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Titel und Anzeigen_goe.indd 3 22.04.2009 09:26:22

 CONNECTING
PEOPLE AND
MARKETS
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It forms an essential part of everyday life and
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But that’s not all: it’s also one of the most

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METRO Group employs more than 290,000

people from 150 nations at some 2,200 sites
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We like to call it the ‘Spirit of Commerce’.
Discover the world of retail for yourself at
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Titel und Anzeigen_goe.indd 4 22.04.2009 09:26:23

Titel und Anzeigen_goe.indd 5 28.04.2009 15:55:30
 editorial

First issue of the new police in europe Dear Readers,

It is with great pleasure that we present today the ¿rst issue of the new pan-European
police journal the new police in europe. It is thanks to the joint efforts of the publishers,
editors, and numerous supporters from the police services, ministries and agencies of
the EU Member States as well as the EU institutions that this journal is appearing today.
We would ¿rstly like to thank all those who supported us in publishing this journal, our
special thanks also go to the authors who provided us with excellent material worthy of
a ¿rst issue.
Several months have now passed since the idea of a journal was presented to the Euro-
pean Police Chiefs Task Force in The Hague in the spring of 2008, where it was met with
praise and support. All the points of contact and supporters from the European security
sector with whom we have co-operated since then share our opinion that Europe’s secu-
rity can only be guaranteed if cross-border security is further enhanced and advanced.
In recent years, new forms of crime have emerged in the EU Member States that avail of
technological developments and changing structures which create opportunities for crime.
In order to cope with this new threat situation, the ‘the new police in europe’ was born
from the idea of networking the various authorities, institutions, ministries, universities and
enterprises which, in the course of their daily work, provide the security that is necessary
as a basis for the development and growth of the unique European vision of a common
market and a common space of freedom and security.
From now on, the journal will appear quarterly with a circulation ¿gure of 70,000 issues.
The contents of the journal are also accessible at www.dnpe.eu. The journal offers exten-
sive information on the existing legislation and the organisation of the security agencies
in other Member States and advocates the exchange of best practices in respect of
tactical measures and preventive actions in the ¿ght against crime and terrorism. It will
also address extraordinary national and international operations, share material on the
training of police of¿cers with consideration of new police technologies and techniques
being given special interest.
This ¿rst issue focuses on transnational security in Europe. Since the new police in eu-
rope is the ¿rst police-related journal of its kind to address security themes at European
level, it is only logical that the ¿rst issue should introduce the security institutions and
protagonists who operate within the context of the EU. Authors from Europol, Eurojust,
Frontex, OLAF, the European Commission and the European Parliament introduce their
institutions and explain how they contribute to the integrated security concept of the EU.
In addition, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s Federal Minister of the Interior, is the ¿rst
to contribute towards our series on the “Activities of a State to ensure Security in Europe“.
Contributions from Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Romania and the United Kingdom round
off this issue with an outline of special themes from the respective national security
agency. Last but not least, we have incorporated a column on current EU decisions on
internal security.
Finally, we would like to call upon the competent ministries and police agencies to conti-
nue their support for our project and to use the opportunity to join us in shaping this new
European communication platform for security issues. We gladly welcome your feedback
and suggestions on the contents, organisation and concept of the journal. Moreover, the
journal will remain open for participation by all Member States, in keeping with its objective
of being the ¿rst police journal for the whole of the EU.
The 2/2009 issue, which will be published in three months, will focus on the suppression of
terrorism and the use of state-of-the-art technology in the security sector. We will be happy
to receive your contributions and suggestions for the upcoming issue. Should you wish
to have further information, please feel free to contact our editorial staff at info@dnpe.de.
We hope the new police in europe inspires you and that you enjoy reading it.
Yours,
Ingmar Weitemeier Jörg Ziercke
Publisher and Director of the State Of¿ce Director of the Federal Criminal Police
for Criminal Investigation of Mecklenburg- Of¿ce, Germany
Western Pomerania, Germany
2 the new police in europe - 01/09

02 editorial_goe.indd 2 22.04.2009 09:46:26

 European Commission

Security in Europe - objective, initiatives and measures of the European Union

Jonathan Faull, Director General in the Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security*
Freedom does not mean absence of rules, because there is no freedom without rules. ing from setting up institutions such as
A well-balanced legal framework for law enforcement can ensure a safe environment to Europol and CEPOL, through setting up
develop daily life. This is the reason for putting ‘Security’ within EU priorities. Globalisation EU-wide databases such as the Schengen
and internationalisation have radically changed our daily life and political answers must Information System, developing a wide
be adequate to this new scenario by ensuring a cross border approach. Classic threats range of policies, and supporting practi-
to security (that is, military threats posed by hostile states) have been replaced by new, cal co-operation through EC-funding, in
dynamic threats that risk disrupting our society and endanger our citizens, such as cyber particular the AGIS and more recently the
attacks, terrorism, CBRN-risks/proliferation of WMD, natural disasters, etc.. ISEC-programme, which covers the period
Tackling these new threats is one of the most important issues for the EU in the foreseeable 2007-2013.
future. An essential complement hereof is providing internal security within the European On 20 December 2006, the Commission
Union, especially in the event of major internal cross-border crises affecting our citizens, adopted a proposal aimed at replacing the
our vital infrastructure and our public order and security. Europol Convention by a Council Decision.
In this context, transnational organised crime is one of the major threats to security, as A signi¿cant change is that Europol will be
it hampers the social, economic, political and cultural development of societies. Organ- ¿nanced from the Community budget (from
ised crime gangs differ - in their structure and their use of violence. Organised crime has 1 January 2010 onwards), and therefore
evolved in times of increasing globalisation and expanding international trade, so the become a Community agency. This change
range of organized crime activities has broadened and diversi¿ed. Modern organised of status will importantly improve the op-
crime groups are criminal enterprises that, like successful legitimate businesses, are erational and administrative functioning of
learning the lessons of globalisation and technological change. As their geographical Europol. This will simplify the procedures for
range increases world wide, they become harder to tackle. As potential pro¿ts increase, managing the budget and staff of Europol.
the temptation to use violence to protect those pro¿ts also increases. The role of the European Parliament in the
control of Europol will also increase, thus
The modus operandi of transnational crime exploits differences in national leg- the democratic oversight over Europol at
organised crime islative provisions. Where such differences European level will be enhanced.
hamper effective international co-operation, The decision will extend the mandate of Eu-
They tend to engage in a wide range of they inadvertently assist organised crime ropol to criminality which is not strictly related
criminal activities, depending on the avail- groups to survive and even Àourish. to organized crime. This will ease support
able opportunities. They strictly adhere to a provided by Europol to Member States in
“high-pro¿t, low-risk” approach. Organised EU security policy – current situation, relation to cross-border criminal investiga-
crime gangs increasingly employ profession- objectives and initiatives tions where involvement of organized crime
als to obtain legal, ¿nancial or technological is not demonstrated from the start.
expertise, and use facilitators to assist them The Commission is currently working, as Europol shall make every effort to ensure
with a wide range of tasks, which include part of the follow-up to the Communication that its data processing systems are inter-
getting forged documents and creating new “Towards a general strategy on the ¿ght operable with the data processing systems
identities. In the last few years, organised against cyber crime” from May 2007, to in the Member States and with the data
crime groups have built up large-scale inter- reinforce cooperation between law enforce- processing systems in use by the European
national networks and amassed substantial ment and private operators. Co-operation Union related bodies with which Europol
pro¿ts from illicit traf¿cking in drugs, traf¿ck- between police authorities and other law may establish relations. The Commission
ing in human beings, traf¿cking in weapons, enforcement agencies across the European has taken much action to support Member
counterfeit products and international fraud. Union is one of the main elements in efforts States and their law enforcement authori-
The proceeds from these crimes are laun- to ensure an area of freedom, security and ties in tackling organised crime.
dered and re-injected into the legal economy, justice. Efforts to ensure such co-operation A few examples are the European arrest
which helps further organised criminal ac- have taken place over the last decades, and warrant, enabling swift cross-border co-
tivity. Criminals and terrorists often exploit have been incorporated within the general operation in arresting and surrendering
weakened state structures to further their illicit framework of European integration since the suspects or convicted persons, the ability
business. The ¿ght against organised crime Maastricht Treaty (1993), which introduced to deprive terrorists and organised criminals
and terrorism should continue and include the concept of the European Union and the of funds, the possibility of creating joint law
measures against speci¿c types of crime, three pillars constituting it. EU-wide police enforcement investigation teams as well as
such as ¿nancial and cyber crime, to coun- co-operation as such is part of the third pillar, Eurojust’s role in co-ordinating cross-border
ter criminal exploitation and daily electronic together with judicial co-operation in criminal investigations and prosecution.
communication. matters. Earlier efforts to come to enhanced
Organised crime activities differ in their police co-operation which were undertaken Stopping identity theft, payment fraud
structure and in their use of violence. by a limited number of EU Member States, and corruption
Organised criminal groups have followed in particular through the Schengen Conven-
new technological developments, notably tions (1985, 1990), have become part of the In the European Union we do not have a
the internet. They have tried to use it and general EU policy as well through the Treaty common de¿nition of what constitutes iden-
exploit possible weaknesses from the of Amsterdam (1997), which incorporated tity theft. Identity theft affects governments,
internet’s very beginning; identity theft is all Schengen-related work into the general businesses and citizens alike. In the Justice
often linked to the internet through activities legal framework of the European Union. and Home Affairs area we are particularly
such as ‘phishing’. As we all know, national At the current time, many European initia- concerned, as identity theft is clearly linked
boundaries present no obstacle for organ- tives have been taken to improve police to various organised crimes. The potential
ised crime. On the contrary, organised cooperation in the European Union, rang- impact of identity theft on victims is im-

the new police in europe - 01/09 3

fertig 3 - 5 Faul goe.indd 3 21.04.2009 15:39:06

 European Commission
portant. There is a lack of legal provision:
In most legal systems there is no speci¿c
offence of identity theft, and penalties are
normally not very harsh. Prosecution is also
comparatively rare.
In the last few years the European Commis-
sion has organised several events to identify
the main stakeholders and take stock of
ongoing initiatives. This has highlighted the
importance of a wide involvement of policy
makers and national administrations, and
of gathering political support to tackle the
threat of identity theft and payment fraud
more effectively. In 2001, new EU-wide
legislation on combating fraud and coun-
terfeiting of non-cash means of payment
was adopted. These are now considered
criminal offences in all Member States. To
reduce low penalties and foster prosecution,
introducing a speci¿c offence of identity
theft might help align Member States and
simplify the investigation and prosecution of
offenders. As a ¿rst step, we have launched
a study of identity theft related legislation or
regulation in both EU Member States and
important third countries. We will have the
result next year.
The Commission considers the con¿scation
of criminal assets as one of the more effec-
tive ways to ¿ght organised crime. Organised
crime gangs seek – and achieve – huge
pro¿ts. We have long believed that to disrupt
criminal activities we must deprive criminals of
their pro¿ts. The key to ¿ghting criminal activi-
ties is to set up appropriate legal instruments
aiding rapid identi¿cation and tracing of illicit
¿nancial transfers and other transactions. A
number of EU legal instruments exist in this
area to ensure a common approach to con¿s-
cation, notably four texts covering substantive
and procedural criminal law. Following long
preparatory work, a Communication on pro-
ceeds of organised crime will be adopted by
the end of this year. A strengthened role for
Eurojust in facilitating cooperation at judicial
level and promoting mutual recognition in
con¿scation matters is necessary, as well
as facilitating the interaction between Asset
Recovery Of¿ces and judicial authorities. We
need more coherent legal instruments and
for promoting coordination and exchange of
information among national agencies. Com-
mon EU training programmes for ¿nancial
investigators should be implemented as a
priority, including comparable statistics on
assets frozen, con¿scated and recovered.
A European register, including, inter alia,
outstanding freezing and con¿scation orders,
would also be needed.
Organised crime needs not only effective law
enforcement cooperation, but also a preven-
tive approach. This includes good govern-
ance, transparency, accountability and
social responsibility standards for the public
and private sector to reduce the opportuni-
ties for crime. Corruption helps organised
4 the new police in europe - 01/09
fertig 3 - 5 Faul goe.indd 4
crime infiltrate legal markets. Therefore
further development and implementation
of a comprehensive EU anti-corruption
policy is essential, taking into account the
UN Convention against Corruption. This
anti-corruption strategy includes criminal
law measures, the promotion of ethics and
integrity in public administration and codes
of conduct. It promotes Public Private Part-
nerships. This year the Commission has
published a Staff Working Paper “Links
between organised crime and corruption”
which highlights information gaps in the un-
derstanding of the links between organised
crime and corruption.
Organized crime and money laundering
– ¿nancing terrorism
There can be a link between organised crime
and terrorism. The ¿ght against terrorist
¿nancing is one of the key elements in
the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism.
Stopping terrorist ¿nancing is an evolving
process. We must be innovative – more so
than the terrorists and organised criminals,
who quickly seize the opportunities of new
technology. The United Nations estimates
that the amount of money laundered globally
a year ranges between 500 billion and
1 trillion US dollars. Money laundering
methods are increasingly sophisticated and
can involve many fund transactions or trans-
actions linked to trade and other legitimate
businesses. In such cases, those involved
may be entirely unaware of the money
laundering or may receive some share of
pro¿ts. These activities are often carried
out in several jurisdictions, notably in those
countries where the risks are lowest and the
opportunities highest. Preventing money
laundering prevents criminal organisations
from accessing their pro¿ts. The cooperation
of the ¿nancial sector is essential in order to
detect both money laundering patterns and
money Àows and to allow for an intelligen-
celed approach. In 2005 the European Un-
ion adopted the EU Third Money Laundering
Directive to ensure that the EU follows the
international standards set by the Organi-
sation for the Economic and Cooperation
Development Financial Action Task Force.
This introduces a new risk-based approach
which provides more flexibility, but also
requires greater responsibilities.
In addition to customer diligence and re-
porting obligations, the Directive introduces
new supporting measures of interest to the
banking sector. For example, the protection
of employees, the need to set up training
programmes for staff, or the feedback on
the effectiveness of the suspicious transac-
tion reports ¿led. The proper implementati-
on of these processes can greatly enhance
the effectiveness of the national money
laundering systems.
Member States have to transpose the
Third Directive into national legislation by
15 December this year. We are concerned
about its timely and correct implementation
and are pleased that in the United Kingdom
the new Money Laundering Regulations,
prepared following an extensive consulta-
tion with the private sector, will come into
force in about two weeks.
The Commission has already taken a
number of initiatives to facilitate the legal
transposition and practical implementation
of the Directive. We remain committed to
continue our efforts in this area. Organised
criminals make various investments in legit-
imate businesses. These include casinos,
import/export businesses and real estate
developments. It is therefore important
that banks and other intermediaries take
reasonable measures to understand the
ownership and who controls their clients.
The Commission is ¿nalising a study on
a Cost Bene¿t Analysis of transparency
requirements on bene¿cial ownership. This
highlights the links between company law
and corporate governance on the one side,
and the prevention of ¿nancial crime on the
other. It should be available by the end of
this year. Extortion racketeering exists in
many forms. These include demands for
protection money, coercing entrepreneurs
[and other businesses] to use services,
supplies and equipment provided by com-
panies under the control of organized
crime groups. This phenomenon causes
extensive suffering to the victims, as well
as extensive harm to the community and
the economy.
The EU and combating organized crime
- conclusions
An effective response is not feasible without
the continuous monitoring by and smooth
exchange of information among the police
and judicial authorities of the Member
States. This must occur within the framework
of the competent international (e.g. Interpol)
and European institutions, such as Europol
and Eurojust, and the European Judicial
Network. With more than 1.2 million police
of¿cers, the European Union should be in
a position to ¿ght these threats ef¿ciently.
To achieve the construction of an area of
freedom, security and justice, we have to
ensure that these forces do not disperse
and that they work in a coherent way, as no
one Member State can ¿ght alone.
Regarding ¿nancial organised crime, it is a
matter of urgency to enhance investigation
capabilities among law enforcement forces.
The Commission is developing a project
with Member States to promote ¿nancial
investigation in the EU by means of com-
mon minimum training standards for EU
¿nancial investigation.
21.04.2009 15:39:06

In the area of investigation and intelligence,
it is of key importance to ensure that ¿nancial
intelligence is fully exploited in all organised
criminal and terrorist investigations. Efforts
are under way to improve the exchange
of information across Member States’
authorities, including the Financial Intelli-
gence Units. A report on the key legislative
instrument which sets up the framework for
EU Financial Intelligence Units is expected
in the ¿rst quarter of 2008. In addition to
legislation, many EU Member States are
connected online and through an informal
European Platform. Finally, the Commission
is launching a study on feedback between
the Financial Intelligence Units and ¿nancial
institutions and law enforcement bodies.
Credit and ¿nancial institutions continue to
make considerable investments to ensu-
re effective compliance with anti-money
laundering and counter terrorist ¿nancing
measures. The ability of such bodies to
identify what is genuinely suspicious and
report it to the Financial Intelligence Units
in a timely and effective manner can be
enhanced by working closer.
All our work requires good information to
help us understand the scale of the pro-
blem. We must develop a reliable crime sta-
The report by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction con¿rms the
need to bring society together to form a European alliance to tackle the issue of drugs
The annual report by the European Moni-
toring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA) on the drugs phenomenon in
Europe in 2008, published in Brussels,
con¿rms the need to bring society together
to form a European alliance to tackle the
issue of drugs. This latest report from the
EMCDDA on the drug phenomenon in Eu-
rope indicates that the consumption of drugs
in Europe is stabilising, whilst the number of
deaths linked to drugs is on the increase.
“Every hour, a young person in Europe dies
from a drug overdose. This alarming fact from
the EMCDDA’s report con¿rms the urgent
need to highlight to young people the seri-
ous risks of taking drugs”, stated Jacques
Barrot, Commissioner responsible for Jus-
tice, Freedom and Security. “To succeed in
overcoming this problem, it is important to
get society on board in every Member State.
This is the goal of the European alliance on
drugs which is aimed at involving and raising
awareness of the risks associated with drugs
amongst citizens, in particular young people,
companies and local authorities”, highlighted
Vice-President Jacques Barrot.
the new police in europe - 01/09
fertig 3 - 5 Faul goe.indd 5
tistics system. This is a long-term process
which will result in convergent referring
elements of selected crime definitions,
minimum penalties and criminal justice
measures at the level of the European Uni-
on. Truly comparable data will allow us to
prioritise measures, to address particularly
vulnerable economic sectors, as well as to
evaluate the effectiveness of actions.
An ef¿cient and effective use of technolo-
gy in all areas of justice and home affairs
policies should be at the heart of our future
security approach. We need to make full
use of the potential of our security research
agenda and push for ever more innovation
in security applications and systems. These
efforts should be made in close cooperation
with both the private and the public sectors.
This is really more important when we
speak about the role of technology.
When considering the role of technology
in all this, it is clear that we want our au-
thorities to be able to detect dangerous
materials, in particular explosives, before
terrorists have a chance to use these
against us. We want our authorities to be
able to share the information they have,
which will assist in arresting terrorists and
bringing them to justice. In a word, we want
Decisions of the EU
This alliance, proposed by the Commission’s
new “Drugs Action Plan” 2009-20012, will
be officially launched on the 26th June
2009 on the International Day against Drug
abuse and Illicit traf¿cking. This new “Drugs
Action Plan” adopted by the Commission
on the 18th September 2008 focuses on
reducing the demand and supply of drugs,
tackling drug traf¿cking and concentrates
on international action. Some 12 million
Europeans (between 15 and 64 years)
have taken cocaine, 11 million have used
amphetamines and 9.5 millions have used
ecstasy. The latest ¿gures for Europe con-
¿rm a stabilisation on amphetamine and
ecstasy consumption. At the same time the
¿gures show a steady growth in cocaine
consumption, although this concerns only a
small number of Member States. As regards
heroine, the report does not show a decline
in the epidemic problems linked to heroine,
but certain signs indicate that the problems
with synthetic opiates could worsen.
The annual report by the EMCDDA gives the
European Union and the Commission a factual
overview of the drug phenomenon in Europe.
European Commission
our authorities to have the tools they need
to do their job.
In order to achieve all this, ¿rst we need to
listen to what the experts say is technically
feasible, and whether there are negative
consequences of using these technologies
or fundamental rights. It is only when we
have considered all sides of the equation
that we can ¿nd a coherent response.
In conclusion, security in our daily life is
one of the most important factors in the
well-being and quality of life of European
citizens. This is an area where the added
value of action at EU level is clearly under-
stood and called for by European citizens.
The Commission should act as a catalyst
between the different stakeholders, which
are not only the police, security and judicial
authorities, but all other ordinary adminis-
trations that tackle security matters, be it
health, trade or education. The Commission
should screen the weaknesses in security
at EU level and consequently consider
further action – whether to legislate or
¿nance projects.
*The author expresses his own views,
not necessarily those of the European
Commission.
The European Monitoring Centre provided the
European Commission with a technical sup-
port to evaluate the Drugs Action Plan (2005-
2008) and to elaborate the “drug” action plan
2009-2012, which will be adopted by Member
States before the end of the year.
For more information please consult
EMCDDA Annual report 2008 on the
drugs problem across Europe
h t t p : / / w w w. e m c d d a . e u r o p a . e u /
events/2008/annual-report
EU Drugs Action Plan (2009-2012)
and report in the ¿nal evaluation of the
previous
EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008)
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
drugs/fsj_drugs_intro_fr.htm
Salle de presse:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/
intro/news_intro_en.htm
Site internet du vice-président Barrot:
For more information on the activities of
Vice-President Barrot, please see:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_bar-
roso/barrot/index_en.htm
5
21.04.2009 15:39:07
 Security

Security in Europe – Prerequisite for our freedom

Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany
Last year the German edition of a book written by the British journalist Misha Glenny
was published. It’s title is “McMa¿a – A Journey Through the Global Criminal Under-
world”. Glenny describes here strikingly that organised crime is interconnected to a high
degree in today’s era of global communication and mobility. Contemporary terrorism is
likewise a global phenomenon. Both have become ‘limitless’, as the subtitle of Glenny’s
book suggests, and it has turned out to be impossible to combat them with classical
national methods only.

