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TRAFFIC CONGESTION
AND LAND USE
REGULATIONS
TRAFFIC CONGESTION
AND LAND USE
REGULATIONS
Theory and Policy Analysis

TATSUHITO KONO
KIRTI KUSUM JOSHI
Elsevier
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 CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Land use regulations are common urban policies in most cities all over the
world. Common regulations include (1) zoning by which land use is restricted
zone by zone; (2) lot size (LS) regulation, which restricts the size of each hous-
ing lot; (3) urban growth boundary (UGB) control, which separates urban
development areas from urbanization control areas; and (4) floor area ratio
(FAR) regulation,a which restricts building sizes. The adoption and imple-
mentation of these regulations vary according to the country or the city. In
some cases, multiple regulations may be applied to a single building; likewise,
each regulation could be implemented in slightly different ways.b
Why do cities impose land use regulations? In practice, cities impose land
use regulations for various reasons such as to mitigate traffic congestion and
noise, improve urban aesthetics, control air pollution, recover public service
cost, or reduce frictions between agents (e.g., landowners and residents) and
conflicts in land use.c Similar to other public policies, the targets of practical
land use regulations are not necessarily economically reasonable. Neverthe-
less, sufficient accountability is required for regulations because the regula-
tions restrict residents and landowners from freely using their property as
they wish, and in most cases, regulations result in costs for them. Hence, land
use regulations should be justifiable.
Moreover, buildings are probably one of the most durable goods ever
produced. Accordingly, if a regulation at a certain time leads to inefficient
urban land use, it remains inefficient for many years. An inefficient result of
land use regulation can be seen in Moscow. As shown in Fig. 1.1 borrowed
from Bertaud and Renaud (1997), the Moscow bureaucratic density control
led to a perverse, inverted population density pattern in which suburban
areas have more residents than the central areas, in contrast to Paris where
the reverse is true. The density pattern in Moscow generates heavy traffic
burdens. Another example is seen in suburbs in Tokyo. Fig. 1.2 shows

a
FAR is the ratio of the total floor area of a building to the size of the plot on which the building is built.
b
For example, an urban growth boundary can be implemented by using a greenbelt. In many countries,
for regulating a building, a LS restriction is set along with a restriction on the FAR of the building.
c
Some land use regulations might be used for less benign purposes such as to serve landowners’ benefits
(see Brueckner and Lai, 1996).

Traffic Congestion and Land Use Regulations © 2019 Elsevier Inc. 1

https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-817020-5.00001-7 All rights reserved.
2 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Fig. 1.1 Comparison of density gradients of Moscow and Paris. (Source: Bertaud, A.,
Renaud, B., 1997. Socialist cities without land markets. J. Urban Econ. 41 (1), 137–151.)

Fig. 1.2 Comparison of density gradients among towns in Tokyo. (Source: Sagamihara
City, 2011. Outlook of Sagamihara and Machida Using Maps, p. 52.)
Introduction 3

change in the population density in three suburb towns according to the dis-
tance from the nearest station in 2005 (Sagamihara City, 2011). These three
towns are new towns, informally called “bed towns,” which were built as
residential places for employees working in the center of Tokyo. Comparing
the density patterns among the three towns, while the population density
decreases with distance in Hachiouji and Hashimoto, the density is almost
constant in Machida. The constant density of Machida generates greater
congestion of commuting trips than in the other two towns. This difference
in population density patterns is probably caused by past land use planning.
As these different density patterns show, it is important to set appropriate
land use regulations or policies to achieve efficient population density pat-
terns. However, as this book will show, the urban mechanism behind land
use regulations is not straightforward. Accordingly, careful consideration in
city planning is required at any time.
In economics, policies can be evaluated and accounted for from two
viewpoints: efficiency and income distribution. In this book, we explore
land use regulations from these two perspectives. However, we focus more
on efficient land use regulations because the effect of land use regulations on
income distribution is so indirect and complex that policy makers do not
adopt land use regulations from the viewpoint of income distribution in
most cases. Nevertheless, because land use regulations do not normally
involve income redistribution, it is important to know the effects of land
use regulation on the income distribution between agents. This book
explores the different effects on landowners and residents.
Urban activities in the market mechanisms lose efficiency in various
manners. Land use regulations can deal with several types of market failures
such as agglomeration economies in business areas, congestion externality,
pollution (e.g., noise and air pollution), blocked sunlight or air circulation
between buildings, aesthetic degradation of landscape, and nonoptimal
investment costs of public facilities such as roads and water and sewage sys-
tems. These market failures incur huge social costs.
One important market failure is traffic congestion externalities. Traffic
congestion in the United States in 2007 caused an additional 4.2 billion
hours of travel and an extra 2.8 billion gallons of fuel consumption, costing
a loss of $87.2 billion in travel time and fuel alone (Schrank and Lomax,
2009). In Japan, about 8 billion hours per year are lost due to traffic conges-
tion, and this amount corresponds to about 40% of the travel time (Ministry
of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism, 2015). Traffic conges-
tion externality spatially extends from the center of a city to its boundary,
4 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

and its magnitude depends on the location. So, land use and densities at loca-
tions in a city with traffic congestion are obviously inefficient.
Another important market failure is agglomeration economies, which
arise from high employment density because of easy access to intermediate
goods and labor, facilitating job matching, and knowledge spillovers, among
others (Fujita and Thisse, 2013; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Puga, 2010).
The employment elasticity of city productivity, which is a typical measure of
agglomeration economies, is estimated to be 0.05 in the EU region
(Ciccone, 2002) and Japan (Nakamura, 1985) and 0.06 in the United States
(Ciccone and Hall, 1996).d In other words, doubling the employment den-
sity would increase the city output by 5% in the EU region and Japan and 6%
in the United States.
Agglomeration economies generate spatial concentration of workers,
although the concentration level is insufficient. The geographical concen-
tration of workers simultaneously produces commuting trips from residen-
tial areas to the business areas. As agglomeration economies increase, the
number of concentrated workers increases, and simultaneously the total
length of trips in a city increases. We have to deal with such spatial land
use patterns to increase the welfare of city residents.
These externalities can be completely internalized by spatially differen-
tiated Pigouvian tax (or subsidies), which are differences between the social
marginal cost (benefit) and the private marginal cost (benefit). However, for
political reasons in particular, it is hard to implement such space-dependent
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.
Indeed, Pigouvian taxes, or even diluted versions of Pigouvian taxes,
have never been the common measures to address urban spatial externalities
such as congestion and agglomeration economies. For example, although
most cities in the world suffer from severe traffic congestion, when a few
advanced cities (e.g., London, Milan, Oslo, Singapore, and Stockholm)
introduced congestion pricing, it had been more than 50 years since John
d
Elasticity of productivity can also be measured in terms of industry size (employment) and city size (pop-
ulation). For example, the employment elasticity of productivity in Japanese cities is estimated at 0.05 by
Nakamura (1985), that in Brazilian cities at 0.11 by Henderson (1986), and that in the US metropolitan
statistical areas at 0.19 by Henderson (1986). The population elasticity of productivity in Japanese cities
is estimated at 0.03 by Nakamura (1985) and 0.04 by Tabuchi (1986) and that in Greek regions at 0.05
by Louri (1988). Recently, such quantitative analyses have been conducted at microlevels (individual
firms and plants) owing to the increase in data availability. This body of research includes Henderson
(2003), Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Moretti (2004), and Jofre-Monseny et al. (2014). Henderson
(2003), using panel data, estimates plant level production functions that allow for scale externalities from
other local plants in the same industry and from the diversity of local economic activities outside the
industry.
Introduction 5

