CHAPTER 3

De-securitizing and Normalizing a Regional

Actor: The Case of Israel and Abraham
Accords

Najimdeen Bakare

Introduction
With its abundant energy resources, rich cultural and civilizational
heritage, and deep-rooted ancient history, the Middle East’s political
landscape stands as an embodiment of multifaceted security dynamics.
Through its substantial oil reserves, the region has significantly shaped
modern international relations. Notably, the formation of the Organi-
zation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC’s role in
the oil crisis of the 1970s, and the subsequent Anglo-American rollback
policy, as well as the establishment of the petrodollar system (İŞERİ,
2009) stand as enduring historical facts. Within the context of this region,
securitization takes on various forms and dimensions. Halliday (2012)

N. Bakare (B)
Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), Department of Peace and
Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST),
Islamabad, Pakistan
e-mail: drnajimdeen.pcs@nipcons.nust.edu.pk

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 45

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. Bakare (ed.), Arab-Israel Normalisation of Ties,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7765-9_3
46 N. BAKARE

identifies three distinct yet interconnected levels of securitization: struc-

tural/systemic, regional, and domestic. Throughout different phases of
the region’s modern history, elements such as politics, modernity, glob-
alization, the state, governance, and identity, among other foundational
factors, have all been subject to processes of securitization. For instance,
various aspects of identity embraced and propagated throughout the
region have been viewed through the lens of security. Since the post-
War era, the region has been plagued by conflicts of diverse nature.
These conflicts have encompassed a range of complexities, including the
Arab-Israel Wars, the Iran-Iraq War, the first and second Gulf Wars, the
enduring Israel-Palestine conflict, conflicts between states and societies,
and more recently, the Arab Spring.
As the Arab states grapple with their individual national issues, the
protracted Israel-Palestine conflict consistently maintains a backdrop posi-
tion, particularly within national and regional consciousness. Amidst all
other matters, the Israel-Palestine conflict has acted as both a centripetal
and centrifugal force within Arab Middle Eastern societies and among
the majority Muslim populations. The status of Israel as a Jewish State
situated in the heart of a predominantly Arab region has remained
contentious since its establishment in 1948, often seen as an alien
intrusion (Joffé, 1983).
While Israel asserts its legitimacy based on principles of interna-
tional law and established state practices, it legitimacy has remained a
contentious issue. Up until the advent of the Abraham Accords, orches-
trated by Washington and signed between Israel, Bahrain, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, and Sudan, respectively, regional insti-
tutions such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have urged Israel to
enhance its statehood’s legitimacy and its role in the region. This entails
recognizing the Palestinian identity not solely as Arab but as a population
deserving of an independent state along the pre-1967 borders. However,
this condition is referred to as “a condition that Israel will not accept”
(Hunter, 2010, 68). The Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by the Arab
League during its March 2002 Beirut summit, extended an offer to Israel
that included recognition of its right to exist. In return, the initiative
proposed a complete withdrawal from Arab lands that were captured since
1967 (Al Jazeera, 2010).
Daoudi (2009, 532) contends that not only was the initiative lost in
translation, but it was also met with “a yawn by the Israeli government.”
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 47

Despite its conservative stance toward Israel, Hamas, the governing

authority in the Gaza Strip, similarly embraces the idea of establishing
a Palestinian state with borders dating back to 1967 (Al Jazeera, 2017).
However, achieving consensus on the pre-1967 borders, a crucial element
for a potential two-state solution that would necessitate a Palestinian
capital in East Jerusalem has proven to be a prolonged and intricate
diplomatic challenge (Robinson, 2023).
Addressing the intricate security dynamics and complexities of the
Middle East, particularly the Israel-Palestine conflict, has never been
exclusively entrusted to the goodwill of regional actors; indeed, foreign
actors have always played a significant role in conflict resolution within
the region. In recent years, various foreign entities, most notably Wash-
ington, have taken the lead in different mediation and conflict resolution
initiatives. The most recent of these is the Abraham Accords, a series of
bilateral agreements aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations between
Israel and its immediate neighbors (UAE, Bahrain) as well as more distant
Arab neighbors (Morocco and Sudan). Under the auspices of the United
States, the naming of the accords reflects the religious heritage and legacy
of Abraham, a patriarch revered in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
Central to the accords lies the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Israel, the promotion of enduring security, the rejection of threats
and the use of force, and the advancement of coexistence and a culture of
peace. These objectives are intended not solely for the Middle East but
also for the broader global arena. The accords are anticipated to exert a
ripple effect on the region, as indicated by various headlines and anal-
yses suggesting that other Arab and Muslim-majority countries, including
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Indonesia, Mauritania, and even Pakistan, may
be contemplating normalization with Israel under the guidance of the
United States (Ahmed, 2022; Ahmed & Abbas, 2021; Al Jazeera, 2023;
Bassist, 2023; Harb, 2023; Ng, 2022; Sareen, 2020; Tani, 2021; The
New Arab, 2020). Adding to the list of foreign actors engaged in conflict
resolution efforts within the region is China, whose diplomatic endeavors
are evident in the recent Iran-Saudi rapprochement (International Crisis
Group, 2023).
The primary objective of this chapter is to illustrate how the Abraham
Accords contributes to the process of de-securitizing Israel. While existing
scholarship on the Abraham Accords often focuses on economic and
diplomatic advantages for parties in accord, this chapter adopts a strategic
perspective. Specifically, it examines the accords through strategic lens
48 N. BAKARE

