus on FLI, adopting a multi-
criteria approach to make the scale precise, objective, and operational. The parameters
used to create this classification are real-time measurable behavior parameters (FLI,
ROS, and FL) and real-time observable manifestations of extreme fire behavior (pres-
ence of pyroCb and downdrafts, spotting activity, and distance) [31]. It presents seven
categories of fires, four labeled as normal fires (categories one to four) and three at the
highest end (categories five to seven) that cover different categories of EWEs. Whereas
the current classifications of some natural hazards are descriptive (e.g., Richter and
Mercalli scales for earthquakes) or prospective (e.g., Saffir Simpson scale for hurri-
canes), the classification by Tedim et al. [31] is both descriptive and prospective.
One of the possible criticisms is whether the classification proposed by Tedim et al.
[31] develops a holistic view of EWEs as a socioecological phenomenon; it seems to
be based solely on measurable fire behavior parameters and suppression difficulty. The
second sentence of the EWE definition includes statements related to the potential
impact of wildfires which reveal it as a key aspect of the definition. People can easily
understand that a fire of category 7 can provoke more losses and injuries than one of
category 2, applying the same logic of other natural hazards classifications. Consid-
ering that many times people need to face a fire by themselves, it is crucial that citizens
are aware about the threats and the potential consequences to protect themselves in
fires with different intensities.
To improve the classification by Tedim et al. [31], in this chapter we have enhanced
it by integrating the multiple fire attack mechanisms (i.e., smoke, radiant heat, flames,
spotting, and wind) and their potential consequences to people, crews, and assets, in
each of the seven categories of fires (Table 1.2). The proposed integration is not based
Table 1.2 Wildfire classification integrating potential physical and psychological consequences.
Physical Psychological

Category People Crew People Crew Assets/Structures Ecosystems

Normal fires 1 Null to minimum. 1) Null to minimum. 2) Minor Possible but rare episodes of Low because all small fires Null to minimum. Null to minimum.
problems from lack of safety stress. include the potential to
rules compliance. escalate.
2 Minimum to medium because there is 1) Possible, but rare, minor Possible but uncommon episodes Low/moderate because of Possible but rare damage. Low to medium
generally adequate time to react. problems because there is of stress because there is time the potential of fire to burning severity.
generally adequate time to for rational thinking, although escalate.
react. 2) Problems in the case higher if people are
of inappropriate or missing unprepared or events occur
use of personal protective during the day when parents
equipment (PPE). are at work, children are at
school. Family separation and
uncertainty regarding the
location and safety of others
increase stress.
3 1) Possible accidents by inappropriate 1) Possible entrapment and 1) Sporadic episodes of stress 1) Possible occurrence of Possible but not frequent. Low to high burning
attitude and behavior concerning burnover, especially from not because of the reduced time stress due to lack of severity.
evacuation or sheltering in place. 2) observing what the fire is for rational thinking, lack of information, weaknesses
Possible injuries from direct flame doing at all times and thinking information, and the absence in the control and
contact if people are not adequately of what it will be doing next. of firefighters’ support. 2) command chain, resource
trained and prepared to face the fire 2) Problems from lack of Stress can be higher if people availability, and
by themselves. 3) Possible but rare safety rules compliance. 3) are unprepared or events occur deployment to tackle fires.
fatalities. 4) Autonomous defense Serious problems in the case during the day when parents 2) Fatigue and exhaustion
using hoses and water is possible but of inappropriate or missing are at work and children are at can increase risk.
risky, especially in the case of an use of PPE. school. Family separation and
electrical power failure (or shut-off uncertainty regarding the
by the power company) while there location and safety of others
is no back-up of petrol driven increase stress.
generators. 5) Likely inadequate
response for evacuation of disabled
or elderly people.
 4 1) Major accidents may be caused by 1) The likelihood of entrapment 1) Feeling of fear, loss, or lack of 1) Possible occurrence of 1) Frequent and relevant. Heterogeneity in
inappropriate attitude and behavior and burnover increases. 2) control, anxiety, affecting the stress due to lack of Strong wind making burning severity
concerning timely evacuation or Fatal problems from lack of decision of passive or active information, weaknesses buildings more vulnerable pattern, with wide
passive sheltering. 2) Difficulty to compliance with safety rules, sheltering and timely in the control and to mechanisms of fire areas of medium to
find adequate response for especially from not knowing evacuation. 2) Diffuse command chain, and the attack. 2) Potential high.
evacuation of nonmobile people: what the fire is doing at all episodes of stress because incapacity to cope with all damages depending on
Children, disabled, or elderly times and inability to predict there is no time for rational the simultaneous fires building design and type
people. 3) High difficulty of what it will be doing next. 3) thinking and the urgency to started by spotting, and of RDPs and WUI.
autonomous defense without Fatal problems in case of take decision facing more issues with resource
adequate awareness and inappropriate or missing use extreme fire manifestations. 3) availability and
preparedness to face the aggressive of PPE. 4) Difficulty of Stress can be higher if people deployment to tackle fires.
assault of the flames. 4) circulation of vehicles from are unprepared or events occur 2) Fatigue and exhaustion
Impossibility of autonomous lack of visibility. 5) Difficulty during the day when parents can become risk factors.
defense using hoses and water in the to impossibility of aerial are at work and children are at
case of lack of electricity and the operations from smoke, wind, school. Family separation and
inexistence of petrol-driven and convective activity. 6) uncertainty regarding the
generators. 5) Injuries and fatalities Relevant problems of radiant location and safety of others
from direct flame contact. 6) heat with consequent increase stress.
Accidents on the road from smoke, exhaustion of firefighters.
flames, radiant heat, and falling
trees. 7) Difficulty of circulation by
car from lack of visibility. 8) The
survival conditions are very difficult
so requiring additional precautions.
Extreme 5 1) Difficulty to find adequate response 1) Likely entrapment and 1) Strong feeling of fear, loss or 1) Possible diffuse and 1) Massive spotting 1) Heterogeneous
wildfire for evacuation of nonmobile people: burnover danger aggravated lack of control, anxiety, persistent psychological exacerbates losses severity patterns
events Children, disabled, or elderly by spotting. 2) Sometimes namely in the case of roads cut stress due to the occurrence. 2) Potential inside fire
people. 2) Possible fatalities in case reaching a designated safety off by fast-moving fire fronts incapacity to contain the damages likely perimeter. 2)
of escape or outside houses. 3) zone in time may not be or closed by authorities, flames spread under exacerbated by building Evidence of areas
Extreme difficulty of autonomous possible. 3) Relevant incapacity to communicate the urgency of immediate design and type of RDPs/ with high burning
defense. 4) Impossibility of problems of radiant heat with with family, friends, and multiple decisions; issues WUI. 3) Strong wind severity.
autonomous defense using hoses consequent exhaustion of authorities. 2) Diffuse and with resource availability making buildings more
and water in the case of lack of firefighters. 4) Problems from persistent psychological stress and deployment to tackle vulnerable to mechanisms
electricity and the inexistence of a smoke. 5) Fatal problems from due to the fire experience and fires, and coordination of fire attack.
petrol-driven generators. 5) Relevant lack of compliance with safety consequences. 3) High stress and devolution of
problems of health from radiant heat rules. 6) Fatal problems in if people are unprepared or responsibility, situational
and smoke. 6) High difficulty of case of inappropriate or events occur during the day awareness if events

