History, Health and Herons: The Historiography of Woodrow Wilson's Personality and

Decision-Making
Author(s): Robert M. Saunders
Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Domestic Goals and Foreign Policy
Objectives (Winter, 1994), pp. 57-77
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and
Congress
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551193
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History, Health and Herons: The Historiography
of Woodrow Wilson's Personality and
Decision-Making

ROBERT M. SAUNDERS
Professor of History
Christopher Newport University

Abstract
Woodrow Wilson is one of the most significant and controversial Presidents
of the twentieth century. Scholars have developed a number of studies focusing upon the
interrelationship between his personality, health and decision-making. Alexander and Juliette
George published in the 1950s a "psychologically-oriented" biography of Wilson in which
they argue that Wilson's overbearing father deprived him of self esteem. Wilson, they contend,
spent his life in a vain attempt to compensate for this deficiency with an insatiable quest for
power. Arthur S. Link, the acknowledged dean of Wilson historians and editor of the
monumental collection of Papers ofWoodrow Wilson, has vigorously disputed any psycho
logical interpretation of Wilson's behavior. Link has developed a stroke thesis, in conjunction
with a number of medical experts, to explain Wilson's failures at key times in his life.
This paper will provide an overview of the conflicting interpretations on the relationship
between Wilson's personality, health and decision-making and evaluate the role of Arthur
S. Link as the chief editor of the Papers of Woodrow Wilson. The thesis of this article
is that a close examination of Wilson's decision-making does not provide any clear evidence
or examples of psychological or medical influences on Wilson as President before his massive
stroke in early October of 1919. Rather, Wilson's decisions, although pressure-packed, fall
within any reasonable definition of rational decision-making.

Since World War II the "editorial revolution" has greatly enriched the study
of American history. Beginning with Julian Boyd's publication in 1950 of the first
volume of the papers of Thomas Jefferson, multi volume projects have made accessible
the papers of major American leaders to students, professors and the public.1
One of the most productive of these great editorial projects has been The Papers
of Woodrow Wilson (PWW) edited by Arthur S. Link and associates at Princeton
University. The project will be completed in 1994 and will consist of sixty-nine
volumes.2 Link has also sponsored an eclectic group of commentators and scholars
who have published monographs as supplemental volumes of the PWW. In short,
the PWW represents the most important project of the "editorial revolution" and
is a monument of its kind.

57

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 58 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

The intent of the PWW project, and others like it, is to provide a comprehensive
collection of documents that are as true to the historical record as possible. Such a
collection, it is assumed, will give historians the basis for developing studies which
can be verified as empirically valid and which will converge towards some consensus
on the "truth" of major questions. This assumption has its roots in the founders
of the modern historical profession in the late nineteenth century who, as Peter
Novick has emphasized, believed fervently in the possibility of objective, verifiable
truth. Ironically, in the case of the PWW the editorial practices of Arthur Link
and his associates have created as much controversy as consensus and will most likely
lead to a divergence rather than a convergence of interpretations on Wilson's behavior
and decision making at crucial times in his life.3
The purposes of this article will be to:

1. provide a historiographical overview of the conflicting interpretations on

the relationship between Wilson's health and decision making;
2. evaluate the appropriateness of some of the editorial practices of the PWW;
3. assess the wisdom of relying on medical experts as surrogate historians;
4. demonstrate that documentary evidence in the PWW raises serious questions
about the Link thesis that Wilson's behavior at crucial times in his life was
rooted in his medical condition.

This article is based on the belief that to let Link's medical explanation of
Wilson's behavior stand virtually without challenge by historians will constitute a
serious dereliction of our responsibilities to the profession and to the public. The
author has the highest regard for Link's contributions to scholarship and has no
connection to any of the scholars reviewed in the article. The article is based on
the close reading over a period of fifteen years of the PWW and the growing
conviction that despite his prominence and contribution to the historical profession
Link has imposed upon the evidence a very tentative, tenuous and ultimately very
misleading interpretation of Wilson's role as President of the United States. Thus
while some of my assessments of Link towards the end of the article may appear
to be harsh, let me assure the reader that my commitment is to the methodology
of the profession and to the "truth" as I understand it. Paradoxically, of course,
the PWW, so ably and productively edited by Link and his associates, provides the
foundation for my analysis. In this sense perhaps the faith of our founders in our
methodology has withstood the test of time. At the same time, the PWW fulfills
the expectations of our founding fathers who like proud parents believed that once
the profession matured through the careful and systematic collection of documents
it would be prepared to move on to more serious endeavors. In this case the goal
will be to develop a fuller and more complex appreciation of a leader ?Woodrow
Wilson ?who is central to an understanding of the modern world.
To establish the historiographical context for an analysis of the editorial practices
and conclusions of Link and his associates, let us review briefly the literature on
the issue of Wilson's health, personality and decision making. The first major antago
nists of Link and his associates are Alexander and Juliette George who published a

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making | 59

"psychologically-oriented" biography of Wilson in 1956.4 Their study was based

primarily on the diary of Edward M. House and on interviews conducted by Ray
Stannard Baker in the 1920s of people who had known Wilson in his youth and
pre-presidential career. The Georges concluded that because of an overbearing father
Wilson sought to compensate for a lack of self-esteem with an insatiable quest for
power which was reflected in a "compulsive ambition."5
Arthur S. Link in conjunction with Edwin Weinstein, a neurologist and psychia
trist, and James William Anderson, a psychologist, launched a major critique in the
late 1970's of the Georges' work. Link, Weinstein and Anderson concur that there
was "universal agreement" among scholars on the importance of Wilson's personality
in interpreting the successes and failures of his leadership, but contend that due
to inadequate research, a flawed psychological model, and ignorance of Wilson's
neurological disorders, the Georges' work was an "essentially incorrect interpretation
of the personality of Woodrow Wilson and its effects on his career."6
Link, Weinstein and Anderson attempt to stand the Georges' thesis on its
head. They concede that Wilson had reading problems as a youth and that some
evidence exists to substantiate the caustic nature of the personality of Wilson's father,
but they assert that the source of Wilson's reading problem was "developmental
dyslexia" and not psychological tension with his father. "Much more substantial"
evidence exists, they contend, which demonstrates that Wilson had an "extraordinary
warm" relationship with his father as a youth and that by the time Wilson was in
his thirties he, and not his father, was the dominant figure in the relationship. If
anything, Wilson suffered from "overconfidence," not lack of self-esteem as the
Georges allege, because of the "overprotective," uncritical role of his mother.7
As an alternative explanation to the Georges' thesis, Link, Weinstein and
Anderson offer the interpretation that no study of Wilson's behavior "can be com
plete" without taking into account the effects of Wilson's "cerebral vascular" disease
which led to recurrent strokes from 1896 until his death in 1924. They emphasize
two critical instances when strokes significantly altered Wilson's behavior and led
to failures in his leadership. In the first instance, the strokes or disease, "caused
changes in his behavior and helped set into motion events relevant to his defeats in
the quadrangle plan and graduate college controversies at Princeton" in 1906 and
beyond. Wilson's 1906 stroke, according to Link, Weinstein and Anderson, led
to important behavioral changes. Wilson exhibited "increased overconfidence" and
"became less empathie, more stubborn, and more prone to overgeneralize and person
alize his problems."8 In the second instance, Wilson's massive stroke of October
1919 "produced mental attitudes and personality changes which were important
factors" in the failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.9
Link, Weinstein and Anderson acknowledge that on the "basis of new evidence"
it was unlikely Wilson had suffered a stroke in Paris as purported in Weinstein's
1970 article. Nevertheless, they persist in their attack upon the Georges for ignoring
the implications of Wilson's 1906 stroke and for sticking to their "disturbed child
hood" thesis.10