to highlight the de-securitization of Israel. Over time and due to

various factors, Israel’s image has been associated with certain perceptions
that have fueled its securitization by neighboring countries. To provide
context for this discussion, the chapter begins with a theoretical explo-
ration of national interests. This theoretical foundation elucidates how the
realist concept of national interest propels Arab states toward reaching an
agreement with Israel, as exemplified by the Abraham Accords. Following
this, the chapter proceeds to evaluate existing scholarly works pertaining
to the Abraham Accords, followed by an exploration of three levels of
threat perception concerning Israel in the region and beyond—particu-
larly within the Muslim world. The final section of the chapter delves
into how the Abraham Accords are strategically leveraged to achieve the
de-securitization of Israel.

National Interest
The concept and notion of national interest have prompted extensive
scholarly discourse, yet a universally accepted definition remains elusive
(Ebegbulem, 2010). It is contextualized as the embodiment of a state’s
intentions. Although it holds a prominent place within the traditional
realist framework, national interest continues to be a focal point for archi-
tects of foreign policy, particularly those aligned with the realist school
of thought. The inquiry into what constitutes the national interest of
a nation remains an enduringly unresolved question, even as scholars
endeavor to anchor this idea within the context of foreign policy, elab-
orated upon through conceptual and theoretical lenses. Croft (1997)
contends that the uncertainties that characterized the League of Nations
in the 1930s bolstered the proponents of the realist approach, who sought
to define international relations and position states’ national interests as
tools for augmenting power. This echoes Morgenthau’s definition, which
aligns national interest (as embodied in foreign policy) with power—a
critical component that secures a state’s existence (Morgenthau, 1948,
1949). For Morgenthau, international relations encompass the politics of
interests among states, making it imperative for each state to pursue its
national interest in order to ensure its survival (Pham, 2008).
The determination of the factors influencing national interest or the
identification of what may be considered as national interest often guides
a state’s behavioral patterns in its foreign relations and shapes its aspi-
rations vis-à-vis other states (Alden & Aran, 2017). In line with these
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 49

considerations, it is important to explore the dynamics that underlie the

concept of national interest.
Drawing upon the premise that democracy has become integral to
the American identity, Smith (1994, 37) contends that “Americans have
argued the relevance to their own national interest in encouraging democ-
racy for others, and the proper means for doing so where appropriate.”
Similarly, for scholars like Hill, these behavioral patterns are intrinsically
linked to national identity, as “the idea of national interest is some-
times seen as inextricably yoked to that of national identity” (Hill, 2013,
138). Continuing within the broader framework of realism, the notion
of national interest pertains to the pursuit of and enhancement of state
security, along with the maximization of material wealth to secure a
competitive advantage over others (Alden & Aran, 2017). In the realm
of foreign policy implementation, national interest becomes self-evident
and “can be arrived at rationally through careful analysis of the material
conditions of states” (Alden & Aran, 2017, 6). Going beyond state secu-
rity, Alade (1997) and Gordon de Brouwer (2020) extend the scope of
national interest to encompass “three components—security, prosperity,
and socio-economic wellbeing,” though de Brouwer emphasizes that the
ultimate aim of any national interest is to mitigate immediate and fore-
seeable risks to a state. To gain further insight into a securitized national
interest, delving into both realist and constructivist approaches can offer
valuable perspectives. Realists argue that the nature of the international
system is inherently anarchic, serving as a crucial framework for under-
standing a state’s foreign policy. In this light, the concept of securitized
national interest (foreign policy) or designating something as a security
threat aligns with realist thought, which comprehends a state’s choices
and responses to actors, regional or international events, according to the
security environment.
Rationalists perceive national interest through the lens of rational
choice and cost–benefit analysis. Alden and Aran (2017, 6) argue that
proponents of this perspective posit “a unified decision-making body in
the form of the state as well as a belief that the pursuit of self-interest
guided all decision makers.” This approach shares commonalities with
realism.
Group or regime theorists posit that national interest represents the
interests of the dominant class (Krasner, 1978; Pham, 2008) or the
prevailing ideology of the ruling elites, whose influence extends beyond
domestic borders (Abercrombie & Turner, 1978). Consequently, national
50 N. BAKARE

