NG50-1-CO-SAF-GN-AB-00-0006

NIGERIA - OPL 246
AKPO FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

BASIC ENGINEERING
_____________
Subsea Isolation Valve Study
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N° NG50-1-CO-SAF-GN-AB-000-006 1 C
REVISED REPORT
200391/05/01
April 28, 2003

Rev. 1
SSIV STUDY
AKPO FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

200391/05/01
Copyright © Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Ltd.
All rights are reserved. This document or any part thereof may not be copied or
reproduced without permission in writing from Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Ltd.
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200391/05/01
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Client TotalFinaElf
Title SSIV Study
Project Akpo Field Development Project
Phase Basic Engineering
EEUK Project No. 200391/05/01
File name SSIV Study Rev 1.doc

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Assessment Studies/Reports
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Responsible BU Oil & Gas, Horsham, UK
Revisions:
Original
A Draft report for internal comment
Date of document 15 April 2003
Author/position/signature A J Skudder, Principal Engineer, Oil & Gas
Date of control 15 April 2003

Checked by/position/signature S R Hall, Manager, Oil & Gas
0 Draft report to Client


1 Revised report to Client


Change at last revision
200391/05/01
Preface
Contact
A J Skudder
Century House, 100 Station Road
Horsham, West Sussex, RH13 5UZ
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 1403 224200
Fax: +44 1403 210758
E-mail: andy.skudder@electrowatt-ekono.co.uk
Web: www.electrowatt-ekono.co.uk
Registered office: Century House
100 Station Road, Horsham, West Sussex
RH13 5UZ, United Kingdom
Registered Number: 1192469
Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Ltd.
200391/05/01
Contents
Preface 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6
1 INTRODUCTION 7
2 DESCRIPTION OF AKPO GAS EXPORT FACILITIES 8
3 OUTLINE METHODOLOGY 9
4 RISER RELEASE SCENARIOS 10
5 FREQUENCY OF RISER RELEASES 11
6 CONSEQUENCES OF RISER RELEASES 13
6.1 RELEASE RATES 13

6.2 DISPERSION 15
6.3 EXPLOSIONS 18
6.4 FIRES 19
7 ESCALATION POTENTIAL 21
7.1 ESCALATION RULE SETS 21

7.2 ESCALATION ANALYSIS 22
8 POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FPSO 25
9 RISK ASSESSMENT OF RISER RELEASES 26
9.1 BASE CASE: NO SSIV 26

9.2 BENEFITS OF AN SSIV 29
9.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 33
10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35
11 REFERENCES 36
APPENDIX A : ASSUMPTION SHEETS
200391/05/01
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Limited (EEUK) has been commissioned by TotalFinaElf (TFE) to
perform Risk Assessment Studies (RAS) of the Akpo Field Development Project during the
Basic Engineering phase that is currently being carried out by Doris Engineering. The Akpo
Field Development Project, located offshore Nigeria within the Offshore Prospecting Licence
OPL 246, comprises of an FPSO and associated sub-sea production and product export systems.
The sea depth of the field is approximately 1400 m.
This report comprises the SSIV Study for this development, which is one of the tasks to be
performed as part of the RAS. The objective of the study is to determine the need to install a
sub-sea isolation valve (SSIV) at the FPSO end of the gas export pipeline.
The conclusions and recommendations of this study are as follows:
1. Using the risk ranking matrix approach set out in the TFE General Specification –
Guidelines for Concept Safety Evaluations of Oil and Gas Installations (Ref. 8), the results
of this SSIV Study indicate that the risk associated with releases from the gas export line fall
within Zone II of the Severity vs. Frequency graph, i.e. ‘target for improvement’.
2. The installation of an SSIV in the gas export riser is assessed as having a potentially
significant effect upon the resultant risk levels, reducing both the frequency of Catastrophic
Asset Loss and the predicted PLL by approximately 57%. However, it should also be noted
that both the frequencies of Catastrophic Asset Loss and the PLL assessed in this study are
believed to be pessimistic (i.e. high).
3. The application of a cost-benefit analysis approach indicates that, on balance, it would
appear not to be cost beneficial to install an SSIV in gas export line. The cost of installing
an SSIV check valve in this line has been estimated to be ~€ 1.5 million, but the assessed
Present Value of benefit of an SSIV, taking account of the resultant reductions in both Asset
Loss and fatality risks, is estimated to be only ~€ 1 million (based on a 20 year installation
life and a project discount rate of 10%). Thus, the installation cost would exceed the
assessed benefit. It is also noted that the assessed benefit of the SSIV is dominated by the
resultant reduction in Asset Loss (95%) rather than by the reduction in PLL (and its
associated costs).
4. Accordingly, it is concluded that the case for installing an SSIV on the Akpo Gas Export
Pipeline cannot be made on the basis of the results of this SSIV Study. However, it is
acknowledged that TFE may well want to take account of other factors – such as company
policy, the uncertainties inherent in this analysis (see 5. below), and any other legislative or
insurance considerations etc. – as a part of its overall decision making process concerning
the installation of an SSIV in this line.
5. It should also be noted that this SSIV Study has been performed prior to all of the other
Akpo Field Development Risk Assessment Studies (RAS) scheduled to be carried out
during the Basic Engineering phase. Hence, the SSIV Study has had to make a number of
relatively coarse assumptions concerning, for example: the frequency of releases from SCRs
and the likely impact of riser events on the integrity of the FPSO, which result in a level of
uncertainty in the analysis. It may be possible to refine these assumptions during the course
of the Basic Engineering phase. It is therefore recommended that the findings of this study
should be reviewed when and if this additional information becomes available (if the project
deadlines permit).
200391/05/01
1 INTRODUCTION
Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Limited (EEUK) has been commissioned by TotalFinaElf (TFE) to
perform Risk Assessment Studies (RAS) of the Akpo Field Development Project during the
Basic Engineering phase that is currently being carried out by Doris Engineering. The Akpo
Field Development Project, located offshore Nigeria within the Offshore Prospecting Licence
OPL 246, comprises of the following principal facilities:
• A large, new-built Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO),
• A Sub-sea Production System (SPS),
• Umbilicals and flowlines,
• Stabilised oil export via an Offshore Loading Terminal (OLT) and a deep water Catenary
Anchor Leg Mooring (CALM) buoy,
• Produced gas re-injection and export to shore via a 16 inch (406 mm) pipeline.
The sea depth of the field is approximately 1400 m.
This report comprises the SSIV Study for this development, which is one of the tasks to be
performed as part of the RAS. The objective of the study is to determine the need to install a
sub-sea isolation valve (SSIV) at the FPSO end of the gas export pipeline.
200391/05/01
2 DESCRIPTION OF AKPO GAS EXPORT FACILITIES

The Akpo FPSO will export 320 Mscfd of gas to the Nigeria LNG plant at Bonny via a 150 km
long sub-sea pipeline to the Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (EPNL) operated Amenam complex.
Gas export from the FPSO will be by means of a Steel Catenary Riser (SCR). This riser will be
attached to the port side of the FPSO in the mid-ship section. The initial angle of descent of the
SCR will be a nominal 15o from the vertical and its horizontal direction will be approximately
at right angles to the hull of the FPSO. Key details of the gas export riser are as follows (Refs. 1
and 2):
• 16 inch (406 mm) outer diameter
• 15 inch (381 mm) inner diameter
• Operating pressure: 194.2 bar(a)
• Operating temperature: 45oC
• Molecular weight of export gas: 21.39
• Composition: 79.16% methane, 10.15% ethane, 5.65% propane, 3.13% butanes
• Vapour density: 218 kg/m3
• Mass flow rate: 341 620 kg/hr (94.9 kg/sec).
The gas export system is shown schematically in Figure 2.1 below. The actual water depth at
the FPSO location is 1320 m. The location of the SCR touch down point (TDP) will be a
horizontal distance of 950 m from the riser hang-off point on the FPSO. The total length of the
riser to its TDP will be 1730 m from the nominal position of the FPSO. If an SSIV were
installed, it is assumed that it would be located close to the TDP, so that the isolatable length of
the export riser would be ~1800 m.
Figure 2.1 – Akpo Gas Export Pipeline System
Pig trap
Valve
FPSO
Sea Water Level
Steel
Rigid
Mooring Lines Steel Riser
Jacket
Catenary
Riser
Sub-sea Valve
TDP
Gas Export Pipeline
Sea bed
200391/05/01
3 OUTLINE METHODOLOGY
The overall approach adopted to determine the need for an SSIV in the gas export riser /
pipeline from the FPSO has involved the following steps that are described in detail in
subsequent sections of this report:
• Estimate the inventory of the gas export riser and pipeline and establish the operating
conditions (pressure, temperature, etc) and composition of the export gas
• Model a range of above and below sea releases with and without the SSIV installed
(releases rates vs. time, release durations)
• Estimate frequencies of release scenarios taking into account the presence of any installed
SSIV
• Evaluate potential consequences associated with release scenarios (gas dispersion, fires,
explosions)
• Evaluate escalation potential associated with the identified fire and explosion scenarios;
potential targets include:
- FPSO hull / structure
- mooring systems
- adjacent risers/flowlines
- LQ/EER facilities
• Evaluate potential impact of the accident consequences, in terms of possible injuries / loss
of life and also in terms of asset loss
• Assess risk reduction potential associated with the installation of an SSIV
• Compare with TFE criteria and assess cost benefit of SSIV installation.
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10
4 RISER RELEASE SCENARIOS

