NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062

AKPO Field Development Project (OML 130)
Subsea Production Systems (SPS)
Contract No. APO/C007/03
3 27 MAR 06 IFC Issued for Construction S. Holyfield C. Kochenower

2 28 Oct 05 IFA Issued for Approval A Moore R. Emptage
1 26 July 05 IFA Issued for Approval A Moore R. Emptage
0 19 Nov 04 IFR Issued for Review A Moore R. Emptage
10 Aug 04 R Issued for IDC A Moore R. Emptage
Status
Rev Date Reason for Issue Originator Approved
Code
Document Title:
RAM MANAGEMENT PLAN
Document Number: NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062

PAGE 1 OF 36
Cameron Document No. X-219400-01-10 REV. 07
Drawn By Date Rev Cameron Document No.
S. Holyfield 27 MAR 2006 07 X-219400-01-10
Approved By Date Rev Total Document No.
C. Kochenower 27 MAR 2006 03 NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
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information for any purpose other than that for which it is intended may not be made without written
CAMERON, a division of COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION. Receipt or possession does not
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 Purpose and Scope ............................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Ram Study References.......................................................................................................... 4
2 RAM REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................................... 7
3 RAM PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ..................................................................................... 8
all events upon completion of the purpose for which it is intended
3.1 Cameron RAM Policy ............................................................................................................ 8

3.2 RAM Activities........................................................................................................................ 8
3.3 Management Organization .................................................................................................... 9
3.3.1 Cameron Project Director............................................................................................ 9
3.3.2 Cameron RAM Manager ............................................................................................. 9
3.3.3 RAM Specialist .......................................................................................................... 10
3.4 Design Reviews ................................................................................................................... 10
4 RAM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................. 11
4.1 Reliability and Maintainability Design Criteria...................................................................... 11
4.1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................... 11
4.1.2 Reliability Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 11
4.1.3 Maintenance Design Criteria ..................................................................................... 11
4.1.4 Outline Repair Policy................................................................................................. 12
5 RAM PROGRAM .............................................................................................................. 13
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 13
5.2 Unit R&M Values ................................................................................................................. 13
5.2.1 Unit Reliability Parameters ........................................................................................ 13
permission from CAMERON. This document is to be returned to CAMERON upon request and in
5.2.2 Unit Reliability Parameters - Goal ............................................................................. 14

convey any right to loan, sell or otherwise disclose said information. Reproduction or use of said
This document contains confidential and trade secret information which is the sole property of
5.2.3 Maintainability Predictions......................................................................................... 14

5.2.4 Updating of Unit Reliability & Maintainability Parameters ......................................... 14
5.3 Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA)............................................................................. 16
5.3.1 Overview ................................................................................................................... 16
5.3.2 FMEA Scope of analysis ........................................................................................... 16
5.3.3 Process ..................................................................................................................... 17
5.3.4 FMEA Format ............................................................................................................ 17
5.3.5 Mitigation/Recovery................................................................................................... 18
5.4 Dormancy Analysis .............................................................................................................. 18
5.5 RAM Modelling .................................................................................................................... 19
5.5.1 Overview ................................................................................................................... 19
5.5.2 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)................................................................................ 19
5.5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation ............................................................................................. 20
5.6 spares sensitivity & Verification assessment ....................................................................... 21
5.7 Critical Items ........................................................................................................................ 21
6 RAM VERIFICATION, VALIDATION & ACCEPTANCE .................................................. 22
6.1 Overview.............................................................................................................................. 22
6.2 Independent review ............................................................................................................. 22
6.3 Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System (FRACAS)............................................... 23
6.4 Analysis of Field Data utilizing DRACAS ............................................................................. 25
6.4.1 Data Recoding and Corrective Action System (DRACAS) ........................................ 25
6.4.2 Corporate DRACAS Reporting.................................................................................. 25
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6.4.3 Data Metrics .............................................................................................................. 26

6.5 Field Performance Reporting............................................................................................... 26
6.5.1 Failure Investigation .................................................................................................. 26
6.6 RAM Verification Analysis.................................................................................................... 27
7 DELIVERABLES............................................................................................................... 28
7.1 RAM Program Plan.............................................................................................................. 28
7.2 RAM Progress Reports........................................................................................................ 28
7.3 Progressive Analysis ........................................................................................................... 28

7.3.1 RAM - 1 Report ......................................................................................................... 28
7.3.2 RAM - 2 Report ......................................................................................................... 28
7.3.3 RAM - 3 Report ......................................................................................................... 29
7.3.4 RAM - 4 Report ......................................................................................................... 29
7.3.5 AKPO RAM Analysis Report ..................................................................................... 29
7.4 FMEA Report ....................................................................................................................... 30
7.5 RAM Analysis Report........................................................................................................... 30
8 GLOSSARY OF RAM TERMS ......................................................................................... 31
Table 1 RAM Study References ..................................................................................................... 5

Table 2 Prediction Models ............................................................................................................ 14
Table 3 FMEA Format................................................................................................................... 17
Table 4 Glossary of RAM Terms................................................................................................... 31
Table 5 Cameron DRACAS Derived Reliability data .................................................................... 35
Figure 1 Failure Reporting And Corrective Action System ........................................................... 24

Figure 2: Accumulated Running Time........................................................................................... 35
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1 INTRODUCTION
This Availability, Reliability & Maintainability (RAM) Plan forms part of the overall
Cameron AKPO Project Management Planning. It describes how Cameron will
implement and fulfil the RAM requirements for the AKPO Sub-sea development.
This plan responds to all of the RAM related requirements within the Cameron Scope
of Supply and will be carried out as an integrated and coordinated activity with the
design, operability and safety and environmental programs. This will offer the design
team an early insight into the expected product availability thus allowing time for
effective corrective actions if necessary.
The RAM Program of work imposes design techniques and management controls to
identify, evaluate and track all design and supportability weaknesses, and reduces
their associated RAM risks to a practical minimum.
1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this RAM Plan is to describe and define all the RAM activities to be
performed by Cameron to ensure that the supplied equipment meets the specified in-
service RAM requirements with the minimum through life costs.
The aim of the RAM Program is to implement a progressive and integrated program of
RAM assurance, which will provide the necessary evidence that the R&M
characteristics of the system design have been obtained, when operated in

accordance with the defined maintenance concept. This Plan is a sub-set of the
systems engineering process supporting the AKPO SPS contract.
The Program of Work will include the following RAM related activities:
• RAM Management
• R&M Design Criteria
• Unit R&M Parameters
• FMEA
• RAM Modelling
• Spares Sensitivity and validation assessment
1.2 RAM STUDY REFERENCES
The list of documents presented in Table 1, constitutes the references of the material
which will be the subject of the RAM study.
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Table 1 RAM Study References
Ref Description Total Number Cameron