interest is subject to change in response to “changes in dominant ideolo-

gies” (Hill, 2013, 6). Behaviorist foreign policy analysts would argue that
national interest is subject to idiosyncrasy—the inclinations of leaders or
their personal preferences (Hayat & Zaid, 2021; Wehner & Thies, 2021;
Zimmerman, 1969). Rosenau’s hypothetical exposition suggests that
idiosyncrasy exerts a more potent influence in less-developed economies
(Hveem, 1972), although events globally, particularly during the era of
populism in developed economies, challenge this line of analysis.
Similarly, from the constructivist viewpoint, reality is not prede-
fined but rather multifaceted, contingent upon the perspective of the
constructor. Consequently, the process of securitizing an individual, a
group, a state, or a concept may stem from self-construction. As aptly
stated by Wendt, “actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they
carry round independent of social context; instead they define their inter-
ests in the process of defining situations” (Wendt, 1992, 398). Conse-
quently, actors consistently interpret the world through their individual
subjective lens (Hill, 2013).
A common thread among all these perspectives and approaches is the
centrality of the state’s interests. Specifically, the survival, integrity, and
prestige of the state take a pivotal role, influencing and directing poli-
cies designed to advance the national interest. While national interest and
foreign policy are inherently interconnected, the assessment of whether
a policy serves the national interest might also be linked to the level of
democracy inherent in the decision-making process behind that policy
(Nincic, 1999).

Abraham Accord
In his farewell address to the American people in 1796, George Wash-
ington issued a cautionary message against foreign entanglements and
alliances: “ Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why
quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our
destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity
in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?”
(George Washington, 1796). However, over the course of many years
and driven by various imperatives, American domestic and foreign poli-
cies, representing national interests, have become deeply intertwined with
Middle East politics and conflicts. This entanglement has led the United
States to engage in numerous wars and contribute to peace initiatives in
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 51

the region. Notable among these initiatives are the Camp David Accords
and the Oslo Accords, which stand as significant legacies (Quandt, 1986;
Shlaim, 1994; U.S. State Department, nd). These accords provide context
and insight into the Abraham Accords, while underscoring Washington’s
pivotal and systemic role in the broader landscape of Middle Eastern
politics.
Amidst the structural/systemic, regional, and domestic dimensions of
the Middle East conflicts (Halliday, 2012), the prolonged Israel-Palestine
conflict occupies a central position. From the inception of Israel in
1948 and the ensuing Arab–Israeli wars, Washington has not only medi-
ated to resolve hostilities between the Arab nations and Israel, but also
endeavored to facilitate a solution to the enduring Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Adding to the array of peace initiatives in the region is the
Abraham Accords—an agreement signed by Israel, the UAE, Bahrain,
Morocco, and Sudan—though initiated, coordinated, and orchestrated by
the United States. The events and negotiations leading to the accords
exemplify classic carrot-and-stick diplomacy, with the Trump adminis-
tration employing imposition and incentives (Ahmed & Abbas, 2021;
Guzanski & Marshall, 2020). While the accords may bear the imprint
of Trump’s influence in the Middle East, the current Biden administra-
tion displays a propensity to build upon this legacy, aiming to expand the
list of participating countries (Khalid, 2022).
While the success of the accords rests upon the diplomatic persistence
of the United States, Guzanski and Marshall (2020, 379) caution against
disregarding the role of regional actors, particularly the Gulf Cooper-
ation Council (GCC), in the overall process. For them, “the formal
announcements only serve to bring the incremental progress in bilateral
relations between Israel and several Arab Gulf states since the turn of this
century into plain view.” Ferziger and Bahgat (2020) further argue that
as the “cold peace” maintained by Cairo and Amman with Israel recedes,
a “warm peace” between the GCC and Israel is gradually nurtured.
Scholars generally position the accords as a demonstration of prioritizing
national interests over inherent sentiments, particularly when grounded
in the economic and strategic advantages of the agreements (Ji-Hyang,
2022; Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, 2022) and the potential for strategic gains
(Guzansky, 2022). Feierstein and Guzansky (2022) critically assessed the
accords, gauging the “distance traveled” by the accord partners and eval-
uating the inability of the accords “to produce tangible improvements in
the Israeli-Palestinian calculus.”
52 N. BAKARE