The vanishing of borders and interconnectedness not only create risks though, but
also chances. The coalescing Europe engenders new economic and political impulses.
Therefore especially the German-Czech and German-Polish border areas are pro¿ting
from the expansion of the Schengen Area. In times of the Iron Curtain, these areas
were the outskirts, today they are at the centre of events. The citizens living there ap-
preciate this in many cases. It is a tangible gain in freedom – not only for us, but also
for the people in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless the coalescence of Europe also confronts politics and security agencies
with new challenges. Especially Germany, with its numerous neighbours, is dependent permit a quick and faultless identi¿cation
on an Europe capable of acting. Therefore we are especially committed to the European in the case of the detention of a wanted
Idea. This also includes our participation in the creation of a European security network, person. The possibility to store the Euro-
for the citizens of Europe can only seize the chances stemming from more freedom, pean Arrest Warrant as an attachment to
openness and mobility if their security is not afÀicted. Freedom and security therefore a warrant and to link search warrants in
are not contrasts, but two sides to a coin. order to enable the tracing of, say, the con-
nection between a wanted person and a
Under these conditions we can only provide for security if we consistently internationalise lost car, are also important improvements.
and Europeanise the combating of cross-border crime and international networks of These improvements require a complex
terror. This calls for close police cooperation within Europe and beyond. In the complex technical infrastructure. The dif¿culties
world of the 21st century the political capacity to act depends increasingly on informa- arising during further development have
tion. We have to link existing information – for the sake of criminal prosecution but also to be overcome quickly.
for the sake of preventive defence against serious dangers. To achieve this we need a The operational police cooperation in the
modern shared police information network. Schengen Area has also increased, for
example, in cross-border observations and
Schengen: Exchange of information When the SIS was implemented, the idea man-hunts. Under speci¿c circumstances,
and operational cooperation of a small group of participants was still police of¿cers from neighbouring states
prevalent. Today the system is opera- can take action on German territory and
Part of the groundwork for police coopera- tional in 23 Schengen states. The recent vice versa. German police agencies are
tion in Europe was laid down in 1985 with enlargement round made it necessary to making use of these instruments. Accord-
the Schengen Agreement. The ¿rst signa- upgrade the system to the “SISone4ALL”. ing to ¿eld reports, there has been an
tories of the agreement, Germany, France, This allows the participating states to ac- average of 100 cross-border observations
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, cess about 27 million ¿les related to search and 10 man-hunts in the past years. This
had already realised that the success of warrants or stolen property. would have been unthinkable before the
further integration also depended on the Schengen Agreement.
active cooperation of the European states We can obtain vital information from this
in the pursuit of common aims in the area data. Whoever claims that the European Admittedly the further development of this
of internal security. Ministers of the Interior are obsessive operational cooperation has lost momen-
No other measure makes the improve- when it comes to collecting data has not tum. The corresponding arrangements
ment in police cooperation in Europe understood the following: the information in the implementation of the Schengen
more visible than the implementation of our police could access during national Agreement have remained nearly un-
the Schengen Information System (SIS). border controls in the past has to be ac- changed for almost 15 years now. The
This system is still unique worldwide in cessible in all of Europe today, since the proposal of the EU-Commission dated
its character. During the last year, 5,627 border controls have been moved to the 2005, which aimed to improve the exist-
persons for whom Germany had issued a external frontiers of the Union. Only under ing mechanisms, was removed from the
search warrant in the system were found these circumstances can we combine agenda after one year of negotiations due
abroad. Reciprocally, 6,294 persons freedom and security in a coalescing to elementary disagreements between the
wanted in other Schengen states were Europe. Member States, and has not been taken
found in Germany. Thus German criminals up again to date.
are no longer safe from discovery in the In order to meet the rising challenges, the Action has to be taken here. The most
rest of Europe. Equally, criminals wanted system is currently being upgraded to the recent police and judicial contracts that
abroad do not remain unmolested in our so-called SIS II. The essential updates EU Member States have negotiated, bi- or
country. This is a sizeable gain in security include the entry of photographs and ¿nger multilaterally, show that further improve-
for all citizens in the Schengen states. prints connected to search warrants, which ments are also possible on the operational
6 the new police in europe - 01/09

6 - 8 Schäuble_goe.indd 6 21.04.2009 15:42:18


level. Our aim has to be that criminals
will no longer remain unpunished due to
legal hindrances in the operational police
cooperation.
Protecting the external borders: Europe
is not becoming a fortress
Germany has done a lot in cooperation
with its European partners to make the
Schengen Area freer and more secure.
Already, effective protection starts at the
external borders of the European Union.
Given the open internal borders, we have
to identify illegal immigrants, criminals or
terror suspects preferably as soon as they
enter the European Union. Even though
the protection of the external borders is
the duty of the respective Member States,
the idea of European solidarity and our
common interest in safe external borders
call for the appropriate participation of all
Member States.
This is why cooperation with the Euro-
pean agency for external border security,
Frontex, and the border security agencies
of the Member States is so important.
Frontex went into service in October 2005
in Warsaw. The fundamental tasks of the
agency are the coordination of cooperation
between the border police of the Member
States for the protection of the external
borders of the EU, and the harmonisation
of the education and further training of the
border police agencies. The agency has
nearly 200 employees from the Member
States and a budget of 72 million Euros
at its disposal.
During the German Presidency of the Eu-
ropean Council we could achieve impor-
tant improvements in the work of Frontex.
This includes above all the passing of the
regulation on the creation of an immediate
response team for border security (Rapid
Border Intervention Teams) and the crea-
tion of a technical central register. At the
request of a Member State, Frontex can
now dispatch rapid intervention teams
if the requesting state is under special
pressure due to illegal migration and can-
not cope with the situation with its own
resources. The above-mentioned central
register lists all operating resources that
the Member States put at each others’
disposal for a given time to protect their
external borders.
With more than 100 ships as well as about
45 airplanes and helicopters, it is well
equipped and offers a solid basis for joint
operations. Germany will go on helping to
shape Frontex in the future and support it
with personnel and funds. Equally, bilateral
cooperation and networking with border
the new police in europe - 01/09
6 - 8 Schäuble_goe.indd 7
security agencies from non-EU countries
will continue to play a crucial role.
Some critics bemoan that Europe is being
entrenched like a fortress through these
border security measures. This perception
does not appreciate the real conditions.
In this era of broad global mobility, we
cannot allow fortresses to exist. There-
fore we have abolished border controls
in Europe. This considerable increase in
the freedom of movement in the Schengen
Area, however, makes it necessary that
we control the external borders of the EU
more thoroughly. We have to ensure that
we live up to our responsibility for labour
markets, stability and security in Europe.
Therefore we need to both combat illegal
migration and regulate legal migration.
Europol: Networking instead of a Euro-
pean super-agency
European police cooperation is taking
place through direct contacts between
several agencies. It leads to a common
use of resources and information. It is
mirrored in the rights that Member States
grant each other and it becomes tangible
in the access to common databases.
Likewise, it becomes manifest in com-
mon agencies such as the European
police agency Europol, with its seat in The
Hague, which began operations in 1999.
Information from all the Member States
converges there and is analysed for pos-
sible cross-border connections.
Data on criminal offences and criminals
provided by individual Member States for
the use of all Member States is stored
in the Europol Information System. This
makes connections visible between differ-
ent preliminary proceedings in individual
Member States. But ¿rst and foremost,
Europol can highlight connections be-
tween criminal offences through so-called
‘analysis ¿les’ and provide Member States
with operational and strategic papers.
With the Council decision on Europol,
which is due to be passed by the Council
of the Ministers of the Interior and Justice
as early as this year, Europol shall be
integrated into the legal framework of the
EU as of 1 January 2010. This primarily
includes an expansion of the European
police agencies’ competences. While
Europol could hitherto only take action if
the criminal offences in question implied
a criminal organisational structure, it can
in future become active against all forms
of serious crime that affect two or more
Member States.
In the ¿ght against terrorism Europol is
also contributing to the integration of in-
Security
formation. Nowadays, terrorists use the
internet as information point, communica-
tions platform, Open University and train-
ing camp all in one. Our security agencies
have to focus their resources if they want
to take action against this omnipresent
menace. For example, it does not make
much sense if experts from all 27 Member
States translate and analyse threats dis-
seminated via the internet from more or
less uncommon Arab dialects. We can and
must avoid needless duplicate activities
here. The project ‘check the web’ aims at
ensuring this by creating an information
portal at Europol where all Member States
can exchange their information. We have
to ¿nd similar forms of cooperation in com-
bating other forms of criminal activity, such
as the distribution of child pornography on
the internet. A more effective approach
would also be possible here if we were to
combine our forces.
Nevertheless, we should not believe that
at European level a central institution
alone can combat terrorism and organised
crime more effectively. It would not yield
the desired results to upgrade Europol to
a European FBI. What we need are bodies
that channel and merge national activities.
On this note, I regard a federally-organ-
ised European security system based on
the principle of subsidiarity as propitious.
European authorities should only be cre-
ated where the inclusion of a higher level
promises tangible advantages.
Prüm Agreement: A balance between
security and data privacy
The Prüm Agreement contributes much to
an increase in the effectiveness of police
cooperation. Cross-border police coop-
eration has reached a new level with this
agreement, signed in 2005 by Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands,
Luxemburg and Austria in Prüm/Eifel.
The agreement makes direct access to
the DNA and ¿nger print ¿les of the other
signatories possible, enabling every sig-
natory to check if the partner has stored
¿les in connection with a DNA sample or
a ¿nger print. At the same time, the agree-
ment implements an exemplary level of
data privacy that only allows the transfer
of sensitive personal data under strict
preconditions. Following the so-called ‘hit /
no hit’ procedure, only anonymised data is
transferred at ¿rst. Overall, the agreement
allows graded levels of access to the data,
depending on its sensitivity.
The Prüm Agreement is an appropriate
reaction to the fact that today crime takes
place in a cross-border environment much
7
21.04.2009 15:42:18
 Security
more often than 30 or 40 years ago. The
high number of matches impressively
demonstrates how effective the sharing
of information in criminal prosecution is.
Thus German agencies achieved 4,516
matches in the databases of the partner
countries by 6 January 2009 using the
automated matching of DNA samples.
Reciprocally, the matching procedures
of Prüm partner countries led to 5,055
matches in the German database.
Once the Prüm Agreement had proven its
value, it was implemented into the legal
framework of the European Union on
initiative of Germany. The implementation
procedure was characterised by a hitherto
unknown dynamism in European internal
politics. This again makes it clear to which
degree the agreement uni¿es the interests
of all partners for a good balance between
security and data privacy, and between the
will to cooperate and national interests.
Nevertheless, an information system can
only be of the quality as the information it
contains. It is important, therefore, how
many Member States participate in it. The
current association procedures with Ice-
land and Norway show that even non-EU
sates are interested in cooperation.
Swedish initiative: Simpli¿cation of the
exchange of information
The key to the successful prevention and
prosecution of criminal offences lies in
the availability of information. In an area
without domestic borders, the exchange of
information between security agencies has
to work as smoothly as on an intra-state
level. The Council’s framework decision
2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange
of information and intelligence between
the law enforcement authorities of the
Member States of the European Union,
dubbed ‘the Swedish Initiative’, has made
an important contribution in this matter. Its
national implementation in Germany has
advanced well.
This initiative establishes the principle
of equality in the exchange of police
information. It de¿nes that the request
for the transmission of information from
a European partner agency, in principle,
has to be treated equally to a request
from an intra-state agency. To put it in a
more technical way: the legal precondi-
tions for the transmission of information
to law enforcement agencies of other
Member States must not be stricter than
for the same procedure within a Member
State. The transmission will accelerate
signi¿cantly due to short time intervals
– 8 hours maximum in express requests
– and standardised forms. The use of up-
8 the new police in europe - 01/09
6 - 8 Schäuble_goe.indd 8
to-date information and communication
technologies will also play its part in this
acceleration.
Access to existing databases, Europe-
an Information Management Strategy
All in all, the Member States have coped
successfully with the new challenges
on the European level and have estab-
lished large IT-systems in order to satisfy
their statutory need for information. The
Schengen Information System has been
supporting the European information shar-
ing in prosecution for years now. During
the German Presidency of the Council
in 2007, a European visa information
system was established and made ac-
cessible to the security agencies of the
Member States and Europol. With it, we
can prevent and prosecute terrorist and
serious criminal acts more effectively.
Finally, Eurodac offers a platform for the
Europe-wide matching of ¿nger prints in
the area of migration.
We have to ensure that European data-
bases can be used even more ef¿ciently
by our security agencies. Precisely in the
case of Eurodac, there is still need for ac-
tion. The Eurodac ¿les can only be used
in cases related to asylum; their utilisation
for police work is still ruled out.
For example, as the investigations relating
to the supposed perpetrators of the terror
attacks in Madrid showed, the biometrical
data stored in Eurodac can in some cases
be the only source of information that al-
lows the identi¿cation of a suspect of a
terrorist act or other serious crime, and the
detection of connections to other Member
States. Therefore we need to be allowed
to also use Eurodac for the purposes of
police work.
This and other systems were initially
planned as individual projects. As a result,
independent and isolated applications
were created that cannot communicate
with each other since the data is stored
and processed in different formats. This
leads to the unsatisfactory situation that
employees of the agencies have to enter
the same information into the different
systems over and over again, usually
manually.
In the future, we should focus more on
coherence when we create new, or en-
hance existing databases. The sharing of
information can only be really successful
and ef¿cient if we harmonise the frame-
work. The systems have to become inter-
operable and have to interlock. Therefore
Germany is promoting the development
and maintenance of an Information Man-
agement Strategy in the European Union
for the security sector.
European Police Academy
Technology alone can never be more
than a useful tool. In the end, the results
in the successful combating of crime also
depend on the personnel, who need to be
trained in, and quali¿ed for international
cooperation.
In order to enhance cooperation between
the European training facilities, the Council
of the European Union decided in 2000
to establish a European Police Academy,
which has its secretariat in the British
city of Bramshill. With a Council decision
of September 2005, it was awarded the
status of an EU agency. For Germany, the
German University of the Police in Mün-
ster/Westfalen participates in the associa-
tion of the European Police Academy.
The Academy was created in order to
enhance the knowledge and skills of the
police of¿cers engaged in cross-border
cooperation. Furthermore, the European
Police Academy promotes a joint self-
understanding of police work in Europe
and works towards establishing common
norms. Its work will play an increasingly
important role in police cooperation in the
future. Through participation on courses
and events, a European network of execu-
tive police of¿cers is scheduled to emerge,
step by step.
Conclusion
The Member States of the European Un-
ion are nowadays partners in a common
area of security and freedom. Without
the manifold forms of police cooperation
in Europe outlined above, this freedom
cannot be reliably protected. After all,
cross-border criminals and networks of
terror are also searching for new ways to
pursue their aims in this era of mobility and
global communication.
If we work steadily on developing this
cooperation, channel our information and
make it accessible to each other, we will
be able to keep up with the security chal-
lenges of the future. The citizens of the
European Union support this commitment
by a large majority. Herein lies a chance,
not only for the internal security of our
countries, but also for the future of the
European Integration Process. It is the
will of all persons in charge to maintain
and strengthen the trust of the citizens in
the European Institutions through a deter-
mined and measured security policy.
21.04.2009 15:42:19
 security and defence

Making Common Cause - The European Parliament's 2009 Annual

Report on the European Security and Defence Policy
Dr. Karl von Wogau, MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the
European Parliament
Since the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, 22 missions have been
carried out within the framework of the ESDP, including 16 civilian missions and six
military operations. This fact not only shows the importance of the civilian components
of the ESDP, it also shows why the European Parliament plays an important role in the
context of ESDP: The civilian missions are ¿nanced from the European budget and
therefore under the control of the European Parliament. In addition to that, there are ¿ve
billion Euros earmarked in the European budget for security related projects such as the
satellite navigation system Galileo (which should be available for ESDP missions and
operations), the Kopernikus-GMES-System and Security Research.
Last year we had the ¿rst European legislation on defence matters, with two directives on
defence procurement adopted in co-decision by the European Parliament and the Council.
The European Parliament is determined to make use of this inÀuence to foster a more
common and coherent approach to security and defence.

Annual Report on European Security
and Defence Policy
The European Parliament’s 2009 Annual
Report on the European Security and
Defence Policy, which I prepared and
which was adopted on February 19, 2009
by a large majority (482 yes; 111 no),
stresses that the European Union needs
to develop its strategic autonomy through
a strong and effective foreign, security and
defence policy, in order to promote peace
and international security, to defend its
interests in the world, to protect the security
of its own citizens, to contribute to effective
multilateralism and to advance respect for
human rights and democratic values. The
European Parliament emphasises in its
resolution that the European Security and
Defence Policy should be based on our
common European Security interests. All
too often, thinking in the Member States
remains con¿ned within the framework of
national security interests, and the common
responsibility for protecting common
European interests is thus neglected.
The Parliament considers it necessary,
therefore, to de¿ne the European Union’s
common security interests. Only if it has
a clear idea of its common interests can
the Union make its common policy more
coherent and effective. The European
Parliament considers that the security
interests of the Union include the protection
of its citizens and its interests both inside
the European Union and abroad, the
security of its hinterland and the protection
of its external borders and critical
infrastructure, as well as the improvement
of its cyber security, the security of energy
supplies and sea routes, the protection of
its space assets and protection against
the consequences of climate change. But
we have not only to de¿ne our European
security interests. The European Union
must also more clearly de¿ne its ambitions
concerning its role in the world. The
European Parliament clearly stated in
its report that it is of the opinion that the
European Union should not try to become a
superpower like the United States, but that
it should instead guarantee its security and
security in its immediate surroundings.
Problems of inef¿ciency and lacking
means
In any case, the European Union has
to have the means to implement its
policies. Most of these challenges are
not simply military, and cannot be met by
military, or non-military, means alone. The
European Security and Defence Policy
has to combine the use of both civilian
and military assets and capabilities, and it
requires close and seamless cooperation
between all stakeholders. Today, our
ability to act is often limited by the absence
of key capabilities. It was dif¿cult, for
example, quite to ¿nd three helicopters
for the operation in Chad. Together the
Member States of the European Union
spend more than EUR 200 billion per year
on defence, which is more than half the
defence expenditure of the United States.
The European Parliament has repeatedly
expressed its concern about the lack of
ef¿ciency and coordination in the utilisation
of European defence budgets. This
inef¿ciency is partly due to the fact that we
do not have a common European defence
and security market. Borders between the
Member States, which were abolished in
1992, still exist in the ¿eld of defence.
The European Parliament strongly supports
the creation of a European defence and
security market. We have therefore
adopted, in codecision with the Council,
two directives on public procurement and
intra-Community transfers, and we suggest
further initiatives to achieve this objective,
in particular in the areas of security of
supply and security of information.
The current absence of a common
European defence and security market
has led to much unnecessary duplication
of procurement programmes and to many
unnecessary costs. Common operations
like Kosovo and Chad become more costly
by the fact that parallel chains of supply
have to be organised due to the different
equipment.
It is often said that duplications between
the European Union and NATO have to be
avoided. This is certainly true. However, I
must point to the fact that the duplications
between the Member States are the main
problem on our way towards improving
our capabilities, and that we must improve
our ability to spend better together. The
increasingly expensive development of
new military or security technology has
already stimulated strong moves towards
integration. Despite this, there is still much
room for greater ef¿ciency.
European security in space
An example for this is space. The European
Parliament has repeatedly stressed the
importance of the space dimension for
the security of the European Union, and
the need for a common approach in
defending European interests in space.
We need space assets to make sure
that the political and diplomatic activities
of the European Union can be based
on independent, reliable and complete
information in support of its policies for
conÀict prevention, crisis management
operations and global security, in particular
the monitoring of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their
means of transportation, the veri¿cation
of international treaties, the transnational

the new police in europe - 01/09 9

9 - 11 Wogau_goe.indd 9 21.04.2009 15:44:47

 security and defence
smuggling of light weapons and small
arms, the protection of critical infrastructure
and of the European Union’s borders, and
civil protection in the event of natural and
man-made disasters and crises.
The Parliament therefore encouraged the
Member States of the European Union,
the European Space Agency and the
various stakeholders to make greater and
better use of the existing national and
multinational space systems and to foster
their complementarity.
Up to now we have three parallel national
systems of satellite-based intelligence
with different strengths and weaknesses.
For humanitarian missions, natural
disasters, the surveillance of our external
borders and for ESDP missions, we have
a common need for real-time images,
independent of weather and time of day.
It is a big step forward that the satellite
imagery from these national systems will
be made available for ESDP operations
via the European Union Satellite Centre in
Torrejón, and the MUSIS project will lead
to more cooperation in this ¿eld.
In its report adopted on 19 February
2009, the European Parliament also
stresses the necessity to allow the use of
Galileo and GMES for autonomous ESDP
operations, for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, for Europe’s own security
and for the Union’s strategic autonomy. I
think we should also consider the creation
of a European space surveillance system
leading to space-situational awareness
(including, for example, GRAVES
and TIRA) so as to monitor the space
infrastructure, space debris and, possibly,
other threats. The European Parliament
clearly advocates the possibility of
funding future European satellite systems
supporting ESDP operations from the EU
budget (EP report on Space and Security,
10 July 2008).
Bene¿ting from synergies
We have to make greater efforts to eliminate
unnecessary duplication between Member
States, namely, through specialisation,
the pooling and sharing of existing
capabilities, and the joint development of
new ones. Therefore, the Member States
should take full advantage of the potential
of the European Defence Agency. Less
unnecessary duplications among Member
States of the European Union and more
ef¿cient European defence spending can
only strengthen NATO and help bring
about a fairer burden sharing between the
Allies.
Capability needs are often technologically
very similar or even identical for armed
forces operations, border surveillance,
protection of critical infrastructure and
10
9 - 11 Wogau_goe.indd 10
disaster management. This creates new
opportunities to exploit synergies and
enhance interoperability between armed
forces and police. The European Union
and its Member States should focus
their efforts on common capabilities,
which can be used for both defence
and security purposes. In this context,
unmanned air vehicles, helicopters and
telecommunications equipment and air
and sea transport are crucial.
In the ¿eld of command and control we
face the same problem of unnecessary
duplications and incompatible equipment.
We need a common basic standard for
the communications systems of military,
police and disaster-control services.
At present, we have ¿ve national
telecommunications systems for running
multinational operations. A common
system would be less costly, more ef¿cient
and less risky for the personnel running
these operations. We therefore need a
common technical standard for protected
telecommunications.
The European Parliament therefore
supports the cooperative development
of Software-De¿ned Radio (SDR) by the
Commission and the European Defence
Agency. SDR will contribute to better
interoperability of telecommunications
systems.
I also welcome the decision taken by
the Steering Board of the EDA on 10
November 2008 on the establishment of
a European Air Transport Fleet and the
Declaration of Intent on participation in this
initiative, signed by the Defence Ministers
of twelve EU Member States.
The European Union should continue to
build its capabilities on the basis of the
civilian and military headline goals and
should endeavour to make a force of
60 000 soldiers permanently available.
The European Parliament reaf¿rmed its
proposal that the Eurocorps should be the
core of this force, if necessary, reinforced
by additional maritime and air capacities.
The Parliament therefore welcomed the
agreement concluded between Germany
and France on maintaining the Franco-
German Brigade at joint locations.
The future of Europe’s Security and
Defence Policy
The European Parliament also welcomed
the Council’s commitment to the idea that in
the years ahead, and within the framework
of the level of ambition established,
Europe should actually be capable, inter
alia, of deploying 60 000 men in 60 days
for a major operation, within the range of
operations envisaged within the headline
goal for 2010 and, within the civilian
headline goal for 2010, of simultaneously
planning and conducting:
• two major stabilisation and reconstruc-
tion operations, with a suitable civilian
component, supported by a maximum
of 10 000 men for at least two years;
• two rapid response operations of limited
duration using, inter alia, the EU’s Batt-
legroups;
• an emergency operation for the evacu-
ation of European nationals;
• a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction
mission;
• a civilian-military humanitarian assis-
tance operation lasting up to 90 days;
• around a dozen ESDP civilian missions
(including, inter alia, police, rule of law,
civil administration, civil protection,
security sector reform and observation
missions) of varying formats, operating,
inter alia, in a rapid-reaction situation,
including a major mission (potentially
involving up to 3 000 experts) which
could last several years.
The realisation of these ambitious plans
will make it necessary to strengthen the
capacity at European level to undertake
strategic planning and conduct ESDP
operations and missions. The European
Parliament therefore urges the setting
up of an autonomous and permanent
EU Operational Headquarters and the
establishment of an integrated civilian and
military strategic planning structure for
ESDP operations and missions.
But the further development of the
European Security and Defence Policy is
not only a question of technical capabilities
and of headline goals.
It is also important to foster the development
of a common European security and
defence culture. The European Union
is characterised by a large diversity of
historically-rooted defence and security
traditions. The defence policies of the
27 Member States are still displaying
substantial differences, in areas such as
strategic planning, transformation doctrine,
equipment or leadership style.
There are more factors uniting than
dividing us. Europe shares a common
set of European values. Europe stands
for a security policy which is based on
values, is not restricted to the military,
is dedicated to the respect and further
development of international law and to
effective multilateralism. These common
convictions provide a good common
base for the development of a common
European security and defence culture.
But experience has shown that we have
still a lot to do in order to overcome the
differences which divide us. The European
Parliament considers it particularly
important therefore to strengthen the
European Security and Defence College
the new police in europe - 01/09
21.04.2009 15:44:47

and to transform it into a permanent
structure. This College can contribute to
the development of a speci¿cally European
security culture. We also urge the
Commission to continue funding common
training activities at European level in the
¿eld of civilian crisis management.
Experience has shown that we have to
take a closer look at the social situation
of personnel who are to be deployed
and work together in civilian and military
operations. We need further initiatives
concerning common training and common
standards for personnel, increased
interaction between the armed forces and
the civilian personnel of Member States,
coordination of crisis-related training,
exchange programmes among armed
forces in Europe and the opening-up of
armies to citizens of other Member States.
Belgium has already opened its Armed
Forces to citizens of all Member States.
Next steps and conclusion
The European Parliament’s 2009 Annual
Report on the European Security and
Ensuring that crime “does not pay”: Commission proposes ten strategic
priorities on con¿scation and recovery of criminal proceeds
The Commission intends to strengthen efforts to hit criminals where it hurts most: de-
priving them of the assets they acquired through crime. The large majority of organised
crime activities have a ¿nancial motive. Even in the absence of reliable statistics, today
the amounts recovered from organized crime remain modest compared to the pro¿ts of
organised crime.
Vice-President Jacques Barrot, EU Com-
missioner responsible for Justice, Freedom
and Security, stated:
“We need to hit criminals where it hurts
them most. The con¿scation of the pro-
ceeds of crime is one of the most effec-
tive means to tackle organised crime and
therefore one of the cornerstones of the EU
wide anti-crime
strategy. Criminals and their illegal pro¿ts
move effortlessly across borders, that’s
why there is added value in action at EU
level. “
The new Communication calls for swift
action – to take some examples: Member
States need to ensure that effective Asset
Recovery Of¿ces are up and running in
each of the 27 EU Member States as a
matter of priority. Such Of¿ces facilitate
the new police in europe - 01/09
9 - 11 Wogau_goe.indd 11
Defence Policy which was adopted on 19
February 2009 also approves the further
development of cooperation between
national armed forces so that they
become increasingly synchronised. We
propose that this process and the armed
forces should be given the name “SAFE”
– Synchronised Armed Forces Europe.
SAFE would provide suf¿cient room for
manoeuvre for neutral Member States as
well as those bound by military alliances, for
those which already work closely together
and for those which are still reluctant to
do so. We proposes an opt-in model for
the organisation of SAFE based on more
intensive voluntary synchronisation.
A European statute for soldiers within
the framework of SAFE should govern
training standards, operational doctrine
and freedom of operational action, issues
relating to duties and rights, as well as the
level of equipment quality, medical care
and social security arrangements in the
event of death, injury or incapacity.
In its resolution adopted on 19 February
2009, the European Parliament calls
for the elaboration of a European White
Decisions of the EU
the tracing of criminal assets, participate in
con¿scation procedures and ensure the
proper management of seized assets.
Member States should also ensure that
cross border exchange of information is
done smoothly and remove other existing
obstacles to con¿scation procedures.
EUROPOL could ensure regular contacts
between Asset Recovery Of¿ces operating
in Member States. EUROJUST should be
increasingly involved in facilitating coop-
eration on freezing and con¿scation at the
level of magistrates. A common EU training
programme for ¿nancial investigators will
be established.
Better European statistics on freezing, con-
¿scating and recovering assets are needed.
Finally, improving information sharing with
asset recovery of¿ces in third countries
is another priority. These actions can be
security and defence
Book on Security and Defence as a tool
to be used to initiate a wide-ranging public
debate and to ensure that the European
Security Strategy is implemented in an
ef¿cient way. In my opinion, this White
Book should concentrate on two main
areas: capabilities and the social situation
of civilian and military personnel in
European missions and operations.
This White Book should be compiled in an
open and transparent way. The compilation
design of the French White Book could
therefore serve as an example.
Transparency and parliamentary accoun-
tability are crucial in order to ensure public
support for European defence. In this
connection, it is of particular importance to
ensure effective parliamentary scrutiny of
the ESDP in the form of close cooperation
between the European Parliament and the
parliaments of Member States. Most of the
threats to security facing us today have
one thing in common: No single state can
tackle them effectively on its own. This
is why we have work together towards a
common Security and Defence Policy for
the European Union.
complemented by a future streamlining and
updating of the existing EU legislation.
Vice President Barrot, welcoming the Com-
munication and its ten strategic actions
pointed out that
“It is necessary to think outside the box
combining both legislative and operational
measures for the rapid identi¿cation, trac-
ing and recovery of assets acquired by
criminals. They operate across borders,
even at a global level, and increasingly
acquire assets in other countries. For that
reason we urgently need an appropriate
European response. Effective national
agencies charged with tracing assets are
of key importance for successful con¿sca-
tion. But they cannot do the job unless we
help them to work together. Crime should
not be a pro¿table business !”.
For more information on the activities of
Vice-President Barrot, please see:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_bar-
roso/barrot/index_en.htm
11
21.04.2009 15:44:47
 ROLA - rsCASE®

Standardisation – Interoperability are not just catch phrases

Handling cases as a network – rsCASE® promotes cooperation

Police authority investigators and detectives are confronted on a daily basis with the challenge of collecting and assessing a wealth
of information from heterogeneous sources in the shortest possible time, comparing it with existing information, and analyzing,
communicating or presenting it to others so as to provide a secure basis for further investigation and decision-making.