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 60 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

In response, the Georges defend the validity and scope of their historical research,
concede the speculative nature of their hypothesis without modifying their interpreta
tion, and launch a frontal assault on the interpretations of Link, Weinstein and
Anderson. The Georges refute every major point of Link, Weinstein and Anderson
and even suggest that Link has manipulated or grossly misinterpreted the evidence
when it runs contrary to his established positions.11 They refute the dyslexia thesis
and forcefully argue that the weight of the evidence supports their interpretation
of Wilson's "ceaseless effort to maintain his self-esteem."12 At the same time, the
Georges argue that Link, Weinstein and Anderson appear "undaunted by the virtual
absence of medical records" as they "unequivocally" pursue their stroke thesis.13 The
Georges refute "brain damage" as a factor in Wilson's "political behavior until the
autumn of 1919" and contend that even after this Wilson's behavior and position
on the League was consistent.14 To the Georges, Wilson's stubbornness and unwill
ingness to compromise on the League was a result of his convictions and his failure
was due in part to the shrewd insights of Henry Cabot Lodge who recognized that
Wilson was driven "by some invincible inner compulsion."15
To clinch their case for strokes being insignificant in determining Wilson's
behavior, the Georges recruited a medical expert of their own, Michael F. Marmor,
an ophthalmologist at Stanford. After reviewing Weinstein's stroke thesis, Marmor
concludes that there seems to be "little doubt" that Wilson had "systemic vascular
disease," but he questions the behavioral inferences Weinstein had abstracted from
the diagnosis of strokes. Marmor cites a lack of speech impairment as a reason for
doubting Wilson suffered a stroke in 1906 and stresses the invalidity of tying person
ality changes to strokes. According to Marmor, "the literature on strokes is quite
clear in emphasizing that personality changes are not a characteristic of the stroke
syndrome in the absence of cognitive changes or dementia."16
In 1984 the Georges followed up their 1981-1982 response to the criticisms
of Link, Weinstein and Anderson with a communication to the editor of the Journal
of American History which reiterated and amplified the contention that Link was
endangering the objectivity of the PWW by making frequent references to strokes
"as if they were established fact."17 The Georges fault Link for making "some thirty
unequivocal references" to strokes which Wilson allegedly had in 1896, 1906 and
1907.18 The Georges argue that "as a matter of principle" the PWW should be free
of any attempt to impose upon the primary sources a particular interpretation, even
if the interpretation was possibly correct. The editorial bias of the PWW is likely, the
Georges fear, to preempt "alternative hypotheses" and to lead to circular arguments
whereby one author will cite another as evidence or proof for a predetermined
position.19
In light of the Georges' assault upon the stroke thesis, how have historians
addressed the issue in their works on Wilson? Is there any discernible consensus or
"school" emerging?
Dorothy Ross, in a 1982 review essay, provides the foundation for such a
consensus with a synthesis of the major psychological studies of Wilson and with
an outline of the questions which need to be addressed in order to advance our

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making | 61

understanding of Wilson as a leader. In making the "Case for Psychohistory,"

Ross cautions historians against rejecting psychological theories on the basis that
psychology is not truly scientific. Ross sees this as false positivism and notes that
psychological studies are similar to historical works in that they are likely to have
"multiple paradigms."20
In her review of the psychological studies of Wilson, Ross finds room for
optimism that a consensus on Wilson is emerging. According to Ross, a considerable
"degree of agreement" exists that Wilson possessed a destructive personality charac
terized by overconfidence, stubbornness, over reliance of his own judgment, high
ambitions, and a desire for power.21
The chief disagreement emerges in explaining the source of Wilson's personality
disorders, although "all have recognized" insecurity as the root of Wilson's problems.
Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, in their controversial study of Wilson, cited
overconfidence and passivity as traits originating in Wilson's basic insecurity. The
Georges, as noted above, see Wilson's compulsive quest for power as an attempt
to compensate for low self-esteem. Link, Ross contends, in his multi-volume biog
raphy of Wilson, originally saw Wilson's leadership problems as stemming from
character failure but has been swayed by Weinstein to accept the significance of
Wilson's personality problems. Weinstein, however, injects a new factor ?sexual
guilt? into the equation for explaining Wilson's behavior. Wilson sought, according
to Weinstein, to expiate the impurity of an affair through service.22
The role of Wilson's parents represents, Ross asserts, another important area
of agreement in the search for the roots of Wilson's personality. Freud-Bullitt and
the Georges emphasize the pathological relationship of Wilson with his father who
they contend tore Wilson down psychologically with his caustic and overbearing
personality. Weinstein argues, however, that Wilson's relationship with his father
was supportive and that the source of the "major debilitating features" of Wilson's
personality was his relationship with his mother. Despite this important variation
with other studies, Ross sees Weinstein's work as still emphasizing the influence
of family and not being fundamentally different from earlier works. The source of
the problem, she suggests, was different but the behavior was similar.23
The "principal novelty" in Weinstein's interpretation of Wilson's behavior,
according to Ross, is the contention that strokes "substantially altered" Wilson's
behavior. Ross carefully avoids taking a firm stand on Weinstein's stroke hypothesis
but suggests that "given the detailed circumstantial evidence available" a consensus on
Wilson's neurological illness may emerge "among experts."24 Although she concedes a
consensus on the stroke hypothesis is "pending," Ross credits Weinstein with making
a positive contribution with his "careful rendering" of the evidence and the subtle,
"nuanced views" in developing the relationship between Wilson's illness and be
havior.25
Another important contribution of Weinstein, in Ross's view, is that he devel
oped and clarified Wilson's "intellectual style" which was "metaphorical, emotional,
self-referential, and focused upon the large contour of ideas." While Wilson's reading
was "remarkably narrow" and self-focused and while he used language to show

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 62 j PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

