Critical Periods NC (TRAD NC) -- SHORT

Framework

[Value] I negate and value Social Justice, meaning government policy that treats people as they

deserve. Rights mean nothing if they can’t be used – without giving people a way of acting on

them, we deny them their due.

[Standard] Thus, the criterion is Promoting Access to Rights. Promoting Access to Rights

means giving all people the opportunity to experience the freedoms they’re entitled to. This

comes before other criteria, since it’s a mechanism for achieving them.
 Thesis

[Thesis] My thesis is that we shouldn’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Blanket

bans on U.S. military presence, abbreviated “USMP,” deny key forms of aid that promote

equality and justice.

 C1: Genocide

[C1] My first contention is that by refusing to recognize rights violations, affirming

undermines equality and justice.

[DeBartolo] Throughout WANA, rights abuses are rampant: Syria has killed over 300,000

civilians in the last decade1, and Saudi Arabia exposes 1.5 million women to slave-like work

conditions.2 Many WANA citizens demand democracy.

Policy Director David DeBartolo notes: DeBartolo, David. [Director of Dialogue Programs for the Project on Middle East
Democracy] “Perceptions of US Democracy Promotion Part One: Middle Eastern Views.” Project on Middle East Democracy, 2008.
https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/POMED-Perceptions-Pt-1-Debartolo-May-2008.pdf CH

The notion that Middle Easterners do not value democracy is relatively common in the U.S. Some argue that, for religious, cultural or historical

reasons, Middle Easterners prefer dictators or monarchs to rule them rather than ruling themselves. Yet the World Values Survey shows

unequivocally that Middle Easterners desire democracy.1 While 52.4% of Americans think that a democratic

political system is a “very good” way to govern the U.S., over 80% of Moroccans believe that democracy is a very good way to

govern Morocco; 67.9% of Egyptians believe democracy is a very good way to govern Egypt; and 58.6% of Iraqis

believe democracy is a very good way to govern Iraq.2 See Figure 1. In no Middle Eastern country

surveyed did less than 49% of the people believe that democracy was ‘very good.’ These results are confirmed
in another question, in which Middle Easterners in almost every country feel strongly that “Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than

any other form of government.”3 While 41.6% of Americans strongly agree with this statement, that is dwarfed by the number of

Moroccans (77.6%), Egyptians(63.6%), and Iraqis (51.2%) who strongly agree that democracy is

better than any other form of government. See Figure 2. In every country, the number of people

who responded positively4 exceeded 69% including Jordan (89.9%), Turkey (88.3%), Saudi

Arabia (74.2%), and Iran (69.2%). In 2007, substantial majorities in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,

Morocco, and the Palestinian Territories said that democracy was not just a ‘Western way of doing things,’

1
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/syria
2
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia#d91ede
and could work well in their countries.5 In the West Bank and Gaza, after the election of Hamas in January 2006, Figure
3b shows that respondents in 2007 were significantly more optimistic about whether democracy would work for them than they had been in 2003,

the last time this question was asked there. From 2006-2007, however, there was an erosion of optimism among people in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan,

and Lebanon about how well democracy would work.

[Kaplan] Yet when the U.S. refuses to intervene militarily, it becomes complicit in calamities

that deny rights access.

Attorney Naomi Kaplan notes: Kaplan, Naomi. [J.D., Boston College Law School; Former Litigation Associate with Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips; previously served in Benin, West Africa with the Peace Corps] “A Failure of Perspective: Moral Assumptions and Genocide.”
Boston College Third World Law Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, May 1, 2003. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71463217.pdf CH

INTRODUCTION Samantha Power's book, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide, examines the consistent non-response of

American leaders to genocide throughout the twentieth century.1 Her book details the failed efforts of lobbyists and legislators to enact laws and

mobilize reaction in order to prevent genocide from commencing or to stop genocide once it has begun.2 Power, through her meticulous research,

clearly demonstrates that American politicians have been aware of all of the major genocides of this

century as they were taking place and details the excuses those in power have used time and again to justify their

inertia.3 Although former presidents have repeatedly pro claimed "never again" when remembering the Holocaust, Power comes to the
troubling conclusion that "never again" truly means, "Never again [will] Germans kill Jews in Europe in the 1940's."4 Subsequent to the

Holocaust, genocides in Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda demonstrate that genocide remains a tool of terror long after World War IJ.5

Perhaps even more troubling, under the current international legal system, nothing affirmatively prevents genocide.6 For example, when the

Khmer Rouge (KR) entered Cambodia's capital city in April of 1975 and began demanding that citizens leave Phnom Penh immediately,7 what

followed was a campaign of genocide waged for fifteen years with a brief period of Vietnamese intervention.s American President Jimmy Carter

actually assisted the murderous Khmer Rouge regime by evicting the Vietnamese and reinstating Khmer Rouge control of Cambodia.9 Similarly,

in 1980, American President Ronald Reagan branded Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons attacks

against his own people, the Kurds, an “internal affair.” l0 As such, the United States did nothing to thwart Hussein's
efforts.ll When Slobodan Milosevic began "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia, he knew that the international community was more concerned with

rhetoric than action.12 Although the UN pointed fingers at the main aggressors, imposed economic sanctions, deployed peacekeepers, and helped

deliver humanitarian aid, the U.S. and its allies did not intervene with armed forces to stop genocide until it was too late.13 When the Hutu power

majority seized control of Rwanda in early April of 1994 and began using the government's radio station to perpetuate the murder of 800,000