Areas of Crime
The IT system rsCASE, which was developed by rola Security Solu-
tions in Oberhausen, Germany, is repeatedly used to support the
police’s handling of criminal cases whenever large and complex
criminal phenomena have to be examined and analysed, as in the ¿ght
against terrorism, in crimes related to traf¿cking and capital offences,
in organised or white-collar crime, to mention just a few examples, but
also in handling special cases, such as hostage taking or attacks.

Areas of Use
The software is meantime used in Germany by 10 federal stages,
the Federal Of¿ce of Criminal Investigation and the Federal Police,
meaning by about 20,000 people in the police authorities.
Other security areas also see considerable advantages in it for their
particular purposes:
the system has been greatly welcomed by military organisations for
drawing up situation reports. Here there is potential for synergy, when,
for example, different operational units cooperate on international
deployment and both an overall image of the threat posed by the
deployment site has to be made (Who are the warlords in Kabul?) and the investigations have to be undertaken locally (Where
do the detonators used in an attack on a police convoy come from?).

The rsCase solution also supports investigations into white-collar and tax crime, from VAT carousel to money laundering.

Standardisation
rsCASE has already become a de-facto standard in different security areas. In Germany, the users in the police sector have
set up the informal interest group known as “IG Fall und Analyse” – a joint venture of all federal states using rsCASE. This has
given rise to synergies and provided impulses for further developments: these members of that IG agreed on a core data model
and standardised interface, expert concepts and software demands, as well as on data exchange possibilities and much more.
As a result, a pan-German standard has been created, albeit without overriding the historical, political and legal measures of
the federal structures, for each individual state police force can also put forward its own speci¿c requirements.
This is an essential prerequisite for the international implementation of rsCASE. An example of the system’s capacity to be
used jointly is the BAO Bosporus (also known as Soko Cesca) in which 160 police of¿cials from ¿ve federal states and a group
from the Federal Of¿ce of Criminal Investigation are jointly investigating a series of murders throughout Germany committed
against foreign nationals.

Interoperability
Furthermore, one of the essential strengths of the rsCASE system is its interoperability: its capacity to communicate with dif-
ferent systems of information acquisition, information collation and dissemination, and information assessment and processing
– towards a trans-state exchange of data.

Outlook
In times of global criminal structures, the ¿ght against crime cannot be restricted to within the borders of one state – here too
standardisation and interoperability are urgently required for cooperation across national borders. First indicators already exist:
in the ¿ght against traf¿cking, for example, it is of great advantage for the German Federal Police and the state of Mecklenburg
Eastern Pomerania that the Polish border patrol has been working with rsCASE for several years. rsCASE is a multi-lingual
system and is meantime being used successfully in six European countries; in other states (also outside Europe) preparations
are in progress for its introduction.

For more information see: www.rola.com

12 the new police in europe - 01/09

12 Anzeige Rola_goe.indd 12 21.04.2009 15:46:54

 Frontex

Safe borders for Europe

Frontex
Border Authorities in Europe are being challenged nowadays as never before. This is due sesses threats, looks at vulnerabilities,
mainly to the new political, social, economic and security-related phenomena now facing and weighs consequences. The Agency
Europe. These include a growth in migration, increased international travel, international has to balance and prioritise the available
trade and heightened demands for more security, especially after September 11. Hundreds resources against risks so that it can ensure
of millions of people are travelling around the globe. Geopolitical instabilities in poor regions, the right amount of protection for Member
religious and ethnic conÀicts are increasing in number and scale. The external borders of States; both under-protection and over-
the European Union are crossed by more than 300 million travellers each year, and the protection must be avoided.
trend is increasing. The border security concept has been developed in recent years. It All Frontex operations are intelligence-
is much broader than before and covers different tasks, not necessarily being performed driven. The Agency analyses trends and
by border guards. patterns in illegal migration and other cross-
The 2005 London bombings have shown that focusing on the border itself while assessing border criminal activities, including traf¿ck-
possible threats is not enough. Modern people think globally today and so do criminals and ing in human beings, at the external borders
terrorists. The new situation forced politicians and law enforcement practitioners to change of the EU. The Agency also monitors the
the approach towards security. In December 2006, while accepting the new Integrated Border global security environment, especially
Management concept, the Council made it clear that improving Member States’ readiness to those political, economical, social, tech-
deal with the challenges at hand requires new thinking, innovation, and collaboration. Key to nological, legal and environmental factors
meeting these challenges was and still is the coordination of inter-agency cooperation and which could drive illegal migration and af-
international cooperation. It was precisely to address this challenge that Frontex, a new EU fect border management as such. Its main
Agency, was set up in 2005 as a specialised and independent body tasked to coordinate tasks are to identify key threats and risks
the operational cooperation between Member States in the ¿eld of border security. to EU border security, point to the need for
joint operations and select areas where ca-
What does Frontex stand for? as the type of their expertise. Apart from pabilities could be built by providing border
border guards conducting patrolling, these guard authorities with appropriate training
Frontex focuses on six principal areas can involve experts in detection of forged or adequate technologies.
which are de¿ned in the Frontex regulation: documents or stolen cars, debriefers or Frontex bases its analysis on a large va-
Frontex provides help in the ‘coordination of translators. The operational plan also speci- riety of sources: information provided by
operational cooperation between Member ¿es the number and details of the technical Member States’ Border Authorities and
Sates in the ¿eld of management of exter- equipment necessary to perform an opera- other EU bodies (such as the European
nal borders’. It strengthens border security tion, which varies according to whether it Commission, Europol and Eurostat), but
by ensuring the coordination of Member takes place at an airport, along a land also by third country partners and inter-
States’ actions in the implementation of border or at sea. It must be stressed that national organizations. In the course of its
Community measures relating to the man- Frontex itself does not possess technical work it also uses ‘open sources’ - academic
agement of the external borders. To ful¿l assets for border control: these are made publications and information provided by
this task, Frontex is seeking to introduce available by the individual Member States watchdog organisations and mass media
system solutions allowing better allocation on a voluntary basis. Such equipment is throughout the world.
of Member States’ resources. Joint opera- listed in the Centralised Records of Avail- Frontex ‘provides assistance to the Member
tions are planned in advance and based able Technical Equipment (CRATE) which States in the training of national border
on the results of risk analysis provided the Member States make available for the guards, including the establishment of
by Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. When the needs of a Joint Operation upon the request common training standards’. The Agency
need for a joint operation is pointed out of Frontex for a limited period of time. contributes to the improvement of the
on a speci¿c border, an operational plan professionalism of Member States’ border
is devised. Frontex activities guards, thus enabling the Integrated Border
The operational plan de¿nes such elements Management system to function better.
as rules of engagement, the number of At the heart of all the Agency’s activities A well-functioning Integrated Border Man-
border guards who must be involved as well is carrying out risk analysis. Frontex as- agement System and participation in Joint
Operations coordinated by Frontex require
that all European border guards ‘speak the
Integrated Border Management is a concept consisting of the following dimen- same language’ – not just literally, but that
sions: they share the same professional knowl-
• border control (checks and surveillance) as de¿ned in the Schengen Borders edge and best practices. The similarity of
Code, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence; daily challenges faced by the border guards
• detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with all com- working at land, sea and air borders in all
petent law enforcement authorities; EU countries - illegal immigration, human
• the four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation traf¿cking, use of forged documents, stolen
with neighbouring countries, border control, control measures within the area vehicles and many others - created the
of free movement, including return); need for common training curricula.
• inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs,
police, national security and other relevant authorities) and international coo- The Frontex Training Unit aims at improv-
peration; ing the professionalism of border guards
• coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and Institutions of the Member States by making them
and other bodies of the Community and the Union. use similar methods, applying the same
standards and undergoing common training

the new police in europe - 01/09 13

13 -15 Frontex_goe.indd 13 21.04.2009 15:49:40

 Frontex
to achieve a functioning ‘interoperability’
which is essential for effective cooperation.
Together with experts from the Member
States, it designed the Common Core Cur-
riculum, coordinates its implementation and
compiles best practices. Frontex has also
created a network of national border-guard
training facilities and established a network
of 10 Partnership Academies throughout
the EU.
By ‘following the development of research
relevant for the control and surveillance of
external borders’, Frontex strengthens the
border-control capabilities of the Member
States’ border guard institutions. It keeps
them informed about the latest technolo-
gies available and ensures that the speci¿c
interests of border guard authorities are
properly taken into account in security
research.
The main task of Frontex in the area of
Research and Development is to follow
developments in research relevant to the
control and surveillance of external borders,
and to disseminate this information to the
European Commission and the Member
States. Frontex constitutes a link between
the research community, the end-users
within the European Commission and
the Member States. It also assesses the
need for further research related to border
security and plays an important role in de-
veloping the research programmes of the
European Union.
The ¿elds of interest of the Research and
Development Unit are broad and include
land and maritime surveillance, detection
systems, biometrics and electronic ID docu-
ments as well as systems for command,
control, communications, computers and
intelligence.
The Agency is actively involved in the se-
curity research section of the Framework
Programme for Research and Techno-
14
13 -15 Frontex_goe.indd 14
logical Development. By participating in
the European Security Research and In-
novation Forum (ESRIF) and in the evalu-
ation of research proposals submitted to
the Framework Programme, Frontex has
an opportunity to inÀuence European re-
search and respond to the needs of border
authorities.
Assistance to Member States
Another task of Frontex is to provide ‘assist-
ance to Member States in circumstances
requiring increased technical and opera-
tional assistance at external borders’. To
be able to respond to unexpected situations
of heightened tension which may arise at
the external borders of the EU, Frontex
has set up pre-structured rapid intervention
packages. These include both experts and
technical assets that can be deployed at
short notice to provide immediate assist-
ance to those Member States which may
need additional assistance. Since it is not
always possible to foresee every possible
crisis that may occur at the EU’s external
borders, operations planned in advance
may not always address every need. Fron-
tex therefore also coordinates operational
cooperation in unexpected situations that
may arise at the external borders of the Eu-
ropean Union. Frontex manages resources
that can be deployed at short notice to as-
sist a Member State which may ¿nd itself
in such a situation.
The Pooled Resources Unit manages
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs)
– more than 600 highly specialised border
guards from all Schengen Associated
Countries - who are available for deploy-
ment in case of such urgent and excep-
tional situations. While their deployment
has not been necessary so far, RABITs
undergo consistent training and participate
in regular exercises based on realistic sce-
narios in order to stand ready to respond to
a possible crisis.
‘Providing Member States with the neces-
sary support in organising joint return op-
erations’ is the last main area of Frontex’s
responsibilities. The role of the Agency in
joint returns is limited to providing assist-
ance to the EU Member States to organise
joint return operations. Frontex, together
with experts from Member States, also
works on the identi¿cation of best practices
in the acquisition of travel documents and
the removal of illegal third country nation-
als.
The external borders in 2008
In 2008 the Member States reported a total
of some 175,000 detections of illegal bor-
der crossing of the external sea and land
borders of the EU. This represents a 20%
the new police in europe - 01/09
21.04.2009 15:49:46

increase compared to 2007. Most of the
increase was due to higher detections in
Italy and Greece. Although slightly higher at
sea borders, the detections of illegal border
crossing was split almost equally between
the sea and land borders. However, while
at the sea borders the number of detec-
tions went up sharply (approx. 69%), land
border detections decreased slightly. As in
2007, detections at the Greek sea and land
borders with Turkey and the land border
with Albania accounted for almost 50% of
the EU total. Most detections at the sea
borders were reported by Italy (37,000),
mainly around the Island of Lampedusa. In
Greece, detections at the sea border along
the Turkish coast also doubled between
2007 and 2008, with the total reaching
29,100 illegal border crossings.
The land border section between Greece
and Albania recorded the largest single
share of illegal border crossings, with
38,600 detections, but, compared to 2007,
detections were down by 10%. It should be
noted that most illegal migrants detected
at this border section, mainly Albanian
nationals, are quickly returned to Albania
under a long-standing and effective police
co-operation agreement. However, despite
this good co-operation, migrants who have
been returned tend to rapidly again illegally
cross the border again illegally. Altogether
14,500 illegal border crossings were re-
ported at the Greek-Turkish land border.
Unlike at the Greek-Albanian land border,
illegal migrants are neither returned quickly
nor in large numbers. Compared to 2007,
detections of illegal border crossing have
decreased by 14% at this border section.
Detections of illegal border crossing at
the EU’s external border with Morocco in
Ceuta and Melilla ranked third among EU
land border sections, with 7,500 illegal
border crossings. Detections at the eastern
land borders totalled 6,200 illegal border
crossings.
In 2008, Member States issued a total of
some 140,000 refusals of entry at the exter-
nal borders of the EU (land around 60,000
and air some 65,000). This represents a
decrease of 11% compared to 2007. The
decrease is due to smaller numbers of re-
fusals of entry at the Polish–Ukrainian and
Polish-Belarusian land borders following a
drop in regular traf¿c due to the introduc-
tion of more stringent visa requirements
with the entry of Poland into the Schengen
area in December 2007. The total number
of refusals at the eastern land borders of
the EU came to 30,000. The border section
recording the largest numbers of refusals
of entry was the UK air border, with 17,600
refusals, followed by Spain with 13,600
refusals.
Detections of illegal stay offer some indica-
tion on ¿nal destinations and secondary
the new police in europe - 01/09
13 -15 Frontex_goe.indd 15
movement of illegal migrants in the EU.
Compared to 2007, Member States’ data
suggests that the number of persons detect-
ed staying illegally in the EU has increased
by about 15%. Ninety percent of the detec-
tions for illegal stay were reported in just
eight Member States. At the top, France
(81,200) and Spain (77,000) represented
40% of all detections, and recorded the
largest increase between 2007 and 2008. A
second group of Member States (Italy and
Greece) reported slightly less than 50,000
detections each. A third group (Portugal,
the UK, Belgium and Sweden) reported
illegal stays ranging between 20,000 and
30,000. Other Member States reported less
than 10,000 detections each.
For the ¿rst time in 2008, Frontex also col-
lected information on traf¿cking in human
beings. More than 10,000 victims of traf-
¿cking were reported over the year 2007
by 22 Member States. Germany (3,345)
and Romania (2,492) reported the highest
number of victims of traf¿cking, followed by
Spain (1,490) and France (1,002). A total
of 4,565 identi¿ed facilitators of THB was
reported during 2007 by a total of 17 Mem-
ber States. Romania (1,509) and Germany
(1,282) reported the highest numbers, fol-
lowed by Italy (863) and Spain (691).
Conclusion
Frontex is constantly working on the im-
provement of analytical methods in order
to create an accurate, reliable picture of
the external borders. The Agency receives
eight categories of data from Member
States, covering illegal border crossings,
facilitators apprehended or numbers of
forged documents detected. But this is
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Frontex
only the tip of the iceberg. Apart from this
solid data, analysts need to study national
legislation, the political situation in transit
countries and countries of origin and many
other factors.
The big question for the analytical commu-
nity and law enforcement of¿cers remains
unchanged: How to assess dark ¿gures?
How many criminals avoid the detection
and investigation of cross-border crimes
they have committed? How many undis-
covered cases of labour exploitation do
we have in Europe? These are only some
of the questions that we are not able to
answer in a convincing way.
The EU border security system is not tightly
closed, which worries some people and
makes others happy. The EU needs to ¿nd
a proper balance between freedom of the
individual and security. While protecting
Fundamental Rights, we all should work
hard on closer cooperation and better
coordination.
The application of three elements, namely,
assessing threats and risks, managing
joint operations at the external borders
of Member States, and building intellec-
tual, operational and physical capacity, will
make it possible for Frontex to become the
corner stone of the European concept of
Integrated Border Management.
By providing EU border guards with spe-
cialised training, up-to-date knowledge of
the latest technologies, making them work
in joint operations and sharing real-time in-
formation about the latest modus operandi
used by criminals, Frontex aims to make
the EU’s borders not only more secure, but
also more traveller-friendly.
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15
21.04.2009 15:49:47
 Europol

The Business, Potential and Limitations of Europol

Max-Peter Ratzel, former director of Europol in collaboration with Diane Boles
is not by accident that the EU has named
an entire policy area as Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice. The inherent meaning of
this realm of policy-making incorporates
a number of areas of which law enforce-
ment is only one, but a very signi¿cant one
nonetheless. To deepen the understand-
ing of the broader goals used at strategic
level, it may be helpful to de¿ne the ideo-
logical terms which the EU uses5:

Freedom: the power or right to act, speak

or think freely; the state of being
free
Security: the state of being or feeling
secure
Justice: the administration of law ac-
cording to the principles of just
Europol HQ, The Hague
treatment

The establishment of Europol has been the single, most exciting development to take Taking these three principles as the basis
place in the EU law enforcement arena in recent years. From its humble beginnings in for a Europe which is a safe and prosper-
1994 as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), the concept of Europol is one which already had ous place to be, the concept of a crime-
its origins in the Treaty of Maastricht 1 and in TREVI 2 before that. The EDU began its free Europe is one which is inherent in the
activities in 1994 in The Hague, the Netherlands, based upon a ministerial agreement above de¿nitions. That is to say, in a bor-
signed by the 12 TREVI ministers in 1993. Since then, during the last decade and a half, derless Europe, freedom of movement and
Europol has evolved and progressed to become a signi¿cant player in the international citizens should not compromise security
law enforcement domain. and justice. European society is of course
multi-faceted, multi-cultural and encom-
Before the existence of Europol, there was no mutually agreed platform of communication passes the positive and negative aspects
for member states whereby the bene¿ts of a trans-national police information exchange of its myriad public. It is, however, the
ideal could be realised. The added complication of con¿dentiality and reluctance to share negative rather than the positive aspects
information within law enforcement arenas, emphasised the need for a workable solu- of a borderless Europe which present the
tion. This, combined with the language limitations of member states dealing with each conundrum of how to maintain peace and
other, meant that an organisation which would overcome language barriers was also security, whilst effectively targeting the
essential. The ensuing bene¿ts which could be gained from an organisation like Europol negative aspects of increased mobility
were becoming more and more evident and the European Union was ready and willing and opportunity. The upstanding citizens
to put its plan into action. of the European community currently en-
joy border-free and less restricted border
Since it became fully operational on 1 July 1999, following full rati¿cation of the Europol controls, but then again, so do the crimi-
Convention3 in 1998, Europol has gone from strength to strength. It has evolved from nals. It is facetious to say that the criminal
being a little-known player in policing to being to an internationally - recognised organisa- threats to European society - drugs, traf-
tion. Indeed, Europol is the ¿rst truly international law enforcement cooperative network ¿cking, terrorism, racism, fraud - will ever
in the European arena. disappear. Undeniably, in an ideal Europe
there would be no need for Europol, but
Freedom, Security, Justice European police of¿ce can also be traced in a less-than-ideal Europe, the need for
back to the seventies when the TREVI Europol is overwhelming.
Building an area of freedom, security and group was formed to exchange informa-
justice is one of the principal aims of the tion on terrorism and serious international Public Security - Terrorism
Treaty of Lisbon4 signed on 13 December crimes.
2007 and now undergoing a rati¿cation From the outset, the European Union has By far the most dominant catastrophic
process in the member states. It is the embodied shared commitment to common criminal event in recent times was what
propagation of these aims which fuels the values such as human rights, freedom of is now known as “9/11” or the terrorist at-
existence of Europol. Europe is a place movement, democracy and the rule of tack suffered by the United States in 2001.
of ongoing political, economic and social law. The European Union is dedicated Similarly, terrorist acts have taken place
change, which has expanded from an to de¿ning an area of peace, prosper- in Europe in the last 5 years, bringing this
original number of 6 member states to 27 ity and equality for its citizens. None of type of heinous crime to the forefront of
member states in 2007. The establishment these advantages exist without the mutual international concerns. However “9/11”
of the current border-free union is the re- obligation to support and cooperate with by virtue of its large number of casualties
sult of years of progress and policy- mak- EU policies which enhance the quality of - almost 3000 people6 - demonstrated the
ing - a process which for the EU, began life for the people of Europe. Peace and vulnerability of any nation in the face of
in the seventies. The innovative idea for a prosperity seem like elusive goals, and it determined terrorists. The organs of law