concern for his health, Ross contends that Weinstein's analysis shows conclusively
that Wilson's behavior was not compulsive as the Georges would suggest.26
Ross considers the Weinstein work as the new standard for a psychological
understanding of Wilson, although she does not validate the stroke hypothesis. She
pictures, as did Link, the Freud-Bullitt study as being misinformed and lacking
sufficient evidence. She discounts the Georges' work on similar grounds. The interpre
tation of the relationship between Wilson and his parents was based upon a "paucity
of primary source material."27
Ross concedes that Wilson's relationship with his parents is an important
on-going question even after Weinstein's study but she concurs with Weinstein that
the key figure is Wilson's mother, not his father, since it was Wilson's dependence on
his mother that most likely bred his overconfidence and insecurity. As a result,
Wilson's "cognitive style, his defensive reliance on denial, his dramatic flair, emotional
intensity, and pattern of sexual relationships all suggest a dominant hysterical compo
nent in his personality."28 She denies, however, that this validates the Georges' thesis
of the compulsive quest for power as compensation for low self-esteem.29
The key remaining question in the historiography of Wilson's behavior and
decision-making, according to Ross, is explaining Wilson's record of accomplishment
in light of the "concentration on the pathological aspects of personality." To address
this problem, she calls upon historians to analyze Wilson's problems within the
"context of his strengths." Crucial to developing this fuller understanding of Wilson,
Ross suggests, will be the necessity of combining intuitive, artistic insights with
a careful weighing of the evidence as utilized by historians and medical experts
alike.30
Thus Ross, despite some reservations, projects an up-beat and optimistic future
for the utilization of psychology in history. Ironically, James William Anderson,
a psychologist, who had collaborated with Link and Weinstein in the 1978 critique
of the Georges, published at virtually the same time as Ross's article a much more
pessimistic assessment of the contributions of psychological biography to historical
understanding. Anderson acknowledges that even the harshest critics concede the
importance of psychological insights but he stresses that as of the early 1980's the
gap between potential and actual contribution was significant. To Anderson the psycho
logical biography is almost uniformly "reductionistic, narrow and disparaging."31
In order to avoid or at least minimize such basic flaws in the future by "unskilled
authors" with "faulty assumptions," Anderson urges scholars to resist the reduction
istic tendency to rely upon "one-dimensional analysis" which seeks to "explain all
of the complex psychological dimensions" of a subject and which does so at the
expense of ignoring broader sociological, cultural and historical factors. The funda
mental problem of such an approach, Anderson notes, is not that the interpretation
is incorrect but that it conveys the message that the psychologically constricted
interpretation is all that scholars need to know about a particular subject.32
The accompanying tendency to disparage the subject stems, Anderson suggests,
from the often unintentional emphasis placed upon a person's psychological diffi
culties. This concern, of course, overlaps with Ross's call for scholars to address

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making 63

Wilson's record of accomplishment within the context of what she considers "patho
logical aspects" of Wilson's personality.33
Anderson's prescription for avoiding the pitfalls of psychological biography is
more developed and technocratic than Ross's plea for artistic and intuitive insights
but fundamentally they agree that the remedy is to immerse one's self in the primary
sources. Anderson emphasizes as does Ross that there is "no alternative to doing
extensive research, whenever possible in the primary materials."34 He also urges
scholars writing psychological biography to minimize psychological terminology in
that the terms in and of themselves do not explain anything and to recognize that in
explaining individuals and events other types of explanations ?economic, cultural ?
complement rather than compete with psychological theses.35
Seemingly, the sixty-nine volumes of the Papers of Woodrow Wilson (PWW)
offer an ideal source to fulfill the injunctions of Ross and Anderson. Although rather
sketchy on Wilson's childhood, the PWW provide an unequaled opportunity to
develop an in-depth understanding of a singular individual rooted in time and place
rather than in abstract theoretical constructs.36
To develop new insights into the personality, health and decision making of
Wilson it will be necessary, as the Georges suggest and as Link and his colleagues
acknowledge, to make a sharp distinction between the documents in the PWW and
the editorial apparatus that Link and his editorial associates have added in the form
of introductions, editorial comments in footnotes and appendices consisting of inter
pretive essays. Scholars will certainly realize that Link and his associates do indeed
have strongly held views on the relationship between Wilson's personality, health
and decision-making. The dire warnings of the Georges concerning the need for
Link and his associates to refrain from any interpretive bias in the name of objectivity
stands out as a simplistic faith in 19th century positivism and can be readily discounted
as Ross did in her case for historians not expecting psychological experts and para
digms to be "objective."
The more important issue is whether historians and other scholars will read
and analyze the documents on their own or whether they will be swayed by the
voice of authority in the form of deference to the prestige and influence of Link
and his Princeton associates. In blunt terms, can scholarly insights and integrity
withstand the pressure to cozy-up to the "Link school" for career and publication
purposes? It seems apparent that more than one scholar has been intellectually seduced
in the Firestone Library of Princeton University.37 On the other side of the coin,
of course, it can be argued that career and publication dreams may be enhanced by
taking unwarranted pot-shots at a scholar and institution of singular character and
accomplishment.
The sycophantic and extreme iconoclastic approach both present obvious prob
lems and should be kept to an absolute minimum. The cure for these academic
"diseases" is ?as is the case for abstract, psychological models?immersion in the
primary sources. The PWW provide a golden opportunity for scholars to think and
be creative concerning historical interpretations and not be so preoccupied with the
process and problems of tracking down evidence.38

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64 I PRESIDENTIAL studies quarterly

Gathering and organizing the evidence on Wilson was an enormous and difficult
task until the 1960s. Numerous scholars in the 1970s and the 1980s have written
studies of Wilson which are only partially based on the PWW and represent, in so
far as they are not supported by the full evidentiary base of the PWW, limited
interpretations.39 In this light, historians of the 1990s and beyond will owe a debt
of immeasurable gratitude to Link and his associates for their editorial accomplishment
whether or not they agree with Link's interpretations of the evidence.
As a case study of the relationship between the evidence provided in the PWW
and Link's interpretation of the sources, let us turn to the question of Wilson's
health before his collapse in late September-early October of 1919. Our purpose
will be to challenge, where it seems warranted, the thesis of the PWW editors as
developed in volumes 58 through 64 on the connections between Wilson's health
and decision-making in the spring, summer and early fall of 1919 and to utilize the
PWW as a foundation for alternative insights.
In volume 58, published in 1988, which covers the period April 23-May 9,
1919, the editors of the PWW announced in the introduction that Wilson had
suffered a small stroke or "cerebrovascular accident" on April 28, 1919. The editors
speculate that the problem stemmed from the strain of the prior week or ten days
upon Wilson at the peace conference. More importantly, the editors emphatically
state that while Wilson apparently enjoyed a speedy recovery "in fact his great
intellectual power, resolve and determination, and physical resources are and remain
severely compromised."40 To the editors, the April 28 attack was sufficient to enable
them to conclude that Wilson "suffered increasingly" from "cerebrovascular disease
... at least from mid-1918 onward."41 The editors concede that it is impossible
"to define precisely the degree to which this disease affected Wilson's personality,
judgment, behavior and decisions during the peace conference." Nevertheless, they
conclude that "from early June 1919 onward" the impact of the disease on Wilson
becomes "increasingly clear."42
To buttress their position the editors decided to consult medical experts and
provide in volume 58 an appendix which consists of their own commentary and
the evaluations of three physicians. To justify this decision the editor's note that in
the process of examining the documents it had "become obvious" that from late
April to about mid-May 1919 Wilson was "undergoing some kind of crisis in his
health." A "dramatic deterioration" of Wilson's handwriting which "became almost
grotesque" and continued until about May 13th provided the catalyst for the editor's
decision to consult medical experts. The editors wondered if Wilson had had a
" 'slight' stroke, or lacunar infarction, on about April 28th" with "additional bleeding
in the brain during the next two weeks or so."43
In addition to the deterioration in handwriting, the editors observed "there
were enough other evidences of uncharacteristic Wilsonian behavior between late
April and mid-May to prompt us to seek the advice of specialists who had done
significant work on Wilson's history of neurologic illness."44 To provide this service
the editors recruited Bert E. Park, a neurosurgeon who they describe as a "trained"
historian and the author of a 1986 study of the impact of illness on world leaders.45