Kain and William Vickrey proposed practical versions of congestion pricing

in the 1950s following Pigou’s (1920) initial proposal (see Harsman and
Quigley, 2011). Furthermore, current practical applications of congestion
pricing are in the form of cordon or area pricing and are far from the
first-best congestion pricing. For agglomeration economies, labor subsidies
have been proposed by many studies (e.g., Kanemoto, 1990; Fujita and
Thisse, 2013; Lucas and Rossi–Hansberg, 2002). Nevertheless, labor subsi-
dies have never been introduced in any cities and probably never been
discussed either.
In contrast to such first-best policies, land use regulations have been
imposed for a long time in many cities around the world.e This common
use of land use regulations is partly because governments tend to prefer
quantity regulations to price regulations. For example, in the United States,
92% of the jurisdictions in the 50 largest metropolitan areas have zoning
ordinances of one kind or another in place, and only 5% of the metropolitan
population lives in jurisdictions without zoning (Pendall et al., 2006). In
Japan, most cities have their own local city planning councils to make city
plans. However, it is not an easy task for the governments to rationally design
optimal land use regulations because of the need to consider change in price
distortions caused by the regulations and change in spatial externalities.f
Indeed the mechanisms involving a spatial equilibrium are complex.
Against this background, it is very important to find optimal land use reg-
ulations, by clarifying how the distortions and externalities change according
to land use regulations and by clarifying the mechanisms, which depend on
the urban situation (e.g., whether or not population changes in response to
land use regulation) or the externality characteristics.g For this purpose, we
need a theoretical model in which the outcomes of all the agents’ behaviors
are in equilibrium and the equilibrium depends on land use regulations.
In this chapter, we review theoretical studies on land use regulations.
The purpose of this review is to capture the overall flow of development
of models for analyzing land use regulations and not to show a comprehen-
sive review of the studies. To address the spatial mechanisms of land use
e
The prevalence of land use regulations all over the world could be attributed to the social preference for
policies that involve no direct money payment, making it easy for policy makers to implement such
policies.
f
Sometimes, some members in the local city planning councils in Japan argue that they follow market
equilibrium to set regulations. However, such comment is illogical because if the market equilibrium is
followed, there is no need to set the regulations.
g
Note that land use regulations can be replaced by equivalent property tax policies (see Pines and Kono,
2012).
6 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

regulations, we basically review only general equilibrium models and ignore

empirical research on land use regulations.h In addition, we do not review
growth control papers that consider only the population distribution across
cities and ignore heterogeneous spaces with transportation and amenities
within a city. Basically, we focus on the ingredients, which play an important
role in determining land use regulations in a city.
The following discussion classifies the theoretical studies into five cate-
gories. The first four categories of the studies explore efficiency of land use
regulations rather than income distribution. The first category includes stud-
ies up to the year 2000. Many studies in this period use Alonso-type models
and regard the central business district (CBD) as a point in the center of the
city (a point CBD). The second category of studies, published after 2000,
also features Alonso-type models but with some modification (e.g., a city
with high-rise residential buildings but a point CBD). The third category
extends the Alonso model from a point CBD by adding nonzero business
areas or considering duocentric city. The fourth category leaps from the
Alonso model to demonstrate dynamics and a system of cities and is publi-
shed after 2000. The last category explores mainly income distribution of
land use regulations, rather than efficiency. The studies in each category
are summarized in the tables on the following pages.
Theoretical studies on the efficiency of land use regulations first appear in
the 1970s, following the Muth (1961) model, the Mills and De Ferranti
(1971) model, and the Solow (1973) model, which incorporate road con-
gestion into the Alonso (1964) model. Table 1.1 summarizes such studies
on land use regulations from the 1970s up to 2000.
Studies in this period, except for Arnott and MacKinnon (1978) that
numerically calculate the welfare cost of building size regulation, take
account of cities composed of only detached houses and roads. Most studies
use an Alonso-type model, that is, a static monocentric city. For example,
Kanemoto (1977), Arnott (1979), Pines and Sadka (1985), and Wheaton
(1998) use Alonso-type models to explore deviation of shadow prices from
market prices of housing at different locations under unpriced congestion.
A graphical representation of this type of cities is shown in Fig. 1.3, where
each cylinder on the city circle indicates a house, and the base of the cylinder
represents the lot size. As a result of rent competition among residents, the
h
Land use interventions and their effects on the welfare level of urban residents have been discussed in
many previous studies (see Brueckner, 2009, for a survey of theoretical analyses, or Evans, 1999;
Brueckner, 2009, for a survey of empirical investigations). In addition, huge empirical research is being
produced (e.g., Brueckner et al., 2017; Albouy et al., 2017).
Introduction 7

Table 1.1 Studies on efficiency of land use regulations (1970–2000).

Land use Targeted
Study regulation externalities Model characteristics
Stull (1974) Zoning Neighborhood Nonzero business area,
externalities detached housing
Helpman and Zoning Neighborhood Nonzero business area,
Pines (1977) externalities detached housing,
multiple cities
Kanemoto (1977) UGB control Road congestion Road space, detached
housing
Arnott and FAR No specified Condominiums
MacKinnon regulation externalities
(1978)
Arnott (1979) UGB control Road congestion Road space, detached
housing
Pines and Sadka LS regulation Road congestion Detached housing
(1985) and UGB
control
Sullivan (1983) Zoning Agglomeration Nonzero business area
economies, road
congestion
Brueckner (1990) UGB control Population Dynamic modelling, an
congestion open city
Engle et al. (1992) UGB control Road congestion Detached housing, two-
and pollution city model
Sakashita (1995) UGB control Road congestion Two-city model
Sasaki (1998) UGB control Congestion, public Different landownership
goods, production systems
Wheaton (1998) LS regulation Road congestion Detached housing
Ding et al. (1999) UGB control Congestible public Dynamic modelling, an
good open city
Abbreviations: UGB, urban growth boundary; FAR, floor area ratio; LS, lot size.

CBD

Road

Detached houses

Fig. 1.3 Alonso-type model incorporating congested roads.

8 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

lot size is larger in the suburbs than in the central area. This Alonso-type
model has only detached houses and no high-rise buildings so that the
inverse of the lot size expresses population density. Another important fea-
ture is a point CBD.
Among other studies using similar models, Stull (1974) and Helpman and
Pines (1977) explore zoning, taking account of nonzero business areas in
addition to the residential areas. Sullivan (1983) considers external econo-
mies of scale in production in nonzero business areas under traffic conges-
tion, using numerical simulations. Helpman and Pines (1977), Engle et al.
(1992), and Sakashita (1995) extend the Alonso-type models to include mul-
tiple cities. In contrast to the previously mentioned static models in this
period, Brueckner (1990) and Ding et al. (1999) derive the efficient dynamic
path of the UGB.
As an optimal regulation, Kanemoto (1977) shows that the UGB should
be smaller than the market equilibrium urban boundary. Pines and Sadka
(1985)i and Wheaton (1998) show that the excess burden of unpriced traffic
congestion can be completely eliminated by appropriate LS regulations.
Accordingly, under optimal LS regulation, the UGB can be determined
by the market in their model. This is hardly surprising because implementing
LS regulations is equivalent to determining the population’s distribution in a
city model composed of only detached houses. Comparing Kanemoto
(1977) and Pines and Sadka (1985), we find that simultaneous consideration
of multiple land use regulations (LS regulation and UGB) gives a different
optimal solution (useless UGB in Pines and Sadka) when addressing a single
regulation (useful UGB in Kanemoto). Accordingly, multiple land use reg-
ulations should be explored simultaneously. In this period, most papers
explore zoning, LS regulations, or UGB control, ignoring floor area size reg-
ulations because they treat only detached houses.
Since 2000, variations of the model exploring land use regulations have
expanded. We have classified this variety into three types. Each type is sum-
marized in Tables 1.2–1.4. As shown in Table 1.2, most papers take account
of high-rise buildings including condominiums in a city with point CBD
and explore FAR regulations. This point is different from the studies before
2000. A graphical representation of this type of cities is shown in Fig. 1.4,
where high-rise buildings are added to Fig. 1.2. Unlike the Alonso-type

i
Pines and Sadka (1985) use housing tax to control lot size. However, this is equivalent to LS regulation in
terms of social welfare. Land use regulations can be replaced by equivalent property tax policies (see
Pines and Kono, 2012).
Introduction 9

Table 1.2 City with a point CBD (2000 onward).

Targeted Model
Study Land use regulation externalities characteristics
Bertaud and Maximum FAR regulation No externalities Numerical
Brueckner simulation
(2005)
Brueckner Maximum FAR regulation, Road congestion Numerical
(2007) UGB control simulation
Pines and Kono Maximum and minimum Road congestion
(2012) FAR regulations, UGB
control
Kono et al. Maximum and minimum Road congestion
(2012) FAR regulations, UGB
control
Kono and Joshi FAR regulation, UGB Road congestion Closed and
(2012) control open cities
Borck (2016) Maximum FAR regulation GHG emissions
Tikoudis et al. FAR regulation, UGB Road congestion
(2018) control
Kono and FAR regulation, UGB Road congestion
Kawaguchi control
(2017)
Abbreviations: UGB, urban growth boundary; FAR, floor area ratio; LS, lot size; GHG, greenhouse gas.

Table 1.3 Extensions of the Alonso model from a point CBD (2000 onward).
Land use
Study regulation Targeted externalities Model characteristics
Rossi-Hansberg Zoning Agglomeration Nonzero business area
(2004) economies, no
road congestion
Anas and Rhee UGB Road congestion Mixed land use, nonzero
(2006) business area
Rhee et al. Zoning Agglomeration Mixed land use, nonzero
(2014) economies, road business area
congestion
Buyukeren and UGB Road congestion An uncongested public
Hiramatsu transit mode and a car
(2016) mode
Zhang and Zoning, Agglomeration Nonzero business area
Kockelman UGB economies, road
(2016) congestion
Kono and Joshi Zoning, Agglomeration Nonzero business area
(2018) FAR, economies, road
UGB congestion
Abbreviations: UGB, urban growth boundary; FAR, floor area ratio; LS, lot size.
10 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Table 1.4 Leaps from the Alonso model (2000 onward).