Number
A. System Basis Of Design NG50-2-300-SPS-GN-AB-30-0022 X-219400-01-31
B. SCS System Functional Design NG50-2-300-SCS-SP-SC-64-0106 X-065415-95

Specification
C. Operational Narrative NG50-2-300-SCS-TR-SC-64-0104 TBA
D. SCU Functional Design Specification NG50-2-SCS-SP-SC-64-0474 X-065415-97
E. Emergency Shutdown Logic Diagram NG50-2-300-SCS-LT-AA-30-0284 SK-066001-65-
33
F. Cause And Effect Charts NG50-2-300-SCS-LT-AA-30-0467 X-065435-02
G. P&ID WI 10 Water Injection String NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-76-0212 SK-119434-01
H. P&ID WI 20 Water Injection String NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-76-0214 SK-119434-03
I. P&ID WI 30 Water Injection String NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-76-0213 SK-119434-02
J. P&ID WI 50 Water Injection String NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-76-0215 SK-119434-04
K. P&ID Water Injection Tree NG50-2-300-XTR-PI-SX-56-0103 SK-127234-04
L. Typical Intermediate Production Manifold NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-30-0211 SK-119441-01
Hydraulic Distribution Architecture
M. Gas Injection Hydraulic Distribution NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-56-0210 SK-119400-01

Architecture
N. WI 10 And WI 50 Water Injection String NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-76-0216 SK-119443-01
O. Typical End Loop Production Manifold NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-30-0209 SK-119442-01
P. P&ID – SPS Typical Production NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-30-0208 SK-119435-01
Hydraulic Distribution Unit
Q. P&ID Production Tree (On/Off Type IWC) NG50-2-300-XTR-PI-SX-56-0101 SK-127234-02
R. P&ID Production Tree (Choke Type IWC) NG50-2-300-XTR-PI-SX-56-0123 SK-127234-05
S. P&ID Production Tree (No IWC) NG50-2-300-XTR-PI-SX-56-0124 SK-127234-06
T. P&ID Production Manifold W/Gas Lift NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-30-0163 SK-127233-01
U. P&ID Intermediate Production Manifold NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-30-0164 SK-127233-02
V. P&ID End Production Manifold NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-30-0162 SK-127233-03
W. P&ID Gas Injection Manifold NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-56-0161 SK-127233-04
X. P&ID Gas Injection Tree (With IWC) NG50-2-300-XTR-PI-SX-56-0100 SK-127234-03
Y. P&ID Hydraulic Power Unit SCS NG50-2-300-SCS-PI-SC-30-0469 SK-119255-96
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Ref Description Total Number Cameron

Number
Z. System Block Diagram Overall Field NG50-2-300-SPS-DW-AB-30-0117 SK-119255-95
Layout
AA. P&ID Legend NG50-2-300-SPS-PI-AB-30-0210 SK-119255-87
BB. Process Flow Diagram Legend NG50-2-300-SPS-PF-AB-30-0212 SK-119255-88
CC. Utility Flow Diagram Typical SPS – NG50-2-300-SPS-UF-AB-30-0217 SK-119255-93

Controls/Chemical Injection System
(Production)
DD. Process Flow Diagram SPS – P10 NG50-2-300-SPS-PF-AB-30-0214 SK-119255-90
Production Loop
EE. Process Flow Diagram SPS – P20 NG50-2-300-SPS-PF-AB-30-0216 SK-119255-92
Production Loop
FF. Process Flow Diagram SPS – P30 NG50-2-300-SPS-PF-AB-30-0220 SK-119264-12
Production Loop
GG. Process Flow Diagram SPS – P40 NG50-2-300-SPS-PF-AB-30-0221 SK-119264-13
Production Loop
HH. Process Flow Diagram SPS – Water NG50-2-300-SPS-UF-AB-76-0213 SK-119255-89
Injection System
II. Process Flow Diagram SPS – Gas NG50-2-300-SPS-UF-AB-56-0215 SK-119255-91
Injection System
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2 RAM REQUIREMENTS
a. Cameron shall implement a RAM program of work (as an integrated and

coordinated activity with the design, supportability and safety and
environmental programs) to evaluate the SPS and identify those aspects
of the system that may limit the maximization of system availability.
b. Specific areas that the Company require to be the subject of detailed

RAM analysis includes:
• Subsea Electrical and Hydraulic distribution system
• Subsea Methanol distribution system
• Subsea Chemical Distribution System
• Comparative analysis of alternative solutions
c. Reliability and availability (including Mean Time to Repair) shall be

calculated for the entire subsea system (production and gas injection)
including topside controls equipment, Xmas Trees, manifolds equipment
and HDUs and SUTs.

d. Cameron will utilize RAM models to determine the sensitivity of the SPS in
achieving high levels of availability with respect to differing support
solutions.
e. Cameron will also utilize the intrinsic* support solutions identified in the
AKPO High Level Availability study to assess the SPS against the
production availability** target of 99.2%.
* Where intrinsic support solution excludes all logistical delays
** Where any equipment failure causes a production failure from a single well,
i.e. all production wells are required to be available to classify the overall
system as being available.
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3 RAM PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
3.1 CAMERON RAM POLICY
Cameron will give equal consideration to RAM as they do to the more visible
parameters of performance, time and cost. RAM is a vital operational characteristic
and has a dominant impact upon both operational effectiveness and Life Cycle Cost
(LCC).
The RAM program of work will be carried out as an integrated and coordinated activity
with the design, supportability and safety and environmental programs. This will offer
the design team an early insight into the expected product availability thus allowing
time for effective corrective actions if deemed necessary.
Through the guidance of the RAM Manager, the proposed design will be developed to
meet the availability requirements, balancing the reliability and supportability
characteristics consistent with optimized operational costs. The planned RAM analysis
detailed within this plan will be used to influence the development of the operability
support concept, to ensure that the supportability and design are achieving the
optimum availability for the minimum of ownerships costs.
3.2 RAM ACTIVITIES

The proposed schedule of RAM activities planned for the development program phase,
form part of the Systems Engineering Process for Subsea Projects Document (Ref X-
282-368-01) and are divided into the following groupings:
• RAM Program Management
¾ Reliability Program Plan
¾ Management Organization
¾ Reviews
• RAM Design Considerations
¾ Reliability & Maintainability Design Criteria
• RAM Analysis
¾ Unit Reliability and Maintainability Parameters

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o Failure Data Recording and Corrective Action System (FRACAS)
o Field Performance Reporting
o Field Data Analysis
¾ FMEA
¾ RAM Modelling (RBDs and Monte Carlo Simulation)
¾ Spares Sensitivity and Validation Assessment
3.3 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
The RAM Program will be managed through the implementation of the RAM
Management Plan.
3.3.1 Cameron Project Director
The Cameron Project Director for the AKPO program will have the overall
responsibility for ensuring that all the RAM activities are performed in accordance with
the Cameron RAM Plan. The Cameron Project Director will be responsible for
ensuring all matters related to RAM are adhered to and that all RAM requirements are
fully covered and documented.