The inner diameter of the gas export riser is 15 inch (381 mm). Four different sizes of riser
release have been considered in this analysis, namely:
• Small, a 10 mm equivalent diameter hole
• Medium, a 50 mm equivalent diameter hole
• Large, a 150 mm equivalent diameter hole
• Full bore, a 381 mm equivalent diameter hole.
Riser releases may occur both above sea and below sea:
• The above sea location extends from downstream of the riser ESD valve (RESDV) to sea
level. Above sea releases are assumed to occur close to the RESDV.
• The below sea location extends from sea level to the riser TDP / optional SSIV location at a
sea depth of 1320 m. Since the consequential effects of gas releases vary with depth, riser
failures have been modelled at five different depths, namely 50 m, 100 m, 200 m, 500 m
and 1320 m. The horizontal distances of these release points from the FPSO are
approximately 15 m, 30 m, 65 m, 220 m and 950 m, respectively.
The inventories of the Akpo gas export riser / pipeline, without and with an SSIV respectively,
are estimated to be as follows:
• No SSIV case – total mass of gas in riser and pipeline to Amenam complex = 3 728 000 kg
(3728 tonnes)
• With SSIV case – total mass of gas in riser to SSIV = 44 740 kg (44.7 tonnes).
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5 FREQUENCY OF RISER RELEASES

The frequency of riser failures assessed in this section is based upon historical data that is
specific to the recorded loss of containment of such systems. It is important to note that, at this
stage, there has been no attempt to estimate Akpo-specific riser release frequencies that take
full account of the actual SCR design and which are based upon the actual potential of, for
example, dropped object impact or ship collisions.
The following data sources have been used:
• PARLOC 96 (Ref. 9) for the frequency of releases from steel risers and offshore pipelines;
this includes failures caused by anchoring and impact incidents, corrosion and material
defects, and from fittings,
• UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics, 2001
(Ref. 11) for releases from the flexi-joint (assumed to be located in the ‘0 - 50 m depth’ riser
section) and from the SSIV (on the sea bed, if fitted).
The PARLOC data is based upon the operating experience in the North Sea and does not
contain specific failure rate data for risers of the SCR design. It has, therefore, been necessary
to utilise failure rate data for conventional steel risers and pipelines in this study. Whilst it is
acknowledged that risers of the SCR type may be more susceptible to fatigue, it is assumed that
the frequency of fatigue failure can be reduced to an acceptably low level, if appropriate design
standards are adopted. In the absence of failure data specific to SCRs, it has therefore been
judged that it is appropriate to use PARLOC data relating to conventional steel lines.
The release frequencies predicted from the gas export riser from downstream of the RESDV to
the SSIV (if fitted) / TDP are shown in Table 5.1 below:
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Table 5.1: Riser Release Frequencies (by Location and Hole Size)
Riser Release Frequency (per year)

Section
Small Medium Large Full Bore Total
Above sea
1.16E-03 2.34E-04 2.98E-04 2.98E-04 1.99E-03
(from RESDV)
50 m depth 3.34E-04 5.41E-05 6.79E-05 6.79E-05 5.24E-04
100 m depth 2.48E-04 5.01E-05 6.39E-05 6.39E-05 4.26E-04
200 m depth 6.97E-04 1.37E-04 9.79E-05 9.79E-05 1.03E-03
500 m depth 1.05E-03 2.05E-04 1.47E-04 1.47E-04 1.54E-03
To Sea bed:
- no SSIV 2.72E-05 1.03E-05 6.92E-06 6.92E-06 5.13E-05
- with SSIV 4.86E-04 3.11E-05 2.78E-05 2.78E-05 5.72E-04
GRAND TOTALS (no SSIV) 5.56E-03
GRAND TOTALS (with SSIV) 6.08E-03
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6 CONSEQUENCES OF RISER RELEASES
6.1 RELEASE RATES

Release rates are calculated using the gas pipeline model (S4) in the consequence modelling
software package CIRRUS (Ref. 13). Gas properties and conditions are as detailed in Section 2
and the inventories are as stated in Section 4. For below sea releases the back pressure is
calculated using a sea water density of 1030 kg/m3, so 100 m of water is equivalent to
approximately 10.1 bar.
The release rate as a function of time, without and with an SSIV, are shown in the tables below.
Table 6.1 : Release Rates (by Location and Hole Size) as a Function of Time – No SSIV
LOCATION Release rate (kg/s) after

Size 0 min 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min 60 min
Above Sea
Small 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Medium 83 80 79 77 75 71
Large 651 331 273 221 195 154
Full bore 1443 315 265 217 192 153
Depth 50m
Small 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Medium 83 80 79 77 75 71
Large 651 331 273 221 195 154
Full bore 1440 315 265 218 197 158
Depth 100m
Small 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Medium 83 80 79 77 75 71
Large 651 331 273 221 195 154
Full bore 1440 332 283 229 201 157
Depth 200m
Small 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Medium 83 80 79 77 75 71
Large 651 331 273 221 195 154
Full bore 1440 356 288 227 198 155
Depth 500m
Small 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Medium 83 80 79 77 75 71
Large 651 343 269 212 185 145
Full bore 1420 339 269 212 186 145
Depth 1320m
Small 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Medium 83 77 74 69 66 59
Large 549 191 153 121 106 80
Full bore 817 192 153 121 106 79
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14
Table 6.2 : Release Rates (by Location and Hole Size) as a Function of Time – With SSIV
LOCATION Release rate (kg/s) after

Size 0 min 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min 60 min
Above Sea
Small 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4
Medium 83 43 23 7.4 <2
Large 651 <4
Full bore 1443 <1
Depth 50m
Small 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4
Medium 83 43 23 7.4 <2
Large 651 <4
Full bore 1440 <1
Depth 100m
Small 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4
Medium 83 43 23 5.7 <1
Large 651 <4
Full bore 1440 <1
Depth 200m
Small 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4
Medium 83 43 23 <1
Large 651 <4
Full bore 1440 <1
Depth 500m
Small 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.4
Medium 83 43 6.7 <1
Large 651 <4
Full bore 1420 <1
Depth 1320m
Small 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.6 2.2 1.1
Medium 83 <2
Large 549 <4
Full bore 817 <1
If there is no SSIV, small and medium ‘above sea’ release rates decline relatively slowly.
However, for large and full-bore releases the release rate declines after 60 minutes to
approximately 25% and 10%, respectively, of the initial value. At depths up to 500 m, the
release rates are similar to the ‘above sea’ cases; however, for releases below this depth the
release rates decline as the very high back pressure affects the discharge from the orifice.
With an SSIV, the decline in release rate is much quicker. For small holes, the release rate falls
by a third after 60 minutes. Releases from larger holes decline rapidly and fall to less 1% in 5
minutes and are complete within 10 minutes.
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6.2 DISPERSION
6.2.1 Above Sea Releases

Releases from the riser above sea have been modelled as momentum releases (D1) in CIRRUS
in order to determine the distance to LFL and 50% LFL (which corresponds to concentrations
of 3.72% and 1.86% respectively). The release rate figure taken is the value after 5 minutes.
The modelling has been undertaken for three release scenarios, a horizontal jet, a vertical jet
and an impinged jet, for two wind speeds, 5 and 10 m/s. The Pasquill stability category is D
and the ambient temperature 25°C.
The results are shown in the tables below.
Table 6.3 : Dispersion Distances for Above Sea Releases – Direction Horizontal
Wind : 5 m/s Wind : 10 m/s
Size LFL 50% LFL LFL 50% LFL
Small 13 26 14 27
Medium 60 117 60 116
Large 120 235 119 222
Full bore 120 232 119 221
Table 6.4 : Dispersion Distances for Above Sea Releases – Direction Vertical
Size Height Downwind Distance Height Downwind Distance
LFL 50% LFL LFL 50% LFL LFL 50% LFL LFL 50% LFL
Small 8.0 10 1.5 3.3 5.5 6.8 1.9 3.6
Medium 35 48 7.2 16 24 3.3 7.7 17
Large 69 86 15 32 47 63 16 34
Full bore 69 86 15 32 47 63 16 34
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Table 6.5 : Dispersion Distances for Above Sea Releases – Impinged Jet
Small 3.8 5.5 26 43 2.1 3.1 34 56
Medium 20 29 65 91 12 17 85 143
Large 41 60 125 190 24 35 131 219
Full bore 41 60 125 190 24 35 131 219
Note: All distances and heights are relative to the release point.
Large and full-bore releases which are directed horizontally are able to create a gas
concentration at LFL approximately 120 m downwind from the release point. The distance to
50% LFL is approximately twice this figure. The distance downwind to LFL for medium
releases is 60 m. The wind speed does not significantly affect dispersion distances.
For 5 m/s wind speed, large and full-bore releases which are directed vertically create gas
clouds with LFL concentrations 69 m above the release point which extend 15 m downwind.
For the 50% LFL concentration the cloud is marginally taller and extends approximately twice
the downwind distance horizontally. With a 10 m/s wind speed, cloud heights are reduced by a
third and distances downwind only increase marginally.
Impinged jets are modelled as low momentum releases orientated horizontally. Large and full-
bore releases can create LFL concentrations 125 m downwind and 41 m above the release point.
Distances to 50% LFL are approximately 50% greater than the LFL distance.
6.2.2 Below Sea Releases