Land use
Study regulation Targeted externalities Model characteristics
Lin et al. (2004) FAR Neighborhood Dynamic modelling
regulation externalities, road
congestion
Anas and Rhee UGB Road congestion Existence of a suburban
(2007) control business district
Anas and UGB Road congestion Two-city model
Pines (2008) control
Joshi and FAR Population congestion Two-zone city with
Kono (2009) regulation growing population
Kono et al. FAR Population congestion Two-zone city
(2010) regulation
Jou (2012) UGB Population congestion Stochastic rents
control
Anas and Pines UGB Road congestion Multiple-city model
(2012) control
Abbreviations: UGB, urban growth boundary; FAR, floor area ratio.

CBD

Road

High-rise building

Detached houses

Fig. 1.4 Alonso-type model with high-rise buildings and roads.

models, the inverse of the lot size does not represent population density any-
more because high-rise buildings include many households. Still, this type of
model assumes a point CBD.
As these post-2000 studies have clarified, we should treat FAR regulation
and LS regulation separately to explore optimal regulations because FAR
regulation necessarily generates deadweight loss caused by the regulation
itself (see Chapter 2 for details), whereas LS regulation has no deadweight
losses (see Pines and Sadka, 1985; Wheaton, 1998). Under FAR regulation,
households can choose their optimal floor size within the regulated build-
ings. In other words, FAR regulation controls population density indirectly,
whereas LS regulation does this directly.
Introduction 11

Considering high-rise buildings, Bertaud and Brueckner (2005),

Brueckner (2007), and Brueckner and Sridhar (2012) quantitatively calcu-
late in a general equilibrium framework how much the welfare cost of max-
imum building size (or FAR) regulation increases with an increase in the
commuting costs. Kono et al. (2012) and Pines and Kono (2012), using a
closed city model, show that minimum FAR regulation should be simulta-
neously imposed along with maximum FAR regulation to achieve optimal
regulation. Next, Kono and Joshi (2012) show how optimal land use regu-
lations differ between closed and open cities. Tikoudis et al. (2018) and
Kono and Kawaguchi (2017) consider road tolls and FAR regulations simul-
taneously. Indeed, real-world cities implementing congestion pricing
impose land use regulations simultaneously.
Land use regulations can also contribute toward making cities environ-
ment friendly by changing population distribution. In a related study, Borck
(2016) estimates how greenhouse gas emissions as CO2-equivalent change
with FAR regulation.
The studies listed in Table 1.2 have taken account of only road conges-
tion or environmental damage in the residential areas, assuming a point
CBD. In contrast to such negative externalities, concentration of workers
in business areas in cities enhances communication and thus facilitates
exchange of innovative ideas (see Rauch, 1993; Ciccone and Hall, 1996;
Duranton and Puga, 2001; Moretti, 2004). Such positive agglomeration
economies in business areas can be explored by taking account of nonzero
business area as shown by post-2000 papers listed in Table 1.3.
In the 1970s, Stull (1974) and Helpman and Pines (1977) already
considered nonzero business areas to explore optimal zoning to tackle exter-
nalities between manufacturing and residential land use. However, agglom-
eration economies arising from employment density are not considered.
Rossi-Hansberg (2004) takes account of the existence of agglomeration
spillovers of firms to explore zoning. Rhee et al. (2014), Zhang and
Kockelman (2016), and Kono and Joshi (2018) consider the existence of
agglomeration economies and traffic congestion to explore land use regula-
tions. Rhee et al. (2014) focus on mixed land use with residences and
businesses. One land use pattern of these models is shown in Fig. 1.5. An
essential feature of this type of cities is no use of a point CBD. So, how land
is allocated for different land use purposes matters.
All previous studies so far have shown that in a monocentric city, resi-
dential locations should be centralized by optimal land use regulations when
there is only car commuting. In contrast, Buyukeren and Hiramatsu (2016),
12 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Road High-rise
commercial building
High-rise residential
building

Detached houses

Fig. 1.5 A city with business zones.

assuming a congested car mode and an uncongested public transit mode,

analytically demonstrate that an expansionary UGB would be optimal under
certain conditions in a simple model composed of two discrete zones. Inter-
estingly, by setting mixed-use zones in a monocentric and nonmonocentric
city having residents with idiosyncratic tastes, Anas and Rhee (2006) also
show that an expansive UGB may be necessary, which contradicts the tra-
ditional conclusions based on a monocentric city model.
The extensions of Alonso models presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 are all
static. Land use regulations influence population density for a long time, and
the regulations cannot be changed easily because of the durability of build-
ings. In a city with low population growth, a one-time decision on FAR
regulation might be useful over a long period. However, many cities, par-
ticularly those in developing countries, have a high population growth rate.
To explore a dynamic situation, Lin et al. (2004) explore the dynamic effects
of exogenous change in FAR regulations on the equilibrium in a mono-
centric city. Joshi and Kono (2009) demonstrate a socially optimal path of
FAR regulation under the presence of negative population externalities that
change dynamically with a growing population. Jou (2012) explores when
and how UGB control should be implemented with a stochastically increas-
ing population. These models are summarized in Table 1.4. Land use reg-
ulation can affect the welfare of agents (e.g., landowners, developers, and
renters) differently at different times; so, some of the studies analyzing
income distribution effects adopt a dynamic framework.
An interesting characteristic of the papers listed in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 is
that all of them target only one city. As Anas and Pines (2008, 2012) show, if
we consider more than one city, optimal land use regulations can differ from
those when only one city is supposed. These studies clarify that the geo-
graphical setting plays an important role in determining the properties of
optimal land use regulations (e.g., see Anas and Rhee, 2007).
These varieties of models are still developing, and the current model set-
tings are limited in many aspects. This leaves room for future works.
Introduction 13

We finally review the studies that focus on the income distribution

effects of land use regulations in Table 1.5. Our division of the studies into
the “efficiency” studies, reviewed earlier, and the “income distribution”
studies is arbitrary in the sense that some papers explore both.
Existing residents in a city have an incentive to control future develop-
ment of the community to serve their own interests. Hence the income dis-
tribution between the current residents and potential future residents
matters. To this end a dynamic model of community formation deserves
attention. This type of studies includes Epple et al. (1988) and Helsley
and Strange (1995), the latter of which assumes endogenous growth control.
In a city, residents with different incomes tend to reside separately
because of income effects on lot sizes and different values of time. Land
use regulations affect residents spatially, so the residents with different
incomes are affected differently. This effect is explored by Pasha (1996).
Land use regulations straightforwardly affect land prices, so the income
distribution between landowners and nonlandowning residents also changes.
As a result, these two kinds of residents, who often bid different rents, reside
separately from one another in the city. This situation is explored by
Brueckner (1995) and Brueckner and Lai (1996). Such income effects
depend, among others, on the system of landownership such as absentee land-
ownership or resident landownership. Only a few studies have addressed
income distribution effects, probably because setting heterogeneity would
complicate the model. Future studies could focus on these effects.
This chapter has so far reviewed how studies on land use regulations have
developed over time. As those papers demonstrate, the geographical setting
(e.g., open or closed setting, one city or a system of cities, and monocentric
or duocentric) and the targeted externalities (e.g., agglomeration economies
and traffic congestion) play an important role in designing optimal land use
regulations. This book addresses land use regulations, disentangling such
complex mechanisms of spatial equilibrium theoretically, and derives prac-
tical ways for optimizing them.
The contents of the remaining chapters are as follows: Chapter 2 shows a
necessity for minimum FAR regulation and maximum FAR regulation to
maximize social welfare in a closed city. In other words, considering only
maximum FAR regulation, a common practice in actual city planning,j is

j
Although not as popular as maximum FAR regulation, cities like Oregon City, Buffalo, and Colorado
Springs have practiced minimum FAR regulation in designated areas to prevent underdevelopment. In
Japan, too, minimum FAR regulation can be imposed according to urban planning law.
14 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Table 1.5 Studies on income effects across agents or endogenously determined

regulations.
Land use Targeted
Study regulation externalities Model characteristics
Epple et al. UGB Public good Two-period model,
(1988) endogenous regulations
Helsley and Population Community-scale Endogenous growth
Strange (1995) controls (e.g., externalities, control
FAR and conflicts among
UGB) communities
Brueckner UGB No externalities Landowner within or
(1995) without UGB, residents,
trade-offs between
agents
Pasha (1996) LS No externalities Two income groups
Brueckner and UGB No externalities Resident landowners and
Lai (1996) residents with no land
Abbreviations: UGB, urban growth boundary; FAR, floor area ratio.