The Cameron Project Director will ensure that RAM aspects are addressed with equal
consideration to performance, cost and timescale and that RAM is included in the
design process, option studies and design reviews. He will be supported by a RAM
Manager who will co-ordinate the RAM analysis tasks defined in this plan.
3.3.2 Cameron RAM Manager
The Cameron RAM Manager will be responsible for all matters relating to RAM during
the Contract and will ensure that all RAM activities are performed and co-coordinated
with the relevant design activities to provide the necessary assurance that the overall
project RAM requirements are achieved.
The RAM Manager will provide the RAM Specialist with updates to the Cameron
DRACAS.
The RAM Manager will also be responsible for ensuring that all RAM analyses are
performed to the appropriate standards* and that all results are fed back to the
Project/Design Team to influence the proposed options.
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The RAM Manager, in conjunction with the Cameron Project Director, will be
responsible for monitoring progress to ensure that RAM program milestones are
achieved.
* Mil Std 1629a for FMEA and BS5760 for Reliability Modelling.
3.3.3 RAM Specialist

The RAM Specialist will be responsible for advice to the Cameron AKPO Project on
Reliability & Maintainability aspects of the design, production of the FMEA worksheets
& the associated report and of the RAM Analysis & the associated report.
3.4 DESIGN REVIEWS
It is a Cameron procedure that the design review agenda includes sections covering
the RAM aspects. At these Design Reviews the Project RAM Specialist will present the
required analyses and reports to the AKPO Project Manager. Details of Design
Reviews are in the Project Management Plan.
As part of the Development program, a continuing appraisal and review of the RAM
aspects of the system will be carried out. These will be timed to coincide with the
Design and Operability Reviews. Information supplied includes
• Specific R&M achievements in the period
•
Progress of RAM tasks and activities defined within the Project Plan.
• Summarize/update the data, information and analysis results used in support

of the RAM case.
• Report the status of new and on-going risks to the RAM program.
• Provide details on the management aspects of the RAM program.
The RAM Progress Reports will detail the current state of the RAM Program and the
key areas/concerns which impact on the optimisation of system availability. As part of
the Design process, it is the responsibility of the associated Cameron Systems
Engineers to review the RAM concerns and either
• Accept the recommendation and propose changes to the Package Engineer
• Accept the recommendation and propose changes to the Company
• Reject concern as a characteristic of the proposed AKPO configuration
requirements
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4 RAM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CRITERIA
4.1.1 Overview
The Cameron Design Team, and the RAM Specialist, will be responsible for the
development of the reliability and maintainability design criteria of equipment to be
incorporated into the AKPO Project to meet, as a minimum, the system availability,
reliability and maintainability requirements of the contract, as presented in section 2.
The RAM Specialist will review the Design Criteria to ensure that the overall design of
the AKPO Project, when operated in accordance with the defined maintenance
concept, is capable of achieving the required reliability and availability whilst being
operated and maintained
4.1.2 Reliability Design Criteria
As an integral part of the design process, Cameron will verify the design solution to
satisfy the required RAM parameters, taking cognizance of the following design related
reliability characteristics:
• Durability Requirements
• System Reliability Requirements
• System Availability Requirements

• Redundancy requirements.
• Reliability impact of single mode failures – effect on production
• Reliability detection of failures
• Recovery from failure
• Repair & Recovery Times
• Ability to Intervene without Halting Production
• Impact on Life Cycle Costs (LCC)
The reliability design criteria is also required to take into account the operational profile
of the AKPO system and ensure that the reliability characteristics are compatible with
the selected maintenance concept and the requirement to optimize Life Cycle Costs.
4.1.3 Maintenance Design Criteria
Maintainability will continue to be a major consideration in the design of the system.

Cameron will integrate the maintainability design requirements with the selected
maintenance concept to ensure that the required levels of availability are achieved.
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As an integral part of the design and operability processes, Cameron will determine a
design solution, including the development of the associated maintenance policy, to
satisfy the required RAM parameters, taking cognizance of the following design related
maintainability characteristics:
• Ease of maintenance by personnel (including protective clothing).
• Optimization of the equipment design in order to satisfy the specific and
comprehensive performance characteristics applicable to AKPO.

• Optimization of the equipment design in order to minimize the LCC.
• Simplification of maintenance and the minimization of preventive
maintenance.
• Minimization of maintenance downtime.
• Ability to test newly installed equipment to ensure that it is available and
operating as designed
• Ability to Intervene without Halting Production
• Set maintenance requirements compatible with the Customer’s current
capability and support environment.
• Minimization of the potential for maintenance errors and maintenance induced
defects.
• Optimization of testability methods (Preference is to be given for equipment
incorporating a Self Test facility allowing faults to be identified.

• optimization of the maintainability and supportability of any software.
The following steps will be taken to maximize the reliability of sub-sea components:
• Mechanical parts which have short-lived wear-out features shall be excluded.
• Short-lived electronic/electrical components shall be excluded.
• De-rating techniques shall be used to increase the life of stressed
components.
4.1.4 Outline Repair Policy
The outline equipment repair philosophy for the AKPO Sub-sea System (which will be
refined as part of the Operability Program of Work) is a combination of repair by
replacement at Lowest Replaceable Item (LRI) / Module level and direct on-site repair.
The proposed policy for the subsequent recovery of failed units is repair/replacement
by the appropriate manufacturer/supplier. Cameron will as part of the spares
optimization process, utilize the availability analysis to determine the validity of this
policy.
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5 RAM PROGRAM
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Cameron will undertake a progressive program of RAM analysis to provide assurance

that the RAM requirements for the AKPO Project will be achieved. The RAM Manager
will implement the RAM analysis in conjunction with the Design and Operability
Teams. The RAM analyses will include the following activities.
• Functional Analysis – FMEA
• R&M Predictions
• RAM Modelling (Reliability Block Diagrams and Monte Carlo Simulation)
All modelling assumptions that arise during the overall analysis process will be
defined, collated and submitted to the Company for approval.
As part of an integrated and progressive program of RAM assurance, predicted R&M

parameters for each equipment type shall be replaced with empirical data obtained
from the DRACAS process.
5.2 UNIT R&M VALUES