Releases of gas underwater result in a conical plume of gas bubbles that rise through the water
to the sea surface. A number of papers have been published that investigate the behaviour of
accidental sub-sea releases of hydrocarbon fluids, e.g. resulting from blowouts and
riser/pipeline leaks (Refs. 3-5). In the case of gas releases in deep waters, it is also necessary to
consider the possible formation of solid gas hydrates owing to the combination of methane and
water molecules into a lattice structure that occurs at the high pressures and low water
temperatures encountered. Such hydrate formation will limit the extent of the gas plume that
rises to the surface in the case of deep water releases.
Gas hydrates take the form of small solid flakes. Their density is similar to that of water and
they form a suspension that remains trapped at depth. In Reference 5, it is assessed that for
discharges in deep waters (>700 m), hydrate formation is a dominating mechanism in limiting
plume rise. DNV (Ref. 6) conclude that hydrate formation will prevent plume rise for releases
at depths of 500 m or greater.
For releases at sea depths of <500 m, several models are available to predict the shape of the
rising gas plume and, in particular, its diameter at the sea surface (Refs. 3 & 4). Work carried
out at MIT (Ref. 3) found that the diameter of the plume of gas bubbles at the surface (the
200391/05/01
17
‘central boil’) is independent of the gas flow rate. It was concluded that the surface release
diameter could be estimated using the following simple equation:
Gas plume diameter, D (m) = 0.2 × Hw
where Hw is the water depth (m).
This is known as the ‘20% Rule’. The use of this relationship is recommended in References 6
and 7.
An alternative approach, based upon both theoretical and experimental analysis, is presented in
Reference 4. Fannalop et al developed a relationship between ‘non-dimensional vertical source
distance’ X and ‘non-dimensional plume radius’ B, where:
X = z / (Hw + 10)
B = b / [2α( Hw + 10)]
where b is the plume radius at vertical distance z above the source point and α is the vertical
entrainment coefficient. α is a function of the gas flow rate but was found to have a constant
value of ~0.1 was mass release rates >1 kg/sec. Thus, again the plume radius is independent of
the gas flow rate for all practical values. For water depths >~50 m, i.e. X > ~0.83, Fannelop et
al found that the value of B was approximately 0.44. Thus,
Gas plume diameter, D = 2b = ~ 2 × 0.44 × 2 × 0.1 x (Hw + 10) =~0.176 × (Hw + 10).
This gives values of D of 10.6 m and 19.4 m at depths of 50 m and 100 m, respectively. It is
concluded that the Fannalop et al method in fact gives results very similar to those predicted by
the simple 20% Rule.
Thus, the following rules have been adopted in this analysis for sub-sea releases:
• For releases at depths of less than 500 m, the gas plume diameter at the sea surface is
determined using the ‘20% Rule’
• For releases at depths in excess of 500 m, it is assumed that hydrate formation would be the
dominant mechanism and none of the released gas would reach the sea surface.
As the plume of gas bubbles rises up to the surface, it is liable to move in a horizontal direction
owing to the influence of the prevailing seawater currents. Obviously, the total horizontal
displacement of the plume from the vertical is likely to increase as the depth of the release point
increases. Information on current speeds at various depths for the Akpo field has been obtained
from the Project’s Environmental Design Criteria (Ref. 10) and this has been used to assess
likely displacement distances.
Downwind dispersion distances when the gas emerges at the sea surface have been modelled
using a momentum jet (D1) in CIRRUS with the orifice size calculated using the 20% Rule.
The dispersion distances for releases at 50 m, modelled as a 10 m orifice, are shown in the table
below.
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Table 6.6 : Dispersion Distances for Below Sea Releases (50 m Depth)
Small 4.3 6 23 40 2.8 4 30 53
Medium 21 30 56 97 14 19 78 137
Large 40 59 80 142 27 38 116 203
Full bore 40 59 80 142 27 38 116 203
With low wind speeds, gas clouds from large and full-bore releases extend 80 m downwind to
LFL from the centre of the plume on the sea surface. The height of the cloud to LFL is 40 m
which is 9 m above the Main Deck (EL 31.000 m). With a higher wind speed the cloud is
flattened and extended downwind. Clouds sizes for 50% LFL concentration are approximately
50% larger.
Gas clouds from medium sized releases reach approximately 21 m in height and 56 m
downwind of the plume centre to LFL and should not therefore reach the Main Deck at
flammable concentrations. The effect of a higher wind speed is the same as for larger releases.
A release from 100 m depth creates a plume on the sea surface with a 20 m diameter. CIRRUS
predicts the same dispersion distances as for releases from a 10 m orifice because both
represent low momentum releases and, with the exception of small releases, a cloud
significantly larger than the orifice.
Releases from 200 m depth, corresponding to 40 m orifice on the surface, also predict the same
dispersion distances for medium and larger releases.
In the case of releases from 500 m depth, corresponding to a 100 m orifice on the surface, large
and full bore releases create gas clouds with the same dimensions as from shallower water.
Small and medium releases could not be modelled from an orifice of this size.
6.3 EXPLOSIONS
A separate Explosion Risk Analysis study is being carried out as a part of these RAS to
determine the levels of overpressure that may be generated by topsides explosions on the FPSO.
Results from this study are not yet available. It has therefore been pessimistically assumed that
an explosion causing Catastrophic Asset Loss may potentially occur if a flammable gas cloud
envelops a congested/confined part of the FPSO topsides and is then ignited (see Sections 7.1
and 7.2.3)
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6.4 FIRES
6.4.1 Above Sea Releases

Flame lengths for unimpinged gas jets have been calculated for above sea releases by the
process hazard analysis software tool PHAST (V6.1) (Ref. 14) using the release rate profiles in
Section 6.1. The resultant flame lengths for no SSIV and with an SSIV are shown in the tables
below.
Table 6.7 : Flame Length as a Function of Time – No SSIV
Size Flame length (m) after

0 min 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min 60 min
Small 28 28 28 28 28 28
Medium 129 126 125 123 122 119
Large 342 248 226 205 192 172
Full bore 518 248 224 203 190 171
Table 6.8 : Flame Length as a Function of Time – With SSIV
Size Flame length (m) after

0 min 5 min 10 min 20 min 30 min 60 min
Small 28 27 27 26 25 24
Medium 129 109 70 40 <22
Large 342 <30
Full bore 518 <16
With no SSIV, flame lengths for medium and larger releases are sufficient to reach the forward
or aft end of the vessel, whereas jet flames from small releases could reach the hull, adjacent
risers and modules on the topsides if directed appropriately.
With an SSIV, release durations are shortened, particularly for large and full-bore releases.
Medium and small releases could still cause flame impingement on the FPSO hull for
>30 minutes.
6.4.2 Below Sea Releases

For sub-sea releases, the diameter of the gas plume at the sea surface is a function of the water
depth (see Section 6.2.2 above). If the released gas encounters an ignition source, then a
minimum release rate (or surface flux) is required at the surface in order for a stable sea fire to
be sustained. The limiting value of this surface mass flux has been estimated to be 0.02 kg/m2s;
this is equivalent to the minimum observed burning rate of hydrocarbons on water (Ref. 7).
Applying the 20% Rule, this implies that the minimum gas release rate, m (kg/s), required at a
water depth Hw (m) to sustain a sea fire can be expressed as:
m = 6.4 x 10-4 x Hw2.
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The critical gas release rates to sustain a sea fire at the water depths of interest are shown in the
following table.
Table 6.9 : Critical Release Rates
Depth Critical Release Sustainable Fires after 60 minutes

Rate (kg/s)
No SSIV With SSIV
50 m 1.6 All Only small
100 m 6.4 Small not sustainable None
200 m 25.6 Small not sustainable None
500 m 160 None None
The fire on the sea surface has been modelled in CIRRUS as a low velocity, vertical jet flame
using the flare/torch fire model (F2). The horizontal distance to the flame boundary, taken as
the 100 kW/m2 radiation contour, has been measured from the centre of the fire and the results
are shown in the following table.
Table 6.10 : Horizontal Distance to Flame Boundary
Depth Distance (m)
50 m 10
100 m 20
200 m 40
500 m N/A
It is interesting to note that for these release scenarios the distances are a function of
plume/orifice size on the surface and are effectively independent of release rate.
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7 ESCALATION POTENTIAL
7.1 ESCALATION RULE SETS

For both above sea and below sea releases, the potential for escalation has been examined for
both fires and explosion scenarios. It is assumed that un-ignited releases, both above sea and
below sea, will not cause a threat either to the integrity of the FPSO, or to the EER facilities on
the FPSO. In particular, the loss of buoyancy of the FPSO as a result of a sub-sea gas release
from this riser is not considered to be a credible event owing to the very high reserve buoyancy
of the FPSO and its very large size relative to the dimensions of any gas plume that may emerge
in its vicinity.
Potential escalation of fire scenarios is dependent upon the location of the release, the direction
of the jet fire, the duration of release, etc. In terms of targets, the following have be considered:
A. FPSO hull / structure of FPSO
It is assumed that currently there is no PFP on the hull and that, although the hull is
double-skinned, a jet fire directed towards the hull could pessimistically cause hull
failure / loss of FPSO structural integrity within 60 minutes. Fire escalation to a cargo
tank within the inner hull would occur.
It is assumed that the presence of firewater / deluge in the riser area will mean that
neither sea fires, nor high radiation levels (e.g. non-impinging jet fires) will cause hull
failure / loss of FPSO structural integrity within the first 60 minutes. However, it is
assumed that long lasting sea fires (> 60 minutes) could ultimately cause hull failure /
loss of FPSO structural integrity if the hull were subjected to continuous direct flame
impingement (or a thermal radiation level > 100kW/m2).
B. Mooring system
It is assumed that currently there is no PFP on the mooring system and therefore a jet
fire, impinging on the mooring system above the water level, will cause its failure
(multiple failures of the mooring lines – assumed to be chain links) and therefore loss of
FPSO station within 30 minutes. Such a scenario may lead to multiple riser / flowline
failure and also threaten the integrity of the FPSO.
It is assumed that the presence of firewater / deluge in the mooring system area will
mean that neither sea fires, nor high radiation levels (e.g. non-impinging jet fires) will
cause loss of mooring integrity within the first 60 minutes. If the mooring system were
unprotected, the time to failure would be much shorter, probably within 30 minutes.
However, as before, it is assumed that long lasting sea fires (> 60 minutes) could
ultimately cause failure of the mooring system if it were subjected to continuous direct
flame impingement (or a thermal radiation level > 100kW/m2).
C. Adjacent risers / flowlines
It is assumed that currently there is no PFP on the risers and flowlines and that directly
impinging jet fires will result in riser-to-riser / flowline escalation within 20 minutes.
It is assumed that the presence of firewater / deluge in the riser area will mean that
neither sea fires, nor high radiation levels (e.g. non-impinging jet fires) will cause riser-
to-riser / flowline escalation within the first 60 minutes. As with the mooring system, if
the risers / flowlines were unprotected, the time to failure would be much shorter,
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probably within 30 minutes. However, once again it is assumed that continuous direct
flame impingement (or a thermal radiation level > 100kW/m2) from a long lasting sea
fire (> 60 minutes) will ultimately cause a failure of adjacent risers and / or flowlines.
D. LQ / EER facilities
The LQ is protected by PFP (H60 on the front face and on the roof, and A60 on the side
walls), which will protect against all fire scenarios, except a long duration (> 30
minutes) directly impinging jet fire. However, due to the relative location of the gas
export riser and the LQ, it is assumed that there is a negligible probability of direct jet
fire impingement on the LQ from a gas export riser fire.
In terms of EER facilities, the provision of escape routes at both sides of the FPSO will
mean that a riser fire below the RESDV on the gas export riser will probably impair the
escape route on that side of the FPSO, but would not impair the escape route on the
other side.
In terms of muster areas, the primary muster areas will be inside the LQ and therefore
will be at least as well protected as the LQ.
As far as evacuation is concerned, the primary means of evacuation is the standby
vessel and the secondary means is the TEMPSC. In the event of a riser fire, even if the
standby vessel cannot get close enough to allow direct off-loading of the FPSO crew,
the location of the main freefall TEMPSC (4 off) behind the LQ, should ensure that at
least one evacuation route is available for as long as it takes to evacuate the FPSO.
As far as explosions are concerned, at this stage, without the benefit of any detailed explosion
analysis, it is pessimistically assumed that if a riser release disperses in the appropriate direction
(this is taken to be predominantly wind driven, although jet orientation would also have some
influence) and is of sufficient size for a flammable gas cloud to reach an ignition source on the
topsides, then the resulting explosion will be capable of causing escalation to either topside
structures, or to topsides equipment and that this escalation could threaten the integrity of the
FPSO. However, it is further assumed that any such scenario will not immediately threaten the
integrity of the EER facilities and that the FPSO could still be evacuated, if required, before the
overall integrity of the FPSO is seriously threatened.
7.2 ESCALATION ANALYSIS
7.2.1 Jet Fires