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making | 65

Park read what has become volumes 51 through 59 of the PWW on the Paris
Peace Conference. In addition to Park, the editors enlisted as commentators Edwin
Weinstein and James F. Toole, the latter a professor of neurology at Wake Forest
University.
The editors note that Park and the commentators disagree on the diagnosis
of Wilson but contend that this is "not surprising" given the lapse in time and the
scanty medical records available on Wilson's health. The editors also take note of
Park's warning to avoid "retrospective medical reductionism."46 Nevertheless, the
editors emphasize that they see the issue of Wilson's health from April to the autumn
of 1919 to be of "ever-increasing relevance" and that they regard the utilization of
modern medicine as legitimate. At the same time, the editors acknowledge that
there is "ample room for disagreement" but offer the hope that the insights of
medicine will add to our understanding of important historical issues revolving
around Wilson's leadership from the spring to the fall of 1919.47
The use of medical insights does present some thorny problems for historians,
most notably the use of technical medical terms. Assuming that this problem can
be overcome, it seems reasonable to expect medical, and other experts, who engage
in historical analysis to be judged by the same basic criteria and standards of research
as would historians. In short, it is incumbent upon the medical-historical investigators
to define their key terms in an understandable and coherent fashion and to marshall
sufficient historical evidence to support their thesis. As Dorothy Ross in her 1982
essay notes: "in psychohistory as in other kinds of history, evidence does make a
difference."48
As Ross makes clear, different theoretical orientations will refracture historical
evidence and lead to many different conclusions despite employing the same body
of evidence. As we look through the great historical prism, then, we should expect
to see a variety of colors or interpretations and not just shades of gray. Our charge
as historians is not to demand one color or interpretation but to examine the full
range of interpretations. In so doing, we need to insist, as noted above, that the
practitioners of specialized diagnoses or methodologies be evaluated, if they attempt
to contribute to historical understanding, on the same basis as any other historian.
The great litmus test for all pieces of historical analysis, regardless of its methodology,
is the age old question?is the interpretation backed up by the evidence?
On this basis let us evaluate the contributions of the medical experts gathered
by the Link editorial team, with particular attention being paid to the major contrib
utor?Bert E. Park.
As would any good historian writing an interpretive article, Park announces
his thesis at the outset. He contends that Wilson suffered from hypertension which
accounts for his poor health and for "most of his later behavioral and cognitive
changes."49 According to Park, Wilson's "chronic elevation of blood pressure arguably
accounted in part for much of his intransigence and character transformation that
occurred from 1918 onward." Park then informs us that hypertension induces "de
mentia."50
Thus any historian can readily understand the key features of Park's thesis and
see that he is engaging in inferential reasoning which postulates a straight-forward

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 66 I presidential studies quarterly

cause and effect relationship. In other words, Park is hypothesizing that a discernible
and significant change occurred in Wilson's behavior and thinking "from 1918
onward" as a result of his medical problem, which Park defines as dementia.51 Let
us turn to the task of testing whether the evidence supports this thesis.
After reviewing volumes 51 through 59 which cover September 14, 1918
through May 31, 1919, Park differs with earlier studies of Weinstein and the editors
of the PWW who had contended that Wilson's health had had a significant impact
on his behavior. Park concludes that despite showing signs of early dementia, the
evidence for significant changes in Wilson's "style and conduct . . . falls short" of
substantiating a decline in Wilson's performance at the Paris Peace Conference in
the spring of 1919.52
For the summer of 1919, however, Park sees significant changes in Wilson
due to dementia. Park contends that Wilson exhibited significant loss of memory,
was petulant, set in his ways, and had lost the ability to shift reflectively in his
thinking by July-August of 1919. Park even goes so far as to quantify Wilson's
"percentage of impairment" and arrives at the conclusion that Wilson "would have
been conservatively certified as being from 15 to 45 percent impaired as a percentage
of the whole man by September 1919."53 Thus to Park it is "self-evident" that
Wilson was "impaired in the strictest medical sense of the wording during the
summer of 1919."54
Wilson, Park concludes, suffered "yet another small stroke" in mid-July which
produces "hard evidence" of "memory loss." To substantiate this conclusion, Park
cites letters that Wilson exchanged with Henry Cabot Lodge and other Senators
in July and early August of 1919. Lodge wrote Wilson asking for information on
agreements concerning "certain reparation payments by Germany." Wilson re
sponded there was no such agreement. A few days later Wilson responded in a
similar vein with a letter to the Senate which denied getting any protests from
American peace Commissioners while in Paris on the Shantung Settlement. According
to Park, these responses are examples of serious lapses in Wilson's thinking.55
A review of volume 62 of the PWW for July 26-September 3, 1919 reveals
problems with Park's analysis. Wilson worked closely with his Secretary of State,
Robert Lansing, on a wide variety of issues in the summer of 1919, including the
Shantung Question. Wilson had initially decided to provide the Senate with a copy
of Tasker Howard Bliss's letter criticizing the Shantung agreement but after con
sulting with Lansing he decided it was "unwise" to release the Bliss letter and chose
instead to write a statement to the Senate which he provided to Lansing for prior
review. Wilson soon followed up his statement with a clarification to the Senate
on the context of the Bliss letter. Reflecting his consultation with Lansing and
Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson conceded that Bliss had written a critical letter, but he
contended that Bliss's protest had not been against the "final Shantung decision."
Wilson also sought to justify his decision not to release the letter on the grounds
that the letter contained references to other governments and therefore had to be
considered a "confidential communication."56
Thus if Wilson's thinking was flawed, as Park contends, it was done in conjunc
tion with his key advisers. Rather than flawed thinking it seems obvious that Wilson

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making 67

was employing classical political devices to fend off his political opponents. The idea
that Wilson was splitting hairs, relying on precise definitions of words and invoking
executive privilege in order to avoid admitting what could become embarrassing
political flaps apparently never occurs to Park.
The shortcomings of Park's analysis perhaps can be attributed to his relative
lack of training as an historian.57 The point can best be made by reversing roles
with Park. A historian could be taught rather quickly to diagnose a particular illness
but a historian would not know the implications of decisions for one part of the
body for other parts of the body. Park's historical analysis suffers from a similar
shortcoming. It is obvious that he has little knowledge or appreciation of historical
context.
Much more serious in its implications for the PWW and the role of the editors
is the collaboration between Park and the editors when Park analyzes Wilson's
August 8, 1919 speech on the cost of living. Park's interpretation of the speech is
so influenced by the editors of the PWW that it destroys any credibility that he
may have had as an historian or expert observer, raises grave questions about the
procedures and judgment of the PWW editors and confirms some of the worst fears
of the Georges. Park, in fact, exceeds the fears of the Georges in some respects. He
turns, on several occasions, counter factual hypotheses into assertions of fact.58
Unfortunately, the editors of the PWW have developed a similar habit. Park
and the editors seem to have embraced a highly simplistic version of the great man
theory: A healthy Wilson could have accomplished single-handedly any manner of
great things.59
Park accepts without question the editor's analysis of the Wilson's August 8th
speech as providing evidence of Wilson's dementia. The editors assert that the speech
illustrates "the degree to which the dementia resulting from his stroke of July 19
had affected" Wilson. The editors seem certain that the reader of the PWW will
concur with the "obvious facts about the address" and note as supporting evidence
the unusual, last-minute haste of Wilson in sending an unedited copy of the speech
to the printer with "several grammatical errors and at least one garbled sentence."60
According to the editors, the language of the speech was similar to some of Wilson's
essays written in the 1880s and 1890s and was "rambling, loquacious, repetitive,
and chatty." All of this in the view of the editors is conclusive evidence that Wilson
was unable to focus or concentrate on the task at hand, an obvious characteristic
of dementia.61
Perhaps swayed by the adamant tone of the editors and the fact that the conclu
sions fit his thesis, Park readily accepts the editors' analysis and cites their key points
for his conclusion that the speech was "one of his poorest on record" and was "often
rambling and without substance."62
Scholars and students interested in this problem should read the speech for
themselves but a brief synopsis of the speech can serve as a basis for assessing the
intellectual propriety of such close collaboration between editors and scholars who
should exercise their own independent judgment.
Wilson begins his speech with the contention that it was his duty to persuade
Congress to pass effective legislation to control the cost of living. He argues that