5.2.1 Unit Reliability Parameters

The RAM Analysis of the AKPO Controls System will be conducted utilizing empirical
reliability parameters, wherever possible, obtained from the Cameron Company wide
DRACAS system, which has been validated by DNV as an independent party, refer to
section 6.2
Unit and individual sub component point reliability parameters are derived by
combining the accumulated in-service operational hours and failures, using
Exponential (for electrical/electronic) and Weibull distributions (Mechanical
equipment).
Where any resultant reliability is deemed to be compromised by a low sample size, a

more representative generic value obtained may be obtained from similar in-service
equipment or an estimated value of unit reliability can be obtained from parts count
prediction models
Reliability figures for all components will be documented and justified by one of or a
combination of the following methods as detailed in Table 2
The derivation of Reliability parameters from the Cameron Corporate DRACAS data
system is presented in Appendix A-1. The procedure to undertake Parts Count
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Prediction is presented in Appendix A-2, will in general utilizes the Naval Sheltered
environmental factor.
5.2.2 Unit Reliability Parameters - Goal
The goal is to baseline and document the component, sub-system and system MTBF
and to determine the main contributors to system unreliability and unavailability. This
will help to verify that the proposed system meets the project requirements with regard
to field life and frequency of intervention. Action will be taken to ensure that critical
components have an MTBF appropriate for its application.
FAILURE RATE SOURCE
CALCULATION VIA NPRD-95 OREDA-97 SUPPLIER DRACAS TEST

AN ESTABLISHED DATA FIELD DATA
MODEL. DATA
(MIL-HDBK-217)
Electronic
Prediction X X X X X
Mechanical
Prediction X X X X X
Table 2 Prediction Models
5.2.3 Maintainability Predictions
Maintainability Predictions in terms of the Mean Active Repair Time will be performed
for each level of maintenance i.e. system, sub-system and equipment. Cameron will
make a maximum use of available DRACAS data and from similar in-service
equipment to determine the Mean and Maximum Active Repair Times. Where this is
not possible, Cameron will carry out maintainability predictions using appropriate
maintainability prediction models.
5.2.4 Updating of Unit Reliability & Maintainability Parameters
Unit R&M parameters will be updated and refined as the project progresses. As part
of the RAM program, reliability data shall be recorded against all equipment, whether
from design, service use or from field data gathered as the result of other end users.
This data will be input to the Reliability model(s) to ensure that the current predictions
are as accurate as possible.
This document contains confidential and trade secret information which is the sole property of CAMERON, a division of COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION. Receipt or possession does not
convey any right to loan, sell or otherwise disclose said information. Reproduction or use of said information for any purpose other than that for which it is intended may not be made without written
permission from CAMERON. This document is to be returned to CAMERON upon request and in all events upon completion of the purpose for which it is intended
Drawn By
S. Holyfield
Approved By
C. Kochenower
data obtained from the DRACAS process

Date
Date
27 MAR 2006
27 MAR 2006
03
07
Rev
Rev
Page
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X-219400-01-10
As part of an integrated and progressive program of RAM assurance, predicted R&M

Total Document No.
parameters for each equipment type will be replaced whenever possible with empirical
Cameron Document No.
NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
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5.3 FAILURE MODE & EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
5.3.1 Overview
Cameron will perform an equipment level FMEA to identify single point failures, justify
redundancy claims, and in conjunction with the Level of Repair Analysis (LORA),
determine and classify the appropriate Levels of Repair for each major equipment
type.
The criticality analysis associated with an FMECA will be undertaken as part of the
RAM Modelling Analysis, as the Monte Carlo analysis is able to take into account more
efficiently the effects of multiple failures combined with individual failure occurrence
and repair characteristics.
The FMEA results will be utilized as inputs by the following RAM activities: -
• R&M Modelling
• Maintainability Analysis
The FMEA be performed early in the design which will allow corrective actions to be
implemented from identified critical single point failures and maintenance actions
developed to address hold for repair failure modes. The FMEA will also be used to
verify the construction of the Reliability Block Diagrams and assumptions made during
the RAM modelling process.

5.3.2 FMEA Scope of analysis

Cameron will implement the FMEA based on the generic equipment types utilised
within the Subsea Controls System. Hence the FMEA will be undertaken on those
elements of the subsea control required to control a single tree or manifold. Thus all
elements of the subsea control system will be covered by this approach:
• HPU
o LP Channel (pumps, accumulators, ESD valves, isolation valves, relief
valves etc)
o HP Channel (pumps, accumulators, ESD valves, isolation valves, relief
valves etc)
• SCU (Servers, Network Switch, PLCs, Modems, etc)
• SPCU ( subsea output module)
• SUT ( LP hydraulic channel, HP hydraulic channel, Control Quad (pair 1 and
pair 2), Methanol channel, Wax Inhibiter etc)
• HDU (LP hydraulic channel, HP hydraulic channel, Methanol channel, Wax
Inhibiter etc, including ROV actuated Isolation Valves)
• EFL (Single Comms on Power Channel)
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• HFL (LP hydraulic channel, HP hydraulic channel, Methanol channel, Wax

Inhibiter etc)
• Production Tree SCM (including LP and HP selector valves, LP and HP
accumulators, SEM, VEM, LP DCVs, HP DCVs LP and HP shuttle valves)
• Manifold SCM (including LP selector valves, LP accumulators, SEM, VEM, LP
DCVs, LP shuttle valve)
• Manifold SAM (LP Accumulators 6 off)
5.3.3 Process
The FMEA process is a “bottom up” systematic group of activities intended to: -
• Recognize and evaluate the potential failure of a product and its effects
• Identify methods to eliminate or reduce the occurrence of a potential failure
• Identify design improvements.
• Identify dormant failure modes
• Identify redundancy characteristics
• Identify maintainability and sparing strategy
•
5.3.4 FMEA Format
The FMEA will provide results in a tabular form using MIL-STD-1629 for guidance, the
FMEA worksheets will be compiled utilizing the format described below in Table 3.
Table 3 FMEA Format
HEADING DESCRIPTION
FM Ref: This provides a unique Failure Mode identification.
Failure Mode (FM): For each function, failure modes are identified and recorded. A failure mode is
defined as the manner by which a failure is revealed. All units are designed to
fulfil one or more functions; a failure is thus defined as non-fulfilment of one or
more of these functions.
CS Ref: This provides unique failure cause identification.
Causes (CS): The possible failure mechanisms (corrosion, erosion, fatigue, etc.) that may
produce the identified failure modes
Failure Rate: The failure Rate (in failures per million hours) for the sub-system or failure
cause.
Data Source: This identifies the source for the failure rate value associated with the sub-
system of failure cause.
Local Failure Effect: The main effects of the identified failure modes on the localized parts.
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HEADING DESCRIPTION
System Effect: The main effects of the identified failure modes on the primary function of the
FPSO system and the resulting operational status of the system after the failure.
It also includes the impact of dormant failures and repair actions.
Method of Detection: The various possibilities for detection of the identified failure modes. These may
involve different alarms, testing, human perception, and so on. Some failures
are called evident failures. Evident failures are detected instantly. Another type
of failure is called the hidden (dormant) failure. A hidden failure is normally