The bilateral accords were tailored to ensure peaceful coexistence

between Israel and its neighbors, achieved through the normalization
of ties and enhanced relations in various areas of mutual interest (U.S.
State Department, 2020). Despite this shared goal, the accords were not
multilateral in nature; instead, they were bilateral agreements outlining
distinct levels of normalization between Israel and the respective parties
involved. The titles of these agreements clearly delineated the envisioned
and planned paths of normalization.
At the heart of the Arab–Israeli and Israel-Muslim world tensions lies
the Palestinian issue (Abu-Nimer, 2004; Kumaraswamy & Quamar, 2019;
Rahman, 2008; Zaidi, 2005). However, the joint declaration involving
the United States, UAE, and Bahrain omitted any reference to Palestine,
except for the separate bilateral agreements signed between Israel and the
Kingdom of Bahrain, as well as with Morocco. The Abraham Accords
have reshaped Israel’s strategic landscape and alleviated the burden of
the Palestinian issue from Israel. However, this topic remains sensitive for
many in the Muslim world. In his estimation, Trigano (2021) argues that
the advent of the Accords is a game changer, in the sense of affecting the
Palestinian struggle; its decades-long control over the Arab world, as well
as the EU, is waning. Being one of the non-Arab Muslim countries, whose
foreign policy has historically championed the Palestinian cause, Ahmed
and Abbas (2021) delve into the potential implications of the Abraham
Accords for the Muslim world, particularly Pakistan. They scrutinize the
Islamabad-Tel Aviv relationship and, by extension, explore the feasibility
of normalization between the two nations.
In the broader context of the Middle East and beyond, Güney and
Korkmaz (2021) contend that the energy competition in the Eastern
Mediterranean has given rise to two potent axes: “Israel, Greece, South
Cyprus, and Egypt—2013” and “Russia, France, UAE, and Israel—
2015.” They propose that in Washington’s view, these axes needed
balance, thus prompting the formation of the “third axis of alliance by
negotiating the Abraham Accords with Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan,
and Morocco in 2020” (Güney & Korkmaz, 2021, 62).
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 53

Threat Perception and De-Securitization Israel

Through the lens of international relations scholarship, this section briefly
outlines the concept of threat perception and, in this context, iden-
tifies strategic, regional, and societal areas for which Israel has been
securitized—deemed a threat to its neighbors.
Threat perception has played a central role in theories of war
within both intergroup conflicts and international relations (Gries, 2022;
Rousseau, 2007). Cohen (1978) underscores that threat perception is the
pivotal intervening variable between action and reaction during inter-
national crises. Scholars within international relations who draw from
behavioral and conflict theories in psychology contend that asymme-
tries in power inevitably trigger perceptions of threat (Rousseau, 2007).
Consequently, threat is often equated with military power, reflecting
power politics—Machtpolitik—where power shapes threats and drives
foreign policy decisions (Gries, 2022; Stein, 2013).
Exploring threat perception through the lens of social psychology, Jost
et al. (2009) assert that conservatives exhibit greater sensitivity to threats
than liberals. This perspective unveils the role of ideology in shaping
threat perception. Scholars have delved into understanding the correla-
tion between a state’s ideology and its perception of national power. For
instance, when a state adopts a hawkish or dovish stance toward other
nations, it likely perceives those nations as relatively weak or strong,
respectively (Gries, 2022). Mark Haas (2005) submits that ideological
differences, especially in an out-group setting, can influence perceptions
of mutual threat. This was evident in the context of great power ideolog-
ical Machtpolitik. Challenging traditional balance-of-power theories, Walt
(1987) introduces a nuanced view, contending that state cooperation in
the form of alliances is primarily aimed at balancing threats rather than
power. However, Michael Barnett (1996) counter argues that “balance
of threat” approaches tend to conflate threat with power, as nations are
generally apprehensive of more powerful counterparts.
Arguably, the perception of threat and the securitization of Israel
trace back to its establishment in 1948 and have evolved over the years,
reflecting multifaceted dimensions. The ensuing discussion aims to iden-
tify and categorize threats within the domains of strategic, regional, and
societal contexts.
54 N. BAKARE