insufficient from a welfare perspective. For obtaining a second-best policy,

the deadweight losses in the floor space market play an important role, and
this chapter shows that, to minimize the total deadweight losses, a minimum
FAR regulation should also be imposed.
Chapter 3 shows that optimality of land use regulation—in this case,
FAR regulation—differs between a closed city and an open city. This chap-
ter demonstrates that a closed city requires not only downward adjustment
to the market density at boundary locations using maximum FAR regulation
but also upward adjustment at central locations using minimum FAR
regulation. On the other hand an open city requires only the former. There-
fore city planners should identify whether the city is open or closed
before determining policies. We will discuss what factors determine the
openness of a city.
Chapter 4 explores optimal land use regulation in a growing city with
congestion. Many cities, particularly those in developing countries, have
a high population growth rate. In such cities the population distribution
and thereby the level of externality at a location can change remarkably over
time. For optimality, FAR regulation should also change dynamically and
concomitantly with population growth. This chapter explores the optimal
timing and scale of FAR regulations in a dynamic setting.
Introduction 15

Chapter 5 addresses optimal land use regulations in a city with agglom-

eration economies and traffic congestion, closely modelling on a real-world
city. A typical city is generally composed of distinct land use zones consisting
of business firms, condominiums, and detached houses. This chapter shows
how regulations on building size, lot size, and the zonal boundaries should
be imposed in the presence of agglomeration economies and traffic conges-
tion. Results show that optimal regulations depend on the trade-off between
agglomeration economies and traffic congestion costs. As an important result
the Appendix of this chapter shows the formulae demonstrating by how
much the building size, the lot size, and the zone sizes should differ from
those determined at the market equilibrium. These formulae readily evalu-
ate whether the current land use regulations are optimal or not.
Chapter 6 introduces cordon pricing in a city with regulated land use.
Several cities have indeed imposed cordon pricing to mitigate traffic conges-
tion and impose land use regulations as well. The chapter explores the opti-
mal level of a single cordon toll and its location and the optimal FAR
regulation. Results show existence of price distortions in the presence of
cordon pricing and FAR regulation.
Chapter 7 focuses on road investment. Up to Chapter 6, we discuss how
to design optimal density and zonal regulations in congested cities. In such
cities, road investment can also reduce congestion, but this requires a large
area of land, which could otherwise be used for residential and business uses.
Chapter 7 explores how much of the land should be allocated for roads in a
city without congestion tolls.
Chapter 8 summarizes results and their implications from the perspective
of urban policy making and discusses future studies as well.
Spatially variable land use regulations can change the spatial distribution
of population. But it is not easy to forecast the effect of land use regulation on
the spatial equilibrium and capture all the changes in price distortions, which
are important factors for optimizing the regulations. These complex mech-
anisms can be captured by rigorous derivation using optimal control theory.
We also provide intuitive explanation in each chapter to supplement math-
ematical derivation.
Optimal control theory has often been used to analyze the first-best allo-
cation in urban economics. However, land use regulations are second-best
policies. So, we have to impose market equilibrium conditions when apply-
ing optimal control theory. Furthermore, land use regulations are not nec-
essarily spatially continuous. For example, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6,
land use regulations should be simultaneously optimized over distinct zones
16 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

(e.g., business zones, condominium zones, and detached housing zones).

We provide detailed explanation of how optimal control theory is applied
to such discontinuous cases to analyze the optimal regulations.
Understanding the mechanisms rigorously provides not only theoretical
insights but also knowledge of the practical usefulness of land use regulations
for the maximization of social welfare. Each chapter provides concise tips for
land use regulations for policy makers. Regarding some of the optimal reg-
ulations proposed in this book, it is hard to compare our results with empir-
ical evidence due to the lack of actual implementation of such regulations. In
such case, we show simulation-based results of the effects of optimal
regulations.

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 CHAPTER TWO

Necessity of a minimum floor

area regulation

2.1 Introduction
Urban areas in most countries are confronted by various externalities.
Agglomeration externalities arise in business areas, based on communication
among people and firms. Negative externalities, which typically include
traffic congestion, congestion in public facilities, noise, and insufficient sun-
light, are prevalent in business areas and residential areas. This chapter argues
that, in order to manage these externalities with floor area ratio (FAR)
regulations, a minimum FAR regulation, though not common in current
practices, is necessary nevertheless, along with a maximum FAR regulation.
Regardless of whether the target externalities are positive or negative,
the overall level of externalities in a zone depends on population densities.
For example, since communication between agents is promoted by easy
accessibility, agglomeration economies depend on population densities.
Likewise, negative externalities, such as congestion, noise, and insufficient
sunlight, also depend on population densities overall. If a certain zone in
an urban area has both positive and negative externalities, the net effect is
also dependent on population densities.
To manage population density externalities in an urban area with high-
rise buildings, FAR regulations are effectivea in the sense that such regula-
tions control building sizes, which are generally large in densely populated
areas. Maximum FAR regulations control population density by restricting
the size of buildings accommodating many households, which in turn helps
reduce negative externalities.

a
FAR regulations can deal with both building-height diseconomies and population density diseconomies.
However, for the former, shape regulations are more appropriate than FAR regulations. This is because
FAR regulations impose a common FAR on a large area, whereas building-height diseconomies arise
within a specific site (e.g., a local area around a high building).

Traffic Congestion and Land Use Regulations © 2019 Elsevier Inc. 21

https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-817020-5.00002-9 All rights reserved.
22 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Lot size (LS) regulation is also used to control population density,

particularly in detached housing zones. Although LS regulation and FAR
regulation are both intended to control population density externalities, they
must be examined separately because of their distinctly different character-
istics. In particular, FAR regulations are second-best policies, whereas the
optimal LS regulation can be a first-best policy. How does that difference
arise? In the zones regulated by FAR regulations, households can choose
their optimal floor space in the regulated buildings, whereas in the zones
regulated by LS regulation, households cannot choose their optimal LSs. If
FAR regulation reduced the total floor space of a building, floor rents would
rise. In response, residents might simply choose to consume less floor space
than before, causing population density to increase. Therefore, to reduce
population density by a certain amount, a sufficiently small FAR would have
to be imposed so that such a response to the regulations by residents could be
overcome.
In other words, FAR regulation can only control the population density
indirectly, whereas LS regulation can do so directly. Correspondingly, FAR
regulations are second-best policies because a difference pertains between
the rent and the marginal supply cost in the “total floor space of a building”
market. The optimal minimum LS regulation, on the other hand, achieves
the first-best outcome, as described in Wheaton (1998). Designing second-
best policies is more difficult than designing first-best policies because the
former deals with the residual deadweight losses.b
This chapter examines where and how to impose FAR regulations in the
presence of negative externality arising from population density using a sim-
ple two-zone city model in which population density externality is larger in
one zone than in the other zone. Applying the model to obtain optimal FAR
regulations following Kono et al. (2010), we show that a maximum FAR
regulation should be imposed in the zone with larger externality and a min-
imum FAR regulation in the other zone. In other words the imposition of
only maximum FAR regulations, a practice common in actual city planning,
is not optimal. This necessity of minimum FAR regulations has also been
argued by Joshi and Kono (2009). For designing a second-best policy, the
deadweight losses in the related markets play an important role. This chapter

b
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) define a general definition of the second-best policies. Accordingly, if there
is some constraint within the general equilibrium system that prevents attainment of at least one of the
Pareto optimal conditions, then attainment of the other Pareto optimal conditions is no longer neces-
sarily welfare improving.
Necessity of a minimum floor area regulation 23

shows how a minimum FAR regulation minimizes the total deadweight

loss, hereby justifying its necessity.
We also verify, through numerical simulation, the necessity of simulta-
neous imposition of minimum and maximum FAR regulations in a mono-
centric city with traffic congestion externality. We also compare welfare
gains under market equilibrium and different policy regimes including con-
gestion toll (first-best policy), FAR regulation, urban growth boundary
(UGB) regulation, and FAR with UGB regulations.
The remaining part of this chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2.2
develops a two-zone city model with population density externality, and
Section 2.3 examines FAR regulations for the same. Section 2.4 presents
numerical simulation to explore different policy regimes including FAR
regulation in a monocentric city with traffic congestion externality.
Section 2.4 presents conclusions. The final subsection provides Technical
Appendix.