detected only during testing of the unit, and is normally associated with the
protective systems or systems that are not normally used during normal
operations. The failure mode “fail to start” of a pump with operational mode
“standby” is an example of a hidden failure.
Mitigation/Recovery: Possible actions to correct the failure and restore the function or prevent serious
consequences are then recorded. Actions that are likely to reduce the frequency
of the failure modes are also recorded.
Comments Additional field, to assist with the management of any actions resulting from the
FMEA.
5.3.5 Mitigation/Recovery
The FMEA will provide possible solutions from a purely reliability point of view for
review By Cameron and the Company . These suggestions will not automatically be
adopted the main aim of the FMEA is to ensure that all options have been considered
for each failure odes which may adversely affect the optimisation of achievable uptime.
5.4 DORMANCY ANALYSIS
Dormancy analysis is important due to the fact that some products are only cycled
periodically during the product life or have failure modes that are not detected until a
demand is placed on that particular function.
When operational demands are placed on these types of equipments and/or

sub-systems, it is important that they work flawlessly. In order for this to become a
reality, designers need to be aware of the effects of the non-operating environment
closely and consider appropriate mitigation/compensation early in the design phase.
The following are some of the possible environments the designers will consider aside
from the field environment: -
• Un-revealed failures during normal system operation

• Failures that occur during storage
• Hold for repair
• Failures that occur during modification
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The dormancy analysis will be performed as part of the FMEA and System R&M
Modelling (RAM Analysis).
5.5 RAM MODELLING
5.5.1 Overview
System mathematical models (using RBDs and Monte Carlo Analysis) that realistically
represent the RAM functions and the maintenance support characteristics of the AKPO
Subsea Controls System will be developed in association with the FMEA process, to
determine the overall RAM parameters of the equipment.
The RAM models will also reflect the characteristics of the maintenance concept in
terms of level of repair, manning levels, skill levels, and spares holding. Downtime will
also include all intrusive preventive maintenance, which results in the loss of
operational functionality.
As part of an integrated and progressive program of RAM assurance, the RAM models
will be updated with data from the FMEA and will replace predicted parameters for
each equipment type with available empirical data obtained from the DRACAS
process.
All modelling assumptions that arise during the overall analysis process will be
defined, collated and submitted to the Company for approval. The results of the RAM
modelling will be documented in the RAM Report.
5.5.2 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD)
Reliability Block Diagrams will be developed for the subsea control equipment which
takes into account the natural fault tolerance or redundancy contained within the
overall AKPO sub-sea system.
Each RBD is sub-divided into high-level system groups and individual modules in order
to identify the resultant availability characteristics of each major function and each
major equipment type. The function of each block is identified from its title, the
location reference is also provided, where possible, based on the proposed location for
the new equipment.
The goal of a RBD is to produce a series of blocks representing the system or

sub-system that is to be analyzed. Once the blocks are configured properly and data
for the block is provided, calculations will be performed to calculate the failure rate,
MTBF, reliability and availability of the system.
Items that cause the loss of a function are represented as Blocks in a series
configuration. Items of equipment that are redundant or fault tolerant are represented
as Block in a parallel configuration.
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Blocks are assumed to be mutually independent such that a random failure in one sub-
assembly will not affect the probability of a random failure in another, unless identified
within the model.
5.5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation

In order to determine the availability characteristics of the system, Cameron will
analyze the RBDs using the AvSim+ Monte-Carlo simulation package from Isograph
Ltd.
The AvSim + models utilizes equipment reliability parameters and determines the
probability of failure over the project lifecycle, using failure distributions appropriate to
the equipment involved.
In addition to MTBF and MTTR, the analysis takes into account the impact of the
maintenance philosophy, which includes; hold for repair, spares holdings, spares
replenishment, maintainer specialization and downtime caused by preventive
maintenance. Each block within the model will be assigned the following reliability and
maintainability parameters:
• Element MTBF and associated failure rate distribution

• Element MTTR and associated repair time distribution
• Element repair priority
• Spares level
• Skill level
• Manning levels
For electrical/electronic equipment, AVSIM+ utilizes equipment mean reliability values

and determines the probability of failure using the exponential distribution.
For non-electronic/electric equipment AVSIM+ utilizes equipment mean life values and
determines the probability of failure using the Weibull distribution. The Weibull
distribution has three input parameters, represented by Eta, Beta and Gamma, where:
• Eta is the mean life of the equipment.
• Beta is the failure distribution shaping parameter, where typically:
o 1 equates to exponential
o 2 equates to linear wear out, using the normal distribution
o 3 equates to a more realistic bath tub wear out.
• Gamma equates to an initial period where failure is not expected.
It should be noted that the majority of reliability values for subsea components are for
individual elements within a higher assembly and not for the overall assembly itself.
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The Monte Carlo simulation process models the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) using
the lognormal distribution of repair times. The program inputs the MTTR for each item
including a dispersion factor. The dispersion factor combined with the MTTR enables
the program to determine the maximum time to repair. A factor of 0.8 represents
module replacement and has been used for topside equipment and a factor over 1
assumes more difficult access and has been used for subsea equipment.
The overall process used to determine the mean and maximum repair times is fully
explained in Appendix B to this report.
5.6 SPARES SENSITIVITY & VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT
Cameron will also utilise the RAM Availability models to assist in the spares selection
process by undertaking a sensitivity analysis on a range of spares holdings and
associated lead times and turn around times, to determine the impact on achieved
uptime for a given cost of spares support.
5.7 CRITICAL ITEMS
Cameron will maintain an AKPO RAM critical item list. The lists will contain all
components or products whose failure can significantly affect availability.
The critical item list will include; high value components, performance parameters,
process, dormant failure modes, limited life part (Early wear-out), reliability sensitive
parts and sub-systems, and components and sub-systems which cause critical single
point failures.
All reliability critical items will be identified from the FMEA and RAM modelling. The
design aim of the equipment will be such that these items will be minimized.
During the design reviews, the critical items list will be reviewed to ensure that
mitigation steps are in place to limit the system effects of the critical items, ensure
documentation and to track the performance through the product development cycle.
The Critical Items list will also be used as part of the design and project management
process to develop the maintainability and spares analysis. The List will be
documented in the RAM progress reports.
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6 RAM VERIFICATION, VALIDATION & ACCEPTANCE
6.1 OVERVIEW
Cameron intend that all equipment and/or software defects be formally recorded during
assembly testing, and integration testing by utilizing formal Failure Reporting, Analysis
and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) procedures.
FRACAS is a corporate recording and corrective action system that combines

