IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIFTH DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,
RICHARD WALSH

HONERABLE JUDGE MADRIGAL III

Respondents.

v. Original Case No. 48-2022-CF-00688 AO

KELLI LYNCH,
DEFENDANT

RUSTY MILLER,
NON-PARTY
Petitioners.

EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

AND MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL (PRO SE WITH REQUEST
FOR APPOINTMENT OF APPELLATE COUNSEL)

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100, the Appellant,

KELLI LYNCH, respectfully petitions this Court for a Writ of Mandamus or
Prohibition, and a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.

I. BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition

under Article V, Sections 4(b)(3) and 5(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, and
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2) and (3). These writs are
appropriate remedies to address the trial court's clear abuse of discretion
and authority, as well as the numerous violations of Petitioner’s due
process rights detailed herein.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On January 18, 2022, Petitioner Kelli Renee Lynch, a 45-year-old mother of

three with no prior criminal history other than minor violations, was arrested
at Airport Chrysler Dodge Jeep RAM in Orlando, Florida, for attempted
fraud. The dealership staff alleged she attempted to purchase a vehicle
using fraudulent documents, including a fake driver's license, fraudulent
insurance card, and false financial information. However, the actual
fraudulent use of personal identification occurred a few days prior,
perpetrated by individuals who created the documents for the scheme, not
Ms. Lynch. This stands in stark contrast to her co-defendants, who had
multiple felonies and similar charges.

Law enforcement arrived, and Ms. Lynch was escorted to the finance office
to sign papers finalizing the vehicle's sale. Believing she was merely
picking up a car, she began filling out paperwork but, overwhelmed by the
unexpected level of involvement, attempted to abandon the crime and
leave, consistent with the defense of abandonment as established in Model
Penal Code § 5.01(4). She, along with the co-defendant who had
accompanied her, was subsequently arrested.

Earlier that day, Ms. Lynch had a prescription for her roommate, containing
the full amount of prescribed pills. The co-defendant's false statement to
authorities potentially contributed to the charges against her.

Petitioner Rusty Miller retained Attorney Jonathan Mills for $15,000 to

represent Ms. Lynch, focusing on an abandonment defense and seeking
prosecution of the co-defendants. The co-defendant expressed willingness
to recant and provide evidence against the individual who created the
documents and used the false information online for the car's approval.

However, Mr. Mills failed to attend pretrial hearings and faced criticism from
the State Attorney and the judge for his handling of the case, violating Ms.
Lynch's right to effective counsel as guaranteed in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Following the Court's denial of further continuances, Mr. Mills, under

pressure, allegedly devised a plan to avoid scrutiny and potential
malpractice claims. It's alleged he never intended for a scheduled proffer to
reduce Ms. Lynch's sentence, instead aiming to induce her into a flawed
Quarterman's agreement, hoping she would admit guilt to protect himself
from a potential lawsuit by Mr. Miller, who witnessed his misconduct. This
manipulation of the plea process mirrors the coercive tactics condemned in
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), and violated Ms. Lynch's right
to a voluntary and intelligent plea, as established in Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969).

Mr. Miller's concerns stemmed from Mr. Mills' unorthodox handling of the
case, including limited communication with Ms. Lynch and only responding
to Mr. Miller regarding legal fees. Mr. Miller's presence during strategic
discussions and his witness to the plea negotiation further highlight Mr.
Mills' ineffective counsel.

The sentencing hearing shocked Ms. Lynch and Mr. Miller due to the
discrepancy between Mr. Mills' representations and the outcome. The
judge, possibly unaware of Mr. Miller's involvement initially, later accused
him of crimes and threatened Ms. Lynch with 80 years if she listened to his
advice, violating Mr. Miller's due process rights and creating a coercive
atmosphere as seen in State v. Glisson, 285 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA
2019).