Continued
Table 1.2 Wildfire classification integrating potential physical and psychological consequences.dcont’d
Physical
Category People
circulation from lack of visibility. 7)
Road accidents resulting from
falling trees provoked by winds or
by fast moving fire fronts. 8) Lack of
information to support emergency
decisions. 9) Difficulty or
impossibility of communication by
failure of power lines and lifelines.
6 1) The survival conditions are very
extreme, but it is possible to survive
if adequately prepared. 2) Difficulty
to find adequate response for
evacuation of nonmobile people. 3)
Likely fatalities in case of escape, or
outside houses or in case of passive
sheltering. 4) The erratic and
unpredictable fire behavior can
preclude evacuation and make
dangerous evacuation or escape. 5)
Time to make decisions may be
limited and inadequate for carrying
out an order. 6) Impossibility of
autonomous defense using hoses
and water in the case of lack of
electricity and the inexistence of
petrol-driven generators. 7) Last-
minute evacuation can conduct to
dramatic end. 8) Roads are likely to
be cut off for those who were late in
deciding and by fast-moving fire
fronts. 9) Extreme difficulty of
Crew
missing use of PPE. 7) Road
accidents resulting from
falling trees provoked by
winds. 8) Extreme difficulty of
communication. 9) Difficulty
to impossibility of circulation
of terrestrial vehicles from
lack of visibility. 10)
Difficulty to impossibility of
aerial operations from smoke,
wind, and convective activity.
1) Likely entrapment and
burnover danger aggravated
by spotting. 2) Injuries from
imprudent but generous
attempts to contain fire spread
also due to profuse spotting. 3)
Relevant problems of radiant
heat with consequent
exhaustion of firefighters. 4)
Problems provoked by smoke.
5) Fatal problems in case of
inappropriate or missing use
of PPE. 6) Fatal problems
from noncompliance with
safety rules. 7) Road accidents
resulting from falling trees
provoked by winds or by fast-
moving fire fronts. 8) Extreme
difficulty of communication
and compliance with orders of
the control and command
chain. 9) Difficulty to
impossibility of circulation of
Psychological
People
when parents are at work and
children are at school. Family
separation and uncertainty
regarding the location and the
safety of others increase
stress.
1) Decisions are made under
physical stress/suffering due
to heat and smoke. 2) Strong
feeling of fear, total loss or
lack of control, anxiety, affect
evacuation or escape. 3) Stress
increased because of the
collapse of phone and mobile
communication network with
subsequent incapacity of
communicate with family,
friends, and authorities. 4)
Lack of psychological
preparedness conducting to
unsafe decision-making (e.g.,
last-minute evacuation) can
precipitate the occurrence of
fatalities. 5) People focus on
the threat and not on the
choice of the adequate
behavior. 6) Diffuse and
persistent psychological stress
even for well-aware and well-
Crew Assets/Structures Ecosystems
escalate and evolve. 2)
Fatigue and exhaustion
can become risk factors.
3) Issues arising from
working with unfamiliar
firefighter teams or
interaction between
professional and volunteer
firefighters.
1) Diffuse and strong 1) Long-distance massive 1) Heterogeneous
persistence of stress also spotting. 2) Potential severity patterns
because of involvement in damages likely inside fire
rescue activities of exacerbated by building perimeter. 2)
victims. 2) Increasing design and type of RDPs Medium- to large-
issues with resource and WUI. 3) Wind scale extreme
availability and making buildings more burning severity.
deployment to tackle fires. vulnerable to fire.
3) Fatigue and exhaustion
can become risk factors.
4) Issues arising from
working with unfamiliar
firefighter teams or
interaction between
professional and volunteer
firefighters. 5)
Coordination and
devolution of
responsibility, situational
awareness if events
escalate and evolve.
 autonomous defense. 10) Very
relevant problems of health from
radiant heat and smoke. 11) High
difficulty of circulation from lack of
visibility. 12) Lack of information to
support emergency decisions. 13)
Impossibility of communication
caused by failure of power lines and
lifelines. 14) High probability of car
accidents in case of escape in very
difficult environmental conditions.
15) Strong winds can make trees fall
and provoke car accidents or traffic
jams with loss of lives. 16) Survival
outside a shelter made very difficult
by wind and ember transport.
7 1) The survival conditions are very
extreme, but it is possible to survive
