Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CA by Shehreyar Khan 2024
CA by Shehreyar Khan 2024
CA by Shehreyar Khan 2024
''The whole so-called Western bloc formed by the US in its own image and likeness is the'' empire
of lies''
Vladimir Putin
Pres. Of Russia
Global power dynamics are fluid and subject to change, often reflecting the shifting fortunes and
strategies of nations. It's essential to monitor these dynamics closely to understand how they impact
global stability, cooperation, and conflicts. Additionally, the emergence of new challenges, such as
cybersecurity and space exploration, continues to shape the evolving landscape of global power.
ROLE OF PAKISTAN
Global power dynamics are complex and constantly evolving, influenced by a variety of factors
including economic, political, military, and cultural elements. The role of Pakistan in these
global power dynamics is significant due to its strategic location, nuclear capabilities, and its
history of involvement in regional and international affairs. Here, we will discuss some key
aspects of Pakistan's role in global power dynamics:
1. Strategic Location:
○ Pakistan's geographical location places it at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia,
and the Middle East.
○ It shares borders with key countries like India, China, Afghanistan, and Iran.
○ This strategic location makes Pakistan a vital player in regional geopolitics
○ and an important partner for global powers seeking to exert influence in the region.
2. Nuclear Capabilities:
○ Pakistan is one of the world's nuclear-armed states.
○ Its nuclear weapons program has added a layer of complexity to global security
dynamics.
○ Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is seen as a deterrent against potential adversaries
○ and has implications for regional stability, especially in its rivalry with India.
3. Counterterrorism and Afghanistan:
○ Pakistan has played a pivotal role in the U.S.-led war on terror, particularly in the conflict
in Afghanistan.
○ It has served as both an ally and a target of criticism from Western powers
○ due to concerns about its support for certain militant groups.
○ The outcome of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has further shifted the
dynamics in the region,
○ with Pakistan seeking to ensure stability and influence in its western neighbor.
4. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):
○ Pakistan's deepening economic and strategic partnership with China through the (CPEC)
○ has added a new dimension to its role in global power dynamics.
○ CPEC is part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
○ aims to connect Gwadar Port in Pakistan to China's northwestern region through a
network of highways, railways, and pipelines.
○ This project has implications for regional trade and security dynamics and has drawn
attention from global powers.
It’s a useful coincidence that the 20th anniversary of George W Bush and Tony Blair’s illegal attack
on Iraq falls only a matter of weeks after the anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s illegal attack on Ukraine.
Neither war was authorised by the UN. Both are marked by massive destruction and huge loss of life.
The Bush/Blair invasion and occupation of Iraq, and its chaotic consequences, have taken the lives of
more than a million Iraqi civilians, according to one survey. US forces committed innumerable war
crimes, not least the torture of captured soldiers. At the Abu Ghraib detention centre near Baghdad,
US officers humiliated Iraqi prisoners in violation of the Geneva conventions. The invasion provoked
widespread resistance, but US counter-insurgency tactics involved raids on villages that led
to massacres of unarmed civilians.
The world reacted to the Bush/Blair war with disapproval, but almost no action was taken against
them. There were no state-imposed sanctions on the US or Britain. No investigators from the
international criminal court took evidence to substantiate prosecutions for war crimes. A few
individuals and some human rights organisations called for Blair to be indicted on the charge
of committing the crime of aggression, but no government approached the UN with a resolution to
open a criminal case against them.
Now consider the very different reaction to Vladimir Putin’s illegal war on Ukraine. Virtually every
western government, following the US’s lead, has slapped sanctions on Russia’s exports. Russia’s
financial holdings in US banks have been frozen. Putin’s friends have had their yachts and other
property impounded – and then a few days ago the international criminal court issued an arrest
warrant for Putin for war crimes involving the illegal deportation of children from Ukraine.
The contrast in the global reaction to the two wars is instructive. Nothing better illustrates the
differential between Russia’s meagre international authority and that of the US. For Putin it is
humiliating. He may like to think of his country as a superpower, but in reality, beyond holding a
massive nuclear arsenal, Russia has little global clout and few foreign friends. Putin is widely
criticised for trying to recreate an old-fashioned empire by seizing land and intimidating states on
Russia’s western and southern borders.
The US, for its part, runs a new style of non-territorial empire with great success. It enjoys enormous
political and economic influence on every continent, dominates the international financial system,
and operates 750 military bases in more than 80 countries. Most of the world dare not oppose
Washington’s writ.
Some analysts argue that if Russia is defeated in its current war on Ukraine, Europe will be able to
enjoy a post-imperial system of peaceful relations and autonomy on the continent for the first time
in history. They forget Nato. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization began in 1949 and still
continues in part as an instrument for US hegemony in Europe. Allies may decline to participate in
US military operations, as France and Germany boldly did over Iraq in 2003, but they do not publicly
denounce them as illegal or call for sanctions.
Europeans and some Americans, including past and present senior officials, who argued against the
expansion of Nato after the demise of the Soviet Union – or even advocated the alliance’s
dissolution now that the enemy was gone – were never going to achieve their goals. The Baltic states
and Poland craved the protection of the imperial American umbrella, which the US military-
industrial complex was not going to give up in any case.
Equally unattainable was the proposal that NATO should invite the Russian Federation to join,
thereby promoting post-cold war reconciliation. It was not to be. Even though Russian leaders, both
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, were keen to end the division of Europe, Washington would
not open the alliance to a new member who could match the US’s nuclear potential and might
question its political priorities.
Now, 30 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, there are signs that the unipolar world of US
dominance may be coming to an end. The main challenger is not Putin’s Russia, but an increasingly
confident China. Leaders in the global south are also stirring. In the first flush of shock over Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine in February last year, more than 140 UN states voted to condemn it. But
only around 40 countries in total have joined the US in imposing sanctions on Russia. As the west
floods Ukraine with military hardware, the notion that it is merely helping to defend Ukraine looks
questionable to many Asian, African and Latin American states who suspect the end goal to be
regime change in the Kremlin.
A survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) reveals a significant shift in public
opinion in several key countries. People want to see a quick end to the war in Ukraine, even if it
means Ukraine giving up western-supported aspirations to victory and accepting the temporary loss
of some territory. It is not only citizens of authoritarian China who think this way. So do citizens in
India and Turkey.
Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign policy chief, told the Munich Security Conference last month: “I see
how powerful the Russian narrative is, its accusations of double standards.” France’s Emmanuel
Macron said he was “shocked by how much credibility we are losing in the global south”.
Some fear a new cold war, this time between the west and China. Looking 10 years ahead, others
expect to see a multipolar world in which states will not be pressured to align themselves with one
side or the other. Either way, in spite of the resurgence of US power in Europe as a result of the war
in Ukraine, the era of US supremacy in the rest of the world may soon be over.
Jonathan Steele is a former chief foreign correspondent for the Guardian and the author of Defeat:
Why They Lost Iraq
• The Sudan conflict is a complex and long-standing series of conflicts that have afflicted the region for decades.
• The conflicts in Sudan have involved various armed groups, ethnic and religious divisions, and political rivalries.
Historical Background:
1. North-South Sudan Conflict:
○ One of the most significant aspects of Sudan's conflict history was the prolonged civil war
i. between the northern and southern regions.
○ This war, which began in the mid-20th century, had its roots in ethnic, religious, and economic differences.
○ It resulted in millions of deaths and widespread displacement.
2. Darfur Conflict:
○ Another major conflict in Sudan was the Darfur conflict, which began in the early 2000s.
○ This conflict arose from tensions between ethnic Arab groups and non-Arab African groups in the Darfur
region.
○ The Sudanese government was accused of supporting Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed,
○ which were responsible for violence and atrocities against non-Arab populations.
3. South Sudan Independence:
○ In 2011, South Sudan, after a long struggle for autonomy, gained independence from Sudan.
○ This marked a significant development in the Sudan conflict, as it led to the partition of the country.
○ However, South Sudan itself has since experienced internal conflicts.