The judge's outburst, based on erroneous information, was later retracted

but without apology, demonstrating bias and undermining the fairness of
the proceedings, as prohibited in In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge
(Maloney), 639 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1994).

The judge's subsequent actions, including researching Mr. Miller's private

information and revealing his prior arrest history, constitute a clear violation
of his privacy rights, similar to the concerns raised in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), which established a reasonable expectation of
privacy.

The judge's conduct further escalated, leading to the appointment of

Attorney Allen Holland, who discouraged any challenges to the judge's
actions and advised Ms. Lynch to plead guilty. This interfered with her right
to independent counsel, as established in United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).

Ms. Kazzi, a subsequent attorney, drafted a valid motion to dismiss based

on misattributed evidence but withdrew without filing it, potentially due to
undue influence, similar to the concerns raised in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S.
95 (1972), where a judge's intimidating remarks deterred a witness from
testifying.

The judge's continued bias, ex parte communications with the State

Attorney, and dismissal of valid motions without due process, as
highlighted in Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1992), further
prejudiced Ms. Lynch's case.

The State Attorney's failure to disclose the exculpatory prescription and the
misattribution of evidence constitute Brady and Giglio violations,
respectively, undermining the fairness of the proceedings and violating Ms.
Lynch's due process rights, as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

The misuse of the Quarterman agreement, deviating from the agreed-upon

terms in Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988), and the
coercive nature of the plea negotiations, akin to the issues in State v.
Leroux, 132 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2014), render Ms. Lynch's plea involuntary
and invalid, as plea agreements are contracts between the defendant and
the state as affirmed in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

During the legal proceedings, Judge Madrigal, who presided over the case,
allegedly exhibited bias against Lynch, making statements such as "She
would already be in DOC if it were not for her buddy Rusty," in violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct's mandate for impartiality. Judge Madrigal
also allegedly pressured Lynch to accept a plea deal, instructed her
attorney to withdraw, and disregarded motions filed by her attorneys, all of
which could be considered an abuse of discretion as stated in Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).

On a separate occasion, Mr. Mills revealed in a side bar with the judge and
state attorney that Ms. Lynch had a prescription for the controlled
substance she was accused of trafficking. The judge and State Attorney
then discussed the possibility of refiling more serious charges if she
withdrew her plea, excluding Ms. Lynch from this conversation, a clear
violation of her due process rights and the principles of ex parte
communication as established in Rose v. State.

The State Attorney's decision to refile the trafficking charge despite

knowing about the prescription constitutes a Brady violation, as it withheld
exculpatory evidence that could have significantly impacted the outcome of
the case. This is a clear violation of Ms. Lynch's due process rights as
affirmed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

The subsequent withdrawal of attorneys Swartz and Kazzi, both of whom

recognized issues with the case but failed to act, raises concerns about
ineffective assistance of counsel, potentially due to the judge's intimidating
behavior, reminiscent of the issues in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972).

The judge's conduct, including the unauthorized investigation into Ms.

Lynch's hospitalization, mocking her situation, and disrespecting her family,
further demonstrates a lack of impartiality and professionalism, further
eroding her right to a fair trial. This is a blatant violation of the principles set
forth in the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to act with
impartiality, dignity, and respect for all parties involved.

On October 4, 2023, in an ex parte communication, Mr. Mills revealed to

the judge and state attorney that Ms. Lynch had a valid prescription for the
controlled substance she was accused of trafficking. The judge and State
Attorney then discussed the possibility of refiling more serious charges if
she withdrew her plea, deliberately excluding Ms. Lynch and violating her
right to be informed and participate in decisions affecting her liberty, as
guaranteed by the principles of due process and fundamental fairness
enshrined in Brady v. Maryland.