Cameron’s existing Field Performance Reporting (FPR) procedures, EP-307 and Data
Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (DRACAS) procedures, EP-212.
To drive systematic failure investigations, a comprehensive and well established

process for identifying and addressing both non-conformances during manufacturing
and field problems after delivery is in place and is implemented on all projects
including AKPO.
Lessons learned from follow up investigations, coupled with feedback from the
Company and sub-sea industry databases, are used to derive actions that lead to
changes in system design as well as to improve supply chain management,
manufacturing, installation, commissioning, and operations and maintenance
processes.
6.2 INDEPENDENT REVIEW

The Cameron Corporate DRACAS process has also been independently reviewed by
DNV Consulting, in its capacity of as an independent approval authority. The following
conclusions have been extracted from DNV Letter dated 21 April 2004.
“DNV has, in the period from March 17 to April 17, 2004, performed a review of
Cameron’s Data Reporting and Corrective Action System (DRACAS).
It is DNV’s conclusion that DRACAS adheres to common industry practice with respect
to processes and methodology and meets objectives of a data collection system with
respect to:
• Data structure and taxonomy
• Analysis approach and results
Details of the review are documented in DNV Report No. 70004457 dated 21 April
2004”
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6.3 FAILURE REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM (FRACAS)
The Cameron FRACAS combines the DRACAS and FPR processes together, to form
one systematic closed loop approach as shown in Figure 1 and are briefly described
below.
The FRACAS Process is implemented on all Cameron projects, including AKPO, to

drive systematic failure investigations, which is a comprehensive and well established
and field problems after delivery.
Lessons learned from follow up investigations, coupled with feedback from the
Company and sub-sea industry databases, are used to derive actions that lead to
changes in system design as well as to improve supply chain management,
manufacturing, installation, commissioning, and operations and maintenance
processes.
The FRACAS closed loop process shows the interrelation ship between data gathering
(to discover the problems associated with the failure(s) and the failure investigation
process, and how the data is provided to the associated projects.
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Non
Conformance Field
Reporting (NCR) Performance
(Manufacturing Reporting
Related Failures)
Failure
Investigation
Non
FPR
Conformance DRACAS
Database
Database
Corrective Action
Systematic
Customer Problem Subsea Industry
Feedback Identification and Databases
Resolution
Design and
Six Sigma R&D
Process
Projects Projects
Changes
Figure 1 Failure Reporting And Corrective Action System

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6.4 ANALYSIS OF FIELD DATA UTILIZING DRACAS
Through the use of life data analysis, an attempt is made to determine the probability
and capability of parts, components, and systems to perform their required functions
for desired periods of time without failure, in specified environments.
6.4.1 Data Recoding and Corrective Action System (DRACAS)
Input Data to the DRACAS will be primarily from two systems:
• Cameron Field Performance Reporting (FPR)

• Customer data log
The purpose of the DRACAS is to capture information that is necessary to

meaningfully analyze the product field performance. The data will be used to:
• Measure project reliability improvement.

• Provide quality and reliability trends.
• Identify wear out and decreasing failure rates.
• Determine component, subsystem and system availability, MTBF and reliability.
• Contribute statistical data for future reliability and repair time predictions.
•
Assist in planning maintenance and determining maintenance intervals.

• Enable spares provisioning to be refined.
• Enable the field element of quality costs to be determined.
When required, the Offshore Reliability Database (OREDA) database will be used to
complement the DRACAS field data effort.
6.4.2 Corporate DRACAS Reporting
As part of the Corporate feedback process, data review meetings will be held to
discuss and assess the program metrics and failure analysis activities.
The review meetings will also be used to identify overall trends and failure modes at
system, subsystem and component levels. The use of this data will enable project
designers to see the correlation between their design and the cost of unreliability.
Field reliability data is an important input into new product or redesign effort
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6.4.3 Data Metrics
DRACAS will produce generic reports on a component, subsystem and system

showing the following metrics:
• Failure modes and causes

• Hours in service
• At sub-System; Unit and /sub-component levels
o Reliability - Achieved vs. predicted
o Availability - Achieved vs. predicted
o Downtime - Achieved vs. predicted
• Projected performance over any given period
• Infant mortality failures
6.5 FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTING
The Field Performance Reporting (FPR) System is used to document and track items
shipped from the original manufacturing facility that are subsequently discovered by
the Company or a Cameron employee in the field to be defective in material,
workmanship or product design or are not manufactured to requirements, do not
function as intended, are damaged or incomplete, or are not received in a "ready for
use" condition.
To drive systematic failure investigations, a comprehensive and well established

and field problems after delivery is in place and will be implemented
Failed parts documented on FPRs that do not cause customer downtime or do not
require expedited repair and return to the field are shipped to the facility where a
person assigned by the Director of Engineering to investigate the part is located. The
FPR Investigator examines the part, identifies the root cause of the failure, and then
determines the necessary corrective action. When the recommended action has been
completed or approved by the Director of Engineering, the FPR is closed out. The part
is then repaired, scrapped or returned to the customer, as appropriate.
6.5.1 Failure Investigation
If a failed sub-system, assembly or part causes customer downtime and cannot be