Recent Developments:
1. Transitional Government:
○ One of the key recent developments in Sudan was the establishment of a transitional government in August
2019.
○ This followed months of protests against the long-ruling President Omar al-Bashir,
i. who was eventually ousted from power.
○ The transitional government included a military-civilian power-sharing arrangement.
2. Peace Agreements:
○ Sudan's transitional government has been actively involved in peace negotiations with various armed groups,
○ including those from Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile.
○ Several peace agreements were reached,
i. aiming to end long-standing conflicts and bring stability to the regions.
3. Economic Challenges:
○ Sudan has faced severe economic challenges, including hyperinflation and economic instability.
○ The transitional government has been working to stabilize the economy and attract international assistance
and investment.
4. Tensions in Eastern Sudan:
○ Eastern Sudan, historically marginalized, has witnessed tensions and conflicts
The Sudan conflict remains a complex and multifaceted issue, requiring sustained efforts to achieve lasting peace,
stability, and development in the country.
International diplomacy, peace negotiations, and efforts to address the root causes of conflicts continue to play a vital
role in shaping Sudan's future.
IMPACT ON TE REGION
• The Sudan conflict has had a significant impact on the wider region,
• affecting neighboring countries and contributing to regional instability in various ways.
WAYFORWARD
• Resolving the Sudan conflict is a complex and challenging endeavour that
• requires a comprehensive approach involving multiple stakeholders, including
○ the Sudanese government,
○ opposition groups,
○ regional actors, and
○ the international community.
• The conflict has displaced almost 1.1 million people, both inside Sudan and into
neighboring countries.
• It is estimated that between 700 and 1,000 people have been killed and
• at least 5,287 have been injured.
• Experts say that over half of the population is in need of humanitarian
• aid after widespread power outages left civilians without access to water and food.
❖ Opinion:
○ There are competing interests in the region: stability or democracy.
○ Neither Burhan nor Hemedti want a democratic Sudan, and
○ many governments support a transfer of power to one general or the other
○ to maintain stability and gain access to Sudan’s resources,
○ rather than prioritizing democracy.
As of my last knowledge update in September 2021, the Middle East has been plagued by a
complex web of political, economic, and social crises for decades. It is essential to note that the
situation in the region can change rapidly, and new developments may have occurred since then. I
will provide an overview of some of the key issues that have historically contributed to instability
in the Middle East.
1. Conflict in Syria: The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, has been one of the most
devastating conflicts in the region. It has caused significant loss of life, displaced millions of
people, and involved various local and international actors. The conflict has also fueled the
rise of extremist groups like ISIS.
2. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a
major source of tension in the Middle East. The issues of borders, settlements, refugees, and
the status of Jerusalem remain unresolved, leading to periodic outbreaks of violence.
3. Iranian Influence: Iran's regional influence and its rivalry with Saudi Arabia have exacerbated
tensions in the Middle East. Iran has been involved in proxy conflicts in countries like Yemen,
Iraq, and Syria, leading to increased instability.
4. Yemeni Civil War: Yemen has been embroiled in a civil war since 2015, with Houthi rebels,
supported by Iran, fighting against the internationally recognized government, which is
backed by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.
5. Terrorism: Various extremist groups, including ISIS and al-Qaeda, have operated in the
region, causing violence and instability. Efforts to combat terrorism have led to military
interventions by Western and regional powers.
6. Oil and Energy Security: The Middle East is a crucial region for global energy security due to
its vast oil reserves. Disruptions in the region's oil production and distribution can have a
significant impact on global oil prices and the world economy.
7. Refugee Crisis: The Middle East has been a major source of refugees and internally displaced
people due to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries. This has put immense
pressure on neighboring countries and led to a humanitarian crisis.
8. Human Rights Concerns: The Middle East has faced criticism for human rights abuses,
including restrictions on freedom of speech, political repression, and discrimination against
minority groups.
ALJAZEERA
In an attempt to salvage his country’s waning influence in the Middle East, US Secretary of State
Antony Blinken is embarking on a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia this
week. But advancing “strategic cooperation” with his Saudi and Gulf counterparts may well
prove an uphill battle.
In July last year, President Joe Biden attended the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in the
kingdom and vowed that the United States “will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by
China, Russia, or Iran”. But that is precisely what has been happening.
Despite US objections, the past year has seen its regional allies go hybrid: they have improved
relations with Beijing and Tehran and maintained strong ties with Moscow.
Although the Biden administration has publicly downplayed the importance of the recent Chinese-
brokered Saudi-Iranian agreement to re-establish diplomatic relations, it seems frantic about the
growing Chinese influence in the oil-rich Gulf region and the greater Middle East.
Over the past two decades, the US has ramped up oil and gas production, becoming virtually
energy independent. It may no longer need Gulf oil as much, but it insists on being in charge in the
region so it is able to cut China off of vital energy supplies in the event of a conflict, and secure
them for its allies.
As Blinken warned last month, “China represents the most consequential geopolitical challenge we
face today: a country with the intent and, increasingly, the capability to challenge our vision for a
free, open, secure, and prosperous international order.”
But Beijing’s autocracy may actually be an easier and better fit for the region’s autocrats than
Washington’s democracy.
Russia’s sway in the Middle East and beyond has also made the US nervous.
Fed up with their ambiguity, even complicity with Russia, the Biden administration has
been ramping up pressure on certain Middle Eastern states, making clear that its patience is
running out. It has been warning countries in the region against helping Russia evade sanctions
and demanding they pick sides – or else face the wrath of the US and G7 nations.But to no avail.
“The United States and Saudi Arabia have an extraordinary relationship and friendship
that dates back to Franklin Roosevelt.”
— Barack Obama
BRIEF HISTORY
The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has evolved significantly over the years.
U.S. President Joe Biden’s trip to the Middle East ended not with a bang but a whimper. The rewards for his fist bump with Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, proved paltry. Saudi Arabia did not commit to increasing oil production.
No dissidents were released. Human rights only came up when MBS dismissed criticism of journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder,
which was carried out under his orders, by pointing to American silence over Shireen Abu Akleh, a Palestinian American
journalist who was killed in May in the West Bank by the Israeli military. Saudi Arabia did not announce major moves toward
normalization with Israel, and no new security alliance emerged.
Yet the Biden administration had broader ambitions for the trip that aren’t fully captured by the scorecard of short-term
deliverables. The administration believed that it needed to reset relations with Saudi Arabia and other regional allies, working on
the relationships for their own sake to better deal with a range of issues. The likely impending demise of negotiations for a
revived nuclear agreement with Iran, as well as the rippling shocks from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, added some urgency.
While media rumors ahead of the visit about the creation of a formal military alliance with the Arab states and Israel proved
premature, the intent of the trip was to push the region toward a new regional order based on Israeli-Arab cooperation against
Iran under American guidance.
The trip did make some small steps in that direction—but not in ways that are likely to increase regional stability. The security
architecture envisioned by the administration would not be novel. Israel’s alignment with Arab states against Iran has been
growing for decades. The Abraham Accords, first brokered under the administration of President Donald Trump, made
cooperation formal and public and explicitly removed the questions of Palestine and human rights from the equation. The
United States is gambling on the ability of autocratic Arab states to embrace a regional order that includes Israel without
concern for how these policies are received by their publics back home. But taking that risk at a time of escalating economic,
political, and social crisis across much of the region is likely to backfire—as it has in the past.
Orchestrating a U.S.-led Middle Eastern regional order has been a U.S. pastime since at least 1991, when the United States
successfully led a military operation to drive Saddam Hussein’s Iraq out of Kuwait. But today’s Middle East is in no condition to
be ordered by Washington. Middle Eastern leaders prefer to hedge their bets within what they see as an increasingly multipolar
world, as could be clearly seen in their refusal to take the side of the United States and Europe against Russia. Were Biden to
succeed on his own terms by bringing Israel and the Arab autocracies into a formal regional alliance against Iran, it would only
repeat the mistakes of the past. This would accelerate the next collapse of regional order by reversing progress toward de-
escalation, encouraging domestic repression, and paving the way to the next round of popular uprisings.