2.2 The model

2.2.1 The city
This chapter uses a simple city model composed of two residential zones, Zone
h and Zone l with fixed areas, denoted Ah and Al , respectively.c Fig. 2.1 shows
an image of the target city. The land is divided into an urbanization promotion
area, which is composed of the two aforementioned residential zones, and an
urbanization restriction area. This division is fixed. Without any loss of gener-
ality, we assume that the externality level in Zone h (high-externality zone) is
more severe than in Zone l (low-externality zone) because of the difference in
zone-specific environmental factor q
i , which represents all location-relevant
utility-enhancing factors such as weather, existence of a shopping center, or
transportation facilities. The variable q
i engenders different equilibrium popu-
lation densities in Zones h and l. Although each zone in the model city could
have both positive and negative externalities, we assume, for simplicity, that the
net externality in each zone is negative.d
The economy has two types of agents: homogeneous households and
developers. Each household member works outside the residential areas.
External diseconomies arise only from the population density. No resident
c
The setting of two zones is for simplicity; multiple zones can also be grouped into two zones.
d
The concluding section of the chapter explains how the results are applicable to cases in which positive
externality is greater than negative externality.
24 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Fig. 2.1 City configuration.

migrates to another city (i.e., the city is closed),e reflecting that workers are
unable to move to another city to work.

2.2.2 Household behavior

The household utility in Zone i (i 2 {h,l}), denoted Vi, comprises floor
space fi; composite goods zi; zone population Ni; and zone-specific envi-
ronmental variable qi , which is exogenously given. The zone population
Ni (i 2 {h,l}) in the utility function expresses the population density exter-
nality. Note that population density is proportional to zone population
because the zone area is fixed by assumption. For that reason the external-
ity in the model is related directly to both population density and zone
population. Typical examples of such externalities are familiar urban prob-
lems such as traffic congestion and noise caused by the residents. For sub-
urban residents also, such externalities might exist in the form of traffic
congestion on specific roads leading to downtown or congestion in
large-scale stores and public facilities.
We adopt a quasilinear utility function for simplicity, and use consumer
surplus for welfare analysis. The income is the sum of the exogenous wage w
e
An open city is explored in the next chapter.
Necessity of a minimum floor area regulation 25

and income from the land and developers’ profit. We assume public own-
ership of the land and developers (i.e., all households share the land and
developers’ profit equally). The household model is formulated as
" #
1 X
Vi ¼ max uð fi , Ni , qi Þ + zi , s:t: zi + ri fi ¼ w + Π+ Ri Ai , i 2 fh, lg (2.1)
z i , fi N i

where u() is subutility function, ri is the rent of floor space, Ri is land rent, N
is total population (constant), Ai is the supply of land (constant), and Π is
developers’ profit.
Regarding the preference, we make the following plausible assump-
tions. First the subutility function u() decreases as Ni increases, that is,
∂u/∂Ni < 0, which expresses negative population externality. Moreover,
uð fi , Ni , qi Þ increases as fi increases, that is, ∂u/∂fi > 0; also, ∂2 u=∂Ni 2 < 0
and ∂2 u=∂fi 2 < 0. Second the cross derivative of u() with regard to Ni
and fi is zero, that is, ∂2u/∂fi ∂Ni ¼ 0. This assumption implies that the pref-
erence for floor space is independent of the external population density
externality.

2.2.3 Developers’ behavior

Landowner-cum-developers produce floor space Fi in Zone i (i 2 {h, l}).
Floor space and land are supplied under perfect competition. The inputs
for producing floor space are composite goods zdi and land Adi . Developer’s
profit is formulated as
X X
Π¼ ri Fi  Si ðRi Fi Þ, i 2 fh, lg (2.2)
i i
   
where Si ðRi Fi Þ ¼ min zdi , Adi zdi + Ri Adi , s:t: Fi ¼ Fi zdi , Adi (cost function
of developers). The production function is assumed to be homogeneous
of one degree for expressing perfect competition—the developers’ profit
Π is zero. Floor space Fi is exogenous for developers because it is controlled
under FAR regulations by the government. FAR is defined as floor space
Fi divided by the respective fixed zone area Ai , that is, Fi =Ai .

2.2.4 Market clearing conditions

The market equilibrium conditions are given in Eqs. (2.3)–(2.6) and are
explained as follows. First the sum of all residential lots demanded equals
the total supply of the floor area in each zone:
26 Traffic congestion and land use regulations

Floor space:
Ni fi ¼ Fi , i 2 fh, lg (2.3)
The land consumed by developers equals the supply of land:
Land area:

Adi ¼ Ai , i 2 fh,l g (2.4)

Residents migrate between zones without incurring any cost, so the utility
levels must be equal between Zones 1 and 2:
Utility:
V1 ¼ V2 (2.5)
Finally the population constraint holds:
Population:
X
Ni ¼ N , i 2 fh, lg (2.6)
i

2.3 Optimal FAR regulations

2.3.1 Harberger’s welfare function and optimal conditions
for FAR regulation
Maximizing the utility of each household is equivalent to maximizing
aggregate household utility because all households are homogeneous.
 P 
The aggregate household utility function is written as W ¼ i Ni Vi
(i 2 {h, l}), which is hereinafter called social welfare. Optimal FAR regula-
tions are defined as maximizing W by controlling both F1 and F2 subject to
Eqs. (2.1)–(2.6).
Through calculations provided in Technical Appendix 2(1), the total dif-
ferential form of social welfare, dW, is obtained as
     
∂Sh ∂Sl ∂u ∂u
dW ¼ rh  dF h + rl  dF l + Nh dN h + Nl ½dN h 
∂Fh ∂Fl ∂Nh ∂Nl
(2.7)
Eq. (2.7) shows the total change in deadweight losses in the following three
markets: FARs in Zones h and l and the population density market. The first
term and second term in Eq. (2.7), respectively, express the changes in dead-
weight losses in the floor space markets in Zones h and l. The third term
Necessity of a minimum floor area regulation 27

expresses the change in population density externality in Zones h and l. Note

that dNh ¼  dNl because the city is closed by assumption. Eq. (2.7) is con-
sistent with Harberger’s (1971) welfare change measurement formula,
which represents the change in welfare with the existence of deadweight loss
in an economy.f
Social welfare W is written as W(Fh, Fl), that is, a function of floor spaces,
which are policy controllable variables. To maximize W(Fh, Fl) with respect
to floor spaces, we require ∂W/∂Fh ¼ 0 and ∂W/∂Fl ¼ 0. This implies that a
change in the floor space does not change the social welfare at optimal con-
dition. The optimization conditions for Fi (i 2 {h, l}) are obtained as follows,
using Eq. (2.7):
   
∂W ∂Sh ∂u ∂u dN h
¼ rh  + Nh  Nl and (2.8a)
∂Fh ∂Fh ∂Nh ∂Nl dF h
   
∂W ∂Sl ∂u ∂u dN h
¼ rl  + Nh  Nl (2.8b)
∂Fl ∂Fl ∂Nh ∂Nl dF l

The first parenthesis in Eq. (2.8a), that is, floor rent minus the marginal cost
in Zone h, implies the marginal change in the deadweight loss in the floor
space market in Zone h according to the change in Fh. The second term in
Eq. (2.8a) implies the marginal change in total population density externality
in Zones h and l, resulting from the migration from Zone h to Zone l
according to the change in Fh. Eq. (2.8b) can be similarly explained.
An important point to note is that, to maximize the social welfare with
respect to the supply of Zone i floor space (i 2 {h, l}), the marginal change in
the sum of the deadweight loss in the floor space market in Zone i and the
total population density externality in Zones h and l is expected to be zero.