16 the new police in europe - 01/09

fertig 16 - 21 Ratzel_goe.indd 16 21.04.2009 15:54:47


The Road to Europol
07-02-1992 Treaty of Maastricht
03-01-1994 Europol Drugs Unit (EDU)
18-07-1995 Europol Convention agreed
01-10-1998 Europol Convention in force
01-07-1999 Europol took up full activities
enforcement and crime prevention sud-
denly seemed more important than ever,
as a nervous public looked to them to
relieve their anxiety. Whilst terrorism has
a more resounding impact on the public
mentality, other areas of crime are just as
damaging but perhaps less shocking due
to their covert nature. Therefore, although
Europol had already been in existence
for some time when “9/11” occurred, the
overwhelming need to react to such an
atrocity served to reinforce the European
Union´s wish to cooperate at all levels to
combat possible future threats to Europe.
Following the “9/11” attack, the European
Council held an extraordinary meeting on
21 September 2001 pledging solidarity
and cooperation with the United States.
Furthermore, it committed itself to enhanc-
ing police and judicial cooperation7 with
Europol as one of its main instruments for
doing this. Terrorism was on the agenda in
bigger and bolder letters than before and
ideally there was already an organisation
in place to assist in the ¿ght against ter-
rorism. Hence the pro¿le of Europol was
more visible in the public
arena than it had ever
been.
Organised Crime re-
porting
Although terrorism
seems to be an almost
daily occurrence in geo-
graphical areas outside
the EU, other crimes are
often more proli¿c and
damaging within the EU.
Despite terrorism being
a high priority, cooperat-
ing against the criminal
elements in Europe is
just as important. Other
types of crime, such as
organised crime, money
laundering, traf¿cking of
drugs and people, fraud
and ¿nancial crime, are
equally destructive to
society. Since organised
crime often encompass- European Criminal Intelligence Model (Graphic 3)
the new police in europe - 01/09
fertig 16 - 21 Ratzel_goe.indd 17
es elements of other major (international)
crime, the Council has always recognised
the huge threat that organised crime
presents for EU internal security. There-
fore action in this area was required and
all EU member states needed to be in
agreement about the approach. Given its
existing and previous mandates, Europol
was ideally placed at the centre of the EU
law enforcement arena to combat interna-
tional organised crime. The wheels were
in motion.
The concept of a report on organised
crime in Europe was one endorsed and
welcomed at EU level and was desig-
nated to provide a better understanding
of organised crime in EU member states.
Europol, in cooperation with the member
states, produced an annual report in
2004 and 2005 on organised crime but
the concept of intelligence-led policing
as embodied in the EU Architecture for
Internal Security meant that a change in
approach was needed. Therefore in 2006,
Europol produced the ¿rst organised crime
European Criminal
Intelligence Model
Intelligence generated
by investigations
is ‘recycled’
Led by intelligence,
PCTF subgroups task and
coordinate investigations
(COSPOL)
Analysis produces
- specific TA in priority areas
Police Chief Task Force - list of target profiles
- identification of top criminals
- defines enforcement
in priority areas
- implements them
Europol
threat assessment or OCTA. Instead of
reporting on crime which had already hap-
pened, the new position was to predict the
areas of threat and act accordingly. The
OCTA therefore was the ¿rst step to wards
changing how member states thought
and acted about crime prevention. It was
also the step required to link intelligence
policing to policy- making at EU level so
that concrete steps could be taken to ¿ght
crime in all EU member states.
Therefore in the Council Conclusions
of June 2007, having regard to the ¿rst
Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(OCTA) prepared by Europol in 2006,
the Council restated its conviction that
“the ¿ght against organised crime should
focus on reducing the threat and harm
caused by it, in particular in those coun-
tries with regional problems”8. Thereafter
the Council emphasized the international
nature of organised crime groups and how
they presented serious obstacles to law
enforcement because of their complex
nature.
Since international problems need in-
ternational solutions, it is evident that
Europol is ideally placed to achieve the
goals of ¿ghting crime in Europe. By its
own de¿nition, “Europol is the European
Law Enforcement Organisation which
aims at improving the effectiveness and
co-operation of the competent authorities
in the member states, in preventing and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug traf¿ck-
ing and other serious forms of international
organised crime. Its mission is to assist the
OCTA
Æ Intelligence Gaps
Æ data collection
Europol:
- EU central capacity
- stores and analyses data
17
21.04.2009 15:54:47
 Europol

law enforcement authorities of the member

states in their ¿ght against organised crime
and terrorism.”
Strategic Considerations
It is clear that the OCTA represented a
new departure in EU law enforcement.
With that in mind, the framework of refer-
ence for Europol remains the concept of
intelligence-led policing9 - the concept of
pro-active rather than reactive crime-¿ght-
ing. The way this works is in the form of
an intelligence cycle as outlined below in
Graph 3.
In a simpli¿ed approach we can see that
the threat assessment done by Europol
(OCTA), leads to political priorities being
set by the Council, which in turn imple-
ments those priorities using Europol, after
which the resulting evaluation is fed back
into the intelligence cycle. The focus of the
OCTA is a threat assessment of the current
and expected trends in organised crime
across the EU. However, it is foreseen at
EU level that assimilating reports such as
the OCTA should eventually be carried
out for other crime areas as well. Earlier
this year, the Council endorsed a further
initiative to develop the Russian Organised
Crime Threat Assessment and indicated
that Europol should develop a template
for an intelligence requirement in line with
the OCTA methodology10.
Whilst the focus of Europol is organised
crime in many forms, the events of “9/11”
also ensured a strong reaction against ter-
Mandate of Europol
Initial mandate
• Drugs
• Terrorism
• Forgery of Money
• Illegal Immigration
• Money laundering
• Trafficking in
ƒ human beings
ƒ stolen vehicles
ƒ nuclear and
radioactive materials
Mandate of Europol (Graphic 4)
If one reverts back to the ideal for Europe
to be an area of freedom, security and
justice for all its citizens, then it is pos-
sible to see how the vision of a European
law enforcement agency could slot into
this picture. Europol is in the position
of being able to implement the plans to
make Europe a better and safer place for
all its citizens. Europol is the European
law enforcement agency or as it is some-
times known, the European police of¿ce.
However the differences to a conventional
police force are sometimes the stumbling
block to understanding Europol. It is not
Europol Organisation Chart, 20 November 2008
Extended mandate
(since 2002)
• Environmental crime
• Economic crime
• Fraud
• Kidnapping
• Murder
• Arms trafficking
an identi¿able uniformed body of troops
which can be pointed at and praised or
criticised at will. To the general public, the
identifying marks usually associated with
police, are absent. On paper, Europol does
not have coercive powers, which means
that Europol staff cannot arrest persons,
seize drugs or do house searches. Nev-
ertheless, Europol is operational, since
Europol staff immediately goes to a crime
scene by invitation of the member states
or Third Partners.
Certainly, Europol would never describe
itself as a police force. Instead it is a far

rorism at EU level. The resulting strategic

action at Europol was to produce the EU Director (DIR)
Financial Controller (FC)

Terrorism & Situation Trend report (TE- Management Board

Secretariat (MBS)
SAT), a report giving an overview of the
security situation in the EU. Based on Department IMT Department SC Department CG
Information Management and Serious Crime Corporate Governance
initiatives taken by the Justice and Home Technology
Affairs Council in 2006, the TE-SAT was Deputy Director (IMT DD)
Assistant Director (IMT AD)
Deputy Director (SC DD)
Assistant Director (SC AD)
Deputy Director (CG DD)
Assistant Director (CG AD)
produced by Europol for the ¿rst time in
2007 and continues to be a point of refer- IMT CO SC CO
IMT Coordination Unit SC Coordination Unit CG 1 / CG SEC
ence for terrorism activities in EU member Directorate Support and
IMT 1 SC 1 CG Secretariat
states. Similar to the OCTA, this document ICT Infrastructure and Ops Organised Crime Groups
also provides evidence of trends in terror- IMT 2
SC 2 CG 2
ICT Architecture and
ism and where the focus of international Processes Drugs Legal Affairs
law enforcement should be concentrated. IMT 3 SC 3 CG 3
ICT Solutions Development Crimes against Persons Corporate Communications
(Both reports for the current and previous
IMT 4
years can be found on Europol’s website Information Management
SC 4 CG 4
Operations Financial and Property Crime Human Resources
www.europol.europa.eu.) IMT 5
SC 5 CG 5
Information Management
Coordination Terrorism Finance
Law enforcement agency at EU level IMT 6 SC 6 CG 6
Customer Liaison and Support Forgery of Money General Services
IMT 7
With reference to the above, producing Data Protection and
SC 7 CG 7
Analysis Security
reports is one thing and implementing Confidentiality

action is quite another. Implementing the

plans outlined in the EU Architecture for
Internal Security is a complex process. It
requires a strategy, expertise and person-
nel to see it through to fruition.
Member States’ Liaison Bureaux
Third States’ Liaison Bureaux
Europol Organisational Chart (Graphic 5)

18 the new police in europe - 01/09

fertig 16 - 21 Ratzel_goe.indd 18 21.04.2009 15:54:47


more diverse entity which combines the
best of policing with the best in innova-
tion, strategy and technology to enable the
¿nest platform possible for cooperation,
i.e., law enforcement cooperation in the
EU. Europol is not a supranational police
force, but “an international cooperative
network which supports the activities of
law enforcers in the EU member states
via the Europol National Units based in
the Europol of¿ce in The Hague, Nether-
lands.” 11 Although Europol is mandated by
the European Union and overseen by the
regulatory bodies of the EU, Europol is de-
pendent in its activities on the police forces
of the EU member states. Europol there-
fore embodies the idealism of cooperation
- it only exists because of cooperation by
the member states themselves and yet it
also exists purely to foster cooperation
between the member states.
What areas of crime does Europol focus
on?
Europol, when it functioned initially as the
EDU, focussed mainly on drug traf¿ck-
ing. An expanding Europe, however, had
greater needs in ¿ghting more types of
cross-border crime and thus progressively,
other areas of criminality were added to
Europol’s mandate. On 1 January 2002,
the mandate of Europol was extended to
deal with all serious forms of international
crime which are:
• illicit drug traf¿cking;
• illicit immigration networks;
• terrorism;
• forgery of money (counterfeiting of the
Euro) and other means of payment;
• traf¿cking in human beings (including
child pornography);
• illicit vehicle traf¿cking;
• money laundering.
The above categories are expounded upon
in the full text of the Annex12 referred to in
Article 2 (1) of the Europol Convention,
which after 2002 also included crimes
such as kidnapping, murder, environmental
crime, fraud, arms traf¿cking and economic
crime.
The Structure of Europol (Graphic 5)
Europol as an organisation is headed by the
Director of Europol – currently Max-Peter
Ratzel - and three Deputy Directors. The
Director and Deputy Directors of Europol
are appointed by the Council of the Euro-
pean Union, Ministers for Justice and Home
Affairs. Europol is politically accountable to
the Justice and Home Affairs Council via
the Europol Management Board which is
staffed by a representative of each Member
the new police in europe - 01/09
fertig 16 - 21 Ratzel_goe.indd 19
OPERATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Australia *
Canada *
Croatia *
Eurojust
Iceland *
Interpol *
Norway *
STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS
Albania
Bosnia Herzegovina
European Police College (CEPOL)
Colombia *
European Commission (EC)
European Central Bank (ECB)
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
AGREEMENTS IN PROGRESS
China
Israel
Liechtenstein
Monaco
Third Party Cooperation: Agreements in place (Graphic 6)
state. The Directorate and the Management
Board, meet a minimum of twice a year to
discuss matters of importance for the run-
ning of Europol. The additional positions of
Financial Controller and the Joint Supervi-
sory Body (JSB) complete the management
and control side of Europol.
The functional structure of Europol is
such that it consists of three well-de¿ned
areas: Corporate Governance, Information
Management & Technology, and Serious
Crime. Therefore personnel working at
Europol have different expertise, back-
grounds and employment situations. They
consist of law enforcement personnel,
technical and scienti¿c specialists and
administration and security personnel.
Whilst all of these organs are crucial to
the governance and running of Europol,
broadly speaking the latter area – Serious
Crime – is the one which most closely
de¿nes the operational nature of Europol.
The Serious Crime department employs
almost twice the number of staff as the
other two departments. The Serious Crime
department deals directly with operational
and analysis functions. To reiterate, the
Europol
Switzerland *
USA *
USA Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) *
US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) *
US Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) *
United States Secret Service (USSS) *
US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF) *
Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External
Borders of the Member states of the
European Union (Frontex)
Moldova
Russia
Situation Centre of the European Council
(SitCen)
Turkey
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC)
World Customs Organisation (WCO)
Montenegro
Serbia
Ukraine
*denotes having a Liaison office at Europol
core business of Europol is improving the
effectiveness and cooperation of the com-
petent authorities in the member states in
preventing and combating serious organ-
ised crime. In order to carry out this role,
the Serious Crime department consists of
a number of specialist units, each relat-
ing to the Europol mandated crime areas
as previously outlined. There are 7 such
units in the Serious Crime department at
Europol, which are:
SC1: Organised Crime (targeting (interna-
tional) organised criminal groups)
SC2: Drugs (combating production &
traf¿cking of illicit drugs)
SC3: Crimes against Persons (illegal
immigration, human traf¿cking,
child sexual exploitation)
SC4: Financial crime (money laundering,
VAT fraud) and property crime
(theft,- vehicle crime)
SC5: Terrorism (counter- terrorism and
counter-proliferation programmes,
analysis and the Terrorism & Situa-
tion Trend report TE-SAT)
SC6: Forgery of Money (euro counterfei-
ting and payment fraud)
19
21.04.2009 15:54:47
 Europol
SC7: Analysis (intelligence analysis and
training)
Within each unit are specialist of¿cers who
have expertise in a certain area. These of-
¿cers work on projects that are run within
Europol, or on support projects and opera-
tions being run in the member states.
Liaison Bureaux and exchange of in-
formation
The units described above function within
the Europol framework itself. But since
one of the principal functions of Europol
is to act as a facilitator for the exchange
of information between police forces, an-
other facet of this set-up involves actually
enabling the member states to cooperate
on this exchange process.
In order to carry out the essential function
of information exchange, a Liaison Bureau
for each member State has an of¿ce at
Europol (in addition to some liaison of-
fices for non-EU states and organisa-
tions with which Europol has cooperation
agreements). Since Europol principally
acts upon request of a Member State, it
makes sense that each member State has
an of¿ce at the Europol premises. In turn
the Liaison Bureaux communicate with a
Europol National Unit in their own member
state. Europol currently has 37 Liaison
Bureaux in operation in The Hague.
Through the use of the Europol Information
System (IS) and the InfoEx (Europol se-
cure information exchange tool), informa-
tion can Àow back and forth between Eu-
ropol and the member states as required
and in the language of the requester. The
IS is used to store personal information
about people who, under the national law
of a country, may have committed a crime
or may possibly commit a crime in the
future. The type of crime must fall within
Europol’s mandated areas in order for it
to be of interest. There are strict rules of
data protection governing the use of this
system because it contains personal in-
formation therefore strict data protection
compliance at Europol is overseen by the
Joint Supervisory Body. Since capturing
information is a crucial part of Europol’s
functions, use of the available information
systems is strongly encouraged back to
the member states.
Since Europol also has agreements with
non-EU member states and specialist
organisations, the charts hereunder high-
light the current agreements in place. An
important difference to note here is that in
principle, operational agreements provide
for the transmission of personal data,
20
fertig 16 - 21 Ratzel_goe.indd 20
while strategic agreements do not. In ad-
dition to its information systems, Europol
has Analysis Work Files (AWFs) which
store data on criminal offences for the
purpose of analysis. An AWF is therefore
a body of information directly available to
an analyst working on a particular case.
There could be, for example, an AWF for
tobacco fraud or for money laundering.
This ef¿cient structure therefore enables
intelligence to be collated and used for a
particular crime area. An AWF will only
exist, however, if it is a priority crime area
for a member state and thereby linked
to the OCTA. Ultimately, how successful
an AWF will be depends on the quality of
information therein.
Europol in Action
Given the above outline of how Europol
operates, it may be useful to demon-
strate the added value Europol can offer
to a national police force, when there
is a crime with international scope and
implications.
During an investigation called Operation
Koala in 2007, which involved child abuse
images on the internet and offenders in
countries both within and outside the EU,
Europol played a signi¿cant role in the
coordination and success of this opera-
tion. The original criminal information from
Australia was sent via Interpol to Belgium
and Europol. The material was then ana-
lysed and disseminated to the countries in
which internet customers were identi¿ed.
Eurojust and Europol, working in close
co-operation, then invited representatives
from 28 countries to several operational
meetings in The Hague. At Eurojust, the
OPERATION KOALA
Around 1000 users
identified
Iceland
More than 500 child
offenders under
investigation
United-Kingdom
Ireland
More than 100 “High
profile”
profile” offenders Portugal
Spain
arrested
More than 30 victims
identified
Belgian and Italian National Members
took the initiative to co-ordinate, on a
judicial level, all the countries involved.
Subsequent investigations were initiated
by the national authorities. This led to
a signi¿cant number of arrests and the
seizure of a considerable amount of child
abuse material.
The keys to the success of this operation
are the provision of valuable data by mem-
ber states and Interpol, long-term crime
analysis carried out by Europol specialists
dealing with online child sex abuse cases,
and the judicial co-ordination carried out
by Eurojust.
The Potential of Europol
Operation Koala illustrates the huge
potential of Europol to ¿ght crime across
national borders when the correct informa-
tion is exchanged, the right analysis is car-
ried out and the cooperation required for
success is practiced and endorsed by all
the concerned countries and jurisdictions.
In a case of this geographical magnitude,
the supporting analytical role of Europol,
the investigations of the countries involved
and the judicial powers of Eurojust com-
bined in a perfect way to put criminals
behind bars.
Since Europol’s potential to a large degree
hinges on its powers as determined by the
Convention, logically its potential is also
dictated therein. Since the Convention is
widely renowned as being cumbersome
and inÀexible, it has become necessary to
re-examine and change the legal structure
of Europol. Since Europol is advocating
Norway
Sweden
EUROPOL
Denmark
Latvi
a
Netherlands
Poland
Belgium
Ukraine
France
Switzerland Austria
croatia
Italy
Greece
Australia
the new police in europe - 01/09
21.04.2009 15:54:57

intelligence-led policing, it is inherent in
that expectation that the demands of the
criminal environment should also require
Europol to change IN RESPONSE to that.
If this were possible, Europol could be-
come even more effective at ¿ghting crime
by having the opportunity to adapt when
necessary and in the public interest.
Replacing of the Convention by a Council
decision will make changing priorities
easier and will also give the member
states more opportunity to inÀuence the
way Europol is run. For example, assist-
ing member states to catch serial killers or
rapists is currently not possible because
of the de¿nitions within the Convention.
The potential to react to such crimes
could become possible with a more Àex-
ible legal framework. It has been said that
re-de¿ning “organised crime” is also a way
towards expanding the potential for crimes
to be included under this heading. The es-
sential element to remember; however, is
the involvement of two or more member
states, making it a crime of international
rather than national concern.
At the practical level, cooperation and
ef¿ciency between EU bodies, member
states and Europol can be enhanced by
establishing a clear division of tasks and
responsibilities in the area of horizontal co-
operation. A holistic approach is required
to marry the needs of tackling organised
crime and terrorism and ensuring that the
tasks of various agencies such as Eu-
rojust, Frontex and the European Police
college, CEPOL, do not overlap, since
they are all to a greater or lesser degree
concerned with security in the EU.
At an operational level, Europol’s role
remains ¿rmly in the area of support. A
good example of this is on-the-spot sup-
port for national police forces carrying out
seizures, arrests or investigations. For ex-
ample the Europol Forgery of Money unit
has such sophisticated technical appara-
tus for forensic analysis and identifying
forged euro currency, that Europol of¿cers
are frequently requested to assist with
verifying criminal evidence. The forensic
experts at Europol are available to all EU
member states on request.
Limitations of Europol
Since the potential and the limitations of
Europol are interlinked, it is easy to see
how outside inÀuences can sometimes be
detrimental to the success of Europol’s
operations. Currently amendments to
the Convention require protocols which
in turn require rati¿cation by the member
states. Implementation of new protocols
the new police in europe - 01/09
fertig 16 - 21 Ratzel_goe.indd 21
can therefore take years. The Council
Decision to replace the Convention should
overcome this aspect of the current limita-
tions.
Concerning the use of the Information
System, lack of interoperability is the big-
gest obstruction to information sharing
between member states and Europol and
vice versa. According to Europol, results
in this area can only be achieved through
coordinated planning AT EU-level.
Information exchange is the reason for
Europol’s existence. However, according
to the UK House of Lords European Union
Committee report for 2007-200813, 80% of
information exchanged at Europol is done
directly via the Liaison of¿cers and not
placed on the Europol database, thereby
preventing it being accessible to anyone
other than those directly involved.
Another obstacle to information sharing
could be lack of con¿dence in the Europol
system, i.e., not being familiar enough
with Europol’s mechanisms to provide the
information necessary to further investiga-
tions. There still remains some reluctance
on the part of national police forces to
share sensitive information. One of the
major ways to overcome this is by Europol
not only reinforcing the argument of the
security of the information provided, but by
educating the member states on the huge
advantage of using Europol in this way.
Lack of awareness in the law enforcement
community is an area which can be rem-
edied through a focussed communication
strategy. Lack of trust is a more dif¿cult
issue to tackle and probably requires the
reassurances of national police forces to
their own members.
As explained earlier, there can be a
general misunderstanding in the public
view about Europol being an actual police
force in spite of the conspicuous lack of
one. Europol has no coercive powers
and continually strives to emphasise the
supportive nature of the work it carries
out, i.e., “to assist in improving the ef-
fectiveness and cooperation of the com-
petent authorities in the member states
in preventing and combating all forms
of serious international organised crime
and terrorism”. Given the opportunity
to speak to law enforcement authori-
ties throughout Europe, Europol always
promotes itself as a service provider and
a purveyor of expertise in areas comple-
mentary to national investigations. This
is a distinct advantage for the promotion
of intelligence-led policing, since the
services provided are in addition to the
expertise provided at national level.
Europol
Conclusion
Europol’s vision continues to be that it is
the EU centre of excellence for information
exchange, crime analysis and operational
support. It is Europol’s view that its own
potential can only be fully realised if the
national law enforcement authorities make
suf¿cient use of the tools, technologies
and expertise which Europol makes avail-
able to them.
Europol is a committed partner in building
a safer Europe – an area of justice, peace
and security for all.
1
Treaty of Maastricht, 07 February 1992
2
TREVI was a network of national of¿cials
from ministries of justice and the interior
from European countries to enhance
“mutual assistance in combating terrorism
within member states” ; The name TREVI
is thought to stand for either the Trevi
fountain in Rome where the ¿rst meeting
was held, or the French acronym for
Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et
Violence Internationale (Wikipedia)
3
Europol Convention based on Art.K3 of
the Treaty of the European Union & Coun-
cil Act of 26 July 1995 establishing a Euro-
pean Police Of¿ce known as Europol.
4
Treaty of Lisbon signed by Heads of State
or Government of the 27 member states;
target date for rati¿cation by member go-
vernments is 01 January 2009.
5
Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2008.
6
Source: Wikipedia, 2974 people died
in the attacks, 24 are missing presumed
dead
7
The European Policy to combat terrorism,
Council Conclusions SN3926/6/01, 20
Sept 2001
8
2807th Justice & Home Affairs Council
meeting setting EU priorities for the ¿ght
against organised crime based on the
2007 organised crime threat assessment
9
EU Council Architecture of Internal Se-
curity, 9596/1/06 JAI 271
10
Draft Council Conclusions on the ROCTA
6548/2/08. 28 March 2008
11
International Police cooperation against
terrorism, Mathieu Deflem, IOS Press
2007
12
Against life, limb or personal freedom;
against property or public goods, including
fraud; illegal trading and harm to the en-
vironment (Annex to Europol Convention
Consolidated version 18 April 2007)
13
House of Lords, European Union Com-
mittee, 29th Report of Session 2007-08,
Report with Evidence, Published by the
Authority of the House of Lords, London,
UK 2008
21
21.04.2009 15:54:58
 WE WILL TAKE 730 MEGAWATTS FROM THE AIR
WE WILL DIG 800 MEGAWATTS FROM THE GROUND
When looking for effective solutions, we seek inspiration from the environment around us. In Poland, RWE strategy "More growth, less
CO 2" will result in the latest technology 800 MW hard coal power station being constructed in a joint venture with Kompania Węglowa.
This investment worth 1.5 billion euros will be made in Silesia and Wielkopolska. RWE is also planning construction of 730 MW wind
farms in the Mazurian and Pomeranian districts. These projects, as well as already made investments of 2.5 billion euros in total in -
among others - RWE Polska, RWE Stoen Operator, RWE Polska Contracting will make RWE one of the leading foreign investors in Poland.

Titel und Anzeigen_goe.indd 6 22.04.2009 09:26:24

 Eurojust

The European Union’s Judicial Co-operation Unit

José Luís Lopes da Mota, President of Eurojust
This article describes the objectives and tasks of the European Union Judicial Coopera-
tion Unit established in 2002 and called EUROJUST. It outlines how Eurojust operates
and how it has developed its relations with national law enforcement authorities in the
Member States and with other European Union organisations active in the ¿ght against
serious cross-border and organised crime. The article includes examples of cases where
cooperation between law enforcement authorities, with the support of Eurojust and Eu-
ropol, has led to the dismantling of networks involved in the traf¿cking of human beings,
skimming crimes and child pornography on the internet. The aim is to explain the crucial
role Eurojust plays in the creation of a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
and how it contributes to a more effective EU approach to combating serious cross-border
and organised crime.