For a brief moment, all roads led to Washington. The United States launched the Madrid peace process to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict but also to establish a U.S.-led regional order that could include both Israel and Arab states. Former Soviet
allies such as Syria cast about for ways to get into this new order through peace negotiations with Israel. Even Iran, exhausted
from a decade of war with Iraq, looked to rebuild relations with Europe and the Gulf states, launching a “dialogue among
civilizations” at the UN, taking small steps toward engagement with Washington, and dialing back its regional interventionism.
A positive normative purpose, as well as a military foundation, for a U.S.-led regional order briefly flickered into view. The U.S.-
led military operation to retake Kuwait had been a genuinely multilateral affair, authorized by the UN Security Council and an
Arab summit. Heavy U.S. investment in Arab-Israeli peacemaking after 1991 and stewardship of the Oslo peace process offered a
potential positive vision for the future of the Middle East.
But those normative foundations did not take root, and regional order proved difficult to manage. Washington’s nostalgia for
the Middle East of the 1990s runs deep, but that period wasn’t as orderly as the myth holds. Why the approach the United
States adopted in 1991 failed to produce a stable, legitimate U.S.-led regional order even at the height of its global power offers
instructive lessons for today.
At the heart of U.S. micromanagement of the region was the containment of Iraq, which required the maintenance of a
draconian, historically unprecedented sanctions regime. Cutting Iraq off from imports and exports was responsible for untold
numbers of excess deaths and human misery that profoundly undermined American moral claims in Arab eyes. Clashes over
weapons inspections led to repeated military actions, such as Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign of Iraqi
targets carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1998. Ultimately, however, these efforts didn’t
work. Saddam exploited the UN’s oil-for-food program to secure his own regime, and regional compliance with sanctions
eroded.
Despite the diplomatic energy spent on it, the United States also failed to deliver on the promise of Israeli-Palestinian peace. The
Clinton administration certainly put effort into the negotiations but was unable to overcome the assassination of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, successive waves of Hamas terrorism, or Israel’s relentless expansion of settlements in the West
Bank. Washington similarly failed to deliver on Israeli-Syrian peace.
The 1990s also saw the downplaying of democracy out of fear of Islamist victories at the ballot box. Instead, Washington
pretended to believe that Arab autocrats would cultivate civil societies and prepare their populations to someday be ready for
real democracy. That, of course, is the same argument made by most Arab autocratic regimes today, a claim the Biden team has
shown no interest in challenging. The result of trading off democracy promotion for stable order was the entrenchment of Arab
autocracy in all of its pathologies. Not coincidentally, the 1990s were also a period of Islamist insurgency in Egypt and Algeria
and the incubation period for al Qaeda.
Ultimately, the glory days of U.S.-led regional order in the Middle East were less than they appeared. The containment of Iraq
and American efforts to secure Arab-Israeli peace both failed. The idea of building the conditions for democracy by working with
Arab autocrats did not deliver. And the prominence of the U.S. role in all these failures arguably made it an attractive target for
al Qaeda as it shifted from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy” on 9/11.
REPEATING MISTAKES
The presidential administrations that followed Clinton each attempted their own redesign of Middle Eastern regional order.
After the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration set out on a strategy of U.S. primacy. The centerpiece of this new
regional order would be the “global war on terror,” which in the Middle East involved close U.S. cooperation with regional
security services and a massive and intrusive expansion of the U.S. presence in the region. The invasion of Iraq to remove
Saddam proved, of course, to be uniquely disastrous, creating a vacuum of stability in the heart of the Middle East. The U.S.
occupation of Iraq unleashed brutal sectarianism, empowering both Iran and Sunni jihadist movements such as the nascent
There was an order to be found in this chaos, however. This “new Middle East,” a term coined by Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice during the height of Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon, was violent and hypercompetitive, but structurally, it was quite similar to
today. On one side was what U.S. officials called the “axis of moderates,” which included Israel and most of the Arab states
under the U.S. security umbrella, and on the other side was the “axis of resistance,” which included Iran, Syria, and nonstate
actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. It is often forgotten that Saudi-owned media initially supported Israel’s 2006 assault on
Hezbollah because of its antipathy toward the Iranian-backed Shia movement until a hostile public response forced them to
change their editorial line. The extreme unpopularity of U.S.-led efforts, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, allowed Turkey
and Qatar to make great political gains during this time by acting as swing states taking positions more in line with Arab public
opinion writ large.
President Barack Obama offered a genuinely different vision of regional order based on creating a stable and workable balance
of power between Iran and its neighbors through nuclear diplomacy and a reduced U.S. military presence. It is telling that Israel,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) opposed virtually everything the Obama administration attempted, including
the Iran nuclear deal, because their leaders thrived within the regional order he was seeking to change. The Gulf states wanted
nothing to do with Obama’s ideas of sharing the region with Iran and even less to do with his heretical ideas about embracing
democracy and the Arab Spring uprisings. At the same time, Israeli leaders were against Obama’s ideas about restarting peace
negotiations that would work toward creating a Palestinian state and even more opposed to the idea that a two-state solution
would be necessary to establish relations with Arab states. Iran, too, proved unwilling to meaningfully moderate its regional
policies of using proxies to fight in places such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen after the nuclear deal was signed. This further
undermined Obama’s efforts to craft a new regional order.
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—like many other Arab leaders—therefore welcomed the Trump administration’s return to the
George W. Bush-era “new Middle East” model. Trump adopted their views as his own and stopped pressuring Arab states on
their human rights records or pushing them to resolve the Palestinian issue. His administration abandoned the Iran nuclear deal
and instead pursued what it called a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. But once again, attempts to impose a regional
order backfired. His tight embrace of these Arab states and Israel encouraged the worst instincts of those governments,
including aggressive interventionism that inevitably accelerated civil wars and state failures across the region, from Yemen to
Libya and Syria. Stepped-up repression at home only increased domestic instability and the risk of renewed uprisings, while
Israel’s rapidly accelerating seizures of Palestinian lands triggered repeated crises.
To the dismay of those regional allies, Trump’s tight embrace proved to have limits. His refusal to retaliate against Iran after the
unprecedented attack on two key oil installations inside Saudi Arabia in 2019 proved especially sobering to the region’s leaders.
If the friendliest American administration in memory could not be counted upon to respond militarily to such a transgressive
attack, could any U.S. security guarantees be trusted?
What’s telling about the Biden team’s embrace of the Bush-era model of regional order is what it leaves out: the “freedom
agenda.” Bush may have given up notions of promoting democracy in the Middle East once Hamas won Palestinian legislative
elections in 2006, but the administration’s rhetoric about democratic change at least offered some positive vision for regional
order. On his recent trip to Saudi Arabia, Biden abandoned that completely. That’s understandable for an administration that
wanted to mend relations with Arab leaders and avoid anything that might antagonize them. But it has real costs.
Arab autocracy was the glue holding together the U.S.-led regional order in both the 1990s and the first decade of this century.
The 2011 Arab uprisings undid that in ways that are still not fully appreciated. They did not produce sustainable democratic
transitions anywhere, with Tunisia’s presidential coup in July 2021 sealing the fate of one of the few that had emerged. Today’s
Arab autocrats want Washington to believe that there has been a full restoration of the old order, that democracy is now off the
table, and that they are firmly back in control. The dismal economic indicators in most of the region, exacerbated by COVID-19,
along with Russia’s war in Ukraine and the repeated explosions of popular mobilization in unexpected places such as Algeria,
Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan, suggest that this faith is misguided.
A DIFFERENT WORLD
Even setting aside the likelihood of new mass uprisings, the region today looks quite different from previous eras of U.S.-led
At the same time, this is not a period of U.S. dominance. That isn’t to say that there is anything like a new bipolarity or even
multipolarity in the world. Russia was always more of a spoiler than a competing pole to U.S. power, and it is now consumed by
its war in Ukraine. China has not yet made a bid to translate its rapidly growing economic presence into political or military
influence, and for the most part, it shares core U.S. interests such as keeping Gulf oil flowing.