Strategic Level
Given the previously discussed perspectives on threat perception, I
contend that within the broader context of the Muslim world, and
more specifically, among Arab states, Israel’s strategic threat perception
is characterized by several key factors. These include Israel’s controver-
sial nuclear weapons and technology, its Zionist ideology, agenda, and
policies, the threat posed to the realization of a Palestinian state or what
Edward Said refers to as the “question of Palestine,” the colonial percep-
tion of Israel (Said, 1978),1 the sense of cognitive defeat among Arabs
in the Arab–Israeli conflicts, the securitized public opinion within the
Muslim world, and the potential threat of Israel’s interference in domestic
politics.
From a strategic standpoint, Israel has long been regarded as the most
powerful regional actor (militarily) in both the immediate and broader
Middle East (Roth, 2009; Spiegel, 1990). It is not simply recognized
as a powerful state within the region, but it also behaves as one, which
inevitably shapes its interactions with its neighbors and consequently
influences their threat perception. If Israel’s military might serve as a
reflection of its power politics, it aligns with analyses demonstrating
how asymmetric power dynamics shape perceptions of threat and inform
foreign policy decisions (Gries, 2022; Rousseau, 2007). Beyond power
politics and threat perception, Israel’s status as a contentious nuclear state
raises concerns among its neighbors, rendering it a perceived threat (Kam,
1995). Moreover, Israel’s diplomatic potency is bolstered by its strong
alignment and close ties to, as well as the support it garners from, Wash-
ington. Provoking Israel is synonymous with challenging US interests
in the region, and thus a matter of considerable significance within US
domestic politics (Lieberman, 2009).
It is arguable that both Israel and many Arab monarchical states share
a common conservative ethos. Interestingly, Jost et al. (2009) contend
that conservatives tend to be more attuned to threats than liberals. In
a subsequent study, Jost et al. (2009) further establish the correlations
between perceptions of threat and conservatism.
Israel’s foundation as an ideological state has significantly shaped its
political culture over time (Rynhold, 2002). Rooted in the revolutionary

1 Said, E. (1978). The Idea of Palestine in the West. MERIP Reports, 70, 3–11.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3011576.
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 55

ideology of Zionism, Israel’s narrative emphasizes the primacy of Jewish

claims to the land of Palestine, positioning Jewish existential needs as
paramount over those of the Arabs (Quandt, 1995). In the context of
the existential needs, the state’s security considerations and policies are
intimately intertwined with its ideological underpinnings. The intricate
relationship between Israel’s strategic posture, its ideological foundation,
and the perceptions of its neighbors illuminates the multifaceted nature
of threat perception in the region.
In pursuit of its existential imperatives and the safeguarding of its
national interests, Israel has pursued both belligerent and covert actions
in Iraq, Syria, and Iran (Al Tahhan, 2017; Eilam, 2020; Hubbard et al.,
2021), which can be deemed as hawkish. However, this characterization
doesn’t negate Israel’s capacity for adopting a dovish approach. Despite
being a relatively vibrant democracy in the region and politically aligned
with the Western world, Israel has been unable to shake off accusations
of being a colonial project and a threat to the realization of a Palestinian
state, a perception that persists among Arabs and critics worldwide. While
some scholars have countered this narrative by attributing blame to the
Palestinians (Hackl, 2020; Smooha, 2010; Strawson, 2019).
At the strategic level, Israel’s predominance in most conflicts with
its Arab neighbors has resulted in what I term “cognitive defeat.“ This
defeat has instilled a perception among Arabs that Israel is unconquer-
able. Notably, while many Arab regimes may not endorse Hezbollah’s
policies, the organization managed to challenge Israel’s perceived invinci-
bility. In 2006, Hezbollah engaged the Israel Defense Force in a 34-day
battle that ended in a standstill (Byman, 2022) and a Pyrrhic victory for
Israel (Shanahan, 2008), culminating in Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon
(Kane, 2018). This feat resonated throughout the Arab world, briefly
alleviating the long-held sense of cognitive defeat. As Shanahan (2008,
34) aptly notes, “Hezbollah emerged stronger from the war as the pre-
eminent Arab military force. It was able to strike into the heart of Israel
and its committed fighters again dented the reputation of the Israeli
military.”
Collectively, these dynamics contribute to the Arab world’s perception
of Israel as a genuine threat, underpinning the securitization of Israel at
both the state and societal levels. Over the past several years, the strategic
threat perception of Israel has become more pronounced, solidifying its
role as a focal point within the securitized public opinion prevailing in the
Muslim world.
56 N. BAKARE