Eurojust is a European Union body struments and institutions, such as the

established in 2002 to stimulate and im-
prove the coordination of investigations
and prosecutions among the competent
judicial authorities of European Union
Member States when dealing with serious
cross-border and organised crime. The
organisation was set up as one of the
Tampere milestones - a list of measures to
support the creation of a European Union
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
- which recommended the establishment
of a permanent judicial cooperation unit
to reinforce the ¿ght against serious or-
ganised crime.
Eurojust would become a pool of experts,
pro¿cient in criminal and procedural law,
who are in direct contact with each other
so as to enhance judicial cooperation in
criminal matters between the Members
States of the European Union. Eurojust
represents a new dimension to the tra-
ditional horizontal cooperation between
the Member States in tackling criminal
problems from a local and national
perspective. The new institution would
also provide added value to existing in-
Eurojust and the International Criminal Court,
The Hague
European Judicial Network, Europol, and
the European Anti-Fraud Of¿ce (OLAF).
Eurojust was of¿cially created by a Council
Decision of 28 February 20021- hereinafter
referred to as the Eurojust Decision - but
existed ‘avant la lettre’ as of 1 March 2001
as Pro-Eurojust, operating in Brussels.
Since December 2002 the unit has been
based in The Hague. Eurojust is the ¿rst
body in the European judicial area with
competences in criminal matters and
was set up to achieve three objectives: to
improve cooperation between the national
competent authorities; to stimulate the
coordination of investigations and prose-
cutions of serious crimes involving two
or more Member States; and to support
national authorities when dealing with
serious cross-border cases.
The overall aim of Eurojust is to improve
cooperation among Member States and to
enhance the effectiveness of investigati-
ons and prosecutions when dealing with
cross-border and organised crime – e.g.
terrorism, traf¿cking in human beings, drug
traf¿cking, fraud and money laundering
- in order to bring criminals quickly and
effectively to justice. Eurojust facilitates
the execution of international mutual
legal assistance and the implementation
of European Arrest Warrants. It enhan-
ces coordination between investigating
and prosecuting authorities by gathering
and transmitting relevant information in
criminal cases, providing legal advice
and assistance on national criminal laws
and organising coordination meetings,
including the provision of both legal and
logistical support, such as translation and
interpretation services. It also enables a
more effective exchange of information,
ensures that national authorities inform
each other and supports coordination
among them.
Eurojust can assist investigations and
prosecutions concerning two or more
Member States, between a Member State
“Eurojust’s vision is to become a key
player in investigations and prosecutions
involving two or more Member States by
establishing and supporting coordination
between national authorities for effective
judicial action against serious, cross-bor-
der and organised crime in the European
Union.”
and a non-Member State, or a Member
State and the Commission, regarding
criminal offences affecting the European
Community’s ¿nancial interests. It acts
upon any information or request emana-
ting from a competent authority of a Mem-
ber State, and any information provided by
a body competent by virtue of provisions
adopted in the framework of the Treaties
(European Judicial Network, Europol and
OLAF). Eurojust has a wide range of tasks
and powers in different areas. Speci¿cally
in relation to investigation and prosecution
procedures, Eurojust National Members
and the College have the power to request
the competent authorities of the Member
States to investigate or prosecute speci¿c
acts; to accept that one Member State is
better placed to undertake an investigati-
on or to prosecute; to coordinate among
competent authorities of different Member
States; to set up joint investigation teams;
and to provide any information necessary
for Eurojust to carry out its tasks.
The College of Eurojust, which acts as the
management board, is composed of 27
National Members, one from each Member
State. These National Members are senior,
experienced prosecutors, magistrates or
police of¿cers of equivalent competence,

the new police in europe - 01/09 23

23 - 27 Da Mota - Eurojust_goe.i23 23 21.04.2009 15:58:09

 Eurojust
seconded in accordance with their respec-
tive legal systems and holding permanent
seats in The Hague. Due to the signi¿cant
increase in casework, most of them are
supported by Deputies and Assistants of
Seconded National Experts. The College
of Eurojust is supported by an administra-
tive team led by an Administrative Director
and composed of units and services: Bud-
get & Finance, College Secretariat, Data
Protection Officer, Human Resources,
Information Management, Legal Service,
Press & Public Relations and Security,
Facility Management, General Services &
Events. The secretariat of the European
Judicial Network (EJN) is situated within
the Eurojust Administration, functioning as
a separate and autonomous unit.
Within the College of Eurojust, a Presi-
dent has been elected – at present, Mr
José Luís Lopes da Mota, the National
Member for Portugal - who has additional
responsibilities and obligations conferred
upon him by the Eurojust Decision. The
President exercises his duties on behalf of
the College and under its authority, directs
its work, represents Eurojust and monitors
the daily management ensured by the
Administrative Director. The President
is assisted by two Vice-Presidents – at
present, Ms Michèle Coninsx, the National
Member for Belgium, and Mr Raivo Sepp,
the National Member for Estonia.
The National Members meet in plenary
session twice a week to discuss casework
and to make decisions regarding the or-
ganisation and operation of Eurojust. The
National Members work independently
in liaison with their competent national
authorities and should be seen as the
continuation abroad of those authorities.
As national authorities they are granted
certain powers by their home countries.
The extent of those powers is important,
as it indirectly determines Eurojust’s own
strength and authority.
Eurojust ful¿ls its tasks through its National
Members or as a College. It acts as a Col-
lege when certain circumstances occur,
as speci¿ed in Article 5 of the Eurojust
Decision. When Eurojust acts as a Colle-
ge, its powers are slightly stronger, given
that Member States need to provide the
reasons for not complying with a College
request, the only exceptions being due to
national security concerns or to the risk
of jeopardising ongoing investigations or
the safety of individuals. The new Council
Decision on the Strengthening of Eurojust
(see below) will extend this reporting duty
to situations where competent authorities
do not comply with a request submitted by
a National Member. However, Eurojust’s
24
23 - 27 Da Mota - Eurojust_goe.i24 24
powers do not entail giving direct orders to
the competent authorities in the Member
States, and no enforcement system is in
place.
Eurojust organises three kinds of ope-
rational coordination meetings: ¿rst, the
Level I meetings, which are the plenary
meetings with all 27 National Members
that take place twice a week; second, the
Level II meetings, which are meetings held
among the National Members involved in
a case; and, ¿nally, the Level III meetings,
attended by the National Members and
prosecutors, judges and/or police of¿cers
of the Member States involved in a case.
Besides the casework, which is its core
business, Eurojust also organises strate-
gic meetings on signi¿cant types of serious
organised crime, terrorism and other
matters of interest to practitioners, such as
joint investigation teams, European Arrest
Warrants, and asset restraint and con¿s-
cation procedures. The main objective of
these strategic meetings is to enhance
judicial cooperation. These meetings give
an insight into existing national procedu-
res and practices, which vary among the
Member States. These meetings also
inform participants of new developments
in certain areas of criminality, and contri-
bute to improving working relations with
national investigators and prosecutors.
For instance, in 2008 Eurojust organised
strategic meetings on traf¿cking in human
beings and witness protection, terrorism,
cybercrime, preparation of the entry into
force of the Agreements on extradition
and mutual legal assistance between the
European Union and the United States of
America, and the OCTA.
The College has also delegated the
preparation of its work to College teams,
which are composed of National Members,
Meeting College of Eurojust and the Commission
Deputies and Seconded National Experts
who have experience in dealing with
certain types of crimes, such as terrorist
crimes, traf¿cking in human beings and
fraud offences, or who are committed to
support the work of Eurojust with regard to
administrative and organisational issues,
relations with the EU institutions or negoti-
ations with third States and organisations.
These teams are supported by members
of the administration, such as case ma-
nagement analysts and legal of¿cers.
Another interesting initiative was the ap-
pointment in 2008 of a Contact Point at
Eurojust for Child Protection - at present
the National Member for Sweden - who
is setting up a centre of expertise in ju-
dicial cooperation in cases concerning
children.
The organisation’s competences are in-
creasing, and over the years Eurojust has
been assigned new and important tasks in
the ¿ght against terrorism and in relation
to the European Arrest Warrant. Eurojust’s
national correspondents for terrorist mat-
ters have been appointed in line with the
Council Decision of 20 September 2005 on
the exchange of information and coopera-
tion concerning terrorist offences2, and the
Council Framework Decision of 13 June
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant³ has
introduced an advisory role for Eurojust in
case of multiple requests and obligations
to notify Eurojust of breaches of time
limits. Eurojust will also play a role in the
implementation of the European Evidence
Warrant and in the training of magistrates
in cooperation with the European Judicial
Training Network.
We have already mentioned the new
Council Decision on the Strengthening
of Eurojust (hereinafter referred to as
the “new Eurojust Decision”), which was
the new police in europe - 01/09
21.04.2009 15:58:15

Case evolution 2002 - 2008 (Graphic 1)
adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs
Council on 16 December 2008. The new
Eurojust Decision is the result of an as-
sessment carried out after Eurojust’s ¿rst
¿ve years in existence, evaluating the
effectiveness and unexploited potential of
Eurojust on the basis of gained experience
and identi¿ed constraints and limits. The
goal of the new Eurojust Decision is to ren-
der Eurojust more effective. Its objectives
are the creation of a common minimum
basis of National Members’ powers, the
setting up of an emergency coordinati-
on mechanism, the improvement of the
transmission of information to Eurojust and
Eurojust’s case management system, the
strengthening of cooperation between Eu-
rojust National Members and their national
EJN contact points, the strengthening of
judicial cooperation with third States by al-
lowing Eurojust to post liaison magistrates
in these countries, and the strengthening
Main crime types 2008 (Graphic 2)
the new police in europe - 01/09
23 - 27 Da Mota - Eurojust_goe.i25 25
of cooperation with other bodies, such as
Europol, OLAF, Frontex and SitCen. With
the new Eurojust Decision, Eurojust will
be able to improve its effectiveness in the
¿ght against serious organised crime and
to provide even better support in criminal
investigations in the Member States.
Eurojust has provided signi¿cant added
value by assisting the competent authori-
ties of the Member States in their national
investigations and prosecutions. Member
States are more frequently involving Eu-
rojust in complex cases requiring coordi-
nation efforts. Eurojust has experienced
a continual increase in case referrals
and coordination meetings. Since 2002,
the number of case referrals has steadily
increased year by year. In 2008 a total of
1,193 cases were registered. The graph
below shows the total number of case
referrals per year.
Eurojust
The Council Conclusions setting Euro-
pean Union priorities in the ¿ght against
organised crime, based on the Organised
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and
the Council’s work on establishing an EU
Internal Security Architecture, reaf¿rm the
important tasks allocated to Eurojust with
regard to coordination of investigations
and prosecutions, participation in joint
investigation teams and organisation of
strategic meetings on organised crime
priorities. Eurojust’s mandate enables it
to address all types of serious crime. The
organisation has been active in cases
involving drug trafficking, fraud and/or
money laundering and traf¿cking in human
beings, and sees its work on terrorist cri-
mes as its highest priority. These ¿elds of
activity are consistent with EU priorities.
The graph below shows the main types
of crimes. Criminal activities dealt with
at Eurojust followed a similar pattern to
previous years.
Eurojust has established working relati-
ons with Europol. In accordance with the
Eurojust Decision, Eurojust and Europol
negotiated a Cooperation Agreement in
2004 to establish and maintain close co-
operation relevant for the performance of
their tasks and for achieving their objecti-
ves, particularly with regard to increasing
their effectiveness in combating serious
forms of international crime through the
exchange of operational, strategic, and
technical information and by coordination
activities. Since 2004, much progress has
been made.
Eurojust has been associated with the acti-
vities of Europol’s Analysis Work Files, and
Europol has been involved in Eurojust’s
operational activities. In addition, Eurojust
has contributed to Europol’s Organised
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) and EU
Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT)
reports. Cooperation between both orga-
nisations will be enhanced by the secure
communication link established between
the two organisations and the setting up
in June 2008 of a task force mandated to
further improve the cooperation between
Eurojust and Europol by the amendment
of the Cooperation Agreement, adoption
of which is foreseen in the ¿rst half of
2009.
OLAF is also a privileged partner of Euro-
just. In 2003, Eurojust and OLAF signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to set up
an integrated approach in dealing with EU
budgetary fraud. In 2008 this Memoran-
dum was replaced by a Practical Agree-
ment on Arrangements of Cooperation,
de¿ning modalities for closer cooperation
between Eurojust and OLAF, in particular
on the exchange of information.
25
21.04.2009 15:58:20
 Eurojust
Eurojust has been recognised outside
the European Union as an important
partner in judicial cooperation. It has sig-
ned formal cooperation agreements with
several non-EU states: Norway, Iceland,
the United States of America, Croatia, the
Swiss Federation and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. All agreements
contain provisions on the exchange of
personal data. At present, liaison prose-
cutors from Norway and the United States
are stationed at Eurojust. Arrangements
have been made to open negotiations with
the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova
and Liechtenstein. Eurojust is also nego-
tiating a Memorandum of Understanding
with IberRed, a network of contact points
for judicial cooperation in Latin America.
Member States have bene¿ted from the
support and added value that Eurojust
has delivered in complex cases. Below,
as examples, are a few case illustrations
to demonstrate that a successful out-
come also depends on good cooperation
between Eurojust, national judicial autho-
rities, police forces and other European
organisations, in particular Europol.
• In quite a few cases, Eurojust has been
consulted with a question related to
positive conÀicts of jurisdiction. In one
case, Eurojust was called to advise
whether Germany, Spain or France
was in a better position to prosecute a
case. The case involved investigations
against a German national who was in
detention in Germany and suspected
of having committed 19 murders and
attempted murders. The accused had
confessed in six cases, three commit-
ted in Spain, two in France and one in
Germany. The prosecutor investigating
the case contacted the German Natio-
nal Member at Eurojust requesting an
opinion on which of the three countries
involved was in a better position to
prosecute the case.
When asked to issue a recommenda-
tion, Eurojust takes note of the legal
issues and practical matters at stake,
along the lines of the Eurojust Guideli-
nes on the prevention of positive con-
Àicts of jurisdiction4. Eurojust delivered
its opinion that the German judicial
authorities were better placed to deal
with the totality of the offences allegedly
committed by the accused and asked
the national authorities of the Member
States involved in the case to accept
that the German authorities were in a
better position to prosecute the case.
• In a drug traf¿cking case, the National
Member for Sweden was contacted by
his authorities regarding a car loaded
26
23 - 27 Da Mota - Eurojust_goe.i26 26
with heroin that was ready to leave
the southern Balkans for Sweden that
same evening. Sweden had asked for
a controlled delivery, which meant that
the car was to be under surveillance
throughout its journey without being
stopped at the borders. Since the route
was unknown, the countries reques-
ted to provide assistance were quite
numerous: Serbia and Montenegro,
Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria,
Germany, the Slovak Republic, the
Czech Republic and Denmark. Given
that the operation required swift action,
the Swedish National Member called
an urgent meeting with all the National
Members involved.
A request was issued for mutual legal
assistance in their countries and per-
mission from all countries involved was
granted within two hours. Since Europol
was involved via Eurojust in the coordi-
nation of police and customs cooperati-
on, the Eurojust National Members also
gave instructions to their respective
national desks at Europol. When the
car started its journey one day later
than expected, it became apparent that
it was headed for the Swiss border. As
no permission for a controlled delivery
had been requested from the Swiss au-
thorities, the German police, who were
following the car, decided that it would
be better to seize the drugs before the
car reached the Swiss border.
The “preventive seizure”, however,
would have eliminated the possibility of
prosecuting the intended recipients in
Sweden. Another valid solution had to
be found quickly, so Eurojust’s Swedish
National Member issued a request for
mutual legal assistance, which was
sent via Interpol to the Swiss authorities
and which was granted when the car
was only 20 minutes from the Swiss
border. Ultimately, the car was stop-
ped in Sweden, where six people were
arrested and 12 kilos of heroin were
seized. The accused were prosecuted
in Sweden.
• In Operation Trufas, sixty-¿ve people
suspected of involvement in a peo-
ple-smuggling network were arrested
throughout Europe. The operation was
conducted by the Spanish National
Police with the support of Europol. In
the course of the Spanish-led investi-
gations, it soon became apparent that
the criminal network had connections
in several other EU Member States.
The Spanish police of¿cers involved,
who were working closely with the Spa-
nish prosecutors and judges, submitted
reports containing vital information on
the case, which also highlighted that
the case involved a large criminal group
dealing in people smuggling. At the
request of the Spanish investigating
prosecutors and judges, the Spanish
National Member asked Eurojust to
coordinate the execution phase in four
Member States and to facilitate mutual
legal assistance and the execution of
European Arrest Warrants.
Two coordination meetings were held
among the National Members and the
judges and prosecutors of the countries
involved. In the course of these two
meetings, an agreement was reached
that the National Members involved
should ask their national authorities to
consider opening an investigation on
the facts and suspects identi¿ed by the
Spanish police. Thereafter, subsequent
coordination meetings were held, at
which time more detailed matters, such
as the date of execution of arrests or
house searches, were dealt with. The
joint operation was managed from
Malaga, where a delegation from Eu-
ropol and Eurojust was sent to Spain
to establish a mobile of¿ce from which
operations could be coordinated direct-
ly in the ¿eld.
• Another example of good coordinated
police and judicial action was Operation
Koala. The case began when a child
abuse video that had been produced
in Belgium was discovered in Australia.
The producer of the material, an Italian
national, was arrested. He was running
a website through which he sold over
150 self-made, sexually explicit videos
of underage girls.
This business had been running for
a year and a half, generating con-
siderable profits from around 2,500
customers worldwide. The information
from Australia was routed via Interpol
to Belgium and Europol. The keys to
the success of this operation were the
provision of valuable data by Member
States and Interpol and crime analysis
for more than a year, carried out by
specialists dealing with online child sex
abuse cases at Europol, and the judicial
coordination carried out by Eurojust.
The abusive material was mainly produ-
ced in Ukraine and some material was
¿lmed in Belgium and the Netherlands.
Eurojust and Europol, working in close
cooperation, invited representatives
from 28 countries to several opera-
tional meetings in The Hague. This
remarkable level of cooperation with all
Eurojust National Members, requesting
their national authorities to follow the
deadlines established for the common
operations, contributed to the success
of the joint Europol-Eurojust operation.
the new police in europe - 01/09
21.04.2009 15:58:20

Subsequent investigations were initia-
ted by the national authorities, which
led to a signi¿cant number of arrests,
the seizure of a considerable amount
of child abuse material and the convic-
tions of the perpetrators.
One ¿nal example is a case where Euro-
just and Europol played an important role
in the dismantling of a large international
skimming network involving nine Member
States. Fifteen persons suspected of being
part of a skimming network were arrested
throughout Europe. The investigations
and prosecutions took place in Belgium,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Australia and Canada. As a coordinated
approach in both EU and non-EU countries
was needed, the case was referred to Eu-
rojust and Europol. Several coordination
meetings took place at both organisations
to prepare the arrests and the 34 house
searches that took place.
Promoting our organisation remains an
important task. There is a need to increase
the new police in europe - 01/09
23 - 27 Da Mota - Eurojust_goe.i27 27
awareness in the Member States of the
real and potential added value Eurojust
can offer. The same applies to other
European Union organisations, such as
Europol, that are involved in combating
serious and organised crimes.
We believe that the establishment of
Eurojust was a landmark in the efforts to
create an Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice. Establishing trust and con¿dence
amongst the different legal systems in the
European Union, as well as in the work
of Eurojust and its National Members, is
crucial for the development of a European
criminal justice area. Eurojust is working
towards promoting a new overall European
approach to cross-border crime by cont-
ributing to the development of a criminal
justice area based on the different natio-
nal legal systems of the Member States.
Eurojust’s goal is to play an effective and
ef¿cient supporting role in cross-border
investigations and prosecutions and to
contribute to the creation of a high level of
safety within the European Union.
Eurojust
1
Council Decision of 28 February 2002
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinfor-
cing the ¿ght against serious crime, OJ,
2002/187/JHA, L 63/1, 6.3.2002.
2
Council Decision of 20 September 2005
on the exchange of information and coo-
peration concerning terrorist offences, OJ,
2005/671/JHA, L 253/22, 29.9.2005.
3
Council Framework Decision of 13 June
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant
and the surrender procedures between
the Member States, OJ, 2002/584/JHA, L
190/1, 18.7.2002.
4
See the Eurojust Annual Report of 2003,
pp. 61-66, http://www.eurojust.europa.
eu.
For more information on Eurojust, see:
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu
27
21.04.2009 15:58:20
 KPMG - operation QUEST
Operation QUEST: transforming the UK’s police forces
‘QUEST, for me, represents a great step forward in supporting of¿cers and staff
to focus on the job they signed up for; it frees up front line resource; it focuses
on what is important; it lets managers manage; and, most fundamentally, it al-
lows frontline of¿cers to improve the service they provide to the public – where
it counts.’
Jacqui Smith, UK Home Secretary, March 2008
The national context – increasing In recent years many forces have been
expectations and decreasing bud- faced with a rising backlog of calls for
gets service coupled with considerable ad-
ministration for ongoing investigations.
In the UK, as in the rest of Europe, the This has given of¿cers less time to
police service is under considerable spend actually engaging with commu-
pressure to deliver better performance nities and ¿ghting crime, and with work
for less money. This has stretched piling up, there has been evidence of
the resources of many forces as they public dissatisfaction and a lack of
attempt to tackle terrorism, improve con¿dence. The traditional approach
neighbourhood policing, cut crime and to tackling performance challenges has
increase detection and conviction rates. been to push through changes from the
With the UK Government’s 2007 Com- very top by means of targets and com-
prehensive Spending Review having parative performance measures. This
reduced the funding available to forces has often led to resistance from those
in real terms, the police service is acu- on the front line, who feel that such
tely aware of the need to ¿nd ways to initiatives merely create additional bu-
be more ef¿cient and effective and help reaucracy and add to their workload.
allay the public’s fear of crime.
Last July the UK
Government pub-
lished a policy
paper setting out
a vision for the
future of policing,
centred around
the needs of lo-
cal communi-
ties. Two of the
key themes were
around cutting
red tape to give
the police service
more freedom to
get on with redu-
cing crime and a
radical shift away
from ‘top down’
performance ma-
nagement arran-
gements. In light
of this the current
set of compara-
tive performance
measures is
being replaced by
a single national
target for police
forces – to deliver
Figure 1: The QUEST network
14 forces have participated in the programme so far since its inception in 2006. increased levels
28
28 - 33 KPMG_goe.indd 28
of public con¿dence. The Green Paper
also set out details of a new policing
pledge consisting of a national standard
on what people can expect from the
police underpinned by a series of local
priorities agreed with people in each
neighbourhood.
Operation QUEST – delivering su-
stainable transformation of police per-
formance
Within this context many police forces
are examining their operational pro-
cesses to understand what it takes to
deliver enhanced levels of customer
service whilst becoming more cost
effective. Operation QUEST is a UK
Home Of¿ce sponsored programme
of work focused on operational per-
formance improvement and value for
money. QUEST was ¿rst trialled with
Merseyside Police, Suffolk Police and
the Metropolitan Police Service in
2006.
The objective was to apply proven
approaches to process improvement
from the private sector, coupled with
the deep first hand knowledge and
experience of police of¿cers and police
staff, to identify signi¿cant opportunities
to improve police performance. The
trial was suf¿ciently successful in de-
livering increased capacity, improved
performance and tangible ef¿ciency
savings to justify the Home Office
continuing its support. The journey
had begun on the road to transforming
police performance in the eyes of local
communities.
Following the success of the ¿rst pha-
se of QUEST, 2007 saw a further four
forces undertake the second wave:
Lancashire, Cheshire, Thames Valley
and Avon and Somerset. Last year
Norfolk, Sussex and Wiltshire Police
took part in the third wave and a further
four forces, Greater Manchester, West
Yorkshire, North Wales and Devon &
Cornwall, are currently participating
in QUEST 4. Each project is centred
around an intensive six-month period
of full time, on-the-ground support, fol-
lowed by continued help on a smaller
scale as the forces begin to indepen-
dently pursue ongoing improvement
opportunities.
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 07:46:03
 KPMG - operation QUEST

QUEST Intensive Phase

issues relevant to its own commu-
(6 months) nities and, importantly, arrive at its
own solutions; the rationale being
2.1
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
that those who live with the chal-
Opportunity&
Mobilisation
Identification
Business
Case
Detailed
Solution
Implementation
Implementation,
and Tracking
lenges of policing on a daily basis
Opportunity Support &
x
Identification Development Design x
Monitoring are best equipped to generate
(Weeks
(5 1 - 4)
Weeks) (Weeks 5 - 8)
(6 Weeks) (Weeks 9 - 15)
(6 Weeks) (Weeks
(7 16 - 24)
Weeks) and action relevant improvements.
Activity:
The joint
joint QUEST
Activity:
A number of the
Activity:
A detailed
Each project is
Activity:
Each project ‘goes
Giving staff such independence
The QUEST team
is mobilised through a
week long ‘QUEST
opportunities
identified are
will be
implementation
developed
plan is
develops a detailed
for each
implementation plan,
live ’ in an
operational area.
can require a real leap of faith for
Academy’ training
course. The process
developed into
outline
outlinedbusiness
business
project,
given for
with
with consideration
consideration given to
The joint team takes
responsibility for
senior of¿cers who may be more
organisational,
work streams then
start to identify areas
cases. A full
cost/benefit analysis
organisational,
process, people,
process, people,
systems and
supporting the
activity; delivering accustomed to traditional ‘top-
of underperformance,
team will use the
down’ management styles. If the
is performed along systems and training and advice,
map processes and stakeholder issues.
1.
1. Planning
Planning identify issues through
with an evaluation of stakeholder issues.
New or revised
and assisting 3.
3. QUEST
QUEST
New or revised supervisors and
force wants to focus on volume
risks and
Phase
Phase workshops and
interviews. development of a
processes and protocols
protocols
are developed along
managers. Syndicate
Syndicate
high level are developed along A range of
(1 month)
(2 months) Issues then undergo
an initial fact based implementation plan.
with training and
with training and
communication
communication
performance measures
are tracked for each
(6months)
(6 months)
crime, Operation QUEST uses the
analysis to build an
understanding of the
size and scope of the
materials, role
materials, role
descriptions and
descriptions and
project to evaluate
success and where ‘racetrack’, a high level process
performance necessary processes
problem. performance
measures.
measures.
are refined further. map to help examine the blocks
Output: Output: Output: Output: to performance in key operational
Chief Officers are
presented with a pack
The ACPO
Based uponlevel
presented
the facts
Chief
force lead will be
Chief
The SROofficers
andand
all all
internal stakeholders
Real change
delivered in a live areas (see Figure 3). This allows
which identifies issues, Officers decide which are involved
will be in the
involved in the operational
the joint team to quickly ascertain
presented with each
evidence, impact and projects should be
business case, and ratification of the plans
plan environment, with
areas of opportunity. A taken forward
using the facts to ensure that they performance uplift
shortlist of issues are
identified for further
immediately
provided will to design
make
and implementation.
a are operationally
robust and fit for
measured through
the performance
the scope and scale of issues and
decision as to which
evaluation during the
business case phase.
Others may be ‘parked’
projects are taken
for the force to
forward.
purpose. management
system.
adds rigour to the subsequent
progress later.
prioritisation process.
Figure 2: The QUEST Approach – process improvement
Detailed data analysis is underta-
ken to ensure that any decisions
The end-to-end volume crime policing process is divided into four ‘process areas’ around which the workstreams of a to change the way forces work
QUEST project are typically structured
are fact based. Issues are then
1. Incident management and resolution 1. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT taken forward rapidly through
Contact from the Appropriate
Scene
Calls from the public are graded and filtered
appropriately. Where necessary an officer is detailed analysis, business case
attendance
public resource dispatched.
development, solution design and
2. CRIME RECORDING & INVESTIGATION
Assessment Deployment
Primary investigation is conducted either by
implementation stages. At the end
Assessment
Trial (CPS) 4. Patrol and proactive operations
the officer at the scene or by telephone. A
crime report is recorded. Secondary
of the initial six month intensive
• Gather intelligence
Investigation is carried out for appropriate
crimes, possibly leading to an arrest.
period the force is left with real
File building
• Analyse and assess
Crime recording
3. DEFENDANT MANAGEMENT solutions that are fully embedded
• Task and deploy
Following arrest the defendant is taken into
custody and interviewed. A disposal decision
and delivering results.
Investigation
is then made, typically either charge, bail
Evidence Management
pending further enquiries or no further action.
Custody
assessment
(Force / CPS) The work is always accompanied
4. PATROL AND PROACTIVE
Custodial
Arrest
This encompasses all activity relating to the
by establishing a framework of
OPERATIONS
Alternative
disposal
2. Crime recording
gathering and analysis of intelligence and the
subsequent deployment of proactive
measures to track performance,
3. Defendant management and investigation resources. both before and after go-live, and
Figure 3: The ‘Racetrack’ embedding these into the force’s
‘business as usual’ reporting arran-
How QUEST works tify opportunities to improve operational gements. Following the six month
performance and ef¿ciency by designing intensive phase forces transition to a
The fundamental objective of Operation out wasteful activity. The integrated further six month period of ‘light touch’
QUEST is to foster and support a ge- teams comprising KPMG, Home Of¿ce support as they begin to roll out the pilot
nuine step-change in the way in which and police personnel examine front
the police service thinks and operates. line policing processes, quantify the
“QUEST has reposi-
It has been speci¿cally designed to help key issues and design and implement tioned the Home Of-
police forces change the way in which a series of practical improvements that ¿ce and government
they view and approach the core disci- can be delivered quickly to bring im- as being supporters
plines of performance improvement and mediate bene¿ts. These have included and enablers…rat-
change management. For this reason new ways of responding to calls from her than a source
the intensive six month assisted phase the public; new approaches to recording of top-down central
is based around two main workstreams and investigating crime; greater speed control. It’s a culture
change programme
– process improvement and sustaina- and ef¿ciency in dealing with those in
masquerading as a
bility. custody; and more effective and ef¿ci- productivity impro-
ent ways of capturing and processing vement programme.”
Process improvement intelligence.
The process improvement workstream Dr Robert Arnott, Head of Value for Money
uses tried and tested techniques to iden- Each force is encouraged to target and Productivity Unit, UK Home Of¿ce