The State Attorney's decision to refile the trafficking charge despite

knowing about the prescription constitutes a Brady violation, as it withheld
exculpatory evidence that could have significantly impacted the outcome of
the case. This is a clear violation of Ms. Lynch's due process rights as
affirmed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

The subsequent withdrawal of attorneys Swartz and Kazzi, both of whom

recognized issues with the case but failed to act, raises concerns about
ineffective assistance of counsel, potentially due to the judge's intimidating
behavior, reminiscent of the issues in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972),
where a judge's intimidating remarks deterred a witness from testifying.

Attorney Holland, appointed as Ms. Lynch's final attorney, not only failed to
address the aforementioned issues but also actively discouraged her from
exercising her rights, advising her to simply plead guilty. This blatant
disregard for her defense and well-being further exemplifies the ineffective
assistance of counsel that has plagued this case.
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

VI. ARGUMENT

Judicial Misconduct: A Violation of Due Process

Judge Madrigal's conduct in this case demonstrates a pattern of judicial

misconduct that severely prejudiced Petitioner's case. By publicly
disparaging Rusty Miller, an individual not involved in the case, and
revealing his confidential criminal record, the judge breached the duty of
impartiality and the presumption of innocence. This bias, prohibited in In re
Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Maloney), 639 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1994), tainted
the proceedings and undermined Petitioner's right to a fair trial, as
guaranteed by the Florida and U.S. Constitutions.

The judge's actions are reminiscent of the misconduct observed in The

Florida Bar v. Kelsay Dayon Patterson, where unfounded allegations and
procedural violations led to a denial of justice. In the present case, the
judge's personal bias and manipulation of the proceedings similarly
prejudiced Petitioner's case.

Judicial Interference with the Attorney-Client Relationship and

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

The lower court's ex parte communication with Mr. Mills, outside the
presence of Petitioner or the State Attorney, represents a blatant disregard
for the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship, a cornerstone of our legal
system, as emphasized in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 (1973). This
communication not only breached the attorney-client privilege but also
directly interfered with Petitioner's ability to receive independent legal
advice and counsel.

This interference was further exacerbated by the judge's coercive tactics,

including threatening Mr. Mills with harsher sentencing for Petitioner if she
withdrew her plea. This direct intervention in the attorney-client relationship
violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to choose her own counsel, as
established in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). The
judge's actions created a hostile and intimidating atmosphere, similar to the
conduct condemned in State v. Glisson, 285 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA
2019) and United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The cumulative effect of judicial interference and ineffective assistance of
counsel is evident in the actions of Petitioner's attorneys. Ms. Kazzi drafted
a motion to dismiss based on the misattributed evidence but withdrew from
the case hours later after attempting to notify the court and the state of the
errors. Mr. Swartz also withdrew after agreeing that the misattributed
evidence was problematic and stating his intent to suppress it. These
withdrawals, along with Attorney Allen Holland's failure to challenge the
state's weak case and coercing Petitioner into a plea deal despite the
evident witness issues, demonstrate a pattern of ineffective assistance of
counsel that further prejudiced Petitioner's case.

Unauthorized Ex Parte Communications and Abrupt Dismissal of

Motions:

The lower court's engagement in unauthorized ex parte communications

with the State Attorney and the abrupt dismissal of Petitioner's motions
without providing a meaningful opportunity for argument further
demonstrate a disregard for due process.

Ex parte communications erode the fundamental fairness of judicial

proceedings, create an appearance of impropriety, and can prejudice the
opposing party, as established in Rose v. State, 601 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.
1992) and Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393
U.S. 145 (1968). The abrupt dismissal of motions without adequate
argument violates Petitioner's right to be heard, as recognized in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and constitutes an abuse of discretion, as
held in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.

Brady Violation and Due Process:

1. The Respondent's failure to disclose the exculpatory prescription

belonging to Petitioner's roommate constitutes a clear and
unequivocal violation of the Brady Rule, as established in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This suppression of material
exculpatory evidence directly contravenes the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, which guarantees a fair trial in a
fair tribunal. The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976), has consistently upheld this principle, emphasizing
 that due process necessitates the disclosure of exculpatory evidence
to the defense.