Jet fires will result in the case of above sea ignited releases from the gas export riser.
If the jet flame impinges on the hull of the FPSO, it is pessimistically assumed that escalating
damage could occur after 60 minutes. The riser hangs off the side of the FPSO and the
separation distance between them is negligible (the order of 1 m). In the case of punctures
(small, medium and large holes) of the riser, the jet fire direction would be radial and it is
reasonable to assume that there would be a directional probability of 0.5 of flame impingement
on the hull. If a full bore rupture occurred (guillotine break), it is assumed that there would
inevitably be flame impingement on the hull (directional probability = 1). Thus, if the duration
of the jet fire exceeds 60 minutes, then the probability of hull failure will be given by the
directional probability.
Mooring lines are attached to the four ‘corners’ of the FPSO. The mooring systems on the
starboard side of the FPSO would be shielded from possible flame impingement by a jet fire
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from the gas export riser. Those on the port side are separated from this riser by distances of
approximately 85 m (forward) and 170 m (aft). Thus, flame impingement could only occur on
the port side mooring systems in the case of very long jet fires directed along the side of the
hull. It is assumed that failure of the mooring system would require 30 minutes of jet flame
impingement. It is concluded that the probability of such flame impingement would be very
low. In any case, such a scenario would inevitably also result in flame impingement on to the
hull of the FPSO, which has already been considered as a potential escalation target. This
escalation mechanism is therefore not considered further.
The risers / flowlines that are adjacent to the gas export riser on the port side are as follows:
• The gas injection riser, two slots forward, a distance of ~10 m away
• A production riser, (min.) ten slots aft, a distance of ~50 m away.
This excludes future risers, and water injection and umbilical risers.
Owing to the geometrical configuration of the risers, it is considered unlikely that any of the
risers would suffer flame impingement from a fire from the gas export riser without flame
impingement also occurring on the hull of the FPSO. Based on the angle subtended by the gap
between the hull and the gas injection riser from the location of the gas export riser, a distance
of ~10m away, there is estimated to be a probability of only ~0.025 of flame impingement
occurring on the gas injection riser without it also hitting the hull. The failure time of a riser is
taken to be 20 minutes given jet flame impingement (in contrast to the value of 60 minutes
assumed for the hull, see above).
Thus, in the case of long duration (>60 minute) jet fires from punctures of the gas export riser,
there is estimated to be a 50% chance of escalating hull damage (see above), plus an additional
2.5% chance of escalating riser damage alone. However, if the fire duration is limited to the
range of 20-60 minutes, then there is a greater chance of escalation occurring to the riser but not
the hull; this value is then estimated to be 0.25.
7.2.2 Sea Fires

Sea fires will result in the case of below sea releases from the gas export riser that are ignited.
If the sea fire impinges directly on the hull of the FPSO or results in a thermal radiation level >
100kW/m2 at the hull of the FPSO, it is pessimistically assumed that escalating damage will
occur after 60 minutes. Thus, if the FPSO hull lies very close to, or within, the area of the gas
plume at the sea surface, then it is assumed that hull failure will occur with a probability of 1 if
all of the following conditions apply:
• The release is ignited (assumed to be only possible if the gas concentration exceeds 50%
LFL at the deck level of the FPSO, 31 m above the sea)
• A sea fire is sustainable
• The duration of the fire is >60 minutes.
The sea fire may be displaced horizontally from a position vertically above the riser release
point by the prevailing currents. The probability of the sea fire being adjacent to the hull of the
FPSO is estimated taking account of the depth of the release, the possible horizontal
displacement of the plume and the diameter of the sea fire.
The mooring system and adjacent risers / flowlines are assumed to fail if exposed to 60
minutes of sea fire exposure or a thermal radiation level > 100kW/m2. For this to occur, the hull
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of the FPSO would also be similarly exposed and would itself fail (see above). These escalation
mechanisms are therefore not considered further.
It is assumed that there is a negligible chance of direct escalation / impairment of the LQ / EER
facilities by sea fires (see Section 7.1 above).
7.2.3 Explosions
Explosions may occur in the case of both above sea and below sea releases from the gas export
riser if they produce a flammable cloud on the topsides of the FPSO (in a congested / confined
area) that is then ignited. The following conditions must therefore apply:
• The dispersing gas cloud must extend sufficiently far from the point of release, both
horizontally and vertically, to have the potential to result in a flammable gas
concentration on the topsides of the FPSO (>31 m above sea level)
• The wind direction / release orientation must direct the dispersing gas towards the FPSO
• The gas must encounter a source of ignition on the topsides and then produce an
explosion.
The gas export riser is on the port (FPSO west) side of the FPSO. The prevailing wind direction
is south-westerly, blowing riser releases back towards the FPSO. The wind direction is in the
180o sector to the west of the platform north-south axis (approximately true 195o to true 15o) for
80% of the time (Ref. 10).
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8 POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FPSO

The impact of gas export riser failures on the FPSO has been considered in terms of the
potential to cause injuries / loss of life (risk to personnel), as well as the potential to cause a loss
of the asset (i.e. the FPSO). Other risks, such as the risk to the environment, or the risk to
company reputation, generally go hand in hand with a loss of the asset and therefore have not
been evaluated separately in this study.
In terms of risk to the asset (and therefore also risk to the environment and risk to company
reputation), it has been assumed that any escalation of the initial riser release event that could
threaten the integrity of the FPSO, the integrity of the mooring system, the integrity of adjacent
risers, or the integrity of the LQ / EER facilities will result in a loss of asset. The potential
magnitude of the risk associated with these scenarios has been evaluated based on the rating
system described in TFE’s GS EXP 401 (Ref. 8). Based on this approach, it is assumed that
any escalation of the initial riser release event causing either a loss of FPSO integrity or a loss
of the integrity of the mooring system would result in a potentially ‘Catastrophic’ incident and
that any escalation of the initial riser release event leading to either riser-to-riser / flowline
escalation or a threat to the integrity of the LQ / EER facilities would result in a ‘Major’
incident.
In terms of risk to personnel, it is assumed that the presence (or not) of an SSIV on the gas
export pipeline will not have any significant effect on the likelihood of immediate fatalities
(those that occur in the vicinity of the initial event). As far as delayed fatalities are concerned,
it may be argued that the potential consequences associated with a riser fire, or an explosion,
are unlikely to have an immediate effect the EER facilities on the FPSO. However, it is
pessimistically assumed that any event that could threaten the integrity of the FPSO within the
first 60 minutes would cause a small risk to personnel owing to the resultant need to mount a
‘rapid’ evacuation from the FPSO before impairment of the evacuation facilities occurred.
It is assumed that if such a ‘rapid’ evacuation of the FPSO were required owing to the threat to
its integrity (e.g. as a result of escalation to the FPSO’s hull / structure), then this would be
mounted by means of the lifeboats rather than by the standby vessel. An evacuation fatality
fraction of 0.02 (2%) is assumed for such evacuations (Ref. 7). Thus, if the POB on Akpo were
the maximum value of 240, then the average number of delayed fatalities during evacuation is
estimated to be 0.02 x 240 = 4.8. This pessimistically assumes that the riser failure causes no
immediate fatalities (thus reducing the number of potential delayed fatalities).
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9 RISK ASSESSMENT OF RISER RELEASES
9.1 BASE CASE: NO SSIV

Table 9.1 below summarises the escalation potential and potential impact on the FPSO of each
of the identified accident scenarios for the base case in which no SSIV is installed. The table
also shows the algorithms used to assess the escalation frequencies. Release frequencies and
directional probabilities have been assessed as described in Sections 5 and 7, respectively.
Ignition probabilities and explosion probabilities, conditional upon ignition, have been derived
using the methodology of Cox, Lees and Ang (Ref. 12).
The results are summarised below:
Escalation Frequency (per year) Delayed