the new police in europe - 01/09 29

28 - 33 KPMG_goe.indd 29 22.04.2009 07:46:04

 KPMG - operation QUEST
What is sustainability?
Sustainability w ithin QUEST means embedding the ability to continuously improve
performance. The four tiers of the pyramid highlight the different levels at w hich the QUEST
approach needs to be understood and adopted in order to become truly sustainable.
Tier 1 – ensuring the
solutions implemented in the
initial geographic area can be
sustained.
Tier 2A - embedding the
solutions from the pilot
location into the force.
Tier 2B – ensuring that
the QUEST forces play
an active part in cross-
force w orking
Tier 3 – follow ing the intensive 6
month phase, QUEST Syndicate
forces continue to share experiences QUEST SYNDICATE
and ideas through netw orks and
cross-force w orkshops.
Figure 4: The QUEST sustainability pyramid
An example of ‘current’ and ‘ideal’ OCI cultural profiles for a police force
Current
Figure 5: Analysing values and behaviours using the Organisation Cultural Inventory (OCI)
projects forcewide and also initiate new
process improvement projects in other
areas of operations.
Building sustainability
The six month intensive support period
of Operation QUEST is just the start.
QUEST was conceived as a programme
of continuous improvement, within
which each force develops the skills
and con¿dence to review and improve
its own operational performance through
the ongoing application of lean me-
30
28 - 33 KPMG_goe.indd 30
TIER 1
BCU
Tier 2C – creating the ability
TIER 2A TIER 2C w ithin force to conduct future
ROLL OUT FORCE performance improvement
TO FORCE CONTINUOUS projects w ithout significant
IM PROVEM ENT external assistance.
TIER 2B QUEST NETWORK
TIER 3
Tier 4 - seeks to influence the climate
TIER 4 in w hich the programme operates by
SERVICE LEVEL engaging the w ider Police Service and
its supporting agencies.
Ideal
thods. Delivering sustainable change
is the most important element of the
QUEST programme, and as such it is
at the heart of the approach from day
one. Running alongside the process
improvement work is the sustainability
workstream, which aims to equip each
force with the skills and ability to deliver
bene¿ts in three stages, as shown in
the ‘sustainability pyramid’ in Figure 4.
In this workstream there is a particular
focus on performance management,
training, governance, communication
and leadership behaviours.
Through one-to-one coaching,
team working, formal training
and on-the-job learning, of¿cers
develop the skills and con¿dence
to proactively review and improve
their own operational performance.
Any underlying cultural issues that
could impact performance are
also diagnosed and discussed,
with plans put in place to address
these in the longer term. Growing
a wider QUEST network of forces
(known as QUEST Syndicate) is
also key to the ongoing success
of the programme. Force teams
are brought together regularly
throughout the intensive six month
phase to discuss lessons learned
and to share solutions, tools and
techniques. Police officers and
staff from across the network of
QUEST forces are also involved in
these sessions, as well as guest
speakers with expertise on a wide
range of policing issues.
As well as the transfer of practical
skills and knowledge QUEST uses
a range of organisational and cul-
tural diagnostic tools, such as the
Organisational Cultural Inventory
(OCI), to help diagnose and tack-
le any underlying cultural issues
which may impact upon delivery.
This is critical in assisting each
force to develop constructive lea-
dership values and behaviours.
Figure 5 provides an example of
‘current’ and ‘ideal’ OCI cultural
pro¿les for a typical police force.
Case studies
Operation QUEST delivers value
in a number of ways by improving
operational performance and
customer satisfaction; delivering
substantial ef¿ciencies and cost sa-
vings; and building the understanding,
con¿dence and capability to continue
this as a normal way of operating. The
split of these bene¿ts is different in
every force. Each force faces its own
unique socio-economic, demographic
and criminal environment, resulting
in a broad array of challenges and
priorities.
The QUEST approach is designed to be
Àexible to cope with these differences,
and to deliver bespoke solutions which
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 07:46:05

target the issues that matter most to
a force. The following case studies
provide some specific examples of
some of the projects implemented in
four participating forces.
Merseyside Police – Incident Manage-
ment and Resolution
M any of the other QUEST
forces have also delivered
successful projects in this area
the new police in europe - 01/09
28 - 33 KPMG_goe.indd 31
KPMG - operation QUEST
Of the four process areas typically police staff involved in this function.
examined as part of QUEST some of This area is also one of the primary
the greatest ef¿ciencies have been interfaces with members of the public
delivered have been in relation to In- and often provides fertile ground for
cident Management and Resolution. enhancing levels of customer service
This is perhaps not surprising consi- coupled with substantial efficiency
dering the volumes of telephone calls savings.
and incidents that forces need to deal
with, and the numbers of of¿cers and
M erseyside Police
(Implementation period April’06 – July’06, this project
w as one of nine projects implemented)
Solution M erseyside introduced revised call grading and
incident resolution protocols, using a Customer
Service Desk to match w orkloads to resources and
maximise the use of telephone resolution, scheduled
appointments and surgeries.
Performance z 22% increase in grade 2 incidents attended w ithin
results target times (65% to 87% incidents w ithin target -
7,191 to 9,234 incidents).
z 18% reduction in incorrectly graded grade 2
incidents (51% to 33%), and 22% increase in
grade 3 incidents (30% to 52% grade 3 incidents).
z 70% of grade 3 incidents are now resolved
w ithout deployment of frontline officers.
Projected z £ 757k p/a officer time officer time savings in pilot
annual division (Liverpool South) equating to 13.3% of
savings response/neighbourhood team budget.
Force grade 2 attendance w ithin target (%)
100 Project Go Live
April’06
95
Grade 2 attended w ithin target time (%)
90
85 87% Post Go live
average
80
75
70 Sustained performance above target
65 Baseline
65%
60
22% increase from baseline
55
50
Aug- Nov- Feb- May- Aug- Nov- Feb- May- Aug- Nov- Feb- May- Aug-
05 05 06 06 06 06 07 07 07 07 08 08 08
31
22.04.2009 07:46:06
 KPMG - operation QUEST
Avon & Somerset Constabulary
– Crime Recording and Investi-
gation
Crime recording and investiga-
tion is the second area typically
examined. A major driver in this
area is the substantial impact on
victim/customer satisfaction that
good or bad performance can
have and of course, the desire to
maximise quality, timelines and
detections. Areas as varied as
crime recording, screening and
allocation processes, investigati-
on standards and victim follow up
have been examined to date.
Wiltshire Police – Defendant Ma-
nagement
The primary objective of the custo-
dy process is to ensure the safety
of the detainee and comply with
relevant legislation. However,
current practices mean that cus-
tody frequently absorbs frontline
resources, removing them from
core duties. This impacts on the
visibility of of¿cers on the street
and on operational performance.
Prompt and effective evidence re-
view and decision making enables
forces to direct resources towards
securing positive outcomes.
32
28 - 33 KPMG_goe.indd 32
Avon & Somerset Constabulary
(Implementation period November’07 – January’08, this
project w as one of eight projects implemented)
Solution This project delivered an improved process for
progressing Violence Against the Person (VAP) crime.
Introducing tw o main changes; creating a revised
timeframe policy for assault crimes to improve
attendance and secondly, revising investigation
management processes to improve timeliness. This
has sped up the transfer of cases betw een the crime
recording staff and the district Crime M anagement
Unit, developing a team focus on executing arrest
packages quickly.
Performance z 12.9% increase in ABH detections (23.2% to
results 36.1% ) and 9% increase in common assault
detections (27.1 to 32.5%).
z Timeliness of arrest has improved by over 70%
for both ABH (15.5 to 3 days) and common assault
(25.5 days to 7 days).
z Time taken to contact victims is 90% faster; ABH
has reduced 8 days (8.5 to 0.5 days) and common
assault 12.5 days (15.5 to 3 days).
Projected
annual z N/A
savings
Bristol ABH detections
50%
40% 12.9% increase in
ABH detections 36% Pilot
average
30%
23% Baseline
average
20%
10%
0%
Bristol East Bristol South Bristol BCU
Baseline (April'07 - Oct'07) Pilot (Nov'07 - Jan'08)
Wiltshire Police
(Performance metrics based on 5-w eeks “ Go-live” results
since implementation on 15 September ‘08), this w as one
of six projects implemented)
Solution Wiltshire Police implemented processes to enable the
Custody Sergeant to more effectively supervise the
Custody Unit, w hile Detention Officers book in and
process prisoners. This is supported by the use of a
‘Queuebuster’ function w here arresting and escorting
officers carry out the administrative tasks of booking in
process at busy times. The Evidence Review Officer and
Bail M anagement processes have been revised to drive
positive disposals and deliver improved Offences
Brought to Justice outcomes.
Performance z 69% reduction in average w aiting time to see a
results Custody Sergeant (26 minutes to 8 minutes).
Projected z Low level officer and detention officer time saving in
annual the pilot BCU from reduced custody waiting times.
savings
Custody w aiting time
30 50% reduce in custody w aiting time
26minutes
25 Baseline
‘Airlock’ time (minutes)
20
15
13minutes
Go Live average
10
0
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 07:46:08
 KPMG - operation QUEST

Norfolk Constabulary – Patrol and

Norfolk Constabulary Proactive Operations
(Performance metrics based on 12-w eeks “ Go-live”
results since implementation on 28 July ’08, this w as Many forces experience issues
one of seven projects implemented)
QUEST implemented a new intelligence framew ork
with the quality and relevance of
Solution
across the constabulary, designed to improve the intelligence submitted by of¿cers,
quality, relevance and accuracy of intelligence who are often not aware of what
submissions. All intelligence staff and over 750
officers w ere trained in the new processes and w ays constitutes ‘good’ intelligence. This
of w orking. QUEST also implemented standardised can lead to excessive workloads
roles and responsibilities and a performance
management framew ork w ithin the Intelligence Units for intelligence analysts, backlogs
as a precursor to complete centralisation. This has of intelligence reports waiting to be
established common w ays of w orking and has more
than doubled the productivity of the units in terms of reviewed and severe delays getting
the numbers of intelligence reports (IRs) being critical intelligence onto the system,
processed.
where it can be accessed by of¿-
Performance z 92% reduction of intelligence report (IR) backlog cers. This is often compounded by
results over 12 w eeks (5,699 to 445 IRs).
z 121% increase in total IRs processed per w eek poor productivity and processing
(515 to 1,139 IRs). rates, failure to link records relating
z 82% reduction in the time taken to allocate crimes
for investigation follow ing crime recording (21.1 to to the same individual and high
3.7 hours). levels of duplication of the same
Projected
annual
z Total police officer and police staff time saving in information across multiple force
intelligence units of £305k p/a, equating to 31% of
savings
budget for the intelligence function.
systems. Combined, these factors
Force Intelligence Report backlog
can seriously reduce the usability of
6,000 5,699 IR Baseline the intelligence system, undermine
of¿cers’ con¿dence and impede ef-
Number in IR Backlog

5,000 Baseline

4,000
3,000
Total backlogged IRs
fective tasking of resources in line
2,000 with force priorities.
1,000 92% reduction in IR backlog, w ith further
reduction expected
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Go Live w eeks

Further information
Home Office – Robert Arnott Operation QUEST is now widely
Robert Arnott regarded as one of the leading and
Tel: 02070351756 most successful performance impro-
Email: vement programmes in UK policing.
robert.arnott@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk Ten forces have already bene¿ted,
reporting tangible and signi¿cant
performance uplift and cashable
bene¿ts, and a further four forces
are currently participating in the
KPM G – Rosemary Scully programme. In recognition of this,
Operation QUEST was awarded
Rosemary Scully the Best Performance Improvement
Tel: 020 7311 1516 Programme award at the inaugural
Email: 2008 Home Of¿ce Supplier Value
rosemary.scully@kpmg.co.uk Awards. We welcome enquiries. If
you would like any further informa-
tion on Operation QUEST please
contact either Robert Arnott, Rose-
mary Scully or Nicholas Fox.
KPM G – Nicholas Fox
Nicholas Fox
Tel: 020 7311 5046
Email:
nicholas.fox@kpmg.co.uk

the new police in europe - 01/09 33

28 - 33 KPMG_goe.indd 33 22.04.2009 07:46:09

 OLAF

The European Anti-Fraud Of¿ce (OLAF)

Franz-Hermann Brüner, Director-General of OLAF
The European Anti-Fraud Of¿ce (OLAF) was created as an “independent administrative
body” by a decision of the European Commission in the year 1999.1 It is in charge of
conducting (internal) investigations in all EU bodies and institutions in cases of corrup-
tion, fraud and other serious offences against professional duties at the expense of the
EC budget. With an institutional agreement in May 1999, the investigative competences
of the agency were expanded in order to include all unlawful actions conÀicting with EU
¿nancial interests for which EC employees can be held to account under administrative
or penal law.

The current sphere of activities of the agency2 shows that many things have changed in
the ¿eld of combating fraud and corruption in the last nine years since the founding of
OLAF. Hence it would not be exaggerated to call OLAF a success story.

Basic principles
OLAF is assigned to carry out so-called
administrative investigations (both internal
and external). This term includes all con-
trols, inspections and other measures that
personnel of the agency carry out according
to their competences under the regulation
(EC) Nr. 1073/199 (Articles 3 and 4) in order
to achieve the aims de¿ned in Article 1 of
the mentioned regulation.
Meanwhile, the investigations are aimed
at combating fraud, corruption and other
unlawful acts committed at the expense
of the EC budget. Furthermore they are
meant to uncover serious offences against
professional duties by functionaries and
headquarter OLAF
employees of the Community which are
possibly punishable under disciplinary
regulations or even penal law.
The external administrative investigations
are aimed at strengthening the combating
of fraud, corruption and all other unlawful
acts committed at the expense of the EC
budget. In doing so, OLAF is executing
powers of the European Commission.
OLAF has several tasks to fulfil. The
agency is not limited to carrying out inves-
tigations.
Its further tasks are:
• Developing concepts for combating
fraud;
• Contributing to cooperation between the
Commission and the Member States in
the ¿eld of combating fraud;
• Preparing initiatives of the Commis-
sion;
• Ful¿lling all operative tasks in connection
with combating fraud for the Commis-
sion;
• Developing the necessary structures;
• Gathering and evaluating information;
• Providing technical support for other
bodies, agencies, administrations and
institutions and the public authorities in
charge in the Member States;
• Being available as a direct contact for
police and judicial agencies;
• Representing the Commission on the
responsible panels at a unit level.
The director of the agency is not allowed
to accept or ask for instructions from the
Commission, a government, another body,
institution, agency or administration.
If the director is of the opinion that a
measure of the Commission questions his
independence, he can bring suit against
the Commission at the Court of Justice.
He is authorised to commence investiga-
tions independently. This is another way
in which the independence of the of¿ce is
ensured.
OLAF must have access to all premises,
information and documents of the bodies,
institutions, agencies and administrations
in order to carry out internal investigations.
Access can be demanded without prior no-
tice and is to be granted immediately.
OLAF may check the accounting of the
aforementioned institutions. The agency
can duplicate all documents and the con-
tents of all media in their possession, or
demand extracts and seize the documents
and information if necessary to impede
its extermination. It can also question the
members of the bodies and the staff of the
aforementioned institutions.
OLAF is entitled to carry out controls on the
premises of involved economic players in
order to gain access to information in their
possession related to possible irregulari-
ties. The agency can also request informa-
tion from all players it deems of relevance
for its investigations.
The personnel of the agency has to present
a written authorisation in the scope of their
work. They carry out the investigations
without interruption, and ensure that the
duration of the investigations is adequate
to the circumstances and the complexity of
the case in hand.
Investigative authorities
The investigations within the scope of ad-
ministrative law carried out by OLAF should
not to be confused with audits. Audits are
aimed at controlling the orderliness and
the correct implementation of relevant legal
regulations in order to reveal administrative
de¿cits or irregularities.
Contrary to this, OLAF’s work consists of
precise and concrete investigations with
the aim of uncovering facts and/or unlawful
behaviour which possibly provide a reason
for disciplinary measures or prosecution
under penal or administrative law against
physical or legal persons. This can include
the reclamation of funds that were acquired

34 the new police in europe - 01/09

34 - 36 OLAF_goe.indd 34 22.04.2009 07:51:36


or used illegitimately. Conclusions drawn
during a normal auditing procedure might
well be a basis for further detailed investiga-
tions by OLAF.
As soon as irregularities that are relevant
under criminal law aspects emerge, person-
nel from a unit of the agency, comprised
of prosecutors and judges of the Member
States, are called in. They remain available
for the team working on the case. They
are in charge of organising the gathering
of evidence in such a way that the results
can be used in penal proceedings in the
Member States.
After carrying out an investigation, a re-
port is ¿led which complies with the legal
requirements of the Member State in which
the proceedings will take place. The reports
composed in this way are considered as
legitimate evidence (analogous to reports
and opinions of domestic authorities) within
the scope of administrative or judicial pro-
ceedings of the Member States in which
their employment proves to be necessary.
They are judged according to the same cri-
teria as administrative reports of domestic
inspectors and are to be considered as
being of the same value.3
The report composed after an external
investigation and all ‘useful’ documents
are conveyed to the authorities in charge in
the Member State in question.4 The same
applies correspondingly to internal inves-
tigations. The addressees are obligated to
take the necessary measures according to
the conclusions of the investigation, espe-
cially legal and disciplinary measures. The
director of OLAF is to be informed of the
subsequent measures within the deadline
set in the conclusions of his report.5
Each functionary or other employee of the
European Communities can ¿le a com-
plaint with the director of OLAF against
the measures taken against him within the
scope of an internal investigation, as long
as he respects the modalities set forth in
the respective statute. This applies analo-
gously to the staff of bodies, institutions
and agencies, which are not addressed
by the statute.6
Case studies
Given the high degree of popularity of the
agency, the public increasingly trusts OLAF
to use indicators it receives efficiently.
The amount of indicators that arrive at the
agency has gradually risen from 529 new
indicators in 2002 to 886 in 2007.
In 2007, 543 decisions were taken based
on the indicators received. The cases in
question vary from suspected corruption
within EU institutions to customs delin-
quency and economic subsidy fraud.
the new police in europe - 01/09
34 - 36 OLAF_goe.indd 35
Three case studies will be presented
below:
1. Internal investigation within an EU dele-
gation
The Directorate-General External Re-
lations of the European Commission
informed OLAF about ¿nancial irregulari-
ties within a Delegation of the European
Commission in an African state in 2005.
A random control of the delegation’s
book-keeping resulted in the suspicion
that an employee in the pay of¿ce had
possibly defrauded large sums.
During the OLAF investigations, which
were largely carried out in the of¿ces of
the delegation in Africa, money transfers
were investigated in detail and several
persons were questioned.
The investigation showed that an emp-
loyee in the book-keeping department
had systematically falsi¿ed the signatu-
res of authorised personnel on several
cheques, payment authorisations and
other book-keeping documents.
By this means, the employee could di-
vert about 300,000 EUR to her own bank
account. The results of the investigation
were relayed to the judicial authorities in
charge. The money was reclaimed.
2. Joint customs operation “Diabolo”
OLAF organised the ‘Operation Diabolo’
in the name of the European Commissi-
on in February 2007, a joint cross-border
operation by the customs authorities
of all 27 EU Member States in which
representatives of Interpol, Europol and
the World Customs Organisation were
involved.
The joint customs operation was aimed
at seizing brand name cigarettes and
other imitations. The maritime operation
OLAF
was a full success, regarding the coordi-
nation of the individual measures at EU
level. Overall, 67 containers with illegal
commodities were detected.
Most of these containers held fake clo-
thes, furniture, suitcases, shoes, elec-
trical appliances, sun glasses, football
goods, as well as fake mobile phone
accessories, toys and so on. Overall,
557,000 items were seized. One con-
tainer held non-declared poultry.
20 of the 67 containers held a total of
134,448,000 fake cigarettes.
The possible de¿cit in customs and tax
revenue for the European Community
and the Member States that was impe-
ded adds up to an estimated total of 220
million euros.
‘Operation Diabolo’ goes back to an
initiative of the member states of ASEM
(Asia-Europe Meeting). More than 300
customs functionaries from EU countries
were involved. The customs agencies
of the 27 Member States cooperated
closely and enhanced their exchange
of information under the coordination of
OLAF, in order to trace Àows of forged
commodities in the international traf¿c
in commodities.
Most international ports of the EU were
included in the whole duration of the
operation. The measure was coordina-
ted by a team of 9 liaison of¿cers of the
Member States and functionaries of the
Permanent Technical Support Infrastruc-
ture for Common Customs Operations
in the OLAF of¿ce in Brussels.
3. Fraud within the Scope of the European
Social Fund
An instructor in a training measure co-
¿nanced with funds from the European
Social Fund (ESF) contacted OLAF in
35
22.04.2009 07:51:38
 OLAF
2004, stating that he had not received
his full payment guaranteed within the
scope of the measure and that he sus-
pected fraud.
Thereupon OLAF started a so-called
‘external investigation’. During the
controls, which were also conducted
on the premises of the training facility,
it became clear that in several cases
excessive costs had been declared to
the administration.
The training facility had charged the
organiser of the training the services
and commodities provided, including the
computers and the salary of the trainers,
and had thereby raised its pro¿ts by
240% to 640%.
Therefore the trainers only received
25 % of the declared ‘expenditures for
salaries’. The receipts for the computer
equipment were declared as expenses
both by the addressee and the provider
(a case of so-called double ¿nancing).
With the sums declared for the leasing
of computer equipment alone, twice the
number of computers could have been
bought at normal market prices.
OLAF found out that the director of the
training facility had apparently paid
500,000 euros to the organiser without
any business-related reason. It can be
assumed that this is half of the sum
gained through the arranged fraud at
the expense of the Community budget
and national budgets.
OLAF suggested con¿scating all the
funds transferred to the addressee
(about 2 million euros). Furthermore, the
legal authorities of the affected Member
State were informed in order to initiate
measures for a prosecution.
36
34 - 36 OLAF_goe.indd 36
Conclusions
On the 31st of December 2007, 467
employees from 27 Member States were
working for OLAF. This includes judges,
lawyers, police and customs of¿cials, tax
investigators, accountants and even a vet.
This multi-disciplinary approach is one of
the recipes for success for OLAF. Thus the
agency is very well positioned.
The working languages are English and
French and several functionaries are so-
called temporary employees who return
to their home countries after a 6 to 8 year
commitment.
In less than 10 years, an agency was es-
tablished that is not only internationally re-
nowned and produces outstanding results
in its investigations, but is also contributing
decisively towards recovering growing
sums of illegally obtained EU funds.
The United Nations and other international
organisations turn to OLAF, among other
things, for advice on ‘best practice’ in the
¿eld of multinational investigations. Fur-
thermore, OLAF organises several inter-
national conferences in order to further the
exchange of important investigation results
and information.
This year, OLAF received the Award of
the European Union of Tax Payers. The
European tax payers’ organisation has
awarded the coveted trophy (a bronze bull,
a symbol of strength and assertiveness) to
EU institutions and personalities who ¿ght
against fraud and corruption once every
year since 1999.
In 2006 alone, damages at the expense
of the EU budget amounting to 1.2 billion
euros were uncovered thanks to OLAF.
Investigations conducted by OLAF have
already led to several convictions in the
different Member States.
The investigations in 2007 led to the re-
covery of 478 million euros. The yearly
expenses of OLAF amount to 52 million
euros, so the agency has ‘¿nanced itself’
by the end of February of each ¿scal year.
After this date, wrongly paid and recovered
money is directly refunded to the European
budget.
A so far unsolved problem of OLAF is that
all investigations end with the creation of a
dossier, and that OLAF has very little inÀu-
ence on the progress of the investigation as
soon as the results have been passed on
to the (judicial) authorities of the Member
States. This is one of the reasons why the
proposal was made to appoint a European
Prosecutor to safeguard the Community’s
interests. The proposal was included in
article 86 of the Lisbon Treaty (consolidated
version).
According to the article, the establishment
of a European Prosecution to combat of-
fences that damage the ¿nancial interest of
the Union would be possible through a spe-
cial, unanimous legislative procedure.7
The European Prosecution would be in
charge of criminal investigations as well as
the prosecution and arraignment of persons
who committed offences damaging the
¿nancial interests of the Union, or partici-
pated in committing them. The European
Prosecution would take on the role of the
prosecution in the responsible courts of the
Member States.8
As pointed out above, it’s possible estab-
lishment is part of the Lisbon Treaty, and
one can only hope that this part of the treaty
is implemented as soon as possible after
rati¿cation.
1
On tasks and competences of the
institution: Kuhl/Spitzer, EuZW 1998, 37
ff.; EuR 2000, 671 ff.; Wolffgang/Ulrich,
EuR 1998, 616 ff.; Gleß, EuZW 1999,
618 ff.; Mager ZEuS 2000, 177 ff.; Haus,
EuZW 2000, 745 ff.; Ulrich, EWS 2000,
137 ff.; Rabe, NVwZ 2001 (special issue),
54 ff.; von Bubnoff, ZEuS 2002, 185 ff.;
Hetzer, ZfZ 2003, 32 ff; Kriminalistik 2005,
419 ff. 105 ff.
2
http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/reports/
index_en.html.
3
Art. 9 Abs. 2 VO (EG) Nr. 1073/1999.
4
Art. 9 Abs. 3 VO (EG) Nr. 1073/1999.
5
Art. 9 Abs. 4 VO (EG) Nr. 1073/1999.
6
Art. 14 VO (EG) Nr. 1073/1999.
7
Art. 86 para. 1 Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the European Union and
the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (Lisbon Treaty)
8
Art. 86 para. 1 Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the European Union and
the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (Lisbon Treaty)
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 07:51:41
 RWE

The Protection of Critical Infrastructures in the Energy Sector

Michael Schmidt, Leiter Konzernsicherheit, RWE Aktiengesellschaft
To get some idea of a large-scale power cut we need only to remind ourselves of the
incident in November 2006 when a high voltage line above the river Ems was turned
off and suddenly caused darkness to descend in Germany, France, Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, Italy and Spain. To this very day we do not have any exact ¿gures relating to
the damage, either on a wider national scale, or on the level of the company. Security
experts therefore classify the power supply as one of the so-called “critical infrastructures”
(KRITIS in German).