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 68 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

high prices stemmed "in many cases" from questionable practices which need to be
corrected by law. Higher prices quite naturally led to demands for higher wages
which were justified if there were no other means to survive; higher wages then
led to higher prices and strikes. Government, in Wilson's view, could not sit idly
by and let this destructive economic cycle run its course.63
Proposed remedies were complicated, however, by the need for peace. The
economy of the United States was "inextricably interwoven," he suggests, with the
economies of other nations and the economic future would remain uncertain until
the peace was settled.64
Wilson then set out in concrete detail a half-dozen or so measures the United
States could take to alleviate economic problems ranging from control of wheat
prices to the need to adopt measures that had been successfully implemented at the
state and local level. Wilson follows up on his explication of "detailed measures"
with a justification for bold, decisive national action. He contends that he would
"not hesitate to handle a national measure in a national way."65
Wilson concludes his speech with an acknowledgment of the gravity of condi
tions, but he cautions against too "fearful forecasts." In this context he reiterates
his original point on the economic consequences of peace for Europe which he
projected as in the interest of the United States since Europe was America's "biggest
customer."66 To address the problems in the United States, Wilson called for calm
reason, not passion. He expresses his confidence in the American people and singles
out for praise middlemen and labor leaders. To resolve the economic issues in the
United States, Wilson asks for unity and cooperation.67
Anyone familiar with Wilson's career or the Progressive movement, can readily
detect the basic themes of Wilson's thinking. One can criticize the substance of the
ideas and the sincerity of Wilson's commitment to the principles enunciated, but
the contention of Park and the editors of the PWW that the speech provides evidence
of Wilson's disoriented and damaged thinking because of dementia simply does not
stand up to close examination of the evidence.
Even the most casual reader of Wilson's speech can detect his political agenda
at home and abroad. Wilson may have overstated the interdependence of America's
economy with Europe but the linkage serves his purposes and demonstrates a consis
tency of thinking and goals. Likewise, his praise for the American people in general
and middlemen and labor leaders in particular focuses attention upon the key political
controversies of the time. It is difficult, in fact, to find any points in the speech
that are not related directly to his domestic and foreign policy goals. The speech
may be pedestrian and mundane, but it is certainly not confused or "chatty" as Park
and the editors of the PWW contend.68
An alternative explanation to dementia for the haste and for the errors in
Wilson's speech is straight forward and requires only a recognition of the historical
context of the speech. The PWW provide an abundance of evidence that demonstrates
the demands upon Wilson's time and faculties in the summer of 1919. One would
be hard-pressed to find a year in American history, outside of the Civil War period,
in which the leaders of the United States faced greater challenges. Wilson had

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making | 69

to confront simultaneously the problems associated with the economic and social
readjustments after the war and the political pressures related to negotiating with
a recalcitrant Senate that called into question nearly every major decision he had
made in Paris at the peace conference.
Just a quick review of Wilson's main activities on the day in which he delivered
the cost of living speech will demonstrate the demands and pressures he faced. Wilson
wrote or reviewed about a dozen letters which ranged from important matters of
policy at home and abroad to routine expressions of recommendations and condo
lences. All of the responses upon examination appear to be logical, to the point and
even insightful in some cases.69
Wilson responded, in addition, to a request from Henry Cabot Lodge "for
all proceedings, arguments and debates, including a transcript of the stenographic
reports of the Peace Commission" with an indication that he had "at last been able
to go personally over the great mass of papers" which had been brought from
Paris. Wilson expressed his disappointment that the file was not complete, although
"enormous in mass;" he also deftly and politely side-stepped Lodge's request for
access to the papers with the contention that no official stenographic record had
been taken at the conference and that what had been taken was regarded by all the
governments involved as "confidential."70 Nevertheless, in a gesture of goodwill,
Wilson provided Lodge with a copy of a treaty draft which he described as the
presentation of the American Commissioners.
The editors of the PWW deem it necessary to point out in a footnote that
Wilson was "of course, mistaken" about the treaty draft ?there was no American
Commissioners' draft and that what Wilson sent Lodge was the Hurst-Miller draft
which was done by these experts assigned to the American delegation.71 This is only
one of many examples the editors cite which are apparently designed to provide the
evidentiary base for Park's dementia thesis. The effort represents a case of misplaced
literalism which ignores broader and more important points of historical context
and significance.
Ironically, the editors provide evidence not available elsewhere which contradicts
the dementia thesis. They quote a long excerpt from an undated memorandum by
Stockton Axson, the brother of Wilson's first wife, which is in the possession of
Arthur S. Link, that summarizes Wilson's reaction on "the evening after the President
delivered his address on the Cost of Living" to the Plumb plan which called for
nationalization of the railroads. Axson noted how attentive Wilson was to the details
of the proposal and how thoughtful and "open-minded" Wilson was. There is not
the slightest hint in Axson's analysis of Wilson's mental faculties of loss of memory,
petulance, close mindedness or the inability to shift reflectively. To the contrary
the tone and substance of Axson's memo is one of great respect, even awe, over
Wilson's ability to analyze and synthesize so many complex matters at once. Axson
underscored the tentative and contingent nature of Wilson's thinking with the
assertion that "of course, in a general conversation of this sort the President arrived
at no definite conclusions. He could not have done so. But it interested me to see
how very open-minded he was towards the whole thing." Axson also pointed out

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 70 j PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

that Wilson "had been so occupied with the Peace Treaty, the League of Nations,
Cost of Living questions, Strike questions, and so on that he had not had an opportu
nity until this leisurely evening with his family to inform his own mind of the
Plumb Plan."72
Without getting bogged down in the extensive explanatory notes that crippled
the publication of the Jefferson papers under the editorship of Julian Boyd, the editors
of the PWW could have noted the historical significance of executive privilege which
Wilson was defending with his deflection of the Lodge request. The fact that Wilson
mislabeled or even confused the various drafts of proposals some six months prior
to his letter hardly seems important. Tallies of the number of grammatical errors
and misplaced words likewise seem to be focusing on the relatively trivial rather
than the truly significant.
If on the other hand, the editors could demonstrate erratic shifts in the main
themes of Wilson's thinking and behavior that would be an entirely different matter.
This has not been done except for rather questionable comparisons that are illogical.
In the note to the August 8th speech, for example, the editors, in attempting to
make the case for Wilson's poor performance in drafting the speech as evidence of
dementia, compare the speech without any specific references to some of Wilson's
essays in the 1880's and 1890's. What is the point of this comparison? Are the
editors suggesting that Wilson showed signs of dementia when he was in his thirties
and forties? If so, how did he become President of Princeton much less the United
States?73
Unfortunately, it seems obvious that the editors of the PWW have fallen into
the trap that James William Anderson warned against in his 1982 essay on the
"Methodology of Psychological Biography." Contrary to Anderson's advice, the
editors have latched on to a one-dimensional analysis ?dementia?and have gone to
great lengths to disparage Wilson's performance as a leader during periods when
he made controversial and ultimately unsuccessful decisions in order to prove to
their own satisfaction a pre-determined thesis.74
Park's performance and the supporting role of the PWW editors are even more
lamentable in their coverage of Wilson's meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on August 19, 1919. In a three and one-half hour meeting in which
Wilson responded without notes to questions from the Senators, Park and the PWW
editors see fit to concentrate upon the errors of fact which Wilson supposedly made.
Acting as if Wilson were on a quiz show, Park contends that Wilson "made at
least sixteen overt errors, misrepresentations, and self-contradictions." Park cites
specifically Wilson's inability to recall exact dates of what took place in Paris, his
misrepresentation of what documents he possessed, what role his advisers played at
the conference, and what the exact terms of the treaty were. Park concludes his
catalogue of Wilson's mental lapses with the contention that Lodge embarrassed
Wilson by citing an advertisement which had been in a New York newspaper
concerning the resumption of German trade.75 All this proves, according to Park,
that "Wilson's memory was clearly faulty?almost consistently so." Park's analysis
of the conference depends heavily on a slew of "sics," some with explanation points,