if adequately prepared. 2) Difficulty
to find adequate response for
evacuation of nonmobile people. 3)
Maximum probability of fatalities
and casualties directly caused by
radiant heat, smoke, and flames and
indirectly by escape in very difficult
environmental conditions. 4) Last-
minute evacuation can conduct to
dramatic end. 5) Roads are likely to
be cut off by fast-moving fire fronts
or by authorities frustrating last-
minute evacuation. 6) The erratic
and unpredictable fire behavior can
preclude evacuation, make fatal
escape and dangerous passive
sheltering in place. 7) Extreme
difficulty of autonomous defense
using hoses and water in the case of
lack of electricity and the
inexistence of petrol-driven
generators. 8) Entrapment and
vehicles from lack of
visibility. 10) Difficulty to
impossibility of aerial
operations from smoke, wind,
and convective activity.
1) Likely entrapment and
burnover danger aggravated
by spotting. 2) Fast and wise
decision-making is needed but
is difficult because of poor
information due to smoke,
other adverse conditions. 3)
Relevant problems of radiant
heat with consequent
exhaustion of firefighters. 4)
Problems from smoke. 5)
Fatal problems in case of
inappropriate or missing use
of PPE. 6) Fatal problems
from noncompliance with
safety rules. 7) Extreme
difficulty of communication.
8) High probability of failure
in communication systems
and lack of information to take
the adequate and timely
decisions. 9) Difficulty of
circulation of terrestrial
vehicles from lack of
prepared people, can
precipitate the occurrence of
fatalities. 7) Very high stress if
people are unprepared or
events occur during the day
when parents are at work,
children are at school. Family
separation and uncertainty
regarding the location and
safety of others increase
stress.
1) Strong feeling of fear, total loss 1) Diffuse and strong
or lack of control, and anxiety
affect decisions mainly for
evacuation or escape. 2) Lack
of psychological preparedness
conducts to unsafe decision-
making (e.g., last-minute
evacuation) facing the
extreme manifestations of fire
and can precipitate the
occurrence of fatalities. 3)
Fear makes people focus on
the threat and not on the
choice of the adequate
behavior; high levels of stress
can precipitate the occurrence
of fatalities. 4) Extreme
psychological stress even for
well-aware and well-prepared
people. 5) Stress increased
because of the collapse of
phone and mobile
communication network with
subsequent incapacity of
1) Long-distance massive 1) Heterogeneous
persistence of spotting. 2) Potential severity patterns
psychological stress damages exacerbated by inside fire
because of involvement in building design and type perimeter. 2)
rescue activities of of RDPs and WUI. 3) Large-scale
victims. 2) Increasing Ember attack, and radiant extreme burning
issues with resource heat can induce loss of severity. 3)
availability and tenability in structures. 4) Unburned patches
deployment to tackle fires. Wind damage can render can be found.
3) Fatigue and exhaustion building more vulnerable
can become risk factors. to fire attack.
4) Issues arising from
working with unfamiliar
firefighter teams or
interaction between
professional and volunteer
firefighters. 5)
Coordination and
devolution of
responsibility, situational
awareness if events
escalate and evolve.
Continued
Table 1.2 Wildfire classification integrating potential physical and psychological consequences.dcont’d
Physical
Category People
burnover danger aggravated by
long-distance massive spotting and
by the loss of tenability of the
houses. 9) Lack of monitoring of
both the internal and external
conditions of buildings can make
difficult decision to move toward an
exit as houses lose tenability. 10)
Strong winds make difficult the
survival outside of the protection of
a shelter. 11) Strong winds can make
trees and power lines fall and
provoke car accidents or traffic jams
with loss of lives. 12) Impossibility
of communication caused by failure
of power lines and lifelines.
Adapted from Tedim et al. [31]
Crew
visibility. 10) Difficulty to
impossibility of aerial
operations from smoke, wind,
and convective activity.
Psychological
People Crew Assets/Structures Ecosystems
communicate with family,
friends and authorities. 6)
Very high stress if people are
unprepared or events occur
during the day when parents
are at work, children are at
school. Family separation and
uncertainty regarding the
location and safety of others
increase stress. 7) Issues
arising from evacuation and
possibly dealing with short-
and long-term relocation, and
livelihood issues.
Extreme wildfire events: The definition 23