Tutsis in 100 days, the international community labeled the problem "tribal hostility" and withdrew UN troops from the State. 14 Those

who wish to perpetrate genocide have needed only to look at recent history to realize that

nothing will be done to stop them. IS Power asserts that American nonintervention has its roots in a fundamental failure of
imagination-that because genocide is by nature unfathomable, the general public, presidents, and policy makers alike have chosen to

look the other way instead of wrapping their minds around, and acting upon, the horrific.16 She also concludes that
American nonintervention in the face of genocide has actually been a successful policy of avoiding conflicts that do not clearly implicate

American interests.1' Although there is a common misconception that the United States did not know about genocides as they were unfurling,

Power's painstaking research proves that American presidents have been acutely aware of what was taking place; they simply lacked the will to

do anything about it.t8 Because genocide does not clearly impact American profit or pleasure, those in power have deliberately obscured the truth

of shocking events in order to avoid "do[ing] something" about genocide.t9 Inspired but not convinced by Powers' analysis, this Book Review

argues that the roots of nonintervention lie, not in a failure of imagination, but in the failure of our legal system's moral perspective to address

adequately the responsibilities genocide raises.20

She adds: Kaplan, Naomi. [J.D., Boston College Law School; Former Litigation Associate with Manatt, Phelps & Phillips; previously
served in Benin, West Africa with the Peace Corps] “A Failure of Perspective: Moral Assumptions and Genocide.” Boston College Third World
Law Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2, May 1, 2003. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71463217.pdf CH

Those in power who could have chosen to act in the spirit of the Genocide Convention relied instead upon the ethic of justice to inform their

approach to the problem. Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell, for example, drafted a strict list of requirements that must be fulfilled before

giving authorization for the United States to intervene militarily.97 Their list demanded that armed intervention: (1) be used only to protect the

vital interests of the United States or its allies; (2) be carried out wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning; (3) be in pursuit of clearly

defined political and military objectives; (4) be accompanied by widespread public and congressional support; and (5) be waged only as a last

resort.98 Moreover, Colin Powell restricted this list further by adding the requirement that the use of force be "decisive" and be carried out with a

"clear exit strategy."99 Such a hierarchical ordering of values that privileges a State's "personal" objectives reflects the values of an ethic of

justice, in which personal rights trump the needs of another. IOO The conservative nature of this list, bent on making military

intervention a “last resort,” clearly restricts affirmative action in response to genocide or other

humanitarian crises. IOI In a situation in which a foreign State is perpetrating genocide on

its inhabitants, the list drafted by Weinberger and Powell would approve of intervention only in the most limited of

circumstances in which the genocide impacts American profit or pleasure. I02 Such an outcome would be

unconscionable under an ethic of care.I03 II. SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES TO AN ETHIC OF CARE REFOCUSES THE "PROBLEM
FROM HELL" From an ethic of care perspective, there are numerous options available to prevent genocide. 104 Operating from an ethic of care

framework, the first question those in power must ask themselves is, "What have I done, directly or indirectly, to assist those who wish to

perpetrate genocide?"105 By first finding fault with the self, the questioner then takes on a high level of personal responsibility for genocidal

regimes as they unfold. l06 Taking personal responsibility means weaving the victims of genocide into a broadening web of care, in which a

person with the capacity to help sees the safeguarding of genocide victims as vital to her own sense ofwell-being.107 In this way, Power herself is

operating from an ethic of care perspective as she frames the argument of her book.
Thus, USMP is key to combating unjust rights denials.
 C2: Humanitarian Aid

[C2] My second contention is that by providing humanitarian aid to civilians, USMP helps

ensure access to rights and justice.

[Cuny] USMP isn’t just about violence – it’s often key to get people their basic needs.

Humanitarian Frederick Cuny shows: Cuny, Frederick C. [American humanitarian whose work spanned disaster relief,
refugee emergency management, recovery from war and civil conflict as well as disaster and emergency preparedness, mitigation and
peacebuilding] “Use of the Military in Humanitarian Relief.” PBS.org, November 1989. http://tinyurl.com/2zs7u55t CH

INTRODUCTION Use of military forces for humanitarian purposes is a long-established tradition in all

corners of the world. In the public mind, there is an association between disaster relief and military involvement; indeed, there is often an

expectation that military units will assist the civilian population in the immediate aftermath of

wars and large-scale emergencies. The earliest recorded instances predate Alexander the Great. The assistance of armies to
the populations they had conquered was seen as a humane gesture to the vanquished -- and, not inconsequentially, a means of winning some

degree of loyalty to the new regime. Initially, humanitarian assistance was simply logistical. Soldiers provided an interim administration to ensure

that food and other vital supplies reached the population. There was an element of self-interest involved; if the people were producing food and

goods, the army's own logistics were simpler. By the Napoleonic period, this use of military forces had become so well-established that it was

seen as an adjunct to military science. The concept of establishing martial law over civil populations was developed as a means of structuring this

involvement in a post-conquest period. While most European armies of the period pursued only a limited security objective with martial law,

Napoleon and the French revolutionary armies saw it as a means of changing the social structure and bringing the benefits and new social order of

the French Revolution to the occupied territories. (That they failed is a lesson to be learned.) Post-World War II Europe witnessed what was

perhaps the most extensive use of the military in civil affairs. It is important to recognize the influence this had both on military doctrines of civil

involvement and on development of the international relief system and the approaches that relief agencies have used since that time. The task that

faced the Allies in the aftermath of the war was enormous. Virtually an entire continent had to be administered. Vestiges of the Nazi regime had

to be eradicated, whole populations had to be reunited or resettled and economies rejuvenated. Civil government and the rule of law had to be

reestablished and entire civil administrations restructured. The role of the military was expanded as never before. The public administrative

function was perceived as so important by the Allies that special attention was given to recruiting civil administrators, city planners, urban

development specialists, and hundreds of persons skilled in operating the systems of modern cities and their governments. From the beginning,

the objective was to establish martial law in the occupied territories, then quickly rebuild indigenous capacity to manage the cities, the provinces

and, ultimately, the national governments. In Germany, the process took longer but the goal was the same -- the military role was to shift from

security and management to strictly security as quickly as possible.