2.3.2 Optimal FAR regulations and market equilibrium FAR

Optimal FAR regulations can be compared with the market FAR: whether
the regulated floor space is expected to be smaller or larger than the market
equilibrium floor space. To that end, we rewrite the optimization conditions
(2.8a) and (2.8b) in terms of two new functions, DFi and DN, and two new
variables, FM e
i and F i , with definitions following next.
P
f
Harberger’s welfare formula is expressed as dW/dQ ¼ iΞi ∂Xi/∂Q where Ξi is the distortion (e.g., price
minus marginal cost) in market i, X is the output in market i, and Q is the policy variable. See Supple-
mentary Note at the end of this Chapter.
Another random document with
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 »Teatterien ovet ovat köyhiltä suljetut; kirjoja eivät oppimattomat
ymmärrä. Taide on olemassa ainoastaan muutamia valittuja varten,
jotka etsivät siitä milloin nautintoa, milloin lohtua. Tätä lohtua ja
nautintoa tahtoo Antoine Genesvrier tarjota teillekin ja hän opettaa
teidät sitä ymmärtämään, siitä iloitsemaan. Hän poimii teille taiteen
laajasta aarreaitasta, ihmiskunnan yhteisestä perinnöstä, kaikkein
täydellisimmät, puhtaimmat, helpoimmin tajuttavat palaset. Ne teistä,
jotka älynlahjojensa tai korkeamman sivistystasonsa avulla jo voivat
iloita näistä jaloista nautinnoista, liittykööt auttamaan Genesvrier'ta ja
hänen työtovereitaan heidän ponnistuksissaan. He voivat niistä
levittää hedelmällistä tietoa, innostuttaa heikommilla kyvyillä
varustettuja tovereitaan. Käsityöläiset, työmiehet, täältä löydätte
paremmin kuin kapakasta, paremmin kuin konserttikahviloiden
karkeista huveista, virkistystä jokapäiväiseen aherrukseenne,
unohdusta kovaan arkielämäänne, pyhää innostusta, iloa, joka ei
alenna. Te opitte tuntemaan näitä ihmisiä, jotka tekevät työtä ja
taistelevat samoin kuin tekin ja joita te pidätte itsellenne vieraina,
'porvareina', huomaamatta sitä, että he pyrkivät juuri toteuttamaan
teidän omia päämääriänne. He vuorostaan, taiteilijat, kirjailijat,
henkisen työn tekijät, uudistuvat ja tuorestuttavat mielikuvitustaan
kansan sielun kosketuksesta.

»En voi kuvata teille, hyvät naiset ja herrat, millä ilon ja

luottamuksen tunteilla jätän tämän salin. Olen nähnyt ensimmäisen
esimerkin taiteen ja elämän liittoutumisesta, siitä, kuinka
yhteiskunnalliset vihanaiheet voidaan unhoittaa henkisen
veljestymisen tietä, joka ennustaa sydänten veljeyttä ja niitä suuria
tulevaisuuden juhlia, joihin koko ihmiskunta on ottava osaa.»

En jäänyt odottamaan, kunnes koko yleisön aalto vyöryisi ulos

selkoselälleen avatusta ovesta. Laskien alas harsoni ja napittaen
kiinni päällysnuttuni livahdin eteisestä ulos kuin varjo. Mustat ja
tyhjät kadut pelottivat minua näin myöhäisellä hetkellä. Huusin ajurin
ja käskin ajamaan kotiin.

Heti kun olin muuttanut vaatteita, herättämättä Babettea, menin

alakerrokseen ja avasin kirjaston oven. Siitä oli jo kauan, kun olin
siellä viimeksi käynyt. Kylmä ilmavirta tulvahti vastaani saaden minut
värisemään ohuessa yöpuvussani ja häilytti kynttilöiden liekkejä
kaksihaaraisessa kynttiläjalassa, jota kannoin ojennetuin käsin
valaisten itselleni tietä. Asetin tulen pöydälle, seisoin nojaten tuolin
selkämystään ja katselin kuinka häilähtelevät valosilmät heittivät
kattoon saakka huonekalujen eriskummalliset varjokuvat ja piirsivät
sinne luonnottoman suuriksi Platonin rintakuvan ääriviivat. Korkealla
uunilla, melkein hiusteni tasalla, jatkoi olympialainen Pallas vanhaa
mietiskelyään. Koko huone näytti minusta vieraalta, pelottavalta,
melkein yliluonnolliselta. Keveä hiki helmeili ohimoillani, hiusrajassa,
mutta voitin tämän heikkouden. Kädet liitettyinä ristiin kuin
rukoukseen minä kutsuin kaikilla sieluni hiljaisilla äänillä luokseni sitä
varjoa, jota olin tullut avukseni huutamaan.

»Jos jossakin vielä elätte, oi rakas setäni, jos lapsenne ajatus voi
yhtyä teidän ajatukseenne, joka ruumiin kahleista vapaana on
muuttunut kuolemattomaksi, niin missä muualla, jollei täällä, näiden
seinien sisällä, näiden vanhojen kunnianarvoisten esineiden
keskellä, jossa te eläessännekin niin hyvin viihdyitte? Ja jos
ajatuksennekin olisi sammunut ruumiin mukana niinkuin lampunliekki
sammuu, niin täällä voin hellyyteni ihmevoimalla herättää sen uuteen
elämään muistojeni maailmassa.

»Muistan tuon kohtalokkaan hetken elämässäni, hetken täynnä

pelottavaa aavistelua, jolloin te Châtaigneraie'n kukkien keskellä
selititte minulle elämän tarkoitusta ja tulevan rakkauden olemusta.
Hyvin vähän tiesin tuosta rakkauden olemuksesta vielä silloin, kun
iltaruskon kullatessa ketoja tai aamuauringon noustessa kaupungin
yli lupasin vihkiä itseni teidän ennustamallenne sankarille.

»Te uneksitte hänestä lapsuudestani alkaen, selittäessänne

minulle Plutarkhosta vanhan viikunapuun alla. Häntä varten te teitte
minut viisaaksi, voimakkaaksi ja puhtaaksi; häntä varten veistitte
virheettömään marmoriin ihanteellisen kuvapatsaan, joka hänen
kosketuksensa kerran piti herättää eloon.

»Oi, isäni, oi mestarini, nyt hän on tullut, tuo sankari! Luulin

tuntevani hänet väärässä hahmossa, ja tie, jota olin lähteä
kulkemaan, olisi ainaiseksi etäännyttänyt minut hänestä. Vihdoinkin
olen saanut selvyyden ja palaan hänen luokseen, jonka tekin olisitte
sisimmässä sielussanne minulle valinnut; hänen luokseen, joka
köyhänä ja ihmisten väärin ymmärtämänä on voinut elää
korkeampaa elämää kuin muut ja luoda itsestään jumalan kuvan.

»Hänen läheisyytensä vaikutti minuun peloittavasti. En tiennyt,

että minä rakastin häntä. Mutta kaikkien muiden kanssa tunsin
olevani yksin; erämaa ympäröitsi minua kaikkialla, missä häntä ei
ollut. Maanpakolaisena vieraassa, oudossa maailmassa, tuntien —
itsekään käsittämättä, mitä se oli — salaperäistä koti-ikävää,
kirkastui minulle vähitellen murheeni ja levottomuuteni läpi hänen
kauneutensa, suuruutensa ja voimansa. Ja näin täyttyi teidän
ennustuksenne: saavutin rakkauden ihailun kautta.

»On kuin kuuluisi humaus halki yöllisen hiljaisuuden; kynttilän liekit

lepattavat kuin haudantakainen henkäys niitä koskettaisi. Mestari,
Isä, tekö se olette? Onko se teidän sielunne, joka laskeutuu alas
salaperäisestä Tähdestä tai kohoaa ilmoille kuolleitten pimeästä
valtakunnasta? Siunatkaa tytärtänne, joka herää
kaksikymmenvuotisesta unestaan ja rientää valittunsa syliin,
elämään.»
XXX.

— Neiti Hellé! huudahti Marie Lamirault aukaisten Genesvrier'n

asunnon oven… Mikä yllätys! Kylläpä herra Antoine nyt tulee
olemaan tyytyväinen!

— Onko hän kotona, Marie?

— Ei, neiti, mutta hän tulee pian… Minä käyn iltapäivisin täällä
siivoamassa. Astukaa sisään! Pikku Pierre on mukanani. Hän leikkii
eteisessä. Tule, Pierrot, tule pikku mies!

Tanakka lapsukainen riippui hameessani: otin hänet syliini ja

kannoin hänet Antoinen työhuoneeseen saakka, jonne äiti nauraen
mielihyvästä minua seurasi.

— Neiti on tullut hiukan kalpeaksi… Ah, olen paljon ajatellut neitiä,

Babettea, tuota maalaistaloa ja herra Sylvain raukkaa, joka oli niin
hyvä!

— Ja onko teillä paljon työtä, Marie?

— No, onhan sitä jonkun verran, ei kehuttavasti. Siitä on kuitenkin

se etu, että ehdin käydä siivoamassa herra Antoinen luona, kun
asun tässä aivan lähellä. Käyn aina silloin, kun hän ei ole kotona,
sillä hän ei halua tulla häirityksi.

Pikku Pierre, joka ei minua tuntenut, katseli minua pelokkaan

näköisenä. Siirsin syrjään hänen otsalle valahtaneet ruskeat
kiharansa ja tarkastelin häntä kauan, — ei sen vuoksi, että olisin
tahtonut hälventää epäluuloa, jota ei enää sydämessäni ollut, vaan
nauttiakseni varmuudesta. Katselin noita somia, vienosti punertavia
kasvoja, jotka muistuttivat äidin piirteitä, ja veitikkamaisia, kauniin
sinivihreitä silmiä, jotka olivat aivan samanlaiset, niin oli Marie
minulle kertonut, kuin Louis Florentin silmät. Ihana riemuntunto
valtasi minut ja minä suutelin pikku Pierreä.