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 WOODROW WILSON'S DECISION-MAKING | 71

which the editors placed in the footnotes throughout the seventy-five pages of
transcribed notes on the meeting.76 The numerous sics would appear to go beyond
the academic pale and to blur the line between the documents and the editors'
conclusions.
Once again, Wilson's alleged memory loss can be discounted and his perfor
mance placed in a context which provides some sense of historical context and
significance. The contention that Wilson should be able to provide without notes
the exact dates some six to eight months later for the pressure-packed events of the
Paris Peace Conference seems unreasonable and insignificant in and of itself.
Wilson's contradictory responses to questions concerning the documents
brought from Paris were obviously attempts, perhaps not too successful or subtle,
to preserve his control over these important sources. His answers may not have been
very effective, but Wilson is not the only President in American history to have
had trouble with Congress over executive prerogatives or privileges. To attribute
Wilson's waffling responses on this matter to loss of memory seems misplaced at
the very least.
Political reality also explains Wilson's efforts to obfuscate the role of his advisers
at the Paris conference. Do Park and the editors of the PWW really expect Wilson
to admit to his political opponents that his advisers played a marginal role at the
conference? Surely, as scholars we need to be more politically sophisticated than
this.
Park's points about Wilson's inability to recall specific terms of the peace treaty
likewise crumble in the face of rather simple and basic questions about Wilson's
intellectual style as a thinker and the nature of the treaty itself. The treaty consisted
of hundreds of pages of technical economic and diplomatic agreements. Wilson,
who prided himself on being a "big-picture" thinker, showed no embarrassment
whatsoever in readily admitting that he had not committed the treaty to memory.77
Why should he?
Park's contention that Lodge caught Wilson in an embarrassing lapse of memory
is logically flawed. During the meeting, Lodge cited an advertisement in a New
York newspaper concerning the resumption of trade with Germany.78 Wilson showed
no knowledge of the ad, which Park attributes to loss of memory. A more likely
explanation is that Wilson had never read the paper. The editors surely recognized
that Wilson avoided reading newspapers and even bragged about it from time to
time. This may have been bad political judgment on Wilson's part, but failure to
read a newspaper does not constitute loss of memory.
In concentrating upon Wilson's alleged loss of memory and other supposed
mental shortcomings, Park and the editors of the PWW ignore the more important
conflicts of principles and policies revolving around the future direction of American
foreign policy after World War I. In the face of strong concerns in the Senate
over United States sovereignty and security, Wilson chose to avoid an explicit
confrontation over the international obligations which the treaty entailed. Many
important political and diplomatic consequences and questions arise from Wilson's
treaty ratification strategy but few, if any, of the questions or consequences stem

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 72 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

from Wilson's loss of memory or other symptoms of dementia in the summer of

1919.
Unfortunately, the judgment and editorial conclusions of Link and his associates
are as suspect in their coverage of Wilson's famous western speaking tour in Sep
tember, 1919. The editors acknowledge that Joseph P. Tumulty had raised the idea
of a speaking tour of the United States while Wilson was still in Paris, but they
contend that any discussion of a tour "dropped out of sight upon Wilson's return
to Washington and after his stroke on July 19." As a result, Link and his colleagues
characterize Wilson's decision to make the tour as "obviously made without much
thought, in anger, and on the spur of the moment. The decision was, we have to
say, irrational."79
Once again, a fuller historical context puts Wilson's decision-making in a very
different light. The speaking tour was just one part of an overall strategy to win
ratification in the Senate. When he returned from Paris, Wilson launched with the
approval of his advisers a one-on-one canvass of the Senate. It was only after extensive
personal contact with the Senate which included a congenial and even-tempered
three and one-half hour meeting at the White House with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, that Wilson decided to make what he considered to be the
long-delayed speaking tour of the United States.
In reality, there is no extant, contemporary evidence of anyone conveying
directly to Wilson strong doubts about the speaking tour. It is true that some of
Wilson's advisers cautioned against giving the appearance of going over the head
of the Senate and Mrs. Wilson expressed in mid-July concerns about taking the
tour during "very hot weather." The only evidence of strong opposition which was
supposedly expressed to Wilson comes from the memoirs of Dr. Grayson and Mrs.
Wilson, which were both written well after the fact. Moreover, there had been
discussion of the proposed tour after Wilson's return to the United States although
the question had been put on the back-burner while Wilson was conducting his
canvass of the Senate.
To further bolster their case for the "irrational" nature of Wilson's decision
to conduct the tour, the editors contend there is "absolutely no evidence" that
Wilson's tour would have had any influence on the nineteen to twenty mild reserva
tionist Republicans who were crucial for the passage of the treaty. After criticizing
Wilson for not seeing what they claim was "perfectly obvious," the editors contradict
themselves by conceding that "of course, it is possible that Wilson understood these
necessities, had decided to go to the country and build as much popular support as
possible, and intended to sit down with the Republican moderates upon his return
and make the best deal possible."80
Dr. Bert Park's interpretation of Wilson's speaking tour is even more contradic
tory and illogical than the editorial judgment of Link and his associates. Park begins
his analysis of Wilson's western speaking tour with the contention that Wilson was
"seriously ill." He then summarizes the debilitating long-term effects of hypertension
but unlike his diagnosis of Wilson's health in the summer of 1919, he never mentions
dementia. Park, in fact, concedes that a "superficial reading" of Wilson's speeches

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 WOODROW WILSON'S DECISION-MAKING | 73

"might suggest that he remained an effective speaker to the very end." Park attributes
this to the great "will power, endurance, and genius" of Wilson, but he also contends,
without any specific examples or citations, that Wilson's speeches were "uncharacter
istically repetitive, rambling, and poorly constructed." The remainder of Park's article
consists of an analysis of Wilson' stroke in early October and a conclusion which
maintains that Wilson's health problems "had no appreciable impact on the speaking
tour itself."81
Historians are akin to herons; they come in great variety and represent many
approaches to life. The great blue heron, a creature of singular beauty, lives a solitary
existence in brackish and freshwater swamps and tends to nest in small, single species
groups. Other herons live in large, noisy, mixed species groups called "rookeries."
In either case, herons are at the top of their food chain but precisely what they eat
varies by habitat and availability.
The safest role model for historians addressing the myriad of issues and questions
surrounding the life and career of Woodrow Wilson would clearly be the great
blue heron: Stay in the swamps and be careful about mixing with other species.
All analogies and metaphors aside, it is cause for genuine scholarly regret that such
a magnificent piece of historical scholarship as the Papers of Woodrow Wilson will
forever be marred by the ill-advised and ill-conceived attempt to develop a medical
interpretation of Wilson's behavior and thinking which the documents in the PWW
will not support, at least before Wilson's major stroke in early October of 1919.