He adds: Cuny, Frederick C. [American humanitarian whose work spanned disaster relief, refugee emergency management, recovery from
war and civil conflict as well as disaster and emergency preparedness, mitigation and peacebuilding] “Use of the Military in Humanitarian
Relief.” PBS.org, November 1989. http://tinyurl.com/2zs7u55t CH

To help answer these questions, we will look at reasons for military involvement in humanitarian operations, scenarios under which the military

may be deployed, and configurations or models of deployment. We will then examine several cases to identify some of the key lessons and

issues. To help understand the complexities of the relief environment and the constraints it presents, the nature of disasters in the Third World

will be explored. Finally, the dilemmas facing military commanders in humanitarian operations will be identified and discussed, and specific

recommendations for overcoming or avoiding the pitfalls will be presented. REASONS FOR INVOLVEMENT Civilian authorities turn

to the military for help in humanitarian operations for several reasons, among which the most obvious may be

their physical assets. The military is often regarded as a cornucopia of assistance. Among the most sought-after

assets are transport (land, sea and air); fuel; communications; commodities including food,

building supplies and medicines; tools and equipment; manpower; technical assistance

(especially logistics and communications) and facilities. Requests can run the gamut from the arcane, like
delousing equipment, to the mundane, like maps; from cheap items like soap, to highly-sophisticated items like bulldozers; from off-the-shelf

items like tents, to items that must be specially produced such as aerial photographs. Relief authorities know the military has

the capability of providing these on request and, in a resource-poor post-disaster

environment, it is not unreasonable for authorities to request them. Since many of the items are commonly
stockpiled and since civil disaster agencies have few stockpiles of their own, especially in the developing countries, demands can be quite

extensive. Of these assets, several are particularly attractive to emergency managers. For example, communication is critical in emergencies but

in most countries there are severe restrictions that limit civilian access to radio/telephonic systems. Thus, in the aftermath of a disaster, it is not

unreasonable for civilians to turn to the military for these services. The vast, disciplined and generally self-supporting manpower of the military is

the other key asset coveted by civil disaster authorities.

[Fossum] And this is especially key in WANA – areas like Palestine that are currently being

torn apart by violence need USMP.

Journalist Sam Fossum writes: Fossum, Sam. [White House producer, CNN] “US military to fly critical humanitarian aid to
Egypt to be brought into Gaza.” CNN.com, November 28, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/28/politics/us-military-humanitarian-aid-gaza/
index.html CH

Washington CNN — The US military will fly three planeloads of crucial humanitarian aid to North

Sinai in Egypt to be brought into Gaza to aid civilians in the region, according to senior administration officials.
The aid that is being brought will include medical supplies, food and winter weather gear as Gaza enters its rainy

season – which can be wet, cold and even lead to flooding – with countless Palestinians displaced in temporary

shelters. The first of the three flights is set to arrive Tuesday. That flight delivered more than 54,000 pounds

of medical items and food aid to a logistics hub in Egypt to then be delivered to Gaza as part of efforts to provide humanitarian

aid to civilians in the enclave, according to national security adviser Jake Sullivan . The announcement comes amid a pause in the fighting

between Israel and Hamas that has been extended for an additional two days to potentially secure the release of further hostages and allow

increased humanitarian aid into Gaza. One official noted that this ongoing effort to help supply civilians is not linked to the ongoing hostage deal

and will continue when hostilities ultimately resume. The aid being flown in by the United States, which officials

called a “significant contribution,” will be distributed by the United Nations and replenish stocks of supplies,

which had been depleted as the pace of aid being brought into Gaza increased in recent days. The effort builds upon five previous
flights of aid being brought into the region on domestic planes, the officials added. Administration officials have also been having discussions

with the Israeli government over the last few weeks about not just providing basic humanitarian assistance to Gaza but moving to what they

described as phase two: Getting commercial goods into Gaza. One of the officials said that the current level of humanitarian

aid is not enough, and they need to reach a point where they can provide the sustained delivery of commercial goods in addition to

basic humanitarian aid. They added that everyone “from the president on down” understands that what is getting into Gaza is not enough for

normal life in the besieged enclave. During the ongoing humanitarian pause, roughly 800 trucks of aid have entered Gaza, according to the

officials. And over the past seven weeks, Biden and senior officials have been working “around the clock” on the humanitarian response, these

officials added. This includes working to expand humanitarian access, push for restoration of essential services and secure deconfliction

mechanisms for civilian sites and movement in Gaza. The need for increased assistance is a reality that UN officials have also been emphasizing.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency spokesperson Adnan Abu Hasna told CNN Sunday that the current levels of aid are “just a drop in the

ocean of humanitarian needs” and that they need more supplies to operate critical services and sectors like sewage, water or hospitals. Sullivan

this past weekend detailed some of the steps that are taken in order to bring aid into Gaza. It’s first brought through the Rafah crossing into Gaza

where it is inspected by the Israelis, following which the aid trucks go to United Nations depots and other humanitarian organizations that, he

said, are “vetted and trusted partners” after which it is distributed directly to civilians. “As humanitarian assistance has

ramped up, we’ve seen it work – that it’s actually getting to people and that it’s not being diverted

into the hands of Hamas. But that’s something that we have to continue to focus on an ongoing

basis,” Sullivan said. In a statement on Monday President Joe Biden highlighted efforts his administration has been taking to surge this
additional humanitarian aid into the Gaza strip. “The United States has led the humanitarian response into Gaza—building on years of work as
the largest funder of humanitarian assistance for the Palestinian people,” Biden said. “We are taking full advantage of the pause in fighting to

increase the amount of humanitarian aid moving into Gaza, and we will continue our efforts to build a future of peace and dignity for the

Palestinian people.”