But even without a true peer competitor, the United States simply does not have the resources or the political capabilities to
play the role of hegemon in the Middle East. Regional powers no longer believe the United States can or will act militarily to
defend them. The Arab uprisings taught these autocratic leaders that Washington could not guarantee the survival of regimes
that worked toward U.S. interests. Their nationalist posturing and relentless complaint of abandonment by Washington are not
just a bargaining position aimed at securing more U.S. arms and political support (though they are that). They also reflect Arab
states’ increased capabilities and their profound feelings of insecurity. Attempting ineffectually to reassure these states will go
nowhere: their doubts are too deep, and American capabilities and political will are too obviously insufficient.
This sounds like a bad thing, but it doesn’t have to be. Rather than attempt to rebuild an order whose foundations have eroded
beyond repair, a better approach would be to encourage the moves countries took on their own to de-escalate regional tension
in the absence of American leadership. Over the last year, the UAE rebuilt its relations with Qatar and Turkey, cease-fires took
hold in Yemen and Libya, and Saudi Arabia even held preliminary talks with Iran. The United States’ moves to build a united front
against Iran—escalating arms sales and reaffirming security guarantees—could prove deeply counterproductive to these local
efforts. The more that Washington moves to expand its military and political commitments to lead a new regional order, the less
stable the region will likely become.
The region has been profoundly disordered since 2011, and its problems have been legion. But how order is rebuilt has profound
consequences, and outdated conceptions of order will rapidly contribute to more failure. Today, the Gulf is a more independent
region, with Arab states willing and able to act without regard to a superpower patron. But outside of a few wealthy Gulf states,
the region is also a patchwork of warscapes and a place where ever-fiercer autocrats are barely holding on in the face of massive
and mounting economic problems. Despite recent cease-fires, conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen continue to smolder and could
reignite at any time. Autocrats and kings across the region project stability and normalcy, but in reality, both economic and
political conditions are worse today than on the eve of the 2011 uprisings. In the absence of any hope for a two-state solution or
any serious international restraint on its occupation, Israel’s relentless expansion into the West Bank and the ongoing siege of
Gaza could spark another crisis at any moment.
At the same time, the United States is a mess, consumed by political infighting and polarization. Washington has largely
abandoned even the pretense of promoting democracy or human rights. Advocates in Israel and the Gulf argue that the
Abraham Accords provide a vision for the region around which an order can be built, but all evidence suggests that Arab publics
overwhelmingly reject the idea of normalization with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue. An order relying on
autocratic regimes to suppress public opinion rather than building an order that commands legitimacy beyond the palaces will
not be a stable or enduring one.
It would be ironic indeed if this order ended as did Clinton’s 1990s regional order—in an unnecessary and disastrous war.
Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 fatally ruptured the Obama effort to build an alternative order.
Biden could not overcome the toxic effects of that. With the Iran nuclear deal dead, it is all too easy to envision the same steady
slide toward U.S. support for a regime change war in Iran. To be sure, Biden has avoided discussing the use of force against Iran,
and his withdrawal from Afghanistan gives some credibility to his determination to avoid another large-scale war. But pressure
to take decisive action will grow as the choices narrow down to accepting a nuclear Iran or acting militarily to prevent it. The
path Biden is taking to rebuild regional order makes that disastrous outcome more likely.
''The two countries [Pakistan and India] have already come close to nuclear confrontation
twice
and this could get worse. So dealing with the relationship with India is extremely
important.''
--Noam
Chomsky
1. Historical Context:
• Before the partition of British India in 1947, trade between regions that are now Pakistan and
India was seamless and substantial.
• After partition, trade links were disrupted, and hostilities erupted over the Kashmir region,
leading to several wars and ongoing political tensions.
2. Bilateral Trade Statistics:
• Pakistan and India have sporadically engaged in trade over the years, but it has been relatively
limited compared to their potential.
• In 2012, both countries took steps to normalize trade relations by granting each other Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status, which was later renamed Non-Discriminatory Market Access
(NDMA).
• In 2019-2020, bilateral trade between Pakistan and India was valued at approximately $2
billion, with Pakistan exporting goods like agricultural products and textiles to India and
importing items like chemicals and machinery.
3. Trade Barriers:
• Despite some normalization efforts, various barriers hinder Pakistan-India trade, including:
• Political Tensions: Ongoing political disputes, particularly over Kashmir, have led to trade
suspensions and disruptions.
4. Security Concerns:
○ Security issues have led to trade interruptions, including the suspension of trade via the
Wagah-Attari border crossing in 2019.
5. Non-Tariff Barriers:
○ Both countries have imposed non-tariff barriers, such as stringent product standards and
lengthy customs procedures.
○ Public Sentiment: Public sentiment often influences trade relations, and incidents of
violence can escalate tensions.
4. Potential Benefits:
• Improved trade relations between Pakistan and India could bring several advantages:
○ Economic Growth:
▪ Enhanced trade could stimulate economic growth in both countries by creating
jobs and increasing business opportunities.
○ Stability:
▪ Reducing political tensions through trade could lead to regional stability.
○ Energy Cooperation:
▪ Both nations could benefit from cross-border energy trade.
5. Geostrategic Implications:
• The trade relationship between Pakistan and India is intertwined with their broader
geopolitical and security concerns.
• Progress in trade relations could help pave the way for more extensive diplomatic
engagement.
6. Recent Developments:
• no significant breakthroughs in Pakistan-India trade relations.
• The status of bilateral trade was subject to political dynamics and security concerns.
''The whole so-called Western bloc formed by the US in its own image and likeness is the''
empire of lies''
Vladimir
Putin
Pres. Of
Russia
"There is no doubt that the United States will not achieve success with this new plot against Iran
as they are retreating step by step.''
--Hassan Rouhani,
The Iranian president,
“Today, five innocent Americans who were imprisoned in Iran are finally coming home,”
-Joe Biden On
celebrating the release of
5 American prisoners from Iran
September 18, 2023.
US-Iran Relation
U.S.-Iran relations have been characterized by decades of tension and conflict.
1. Historical Background:
• U.S.-Iran relations have a complex history.
• Prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the United States maintained a close alliance with Iran
• under the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
• The U.S. provided military and economic support to the Shah's regime.
• Iranian Revolution (1979):
○ The Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
○ resulted in the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic Republic.
○ This event drastically changed the dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations.
• Hostage Crisis (1979-1981):
○ The U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, during which 52 American diplomats were held captive for 444 days,
▪ was a major turning point.
○ The hostage crisis damaged diplomatic relations between the two countries and
○ led to the severing of formal diplomatic ties.
In summary, the ongoing tensions and conflicts in U.S.-Iran relations have had profound implications for the
Middle East, contributing to regional instability, conflicts, and humanitarian crises. Pakistan, as a
neighboring country, has been impacted economically and faces security challenges due to regional
instability. Pakistan's diplomatic efforts in mediating between the U.S. and Iran reflect its desire for regional
stability and its strategic interests in maintaining good relations with both countries. However, it's important
to note that the situation in this region is highly fluid, and developments can change rapidly, potentially
affecting Pakistan and the broader Middle East in various ways.
''Mankind invented the atomic bomb, but no mouse would ever construct a
mousetrap.''
– Albert
Einstein
NUCLEARIZATION OF ASIA
• refers to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the presence of nuclear-armed states in
the Asian continent.
• Asia is home to several nuclear-armed countries, including China, India, Pakistan, North
Korea, and Israel.
• The nuclear dynamics in Asia have significant implications for regional and global security.
Nuclear-Armed States in Asia:
1. China:
○ China is one of the world's nuclear-armed powers,
○ with a well-established nuclear arsenal.
○ Its nuclear doctrine emphasizes a no-first-use policy,
○ which means China commits not to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict.
2. India:
○ India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and declared itself a nuclear weapons
state.
○ India's nuclear posture includes a credible minimum deterrent and a commitment
to a no-first-use policy,
○ though there has been some debate about the latter in recent years.