repaired in the field, the Director of Engineering is immediately notified. A formal
failure investigation process is initiated to ensure the failure mode is determined and
immediate corrective action is taken on an expedited basis. Failure analysis is also
initiated on trend failures.
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6.6 RAM VERIFICATION ANALYSIS
The Cameron AKPO Project will utilize the output data obtained from the DRACAS to
validate the overall RAM assessment process. The data will be used to verify the
failure mode and modelling assumptions made in the following analyses:
• Functional Analysis
• RBDs
• RAM Modelling
• Maintenance Analysis
The data will also be used to confirm that the assigned unit reliability and
maintainability data conforms to the distribution of failures and repair times being
observed. Whenever data is obtained that is at odds with the RAM analysis carried
out, the analysis will be re-assessed and values re-calculated.
If the achieved levels of RAM fall below that specified, the Cameron System
Engineering Group will be notified via RAM Progress Reporting and design reviews.
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7 DELIVERABLES
7.1 RAM PROGRAM PLAN
Cameron will compile and issue a formal RAM Program which will include the
associated program plan.
7.2 RAM PROGRESS REPORTS
Cameron will issue formal RAM progress reports (RAM-1, 2 ,3 & 4) prior to each
design review/P&ID freeze, which will précis of the current situation and include:
• RAM Management;
• RAM Requirements;
• R&M Success Criteria;
• Spares Verification current Status
• FMEA Current Status;
• RAM Analysis Current Status;
• Critical Item Listing
7.3 PROGRESSIVE ANALYSIS
A progressive RAM analysis will be undertaken to enable both the Company and
Cameron to assess the effects of the system connectivity and the associated success
criteria and support policy as the analysis expands to include the full production SPS.
The format of the analysis is detailed below.
7.3.1 RAM - 1 Report
This report provides the P40 Loop RAM Analysis initial assessment.
This report provides the RAM Analysis based upon the Initial model of the SCS for 22
Production Trees, to include:
• Subsea Methanol Distribution system

• Subsea Chemical Distribution System
This report replaces the RAM – 1 report which will be rendered obsolete upon issue of
this report.
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This report provides the RAM Analysis based upon the updated the model of the SCS
to include the two Gas Injection Trees:
• Update success criteria, if available

this report.
This report provides the RAM Analysis based upon the final model of the SCS for 24
Production and Gas Injection Trees with input from the Company, to include:
• Update success criteria, if available

• Update support policy arrangement, if available
• Spares Sensitivity Analysis
this report.
7.3.5 AKPO RAM Analysis Report
This report provides the RAM Analysis based upon the final model of the SCS for 24
Production and Gas Injection Trees to include:
a. Formal reporting of the achieved availability of the production SCS utilising
• Final agreed success criteria

• Final supportability assumptions (MTTR, spares holding, vessel
intervention times etc).
b. Formal reporting of the achieved availability of the production SPS utilising

• Final supportability assumptions (MTTR, spares holding, vessel
intervention times etc)
• Inclusion of rare events
• Inclusion of flowlines and risers
c. Formal reporting of the achieved intrinsic availability of the production SPS

utilising

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• Theoretical Supportability assumptions (unlimited spares, minimum

intervention vessel delays)
• Exclusion of rare events
• Exclusion of flowlines and risers
d. Formal reporting of the achieved intrinsic equipment availability of the production
SPS utilising

• Theoretical Supportability assumptions (unlimited spares, minimum
intervention vessel delays)
• Inclusion of MPFM
• Exclusion of rare events
• Exclusion of flowlines and risers
this report.
7.4 FMEA REPORT
Cameron will compile an overall FMEA Report, which will summarize the main findings
of the analysis, including:
• Single Point Failures;

• Dormant Failures;
• Hold For Repair.
7.5 RAM ANALYSIS REPORT
Cameron will compile an overall RAM Report, which will include details of the following
RAM activities:
• RAM Design Criteria
• RAM Assumptions
• RAM Analysis
• Spares Sensitivity & Verification (including Security and 2 years operations
spares definitions, taking into consideration deepwater intervention in offshore
Nigeria)
• Critical Item Listing
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8 GLOSSARY OF RAM TERMS
The listing of abbreviations relating to equipment is given in Appendix A of “ NG50-S-

300-SPS-GN-AB-030-0022.
Abbreviation Definition
DRACAS Data Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FPR Field Performance Reporting
FRACAS Failure Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System
LCC Life Cycle Cost
LRI Lowest Replaceable Item
MIL HDBK Military Handbook
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
NPRD-95 Non Electronic Parts Reliability Data
OREDA Off-shore Reliability Data
RAM Reliability, Availability and Maintainability
R&M Reliability and Maintainability
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
Table 4 Glossary of RAM Terms

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Appendix A-1
Derivation of Reliability parameters from the

Cameron Corporate DRACAS Database
A.1 Empirical Reliability Data

Unit and individual sub component point reliability parameters have been derived by
combining the accumulated in-service operational hours and failures, using
Exponential (for electrical/electronic) and Weibull distributions (Mechanical
equipment).
These initial values are then subjected to confidence limits to provide a degree of
robustness to the data. Table 5 details generic values of equipment currently
contained in the Cameron Database, including the appropriate parameter (in Yellow)
which will be selected for use in the RAM analyses.
Where any resultant reliability is deemed to be compromised by a low sample size, a

more representative generic value obtained from similar in-service equipment has
been utilized (in Green).
Note: The Cameron DRACAS Database is formulated utilising standard Camtrol

terminology. This table will be updated in subsequent RAM Reporting, to reflect AKPO
terminology.
A.2 Confidence Limits

As many of the reliability point estimates have been derived with few or zero failures,
the resultant value is deemed to be optimistic for use in the RAM modelling process.
Therefore, in order to provide a degree of robustness, Cameron has utilized the
universally recognized Chi Squared Distribution to determine a more realistic value
based on the lower confidence limit.
For the majority of cases, Cameron has utilized values derived from the lower limit
MTTF/ETA as it aligns with historical values of MTTF. Where historical data does not
substantiate this, Cameron has utilized point estimate values for MTTF/ETA based on
accumulated running time and zero failures.
The table below indicates how various combinations of running time and failures can
result in the same point reliability estimate (500 hours), and how confidence is gained
as the numbers of failures increases.
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2 Sided Chi Squared Confidence Limits

Based on the 90% confidence parameter
Operating Point Lower Upper

Time Failures Estimate Limit Limit

MTTF MTTF MTTF
500 1 500 105 9748

1000 2 500 159 2814
2000 4 500 218 1464
4000 8 500 277 1005
8000 16 500 329 797
16000 32 500 372 687
32000 64 500 406 622
64000 128 500 432 582
A.3 Electronic Equipment Parameter Selection