Thus, USMP is key to preserving rights access and justice.

 Onto the affirmative

Criterion – Recall the criterion to promote access to rights, which means giving people

the opportunity to experience their freedoms.

1. This precludes other criteria because it’s a mechanism by which people can

use the rights they have.

2. This controls the link to all other criteria such as maximizing expected well-

being bc we can’t do that unless we have the ability to actually experience

wellbeing.

Off Isarel

First: Joint military exercises between the U.S. and IDF enhance defense coordination,

showcasing a commitment to Israel's security. Exercises like Juniper Cobra involve

sharing advanced strategies and technologies.

Second: U.S. military presence serves as a visible deterrent, reinforcing regional stability and

Israel's defense capabilities. This includes missile defense systems and intelligence-sharing

mechanisms.

Morphing of state power from formal to informal control means private military
contractors will fill-in post aff, causing more exploitation without oversight.
Godfrey et al 13 [Richard Godfrey is currently Lecturer in Strategy at the University of
Leicester School of Management, Jo Brewis Co-directs the PhD programme in the
School of Management and is also responsible for matters PGR in the wider College of
Social Science at the University of Leicester, Jo Grady is a Lecturer in HRM and
Industrial Relations at the University of Leicester School of Management, Chris Grocott
is a Visiting Lecturer in History at De Montfort University, and an Associate Tutor in
Management at the University of Leicester School of Management “The private military
industry and neoliberal imperialism: Mapping the terrain,” 1/3/13, Organization 2014,
Vol 21(1) 106–125, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1350508412470731.
DOA: December 10, 2023 // ND // recut harris]
As Chwastiak (2007) and
And the absence of transparency around the activities of this industry may be an intentional move by certain powerful elites who stand to gain from the use of private contractors.

Avant, (2008) have observed, the use of the PSI in place of state military allows a
range of ‘wars by proxy’ so that military action can be undertaken without the
oversight—or even media reportage—that would accompany the deployment of
state troops. Ever since the Vietnam War, the US public in particular has been extremely cautious about the use of its military in high risk environments, as seen when a number of US Army Rangers were killed on peacekeeping duties in

Somalia in the early 1990s—events commemorated in the 2002 film Black Hawk Down. Their deaths, and the subsequent domestic backlash, resulted in 1994’s Presidential Decision Directive 25. This led to a decidedly ‘hands off’ role for the US military in any

That private
overseas conflicts not directly relevant to foreign policy objectives. But in the space between official policy like PDD 25 and the pursuit of neoliberal imperialism, the PSI arguably proves a most useful tool.

security ‘solutions’ can be amassed quickly and without the need for oversight and
approval (as we established earlier, in the US at least, if they cost less than $50
million) presumably makes them even more attractive. We would suggest that it is
partly public hesitance and the cost in political capital of sending troops to fight
which has led to an increasing reliance on the PSI by many nation states. The increasing use of the PSI, the

relative freedom under which the industry operates, and the seemingly lucrative returns that PSCs can reap have also led to greater networking and collaboration between political, military and corporate elites in the running of these organizations and the securing of
government contracts. For example, many PSCs, originally set up by ex-military personnel, have subsequently been acquired by influential multinational corporations. MPRI, as one instance, was set up by eight former military men, but is now owned by L3
Communications Holdings. L3 is a US-based company that offers a range of services including communications, satellite technologies and electronics systems to both military and civilian customers. Such large and powerful corporations have likewise been able to
appoint Boards of Directors that seem uniquely suited to securing government contracts. Tim Spicer’s Aegis counts amongst its former and current board members and advisers former SAS commander, Major General Jeremy Phipps; former Chief of the Defence Staff,
Field Marshal Lord Inge; former Defence Minister and Conservative MP Nicholas Soames; and Ronald Reagan’s National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane. Other examples include former MP Malcolm Rifkind sitting on the board of ArmorGroup, and Judge
William Webster, one-time CIA Director, serving as a member of Diligence LLC’s advisory board. And, perhaps most famously, former US Vice President Dick Cheney was at one time the CEO of Halliburton, the corporation that owns KBR (Armstrong, 2008;
McCoy, 2010). Under Cheney’s leadership, KBR were able to secure more than $2.3 billion in government contracts, double what they earned in the previous five years. Moreover, they rose from 73 to 18 on the Pentagon’s list of preferred contractors (Johnson, 2004).
As another indication of the scale of these networks, in a single year, Gillian (2011) counts 250 ex-UK Ministry of Defence employees, including 20 generals, air marshals and admirals, joining PSC boards. The culmination of all of this, given the PSI’s immunity from,
for instance, Freedom of Information requests; the fact that there has been no concerted push at national or international level to instigate legislation or oversight procedures to control its activities; and the close networks of political, military and corporate elites which
control this vast industry leads us to concur with Hughes (2007) that we are witnessing the rise of a new security-industrial complex. As such, we conclude our observations on the implications of such arrangements by reminding ourselves of former US president
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address to the nation in 1961, in regard to the rise of a military-industrial complex: This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience … In the councils of government,

The potential for the disastrous rise of

we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.