Regional Level
The securitization or threat perception of Israel extends beyond its terri-
torial boundaries, with its extra-territorial implications notably evident
in the attitudes of regional organizations and institutions toward Israel.
Besides the United Nations, the establishment of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969 is intimately linked to the perceived
threat posed by Israel. Positioned as an advocate for the Palestinian cause,
the OIC presents itself as a unifying platform for Muslims against Israel’s
occupation of Palestine. While its symbolic significance is noteworthy, the
role that the OIC plays in shaping threat perception and securitization
discourse around Israel cannot be underestimated. An analytical frame-
work such as that of Balzacq et al. (2016) illustrates the Israel-Palestine
situation as the “context,” with the OIC embodying the “power” (elite)
shaping the discourse, and the Muslim world constituting the “audi-
ence”—all of which align with the process of securitization. The OIC’s
influence extends beyond Arab regionalism, encompassing Muslim soci-
eties spanning from Indonesia to Gambia. Its broad reach suggests
the potential for a wider “audience” and the plausibility of substantial
acceptance of its narratives regarding Israel within the same audience.
In addition to the OIC, the Arab League stands out as one of the
oldest functional regional (Muslim) organizations, primarily established
to champion Arab nationalism and unity. Established in 1949, around the
same time as Israel’s inception, the “Palestinian cause” became a central
raison d’être for the League. As an actor in the securitization of Israel,
the League has consistently advocated for the pre-1967 borders and
demanded recognition and legitimacy of Israel based on those borders.
The Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by the Arab League during its March
2002 Beirut summit, remained a foundational principle in its dealings
with Israel until the emergence of the Abraham Accords (Al Jazeera,
2017).
While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was initially formed in
1981 for socio-economic and political reasons, geostrategic considera-
tions have increasingly dominated the group’s agenda. Scholars posit that
safeguarding the sovereignties of the princely city-states from powerful
regional actors like Iran was a significant driver behind its creation
(Siraj & Bakare, 2022). On the one hand, Iran, and on the other hand,
Israel’s position (before the Abraham Accords) in the region, both bear
significance for the GCC. While scholarly discourse might temper the
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 57

intensity of the GCC’s securitization of Israel, the oil-rich states have

taken measures that seek to balance loyalty to the Arab League and OIC,
address public sentiment surrounding the emotive and unresolved Pales-
tinian issues, and simultaneously, serve their national interests. As Elisheva
(2004, 192) argues, the GCC countries have often “chose to play the
Israeli card in various ways, not entirely as expected. These ties became
part of a complex balancing act, played by each of the states independently
and, at times, in concert.”

Societal Level
Regardless of how the political landscape in the region is understood, the
authoritarian structure in place does not entirely overshadow the voice of
the people—in fact, instances where the interests of the state and society
align are plentiful. Regardless of how the political landscape in the region
is understood, the authoritarian structure in place does not entirely over-
shadow the voice of the people—in fact, instances where the interests of
the state and society align are plentiful. One such alignment could be the
threat perception of Israel. This confluence of interests often benefits the
state, which leverages it to bolster its legitimacy. Stemming from threat
perception and securitization, the state’s view of Israel trickles down into
society in two main ways. First, the political context—monarchic polit-
ical cultures predominantly enable a top-down narrative shaping process,
often centered around the leader’s persona (Ferziger & Bahgat, 2020).
Second, facilitated by religious scholars and institutions (which are gener-
ally aligned with the monarchy), the legitimization of the elites’ desires
becomes conceivable. This is especially relevant in a Sunni Islam context
where authority must be obeyed and not revolted against, as long as the
leader adheres to Shariah—Islamic law. This synergy between political and
religious elites hastens a trickle-down effect within societies susceptible to
the inflamed Israel-Palestine conflict and politics.

Abraham Accords and Israel De-Securitization

This section adopts a nuanced perspective, arguing how and why the
Abraham Accords should be regarded as a tool of de-securitization. The
section posits that the Abraham Accords contribute to de-securitizing
process of Israel.
58 N. BAKARE