on a scale of adjectives (for instance none, slight or minimal, considerable, substan-

tial), which are considerably arbitrary and subjective dependent on expert judgment
[73,97], and therefore would not have any conceptual and practical utility and effi-
ciency in our point of view.
Our proposed scale does not consider the amount of consequences but the type of
consequences, as the amount is influenced by the characteristics of the area (e.g., WUI,
rural area, prevention and mitigation measures) and the level of preparedness. Thus,
we identify potential physical and psychological consequences for people and crews
and the consequences on assets and ecosystems to inform people and crews about
the scenario they can face and to assist with preparedness and response.
The integration of the physical description of wildfire categories with the narration
of the potential consequences enhances the importance of the definition of each cate-
gory. This is one more element of analysis to be considered when establishing prior-
ities of intervention and to familiarize people with different fire scenarios to increase
risk awareness.
This classification is not just addressed to the scientific community but also to cit-
izens, operational staff, and policy decision-makers. Furthermore, it is important that
stakeholders play complementary roles in fire management and that stakeholder repre-
sentatives at each level of analysis (e.g., staff, citizens) understand their role and take
responsibility for developing their capability to contribute to the overall strategy and
action. The overall goal is to enhance people’s’ preparedness and to assist fire manage-
ment activities. It is important to include in planning the fact that the development of
capability at each level of analysis requires its own dedicated strategy. Irrespective of
the quality of the scientific analyses that contributes to developing risk profiles, this
will not in itself motivate policy makers (e.g., their actions involve reconciling scien-
tific information with economic and political criteria) to act or community members to
prepare (e.g., strategies are needed to encourage people to understand their risk and
motivate them to take responsibility to manage their local risk). Complementary stra-
tegies are needed to give operational staff a tool to communicate with citizens and
inform in a way that can be easily understood following what happens with other nat-
ural hazards’ classifications and to provide them with the tools to collaborate with sci-
entists and to communicate with policy makers.
With the current state of scientific research and its dissemination, science commu-
nicators and emergency planners should cooperate to provide people with a known,
reliable metric at their disposal to gauge the intensity of a wildfire and the potential
consequences, similar to what happens with storms and earthquakes. For instance, peo-
ple living in coastal areas prone to hurricanes are very familiar with the Saffir-Simpson
Scale and easily understand that a category 5 storm causes more wind and surge dam-
age than a hurricane of category 1. This information is used to help people to prepare
and respond appropriately. In the case of fires and mainly EWEs, similar information
could be crucial to help people to understand the physical properties of fire, the
different levels of threat, the potential consequences, and how they can protect them-
selves. This could represent a common reference marker for people across political
boundaries to make shared decisions [98], also in terms of regional and transboundary
emergency cooperation level.
24 Extreme Wildfire Events and Disasters

The importance of the proposed wildfire classification is high, knowing that

communication of information on wildfire risk can be challenging. Key factors influ-
encing community preparedness for wildfires include constructs such as outcome ex-
pectancy and fatalism [99e101]. The former means that if people do not believe that
they can influence the causes and the consequences of fires, then there is nothing they
can do to prepare. These beliefs are reinforced by media coverage and the dissemina-
tion of information from civic and scientific sources that discuss the magnitude of po-
tential events; the bigger the event, the greater the people’s sense of helplessness.
Fatalism can have similar implications. Recognition of these impediments to action
have fostered the development of community-based disaster risk reduction strategies
that need to be included in planning [99e101]. This is especially important for
EWEs as they represent incidents that fall at the extreme end of events that could
put people at the limits of a possibility to survive.

1.4 Conclusion
All wildfires are not the same, and they have intrinsic physical characteristics that are
influenced by the environmental, socioeconomic, and political context where fires
occur.
EWEs are the most challenging wildfires because of the threats they represent to
society and environment. They are not an ecological inevitability, and even though
they have power to create huge amount of losses, it is possible to prevent their occur-
rence and mitigate their impacts.
The science of EWEs is in its early stages but is developing very fast, as this type of
event is increasing in frequency because of more hazardous fire regimes, as a conse-
quence of climate, landscape, and societal changes.
The proposed standardized definition of EWEs and wildfire classification inte-
grating the physical attributes of fires with the potential physical and psychological
consequences to people, crews assets, and ecosystems, are crucial for informing citi-
zens about different fire scenarios and the distinctive challenges they present for hu-
man safety. Both the concept of EWE and the wildfires classification are excellent
instruments to enhance wildfire risk and crisis communication programs, as well as
in the definition of appropriate prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery actions
adapted to the characteristics of the areas affected by wildfires.

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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Racconti storici
- Nuovo volume
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
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Title: Racconti storici - Nuovo volume

Author: Giambattista Bazzoni

Release date: December 22, 2023 [eBook #72470]

Language: Italian

Original publication: Milano: Manini, 1839

Credits: Barbara Magni and the Online Distributed Proofreading

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RACCONTI

STORICI - NUOVO VOLUME ***
RACCONTI STORICI
NUOVO VOLUME
RACCONTI STORICI
DI

Giambattista Bazzoni
Nuovo Volume

MILANO
Presso Omobono Manini
1839
INDICE
 A
Sigismondo Raris
Consigliere.

M’è soave il credere, o Amico, che la tua Maria de Cheissing, la

beltà sì leggiadra ch’ora impalmata conducesti dalla patria vestfalica,
più grata essere ti debba per averla posta a soggiorno in parte
vaghissima di quella terra «ove fiorisce l’arancio,» come cantò il tuo
Goëthe, in questo ridente suolo lombardo, in questa bella Milano che
vi siede regina.
Ella fu qui non tua, e quando, reduce a’ suoi lari, questi campi e
questo cielo, che animava la rimembranza, le avranno sorriso in più
rosea tinta al pensiero, allora di certo l’immagine che nel suo vergine
cuore già sorgeva diletta, raccoglieva da quella luce poetica della
mente più vita d’amore. Quindi l’ebbra passione, quindi quella piena
d’affetti che rende ora sì lieti i tuoi giorni, i quali l’incolpabile e gentile
animo tuo merita numerare sempre ugualmente sereni e felici.
S’io dunque falsamente non m’appongo, entrambi prediligere dovete
vivamente questa contrada, pronuba e fautrice dell’avventurosa
vostra sorte. Ma ohimè! se all’innamorata fantasia qui altro non è
che splendido azzurro d’aure, verde di frondi, olezzo di fiori, se nelle
città grandeggiano allo sguardo monumenti sontuosi e l’arte assidua
ne fa elegante e festevole l’aspetto, molti e molti pur volsero
angosciosi tempi, che ogni cosa qui ammantarono di lugubre velo.
Tratto dal desìo di investigare le trapassate età, io stesso rimestava
le patrie vicende, e mi provai a dare colla penna forma e vita, dirò,
all’impressione che da quell’eco di potentissimi eventi mi derivava,
non m’annodando al rigore de’ fatti, chè troppo agevole riesce il
rilevarli nelle pagine stesse della storia. Ora concedimi adunque, che
ti presenti questi miei lavori, i quali io chiamo volentieri delineamenti
storici, e sarà il mio più caldo voto adempito, se essi varranno ad
ispiegare non senza qualche diletto allo spirito della tua amabile
Compagna, alcune delle scene che compongono la gran tela degli
avvenimenti svolti dai secoli in queste contrade, di cui è bello non
ignorare nè i luttuosi, nè i prosperi casi.
Io poi sarò lietissimo, se tu v’aggiungerai, siccome vero, il
convincimento che questa sia una prova della sincera rispondenza
alla tua cara amistà, di cui tanto mi pregio.
Giambattista Bazzoni.
 MILANO
NELL’ANNO 305 DELL’ERA

DELINEAMENTO A PANORAMA.