misplaced power exists and will persist … We must never let the weight of this
combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes . We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. (Eisenhower, 1961: 3) As Fallows (2002: 46) establishes, most historians suggest
Eisenhower has been routinely misread as warning of ‘an increased risk of going to war’, whereas his real concerns were much more pragmatic and centred around the ways in which the military-industrial complex might coalesce to identify potential national security
threats and demand a budget for weapon manufacturing on that basis. However, if we take it in the sense in which it was generally used during Vietnam, as Fallows also points out, the term ‘military-industrial complex’ is ‘a shorthand reference to the interests that
presumably kept profiting from the war’ (Fallows, 2002). Conclusion Following Grey’s (2009) call for further research at the boundary between the disciplines of security studies and organization studies and by building on Banerjee’s (2008) analysis of the PSI as an
aspect of necrocapitalism, we have sought to introduce a new (/old) industry to the discipline of management and organization studies. We have located the industry in time and space and considered some of the main contours and characteristics of its current form. We
conceive of this as a first tentative step into the substantive study of the PSI within our home discipline. To summarize our key observations, the re-emergence of the market provision of military and security activity, combined with the specific way in which this activity
is currently undertaken, has led many in disciplines such as politics and international relations, law and legal studies, history, and military and peace studies to call for greater scrutiny of what appears to be an emerging security-industrial complex. As McCoy notes, the

However, utilized as a tool of

increasing reliance on private military and security forces could potentially ‘signal a net loss of control for most states under most circumstances’ (2010: 680).

informal neoliberal imperialism, we consider the relationship between state and

private security contractor to be more complex than a simple transfer of power over
the use of legitimate physical violence, identified by Weber (1994) as properly the
sole province of the state . Following Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) we suggest that the increasing use of private military and security contractors does not necessarily diminish the power of the state in relation to

Instead the rise of the PSI is more closely linked to changes in the state
the use of legitimate physical violence.

whereby the lines of responsibility for, and control over, domestic and
international security are beginning to blur. This is leading to ‘new security
structures and practices that are simultaneously public and private, global and
local. Within these assemblages, state power is certainly configured, but it is not
necessarily weakened’ (Abrahamsen and Wiliams, 2011:3). And this is not just the story of the re-emergence of PSI in the current period. Our discussion highlights the organizational and managerial reconfiguration of

Privatization of war, a logical

the state, by analysing the way in which war has been privatized through the mechanism of informal empire—which relies on neoliberal, profree market logic.

consequence of neoliberal theory, also frees PSCs from the ethos of accountability
and proper administrative oversight which du Gay (2000) attributes to bureaucracy.
It allows states to wage wars by proxy, without the official oversight of either the
government, the legislature or the media . Without this ethos of bureaucracy, organizations in the PSI can focus solely on ‘getting the job done’, and not on ‘doing the right thing’.

It is the neoliberal enthusiasm for anti-intervention and deregulation that has pushed states towards privatizing war, and allowed the PSI to function as a tool of informal empire. Thus neoliberalism has provided a philosophical, political and economic justification for

As a result, and adding in recent

overthrowing the bureaucratic but formally accountable form of warfare conducted by a state standing military, in favour of the use of services by the PSI.

events including the Arab Spring and the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and
possible future scenarios including increasing cuts to the size of state militaries in
the UK and the US—plus imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan—there is good
reason to believe that a reliance on private military forces will not recede any time
soon . Therefore, we need to ask further questions that address the changing relationship between public and private provision of military and security services, and how this will continue to reconfigure the control and use of legitimate physical violence.

Line by Line. On the first contention

1. Even if imperialism is bad, unending war fueled by Iran is worse; that
turns the case because many more civilians will die in their world2
2. They don’t solve for their first contention; claiming to stop colonialism
while partnerships and different events occur through things like
economics, and social control causes us to forget about other forms.

off Gurcan that imperialism  war, and Walt 21 solvency card

[Cropsey et al] FIRST, TURN: US WITHDRAWAL CAUSES A POWER WAR THAT

GOES NUCLEAR QUICKER, SO ALL THEIR BIG STICK IMPACTS ARE TURNED

ONTO THEIR CASE

Cropsey et al: Cropsey, Seth. [Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute in Washington D.C.]. Gary Roughead. [Former United States Navy
Officer]. "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East." Foreign Policy, December 17, 2019.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran // AG
Having obtained air and naval bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, both in Syria, Russia can once again turn its focus toward Europe. Nonstate forces

will continue to play a crucial role in the strategic balance. The Kurds are arguably the most relevant of these, because of their highly disruptive

presence in Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian national politics and, additionally, because their transnational character gives them the ability to

stoke interstate conflict. Iran’s significance will, as a result of its economic woes, likely continue to decline, but the political vacuum it helped

create in Iraq and Syria will persist, giving Russia and especially Iran the diplomatic cover to expand their influence. The unique mix of political

forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the region, and none favor U.S.
interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of

those states against another in an effort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to

Europe. The final shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its

proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of

these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if

China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens,

Washington will have to fight its way back into the region for the first time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia

in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of

Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Pacific allies, and it would deny the

United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are difficult to project, but

regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional
war between Tehran and a fluctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and

Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both

Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would

mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level

of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon.

Off their C2 w/ Hoffman + Davison & Stewart of economic crisis and war

1. Our DeBartolo Card shows that people want democracy, US promotes democracy

like it did in Iraq and when it left Afghanistan democracy drastically worsened,

and deterrence SOLVES for terrorism

[Roberts] U.S. COMMITMENT AND PRESENCE IS KEY – WANA countries rely

on U.S. deterrence.