Mechanism PLL
Catastrophic Major (Fatalities per year)
Asset Loss Asset Loss
1.35E-04 3.61E-06
Jet Fires 6.47E-04
(Hull/structure) (Riser/flowline)
3.06E-05
Sea Fires - 1.47E-04
(Hull/structure)
9.03E-05
Explosions - 4.34E-04
(Topsides/structure)
TOTAL 2.56E-04 3.61E-06 1.23E-03
It may be seen that if escalation occurs, it is assessed to be much more likely to result in
Catastrophic Asset Loss rather than Major Asset Loss. This is because, without an SSIV, all of
the releases are of long duration (> 60 minutes) and resultant fires are therefore judged to have
the potential to cause hull/structural damage (Catastrophic Asset Loss). In addition, explosions
are assumed always to cause Catastrophic Asset Loss. It should be noted that these ‘damage’
assumptions are considered pessimistic, i.e. the frequency of Catastrophic Asset Loss quoted
above is likely to be on the high side.
The dominant contributor to the risks (53% of both Catastrophic Asset Loss and Delayed PLL)
is assessed to be jet fires resulting from above sea riser releases, followed by explosions on the
topsides of the FPSO (35%) and sea fires from sub-sea releases (12%).
In terms of risk to personnel, the Average Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) associated with
the above Delayed PLL is of the order of 2.6E-06 per year, a relatively low value for such a
major accident event.
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Table 9.1 : Escalation Potential, No SSIV Case
Escalation Mechanism FPSO Hull / Mooring System Adjacent Risers / LQ / EER Facilities
Structure of FPSO Flowlines
Jet Fires Escalation possible. Escalation unlikely owing Escalation possible, but Escalation probability
to large separation distance. unlikely without additional negligible.
Criterion: 60 min. of flame
In any case, escalation to escalation to FPSO hull.
impingement. This is possible
FPSO hull would also
for all above sea riser releases. Criterion: 20 min. of flame
occur. Not considered
impingement. This is
Escalation Frequency = further.
possible for S, M & L above
ΣAll above sea releases (release
sea riser releases.
frequency x ignition (fire) prob.
x flame orientation prob.) Escalation Frequency =
Σ S, M & L above sea releases (release
Asset loss: Catastrophic.
frequency x ignition (fire)
No. of delayed fatalities: 4.8. prob. x flame orientation
prob.)
Asset loss: Major.
Sea Fires Escalation possible. Escalation unlikely owing Escalation possible, but Escalation probability
to large separation distance. escalation to FPSO hull negligible.
In any case, escalation to would also occur for these
impingement / radiation level
FPSO hull would also cases. Not considered
>100kW/m2.
occur. Not considered further.
This is possible for the further.
following sub-sea riser releases:
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• At 50/100/200 m depths –
L & FB releases (for S & M
releases, either fires are
unsustainable for 60 min. or
no gas at >50% LFL
reaches FPSO deck).
• At depths of 500+ m, no
sea fires are sustainable for
60 min.
Escalation Frequency =
ΣL & FB releases at 50/100/200 m (release
frequency x ignition (fire) prob.
x fire impingement prob.)
No. of delayed fatalities: 4.8.
Explosions Escalation occurs if flammable gas reaches the FPSO topsides and explodes.
This is possible for M, L & FB above sea riser releases. Thus, Escalation Frequency = ΣM, L & FB releases (release frequency x
dispersion direction prob. x ignition & explosion prob.).
For sub-sea riser releases, flammable gas may only reach the FPSO topsides in the case of L & FB releases at 50/100/200
m depths. Thus, Escalation Frequency = ΣL & FB releases at 50/100/200 m (release frequency x dispersion direction prob. x ignition
& explosion prob.)
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9.2 BENEFITS OF AN SSIV

Table 9.2 below summarises the escalation potential and potential impact on the FPSO of each
of the identified accident scenarios for the alternative case in which an SSIV is installed. The
table also shows the algorithms used to assess the escalation frequencies.
The results are summarised below:
Escalation Frequency (per year) Delayed

Mechanism PLL
Catastrophic Major (Fatalities per year)
Asset Loss Asset Loss
1.82E-05 1.22E-05
Jet Fires 8.75E-05
(Hull/structure) (Riser/flowline)
Sea Fires - -
9.03E-05
Explosions - 4.34E-04
(Topsides/structure)
TOTAL 1.09E-04 1.22E-05 5.21E-04
Risk Reduction
Associated with 1.47E-04 -8.59E-06 7.09E-04
SSIV (∆Risk)
With an SSIV installed, the duration of all releases is reduced with the following effects:
• Medium size jet fires can still cause escalating damage to an adjacent riser, but not to the
hull,
• Large and full bore jet fires do not cause escalating damage to either an adjacent riser or to
the hull,
• Sea fires can no longer cause escalating damage to any of the identified targets, since none
of the release scenarios result in fires that are sustainable for >60 minutes,
• Overall, there is a reduction in the frequency of Catastrophic Asset Loss, but a (small)
increase in the frequency of Major Asset Loss. The mitigation provided by the SSIV results
in some accident events causing Major Asset Loss instead of Catastrophic Asset Loss; thus,
there is an observed increase in the frequency of Major Asset Loss,
With an SSIV installed, the dominant contributor to the Catastrophic Asset Loss and Delayed
PLL risks is an explosion on the topsides of the FPSO (83%), whilst jet fires resulting from
above sea riser releases contribute the remaining 17%. The frequency of Major Asset Loss is
dominated by medium size jet fires that escalate to an adjacent riser, but are of insufficient
duration to cause escalating hull damage.
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It may be seen that the installation of an SSIV in the gas export riser is assessed to produce the
following benefits:
• A reduction in the frequency of Catastrophic Asset Loss of 1.47E-04 per year (57.4%),
• A reduction in the combined frequency of Catastrophic and Major Asset Losses of 1.38E-04
per year (53.3%),
• A reduction in the delayed PLL of 7.09E-04 per year (57.6%).
It should be noted that this analysis assumes that the SSIV would always be closed relatively
soon after the occurrence of the leak in the gas export riser, i.e. in less than, say, 5 minutes. The
risk reduction assessed is thus the maximum achievable with an SSIV. If, in practice, the
reliability (probability of failure to close on demand) of an SSIV were, say, 0.05 (5%), then the
∆Risk values given above should be reduced by 5%.
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Table 9.2: Escalation Potential, SSIV Case
Jet Fires Escalation possible. Escalation probability Escalation possible. Escalation probability
negligible. negligible.
Criterion: 60 min. of flame Criterion: 20 min. of flame
impingement. This is impingement. This is
possible only for S above possible for S & M above
sea riser releases. sea riser releases.
Escalation Frequency = Escalation Frequency =
ΣS above sea releases (release Σ S & M above sea releases (release
frequency x ignition (fire) frequency x ignition (fire)
prob. x flame orientation prob. x flame orientation
prob.) prob.)
Asset loss: Catastrophic. Asset loss: Major.
No. of delayed fatalities:
4.8.
Sea Fires Escalation probability Escalation probability Escalation probability Escalation probability
negligible. negligible. negligible. negligible.
impingement / radiation
level >100kW/m2.
This is not possible for any
sub-sea riser releases:
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• At 50 m depth – for S &
M release no gas at
>50% LFL reaches
FPSO deck whilst
duration of other
releases <60 min.
• At greater depths, for S
releases sea fires are not
sustainable for 60 min.
whilst duration of other
releases <60 min.
Explosions Escalation occurs if flammable gas reaches the FPSO topsides and explodes. Initial gas dispersion will be similar to
No SSIV case.
For above sea riser releases, Escalation Frequency = ΣM, L & FB releases (release frequency x dispersion direction prob. x
ignition & explosion prob.).
For sub-sea riser releases, Escalation Frequency = ΣL & FB releases at 50/100/200 m (release frequency x dispersion direction
prob. x ignition & explosion prob.)
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9.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The above results may be compared with TFE’s system for ranking residual accidental events,
as set out in its Document No. GS EXP 401 (Ref. 8), in which Asset Losses are ranked into four
categories of Severity – Minor, Significant, Major and Catastrophic – and plotted on a matrix of
Severity versus Frequency. The matrix is divided into three zones (see below):
• Zone I – Improvement deemed necessary
• Zone II – Target for improvement
• Zone III – Remote risk.
Catastrophic
with SSIV
no SSIV ZONE I
Major
Severity Category
Significant
Minor
ZONE III ZONE II
1.00E-06 1.00E-05 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 1.00E-02 1.00E-01 1.00E+00
Annual Frequency
It can be seen that, without an SSIV, the risk of Catastrophic Asset Loss from gas export riser
failures is assessed to be within Zone II, but it is close to the boundary with Zone I. The
installation of an SSIV on the gas export riser moves this residual risk well inside Zone II. This
finding indicates that the installation of an SSIV should be a ‘target for improvement’ using this
TFE criterion, i.e. it is of some potential benefit in reducing the frequency of Catastrophic Asset
Loss. As discussed in Section 9.2, the mitigation provided by an SSIV results in some accident
events causing Major Asset Loss instead of Catastrophic Asset Loss. There is thus an observed
increase in the frequency of Major Asset Loss, but this risk remains well within Zone III.
An alternative method of assessing the need for an SSIV is to apply cost-benefit analysis. The
following assumptions have tentatively been made:
• Field producing life = 20 years (Ref. 2)
• Cost of Catastrophic Asset Loss = € 750 million
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• Cost of Major Asset Loss = € 15 million