2. The prescription's materiality is evident from the fact that its

revelation led to the dismissal of the charges, thus fulfilling the
"reasonable probability" standard for materiality established by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). As
the Florida Supreme Court has reiterated in State v. Coney, 251 So.
3d 837 (Fla. 2018) and Rutherford v. State, 115 So. 3d 335 (Fla.
2013), the Brady Rule is a fundamental constitutional guarantee, and
its violation cannot be tolerated.

Prosecutorial Misconduct – Suppression and Manipulation of

Evidence:

The State Attorney's actions in this case reveal a disturbing pattern of

manipulating the legal process. The deliberate withholding of the
exculpatory prescription constitutes a Brady violation, a fundamental
breach of due process. This evidence, if disclosed, would have
significantly undermined the state's case against Ms. Lynch. The
State Attorney's decision to drop charges related to the insurance
card and bank statements due to chain of custody issues further
demonstrates a calculated approach to avoid jeopardizing the entire
case while still securing a conviction. This selective prosecution,
reminiscent of the issues raised in Nock v. State, 542 So. 2d 1348
(Fla. 1989), highlights a willingness to manipulate the legal process
for strategic advantage, rather than pursue justice. Additionally, the
State Attorney proposed a plan for Petitioner's attorney to withdraw
before a deadline, hindering Petitioner's ability to mount a sufficient
defense.

Misattribution of Business Records as a Due Process Violation:

The State Attorney's failure to correct the misattribution of business

records to Luiz Holt, instead of the Petitioner, constitutes a grave
violation of Ms. Lynch's due process rights. This misattribution not
only prejudiced her defense but also undermined the fundamental
fairness of the proceedings. This failure can be construed as a
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused, violating the Brady
 Rule. Additionally, it raises concerns about a potential Giglio violation,
where the prosecution fails to disclose evidence that could impeach
the credibility of a witness (Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972)). The State Attorney's conduct in this case is reminiscent of
the prosecutorial misconduct in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), where the Supreme Court held that a conviction obtained
through the knowing use of false evidence is a denial of due process.

Misuse of the Quarterman Agreement:

1. The lower court's actions distorted and abused the Quarterman

agreement established in Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.
1988). By presenting the agreement as a path to leniency without
fully disclosing its potential consequences, the court engaged in
deceptive practices, akin to the "bait-and-switch" tactic condemned in
State v. Leroux, 132 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2014).
2. Furthermore, the lower court's failure to adhere to the terms of the
Quarterman agreement mirrors the circumstances in Norman v.
State, 2D09-3300 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), where the court held that a
defendant's plea was involuntary due to the court's failure to abide by
the plea agreement's terms. This deviation from the agreed-upon
terms, coupled with deceptive inducement, created a coercive
atmosphere reminiscent of the psychological manipulation
condemned in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), thus
rendering Petitioner's plea involuntary.

Plea as a Contract:

1. Plea agreements are essentially contracts between the defendant

and the state, as affirmed in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971). Petitioner reasonably relied on the lower court's
representations regarding the potential benefits of the Quarterman
agreement, similar to the reliance in United States v. Benchimol, 471
U.S. 453 (1985). The lower court's failure to uphold its end of the
bargain, in violation of this contractual understanding, renders the
plea invalid and fundamentally unfair, as emphasized by the Florida
Supreme Court in Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993).

No Adequate Remedy at Law: A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary

remedy available only when there is no other adequate remedy at law. In
this case, the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and judicial misconduct has resulted in a complete
deprivation of Petitioner's due process rights. A direct appeal would not be
sufficient to address the pervasive and systemic nature of these violations.
The only adequate remedy is the dismissal of all charges against
Petitioner.

Clear Legal Right to Relief: Petitioner has a clear legal right to a fair trial,
free from prosecutorial misconduct, judicial bias, and ineffective assistance
of counsel. The aforementioned violations have irreparably tainted the
proceedings, making a fair trial impossible. Thus, Petitioner has a clear
legal right to the dismissal of all charges.