Roberts: Roberts, David [Senior Lecturer at the School of Security Studies lead for Regional Security and Development at
King’s College London], “For decades, Gulf leaders counted on U.S. protection. Here’s what changed”, Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/30/decades-gulf-leaders-counted-us-protection-heres-what-changed/TDI/RP

Gulf countries relied on U.S. protection. For the Gulf monarchies, protection through

deterrence has long been a central point of their relationship with the U nited S tates. Since the

establishment of the Saudi-U.S. relationship in the 1940s, such starkly different countries have seldom forged denser bilateral relations. Saudi leaders saw neither commonality nor familiarity

with their U.S. counterparts. Rather, they expanded the scope and depth of this bilateral relationship to

benefit from closer U.S. technical and advisory cooperation — and counted on an ever-

closer defensive and protective relationship with the U nited S tates to ward off a growing

array of regional security threats . The U.S. government, a veritable army of contractors and

consultants, and other Western nations such as Britain, played decisive roles in shaping
and modernizing the security institutions in the Gulf monarchies, but particularly in Saudi

Arabia. The security-rooted relationship between Washington, London, Paris and the Gulf capitals flourished regardless of other political controversies. The monarchies enjoyed
relatively unfettered access to the most advanced Western military equipment, spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Western capitals. By comparison, since 2008, the monarchies have

outspent Iran by about 180 to 1 on weaponry. When its Gulf clients were threatened, the U nited S tates in the past

delivered on its commitments . During the 1980s Tanker War , the United States deployed

forces to the Persian Gulf to reflag and protect Gulf shipping. In 1990-1991, the United

States led one of the largest coalitions in modern history to defend the monarchies and

liberate Kuwait. This Gulf War demonstrated both the dangers of the Gulf region , and the

effectiveness of U.S. military force . Despite long-standing concerns about appearing

[CRS] WANA countries want US aid, and the US gives billions

CRS: Congressional Research Service. [The Congressional Research Service is a public policy research institute of the United
States Congress. Operating within the Library of Congress, it works primarily and directly for members of Congress and their
committees and staff on a confidential, nonpartisan basis.] “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical, Recent Trends, and
the FY2024 Background Request.” August 15, 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46344 FW

Since 1946, the United States has provided an estimated total of $372.6 billion (obligations in current dollars) in foreign assistance to the MENA

region. For FY2024, overall aid requested for the MENA region amounts to $7.57 billion , or about
11% of the State Department’s International Affairs budget request. Compared with FY2022 actuals (not including emergency supplemental

funding), for FY2024, the Administration proposed to reduce MENA funding by 3.5%. As in previous years, assistance for Israel, Egypt, and

Jordan constitutes the majority of the Middle East funding request. The region also receives a sizable portion of annual humanitarian assistance

appropriations, which are not included in the region-specific aid figures. Amid resurgent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the West

Bank, the President’s FY2024 request seeks $225 million in economic aid for the Palestinians and $50 million

to support the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020. It also seeks $33

million in non-lethal security and justice sector assistance for the Palestinian Authority (PA).
The Taylor Force Act prohibits economic assistance that “directly benefits” the PA—subject to limited, specified exceptions—in response to

continued PA payments “for acts of terrorism” against Israel. Reflecting democratic backsliding in Tunisia, the FY2024 budget request would
decrease aid to Tunisia. President Kaïs Saïed’s increasingly authoritarian rule has quashed Tunisia’s nascent democratic system, established after

Tunisians overthrew a long-standing authoritarian regime in 2011.

The United States remains the single largest humanitarian donor to the Syria response.

With this new funding, the United States has provided more than $1.1 billion in

humanitarian assistance throughout Syria and the region in FY 2023, and nearly $16.8

billion since the start of the crisis.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has operated in Yemen since

1959. In 2003, following a seven-year absence, USAID reopened its mission in Yemen

with assistance principally focused on basic education, maternal and child health, and

agriculture. In 2009, amidst growing instability and a greater sense of urgency, USAID

developed a new stabilization strategy that targets underserved communities with support

for basic education, health, livelihoods, and food security. USAID also supports more

responsive governance by working with various levels of the Yemeni government to

improve policies, enhance the capacity of government officials, promote decentralization,

and empower communities.

Off iran W/ Eskandari et al + Avery that Iran will go nuclear w/ USMP –

First: U.S. Gulf presence deters Iranian aggression and supports regional allies. This

includes naval assets and air capabilities positioned strategically in the Gulf region.

American missile defense systems prove an early warning system should Iran launch a

missile strike or proliferate.

Second: Responsive U.S. military presence influences Iran's strategic calculations, maintaining

regional security. Swift deployment capabilities send a clear message about readiness.
As an ov to the aff – they are dependent on USMP  nuclear war and extinction, however,

Not true: No nuke war - major states released a joint statement that it will never happen,

even given their conflict

Ostroukh 1-4 [Andrey Ostroukh, 1-4-2022, "‘No one can win a nuclear war’: Superpowers release rare joint statement," Sydney
Morning Herald, https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/no-one-can-win-a-nuclear-war-superpowers-release-rare-joint-statement-20220104-
p59lmf.html]

Moscow: China, Russia, the UK, the United States and France have agreed that a further spread of

nuclear arms and a nuclear war should be avoided. According to a joint statement released on Tuesday morning (AEDT), the

five countries – permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – said they considered it their primary

responsibility to avoid war between the nuclear states and to reduce strategic risks, while
aiming to work to create an atmosphere of security. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. The five countries making up the UN Security Council – all

nuclear powers – say a nuclear war must never be fought. “We declare there could be no winners in a nuclear war, it

should never be started,” the Russian-language version of the statement read. An English-language version . “We affirm

that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, ” the statement reads. “We also affirm that
nuclear weapons – for as long as they continue to exist – should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war. We believe strongly

that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.” The statement goes on to discuss the importance of addressing nuclear threats and of

preserving and complying with non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements. “We each intend to maintain and further strengthen

our national measures to prevent unauthorised or unintended use of nuclear weapons,” the statement reads. “We underline our desire to work with

all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons

with undiminished security for all.” France also released the statement, underscoring that the five powers reiterated their determination for

nuclear arms control and disarmament. They would continue bilateral and multilateral approaches to nuclear arms control, it said. The declaration

comes despite a UN decision last week to postpone a key arms-control meeting in New York – originally scheduled for February – due to rising

COVID-19 infections. Diplomats had been scheduled to meet to review the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1970 accord designed to limit

the spread of atomic arms. Under the accord, China, Russia, the UK, the United States and France were all granted dispensations to maintain

stockpiles as long as they continued working towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. .