Seconda Roma.
ausonio.

Elmetti d’argento, lucenti loriche, clamidi purpuree, candide vesti

sacerdotali, aste d’oro recanti le insegne e le aquile romane, bighe
sonore, cavalli scalpitanti del lento procedere impazienti, clangore di
trombe, teste coronate di verdi serti, onda di popolo ammirante,
festoso; tale era il magnifico spettacolo che si presentava nell’ampia
via dell’antica Milano, che dal palazzo degl’Imperatori [1], correndo
presso l’Ippodromo o Circo [2], dirigevasi al tempio di Giove [3].
Il cielo era sereno, fulgidissimo il sole che irradiava la moltitudine
stipata nella via, e quella che ghermiva la sommità e le aperture
delle case, de’ palagi, e i peristilii de’ templi, recatasi spettatrice del
sontuoso trapassare di tanto corteo. Era quel dì il primo di maggio
segnato nelle tavole della storia a caratteri cubitali, poichè in tal
giorno due augusti, due imperatori romani dimettevano la porpora,
spogliandosi volonterosi della potestà più sovrana fra quante siano
state strette da mano d’uomo, per rientrare nel nulla della vita
privata. E questi due imperatori erano Diocleziano che in Nicomedia
cedeva la parte orientale dell’impero al Cesare Galerio, e
Massimiano Erculeo che in Milano ne cedeva la parte occidentale al
Cesare Costanzo Cloro.
Diocleziano, quello ch’ebbe il crudo vanto d’imporre il proprio nome
ad un’era tutta di sangue e di tormenti, l’era dei martiri, che oltre i
cristiani sterminò a centinaja di mila i popoli del settentrione, dai
Romani chiamati Barbari, quello che sdegnando come troppo
semplici gli imperiali ornamenti già assunti da un Augusto, da un
Nerone, da un Tiberio, da un Vespasiano, vestiva oro e seta e
cingeva non corona di lauro, ma diadema, facendosi appellare Giove
ed Eternità, ed erasi a modo dei monarchi asiatici circondato
d’eunuchi, quello stesso Diocleziano s’aveva l’inesplicabile vigor
d’animo di discendere spontaneo da tanta nube di fasto, di gloria e di
potenza per recarsi colla moglie in una casa di Salona sua terra
nativa a coltivare l’orto paterno. Ventun anni prima era egli salito al
soglio, evento da una Druidessa di Tongres vaticinatogli, e v’ascese
bagnandone i gradini di sangue, poichè non essendo che
comandante degli ufficiali di palazzo, quando Aprio, prefetto del
pretorio, uccise l’imperatore Numeriano reduce dalla Persia,
Diocleziano trapassò il petto ad Aprio, e fu egli quindi proclamato
all’impero.
Nel giorno stesso adunque che in Nicomedia scendeva Diocleziano
dal trono, ne scendeva pure Massimiano Erculeo in questa città di
Milano, ove aveva recata la sede dell’impero d’occidente. Costanzo
Cloro, il nuovo imperatore che succedeva a Massimiano, trovavasi
nelle Gallie, e frattanto in Milano veniva eletto Flavio Valerio Severo
al grado di Cesare, nome che davasi ai designati eredi del trono
imperiale.
Abbenchè gli abitanti di Milano già da alcuni anni solessero
ammirare lo sfoggio della romana magnificenza, pure quel giorno sì
straordinaria era la pompa, non che la causa di essa, che immenso
appariva il concorso de’ cittadini, a cui s’erano aggiunti
numerosissimi i forestieri convenuti nella capitale d’Insubria da altre
vicine parti, siccome dalle rive del Lario, del Ceresio, del Verbano,
da quelle del Ticino, dai laghi Gerundio ed Eghezzone [4] e dai colli
Orobii.
Nella adunata folla popolare tra l’indole varia delle fisonomie che
appalesavano le razze diverse degli abitatori in questa contrada
commisti, scernevansi più distinte e numerose quelle d’origine
gallica ed etrusca. I discendenti degli antichi occupatori delle Gallie
manifestavansi per chiome bionde, per occhi azzurri, per larghe e
rilevate ossa delle guancie, ed un’espressione del viso guerriera, e
tuttavia alquanto selvaggia; si riconoscevano i figli della gente
etrusca per volti affilati, pel mento acuto, gli occhi e i capelli
nereggianti, e per un’aria che indicava maggiore civiltà e coltura. Il
vestimento era pressochè in tutti consimile e sapeva del romano,
poichè non constava nella maggior parte che d’una tunica di lana sia
bianca, sia di tinta verde o rossa, a maniche brevi, stretta a mezzo il
corpo da una cintura di cuojo; i canuti vegliardi e alcuni pochi tra gli
uomini in età virile recavano folta e lunga la barba, e cadenti sugli
omeri i capegli. Qua e là distinguevasi frammischiato alla plebe
mediolanense, un Jutongio, un Alamanno, un Vandalo, un
Marcomanno, di quelli stati fatti prigionieri nelle ultime guerre e
dall’imperatore distribuiti come schiavi nelle provincie. Alcuni di essi
coprivansi ancora coi laceri avanzi de’ loro indumenti di pelli di topi
insieme congiunte o d’altri villosi animali delle germaniche e scitiche
selve; se ne scorgevano alcuni aventi a modo di collare un giro di
catena di ferro. Erano tutti ispidi, truci, e schiavi sì, ma di animo
indomato.
Fra mezzo al popolo nessuna toga patrizia: vedevansi queste
all’incontro formicare ne’ palazzi ove apparivano le matrone e le