• Incremental cost to avert a fatality (ICAF)= € 7.5 million
• Discount rate = 10%.
Thus, the expectation value of Annual Asset Loss attributable to export gas riser failures is
assessed to be as follows:
∆Catastrophic Asset Loss Risk × € 750 million + ∆Major Asset Loss Risk × € 15 million
= (1.47E-04 × € 750 million) + (-8.59E-06 × € 15 million) = € 110 250 - € 130 = € 110 120
where: ∆Risk is the incremental increase/decrease in the frequency of Asset Loss associated
with the installation of an SSIV (see Section 9.2).
Similarly, the incremental reduction in Delayed PLL can be assigned the following monetary
value for the purposes of this analysis:
∆Delayed PLL × € 7.5 million = 7.09E-04 × € 7.5 million = € 5 320.
Therefore, the total annual saving associated with the installation of an SSIV in the gas export
line is estimated to be € 110 120 + € 5 320 = € 115 440.
The Present Value (PV) of benefit from this reduced risk may be calculated from the following
equation:
PV = R(F-1)/rF
Where R = annual saving (€ 115 440),
r = discount rate,
F = (1+r)n, and
n = number of years.
Thus, over the 20 year life of the installation and assuming a discount rate of 10%, the Present
Value is estimated to be of the order of € 983 000.
based on information provided by TFE, the cost of installing an SSIV check valve in the gas
export line is estimated to be ~€ 1.5 million. Therefore, compared to a Present Value of less
than € 1 million, it is concluded that the installation of an SSIV is not justified, since the cost of
the SSIV then exceeds its benefit.
In addition, it should be noted that the assessed benefit of an SSIV is dominated by the resultant
reduction in Asset Loss (95%) rather than by the reduction in PLL (and its associated costs). It
is therefore concluded that, on balance, it would not seem to be cost beneficial to install an
SSIV in the gas export line.
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10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis described in the previous sections of this report, the following
conclusions / recommendations are made:
1. Using the risk ranking matrix approach set out in the TFE General Specification –
Guidelines for Concept Safety Evaluations of Oil and Gas Installations (Ref. 8), the results
of this SSIV Study indicate that the risk associated with releases from the gas export line
fall within Zone II of the Severity vs. Frequency graph, i.e. ‘target for improvement’.
2. The installation of an SSIV in the gas export riser is assessed as having a potentially
significant effect upon the resultant risk levels, reducing both the frequency of Catastrophic
Asset Loss and the predicted PLL by approximately 57%. However, it should also be noted
that both the frequencies of Catastrophic Asset Loss and the PLL assessed in this study are
believed to be pessimistic (i.e. high).
3. The application of a cost-benefit analysis approach indicates that, on balance, it would
appear not to be cost beneficial to install an SSIV in gas export line. The cost of installing
an SSIV check valve in this line has been estimated to be ~€ 1.5 million, but the assessed
Present Value of benefit of an SSIV, taking account of the resultant reductions in both Asset
Loss and fatality risks, is estimated to be only ~€ 1 million (based on a 20 year installation
life and a project discount rate of 10%). Thus, the installation cost would exceed the
assessed benefit. It is also noted that the assessed benefit of the SSIV is dominated by the
resultant reduction in Asset Loss (95%) rather than by the reduction in PLL (and its
associated costs).
4. Accordingly, it is concluded that the case for installing an SSIV on the Akpo Gas Export
Pipeline cannot be made on the basis of the results of this SSIV Study. However, it is
acknowledged that TFE may well want to take account of other factors – such as company
policy, the uncertainties inherent in this analysis (see 5. below), and any other legislative or
insurance considerations etc. – as a part of its overall decision making process concerning
the installation of an SSIV in this line.
5. It should also be noted that this SSIV Study has been performed prior to all of the other
Akpo Field Development Risk Assessment Studies (RAS) scheduled to be carried out
during the Basic Engineering phase. Hence, the SSIV Study has had to make a number of
relatively coarse assumptions concerning, for example: the frequency of releases from SCRs
and the likely impact of riser events on the integrity of the FPSO, which result in a level of
uncertainty in the analysis. It may be possible to refine these assumptions during the course
of the Basic Engineering phase. It is therefore recommended that the findings of this study
should be reviewed when and if this additional information becomes available (if the project
deadlines permit).
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11 REFERENCES
1. Akpo Field Development Project – Basic Engineering. Gas Export Pipeline & AMP2 Riser
Design Basis. TFE / Doris Doc. No. NG50-3-BE-PLR-AB-000-132, Rev. 0, 21 March 2003.
2. Akpo Full Field Pre-Project Study Final Report – Hybrid Gas Export: Field Development
Architecture. Doc. No. DGEP/SCR/ED/APP No 008APP03AKPO.
3. Milgram, J. H. and McLaren, W.G.: The Response of Floating Platforms to Sub-sea
Blowouts, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Ocean Engineering,
Report 82-8, 1982.
4. Fannelop, T. K. and Sjoen, K.: Hydrodynamics of Underwater Blowouts, The Ship Research
Institute of Norway, Report R-97-80, 1980.
5. Johansen, O (SINTEF): DeepBlow – A Lagrangian Plume Model for Deep Water Blowouts,
Spill Science & Technology Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000.
6. DNV: Offshore Hazard and Risk Assessment Toolkit (OHRAT) Reference Manual, 1992.
7. CMPT: A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, 1999.
8. TotalFinaElf Exploration Production: General Specification – Guidelines for Concept Safety
Evaluations of Oil and Gas Installations. Document No. GS EXP 401, Rev. 00, February
2001.
9. UK Health and Safety Executive / AME, PARLOC 96: The Update of Loss of Containment
Data for Offshore Pipelines, HSE OTH 551, 1998.
10. Akpo Field Development Project – Environmental Design Criteria. TFE Ref. No.
DGEP/TDO/TEC/GEO/VQR-243, Rev. 2, 26 September 2002.
11. UK Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics, 2001, HID
Statistics Report HSR 2001 002, January 2002.
12. Cox, A.W., Lees, F.P. and Ang, M.L.: Classification of Hazardous Locations, Institution of
Chemical Engineers, 1990.
13. BP: CIRRUS Consequence Modelling Software Package.
14. DNV: Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools (PHAST).
200391/05/01
37
APPENDIX A : ASSUMPTION SHEETS

The following table lists the Assumption Sheets associated with the SSIV Study and the actual
Assumption Sheets are presented on the following pages.
SUBJECT AREA ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION SHEET TOPIC

SHEET NO.
Hazard SSIV-HI-001 Hazardous Events

Identification
Accident SSIV-AF-001 Riser/Pipeline Release Frequencies

Frequencies
Event Tree SSIV-ET-001 Ignition Probabilities

Probabilities
SSIV-ET-002 Explosion Probabilities
SSIV-ET-003 Wind Direction and Wind Speed Probabilities
Consequence SSIV-CA-001 Release Calculations

Analysis
SSIV-CA-002 Gas Dispersion
SSIV-CA-003 Fire Modelling
SSIV-CA-004 Explosions
Escalation SSIV-EA-001 Potential Targets

Analysis
SSIV-EA-002 Escalation to FPSO Hull
SSIV-EA-003 Escalation to FPSO Mooring System
SSIV-EA-004 Escalation to Adjacent Risers / Flowlines
Impairment SSIV-IA-001 Impairment of EER Systems

Analysis
Risk / Impact SSIV-RA-001 Risk to Personnel

Analysis
SSIV-RA-002 Loss of Asset
Miscellaneous SSIV-MI-001 Environment Conditions
SSIV-MI-002 SSIV Cost Estimates
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-HI-001
Project Phase : Basic Engineering Issue : B
Study : SSIV Study Date : 30 April 2003
Subject Area : Hazard Identification
Topic : Hazardous Events
Assumption/Rule Set
The provision of an SSIV at the FPSO end of the gas export pipeline will help to reduce the risks associated
with potential releases / leaks from the gas export riser, in between the RESDV and the (possible) location of
the SSIV. Such leaks could occur as a result of a number of possible causes, including:
− equipment failure, e.g. the riser itself, or any fittings associated with the riser
− an impact event, such as a ship collision, or a dropped object, leading to riser failure
− extreme environmental conditions, again leading to riser failure.
These events will form the basis for the analysis associated with the SSIV Study.
The SSIV may also help to reduce the risks associated with other accident events that could escalate to the gas
export riser; including, for example, a fire associated with an adjacent riser, or flowline. However, it is
assumed that the risk reduction potential associated with these escalation-type events is not significant,
compared to the risk reduction potential associated with releases / leaks from the gas export riser itself, and
therefore these events will not be analysed as part of the SSIV Study.
In terms of release location, potential releases / leaks from the gas export riser could either occur above sea,
i.e. in between the downstream side of the RESDV and sea level, or below sea. In terms of the consequence
analysis, it is assumed that above sea releases will be located just below the RESDV and that below sea
releases could occur at any point between the sea surface and the (possible) location of the SSIV, which for
the purposes of this study is assumed to be close to the riser touchdown point (TDP). The consequences
associated with below sea releases will be modelled at five different depths, namely: 50m, 100m, 200m, 500m
and 1320m, to represent to range of possible release locations (the latter being the assumed depth to the sea
bed at the riser TDP).
In terms of hazardous consequences, it is assumed that the main risks associated with these events will occur
as a result of ignited releases, i.e. fires and explosions.
For further details about the assumptions associated with the consequence analysis, see the relevant
Assumption Sheets in the category SSIV-CA-001-004.
Checked and Approved
Company/ Responsible Signature Date

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-AF-001
Subject Area : Accident Frequencies
Topic : Riser Release Frequencies
Assumption/Rule Set
Release frequencies for the gas export riser will be taken from the PARLOC 96 database (Ref. 9) for the
relevant riser / pipeline release scenarios. This data is based on recorded historical riser / pipeline release
events and therefore includes releases caused by impact events, such as dropped objects and ship collisions,
and extreme environmental events, as well as releases due to equipment / component failures. Therefore, at
this stage, it is not the intention to try and estimate any Akpo-specific riser release frequencies, based on the
actual potential for events such as dropped objects and ship collisions affecting the Akpo gas export riser /
pipeline.
Due to the relative length of the gas export riser at Akpo, compared to the average length of the risers covered
by the PARLOC data, it is assumed that the frequency of a release from the Akpo gas export riser is
equivalent to the frequency of a release from a ‘standard’ steel riser (as defined by the PARLOC data), plus
the frequency of a release from a steel pipeline, of a length equivalent to the length of the Akpo riser less
150m (the assumed length of a ‘standard’ riser).
It should be noted that PARLOC does not contain any data that is specific to Steel Catenary Risers (SCRs),
hence the need to use failure rate data for steel lines (see above). It is assumed that SCRs will be
appropriately designed so they do not have a high frequency of failures due to fatigue, thus justifying the use
of failure rate data for steel lines.
In addition to the frequency of a release from the riser / pipeline, as described above, it is also assumed that
releases could occur from the SCR flexi-joint and / or from the SSIV (if installed). Data for the frequency of
releases associated with this equipment will be taken from the UK HSE Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases
Statistics 2001 (Ref. 11).