Off Palestine
First: U.S. military aid to Israel strengthens regional security, indirectly impacting

stability in Palestinian territories. This aid includes advanced weaponry, intelligence

sharing, and joint training programs.

Second: U.S. military presence actively contributes to counterterrorism efforts, indirectly

fostering a more secure environment. Collaborative intelligence-sharing and joint

operations play a key role.

Off USMP being the main cause of terrorism – no where in their case does it
say that,
And they don’t solve – they don’t specify that reducing troops will solve all
the issues they claim, they don’t specify a reduction of presence meaning
troops,

[Cuny] The aff SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCES USMP – they don’t spec what kind – less

military means less humanitarian aid.

Cuny: Cuny, Frederick C. [American humanitarian whose work spanned disaster relief, refugee emergency management, recovery from war
and civil conflict as well as disaster and emergency preparedness, mitigation and peacebuilding] “Use of the Military in Humanitarian Relief.”
PBS.org, November 1989. http://tinyurl.com/2zs7u55t CH

INTRODUCTION Use of military forces for humanitarian purposes is a long-established tradition in

all corners of the world. In the public mind, there is an association between disaster relief and military involvement; indeed,

there is often an expectation that military units will assist the civilian population in the immediate

aftermath of wars and large-scale emergencies. The earliest recorded instances predate Alexander the Great. The
assistance of armies to the populations they had conquered was seen as a humane gesture to the vanquished -- and, not inconsequentially, a means

of winning some degree of loyalty to the new regime. Initially, humanitarian assistance was simply logistical. Soldiers provided an interim

administration to ensure that food and other vital supplies reached the population. There was an element of self-interest involved; if the people

were producing food and goods, the army's own logistics were simpler. By the Napoleonic period, this use of military forces had become so well-

established that it was seen as an adjunct to military science. The concept of establishing martial law over civil populations was developed as a

means of structuring this involvement in a post-conquest period. While most European armies of the period pursued only a limited security

objective with martial law, Napoleon and the French revolutionary armies saw it as a means of changing the social structure and bringing the

benefits and new social order of the French Revolution to the occupied territories. (That they failed is a lesson to be learned.) Post-World War II

Europe witnessed what was perhaps the most extensive use of the military in civil affairs. It is important to recognize the influence this had both
on military doctrines of civil involvement and on development of the international relief system and the approaches that relief agencies have used

since that time. The task that faced the Allies in the aftermath of the war was enormous. Virtually an entire continent had to be administered.

Vestiges of the Nazi regime had to be eradicated, whole populations had to be reunited or resettled and economies rejuvenated. Civil government

and the rule of law had to be reestablished and entire civil administrations restructured. The role of the military was expanded as never before.

The public administrative function was perceived as so important by the Allies that special attention was given to recruiting civil administrators,

city planners, urban development specialists, and hundreds of persons skilled in operating the systems of modern cities and their governments.

From the beginning, the objective was to establish martial law in the occupied territories, then quickly rebuild indigenous capacity to manage the

cities, the provinces and, ultimately, the national governments. In Germany, the process took longer but the goal was the same -- the military role

was to shift from security and management to strictly security as quickly as possible.

He adds: Cuny, Frederick C. [American humanitarian whose work spanned disaster relief, refugee emergency management, recovery from
war and civil conflict as well as disaster and emergency preparedness, mitigation and peacebuilding] “Use of the Military in Humanitarian
Relief.” PBS.org, November 1989. http://tinyurl.com/2zs7u55t CH

To help answer these questions, we will look at reasons for military involvement in humanitarian operations, scenarios under which the military

may be deployed, and configurations or models of deployment. We will then examine several cases to identify some of the key lessons and

issues. To help understand the complexities of the relief environment and the constraints it presents, the nature of disasters in the Third World

will be explored. Finally, the dilemmas facing military commanders in humanitarian operations will be identified and discussed, and specific

recommendations for overcoming or avoiding the pitfalls will be presented. REASONS FOR INVOLVEMENT Civilian authorities turn

to the military for help in humanitarian operations for several reasons, among which the most obvious may be

their physical assets. The military is often regarded as a cornucopia of assistance. Among the most sought-after

assets are transport (land, sea and air); fuel; communications; commodities including food,

building supplies and medicines; tools and equipment; manpower; technical assistance

(especially logistics and communications) and facilities. Requests can run the gamut from the arcane, like
delousing equipment, to the mundane, like maps; from cheap items like soap, to highly-sophisticated items like bulldozers; from off-the-shelf

items like tents, to items that must be specially produced such as aerial photographs. Relief authorities know the military has

the capability of providing these on request and, in a resource-poor post-disaster

environment, it is not unreasonable for authorities to request them. Since many of the items are commonly
stockpiled and since civil disaster agencies have few stockpiles of their own, especially in the developing countries, demands can be quite

extensive. Of these assets, several are particularly attractive to emergency managers. For example, communication is critical in emergencies but

in most countries there are severe restrictions that limit civilian access to radio/telephonic systems. Thus, in the aftermath of a disaster, it is not

unreasonable for civilians to turn to the military for these services. The vast, disciplined and generally self-supporting
manpower of the military is the other key asset coveted by civil disaster authorities. Most disaster
victims will be looking after their own needs at a time when civil works and repairs may require large commitments of personnel. Again, it is not

unreasonable for civilian authorities to want to put the army to work clearing rubble, patching roads, etc.