donzelle coi cinti gemmati ed i pepli trapunti.
Là sugli elevati poggi e le finestre l’idioma più usato era il latino,
sebbene i Milanesi porgessero spesso occasione di burleschi motti e
sogghigni ai Romani, pronunciando quella lingua coll’accento
insubre, in cui principalmente dominava l’u acuto, che fu ne’ tempi
posteriori detto u lombardo, ma che venne innestato tra noi dagli
antichi Galli invasori. Mentre le dame e gli uomini di più raffinato
costume, favellando inframettevano nella lingua latina molte parole
greche, ch’era il vero linguaggio degli eleganti, nel dialogare del
popolo non udivasi neppure una sola terminazione latina, e sebbene
a tale idioma appartenessero la maggior parte delle parole usate
dalla plebe, esse venivano però detroncate e declinate in una foggia
speciale, che quella poi si fu che ingenerò così il nostro come molti
altri dialetti d’Italia.
Il Cesare Flavio Valerio Severo era alfine uscito dagli atrii imperiali.
Precedevano coi centurioni alla testa le coorti delle legioni di Ercole
e di Giove, create da Diocleziano per bilanciare il troppo funesto
potere de’ pretoriani; i cavalieri romani erano i più vaghi a vedersi,
seduti con somma agevolezza sui focosi cavalli, cui un semplice
drappo copriva il dorso; su quella gioventù vigorosa cupidi
s’affisavano gli sguardi femminili. Le loro nude e torose braccia, i
larghi petti ben annunziavano in essi i temuti vincitori dell’orbe intero.
Dietro tali schiere erano drappelli di guardie imperiali cogli scudi
d’argento, e la corta e larga spada svaginata; seguivano con rami di
sacre frondi i sacerdoti, indi sovra aurea quadriga, che cavalli
bianchissimi traevano, appariva coronato d’alloro il nuovo Cesare,
con lorica d’oro fulgidissima e purpureo manto.
La quadriga di Flavio Valerio Severo era seguita da un’altra salutata
più clamorosamente dai viva del popolo; stava in essa un uomo al
quale il crine incanutiva, abbronzato in volto, e le cui membra
appalesavano ancora tutta la forza e la solidità d’un atleta. Era
Massimiano l’abdicante imperatore, guerriero infaticabile, il recente
trionfatore de’ ribelli Bagaudi delle Gallie; gli stava alla destra suo
figlio Masenzio, alla sinistra la figlia Fausta entrambi predestinati alla
porpora. Di seguito a questo veniva sovr’alto carro un giovine per
nessun altro riguardo allora distinto, che per essere figlio di
Costanzo Cloro, il quale mentre doveva un giorno far perire a
Massimiano e Masenzio, doveva poi agli incestuosi ardori di Fausta,
assunta a consorte, sacrificare il suo proprio figliuolo. Susseguivano
in bell’ordine i proconsoli, e i magistrati del pretorio, e i tribuni e gli
edili, e chiudevano la schiera due coorti della legione italica.
Nel tempio fumavano l’are, il Flamine ordinava cadessero sui tori
ricinti di fiori le sacre bipenni: misti ai vapori del sangue delle vittime,
s’alzavano gli incensi odorosi. Eccheggiò d’inni e di preci il tempio, e
si proclamava il Cesare, pio clemente felice.
Compiti i sacri riti redivano i principi alla sede imperiale fra
l’acclamare del popolo incessante. Intanto dietro l’Ippodromo in una
via oscura, angusta, un branco di femmine dimesse e pochi uomini
di condizione servile, uscivano queti, silenziosi, da una casa
d’aspetto ruinoso, e in mezzo ad essi era un vecchio di veneranda
presenza, d’angelico sguardo. Mentre stavano per separarsi furono
scorti dai passanti nella via maggiore, ov’era la pompa trionfale e
cominciò tosto a serpeggiare una voce che ripeteva — i cristiani, i
cristiani. — In un istante quel nome circolò più rapido, fu in tutte le
bocche e s’alzò dalla massa intera, un urlo crescente, tonante, un
ruggito di detestazione, di minaccia, uno spaventoso barrito come
dicevasi allora. Egli era come se sbucato fosse da oscura caverna
un gruppo di tigri, di genii malefici, di furie, e non già misere
donnicciuole, poveri servi, vecchi cadenti, ch’altra colpa non
avevano agli occhi stessi di chi gli odiava, che di propagare ciò che
insegnava ad essi un divino maestro, l’amore cioè e l’uguaglianza fra
gli uomini, il perdono delle ingiurie, la carità senza limiti, virtù
coronate dalla speranza d’una perpetua felicità. Erano cristiani infatti
che uscivano col loro diacono da una specie di catacomba ove
dimoravano nascoste già da oltre due secoli le ossa di santa
Valeria [5], la moglie del primo martire milanese san Vitale, la madre
d’altri celebri martiri, Gervasio e Protasio, che tutti avevano
confessato col sangue all’epoca dell’impero di Nerone.
I cristiani nelle catacombe formavansi esatta la cronologia degli
imperatori romani colla serie dei cadaveri dei loro fratelli martirizzati.
La più abbondante messe d’umane reliquie s’era colà però da
pochissimo tempo accumulata, e l’aveva fornita Diocleziano.
Mandava quell’imperante a Mileto a consultare l’oracolo d’Apollo:
negava il dio il responso, e pronunciò la Pitonessa: che i giusti sparsi