Irreparable Harm: The cumulative effect of the violations has caused

irreparable harm to Petitioner. The denial of due process, the tainted plea
agreement, and the judicial bias have deprived Petitioner of her liberty and
subjected her to a fundamentally unfair legal process. This harm cannot be
remedied through any other legal avenue, making a writ of mandamus the
only appropriate remedy.

Public Interest: The egregious nature of the misconduct in this case,

involving both prosecutorial and judicial actors, raises serious concerns
about the integrity of the judicial system. Granting the writ of mandamus
would serve the public interest by ensuring that such misconduct is not
tolerated and that the rights of defendants are protected.

Case Law Supporting the Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus:

 State ex rel. Gerstein v. Coe, 467 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1985): The
Florida Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus is appropriate to
compel a lower court to dismiss charges when there is no other
adequate remedy and the defendant has a clear legal right to relief.
 Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1965): The court held that
a writ of mandamus can be used to correct a clear abuse of discretion
by a lower court.
 State ex rel. Bateman v. Colding, 155 So. 816 (Fla. 1934): The
court held that a writ of mandamus is appropriate when a lower court
has failed to perform a clear legal duty.
In light of the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court
grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and order the dismissal of all
charges against Petitioner.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Petitioners are Entitled to a Fair and Impartial Tribunal

1. The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges uphold

the integrity and independence of the judiciary, avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety, and perform their duties impartially
and diligently.
2. Judge Madrigal's actions, as described above, demonstrate a clear
bias against Petitioners and a disregard for their due process rights.
3. His statements and actions have created an environment in which
neither Petitioner can receive a fair trial or hearing before him.

B. Dismissal of Charges is Warranted

1. The evidence against Petitioner Lynch is insufficient to prove her

intent to defraud. The focus is primarily on her possession of
fraudulent documents, not their creation or her knowledge of their
fraudulent nature.
2. Petitioner Lynch's actions of leaving the dealership without
completing the purchase could be interpreted as abandoning the
criminal act before its completion.
3. The inconsistencies in the police reports raise doubts about the
accuracy and reliability of the evidence against Petitioner Lynch.
4. The recent trespassing charge against Petitioner Lynch appears to be
unfounded, as she had permission to drive the U-Haul under a valid
rental agreement.
5. The State Attorney's withholding of exculpatory evidence, specifically
a valid prescription for the controlled substance Ms. Lynch was
accused of trafficking, constitutes a Brady violation, further
undermining the integrity of the case against Petitioner Lynch.

C. Judge Madrigal's Misconduct

 1. Misrepresentation and Coercion in Plea Negotiations: Judge
Madrigal misrepresented a plea agreement as a "Quarterman
agreement," concealing its true nature and coercing Ms. Lynch into
accepting it without full comprehension.
2. Ex Parte Communications and Erosion of Due Process: Judge
Madrigal engaged in ex parte communications with State Attorney
Walsh regarding plea withdrawal and potential refiling of charges,
deliberately excluding Ms. Lynch and violating her right to be
informed and participate in decisions affecting her liberty.
3. Violation of Non-Party Rights: The court conducted an
unauthorized investigation into and publicly defamed Rusty Miller, an
associate of Ms. Lynch, by disclosing his sealed criminal history and
making false accusations against him.
4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Ms. Lynch's attorneys failed to
adequately represent her interests, including neglecting to challenge
misattributed evidence, failing to depose a key witness (Mr.
McAlpine), and remaining silent during ex parte communications.
5. Attorney Withdrawal and Delay Tactics: An attorney withdrew from
the case without filing a drafted "Motion to Dismiss," potentially due to
intimidation or ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial was also
delayed for adversarial reasons rather than zealous defense,
coercing Ms. Lynch into a new plea deal.
6. Failure to Challenge Charges: The defense failed to challenge
charges based on a sworn lawsuit by a key witness admitting fraud,
impacting the degree of the crime and indicating ineffective
assistance of counsel.
7. Disclosure of Privileged Information and Mocking Behavior: The
court improperly received privileged information and engaged in
inappropriate behavior, laughing about the potential for Ms. Lynch's
incarceration, and disrespecting her family members.
8. False Accusations and Perjury: The court made false accusations
against Mr. Miller regarding filing motions, a fact later confirmed by
the State Attorney. Despite this, the judge repeated the false claim in
subsequent hearings.