These last two assets help to explain the second reason why civil authorities often seek

military assistance: communications and discipline – what the military refers to as chain-of-

command -- are important elements in managing the post-disaster environment. For the most part, civil
administration will be severely limited; their communications are likely to be affected and staff members may be among the victims requiring

assistance. On the other hand, few indigenous military organizations will be affected to any great extent; military facilities usually weather storms

and earthquakes well and personnel are unlikely to be affected by famines or food shortages. In cases where local forces have been affected or

have been ordered back to their barracks while an international peacekeeping force guarantees disengagement, the internal communications and

command-and-control systems of the outside force are likely to be even more sophisticated and secure. To a civil relief official in the midst of

post-disaster chaos, a disciplined, ordered system is just what is needed to get things out to the affected population. Finally, there is the element

of history and past experience. As mentioned earlier, there is a long association of the military with relief operations and an expectation of some

degree of involvement on both sides. After the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the government was severely criticized by the public for not

bringing in the army for more than routine security, despite President de la Madrid's stated reason that he wanted to employ large numbers of the

victims in civil works projects rather than use the army to restore services and clear the rubble.

[UNICEF, 10/24] MASS CIVILIAN DEATHS – denying humanitarian aid causes

DEVASTATING CYCLES – turns and outweighs case, since there’s MORE violence on the

aff.

UNICEF, 10/24: United Nations Children’s Fund. [Agency of the United Nations responsible for providing humanitarian and
developmental aid to children worldwide] “Child casualties in Gaza ‘a growing stain on our collective conscience.’” UNICEF, October 24, 2023.
https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/child-casualties-gaza-growing-stain-our-collective-conscience CH

NEW YORK/AMMAN, 24 October 2023 – Over the past 18 days, the Gaza Strip has borne witness to a devastating toll on its

children, with a reported 2,360 fatalities and a reported 5,364 injuries due to unrelenting attacks, or more

than 400 children reportedly either killed or injured daily. Additionally, more than 30 Israeli children reportedly have lost
their lives, and dozens remain in captivity within the Gaza Strip. The 18-day period is the deadliest escalation of hostilities in the Gaza Strip and

Israel that the UN has witnessed since 2006. Almost every child in the Gaza Strip has been exposed to deeply distressing events and trauma,

marked by widespread destruction, relentless attacks, displacement, and severe shortages of essential necessities such as food, water, and

medicine. “The killing and maiming of children, abduction of children, attacks on hospitals and schools, and the denial of humanitarian access

constitute grave violations of children's rights,” said Adele Khodr, UNICEF Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa. “UNICEF
urgently appeals on all parties to agree to a ceasefire, allow humanitarian access and release all hostages. Even wars have rules. Civilians must be

protected – children particularly – and all efforts must be made to spare them in all circumstances.” The West Bank has also witnessed an

alarming surge in casualties, with nearly a hundred Palestinians reportedly losing their lives, including 28 children, and at least 160 children

reportedly sustaining injuries. Even before the tragic events of October 7, 2023, children in the West Bank were already grappling with the

highest levels of conflict-related violence in two decades, resulting in the loss of 41 Palestinian children and six Israeli children's lives so far this

year. “The situation in the Gaza Strip is a growing stain on our collective conscience. The rate of death and injuries of children simply

staggering,” said Khodr. “Even more frightening is the fact that unless tensions are eased, and unless humanitarian aid is

allowed, including food, water, medical supplies and fuel, the daily death toll will continue to rise .” Fuel is of
paramount importance for the operation of essential facilities such as hospitals, desalination plants, and water pumping stations. Neonatal

intensive care units house over 100 newborns, some of whom are in incubators and rely on mechanical ventilation, making an uninterrupted

power supply a matter of life and death. The entire population of the Gaza Strip, comprising nearly 2.3 million people, is

facing a dire and pressing lack of water, which poses grave consequences for children, roughly 50 per cent of the

population. The majority of water systems have been severely impacted or rendered non-operational due to a combination of factors, including

fuel shortages and damage to vital production, treatment, and distribution infrastructure. Currently, the water production capacity is a mere 5 per

cent of its usual daily output. Vulnerable population groups are resorting to non-potable water sources, including high-salinity and brackish-

quality water from agricultural wells. To compound the issue, the five Gaza wastewater treatment plants have ceased operations, primarily

because of fuel shortages, leading to over 120,000 cubic meters of wastewater being discharged into the sea. "The footage of children being

rescued from beneath the rubble, injured and in distress, while trembling in hospitals as they await treatment, portrays the immense horror these

children are enduring. But without humanitarian access, the deaths from attacks could be the tip of

the iceberg ," said Khodr. “ The death toll will increase exponentially if incubators start to fail,

if hospitals go dark, if children continue to drink unsafe water and incubators start to fail,

if hospitals go dark, if children continue to drink unsafe water and have no access to

medicine when they get sick.” To respond to the dire situation for children in the Gaza Strip, UNICEF is calling for: An
immediate humanitarian ceasefire. All access crossings into Gaza to be opened for a safe, sustained and unimpeded access of humanitarian aid,

including water, food, medical supplies, and fuel. Urgent medical cases in Gaza to be allowed to leave or to be able to receive critical health

services. Respect and protection for civilian infrastructure such as shelters and schools, and health, electric, water and sanitation facilities, to

prevent loss of civilian and children’s lives, outbreaks of diseases, and to provide care to the sick and wounded.
Off ur C2, if war isn’t happening rn, why is it magically gonna happen if we don’t

withdraw presence now?

Why do we care about keeping the economy stable when peoples lives are being saved by

USMP?