sulla terra gli impedivano di dire il vero. Non potè a meno
Diocleziano di credere che i giusti, indicati dalla Pitonessa, i quali
ammutivano l’oracolo, fossero i cristiani, e determinò di finirla una
volta con questa, diceva esso, setta di stolti che adoravano un
giustiziato della Giudea, e che da ducent’anni stancavano
vanamente i carnefici dell’impero e impinguavano di loro carni le
fiere negli anfiteatri. Ordinò quindi una persecuzione, uno sterminio
generale de’ cristiani pel giorno delle feste terminali, che fu il 2 di
febbrajo dell’anno 302. Quindici giorni dopo non vi doveva essere
più traccia di cristianesimo come se non fosse mai apparso sulla
faccia della terra.
Abbenchè non si risparmiasse contro i seguaci del Nazareno alcun
genere di morte, e in tutto l’impero scorresse il sangue loro a torrenti,
quindici giorni dopo, il cristianesimo era più esteso e saldo di prima,
e quando tre anni e due mesi dopo quel famoso giorno 2 febbrajo
302, Diocleziano ritiravasi ad attendere alla coltura de’ fiori in
Salona, certamente avrà trovati colà non pochi cristiani impetranti sul
suo capo il perdono del cielo. Quest’era la consueta vendetta dei
discepoli di Cristo. Anche i miserelli che in Milano uscivano dal
sotterraneo ov’era la tomba di santa Valeria, al tremendo minacciare
delle turbe non opposero sicuramente in loro cuore che una prece,
un voto. E con quanta gioja avrebbero data essi pure la vita, se
avessero potuto sapere che là, fra quegli altieri romani, loro
infaticabili persecutori, eravi già quasi maturo per la sua alta
missione, un giovine, che quella che essi veneravano, obbrobriosa
immagine del patibolo, la croce, doveva stampare sulle insegne
imperiali, ed aveva ad inalzare al trono quella loro religione umile,
novella, sì abbietta e sprezzata, avanti a cui sarebbe andata fra poco
dispersa ed annichilita l’antica; se avessero insomma saputo che
dietro la imperiale quadriga di Massimiano veniva il fondatore
dell’impero d’oriente in Bisanzio, il figlio di sant’Elena, Costantino il
Grande!
Incolumi nella persona quella fiata i cristiani, nè altrimenti offesi che
dall’immane grido popolare traevano chi alla loro dimora per
riassumere assidui i domestici lavori, chi alle ignorate stanze degli
infermi recando ciò che nell’agape la carità di ciascuno aveva
tributato a sostentamento e sollievo di quelli che visitati dalla
sventura erano destituiti d’ogni umano soccorso.
Non così gli altri cittadini, che la giornata sacrarono al godimento de’
pubblici spettacoli di che il nuovo Cesare gratificava Milano. Nel già
accennato Ippodromo erano gare di cavalli ed ogni maniera di
giuochi circensi, nell’arena od anfiteatro costruito dal console Gabino
ai discobuli, ai lottatori succedevano le pugne de’ gladiatori, per le
quali tutti i ginnasii o scuole gladiatorie delle varie circonvicine città
avevano spediti a competitori i loro più valenti nell’arte di trucidarsi.
Lo spettacolo de’ gladiatori era il più accetto, il più avidamente
desiderato dal popolo, che dagli spalti, dalle gradinate, dal podio
accompagnava di fragorosissimi applausi il fortunato colpo, con cui
l’uno de’ combattenti, tutto all’altro immergeva l’acciaro nel petto, e
copriva di fischi, d’urla spietate, il trafitto che avesse osato morire
fuori delle regole dell’arte, cioè contorcendo o stirando sconciamente
le membra.
Giuochi s’eseguivano pure nel circo alla piazza detta Compitus [6];
quivi conveniva l’infima plebe. I precipui personaggi sedevano al
teatro [7], ove mimi e commedianti che avevano abbandonate le
scene capitoline rappresentavano nuove drammatiche composizioni,
con apologhi allusivi alla fausta giornata. Non mancava al tempo
medesimo gran numero di passeggianti sotto gli ombrosi viali del
Viridarium [8], luogo ove quotidianamente convenivano le più distinte
persone oziando a diporto.
Gli abitatori delle altre città, dei vichi, dei paghi, delle ville, qui la
prima volta accorsi quel dì solenne, passavano intanto curiosi e
stupiti da una piazza da una via nell’altra, ammirando gli eccelsi
palazzi, gli stupendi edificii, che le fiancheggiavano, de’ quali era sì
ricca Milano. Contemplavano l’arco romano [9] alta e massiccia mole
sostenuta da quattro grandi marmorei pilastri, fatta erigere dal
console Marco Marcello dopo la vittoria riportata sui Galli insubri;
fuori della porta Ticinense [10] passeggiavano lo stupendo porticato
delle terme, sorretto da magnifiche colonne corintie scanalate [11];
passavano rasente le forti mura che cingevano la città, munite ad
eguali spazii da quadrate torri che lo stesso imperatore Massimiano
aveva da poco fatto elevare; penetravano nel tempio del Sole alla
porta Argentea [12], in quella di Giano quadrifronte alla porta
Comense [13], visitavano la fabbrica delle monete [14], l’Accademia, la
via dei Sepolcri, e non potevano astenersi dall’esclamare concordi
ch’era milano una seconda roma.
 UN EPISODIO
DELL’ASSEDIO DEL BARBAROSSA