— Eikö totta, neiti, hän on kovasti kasvanut. Hän on herttainen.

— Hyvin herttainen, Marie, ja teidän näköisenne… Pierrot

kultaseni! Hän ei tunne minua enää. Se johtuu siitä, että olen vähän
laiminlyönyt häntä tänä talvena. Meistä tulee jälleen ystävät nyt, me
palautamme vanhat hyvät välimme ennalleen… koska en menekään
naimisiin.

— Siis, kuiskasi Marie, siis on totta, että…

— Niin, se on totta. Jään naimattomaksi, hyvä Marie, ellen löydä

sellaista miestä, joka täysin minulle soveltuu… Mutta asiasta
toiseen, kertokaa minulle jotakin herra Antoinesta. Miten hän voi?

— Jokseenkin hyvin, neiti. Hän rasittaa itseään kovin

kirjoituksillaan.
Ja sitten, hänellä on ollut ikävyyksiä, tietäähän sen.
 — Sanokaa minulle totuus, Marie, minun täytyy se tietää. Onko
herra
Genesvrier puhunut teille minusta?

— On… hän on kysellyt minulta, olenko Babettelta kuullut teistä

jotakin. Hän on joka päivä odottanut kirjettä. Voi, hän on ollut niin
levoton.

— Entä rouva Marboy?

— Hän on käynyt täällä herra Genesvrier'n luona. Tiedän sen

siksi, että olin täällä silloin. Minä luulen, että heillä oli jonkunlaista
sanasotaa keskenään.

— Hyvä on, se asia kyllä järjestyy. Mutta olkaa niin kuin ei minua
täällä olisikaan; jatkakaa työtänne.

— Kaikki on valmista, neiti, olin juuri pois lähdössä.

— No niin, lähtekää vain, minä jään odottamaan herra Antoinea.

Hän puki päällysmekon poikansa ylle, sanoi minulle hyvästi ja

lähti.

Olin yksin Antoinen luona, tuossa pienessä huoneustossa, jossa

olin viettänyt hänen kanssaan niin monta suloista ja työteliästä
hetkeä, jonne olin tuonut rakkautta ja jättänyt tuskaa. Kuten
ensimmäistä kertaa täällä käydessäni kauan sitten loi nytkin kirkas
maaliskuun päivä korkeiden ikkunoiden täydeltä huoneeseen
valoaan. Parvi varpusia sirkutti pappilan puutarhoissa. Suuri
kuparinen lamppu seisoi täytettynä työpöydällä; päällekkäin kasatut
kirjat loistivat silmiin erivärisin selkämystöin. Mustalla marmori-
uunilla vääntelehti Michel-Angelon Orja tuskaisin jäsenin vastapäätä
ruskeisiin kehyksiin suljettua Melankoliaa, joka oli laskenut lepoon
raukeat siipensä ja unelmoi, putkiloista ja rautayrteistä punottu
seppel päässään.

Luostarin rauha vallitsi täällä, tuollainen hiljaisuus, jota niin

rakastin ja joka on sovelias opiskelulle, unelmoimiselle, suuren
rakkauden kätketylle salaisuudelle. Millä sisäisellä, sykähdyttävällä
ilolla näinkään taas edessäni nuo ruskeat tammiset huonekalut,
vihertävät seinäpaperit, nuo raikkaat olkimatot kuluneella lattialla!
Kauan, kauan odotin. Aurinko jo laski. Kello löi kuutta Saint-Etiennen
kellotornissa.

Vihdoinkin työnnettiin avain avaimenreikään, kuului askeleita, ovi

avautui ja kynnyksellä, edessäni, näin Antoinen.

Hän pysähtyi kuin puusta pudonneena. Olin rientänyt häntä

vastaan, mutta en saanut suustani ainoatakaan sanaa. Me
seisoimme siinä vastatusten, mykkinä syvässä äänettömyydessä,
jossa olisimme voineet kuulla toistemme sydämen tykinnän.

— Mitä on tapahtunut, Hellé? kysyi hän vihdoin äänellä, jota ei

ollut tuntea… Voinko jollakin tavoin auttaa teitä? Puhukaa vapaasti.

— Olen ollut Parisissa jo neljä päivää… En ole uskaltanut tulla,

enkä tahtonut kirjoittaa… Tänään vihdoinkin…

Huolestunut ryppy näkyi hänen otsallaan. Hän laski hattunsa

pöydälle ja istuutui viereeni.

— Puhukaa. Olen kokonaan käytettävissänne, huolimatta

julmasta, selittämättömästä vaitiolostanne, josta en ole tiennyt mitä
ajatella. Mutta olkoon asianne mikä hyvänsä, muistakaa, että olen
ystävänne.

Ajatellessani, millaisia kärsimyksiä olin mahtanut tuottaa hänelle,

oli sydämeni pakahtua noiden hienojen ryppyjen uurtamain,
äänettömäin tuskan-öiden, ankaran hellittämättömien työpäiväin,
salaisen kärsimyksen näytelmän kalventamain, stoalaisten kasvojen
edessä.

— Hellé, jatkoi hän lempeästi, olen kuullut kerrottavan ihmeellisiä

asioita… Olette purkanut kihlauksenne Clairmontin kanssa?

Nyökkäsin myöntävästi.

— Rouva Marboy kertoi siitä minulle, mutta en käsittänyt mitään

niistä lisäyksistä, joilla hän koristi kertomustaan… Hän melkein
suoranaisesti syytti minua siitä, että olin muka tullut teidän
molempain rakkautenne väliin, yllyttänyt teitä kapinaan. Hän puhui
salaperäisin vihjauksin eikä nähtävästi sanonut minulle kaikkea, mitä
hän ajatteli. Mitään muuta en tiedä, Hellé. Marie Lamiraultilta sain
kuulla sen, että olitte matkustanut pois. Lukemattomia kertoja olen
ollut kiusauksessa kirjoittaa teille; mutta te olitte luvannut lähettää
minulle kirjeen, jota ei kuitenkaan saapunut, ja, minun täytyy
tunnustaa se teille, olen pelännyt… Ah, olen elänyt nämä kolme
kuukautta kuin painajaisen alla, ystävä raukka!

Kyyneleet nousivat silmiini. Hän katsoi minuun äänettömänä.

— Te itkette, sanoi hän. Mitä olettekaan tehnyt, varomaton

tyttönen?
Mikä oikku sai teidät särkemään onnen, jota epäilemättä nyt
murehditte?
Te itkette, siis rakastatte vielä ja arvaan…

Pudistin päätäni.

— Ah, teillekin, sanoi hän tuskaisesti hymyillen, jota minä luulin

niin viisaaksi ja voimakkaaksi, tuottaa rakkaus lapsen suruja. Te
nurkuilette omalle sydämellenne… Mutta mikä teidän on, Hellé?
Teidän on siis niin kovin vaikea olla! Ettekö voi puhua? No niin,
itkekää, jos se tekee hyvää teille. En kysele teiltä sen enempää.
Tiedän vain, että olette onneton ja että tahtoisin teitä lohduttaa. Enkö
ollut ennen paras ystävänne? Kuinka te olette kalpea ja laihtunut,
lapseni!

Mielenliikutuksen järkyttämänä, poissa suunniltani, tietämättä

enää, mitä sanoa, peitin kasvoni käsiini. Hän siirsi ne sivulle
ikäänkuin rohkaisten minua puhumaan, ja hänen kasvoiltaan hohti
rakkauden ja säälin kirvelevä kauneus. Me vaikenimme molemmat,
mutta yrittäessäni pehmeän avuttomalla, harkitsemattomalla
liikkeellä kääntää päätäni poispäin, osuin Antoinen olkapäihin, johon
punastuen nojasin otsani.

Hän kuiskasi:

— Hellé…

Tunsin koko hänen ruumiinsa vapisevan… Hänen kätensä

laskeutui hiljaa hiuksilleni isällisesti ja rauhoittavasti.