3. Pakistan:
○ Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests in 1998 in response to India's nuclear tests.
○ Pakistan's nuclear posture is characterized by a focus on deterrence against India,
○ with a belief in first-use in certain scenarios if its security is threatened.
4. North Korea:
○ North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),
○ is known to possess nuclear weapons.
○ Its nuclear program has led to international tensions and sanctions.
○ North Korea's intentions and the scope of its arsenal remain subjects of concern.
5. Israel:
○ While Israel has never officially confirmed its nuclear weapons program,
○ it is widely believed to possess a significant nuclear arsenal.
○ Israel's policy is one of nuclear ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying its
possession of nuclear weapons.
For most of the 75 years since India and Pakistan became independent states, at midnight
on 15th August 1947, nuclear weapons have cast a shadow over South Asia. China got the
bomb in 1964, two years after thumping India in a border war and forcing its policymakers to
confront their country’s vulnerabilities. India showed it too could build one with a
demonstrative explosion just a decade later. Pakistan was a screwdriver’s turn away by the
1980s. In 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear-weapons tests, making official
what was already an open secret.
Yet, in many ways, all three countries were hesitant nuclear powers. China did not deploy a
missile capable of hitting the American mainland until the 1980s. When India and Pakistan
fought a war over Kargil, in the disputed region of Kashmir, in the summer of 1999, India’s
air force, tasked with delivering the bombs if needed, was not told what they looked like, how
many there were or the targets over which they might have to be dropped.
All that has changed. China has been adding hundreds of new missile silos in recent years.
When Pakistan celebrated its 60th birthday in 2007 it had roughly 60 nuclear warheads.
Fifteen years on, that number has nearly tripled (see chart). The combined arsenals of China
(350 warheads), India (160) and Pakistan (165), though modest by American and Russian
standards (several thousand each), now exceed British and French stockpiles in Europe
(around 500 in total). All three countries are emulating the American and Russian practice of
having a nuclear “triad”: nukes deliverable from land, air and sea. South Asia’s nuclear era is
entering a more mature phase.
That need not mean a more dangerous one. A new report by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie
Endowment, a think-tank in Washington, explores the dynamics among Asia’s three nuclear
powers. Since 1998, most Western attention has focused on the risk of a conflagration
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. That danger persists. Yet the risk of an arms race
has been exaggerated, argues Mr Tellis, a former State Department official
India’s arsenal has grown slowly, he observes—it remains smaller than Pakistan’s—and its
nuclear posture remains “remarkably conservative”. The comparison with the nuclear behemoths is
instructive. America and Russia both maintain huge arsenals designed to enable so-called
counterforce strikes—those which pre-emptively target the other side’s nuclear weapons to limit the
In contrast, China, India and Pakistan, despite their manifold differences, all view nukes as
“political instruments” rather than “usable tools of war”, argues Mr Tellis. Both China and
India, for instance, pledge that they would not use nuclear weapons unless an adversary
had used weapons of mass destruction first, a commitment known as “no first use”. America
disbelieves China’s promise, much as Pakistan doubts India’s. But the Chinese and Indian
arsenals are consistent with the pledges, insists Mr Tellis.
He calculates that if India wanted to use a tactical (or low-yield) nuclear weapon to take out
a Pakistani missile on the ground, it would have to do so within a few minutes of the
Pakistani launcher leaving its storage site. That is implausible. India does not have missiles
that can launch within minutes of an order, nor those accurate to within tens of metres of
their target. And, for now, China’s rocketeers also train and operate on the assumption that
their forces would be used in retaliation. The result is that things are more stable than the
swelling arsenals suggest.
There are two wrinkles, though, and both concern China. The Pentagon says that China’s
arsenal could expand to 1,000 warheads by 2030, as it seeks to overwhelm American
missile defences and narrow the numerical gap with its chief rival. If that comes to pass,
India might fear that its comparatively meagre arsenal no longer serves as a credible
deterrent. If India has fewer warheads, it will want to be sure they can inflict unacceptable
damage on Chinese cities. But the thermonuclear device which India tested in 1998 was
widely considered to have fizzled.
The real problem, though, is not so much the number of weapons as what China might be
able to do with them. India gets by with a small arsenal because it is highly secretive about
the location of its nukes—the same approach that China has taken for most of its history. Yet
improvements in surveillance technology (such as new spy satellites), artificial intelligence that can
find patterns in huge amounts of data and cyber-espionage against nuclear command-and-control
networks could one day pierce “the veil of opacity”, warns Mr Tellis. That, in combination with more
warheads and more accurate missiles, might enable China to “hold at risk almost every Indian
nuclear-storage site”, a prerequisite of counterforce.
It is, in part, to hedge against such a destabilising rupture that India has decided to hide its
nukes in the ocean. Its first nuclear-armed submarine, the Arihant, began patrols in 2018.
Another, the Arighat, is undergoing sea trials. Two more are under construction. But Mr
Tellis doubts that India, despite extensive Russian help, has been able to build a sufficiently
compact and powerful naval nuclear reactor for extended spells at sea, and a vessel quiet
enough to remain undetected.
The conventional wisdom is that a cascade is under way: America and Russia are
abandoning arms control; China races to catch up with America; India pursues China;
Pakistan follows. The reality is more complex, insists Mr Tellis. China has an eye on India,
too. India increasingly pays more attention to China than to Pakistan. And Pakistan—
specifically, its powerful army—is set on its own path, its programme “increasingly driven less by
what India is actually doing and more by its fervid imaginings of Indian capabilities”.
In one sense, nuclear weapons are stabilising. They preclude, among their possessors, the
big wars that have roiled South Asia through its
history. But they do not prevent small or peripheral ones. And the terror they evoke can be
exploited. Pakistani generals have used their nuclear shield to harbour jihadists. China might
one day seek to emulate Russia’s use of nuclear threats in Ukraine to keep America from
intervening in a war over Taiwan.
South Asia’s nuclear future will depend on whether nuclear conservatism withstands the
pressures of power politics and the temptations of technology. The direction of China’s
--Barack Obama
In summary, while Pakistan is not directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, it does have diplomatic, economic, and
security interests that are affected by the ongoing conflict. Pakistan's foreign policy and diplomatic efforts are crucial in
managing its relations with the parties involved in the crisis and in navigating the broader geopolitical implications for
the region and the world.
SOLUTION
The Russia-Ukraine crisis is a complex and deeply entrenched conflict with historical, political, and security
dimensions. Finding a lasting solution to this crisis requires a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach
involving diplomatic, political, and humanitarian efforts. Here are some potential solutions:
1. Diplomatic Negotiations:
○ Renewed Diplomacy:
▪ Engage in sustained, high-level diplomatic negotiations involving all relevant parties,
▪ including Ukraine, Russia, and key Western and regional actors viz NATO.
▪ This could build on existing initiatives like the Normandy Format and the Minsk agreements.
The world’s agricultural and food systems face a perfect storm. Overlapping crises, including the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, wars in Ukraine and elsewhere, supply chain bottlenecks for both
inputs like fertilizer and outputs like wheat, and natural disasters induced by climate change have
together caused what the United Nations has called “the greatest cost-of-living crisis in a
generation.” World leaders cannot afford to ignore this unfolding catastrophe: rapidly increasing
food prices not only cause widespread human suffering but also threaten to destabilize the political
and social order. Already, along with skyrocketing energy costs, surging food prices have helped
bring about the collapse of the Sri Lankan government.
But storms are increasingly predictable, and severe damage from them is therefore increasingly
preventable. This is true of the current food crisis as well as extreme weather events. Political and
business leaders have for too long ignored key fissures such as insufficient safety net coverage and
lags in agricultural and policy innovations that leave agri-food systems—and the billions of people
whose lives or livelihoods depend on them—vulnerable to the effects of other calamities. If the
global response to the current food emergency likewise neglects these critical points, it may
inadvertently exacerbate underlying problems, worsen and prolong unnecessary human suffering,
and accelerate the arrival of the next perfect storm. Conversely, serious efforts to address not only
the current crisis but also the long-standing issues that have helped cause it could move the world
toward healthier, more equitable, resilient, and sustainable agri-food systems. World leaders and
international organizations have a chance to make food emergencies and widespread acute hunger
problems of the past; they must not let this crisis go to waste.