For the electronic equipment, the DRACAS data was then collated by hours to failure
to determine the point estimate MTTF and the upper and lower confidence bounds.
For the MTTF, it’s simply the division of total equipment hours by failures. For the
upper and lower MTTF, the two sided Chi-Squared distribution was used at the 90%
confidence level.
The two sided confidence level for calculating the lower MTTF:
2 xField _ Hrs
MTTF =
Lower
χ α2 / 2 ; 2 r + 2
α = Confidence _ Level
r = Failures
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The two sided confidence level for calculating the upper MTTF:
2 xField _ Hrs
MTTF =
Upper
χ 12− α / 2 ; 2 r
In the case where there were no equipment failures the lower MTTF was calculated as
follows:
2 xField _ Hrs
MTTFLower =
χα2 / 2; 2
A.4 Mechanical Equipment Parameter Selection
For the mechanical equipment, the Weibull distribution was used to determine the
reliability parameters.
The Weibull distribution is a general-purpose reliability distribution used to model

material strength, times-to-failure of electronic and mechanical components,

equipment, or systems. It is a versatile distribution that can take on the characteristics

of other types of distributions, based on the value of the shape parameter, (Beta).
The three-parameter Weibull distribution used to calculate the equipment reliability

parameter is defined by:
(Eta) = scale parameter, (Beta)= shape parameter (or slope),

(Gamma)= location parameter, f(T) is the probability density function and T is the
accumulated time.
To calculate the reliability parameters, the data from DRACAS was right censored or
suspended as show because it was composed of units which did not fail.
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Unit 7 - Running
Unit 6 - Running
Unit 5 - Failed
Unit 4 - Failed
Unit 3 - Running
Unit 2 - Running
Unit 1 - Failed
Time
Figure 2: Accumulated Running Time
The reliability parameters , were calculated using the data analysis

Program Weibull++. In each case the upper and lower limit on was also
calculated.
For the mechanical equipment with no failures, a failure was randomly

injected in order to calculate (Eta) and (Beta).
Table 5 Cameron DRACAS Derived Reliability data
Note: The Cameron DRACAS Database is formulated utilising standard Camtrol

terminology. This table will be updated in subsequent RAM Reporting, to reflect AKPO
terminology.
Drawn By
S. Holyfield
Approved By
C. Kochenower
Date
Date
27 MAR 2006
27 MAR 2006
03
07
Rev
Rev
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X-219400-01-10
Total Document No.
NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
Drawn By
S. Holyfield
Approved By
C. Kochenower
Date
Date
27 MAR 2006
27 MAR 2006
03
07
Rev
Rev
Page
Page 37 of 41
X-219400-01-10
Total Document No.
NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
Drawn By
S. Holyfield
Approved By
C. Kochenower
Date
Date
27 MAR 2006
27 MAR 2006
03
07
Rev
Rev
Page
Page 38 of 41
X-219400-01-10
Total Document No.
NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
Drawn By
S. Holyfield
Approved By
C. Kochenower
Date
Date
27 MAR 2006
27 MAR 2006
03
07
Rev
Rev
Page
Page 39 of 41
X-219400-01-10
Total Document No.
NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
Drawn By
S. Holyfield
Approved By
C. Kochenower
Date
Date
27 MAR 2006
27 MAR 2006
03
07
Rev
Rev
Page
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X-219400-01-10
Total Document No.
NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062
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Appendix A-2
Parts Counts Prediction Methodology

Parts Count Predictions are usually performed on electronic/electrical new designs

and/or modified equipment, during the design phase, before the actual build is
implemented. The Parts Count Prediction methodology also takes into account
component quality, temperature and stress. MIL-HDBK-217 is the Cameron preferred
standard for undertaking parts count predictions.
Reliability prediction combines rigorous analysis procedures with expert judgment to

develop a realistic estimate of the system performance.
Successful parts count reliability predictions generally requires developing a reliability

model of the component/equipment. The level of detail of the model will depend on
the level of design detail available at the time.
Reliability data for typical equipment will in general utilize the Naval Sheltered
environmental factor, as detailed (MIL-HDBK 217), for the assessment of reliability.

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AKPO Field Development Project (OML 130)

Subsea Production Systems (SPS)

Contract No. APO/C007/03

3 27 MAR 06 IFC Issued for Construction S. Holyfield C. Kochenower

RAM MANAGEMENT PLAN

Document Number: NG50-2-300-SPS-PL-AA-30-0062

3.1 Cameron RAM Policy ............................................................................................................ 8

5.2.2 Unit Reliability Parameters - Goal ............................................................................. 14

5.2.3 Maintainability Predictions......................................................................................... 14

6.4.3 Data Metrics .............................................................................................................. 26

7.3 Progressive Analysis ........................................................................................................... 28

Table 1 RAM Study References ..................................................................................................... 5

Figure 1 Failure Reporting And Corrective Action System ........................................................... 24

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

characteristics of the system design have been obtained, when operated in

1.2 RAM STUDY REFERENCES

Table 1 RAM Study References

Ref Description Total Number Cameron

B. SCS System Functional Design NG50-2-300-SCS-SP-SC-64-0106 X-065415-95

M. Gas Injection Hydraulic Distribution NG50-2-300-MAN-PI-SM-56-0210 SK-119400-01

Ref Description Total Number Cameron

CC. Utility Flow Diagram Typical SPS – NG50-2-300-SPS-UF-AB-30-0217 SK-119255-93

a. Cameron shall implement a RAM program of work (as an integrated and

b. Specific areas that the Company require to be the subject of detailed

• Subsea Electrical and Hydraulic distribution system

• Subsea Methanol distribution system

• Subsea Chemical Distribution System

• Comparative analysis of alternative solutions

c. Reliability and availability (including Mean Time to Repair) shall be

and HDUs and SUTs.

* Where intrinsic support solution excludes all logistical delays

3 RAM PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

3.1 CAMERON RAM POLICY

3.2 RAM ACTIVITIES

• RAM Program Management

¾ Reliability Program Plan

• RAM Design Considerations

¾ Reliability & Maintainability Design Criteria

¾ Unit Reliability and Maintainability Parameters

o Failure Data Recording and Corrective Action System (FRACAS)

o Field Performance Reporting

o Field Data Analysis

¾ RAM Modelling (RBDs and Monte Carlo Simulation)

¾ Spares Sensitivity and Validation Assessment

3.3 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

3.3.1 Cameron Project Director

fully covered and documented.

3.3.2 Cameron RAM Manager

3.3.3 RAM Specialist

3.4 DESIGN REVIEWS

• Summarize/update the data, information and analysis results used in support

4 RAM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

4.1 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CRITERIA

4.1.2 Reliability Design Criteria

• System Availability Requirements

4.1.3 Maintenance Design Criteria

Maintainability will continue to be a major consideration in the design of the system.

comprehensive performance characteristics applicable to AKPO.

incorporating a Self Test facility allowing faults to be identified.