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-ET-001

Project Phase : Basic Engineering Issue : A
Subject Area : Event Tree Probabilities
Topic : Ignition Probabilities
Assumption/Rule Set
The probability of the ignition of a particular release is a complex subject, being influenced by a significant
number of factors. In order to simplify this, it is proposed that the probability of ignition of releases from the
gas export riser is estimated based on the following simple rule sets / assumptions:
For Above Sea Releases

It is assumed that the probability of ignition for these releases can be estimated based on the correlation given
in Cox, Lees & Ang (Ref 12). For gas releases, the ignition probability (Pi) is calculated as a function of
release rate (R), in kg/sec, as follows:
Pi = 0.0158 x R0.6415
With a maximum value of Pi of 0.3.
For Below Sea Releases

In order to recognise the reduced likelihood of ignition associated with these releases, it is proposed that the
ignition probability for below sea releases is calculated using the same correlation from Cox, Lees & Ang, as
above, but only if the release is such that the resultant gas cloud can reach the Main Deck of the FPSO, with a
concentration of, at least, 50% of the LFL. This then means that the estimated ignition probability is not only
a function of release rate, but also of release location.
For further information about the gas dispersion modelling, see Assumption Sheets SSIV-CA-003 and SSIV-
CA-004.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Topic : Explosion Probabilities
Assumption/Rule Set
In the absence of the results from the explosion risk analysis being undertaken for the Akpo Project, the
approach to assessing the explosion potential assumed in the SSIV Study will be based on the following
simple rule sets / assumptions:
For Both Above and Below Sea Releases

It is assumed that an explosion is only possible if the gas cloud, associated with a given release, can reach the
topside modules with a concentration in excess of the LFL.
In those cases where an explosion could occur, the conditional explosion probability (given ignition)
correlation derived by Cox, Lee and Ang (Ref. 12) is as follows:
Explosion probability, Pexp = 0.0528 x R0.3796
Where, R is the release rate in kg/sec and, as with the ignition probability, the maximum value of Pexp of 0.3.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Topic : Wind Direction and Wind Speed Probabilities
Assumption/Rule Set
The estimated wind direction and wind speed probabilities are based on Environmental Design Criteria data
given in the Akpo Project Green Book (Ref. 10).
Given the location of the gas export riser (on the port side of the FPSO) and the normal direction of the
prevailing winds at the location of the FPSO, it is estimated that the probability that the wind will blow a gas
cloud from a gas export riser release towards some part of the FPSO is 0.80 (i.e. 80% of the time).
In terms of wind speed, the data in the Green Book shows that, overall, ~62% of winds are in the range 3 to 5
m/s, ~31% between 5 and 7 m/s and the rest > 7m/s. On the basis that the consequence analysis is being
undertaken for two representative wind speeds, 5 and 10m/s, it is assumed that the split between the two is
roughly 95: 05.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-CA-001
Subject Area : Consequence Analysis
Topic : Release Calculations
Assumption/Rule Set
Releases are analysed in terms of four characteristic hole sizes:

− Small, 10mm diameter hole
− Medium, 50mm diameter hole
− Large, 150mm diameter hole
− Full Bore, 381mm in the case of the gas export riser (15-in ID)
Release rates are calculated using the gas pipeline model in CIRRUS. Gas properties and conditions are
assumed to be as follows:
− Operating pressure: 194.2 bar(a)
− Operating temperature: 45oC
− Molecular weight of export gas: 21.39
− Composition: 79.16% methane, 10.15% ethane, 5.65% propane, 3.13% butanes
− Vapour density: 218 kg/m3
For below sea releases the back pressure is calculated using a sea water density of 1030 kg/m3; hence, for
example, 100 m of water is equivalent to a back pressure of approximately 10.1 bar.
The riser /pipeline inventory is calculated on the basis of the following:
− Riser length from the RESDV to the touchdown point (TDP) is approx. 1730m
− Assumed location of SSIV is 70m from TDP, giving a total ‘riser length’ of 1800m
− Pipeline length from potential location of SSIV to RESDV on Amenam (the export gas receiving
installation) is assumed to be 150km

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Topic : Gas Dispersion
Assumption/Rule Set
Above Sea Releases

Releases from the riser above sea level have been modelled as momentum releases in CIRRUS, to determine
the distance to LFL and 50% LFL. These correspond to gas concentrations of 3.72% and 1.86%, respectively.
The modelling has been undertaken for three release scenarios, a horizontal jet, a vertical jet and an impinged
jet and for two different wind speeds, 5 and 10 m/s. The environmental conditions assumed are stated on
Assumption Sheet SSIV-MI-001.
Below Sea Releases
The following rules have been adopted in this analysis for subsea releases:
− For releases at depths of less than 500 m, the gas plume diameter at the sea surface is determined
using the ‘20% Rule’, i.e. that the diameter of the plume is roughly 20% of the release depth
− For releases at depths in excess of 500 m, it is assumed that hydrate formation would be the dominant
mechanism and none of the released gas would reach the sea surface.
As the plume of gas bubbles rises up to the surface, it is liable to move in a horizontal direction owing to the
influence of the prevailing seawater currents. The total horizontal displacement of the plume from the vertical
is likely to increase as the depth of the release point increases. Information on current speeds at various
depths for the Akpo field has been obtained from the Project’s Environmental Design Criteria (Ref. 10) and
this is described further on Assumption Sheet SSIV-MI-001.
Dispersion distances when the gas emerges at the sea surface have been modelled as a low momentum jet in
CIRRUS with the orifice size calculated using the 20% Rule.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Topic : Fire Modelling
Assumption/Rule Set
Fires have been modelled as either jet fires (for above sea releases) or sea fires (for subsea releases).
Above Sea Jet Fires
Jet fires resulting from ignited above sea releases have been modelled using PHAST. The fires have been
modelled as un-impinged horizontal jet fires, in order to estimate the maximum flame lengths associated with
each of the above sea release scenarios.
Sea Fires
For sub-sea releases, the diameter of the gas plume at the sea surface is a function of the water depth (see
Assumption Sheet SSIV-CA-002). If the released gas encounters an ignition source, then a minimum release
rate (or surface flux) is required at the surface in order for a stable sea fire to be sustained. The limiting value
of this surface mass flux has been estimated to be 0.02 kg/m2.s; this is equivalent to the minimum observed
burning rate of hydrocarbons on water (Ref. 7). Applying the 20% Rule, this implies that the minimum gas
release rate, m (kg/s), required at a water depth Hw (m) to sustain a sea fire can be expressed as:
m = 6.4 x 10-4 x Hw2.
Thus, at a water depth of 100 m, the critical gas release rate to sustain a sea-fire is estimated to be 6.4 kg/s.
Any sea fire scenarios that are deemed sustainable have subsequently been modelled as a low velocity,
vertical jet flame using the flare/torch fire model in CIRRUS. The horizontal distance to the flame boundary,
taken as the 100 kW/m2 radiation contour, has been measured from the centre of the fire.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Topic : Explosions
Assumption/Rule Set
The potential for explosions will be assessed simply by examining the potential for a gas cloud, resulting from
an above sea or a below sea release, to reach a potential ignition source at or above LFL.
In the absence of any detailed explosion analysis results, the consequences associated with any resulting
explosion will be estimated based on the likely confinement of the gas cloud and any congestion in the area
where the gas cloud reaches. Using the probabilistic approach described on Assumption Sheet SSIV-ET-002,
it is pessimistically assumed that if a flammable gas cloud envelopes a congested / confined part of the FPSO
topsides and is then ignited, the consequences of any such explosion could cause significant damage leading
to a catastrophic asset loss.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-EA-001
Subject Area : Escalation Analysis
Topic : Potential Targets
Assumption/Rule Set
Un-ignited Releases
It is assumed that un-ignited releases, both above sea and below sea, will not cause an escalation threat to
either to the integrity of the FPSO, or to the EER facilities on the FPSO. In particular, the loss of buoyancy of
the FPSO, as a result of a sub-sea gas release from the gas export riser, is not considered to be a credible event
owing to the very high reserve buoyancy of the FPSO and due its very large size relative to the dimensions of
any gas plume that may emerge in its vicinity.
Fires and Explosions
The potential escalation of fire and/or explosion scenarios is dependent upon their location, the direction /
orientation of the fire, the fire duration, extent of explosion overpressures, etc. In terms of potential targets,
the following have be considered:
• The FPSO itself (hull, critical structures)
• The FPSO Mooring System (mooring lines, etc)
• Adjacent risers and flowlines
(Note: the LQ and EER facilities have been analysed in terms of their potential impairment, see Assumption
Sheet SSIV-IA-001.)

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Topic : Escalation to FPSO Hull
Assumption/Rule Set
Fires
The potential escalation of fire scenarios will depend on the location of the release, the direction of jet fire,
duration of release, etc.
It is pessimistically assumed that, currently, as there is no PFP on hull and that even though the hull is double-
skinned, a jet fire directed towards the hull could cause hull failure / loss of FPSO structural integrity within
60 minutes. It is further assumed that, in terms of directional probability, an above sea jet fire from a small,
medium or a large release has a 50% chance of impinging on the hull and a jet fire from a full bore release has
a 100% chance of causing flame impingement on the hull. The reason for this is that a full bore release is
more likely to be vertically orientated, whereas the small, medium and large release are more likely to be
radial / horizontally orientated.
For sea fires, it is pessimistically assumed that flame impingement could cause hull failure / loss of FPSO
structural integrity if the fire duration is at least 60 minutes.
Explosions
As far as explosions are concerned, at this stage, without the benefit of any detailed explosion analysis, it is
simply assumed that if a riser release disperses in the appropriate direction (this is assumed to be a function of
wind direction, see Assumption Sheet SSIV-CA-002) and is of sufficient size for a flammable gas cloud to
reach an ignition source on the FPSO, then the resulting explosion will be capable of causing escalation to
either topside structures, or to topsides equipment and that this escalation could subsequently threaten the
integrity of the FPSO.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................