The life blood of industrial society
In a way, critical infrastructures are the life
blood of a modern industrial society. They
include, for instance, traf¿c and transport,
the health service, information technology
and communications. Services in these
and other critical infrastructures are a vital
prerequisite for positive economic devel-
opment, the welfare of the population and
political stability. Yet without energy – and
thus without the blood supply to the veins
of a country – these facilities would be
impossible to provide.
“The security of supplies is absolutely vital
for our customers. If the power supply of a
major provider were interrupted, this would
have far-reaching consequences not only
for private but also business customers. We
cannot therefore afford any severe disrup-
tion to our availability, for instance through
malicious damage to supply facilities,” says
Michael Schmidt in an interview with the
new police in europe. The head of Corpo-
rate Security at RWE AG in Essen, Ger-
many, is well aware that the responsibilities
in his function cover not only the smooth
running of a company and the safety of its
workforce, but ultimately also an obligation
towards society as a whole.
The German government – or, more pre-
cisely, the Interior Ministry – is aware of this
and has become proactive. Working togeth-
er with the affected companies and organi-
sations, it set up a “National Plan for the
Protection of Information Infrastructures”
(NPSI) in 2005. If there is one thing that is
obvious it is that the digital networking of
global economic and social processes has
made information technology (IT) the very
heart of modern civilisation. Any disruptions
are therefore dangerous. So the KRITIS
Implementation Plan of the German Inte-
rior Ministry lists organisational, structural
and practical measures within a speci¿c
time window that can be used by affected
organisations to avert such dangers, to
respond to them and effectively to sustain
a level of protection.
KRITIS is also supported by RWE as an
initiative that has its equivalent at the
European level in the form of EPCIP, the
European Programme for Critical Infra-
structure Protection. In addition, very high
safety standards are speci¿ed through sec-
tor-speci¿c laws for the energy and nuclear
industries, aimed particularly at power and
water utilities.
In the interest of society at large
A number of different units within groups
of companies are concerned with security
issues. These include Health & Safety,
Internal Auditing and IT. “What is therefore
required”, says Schmidt, “is clear de¿nitions
of the functions of these units and also joint
activities at a number of different levels.”
One way in which RWE ensures this in
its role as a utility is through its head of
Corporate Security, a position created to
coordinate such functions while keeping an
eye on the interests of society at large and
also on speci¿c details. Corporate Security
and its security organisation have wide-
ranging responsibilities for the prevention
and aversion of so-called malicious (and
thus harmful) acts. There are clear de¿ni-
tions of the relevant responsibilities and
interfaces with other departments.
Especially against the background of the
KRITIS initiative, Schmidt points out that
collaboration with IT professionals has
been close and based on trust. Emphasis-
ing that “there is now no longer any doubt
about the increasing risk of cyber crime,”
he concludes that, unsurprisingly, corporate
security and cyber forensics have become
inseparable. This is not exactly very palat-
able to many heads of security, as they ¿nd
the virtual world and its complexities rather
overwhelming. Yet Schmidt believes that it
is inevitable. “Our Corporate Security also
includes IT expertise in cyber forensics.”

A high level of security within the Group

must be based on an integrated overall
security concept that de¿nes both the strat-
egy and the activities which are necessary
for implementation. Obviously, Michael
Schmidt does not wish to go into details
at this point. In fact, the only way to set up
and sustain a good level of security is by
providing information and conducting activi-
ties across companies, sectors of industry
and national borders.
More speci¿cally, Schmidt says: “The crea-
tion of an effective security concept presup-
poses exact knowledge of potential threats.
We have therefore conducted a detailed
analysis that covers both publicly acces-
sible information and our own experience.
The various scenarios were assessed in

the new police in europe - 01/09 37

37 - 38 RWE - Schmidt_goe.indd 37 22.04.2009 07:54:50

 RWE
detail for their probability of occurrence
and potential damage and were then con-
solidated in a risk matrix. The bandwidth of
such criminal acts ranges from traditional
theft and fraud to sabotage, for instance,
of power stations and transport networks.
Moreover, according to the German Interior
Ministry, the energy sector is also a primary
target for industrial espionage. Another
area that has been increasingly at the focus
concerns criminal acts perpetrated through
cyber attacks.”
16 security measures
The RWE security strategy is “Action in-
stead of reaction”. The idea is that damage
should not occur in the ¿rst place. This is
far more ef¿cient than having to limit the
effects of damage, no matter how profes-
sionally such damage may subsequently be
handled. Also, the provision of information
is no longer required if nothing has hap-
pened. 18 speci¿c security measures have
been de¿ned:
Throughout the Group:
- Integrated concept
- Directives
- Analysis
- Security regulatory affairs
- Security support issues
- Security risk prevention
- Information security
- Business contingency management
Preventative:
- Protection of property
- Personal security
- Protection of events
- Security speci¿cations
- Security due diligence support
- Travel security
- Identi¿cation and aversion of risks
- Identi¿cation and reporting of criminal
acts
- Crisis management
- Forensics
38
37 - 38 RWE - Schmidt_goe.indd 38
ships”. As an example, he mentions the
security partnership with the authorities
of the state of North-Rhine Westphalia,
initiated by the Association for Security in
Industry in NRW. Schmidt himself is the
deputy chairman of this association.
“As criminals are getting increasingly inter-
national”, says the RWE security chief, “it
has also become more and more impor-
tant for us to collaborate with nationwide
authorities.” The same point was recently
emphasised by Jörg Ziercke, head of BKA,
the German Federal Office of Criminal
Investigation. At his initiative, there is now
close coordination on security between
BKA, nationwide German authorities
and a group of German companies with
international operations, including RWE.
Moreover, RWE regularly takes part in a
Practical implementation is the responsibil-
series of exercises coordinated between
ity of the security organisation, comprising
all the German states by the Bundesamt
Corporate Security and the local security
für Bevölkerungsschutz (German Civil
management of each af¿liate. In this con-
Protection Authority) and Katastrophenhilfe
text, Corporate Security has a wider func-
(the German Disaster Relief Organisation),
tion of de¿ning security speci¿cations and
while also taking an active part in the KRI-
minimum standards. Obviously, the require-
TIS initiative.
ments of the various facilities of a utility
None of this is likely to add much romanti-
group such as RWE can differ enormously
cism to a power cut. However, it will ensure
at times: an administrative building needs
confidence among the population and
a completely different security concept from
businesses that power cuts will be rare and
a power plant.
indeed harmless incidents.
Schmidt points out that compliance with
RWE
minimum standards is the responsibility
RWE is one of Europe’s leading suppliers
of the security management of each af¿li-
of electricity and gas. In the 2006 ¿nan-
ate. As with individual facilities, one has to
cial year its workforce of approx. 62,000
look at the speci¿c security needs of each
achieved external net sales of over 42
company.
billion Euros. Its most important markets
for the production, sale and marketing of
The implementation of security measures
energy are in Germany, the UK and central
and the observance of corporate standards
eastern Europe. RWE provides electricity
by the various companies are regularly
for 20 million customers and gas for 10
monitored by Corporate Security through
million customers.
security compliance audits. To facilitate a
close information exchange between all
stakeholders, a Security Steering Commit-
tee has been put in place, enabling repre-
sentatives of Corporate Security to meet
regularly with the security representatives
of each company. This committee ensures
a standardised procedure and regularly
discusses fundamental new regulations in
matters of security issues.
Collaboration with authorities
How does RWE handle harmful criminal
acts? Michael Schmidt leaves no misun-
derstandings on this issue: “Every criminal
act within the RWE Group is generally
reported to the authorities, so that criminal
charges can be brought. Where investiga-
tions are concerned, we work hand in hand
with the authorities.” Independently of this
procedure, RWE also cooperates with the
authorities strategically and on all levels,
starting with regional “security partner-
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 07:54:50
39 Anzeige Me-Le_goe.indd 39 22.04.2009 07:58:51
 reports from the states
United
Kingdom
Serious Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA)
Chris Humphrey, Senior Manager,
Head of Strategy & Partnerships for
Europe, Balkans & Multilateral
The United Kingdom’s Serious Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA) is utilising new
powers to place conditions, restrictions
or reporting requirements on criminals
involved in serious crime.
Serious Crime Prevention Orders are
designed to protect the public by pre-
venting or deterring individuals from
continuing their involvement in crime or
re-offending after being convicted for a
criminal offence.
William Hughes, SOCA’s Director Gen-
eral, said: “New legislation such as
Serious Crime Prevention Orders are
an important weapon in our armoury and
will make the UK an ever more dif¿cult
place to commit serious organised crime.
Breach of an order, which can last for up
to ¿ve years from the date it commences,
is punishable by up to ¿ve years impris-
onment and an unlimited ¿ne.”
SOCA obtained orders recently as part of
an operation to dismantle an organised
crime gang involved in drug traf¿cking
and money laundering.
Ten men were jailed for a total of 105
years and the orders, which in this case
come into force after release from prison,
will prevent six of the gang members from
possessing more than £1,000 in cash
without informing SOCA and owning or
using more than one mobile phone.
Orders can be tailor made to take into ac-
count an individual’s offending behaviour
and one of them also included terms to
prevent a gang member from possess-
ing cutting agents – chemicals that can
be used to bulk out drugs and increase
pro¿ts for dealers.
Mr Hughes added: “The lengthy jail terms
and prohibitive restrictions imposed fol-
lowing this operation send a very clear
message to criminals that their activities
may be curtailed even after prison sen-
tences have been completed.”
Orders issued at the time of conviction
can prevent an individual from using
the same modus operandi to re-offend
but law enforcement agencies can also
40
40 - 43 Länderumschau_goe.indd 40
apply to a court for orders in non convic-
tion cases. In these circumstances, the
orders are designed to prevent someone
from facilitating or enabling others to
commit crime as the person’s behaviour
may stop short of committing a criminal
offence.
Serious Crime Prevention Orders were cre-
ated through the Serious Crime Act 2007
which can be viewed at www.opsi.gov.
uk/acts/acts2007/ukpga_20070027_en_1.
If you would like further information on how
the legislation can be utilised contact Ken
Pandol¿ via e-mail – ken.pandol¿@soca.
x.gsi.gov.uk.
Bulgaria
Mihail Mikov, Ministry of the Interior,
Bulgaria, So¿a:
“Every day we should provide evi-
dence that the police work for the
citizens”
The criminal world is mobile and modern,
therefore, police cooperation should be
so powerful that criminals feel “con¿ned”
in the European Union – this is the
Bulgarian approach to the ¿ght against
crime.
The Bulgarian police haves a 129
year old history, nearly as long as
the new Bulgarian state. All those
years the police authorities worked
for the consolidation of the system of
government in the ¿ght against crime.
“Every day we should provide evidence
that the police work for the citizens” -
the Minister of the Interior, Mihail Mikov,
recently announced on the occasion of
the Bulgarian police anniversary. This
will be the motto of Bulgarian policemen
performing their day-to-day duties.
Since the accession of Bulgaria as a full
member of the European Union, our state
has been standing up to the necessity for
changes that will make the work of the
police a more demanding one, and more
appreciated by society. In this context,
reformation of police structures started
both at central and local levels several
months ago.There are ¿ve major direc-
tories within the police: Criminal Police,
Security Police, Investigation, Border Po-
lice and Fire Safety and Rescue, as the
focus is on a change of attitude among
police personnel with a view to improving
communication with the people towards
the achievement of clear and visible
results.
The Ministry of the Interior also carries
out a number of tasks directly related to
the membership of our state in the EU,
with a particular focus on the Schengen
requirements. “Our task is to achieve
such level of readiness by 2010 with the
objective of being admitted in the Schen-
gen area in March 2011”, Minister Mihail
Mikov announced. Our state has one of
the most complex borders in the EU, and
the Bulgarian border is external as part of
the European ones. Their protection and
successful border control are among the
most important instruments for the future
safety of Europe. On the other hand, the
border control requirements in line with
EU standards are a pre-condition for our
inclusion in the Schengen area.
Collaborative relationships between
Bulgarian policemen and their colleagues
from the rest of the European states are
basic to the implementation of the objec-
tives and priorities set and discussed dur-
ing the Council of the Ministers on Justice
and Home Affairs in Brussels a week
ago. Among them, are the establishment
of a national and European platform for
cyber security; an increase in operative
police cooperation; the localization of
major sources of drugs, in particular,
cocaine in Western Africa and common
actions for their seizure. Another priority,
discussed by the European Ministers of
the Interior, and extremely important for
the Republic of Bulgaria as well, is the
use of “the ¿les” of passengers on civilian
Àights in the interest of the ¿ght against
terrorism. The issue has been put on the
agenda in most of the European states,
and Bulgaria should not lag behind in
discussing it. The Bulgarian Minister
of the Interior will present this issue for
discussion in the Parliament of our state,
in order Bulgaria to be able to participate
in drafting the common statement of the
EU. Collection of data, accessible within
two days prior to the Àights and process-
ing of ¿les with information, immediately
after the departure as the information is
used in the ¿ght against terrorism and
organized crime.
Bulgaria activates police cooperation
with the Western Balkan states as our
additional contribution of EU security
within its external borders.
Understanding and implementing the
team - spirit of the work among all law
enforcement and judicial bodies is a
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 08:13:35

guarantee of the achievement of good
results and overcoming the criticism
directed at us in the last report of the
European Commission. On the side of
the government institutions, over 70
measures have been noted towards solv-
ing the problems which we have been
criticized for and carried out the ones
addressed to the activities of the MoI
rapidly and in time. Of course, there is
still a lot to be done to achieve maximum
positive results. However, joint efforts
on the part of the MoI, prosecution, tax
authorities and customs services are
a guarantee for that. “Maybe it would
be better if we shortened the terms in
MoI, terms in prosecution, terms in the
courts, in order for penal liability to be
executed faster”, the Bulgarian Minister
of the Interior Mr. Mikov considers. We
shall think seriously about his in order for
Bulgaria to save time and efforts in the
¿ght against crime and, indeed, for our
country to be objectively assessed for it
achievements.
“Bulgarians are the smallest group
among the criminals in Bavaria and their
presence decreases every year” – said
Petra Zandles, Vice President of the Ba-
varian Criminal Police, during her recent
meeting with the Minister of the Interior
of Bulgaria. In her opinion, that is due to
the good work and the long tradition of
interaction between the Bavarian and
the Bulgarian Police. An operation for
the seizure of 70 kilos of heroin valued
at 3 million euro at the end of November
this year, in the Bulgarian Danube town
of Russe is the most recent successful
joint - operation between the police forcrs
of Bavaria and Bulgaria. That is just one
of the examples which indicates how
useful the enhanced police cooperation
can be. The world of crime is mobile and
modern, therefore, police cooperation
should be so powerful that criminals feel
“con¿ned” in the European Union - this
is the Bulgarian approach to the ¿ght
against crime.
Estonia
26th IACP European Executive Policing
Conference in Tallinn on 26th-28th of
April 2009
Raivo Küüt, National Police Commis-
sioner of Estonia and Russel B. Laine,
President of IACP
the new police in europe - 01/09
40 - 43 Länderumschau_goe.indd 41
We are delighted to announce that
Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, will be
hosting the 26th European Executive
Policing Conference of the lnternational
Association of Chiefs of Police from 26-
28 April 2009. The motto of the confer-
ence is: Looking to the future - the key
to success.
The secret of success of an effective law
enforcement system is to be one step
ahead of the others- to foresee the possi-
ble developments analyse them and thus
¿nd the best solutions. That is why the
constant advancement of law enforce-
ment structures is highly important.
The upcoming conference gives us
plenty of opportunities to ¿x our eyes on
the future and discuss the police model,
essential components of which are inte-
grated ef¿cient training, organisational
values and modern technology.
You are offered an excellent chance to
exchange best practices and meet col-
leagues and friends. We believe that the
days spent together will be pro¿table and
informative, not, however, lacking the
time for rest and entertainment. Social
programme involving a welcome recep-
tion at Song Festival Ground, a gala din-
ner, and a sightseeing tour will give the
participants a broader view of the city and
introduce them to the cultural heritage
and the way of life of Estonians.
Partners’ programme is mainly focused
on art, culture, history and nature, but
those interested in the local industrial
scene can visit business enterprises. We
hope everyone will discover something
new and fascinating about Estonia.
Conference information
The conference dates are 26-28 April
2009. All of¿cial conference events will
take place at the Reval Hotel Olümpia,
Liivalaia St 33, Tallinn. Participants are
expected to arrive either on Saturday, 25
April or Sunday, 26 April. The conference
ends with the Gala Dinner on 28 April and
every participant is highly welcome to join
this festive event.
Registration
Participants are requested to register
by sending in the completed registration
form and with payment in full no later than
1 MARCH 2009. Registering is available
online or by fax or by post. The Regis-
tration form can be found at the confer-
ence website. Conference Fees are for
members 250 EUR, non-member 300
EUR, partners150 EUR. The conference
fee will cover conference participation,
reports from the states
meals and social events, but not hotel
accommodation.
For updated conference information,
including the agenda, conference reg-
istration and hotel reservations, please
visit our conference website at www.
politsei.ee/iacp.
In case of questions please contact
conference@pol.ee or call +372 6123
082 or +372 6123 070.
Romania
Schengen area. Goals and priorities
of the Romanian
Nicuúor Dulgheru, Colaborator, Chief
Editor of “Romanian Police” Maga-
zine
Romania’s accession to the Schengen
space is considered as the normal step
to take by an EU Member state, for
ensuring the safety of its own citizens
and implicitly of the EU citizens. Conse-
quently, this represents a top objective
for all the concerned institutions in the
next period.
From this perspective, Romania’s efforts
for acceding to the Schengen space
are focused on three levels: legislation,
institutions and staff training.
Legislative measures
The alignment of the national legislation
with the European acquis, generally, and
particularly with the Schengen acquis,
started prior to Romania’s accession to
the EU. From this point of view, it is highly
signi¿cant the approval of the Law no.
302/2004 on international judiciary coop-
eration as well as the Government Order
no. 103/2006 on measures for facilitating
the international police cooperation.
After Romania’s accession to the EU,
the legislation alignment process con-
tinued- on the one hand, by initiating
negotiations and concluding bilateral
agreements with Hungary and Bulgaria
(still in the negotiation phase) and on the
other hand, by drafting secondary legis-
lation (national norms and procedures
for implementing and using Schengen
Information System)
Institutional measures
For centralizing Romania’s efforts for
Schengen accesion, a unique, coordi-
nation body was set up in 2007, through
Government order, at the level of the
41
22.04.2009 08:13:36
 reports from the states
Ministry for Interior and Administrative
Reform - the Schengen Department. Its
role is to coordinate the activities of all
the institutions and authorities involved
in the accession process as well as to
represent a unique partner in the discus-
sions with the other Schengen Member
States.
The Schengen Department is the unique
national authority in this ¿eld, in charge
with ful¿lling the necessary conditions
for Romania’s accession to Schengen
space.
Its main task is to coordinate and su-
pervise the actions initiated by Romania
in the fields of legislation alignment
and institutions for achieving this goal.
The head of the Department is a state
secretary and also the chairman of the
Romanian Interministerial Group for the
State Border Management and chairman
of the National Commission for Schen-
gen Evaluation.
Under the subordination of the Schengen
Department, the Schengen General Di-
rectorate was established, consisting of
of¿ces and units with competencies in
evaluation, facility, acquis, cooperation
and contact, IT, secretariat, restricted
documents.
Also, in 2006, through Gov. Order the
National Commission for Schengen
Evaluation was established. It is an
advisory body, with no legal personality.
Its purpose is to coordinate the national
policies and strategies in the ¿eld.
Starting from 2007, under the authority
of the National Commission, evaluation
missions were organized. These mis-
sions were coordinated by the Schen-
gen Evaluation Of¿ce within Schengen
General Directorate, together with the
representatives of the structures in-
volved in the evaluation process. The
missions assessed the borders control
and police cooperation related issues.
The purpose was to assess theoretical
issues - such as the knowledge of the
Schengen relevant documents- but also
to check the practical implementation of
the Schengen acquis, good practices and
recommendations. Another important
aspect of the missions was for the as-
sessed structures to get familiar with the
evaluation process. Foreign experts also
took part in such evaluation missions.
Follow up reports containing conclusions
and recommendations were drafted. The
latter are inserted into charts and the
process for removing the de¿ciencies
42
40 - 43 Länderumschau_goe.indd 42
is permanently monitored at the central
level. Also, at the level of all institutions
involved in the accession process, spe-
cialized units were set up to coordinate
Schengen and personal data protection
relevant activities.
Staff training
Apart from the above described meas-
ures, we appreciate that in the accession
process the staff play an essential role.
Thus, it is necessary that at the acces-
sion moment, the professional training
level of the Romanian police of¿cers
should be linked with the operational
necessities and allow them to make use
of all the means and methods provided
by the Schengen acquis, the international
agreements concluded by Romania, with
a view to ensuring an area for liberty,
security and justice.
In order to achieve this, training sessions
were organized both at the central and
territorial level, especially in the internal
border areas. Each territorial unit has
trainers, specialized in the ¿eld of in-
ternational police cooperation. In order
to disseminate the necessary informa-
tion, it was the train the trainers system
which was used and not the centralized
training model which would have failed
to respond to the training needs in the
territorial units.
The feedback was obtained by applying
assessment questionnaires in the ter-
ritorial units. The results were used in
establishing training priorities for the next
year and pointing out the items which
needs further training.
However, an important stage is to be
taken - the training program of the SIS
end-users which will be developed using
the e-learning and the train the trainers
system.
To conclude, the results achieved until
present, as well as the European positive
feedback allow us to be optimistic about
the future, on the condition to further
focus on the continuous training in order
to ful¿l our goal - the accession of our
country to the Schengen area.
Finland
School shootings shattered Finland
Mikko Paatero, National Police Com-
misioner, Finland
For a long time we thought that school
shootings were a problem only at
American schools. However, the situation
changed towards the end of the 1990s
when we started to hear news about
serious and intentional shooting sprees
at schools in countries like Saudi-Arabia,
Brazil, the Netherlands, Sweden and
Germany. Recently two schools shoot-
ings upset Finland.
In Finland, we have had two similar inci-
dents at schools within a relatively short
time. The first shooting incident took
place in Jokela on 07 November 2007. A
young male shot eight persons to death
at his school and ¿nally killed himself.
Similarly, in Kauhajoki on 23 September
2008, a young man shot ten persons
to death at his school and then killed
himself. These incidents have aroused
general insecurity among the public and
been a great concern to the authorities.
School shootings have received a lot of
academic interest all around the world.
The most essential ¿nding of the cur-
rent research is that the shooters are
typically males who have a great inter-
est in ¿rearms and militaria and who are
likely to be anti-social by nature. Their
anti social thinking is seldom reÀected
in their behaviour, and they seem not to
differ that much from other young men
of their age.
However, these young men do not ¿re
shots at their schools on an unde¿ned
whim. In fact a school shooting may be
understood as the utmost culmination
point of a long-term process. During this
process before shooting anyone these
young men’s behaviour may give certain
alarm signs indicating the danger. These
signs may include for example a sense
of superiority, racial attitudes emphasiz-
ing the power of the strongest and open
hostility towards society.
The shooter has a clear goal to kill as
many people as possible. According to
the research, as soon as the shooter
realizes that a risk of his apprehension
has increased, he is likely to commit a
suicide. We all know that the primary
duty of the police in cases like this is to
apprehend the shooter and secure the
safety of other students. When it is not
possible, the authorities should take ac-
tion to disarm the shooter as quickly as
possible in order to minimise the number
of victims.
One of the most interesting research
findings is the so called “leaking”. It
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 08:13:36