Dramatic increases in food prices pose severe health risks, including acute malnutrition or even
famine, particularly in the developing world. According to the World Food Program (WFP), a record
number of up to 323 million people are now, or are at risk of soon becoming, acutely food insecure
(the technical term for nutrient intake deficiencies that puts a person’s life or livelihood in
immediate danger). In more than a dozen desperately poor countries—Afghanistan, Angola, Burkina
Faso, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya,
Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe—hundreds of millions of people already
face severe food insecurity. In the absence of adequate, appropriate, rapid humanitarian response,
many people will die unnecessarily.
There is more than enough food in the global system to go around. Even amid the current crisis,
global daily food supplies average roughly 3,000 calories, 85 grams of protein, and 90 grams of fat
per person, far exceeding human metabolic needs for a healthy life. The core drivers of hunger and
malnutrition are poverty and maldistribution, including excessive food loss and waste, not
insufficient agricultural production. Today, roughly three billion people are too poor to afford a
History and the current crisis sadly show that Western politicians’ discretionary responses routinely
prove insufficient and may even aggravate preexisting inequities. In Ukraine, for instance, the global
humanitarian response has been laudably swift. As a result, it is not among the countries facing food
emergencies, despite the fact that Russia’s invasion has driven more than 12 million Ukrainians from
their homes. Nor are high food prices causing mass hunger among displaced Ukrainians. Yet in
Yemen, which has suffered a terrible civil war for eight years, the WFP estimates that a record 19
million people are food insecure. If the international community were equally generous where
brown-skinned peoples similarly face war and acute food insecurity, the global food system would
have adequate supplies to address the problem.
The G-7 countries just pledged an additional $4.5 billion for emergency global food assistance, which
sounds generous. Unfortunately, that brings global commitments up to only $14 billion, less than
one-third of the $46 billion in current total humanitarian appeals worldwide. And international aid is
down amid the pandemic. The massive costs that governments have shouldered to fund domestic
COVID-19 responses have understandably limited humanitarian spending abroad. But penny
pinching by the world’s richest countries risks precipitating crises in the coming years that could be
far greater, in both monetary cost and human suffering, than the current crisis.
Policymakers must also work to address humanitarian emergencies promptly and fully, or risk
downstream crises that could be far more serious. Ignoring food emergencies doesn’t make them go
away nor cheaper to address later. In fact, it often leads to more challenging problems that are more
difficult to tackle, mostly because higher food prices and greater acute food insecurity are strongly
associated with forced migration. When people grow desperate to feed their families, they take
risks, most commonly by fleeing their homes. Any humanitarian agency can attest that it’s far more
expensive to meet the needs of displaced people than it is to help people in their own homes before
circumstances compel them to leave. And the number of displaced people is growing. At the end of
2021, there were already a record 89 million people forcibly displaced, even before Russia’s invasion
drove 12 million Ukrainians to flee their homes.
Moreover, there are steep sociopolitical costs to the failure to address humanitarian needs, both in
countries that need assistance and in those that might provide it. High food prices lead to an
increased risk of conflict and political unrest in countries with weak social safety nets. Roughly four
dozen countries experienced domestic political unrest or civil war during the 2008–12 global food
price crisis. Governments in Haiti, Libya, Madagascar, and Tunisia fell, sometimes violently, and
protracted civil wars erupted in Syria and Yemen.
Those problems can also spill over into high-income countries. Europe’s migrant crisis began in 2011
Indeed, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine didn’t cause the food price crisis so much as it aggravated an
already existing problem. Global food prices were already rising quickly before the war. Although
food prices fell during the very beginning of the pandemic, they rose rapidly through last year—in
October 2021, they blew past the December 2010 prior global food price record. Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine and blockade of its Black Sea ports certainly accelerated this trend by disrupting wheat,
sunflower oil, maize, and fertilizer exports, driving global food prices up 18 percent just from January
to March 2022. Nonetheless, global food prices peaked a month into the invasion and have since
tapered off slightly in response to reasonably favorable growing conditions in other major producing
countries, the rising risk of recession in major economies, and an agreement to open a Black Sea
corridor to evacuate Ukrainian export commodities. This is because the supply shock arising from
the Ukraine war is relatively small. Of the roughly three billion tons of grain produced globally each
year, the loss of perhaps half of Ukraine’s exports—which is likely the upper bound—implies a
supply shock of less than one percent. That’s less than what was lost to the severe 2012 drought in
the United States’ Midwest—not enough to cause a crisis.
Only about one-quarter of the food consumed globally depends on international trade. Trade
doesn’t feed the global population so much as it stabilizes prices, dispersing varied demand and
supply shocks across the world quite effectively. No nation can be reliably self-sufficient and
adequately nourished. The world needs orderly trade regimes to absorb the shocks that inevitably
occur, especially as climate change progresses. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created
during a period of steadily falling real food prices; they hit an all-time low in December 1999.
Because its rules were negotiated during an era of falling prices, the WTO has effective tools to limit
governments’ ability to indulge domestic political pressure for protectionism around imports that
lead to lower prices. But when prices rise, the protectionist impulse concerns exports, not imports,
and the WTO lacks corresponding agreements to constrain governments’ ability to restrict exports.
New trade agreements to rectify this oversight are needed if the world is to get a handle on food
prices.
Private investment in agri-food systems is far larger than state investments but only slightly better,
tending to concentrate on luxury goods and services rather than on projects that could address high
food prices and mass acute food insecurity. Although rising food prices in 2021 boosted venture
capital agri-food tech funding up to $52 billion, an 85 percent increase over 2020, the largest single
category was online grocery shopping. Although it is an understandable response to COVID-19
lockdowns, fancy delivery apps do little to nothing to reduce food insecurity, greenhouse gas
emissions, biodiversity loss, or water stress, and they may aggravate the global obesity epidemic.
The estimated $26 billion it would cost to eliminate global hunger represents less than one percent
of the $2.7 trillion in cash on hand in early 2022 among the 500 companies listed on the S&P index. If
governments built policy and institutional innovations to attract even a modest fraction of that
money to tackle the underlying imbalances that leave the world vulnerable to perfect storms like the
one it faces now, that would be a game changer for accelerating agri-food systems transformation.
Real leadership—from the private, philanthropic, and public sectors—will manifest in championing
smart and substantial investment in agri-food systems transformation.
Like extreme weather events, perfect storms that cause mass acute food insecurity are happening
more and more often. It took 35 years for the world to experience another food crisis after 1973–74,
but less than a decade after the 2008–12 disaster for the current emergency to hit. Policymakers,
international organizations, and the private sector must develop an appropriate, timely, and
sufficient humanitarian response regime—not only to avoid unnecessary human suffering now but
also to address the larger-scale, longer-term challenges that leave the world increasingly vulnerable
to food crises precipitated by a wide range of shocks. These key points—safety nets, immediate
action, limits on export bans, better research and development, and thoughtful investment—must
guide public and private policy. Policymakers must address the immediate global food emergency
with prompt and generous humanitarian aid and orderly international trade. They must also marshal
the major research and development investment and policy and institutional innovations necessary
to bend the arc of agri-food systems away from increasingly frequent and calamitous crises and
toward a healthier, more equitable, resilient, and sustainable world.
there are "credible reasons" to believe that Indian agents may have been behind the murder
of a Sikh separatist on Canadian soil.
Canadian PM Justin Trudeau
BBC Report
CURRENT STATUS
• There are an estimated 26 million Sikhs around the world, according to the London School of
Economics (LSE).
• Canada has the largest Sikh community outside India,
• with about 770 K people having reported their religion as Sikh in the 2021 census.
• Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has intensified the pursuit of Sikh
separatists and arrested dozens of leaders from various outfits allegedly linked to the
• Nijjar supported the demand for a Sikh homeland and was reportedly organising an unofficial
referendum in India for an independent Sikh nation at the time of his death.
• Nijjar was born in 1977 in Punjab’s Jalandhar district and he moved to Canada in 1997.
• He was initially associated with the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) Sikh separatist group,
○ according to India’s counterterrorism National Investigation Agency.
• New Delhi has listed BKI as a “terrorist organisation” and says it is funded by Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency, a charge Islamabad denies.
INDIA-CANADA RELATIONS
• Following Trudeau’s claims that India had a role in the killing of Nijjar,
• tensions between Canada and India have escalated.
• India suspended issuing visas to Canadian citizens amid the escalation,
• citing “security threats” disrupting work at its missions in Canada.
• Also, in a tit-for-tat move, India expelled one of the top Canadian diplomats last week
• after Canada’s foreign minister expelled Pavan Kumar Rai,
• the most senior member of India’s foreign intelligence agency operating in Canada.
A row between India and Canada surrounding Sikh independence, commonly referred to as the
Khalistan movement, continues to cause tensions.
1. Historical Background:
• FATA was a historically marginalized and underdeveloped region of Pakistan.
• It had a unique legal status under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR),
• which granted the government extensive powers to maintain law and order
• but also led to allegations of human rights abuses.
2. Reasons for Merger:
Several factors contributed to the decision to merge FATA into the neighboring province of
(KP):
a) Socioeconomic Development:
○ FATA was one of the least developed regions in Pakistan, lacking basic infrastructure,
education, healthcare, and economic opportunities.
b) Security Concerns:
○ FATA had been a stronghold for various militant groups, and its separate status made it
challenging to address security issues effectively.
c) Political Representation:
○ The people of FATA had limited political representation and lacked a voice in Pakistan's
national and provincial legislatures.
3. Legal and Administrative Changes:
To effect the merger, several changes were made:
a) Abolition of FCR:
○ The FCR, which had been in place for over a century, was abolished.
○ This marked the end of the special legal framework in FATA.
b) Extension of Pakistani Laws:
○ Pakistani laws were extended to FATA,
○ bringing the region under the same legal system as the rest of the country.
c) Creation of Provincial Seats:
○ FATA was allocated seats in the KP Provincial Assembly,
○ allowing its residents to elect representatives to the provincial legislature.
d) Socioeconomic Development:
○ The government announced plans to invest in infrastructure development, education,
healthcare, and other sectors in FATA
○ to bring it on par with the rest of the country.
In conclusion, the FATA merger in Pakistan was a significant step toward mainstreaming a historically
marginalized and underdeveloped region. While it aimed to address various challenges, the long-
term success of the merger depends on effective governance, development initiatives, and ensuring
the rights and representation of the people of FATA within the broader Pakistani context.
❖ OPINION
THE government wants the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan to shun militancy and play
their role in mainstream politics. On their part, the TTP demand that the government
withdraw its troops from the now merged areas of erstwhile Fata, repeal the 25th
Amendment of the Constitution to reverse Fata’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and
implement the Sharia in Malakand Division. That much we seem to know. Right? But have
you ever wondered what the people of those districts want?
According to a poll survey in 2016 by the Fata Research Centre, 68 per cent of the respondents
in the ex-Fata region demanded the full abolishment of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)
Recently in 2021-22, the Community Resilience Activity North, a project sponsored by the UN
and working in collaboration with the concerned district administrations, was implemented in
the newly merged districts of KP to help the local communities build resilience against any
community stressors and increase social cohesion for community development. The project
was also meant to bridge the information gap between local communities and the newly
established government departments for better and improved working of the latter to provide
specific services to the communities where none existed before the merger in 2018.
Working as a consultant and trainer for this project, I happened to gain some insights into local
conditions and the persistent issues that were limiting the success of any development in the
region. Most local people I interacted with through community resilience workshops, seemed
to be losing hope and developing grievances about the new system. The reasons were often
different for the youth and the elders.
The merger has exposed the growing ideological gap between the elders and the youth
of the tribal districts.
The majority of youth living in the ex-Fata areas tended to support the process of the merger
in principle because they were not happy with the past system of FCR or the dictatorial powers
of the political agent. They were also not happy with the overwhelming influence of
community elders who, through the jirga system, played the role of intermediary between the
political agent and the common people.
Many elders, youth, and government officials have said that the merger afforded them
constitutional rights, like any other citizen of Pakistan. Many among the youth expressed their
optimism that they would now be able to appeal against the jirga’s decisions as well as
approach the higher courts in search of justice. This, they hoped, would give them a chance to
a fair trial and just and timely decisions. They also seemed happy to be saved from the
collective and territorial responsibility which was a cruel part of the FCR. The establishment of
new government departments offering all kinds of services after the merger also promised
more developmental work, a better law and order situation, relative peace, stability and
modern living facilities.
Women participants at these workshops particularly said that the previous system was very
repressive and that the jirga was manipulated by the rich and powerful. They talked about
how women face limitations and often go unheard and are not even allowed to be involved in
matters regarding their own lives. Female participants expressed their optimism over the new
reforms, hoping they would address the repression and limitations that women felt in the
previous system.
Some of the older people, however, believed that the old jirga system had ensured peace and
the quick dispensation of justice which was slow and faulty in the new system. They also
seemed to have grievances about losing the privileges they had as elders in the previous
system. They, however, still enjoy considerable influence in the community and people don’t
generally seem to oppose them openly. Some workshop participants, particularly senior
government officials, disagreed and claimed that the elders of the community do favour the
merger and reform process as they cooperate with the district administration.
But many people seemed extremely disappointed as their expectations from the merger and
promised reforms have not been fulfilled. They complained about the delays in the
administration of justice, the crime rate that has risen after the merger, and drug addiction
and corruption that have increased drastically. While some officials expressed frustration over
the lack of funds for the newly established departments, others believed that the process
through the merger was not smooth and a proper consensus had not been developed before
There is an acute lack of awareness and trust in official procedures and services offered by the
newly established departments.
Compared to the pre-merger system the new system is not delivering. Reasons include the
lack of resources, no training of staff, lack of coordination between different departments,
local conflicts, confusion about procedures, delay in court decisions, damaged infrastructure,
the presence of extremist elements, and opposition from different segments of society. The
administration is unable to meet the people’s expectations, and public frustration with the
new system is growing while the security situation remains precarious.
Against the background of the current negotiations with the Taliban and their demand for the
reversal of the Fata merger, the need to engage the people of these areas by the government
and effectively address their grievances with assurances of a progressive future cannot be
stressed enough.
The writer is a consultant and researcher working on social issues, including building resilience
and cohesion in stressed communities.
Published in Dawn, July 18th, 2022
''We cannot stop natural disasters but we can arm ourselves with knowledge: so many lives
wouldn't have to be lost if there was enough disaster preparedness.''
--Petra
Nemcova
1. Institutional Framework:
i. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA):
○ Established in 2005, NDMA is the apex body responsible for
▪ formulating policies, plans, and guidelines for disaster management.
○ It coordinates disaster response efforts at the national level.
ii. Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs):
○ Each of Pakistan's provinces has its own PDMA,
○ responsible for disaster management at the provincial level.
iii. District and Local Authorities:
○ District and local governments play a crucial role in disaster management and
response.
2. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR):
• Pakistan has adopted a comprehensive National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy
○ to reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience in communities.
○ This includes efforts to raise awareness, strengthen building codes, and improve
early warning systems.
• Earthquake-resistant building codes have been enforced in earthquake-prone areas.
3. Early Warning Systems:
• Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) provides early warnings for weather-related
disasters,
• such as floods, cyclones, and droughts.
• The Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)
○ contributes to disaster monitoring through satellite technology.
4. Response and Relief:
• Pakistan Army, along with other armed forces, plays a crucial role in disaster response and
relief operations.
○ They have significant resources and expertise in disaster response.
• The National Disaster Risk Management Fund (NDRMF) was established
○ to provide financial resources for disaster response and recovery efforts.