Notes
1. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1950).
2. Arthur S. Link et al., eds., The Papers ofWoodrow Wilson (69 vols., Princeton, 1966-1994).
The Jefferson papers have been published at a much slower pace and with several changes of
editors. John Catanzariti, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (24 vols., Princeton, 1950-).
3. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
4. Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality
Study (New York: Dover Publications, 1964. first printed 1956).
5. Ibid., pp. 3, 7-8, 320. In the "Dover Edition" published in 1964, the Georges added a preface
which stressed the need for a biographer to have empathy for the subject, the limits of personality
traits of leaders as the sole factor in determining events, and the necessity of grounding psychoana
lytic theory in "painstaking historical research" with "the most scrupulous attention to the social
setting in which the biographical subject lived." Nevertheless, the Georges made no effort to
change their interpretation of Wilson or to expand their research to an examination of the Wilson
papers which had been severely restricted in the 1950s and had been opened to them only when
"the study was almost complete." ibid., xii-xiii.
6. Edwin A. Weinstein, James William Anderson, Arthur S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson's Political
Personality: A Reappraisal," Political Science Quarterly 93 (Winter 1978), 586, 587. Weinstein
published in 1970 an article on Wilson's neurological illness. In the last paragraph of his article
he characterizes the Georges' interpretation and other such attempts to focus upon the formation
of character in childhood as "unwarranted oversimplifications." Edwin Weinstein, "Woodrow
Wilson's Neurological Illness," Journal of American History 57 (September 1970), 351
Link in 1967 had written a highly critical review of the Sigmund Freud-William Bullitt

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74 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

psychological study of Wilson which destroyed the credibility of the work in the minds of most
historians. Arthur S. Link, "The Case for Woodrow Wilson," Harper's Magazine (April 1967),
85-93.
7. Weinstein, Anderson, Link, "Wilson's Political Personality," 591-593. A "more realistic" picture
of Wilson would have come, they suggest, from providing "family values and cultural norms"
and from including Wilson's relationship with his mother. In the view of Weinstein, Anderson,
Link "any theory of personality" concerning Wilson must include the role of his mother since
she "instilled so much anxiety in him." ibid., 597-598.
8. Ibid., 596.
9. Ibid., 593-594. Link, Weinstein and Anderson express considerable surprise that the Georges
as trained behavioral scientists did not detect the impact of illness on Wilson's performance in
1919 and in 1906. They contend that even "lay observers" noticed a change in Wilson's performance
after he fell ill during the spring of 1919 in Paris.
10. Ibid., 594-596.
11. Juliette L. George, Alexander L. George, "Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Reply to
Weinstein, Anderson, and Link," Political Science Quarterly 96 (Winter 1981-82), 651-652.
12. Ibid., 653.
13. Ibid. The Georges note with undisguised scholarly satisfaction that Weinstein had modified his
position on Wilson having a stroke in Paris during the spring of 1919. ibid., 657.
14. Ibid., 654.
15. Ibid., 654-655.
16. Ibid., 665. The Georges note that Robert T. Monroe, an internist at Harvard, had questioned
Weinstein's stroke thesis in the early 1970s but that Weinstein had dismissed Monroe's points,
ibid., 660-661.
Arthur Walworth had consulted Monroe on Wilson's health. Walworth also cites Walter
C. Alvarez for his contention that Wilson suffered hardening of the arteries. Arthur Walworth,
Woodrow Wilson 3rd. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1978), p. 98.
Marmor acknowledges that chronic vascular disease may cause subtle changes in behavior and
lead ultimately to dementia, but he stresses the complexity of such an analysis by noting that
it is difficult to distinguish the impact of dementia from changes associated with aging. To
Marmor, Wilson's career provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Wilson was a "lucid
and powerful thinker" up to the time of his serious stroke in October 1919.
17. Juliette L. George, Michael F. Marmor, Alexander L. George, "Research Note/ Issues in Wilson
Scholarship: References to Early Strokes' in the Papers of Woodrow Wilson," Journal of American
History 70 (March 1984), 846. Juliette L. George, Michael F. Marmor, Alexander L. George,
To the Editor of the Journal of American History, "Communications," Journal of American History
71(June 1984), 198-212.
18. Georges, "Research Note," 849.
19. Ibid., 851. To bolster their call for objectivity in the PWW and for consideration of the full
range of medical opinion on Wilson, the Georges cite still another medical expert, Jerrold M.
Post, a psychiatrist, as further support for questioning the Link-Weinstein stroke thesis. According
to the Georges, Post consulted with five other medical specialists ? "a psychiatrist, three neurolo
gists, and an orthopedist" ? and none agreed with the stroke thesis. The Georges acknowledge
Link's right as a scholar to be "associated" with the stroke thesis, but they express serious
reservations about Link using his position as editor of the PWW to elevate what they consider
to be a highly speculative and flawed interpretation in to "historical fact." At the very least,
they expressed the hope that when the volumes of the PWW for the spring of 1919 were published
the "speculative nature" of the stroke hypothesis would be acknowledged and the position of
other physicians who differed with Link and Weinstein would be noted, ibid., 852-853.
20. Dorothy Ross, "Review Essay/ Woodrow Wilson and the Case for Psychohistory," Journal of
American History 69(December 1982), 659-660.
21. Ibid., 661.

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making | 75

22. Ibid., 661-662. Link, as will be developed below, no longer supports any psychological interpreta
tion of Wilson's behavior.
23. Ross, "Review Essay," 663. For the Freud-Bullitt interpretation see Sigmund Freud and William
C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1967).
24. Ross, "Review Essay," 665.
25. Ibid., 665. Ross cites as a "crucial" example Wilson's plans for Princeton which "became suddenly
so unrealistic after 1906." According to Ross, the Georges have "no explanation" for this except
for the continued quest for power thesis. Weinstein's contribution is that whether Wilson had
a stroke in 1906 or not, it is clear that the illness "destabilized" him.
26. Ibid., 666.
27. Ibid., 664.
28. Ibid., 667.
29. Ibid., 667.
30. Ibid., 668.
31. James William Anderson, "The Methodology of Psychological Biography," Journal of Interdisci
plinary History XI (Winter 1981), 455.
32. Ibid., 456. Anderson contends that reductionism stems in large part from attempts to explain
a person's whole life through childhood conflicts.
33. Ibid., 456-457; Ross, 668.
34. Anderson, 458.
35. Ibid., 458-459.
36. The editors lament the lack of sources for Wilson's early teens. Editorial Note, Wilson's Imaginary
World, PWW, I, 20-22. The first direct sources by Wilson begin to appear in his mid-teens.
37. Perhaps the most important example of this phenomenon is Robert Ferrell in his volume in the
New American Nation Series, Woodrow Wilson and World War 11917-1921. Ferrell thanks Link
for access to Wilson materials and for a "wonderfully close examination of the present manuscript."
Thus it is not too surprising that Ferrell finds that the "stroke theory of Wilson's behavior over
many years, at Princeton as well as during the League fight, has much to recommend it." Robert
Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War 11917-1921 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1985), p. 159.
38. For two complex but enlightening articles on the need for historians to do serious philosophical
and analytical thinking about their discipline see F.R. Ankersmit, "Historiography and Postmod
ernism," History and Theory 28 (1989), 137-153 and Fritz Ringer, "Causal Analysis in Historical
Reasoning," History and Theory 28 (1989), 154-172.
39. John Mulder, Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1978). Neil A. Thorsen, The Political Thought ofWoodrow Wilson 1875-1910 (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
Dewey Grantham, who has reviewed all the volumes of the PWW for the Journal of American
History contends that "serious researchers" will still need to consult the unpublished papers of
Wilson housed at the Library of Congress. Dewey Grantham, "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson:
A Preliminary Appraisal," in John Milton Cooper, Jr. and Charles E. Neu, eds., The Wilson
Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1991),
291. On the other hand, Ankersmit believes that "the time has come that we should think about
the past, rather than investigate it." Ankersmit, "Historiography and Postmodernism," 152.
40. Introduction, PWW, LVIII, viii. Link is apparently reversing his 1978 conclusion that Wilson
had not had a stroke.
41. Ibid., x.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 607.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. Bert Edward Park, The Impact of Illness on World Leaders (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1986).