— Kertokaa minulle kaikki, ystäväni! (Hänen matala äänensä

vapisi hiukan.) Minä en ole lainkaan muuttunut. Toivon kaikesta
sydämestäni, jos mahdollista vielä enemmän kuin ennen näkeväni
teidät onnellisena. Eikö setänne uskonut teitä minun hellään
hoivaani?… Tiedätte, etten kanna mitään kaunaa… ja että rakastan
teitä aina… Ja juuri sentähden, että rakastan teitä, otan osaa teidän
hätäänne. En voi nähdä teidän itkevän, se koskee minuun, ja
kuitenkin! Nähdessäni noiden kyyneleiden, jotka vierivät toisen
vuoksi, noiden kyyneleiden, jotka polttavat minun sydäntäni,
vuotavan täällä, minun luonani, tunnen, ah Hellé, samalla
jonkunlaista katkeraa, kummallista iloa! Se, että olette rientänyt
tänne tuskanne hetkellisessä puuskassa, todistaa, etten ole tullut
teille vieraaksi. Voi, pikku raukkani, olen kovin kykenemätön ja
taitamaton teitä lohduttamaan. Osaan niin huonosti puhua. Sanat
jättävät minut pulaan… Hellé, Hellé, tekö siinä todella olette? En
tahdo voida uskoa, että olette luonani… Huomenna, kun olette
unohtanut surunne ja nuo kyyneleet, sekä sen, joka ei rohjennut niitä
pyyhkiä, sulkeutuu iäksi yksinäisten unelmieni kehä. Olen etsivä teitä
täältä asunnostani, jossa en enää uskonut teitä näkeväni… jonne
varmaankaan ette enää koskaan palaa… Ja olen kärsivä!
Valitettavasti olen vain pelkkä ihminen ja minullekin ovat tuttuja nuo
epätoivon hetket, jotka murtavat miehekkäimmänkin rohkeuden,
lujimmankin tahdonvoiman… Mutta olenhan taas saanut nähdä
teidät, ystävä. Olen puristanut noita pieniä kätösiä, hivellyt noita
vaaleita hiuksia… Ah, itkekää kauan, olkaa kauan noin… jospa
tietäisitte… Elämä, tuo armoton elämä, lahjoittaa minulle tässä
lyhyessä hetkessä enemmän kuin uskalsin siltä pyytääkään!

Kyyneleeni, jotka eivät enää olleet katkeria, vaan suloisia, vierivät

yhä, pitkittäen Genesvrier'n erehdystä. Minun mielenliikutukseni
tarttui vähitellen häneen; hänen rakkautensa purkautui ilmi
epätahallisiin tunnustuksiin, joiden ennentuntematon sävy
hämmästytti minua.
 Emme kumpikaan ajatelleet enää mitään selityksiä.
Sydämissämme liikkuvien tunteiden uutuus, Antoinen intohimoiset
sanat, hänen äänensä, katseensa ja kosketuksensa saivat minut
kuin huumauksen valtaan. »Tämäkö siis on tuo tyyni Genesvrier?»
sanoin itsekseni, huomaamatta, että hän olisi voinut minulle vastata:
»Tämäkö siis on tuo kylmä Hellé?»

Kohotin pääni, katseemme kohtasivat toisensa…

— Antoine, te rakastatte minua vielä, rakastatte yhä edelleen!

Huuliltani pääsi tämä riemun huudahdus, jota hän luuli naisellisen

turhamaisuuden purkaukseksi. Se loukkasi hänen ylpeyttään. Hän
kalpeni, hänen huulensa puristuivat yhteen:

— En luullut, että se voisi tuottaa teille niin suurta iloa!

Hän päästi irti käteni, jota en vetänyt pois. Silloin vaivuin polvilleni
ohuelle olkimatolle ja kuiskasin hymyillen kyyneleitteni läpi:

— Ettäkö en iloitsisi rakkaudestanne, Antoine, ah, voitteko sitä

epäillä! Katsokaa minua tarkkaan! Ettekö näe levottomuuttani,
häpeääni, iloani?… Kuinka voisin ilmaista sen, mitä tahtoisin sanoa?
Ettekö enää osaa nähdä sydämeen? Älkää pyytäkö minua
selittämään yksityiskohtia, jotka saatte tietää myöhemmin,
huomenna, sitten kun meillä on aikaa puhua muista… Mitäkö on
tapahtunut?… Oh, se on hyvin yksinkertaista: luulin rakastavani
miestä, joka oli miellyttävä, heikko, häilyväinen ja kevyt. Elämän
koetuksissa näyttäytyi hän olevan mitätön luonne, matelevainen
voimakkaiden edessä, epäoikeudenmukainen, itsetiedoton, valmis
halpamaisiin sovitteluihin, jotka minusta olivat tuomittavia…
Huomasin, että olin rakastanut hänessä omaa mielikuvaani,
hämärän ihanteeni kajastusta… Ja nyt olen katkaissut tuon hauraan
siteen, joka yhdisti minut ventovieraaseen, nyt palaan teidän
luoksenne, Antoine, yhdistääkseni, jos vielä sitä haluatte,
menneisyytemme tulevaisuuteemme. Siinä yksinäisyydessä, jossa
nyt olen elänyt kaksi kuukautta, olen päivä päivältä ajatuksissani
tullut teitä lähemmäksi. Mitä siitä, jos tietämättömät ihmiset ovat teitä
vähäksyneet ja kurjat luonteet teitä panetelleet! Totuuden
vastustamaton voima on kirkastanut minulle teidän oikean
olemuksenne: te olette suurempi kuin kaikki muut, minun korkean
rakkaus-unelmani sankari.

Hän oli hämmästyksestä sanaton, uskaltamatta uskoa

odottamatonta onnea, joka iski häneen kuin salama.

— Antoine, katsokaa minuun! Olen tässä teidän vieressänne ja

tarjoan teille kyynelsilmin, ristissä käsin, kaikessa sydämen
nöyryydessä sieluni, ruumiini, elämäni, rukoillen teitä liittämään
minut elämäntyöhönne, nostamaan minut luoksenne, antamaan
minulle anteeksi.

Hän huusi:

— Hellé, Hellé, jonka jo luulin kadottaneeni!… Ainoa, ikuinen

rakkauteni!

Pimeys laskeutui huoneeseen. Se peitti yksityiskohdat, verhoten

esineitten muodot harmaaseen, salaperäiseen huntuun, ikäänkuin
irroittaen rakkautemme pois todellisuudesta. Aivan meidän
lähellämme, sohvan päällä, luulin vielä erottavani pienen taulun,
Albrecht Dürerin synkän enkelin, tuon voimakkaan ja vakavan
Melankolian, jota aina olin tervehtinyt tämän huoneen
suojelushengettärenä. Pimeys tiheni yhä: taulu katosi,
vertauskuvallinen enkeli häipyi tummuuteen, jossa enää vallitsi vain
yksi taivaallinen vieras, Rakkaus. Ja minä olin Antoinen sylissä. Hän
puristi rajusti aaltoilevaa rintaansa vasten neitseellistä saalistaan,
joka vihdoinkin oli alistunut ja voitettu. Nuo ennen niin
läpitunkemattomat silmät, huulien auennut kukkeus, hiusten
aaltoileva välke kuuluivat nyt hänelle. Hän itse säteili onnea, voimaa,
uutta nuoruutta, sankarillisen sielunsa kauneutta, — pimeyden
varjosta loistivat enää vain silmämme ja minä tunsin vihdoinkin
löytäneeni sen, jota aina olin odottanut.
XXXI.

Tähän unohtumattomaan hetkeen lopetan nuoruudenmuistelmani,

jotka olen kirjoittanut hiljaisessa ja tuoksuvassa Châtaigneraie'ssa
pitkän yksinäisen kuukauden kuluessa, hellästi rakastetun
elämäntoverini ollessa matkoilla kaukana luotani.

Joka vuosi palaan tänne, ankaran, työteliään talven jälkeen,

virkistymään synnyinseutuni raikkaassa luonnossa ja nauttimaan
lapsuuteni muistoista. Mikään ei ole muuttunut, ei iäkkään arvokas
talo, ei puutarha, eikä vanha kaivo, jossa värisevä valokiekko yhä
välkähtelee kostean sammalkehän alla, ei seinän vierellä olevat
portaat, joilla ennen iltaisin istuin laskevan auringon ruskossa
ajatellen ja toivoen yli-inhimillistä rakkautta.

Satavuotinen viikunapuu levittelee oksiaan ja suuret sinipunaiset

viikunat putoavat ruohoon pehmeästi kahahtaen. Kaunis lapsukainen
poimii niitä maasta yksitellen ja näyttää välistä niitä minulle nauraen.
Hän on tukeva ja iloinen, mikä todistaa hänen voimakasta rotuaan;
hänellä on minun piirteeni, silmäni ja isän kauniit tummat hiukset ja
laaja otsa.
 Minä katselen sinua, rakas pieni Antoine-Sylvain; äidin sydämeni
paisuu onnesta ja minä muistelen noita profeetallisia sanoja, jotka
Michelet on kirjoittanut teoksessaan Rakkaus:

»Varmastikin syntyivät sankarit korkeimmasta tietoisesta

rakkaudesta.»

Parisi touko—heinäkuu 1898.

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