5. Community Engagement:
• Local communities play a vital role in disaster preparedness and response.
• Various NGOs and civil society organizations work to educate and involve communities in
DRR efforts.
• Community-based early warning systems have been established in some disaster-prone
areas.
6. Challenges:
• Limited Resources:
○ Pakistan often faces resource constraints in dealing with large-scale disasters,
which can hinder response and recovery efforts.
In conclusion, disaster management in Pakistan is a complex and evolving field. Efforts have
been made to strengthen disaster preparedness, risk reduction, and response mechanisms, but
challenges remain. As the country continues to face a range of natural and man-made hazards,
ongoing investments in disaster management, capacity building, and community engagement
are essential to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance resilience.
• Barter trade, or the exchange of goods and services directly without the use of money,
• has a long and ancient history that predates the invention of currency.
1. Prehistoric Times:
• Barter trade can be traced back to prehistoric societies where early humans exchanged
goods like food, tools, and resources with one another based on mutual needs.
• The simplicity of bartering made it a natural form of trade in these early human
communities.
2. Ancient Civilizations:
• Many ancient civilizations, including the Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans,
○ relied on barter trade extensively.
• These societies engaged in the exchange of agricultural products, livestock, textiles, and
other goods without a standardized medium of exchange.
3. Challenges of Barter:
• Barter trade faced several challenges, including the need for a "double coincidence of
wants,"
○ where both parties had to desire what the other had to offer.
• The lack of a common measure of value and issues related to divisibility and durability of
goods
• made barter less efficient as economies grew.
❖ OPINION:
In the backdrop of Pakistan’s trade shift to a barter economy, de-dollarisation or lower
dependency on the US dollar has set its strong foothold in the country; offering Pakistan to
revitalise its economy with less vulnerability from exchange rate risks, balance of payments crisis
and inflation.
In a strategic move, Pakistan recognised the potential of barter trade agreements with countries
Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia and implemented a “business-to-business barter trade mechanism
2023” on June 2; facilitating state-owned and private enterprises in Pakistan to engage in barter
trade with all three neighbouring countries. This shift aligns with the global trend towards de-
dollarisation; driven by geopolitical and economic factors.
Pakistan’s trade with Iran, Afghanistan and Russia has the innate potential to swell but US-led
trade curbs have always acted as a dampener; keeping the quadrilateral trade among all
neighbouring countries at ebb.
The bilateral trade volume between Pakistan and Iran has stood at around $2 billion. Similarly,
Pakistan’s trade volume with Russia stands at approximately $400 million. The trade volume
between Pakistan and Afghanistan is estimated to be around $1 billion. If executed in true letter
and spirit, the barter trade among Pakistan, Iran, Russia and Afghanistan will go manifold.
Meanwhile, before subscribing to barter trade agreements, Pakistan has also begun importing
various essential items from these countries. For instance, Pakistan is importing 100 MW of
electricity from Iran, addressing its energy needs through bilateral cooperation. Additionally,
Pakistan has initiated the import of crude oil, wheat, and other commodities from Russia.
Instead of payment in dollars, Pakistan will settle these transactions through the exchange of
commodities or goods, further reinforcing the de-dollarisation policy.
Barter trade presents numerous benefits for Pakistan’s economy. By exporting a wide range of
goods, including agricultural products, textiles, and sports equipment, Pakistan can showcase its
diverse offerings to international markets. Simultaneously, barter trade allows the country to
import vital commodities such as crude oil, LNG, and LPG from its trading partners, satisfying its
energy requirements and reducing dependence on traditional trading methods. Diversifying
imports, which would include industrial machinery, wheat and pulses, further supports
Pakistan’s industrial growth and overall economic landscape.
Many countries are diversifying their currency holdings and reducing reliance on the greenback
due to concerns about its stability and aggressive rate hikes.
As the world increasingly calls for trade to be conducted in currencies other than the US dollar,
Pakistan’s barter trade move paving the way for de-dollarization aligns with a broader global
trend. Many countries, including Brazil and Southeast Asian nations, are diversifying their
currency holdings and reducing reliance on the greenback due to concerns about its stability and
aggressive rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve. China, as the world’s second-largest economy,
has been at the forefront of the de-dollarization movement, further driving this shift in global
trade dynamics.
Effective implementation of barter trade and de-dollarization is key for Pakistan to capitalize on
the opportunities presented by this transformative shift. It positions Pakistan as a proactive
player in the evolving international financial system, strengthening its economic ties with
regional and global partners. Through careful planning and strategic execution, Pakistan can
harness the benefits of barter trade and de-dollarization to fuel economic growth, enhance
regional cooperation, and pave the way for a more prosperous future.
The barter trade system also presents an opportunity for Pakistan to address its energy
requirements. By exporting surplus agricultural products, Pakistan can secure the import of vital
commodities such as crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
from its trading partners. This not only fulfils Pakistan’s energy needs but also reduces its
reliance on traditional payment methods, such as the U.S. dollar, which can be subject to
exchange rate risks and volatility.
Moreover, the barter trade system enables Pakistan to diversify its import spectrum and support
its industrial growth. By importing industrial machinery, wheat, pulses, and other goods,
Pakistan can strengthen its manufacturing sector, improve productivity, and create new
employment opportunities. This, in turn, contributes to overall economic development and sets
the foundation for long-term growth.
These developments underscore the tangible progress that Pakistan has made in diversifying its
trade partners and reducing dependence on traditional payment methods. By capitalizing on the
potential of barter trade and embracing de-dollarization, Pakistan is poised to expand its trade
volumes, strengthen economic ties, and pave the way for sustained economic development.
The successful implementation of the barter trade system requires careful planning, effective
coordination among relevant stakeholders, and a supportive policy framework. Pakistan’s
government, in partnership with key industry players, needs to ensure seamless logistics,
As Pakistan forges ahead with its barter trade system, it sets a precedent for other countries
looking to diversify their trade relationships and reduce reliance on traditional payment
methods. This bold step towards economic development, driven by mutually beneficial
exchanges and strategic partnerships, positions Pakistan as an emerging player in the global
trade landscape. By embracing the barter trade system with Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia,
Pakistan is laying the groundwork for sustainable growth, greater economic stability, and a
prosperous future.
The writer is a senior Journalist. He is also President of Institute of International Relations and
Media Research (IIRMR).
In conclusion, the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan is a complex issue deeply rooted
in historical, social, political, and economic factors. Addressing this challenge requires a
multifaceted approach that includes not only security measures but also efforts to address
socioeconomic disparities, reform religious education, and promote tolerance and
pluralism within society.
These examples illustrate the multifaceted nature of political crises in Pakistan, ranging from
military interventions and civil-military tensions to economic challenges, ethnic and regional
conflicts, and issues related to governance, accountability, and religious extremism.
Pakistan has made efforts to address these challenges, but they continue to shape the
country's political landscape and stability. It's important to recognize that the situation in
Pakistan can change rapidly, and developments may have occurred since my last knowledge
update in September 2021.
To address political crises and ensure stability, Pakistan has made efforts to strengthen democratic
institutions, improve civil-military relations, and combat corruption.
Additionally, international partners, including the United States, have played a role in supporting
democratic processes and stability in Pakistan.
It's essential to note that Pakistan's political landscape is dynamic, and the situation can change
rapidly.
To understand the current political crisis in Pakistan and its implications, it is crucial to consult up-to-
date news sources and expert analysis.
ECONOMIC CRISIS
• Pakistan has faced various economic crises and challenges over the years,
• which have had significant implications for the country's stability and development.
• These economic crises are often intertwined with the political issues discussed earlier.
1. Balance of Payments Crisis:
○ Example: Balance of payments crisis in 2018.
○ Pakistan has a history of struggling with external financing gaps,
○ leading to balance of payments crises.
○ In 2018, Pakistan faced a severe balance of payments crisis
▪ that prompted the government to seek a bailout package from the (IMF).
❖ Opinion:
Political stability and economic policies are closely interconnected and mutually influential.