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76 j PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

46. Editor's Introduction, Wilson's Neurologic Illness At Paris, PWW, LVIII, 611.
47. Ibid.
48. Ross, "Review Essay," 664.
49. Bert E. Park, "The Impact of Wilson's Neurologic Disease During the Paris Peace Conference,"
PWW, LVIII, 612.
50. Ibid. In spite of Park's contention that Wilson suffered from "chronic elevation of blood pressure,"
the only extant reference to Wilson's blood pressure in the PWW is by Dr. Cary Grayson who
in the spring of 1913 measured Wilson's blood pressure to be 110. According to Grayson, this
was "pretty low." From the Papers of Cary Travers Grayson, PWW, LXIV, 486.
51. As noted above,the first medical doctor to raise the question of dementia was Michael F. Marmor
in a 1981 letter attached to George and George, "A Reply to Weinstein, Anderson, and Link,"
663-665.
52. Park, "Impact of Wilson's Neurologic Disease During the Paris Peace Conference," PWW,
LVIII, 622-623, 628-630.
53. Bert E. Park, "Wilson's Neurologic Illness during the Summer of 1919," PWW, LXII, 634.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 629-630.
56. For concerns over Asia Minor see WW to Robert Lansing, August 4, 1919, ibid., 141, 144,
149. For the Shantung controversy see Desk Diary of Robert Lansing, August 5, 1919, ibid.,
164 and August 6, 1919, ibid., 169. For the Senate statement see A Statement, August 6, 1919,
ibid., 170. For his follow up clarification to the Senate see A Message to the Senate, August 8,
1919, ibid., 208.
57. It is unclear how much training Park has as a historian. In the preface to his book Impact of
Illness on World Leaders, Park casts himself as a "relative amateur" and mentions having "a meager
twenty-eight hours credit toward a master's degree in history." Park, Impact, pp. xiii, xvii. In
volume LVIII of the PWW Park is credited with having a M. A. degree but not in volume LXII.
In volume LXIII Park is credited with an M.A. See PWW, LVIII, 611. ibid., LXII, 628. ibid.,
LXIII, 639. As of volume LX (1989) Park is a member of the Editorial Advisory Committee
for the PWW.
Edwin Weinstein presents a similar case. The editors of the PWW credit Weinstein with
many years of diligent research and cite the favorable reviews of Weinstein's book. In fact,
Weinstein's book is more episodic than historical in nature. He jumps from illness to illness with
little apparent study of the intervening periods. The editors' case for the extensive overlap in
methodology between history and medicine appears to be a case of enthusiasm outrunning reality.
Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John Wells Davidson, John E. Little, "Communications,"
Journal of American History 70 (March, 1984), 946-947.
58. Park strongly suggests that Wilson's growing paranoia was responsible for the treaty being
stymied and for other policy stalemates in the summer of 1919. Park, "Wilson's Neurologic
Illness during the Summer of 1919," PWW LXII, 633, 636.
59. Link has taken his case for the significance of Wilson's health to the public with press interviews
and has even had his thesis cited by George Will. For the press interview under the byline of
Thomas Martello of the Associated Press see The Washington Post, November 26, 1919, p. A7.
For the George Will column see ibid., February 21, 1991, p. A21.
Link is quoted in the Martello interview as indicating that "in his normal, healthy state,
Wilson would have found compromise with the large group of moderate Republicans." Martello
also summarizes Link's contention that Dr. Cary Grayson's medical records which were being
published for the first time in volume 64 of the PWW would substantiate the stroke thesis and
"lay to rest the theories that Wilson's problems were psychological."
60. Editor's Note, PWW, LXII, 209.
61. Ibid.
62. Park, Wilson's Neurologic Illness during the Summer of 1919, PWW, LXII, 630.
63. An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, August 8, 1919, ibid., 210.

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 woodrow wilson's decision-making | 77

64. Ibid., 211.

65. Ibid., 212-216.
66. Ibid., 216-219.
67. Ibid., 217-219.
68. Ibid., 209.
69. For examples see PWW, LXII, 208, 209, 219-236.
70. Woodrow Wilson to Henry Cabot Lodge, August 8, 1919, PWW, LXII, 219.
71. Editor's Note, ibid., 220.
72. Editor's Note, Quoted excerpt from undated memorandum of Stockton Axson, ibid., 228-229.
73. The editors' contention that after a very uncharacteristic period, 1906-1910, Wilson enjoyed a
near miraculous remission appears on the surface to be suspect. Link, Hirst, Davidson, Little,
"Communications," 953-955.
74. Actually, Link and his colleagues have employed several medical concepts to explain Wilson's
behavior ?strokes, hypertension, dementia and, in volume LXIV, paranoia have all been utilized.
In addition, the Link "team" has developed a number of chronological frameworks for explaining
when and to what degree Wilson's health affected his behavior. The Gray son papers in volume
64 of the PWW, for example, are interpreted by Link as a retrospective affirmation of his stroke
thesis but there is no explicit diagnosis by Gray son or any other contemporary physician that
cites any mental or behavioral changes by Wilson as a result of his illness. Link's thesis is built
entirely on inference. See From the Grayson Papers, PWW, LXIV, 485-513.
75. Park, "Wilson's Neurologic Illness during the Summer of 1919," ibid., LXII, 631.
76. A Conference with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 19, 1919,
ibid., 339-411.
The Editors' decision to employ "sics" at this point is noteworthy on two accounts: (1) they
eschewed the use of sic at the outset of the project; (2) the sics are used to denote what the
Editors consider to be faulty judgment or memory by Wilson. This is hardly a standard use for
sic.
77. Ibid., 360, 369. See the Dorothy Ross, "Review Essay," for a substantiation of this point.
78. Conference with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, PWW, LXII, 407.
79. Editor's Note, ibid., 507-508. For an analysis of Wilson's speaking tour see John Milton Cooper,
Jr., "Fool's Errand Or Finest Hour: Woodrow Wilson's Speaking Tour In September 1919,"
in Cooper and Neu, The Wilson Era, pp. 198-220.
80. Editor's Note, PWW, LXII, 507.
81. Bert E. Park, The Aftermath of Wilson's Stroke, PWW, LXIV, 640-646. Park is cited at the
start of this commentary as having an M.D. and M.A.

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