D. A Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition is the Appropriate Remedy

 1. Judge Madrigal's numerous acts of misconduct, as detailed above,
constitute a clear abuse of discretion and exceed his jurisdiction.
2. A writ of mandamus is necessary to compel Judge Madrigal to
dismiss the charges against Petitioner Lynch due to the pervasive
misconduct and violations of due process that have tainted the
proceedings.
3. A writ of prohibition is necessary to prevent Judge Madrigal from
further judicial acts in this matter, as his continued involvement would
irreparably harm Petitioners' rights and interests.
4. A writ of mandamus is necessary to compel the State of Florida to
dismiss the charges related to the U-Haul in question being that there
is an active contract, as well no final bill was ever received in the
matter, nor any notification that the contract was pending involuntary
termination.
5. A writ to determine Judicial Misconduct rising to the level of loss of
immunity against Rusty Miller in the case.
6. A writ to determine that the State Attorney's office under Andrew Bain
has conducted itself in a manner opening the door for civil claims
against the State of Florida.

VIII. RELIEF SOUGHT

A. For Petitioner Kelli Lynch:

1. Issue an emergency stay of proceedings in the lower court.

2. Appoint an appellate attorney for Ms. Lynch.
3. Issue a writ of mandamus compelling the lower court to:
o Reconsider all motions filed by Ms. Lynch and Rusty Miller
o Vacate Ms. Lynch's plea and sentence
o Dismiss all charges with prejudice
4. Sanction Judge Madrigal for their misconduct.
5. Investigate the State Attorney's Office for potential misconduct.

B. For Petitioner Rusty Miller:

1. Issue a public acknowledgment of the erroneous and defamatory

statements made by Judge Madrigal against Mr. Miller.
2. Order a correction of the record to remove all references to Mr. Miller,
including but not limited to the 25 instances where his name or a
name the judge used to refer to him was mentioned.
3. order the removal of any references to Mr. Miller’s adjudicated arrest
history from the court record and issue a declaration that the judge's
actions violated Mr. Miller’s due process rights and potentially
infringed upon double jeopardy protections.
4. Order a correction of the record to remove any privileged information
allegedly received by the judge from Jonathan Mills.
5. Order a public apology from Judge Madrigal for any instances of
potential perjury or defamation resulting from false statements about
Mr. Miller. This includes promoting the State Attorney's office to seek
criminal charges against Mr. Miller, despite the judge's knowledge
that these statements were false, even after being informed of their
falsity by the State Attorney on multiple occasions spanning over 4
months. This conduct demonstrates a lack of jurisdiction and an
abuse of judicial authority.
6. Refer Judge Madrigal's conduct to the appropriate judicial disciplinary
authority for investigation and potential sanctions.
7. Refer Judge Madrigal's conduct and if any Federal and/or State,
Criminal Statues have been violated.
8. Issue a declaration that Judge Madrigal exceeded their judicial
authority and acted outside their jurisdiction in defaming and
disclosing Mr. Miller's arrest history.
9. Order Judge Madrigal III to refrain from making any further mention of
Mr. Miller by name or suggestive in nature or making any comments
or disclosures that are suggestive of Mr. Miller to include any
additional personal information in court proceedings without a valid
legal basis and or affirmative authorization from Mr. Miller.