Strategically, the accords appear to symbolize Washington’s success

in fostering an amicable and de-securitized environment for its most
trusted regional ally. It represents the formalization of a long-nurtured
geostrategic endeavor by Washington and serves as the fulfillment of
a strategic partnership for the GCC, which has long perceived that a
favorable relationship with Washington necessitates alignment with Israel
(Elisheva, 2004; Rahman, 2021). As such, the accords reinforce the align-
ment and convergence of US and Israeli interests, effectively creating a
strategic environment where nations share an “almost congenial” interest.
While the accords fairly dissolve hostilities between Israel and partici-
pating countries, the true accomplishment of the accords—largely unno-
ticed by Middle East pundits and political observers—lies in the trans-
formation of Israel’s Periphery Doctrine. The doctrine was one of Israel’s
political strategies for engaging non-Arab Muslim states that were consid-
ered peripheral to the core Muslim-centric Middle East or major Muslim
countries. Guzansky (2021, 88) avows that the doctrine aimed at “bal-
ancing pan-Arabism and outflanking its hostile Arab neighbors, the
strategy served to enhance Israel’s security and economic ties, and reduce
regional isolation.” With the Abraham Accords and subsequent normal-
ization, one could argue that Israel, with the assistance of Washington,
has successfully transitioned from the Periphery Doctrine to the Core
Doctrine. The inclusion of oil-rich GCC countries, representing core
Muslim states, in the normalization treaties suggests a shift toward a more
central role for Israel. Intriguingly, this may hint that further normaliza-
tion in the wider Islamic world could be challenging but not implausible
given the GCC’s influence.
Taking a closer look at the countries that are signatories to accords
reveals that their policies are often driven by the interests of the ruling
elite (Pham, 2008), particularly the powerful monarchs and authori-
tarian figures. For an extended period, the dominant ideology of these
ruling elites securitized Israel as a critical component of their national
interest. With the advent of the Abraham Accords, the national interest
has shifted based on the perceptions and desires of these elites. Conse-
quently, the national interest, once centered on the securitization of Israel,
has become subject to the changing ideologies of those in power (Hill,
2013). Similarly, just as decisions in these societies pivot on the desires of
the elites or ruling class, public opinion often holds little sway, resulting
in top-down decision-making processes that follow a trickle-down trajec-
tory. Moreover, the interplay between the Abraham Accords and the
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 59

de-securitization of Israel meets the criteria of national interest deter-

mined by the idiosyncrasies of leaders or their preferences (Hayat & Zaid,
2021; Wehner & Thies, 2021; Zimmerman, 1969). Therefore, when the
leaders or elites assume Israel is no more a security threat, it must be true
for the populace without complaint or objection.
Strategically, the accords shed light on the role of rationality (in the
form of rational choice) and a realist foreign policy approach (Alden &
Aran, 2017) in the decision to de-securitize Israel. Bahrain and the UAE,
for instance, were resolute and unequivocal in their approach, viewing
normalization as a means to fulfill their strategic interests with Israel. For
Bahrain, being among the less powerful GCC members (Elisheva, 2004),
the de-securitization of Israel is a rational choice aimed at forging a more
secure path (security partnership) with Israel. The UAE, as argued by
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen (2022), prioritizes technological and economic inter-
ests over the trajectory of Israeli-Palestinian relations or the conflict and
occupation. If de-securitizing Israel aligns with advancing national inter-
ests, the Abraham Accords certainly exemplify this. After two years of the
treaty, “normalization has opened the door to private-sector elements,
especially in the UAE, that were well-positioned to take advantage of
the resulting bilateral trade and commerce opportunities” (Feierstein &
Guzansky, 2022). Consequently, the accords underscore the impor-
tance of national interest and reinforce the realist assumption that states
inherently pursue three key goals—security, prosperity, and economic
maximization leading to socio-economic well-being. This mileage of
achievements can only be accomplished if and when a de-securitized
foreign policy is pursued.
The perpetual unpredictability of insecurity remains a paramount
concern for states. Hence, the existential needs for security against
ideological threats and various forms of traditional and non-traditional
threats are essential in the conventional sense. In this context, the de-
securitization of Israel through the normalization of ties, as facilitated by
the accords, reiterates the assertion of converging interests between Israel
and the GCC regimes (Ahmed & Abbas, 2021; Hasan, 2019; Siraj &
Bakare, 2022). This convergence is underscored by the escalating influ-
ence of Iran and the growing perception of US disengagement from the
region. Normalization and de-securitization are sensible considerations.
However, instead of reducing relations with Israel merely to security
concerns, the Abraham Accords foster and stimulate the necessity for
60 N. BAKARE