means that without an exception the
shooter “leaks” or gives one or more
signals indicating the coming shooting
spree. These may include hints about
his fantasies or plans about shooting
people at school. These hints or indica-
tions may be verbal, written or taped.
For us as authorities, this is an important
¿nding and as such, it provides a mean
to prevent school shootings. In this light,
the importance of monitoring the Internet
and observations made in that context
become emphasized.
Large scale analysis operation re-
vealed potential shooters
The Finnish police authorities have been
particularly concerned about threats
of future school shootings posed after
the two shooting incidents. The police
have taken all threats posed to schools
very seriously. In fact we have had a
zero-tolerance to them. After the shoot-
ing in Jokela in 2007, approximately 90
cases of future threats were reported
to the police, whereas after the most
recent shooting in Kauhajoki in 2008,
the corresponding ¿gure was close to
200. Especially threats posed after the
Kauhajoki incident have employed crimi-
nal investigators to the limits of available
resources, as they have questioned and
interviewed potential suspects and made
house searches and seizures. Accord-
ing to the most recent information, the
police have seized nine ¿rearms from
suspects.
The Finnish Police carried out a large
scale analysis operation whose purpose
was to prevent such school incidents
in the near future. The operation took
advantage of web monitoring and cross-
analysing the information of different
authorities. After the Kauhajoki tragedy
the National Bureau of Finland (NBI) has
been in charge of the web monitoring. It
is conducted on a daily basis between 8
and 24 hrs. After the Kauhajoki incident
the NBI has provided an e mail address
and a phone number for tips. Hundreds of
tips were received. In addition hundreds
of web pro¿les were investigated. Ten of
them, similar to the Finnish school shoot-
ers’ pro¿les, are still under monitoring. At
present the amount of tips is decreasing
and the NBI receives approximately 10
tips per day, half of which requires meas-
ures to be taken.
Professional web monitoring requires
trained personnel, sophisticated software
the new police in europe - 01/09
40 - 43 Länderumschau_goe.indd 43
and understanding the unique communi-
cation culture of the web. The Supreme
Police Command has decided to provide
880,000 euros for the improving of web
monitoring. The web monitoring and the
developing technology it requires, do not
only improve the capability of the Finnish
Police in prevention but strengthens the
ability to combat and investigate a wide
range of web crimes. The Police authori-
zation must always be based on an exist-
ing law. In addition the Supreme Police
Command has sharpened the directives
on preconditions for surveillance and for
undercover activities on the web.
From the prevention point of view the
amount of information on the web is
enormous. Merely some Finnish web
communities have hundreds of thou-
sands of active users on a weekly basis.
Authorities can partly oppose the threats
on the web by monitoring it. However
the Police should co-operate with op-
erators, moderators and citizens. Practi-
cally active surfers of web services and
moderators have an outstanding view in
order to detect crimes and phenomena
that the Police might be interested in.
Therefore these observations play a vital
role in prevention and investigation. The
Supreme Police Command has a project
for providing a secured website for mod-
erators and web surfers forwarding their
observations to the Police.
A liaison of¿cer will assist schools to
audit the security plans
The up-dating of security plans of schools
is topical. The Police will provide the
schools with its expertise and experience
in prevention. The prevention actions
taken by the schools play a vital role. For
this reason it is important for schools to
up-date their security plans taking into
account not only ¿re but also possible
school shootings. The Supreme Police
Command has nation widely instructed
the local police in the whole country to
contact all schools in their area of respon-
sibility and audit the security plans in co-
operation with the school staff. The plans
will be updated to meet the new threats.
In addition all schools will be assigned a
liaison police of¿cer from the local police
department to act as a contact person
between the Police and the school.
The Jokela and Kauhajoki incidents have
been taken into account at several levels
of development of the Police procedures
and co-operations. The active and effec-
tive Àow of information between different
reports from the states
authorities plays a key role in prevention.
The Supreme Police Command has
given guidelines for the harmonization
of fire-arm permit procedures at the
national level. Furthermore the Police
have commenced negotiations with the
Defence Forces and the Ministry of So-
cial Affairs and Health in order to obtain
such information that might be relevant
to a ¿re-arm permit under process.
The Finnish Police have conducted ac-
tions in order to develop and improve
changes in preventing such incidents.
A three-day seminar concerning school
shooting was held at the Police College
of Finland in Tampere between 15 and
17 December 2008. The target group
consisted of senior of¿cers in charge of
strategic and tactical planning. The aim
of the seminar was to provide a best
practice model in tactics at the scene
of school shootings. This model will be
introduced at the following international
seminar.
At the EU level important co-operation
is conducted in the EPCTF (European
Police Chief Task Force). In order to raise
our situational awareness on how other
countries have prepared themselves
for school shootings and on tactical
guidelines of the police while acting at
the shooting scene, The Finnish Minis-
try of the Interior will arrange a one-day
seminar on school shootings in Vantaa,
Finland, on the 22th of January 2009.
Preventing future school shootings is a
major challenge for the Police and for
society. The above-mentioned “leaking”
may be a vital starting point for prediction
and prevention. It appears that by seek-
ing possible warning signs, especially
on the web, and by identifying persons
behind them at an early stage would
give an opportunity to prevent such an
incident. It demands awareness of au-
thorities and seamless cooperation at the
national and international level in order
to detect warning signs from the social
environment of the perpetrator.
Mikko Paatero, National Police Commisioner
43
22.04.2009 08:13:36
 Biogas

Biogas plants, the future-oriented energy suppliers

Stefan Sauer, Project Manager, Archea ME-LE Anlagenbau GmbH
In times when environmental and climate protection have become a necessity, the produc- in some cases with the help of ¿xed feed-
tion of energy from renewable and locally available resources plays an ever more important in tariffs or with other business models,
role. The production of biogas as a source of energy in modern biogas plants has proved such as the issuance of certi¿cates. With
to be an ef¿cient addition to the concept of power supply. This kind of energy production by the economic development resulting from
means of fermentation is to a great extent independent of weather conditions and seasonal these measures and the creation of innova-
inÀuences. The fermentation process is based on biomass turned into high-quality fertilizer in tive training positions and jobs, sustainable
a complex bacterial biodegradation process. At the same time, the bacteria produce biogas technologies are not only of great interest
that can be turned into electricity and heat using its main energy source, methane, in, for to future generations but can also help to
example, a combined heat and power plant. This resource-friendly energy production is a solve current problems.
pro¿table option for many agricultural holdings to provide economic security for the farm and Archea ME-LE Anlagenbau GmbH, with
at the same time take on ecological responsibility. In Germany, more and more farmers are its headquarters in Torgelow, offers you
recognizing the possibilities of this new market and the number of biogas plants is constantly turnkey biogas plants based on innovative
increasing. This trend is boosted by municipal and supraregional energy suppliers that no plant concepts and reliable technologies.
longer only want to purchase green energy but to produce it themselves as well. As a competent partner, we combine the
distribution and planning capabilities as well
After the signing of the Kyoto Protocol and up to 9.0bn KWh of biogas energy annually as the biological and technical expertise
the goals set in it, Germany passed the Act and about the same amount of heat. At the of the Archea group with the experience
on Renewable Energies. This Act regulates same time, the production of green energy of ME-LE as the general contractor in the
feed-in tariffs for renewable energies into reduces the emission of carbon dioxide by ¿eld of plant construction.
public power supply systems. These tariffs 8.5m t a year, and the controlled fermentati- Please do not hesitate to contact us before
are ¿xed for 20 years and are intended on of liquid manure prevents the discharge or when planning a project.
to guarantee the economic ef¿ciency of of greenhouse gases like methane. We will come and analyze your location
alternative energy facilities and, above at no cost and then be able to develop an
all, to facilitate their ¿nancing. Since the Regulations for the promotion of renewable adequate concept and calculate its econo-
amendment to this Act in 2004, the market energies were passed in many neighbou- mic feasibility. So your ¿nancial risks will
has been booming, especially in the ¿eld of ring European countries as well. The pro- be minimized.
biogas plants. Over 4,000 biogas plants are motion of regenerative energy production If you decide to go ahead with the project,
currently operating in Germany, producing is making good progress in these countries, we will compile the documents of approval

44 the new police in europe - 01/09

44 - 45 Sauer_goe.indd 44 22.04.2009 08:44:00


on your behalf and elaborate a suitable
¿nancing model for you, if you wish. Our
team of quali¿ed engineers, draftsmen,
technicians and economists work hand
in hand in order to guarantee a smooth
implementation of our building projects.
We accompany you during all phases of
your project – from the concept and the
actual construction of your turnkey biogas
plant to its maintenance. You can rely on
our competence and choose a future-proof
biogas plant which will enable you to make
use of all types of substrates.
Archea ME-LE biogas plants work on the
principle of fermentation of organic mate-
rial. Different substrates can be used for
biogas production. These include liquid
manure, manure, grass, energy crops
and agricultural waste products. Surplus
production and returned goods from food-
stuffs and fodder production can also be
used. The input mix should be kept as
constant as possible. In order to ensure
an even input when the substrates are not
produced at the same constant level over
the year, suf¿cient storage space has to
be provided.
Archea ME-LE biogas plants generally
have several stages. This means that they
consist of a sequence reactor which the
biomass Àows through. For the most part,
they are upright concrete containers, but
they can also be horizontal steel pipes.
Fifth European Day for the Victims of Terrorism - The European Commission ex-
presses its continued and deeply felt solidarity with all victims of terrorist attacks
On the occasion of the ¿fth European
Day for the Victims of Terrorism, the
European Commission remembers and
honors those who have lost their lives in
terrorist events in Europe and elsewhere
in the world and those who still bear
the mental and physical scars of these
tragic events. The European Commission
stands united with victims, their families
and their friends.
Vice President Barrot stresses: “It is ex-
tremely important that we have dedicated
this day to the victims of terrorism to show
that our solidarity with all victims of terror-
ist attacks will never come to an end.”
Five years ago the most terrible terrorist
attacks on European ground took place in
Madrid. Since then March 11 is the Euro-
the new police in europe - 01/09
44 - 45 Sauer_goe.indd 45
The biomass is fermented with the help of
methanogenic bacteria in the absence of
oxygen. In order to prevent the formation
of Àoating and sinking layers, the substra-
te must be constantly stirred, which also
supports the deduction of the generated
biogas. The biogas collected in the digester
under a membrane roof is then cleaned
and transferred to the cogeneration power
section of the plant. Here combustion
engines produce electricity and heat via
generators. Another alternative is to treat
the biogas and feed it into an existing na-
tural gas network.
An additional side effect of the fermenta-
tion process is the production of excellent
mineral fertilizer that is quickly available
for plants, odourless in contrast to liquid
manure, homogenized and thus very envi-
ronmentally-friendly.
Our experience shows that multi-stage bio-
gas plants reach high levels of process sta-
bility, guaranteeing a high level of capacity
utilization. Additionally, the degradation rate
is higher, which increases gas production
by 20 per cent and sustainably enhances
the profitability of the plant. Through a
high level of standardization of our biogas
plants, we reach signi¿cant reductions in
the investment costs and construction time.
Our biogas plants are based on modular
concepts and can therefore be adapted to
your speci¿c requirements. At the same
time, we can guarantee an optimized
Decisions of the EU
pean Day for the victims of terrorism. In a
video message for the European Network
of Victims of Terrorism, Vice-President
Jacques Barrot emphasizes that this day
is an occasion to once again express
sympathy with the victims and with their
families and friends. It is obvious that
there can never be adequate compensa-
tion for the victims or for the families and
loved ones of the victims of terrorism.
However, the Commission tries to sup-
port them, amongst others by assisting
to ¿nance projects aiming at improving
victims’ lives and by actively promoting
solidarity with them.
The Commission hopes that this small
contribution can offer them some as-
sistance in the dif¿cult task of having to
Biogas
gas production at constantly high quality
levels.
In addition to planning and constructing,
we offer you comprehensive services and
maintenance of our mostly automated
plants. All steps of the fermentation pro-
cess are electronically monitored and can
be remote controlled by the operator. This
ensures short response times during main-
tenance periods and almost 100 percent
operation time.
Please feel free to seek our advice and start
producing energy – in an economical and
almost neutral way in terms pollutants.
Environmental protection is imperative in
our time. Fossil fuels will run low in the near
future due to the continuously increasing
need for energy in our society. For this
reason, energy generation from renewable
resources is a logical step into the future.
Biogas is the most Àexible of all renewable
energy sources: to a high degree it is in-
dependent of external inÀuences, storable
and usable for the production of energy,
heat and fuel.
Benefit from a technology that has al-
ready revolutionized German agriculture.
Archea ME-LE Anlagenbau GmbH is you
reliable partner in the ¿eld of biogas plant
construction.
Our passion for work and drive for inno-
vation for a clean and safe future.
cope with such an experience. In addition,
the Commission will continue its efforts to
combat terrorism without, however, giv-
ing up the respect of fundamental rights.
“This day also gives us an opportunity to
demonstrate clearly that no terrorist will
ever be able to diminish or even destroy
our strong faith in the core values which
we share, such as the fundamental
rights”,
Vice President Barrot says. Today’s day
for the victims of terrorism shows that
terrorist acts will never pay off. There will
never be a justi¿cation for them.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_
home/news/intro/news_intro_en.htm
45
22.04.2009 08:44:00
  T H E V I S O T E C ® FA M I LY A N D
V I S O C O R E ® V E R I F I C AT I O N S O F T WA R E
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enable verification in a variety of different areas and thus contribute significantly to the prevention of identity abuse. Whether at borders, for mobile checks on
the street or at banks, verification is now supported in a fast and reliable manner.
Bundesdruckerei‘s solutions for verifying documents and individuals warrant user-friendly verification at the highest technical level, irrespective of whether an
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Thanks to adherence to international security standards and the utmost in interoperability, the tried-and-tested Visotec devices, together with Visocore, can be
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Titel und Anzeigen_goe.indd 7 22.04.2009 09:26:24


Corporations are inadvertently becoming the No. 1 Security Threat to their own customers
Web Application Vulnerabilities are the
Achilles’ heel for Corporate IT Security/IBM
is the world’s leading provider of risk and
security solutions
Nowadays corporations are unwittingly put-
ting their own customers at risk for cyber-
criminal activity. With an alarming increase
in attacks using legitimate business sites as
launching pads for attacks against consum-
ers, cybercriminals are literally turning busi-
nesses against their own customers in the
ongoing effort to steal consumers’ personal
data. This is the major result of the IBM
Internet Security Systems’ annual X-Force
Trend and Risk report.
First, Web sites have become the Achilles’
heel for corporate IT security. Attackers
are intensely focused on attacking Web
applications so they can infect end-user
machines. Meanwhile, corporations are us-
ing off-the-shelf applications that are riddled
with vulnerabilities or even worse, custom
applications that can host numerous un-
known vulnerabilities that can’t be patched.
Commission adopts revised mechanism for verifying the application of Schengen rules in the
Member States.
The Commission adopted two proposals on
a revised mechanism for Schengen evalua-
tion. The mechanism enables veri¿cation of
the application of the Schengen rules in the
Member States. These proposals supple-
ment the current mechanism and introduce
unannounced visits to ensure a high level of
implementation of the Schengen rules in the
Member States.
Vice-president Jacques Barrot, Commissioner
responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security,
highlighted that “Ef¿cient application of all
Schengen provisions and a high degree of
mutual trust among the actors involved are
essential in an area without internal borders.
Only if the implementation of the Schengen
rules and regulations by every Member State
is transparent, effective and consistent can the
system work.” The Commission proposed two
legal instruments (Regulation and Decision)
in order to cover the whole area of Schengen
cooperation i.e. external borders, visas, police
cooperation, Schengen Information System
and Data Protection. The two instruments
create an evaluation mechanism designed
to ensure both mutual trust between Member
States and the capacity to effectively and ef-
¿ciently apply the Schengen provisions.
The revised mechanism also reflects the
changes in the legal situation after the integra-
tion of the Schengen rules into the framework
of the European Union. The new mechanism
enhances the current system of periodic on-
the-spot inspections in the Member States
the new police in europe - 01/09
47 IBM.indd 47
In 2008, more than half of all vulnerabilities
disclosed were related to Web applications,
and of these, more than 74 percent had no
patch.
The second major trend IBM X-Force, re-
vealed is that although attackers continue to
focus on the browser and ActiveX controls
as a way to compromise end-user machines,
they are turning their focus to incorporate
new types of exploits that link to malicious
movies (for example, Flash) and documents
(for example, PDFs). In the fourth quarter
of 2008 alone, IBM X-Force traced more
than a 50 percent increase in the number of
malicious URLs hosting exploits than were
found in all of 2007.
The X-Force has been cataloguing, analyz-
ing and researching vulnerability disclosures
since 1997. With nearly 40,000 security
vulnerabilities catalogued, it has the larg-
est vulnerability database in the world. This
unique database helps X-Force researchers
to understand the dynamics that make up
vulnerability discovery and disclosure.
IBM as the world’s leading provider of risk
as well as introducing unannounced visits to
ensure the Schengen rules are applied cor-
rectly at all times.
Background information on Schengen
The area without internal borders as set up by
the Schengen acquis - the Schengen area -
was developed within an intergovernmental
framework in the late 80s and beginning of
the 90s by Member States willing to abolish
internal border controls and implement ac-
companying measures to this end, such as
common rules on external border controls, a
common visa policy, police and judicial coop-
eration and the establishment of the Schengen
Information System (SIS).
The Schengen area without border controls
currently consists of 25 Schengen Member
States i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
as well as the two associated countries,
Norway and Iceland and, as of 12 December
2008, Switzerland.
The Schengen area is based on full mutual
trust between the Member States in their ca-
pacity to fully implement the accompanying
measures which allow the lifting of internal bor-
der controls: e.g. checks at external borders
are carried out by Member States not only to
protect their own interests but also on behalf of
all other Member States to which people could
travel once they have crossed the external
IBM
and security solutions, has the right tools to
protect intellectual property and customer
data through layered, pre-emptive security.
IBM Internet Security Systems develops
market leading products and services to
help clients combat the evolving threat while
reducing the cost and complexity of security.
Just recently IBM also unveiled new Rational
software that helps clients mitigate growing
risks on the Web.
Clients around the world work with IBM to
help reduce the complexities of security and
strategically manage risk. IBM’s experience
and range of risk and security solutions are
unsurpassed – from dedicated research,
software, hardware, services and global
Business Partner value – helping clients
secure business operations and implement
company-wide, integrated risk management
programs.
About IBM Internet Security Systems:
For more information please visit http://
xforce.iss.net/
Contact: xforce@iss.net
borders of the Schengen area.
The current system of evaluation which has
been in place since 1999 does not fully reÀect
the current legal situation as well as having
weaknesses regarding methodology and use
of risk analysis.
In the last 10 years, there have been several
discussions between Member States and also
with the Commission on making the Schen-
gen evaluation mechanism more ef¿cient, in
particular concerning the second part of the
mandate, namely veri¿cation of the correct
application of the Schengen provisions after
the lifting of internal border controls.
Additionally the Hague Programme invites
the Commission ‘to submit, as soon as the
abolition of controls at internal borders has
been completed, a proposal to supplement
the existing Schengen evaluation mechanism
with a supervisory mechanism, ensuring full
involvement of Member States’ experts, and
including unannounced inspections’.
The current proposals intend to address the
identi¿ed weaknesses by streamlining the
evaluation methodology and improving the
follow-up. The concept of unannounced vis-
its has also been introduced. The proposals
also take into account the integration of the
Schengen acquis into the framework of the
European Union and provide for the participa-
tion of Member States’ experts.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/
news/intro/news_intro_en.htm
47
22.04.2009 09:51:19
 Federal Interior Minister Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble endorses the new police in europe
Not only have the borders between the
European states fallen, with the fall of the
Wall in Germany the worldwide process of
economic, political and social integration
– normally referred to as globalisation – has
accelerated. The Àow of capital, goods and
information and the unimpeded movement
of people in Europe have increased to an
extent unimaginable before November
1989.
This process of increasing openness and
integration across national borders is bu-
oyed by technical progress, especially in the
information and communication technolo-
gies, but also in transportation technology.
This progress, along with communicative
networking and open borders, is greatly
changing not only our society, but also the
methods, structures and threat potential
of criminals. Like the economy, crime also
operates across national borders and in
global networks.
These changes impact the whole of real-
ity, from simply everyday offences – bag
snatching has been largely superseded – to
the new police in europe - Issue 2/2009: Combating Terrorism
Terrorism has become a pressing concern for the
internal security of the 27 Member States of the
European Union since the 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center in New York and
the Pentagon in Washington DC. Cells of
transnational terrorist groups with networks
reaching far into North Africa and Central
Asia have since perpetrated two disastrous
attacks in Europe. The terrorist bombings
of commuter trains in Madrid in March 2004
claimed the lives of 191 civilians and had a
signi¿cant impact on the Spanish general
election three days later.
The underground train and bus bombings in
London in July 2005 killed 56 and wounded
several hundred. The worst fears of Eu-
rope’s police agencies and secret services
were soon con¿rmed when the British police
identi¿ed naturalised British citizens of Pa-
kistani origin as the main suspects. Europe
had its ¿rst case of ‘home-grown terrorism’
with no apparent direct links to al-Qaeda
and its extensive network.
Even though Europe has a long history of
dealing with terrorism, from the 19th century
anarchists to the German Red Army Fac-
tion and the Italian Red Brigade in the 70s,
to name just a few groups, contemporary
transnational terrorism poses new and
48
48 - Füller_goe.indd 48
global developments: instead of the bipolar
order, whose potential as a deterrent also
guaranteed a certain security, we have
instead a confusing web of conÀicts.
According to the Europol Terrorism Situa-
tion and Trend Report 2008, presented by
Europol in March, 200 Islamist terror sus-
pects were arrested in the European Union
last year alone, including those arrested in
the Sauerland in Germany. This indicates
the global reach of terrorism. International
terrorism breaches the old division between
internal and external security.
As borders become more permeable,
closer international collaboration becomes
imperative. We have to act across national
borders, like the criminals, and we have
to be as well networked – nationally and
internationally. This applies all over the
world, but especially within Europe. For
where no border controls exist, we must
coordinate our activities so as to continue
to guarantee security.
unprecedented challenges to Europe’s
security framework and it’s model of open
democracy. Even though this new form of
terrorism is usually labelled as ‘Islamic’, its
essential characteristics are not religious.
Instead it exhibits a high degree of frag-
mentation and a remarkable autonomy in
its cells, which often act with little or only
irregular contact to the large network of
organisations that provide them with cash
Àow, an ideological basis and, most notably,
the necessary know-how. These cells are
only loosely steered by Islamist propaganda
and carry out their very own attack plans by
tapping into the resources provided by the
transnational network around al-Qaeda,
whereby they increasingly rely on the in-
ternet for this.
Europe’s security and police agencies have
responded to these new threats by forming
new centres for combating terrorism and
networking police agencies and secret
services on national and European levels.
Such centres exist for example in Spain and
Germany, and the reorganization of the Eu-
ropean ¿ght against terrorism has already
borne ¿rst fruits: British police frustrated the
plans of a terrorist cell to detonate liquid
Police collaboration in Europe has gained
momentum thanks not just to Europol, but
also to other cooperation initiatives. But
there is still scope for greater intensi¿ca-
tion. For this reason, the staunch European
and Federal German Interior Minister Dr.
Wolfgang Schäuble endorses a unique
communications project, the new police in
europe. Supported by the Internet platform
www.dnpe.eu the new police in europe will
become a mouthpiece for the police forces
of the 27 European member states.
Source: Federal Ministry of Interior/Hans-Joachim
M. Rickel
explosives on numerous planes over the
Atlantic Ocean in 2006, while in 2007 the
police in Southern Germany arrested a cell
of ‘home-grown terrorists’ who had planned
to attack US targets in Germany.
Nevertheless, the race to impede the next
big terrorist attack is far from decided. The
second issue of the new police in europe
will deal with combating terrorism in the
European Union. It will offer a comprehen-
sive overview of the agencies, institutions
and joint operation centres in the different
Member States and shed light on the role
of the European security institutions in the
¿ght against terrorism. Special attention
will be given in this issue to the use of
up-to-date technology in combating terror-
ism. Additionally, it will assess the current
level of European cooperation in the ¿ght
against terrorism and promote best-prac-
tice exchange in this ¿eld. The competent
agencies and ministries of the 27 Member
States are invited to hand in articles for the
upcoming issue. Proposals for topics can be
discussed with the editorial staff.
Please do not hesitate to contact us at
info@dnpe.de with any enquiries you may
have.
the new police in europe - 01/09
22.04.2009 10:46:29
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Titel und Anzeigen_goe.indd 9 22.04.2009 09:26:25