SECONDO DELINEAMENTO A PANORAMA.

Victa Victrix.

Due frati dell’ordine degli Umiliati, mentre ritornavano al loro

convento sull’ora dell’imbrunire nel giorno 24 d’agosto dell’anno
1158, giunti alla piazzuola di san Matteo alla Bacchetta vennero
scontrati da un uomo d’armi, che frettoloso correva alla loro volta.
Era costui tutto coperto di ferro, alto, complesso, rubesto all’aspetto,
e chiamavasi Masigotto della Cantarana. Arrestatosi ad essi di
contro il milite con voce affrettata:
— Ben trovati, padri santi, disse loro, io me ne andava appunto in
traccia di alcuno di voi.
— D’alcuno di noi?... e che bramate, valoroso fratello? — rispose
sorpreso all’inchiesta uno di que’ monaci.
— Siamo trecento di porta Nuova uniti alla Brera del Guercio nel
camerone dell’armeria, e vogliamo uscire questa notte per far prova
se quei del Barbarossa han duro il sonno.
— Ed in che modo possiamo noi prestarvi in tale impresa l’opera
nostra?
— Voi dovete venire a benedirci ed assolverci dai nostri peccati,
poichè non potendoci trascinare dietro il carroccio, se alcuno di noi
rimanesse di là del fossato, possa almeno rendere l’anima da buon
cristiano. Venite adunque affinchè stia colle nostre armi anco l’ajuto
del cielo. —
Aderirono ben tosto volonterosi i due frati all’invito, e seguirono il
soldato.
Milano, la più forte, la più prepotente città d’Italia di quel secolo,
vedevasi circondata da folte schiere nimiche che la stringevano, la
serravano irremissibilmente, come un cerchio di bragie ricinge senza
scampo uno scorpione che colla coda percosse la gente. Tanta furia
ostile era guidata intorno a Milano dall’imperatore Federigo I; ed a’
suoi agguerriti battaglioni, a que’ de’ regoli germanici suoi vassalli,
s’erano spontaneamente congiunti drappelli di combattenti di tutte le
circonvicine città, alle quali Milano era stata per lungo tempo
gravemente molesta. Unitamente ai Sassoni, ai Bavari, agli Svevi,
concorrevano quei di Como, di Lodi, di Cremona, di Pavia e d’altre
assai lontane terre, a formare più massiccia, più insolubile la catena
che accerchiava la nostra città, a cui agognavano dare l’ultima
stretta per vendicarsi delle tante patite ingiurie.
Gli edificii sacri, le ville, i casolari che stavano fuori e in prossimità
delle mura, erano stati cangiati in campali dimore pei capi
dell’esercito assediante. Sul più distinto fra essi vedevasi innalzato lo
stendardo imperiale, ed ivi aveva presa stanza lo stesso Federigo;
altrove era la bandiera del re di Boemia; più lungi quella
dell’arcivescovo di Colonia. Qua sorgeva l’insegna del palatino del
Reno, là quella del duca di Svevia, e lontano l’Austriaca, la Bavara,
la Vestfalica. Dall’uno all’altro degli isolati e distinti edificj occupati
dai condottieri dell’esercito, stendevansi a compire il grande giro le
file delle tende de’ soldati, avanti a cui erano ove steccati, ove
macchine militari, torri di legno con catapulte, mangani, petriere,
baliste. Dietro quella prima linea così ordinata allargavasi irregolare
l’accampamento per i pingui terreni suburbani, allora devastati
all’intutto, poichè li calcavano quindici mila cavalli d’Alemagna,
alcune migliaja d’Italiani e immenso numero di fanti.
Le mura che stavano a fronte a quell’oste minacciosa e ne
difendevano la città, erano in parte ancora quelle erette da
Massimiano Erculeo otto secoli addietro, ristaurate dalle ruine
cagionatevi dei Goti condotti da Uraja [15], ed in parte quelle
ricostruite ed ampliate da Ansperto che fu arcivescovo, e dir si
potrebbe signore della nostra città [16]. Quelle mura erano merlate;
vedevansi traforate da feritoje a diverse altezze, e s’avevano al
piede larga fossa e profonda. Sorgevano alte torri ove s’aprivano le
porte, e queste stavano chiuse in faccia ai nemico, servendo come
imposte a serrarle gli stessi ponti levatoj contesti da travi ferrate
rialzati colle pesanti catene.
Ardimentosi e forti i Milanesi, usi a provocare e cimentarsi di
continuo nelle zuffe coi vicini, non eransi punto inviliti d’animo, o
posti in ispavento per quella imponente congerie d’armati dal
teutonico imperatore raccolta e condotta ai loro danni. Ben lungi dal
sentirne tema molti de’ più baldi, insofferenti dello stare chiusi e
inoperosi, anelavano d’uscire a misurarsi coi nemici, a far prova con
essi di formidabili colpi, sdegnati in particolar modo che Lodigiani,
Comaschi, Pavesi, Bergamaschi e que’ delle altre città, tante fiate
vinte e sottomesse, ardissero ora presentarsi sotto le loro mura,
perchè s’avevano appoggio nel numeroso esercito straniero.
Frequenti sortite facevano quindi i Milanesi, mostrando agli
assedianti con qual fatta d’uomini avessero a contendere.
Di quei tempi tutti i cittadini in Milano erano combattenti. Venivano
divisi per parrocchia, e quelli spettanti a ciascuna parrocchia
formavano una legione che avevasi il proprio capo. Le parrocchie poi
o legioni che appartenevano ad una delle parti o sezioni della città,
che prendeva nome dalla porta a cui corrispondeva, costituivano un
corpo distinto, che s’aveva una speciale bandiera; e tal corpo
appellavasi col nome della porta stessa. Tutta la milizia poi aveva un
capitano generale, a cui erasi ben lungi dal prestare allora quella
cieca obbedienza che vediamo osservarsi di presente sia negli ordini
della milizia urbana, sia nella soldatesca propriamente detta. Il
capitano generale de’ Milanesi era in que’ giorni il conte Guido
Biandrate novarese.