diversification of diplomatic, economic, and technological opportunities

with Israel.
Notably, it is evident that the accords not only foster bilateral coop-
eration and normalization between Israel and its neighbors but also
seem to transcend state boundaries, increasingly permeating regional
consciousness. Historically, the Arab League maintained a unified voice
and condemnation against Israel. Yet, since the embrace of the accords by
certain Arab states, this unified voice has become divided. For instance,
during the League summit in Algiers in 2022, an observer noted that
“This is a regional organisation that is deeply divided and polarised, so
they were very careful with the words that they used,” … “We heard
leaders express support for the Palestinians and their right to statehood,
but no condemnation of Israel” (Al Jazeera, 2022). The accords are
expected to stir up controversy and have a ripple effect on the region
and beyond. Among the North African states, Algeria and Tunisia remain
decidedly unyielding in their stance toward Israel. In the GCC, with the
exception of Kuwait and Qatar, the rest show greater flexibility. Sugges-
tively, Saudi Arabia and Oman are contemplating normalization, albeit
under specific conditions (New York Times, 2023). On the other hand,
Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon seem no closer to considering normalization.
Meanwhile, the most populous Muslim nations, such as Indonesia and
Pakistan, have been captivated by the headlines detailing the normaliza-
tion of ties with Israel. This trend indicates a shift in attitude toward the
status of Israel.
China has demonstrated its diplomatic prowess and willingness to
contribute to peace in the region, a stance that cannot be separated
from Beijing’s strategic interests in the area. Against the backdrop of
its global mega-project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has
extended its diplomatic and economic influence worldwide, including in
the Middle East. China’s growing relations with Israel and its economic
and financial collaborations with Arab states serve as clear indications of
its vested interest in the region. However, such endeavors might not align
smoothly for Beijing without the establishment of a peaceful, harmonious,
and conducive environment. In this regard, one could posit that China
will take gradual (incremental) approach toward supporting the accords.
It may work toward enabling other states, both within and beyond
the Middle East, to find motivations for normalizing their ties with
Israel. This approach would be a part of the process of de-securitizing
 3 DE-SECURITIZING AND NORMALIZING A REGIONAL ACTOR … 61

Israel. Another aspect to consider is the recent Saudi-Iran rapproche-

ment, which serves as a litmus test for Beijing’s role in the region. To
assert its influence, China would likely aim for a sustainable and enduring
rapprochement between these two nations.
Beyond the realm of state-level perceptions, there exists a prominent
perception of Israel at the societal level, which can be characterized as
largely contentious. The process of de-securitizing Israel may not be met
with universal approval among the general populace across the Muslim
world, particularly in Arab countries. However, the initiation of diplo-
matic relations between Israel and these nations could potentially lead to
a shift in public perceptions of Israel. For example, the media’s portrayal
of Israel, which highlights the violations of Palestinian human rights
(Kalb and Saivetz), might undergo a more nuanced transformation. Addi-
tionally, there could be a prospect of increased travel to Israel without
the need for intermediary countries or additional passports. It is worth
noting that certain passports currently prohibit travel to Israel, necessi-
tating the use of alternative passports or routes. The normalization of ties
could bring about changes in these restrictions, leading to more direct
interactions between the public and Israel.

Conclusion
The normalization of ties with Israel is just as divisive and complex
as the previous securitization of Israel. Among the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries, the absence of a unified and consistent foreign
policy toward Israel is undoubtedly influenced by a multitude of factors,
including economic considerations, pursuit of independent foreign policy,
and intricate local politics. While Bahrain and the UAE have taken bold
steps toward normalization, Kuwait’s public opposition to any form
of ties that do not address the Palestinian occupation, Saudi Arabia’s
cautious yet strategic approach, Qatar’s emphasis on an independent
foreign policy from its GCC counterparts, and Oman’s unique stance
within the GCC must all be closely analyzed. North African states and
several non-Arab Muslim nations share a similar predicament, maintaining
their pro-Palestine foreign policy stance.
One crucial aspect that cannot be overlooked is that the very reasons
and factors, such as power dynamics, national interest, and leadership roles
that shape public discourse around securitization also play a pivotal role in
shaping the discourse around normalization. The impact of the Abraham
62 N. BAKARE

Accords resonates across the international system, prompting changes in

regional and domestic politics, and more importantly, triggering shifts in
societies that were once susceptible to the volatility of the Israel-Palestine
conflict and politics. With the normalization occurring at the state level,
de-securitization is inherently imposed on society. While one might expect
significant resistance from society due to these changes, the reality has
shown that people have generally accommodated the new state stance
towards Israel. Similarly, while some states are reportedly considering
normalizing ties with Israel, others remain steadfast in maintaining their
long-standing diplomatic positions. For example, in 2022, the Iraqi parlia-
ment passed a law that criminalized the normalization of ties with Israel,
subject to a death sentence or life imprisonment (Al Jazeera, 2022).
Even though it is widely acknowledged that national interest under-
pins the decision to alter the threat perception of Israel, and the pursuit
of peaceful coexistence is deemed beneficial for the region, a fundamental
question remains: Can Israel truly attain the peace it desires without
addressing the core issue of the Palestinians? It is also evident that regard-
less of the degree of normalization, the on-the-ground reality will not
shift substantially if tangible progress remains slow and unyielding in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Yousef Munayyer argues, “You
can normalise and have relations with every Arab and Muslim country,
that’s not going to change that fact” (Harb, 2023). The contentious
matter of Israel’s security will persist, as its security is intrinsically linked to
the de-securitization of the Palestinian issue through a two-state solution
as endorsed by the United Nations, the OIC, and the Arab League.

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