Topic : Escalation to FPSO Mooring System
Assumption/Rule Set
Fires
As with escalation to the FPSO hull, it is pessimistically assumed that, currently, as there is no PFP on FPSO
mooring system, a jet fire directed towards the mooring lines could cause mooring system failure / loss of
FPSO structural integrity within 30 minutes. For sea fires, it is also pessimistically assumed that flame
impingement could cause mooring system failure / loss of FPSO structural integrity if the fire duration is at
least 60 minutes.
However, the FPSO mooring systems are located far away (85 m +) from the gas export riser and those on the
starboard side are shielded from possible jet flame impingement. Thus, the probability of flame impingement
on the mooring system is very low. In any case, any fire that could impinge on the FPSO mooring system
would, almost certainly, impinge also on the hull of the FPSO. This escalation mechanism has therefore been
discounted.
Explosions
Due to the relative location of the FPSO mooring system, in relation to those areas where there may be the
potential for significant explosion events, it is assumed that explosions associated with releases from the gas
export riser will not cause any significant damage to the FPSO mooring system.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................

Topic : Escalation to Adjacent Risers / Flowlines
Assumption/Rule Set
Fires
Due to the relatively thin walls of the adjacent risers / flowlines, coupled with the high stresses on those lines,
it is assumed that a jet fire directed towards an adjacent risers / flowline could cause its failure within 20
minutes. For sea fires, it is pessimistically assumed that flame impingement could cause escalation to an
adjacent riser if the fire duration is at least 60 minutes.
However, any fire that could impinge on an adjacent riser would be likely to impinge also on the hull of the
FPSO. There is estimated to be a probability of only ~0.025 of flame impingement occurring on the adjacent
gas injection riser alone, i.e. without impingement occurring also on the hull. Thus, in the case of long
duration (>60 minute) jet fires from punctures of the gas export riser, there is estimated to be a 50% chance of
escalating hull damage (see Assumption Sheet SSIV-EA-002) plus an additional 2.5% chance of escalating
riser damage alone. However, if the fire duration is limited to the range of 20-60 minutes, then there is a
greater chance of escalation occurring to the riser but not the hull; this value is then estimated to be 0.25.
Explosions
Due to the location of the risers / flowlines, in relation to those areas where there may be the potential for
significant explosion events, it is assumed that explosions associated with releases from the gas export riser
will not cause any significant damage to adjacent risers / flowlines.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-IA-001

Subject Area : Impairment Analysis
Topic : Impairment of EER Systems

Assumption/Rule Set
The LQ is protected by PFP (H60 on the front face and on the roof, and A60 on the side walls), which will
protect against all fire scenarios, except a long duration (> 30 minutes) directly impinging jet fire. However,
due to the relative location of the gas export riser and the LQ, it is assumed that there is a negligible
probability of direct jet fire impingement on the LQ from a gas export riser fire.
In terms of EER facilities, the provision of escape routes at both sides of the FPSO will mean that a riser fire
below the RESDV on the gas export riser will probably impair the escape route on that side of the FPSO, but
would not impair the escape route on the other side.
In terms of muster areas, the primary muster areas will be inside the LQ and therefore will be at least as well
protected as the LQ.
As far as evacuation is concerned, the primary means of evacuation is the standby vessel and the secondary
means is the TEMPSC. In the event of a riser fire, even if the standby vessel cannot get close enough to allow
direct off-loading of the FPSO crew, the location of the main freefall TEMPSC (4 off) behind the LQ, should
ensure that at least one evacuation route is available for as long as it takes to evacuate the FPSO.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-RA-001

Subject Area : Risk / Impact Analysis
Topic : Risk to Personnel

Assumption/Rule Set
In terms of risk to personnel, it is assumed that the presence (or not) of an SSIV on the gas export pipeline
will not have any significant effect on the likelihood of immediate fatalities, i.e. those that occur in the
vicinity of the initial event.
As far as delayed fatalities are concerned, it is argued that the potential consequences associated with a riser
fire, or an explosion, are unlikely to have an immediate effect the EER facilities on the FPSO, see Assumption
Sheet SSIV-IA-001. However, it is assumed that any event that could threaten the integrity of the FPSO will
require the evacuation of the FPSO. The risk associated with such a scenario is assumed to be a function of
the inherent risk associated with FPSO evacuation. Without the benefit of any detailed analysis of the
likelihood of successful evacuation, it is currently pessimistically assumed that the evacuation of the FPSO
under such circumstances would result in an average 2% probability of fatality, i.e. the evacuation of the
entire POB (240 max.) would on average result in 4.8 fatalities.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-RA-002

Subject Area : Risk / Impact Analysis
Topic : Loss of Asset

Assumption/Rule Set
In terms of risk to the asset (and therefore also risk to the environment and risk to company reputation), it is
assumed that any escalation of the initial riser release event that could threaten the integrity of the FPSO, the
integrity of the mooring system, the integrity of adjacent risers, or the integrity of the LQ / EER facilities will
result in a loss of asset. It is proposed that the potential magnitude of the risk associated with these scenarios
will be evaluated based on the rating system described in TFE’s GS EXP 401 (Ref. 8).
Based on this approach, it is assumed that any escalation of the initial riser release event causing either a loss
of FPSO integrity or a loss of the integrity of the mooring system would result in a potentially ‘catastrophic’
incident and that any escalation of the initial riser release event leading to either riser-to-riser / flowline
escalation or a threat to the integrity of the LQ / EER facilities would result in a ‘major’ incident.

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-MI-001

Subject Area : Miscellaneous
Topic : Environmental Conditions

Assumption/Rule Set
The environmental data assumed in the SSIV Study are based on an analysis of the data contained in the Akpo
Project Environmental Design Criteria document (Ref. 10).
Wind Conditions, etc
The wind velocity / direction data contained in the Environmental Design Criteria document indicate that the
wind speeds at the location of the Akpo FPSO are generally in the range 3 to 9 m/s (almost 99% of the time).
The consequence analysis supporting this study therefore uses two characteristic wind speeds, 5 and 10 m/s, to
represent this range.
Other environmental conditions assumed in the consequence analysis are:
− Pasquill stability category D
− Humidity of 70%
− Ambient air temperature of 25°C.
Sea Conditions, Currents, etc

The currents at the location of the Akpo FPSO vary, in terms of both magnitude and direction, depending on
sea depth. In order to simplify the analysis of the likely effect of currents on the dispersion of a given subsea
gas release, it is assumed that the direction of currents is omni-directional (i.e. an equal probability for each
direction). As far as current strength is concerned, data for the 1-year return period has been assumed. This is
summarised thus:
Depth (m) Current (m/s)
0 1.1
50 0.9
100 0.7
300 0.5
500 0.3

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................
Project : TFE Akpo Assumption No. SSIV-MI-003
Subject Area : Miscellaneous
Topic : Cost Estimates
Assumption/Rule Set
In order to evaluate the likely cost benefit of installing an SSIV in the gas export riser, the following cost data
has been provided by TFE:
• Loss of FPSO (catastrophic damage) - € 750m
• Loss of a topside module (major damage) - € 15m
• Loss of life - € 7.5m per fatality
• Cost of an SSIV (assuming a check valve) - € 1.5m
• Assumed project discount rate - 10% (minimum).

Discipline Engineer
EEUK Stephen Hall

................................ ................................
TFE Ron Banks
................................ ................................
................................ ................................

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NIGERIA - OPL 246

AKPO FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Subsea Isolation Valve Study

STATUS CODE : A = Issued for comments - B = Issued for approval - C = Approved

TOTAL OR PARTIAL REPRODUCTION AND/OR UTILIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE FORBIDDEN

April 28, 2003

AKPO FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Copyright © Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Ltd.

Internal document control

EEUK Project No. 200391/05/01

File name SSIV Study Rev 1.doc

External distribution TotalFinaElf – Ron Banks

Internal distribution Oil & Gas, Horsham, UK

Responsible BU Oil & Gas, Horsham, UK

Date of control 15 April 2003

0 Draft report to Client

Date of control 16 April 2003

1 Revised report to Client

Date of control 28 April 2003

Change at last revision

Electrowatt-Ekono (UK) Ltd.

2 DESCRIPTION OF AKPO GAS EXPORT FACILITIES 8

4 RISER RELEASE SCENARIOS 10

5 FREQUENCY OF RISER RELEASES 11

6 CONSEQUENCES OF RISER RELEASES 13

6.1 RELEASE RATES 13

7.1 ESCALATION RULE SETS 21

8 POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FPSO 25

9 RISK ASSESSMENT OF RISER RELEASES 26

9.1 BASE CASE: NO SSIV 26

10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35

APPENDIX A : ASSUMPTION SHEETS

2 DESCRIPTION OF AKPO GAS EXPORT FACILITIES

Figure 2.1 – Akpo Gas Export Pipeline System

4 RISER RELEASE SCENARIOS

5 FREQUENCY OF RISER RELEASES

Riser Release Frequency (per year)

50 m depth 3.34E-04 5.41E-05 6.79E-05 6.79E-05 5.24E-04

100 m depth 2.48E-04 5.01E-05 6.39E-05 6.39E-05 4.26E-04

200 m depth 6.97E-04 1.37E-04 9.79E-05 9.79E-05 1.03E-03

500 m depth 1.05E-03 2.05E-04 1.47E-04 1.47E-04 1.54E-03

- no SSIV 2.72E-05 1.03E-05 6.92E-06 6.92E-06 5.13E-05

- with SSIV 4.86E-04 3.11E-05 2.78E-05 2.78E-05 5.72E-04

GRAND TOTALS (no SSIV) 5.56E-03

GRAND TOTALS (with SSIV) 6.08E-03

6 CONSEQUENCES OF RISER RELEASES

6.1 RELEASE RATES

LOCATION Release rate (kg/s) after

LOCATION Release rate (kg/s) after

6.2.1 Above Sea Releases

Wind : 5 m/s Wind : 10 m/s

Size LFL 50% LFL LFL 50% LFL

Medium 60 117 60 116

Large 120 235 119 222

Full bore 120 232 119 221

Wind : 5 m/s Wind : 10 m/s

Size Height Downwind Distance Height Downwind Distance

Small 8.0 10 1.5 3.3 5.5 6.8 1.9 3.6

Medium 35 48 7.2 16 24 3.3 7.7 17