Dworkin.

Dworkin, as a non-realist, believes in the specificity of legal reasons. Meanwhile, he acknowledges the indeterminacy and
uncertainty of legal rules. However, he believes in the power of a judge to bring consensus to the law by applying the
principles that give adjudication integrity. Judges, according to Dworkin, bridge the gaps in legal rules by delving deeper
into the law's principles, not by making new laws. Legal realists, in the opposite sense, will emphasise innovation,
adaptation, dynamism, and the creativity of the judicial role, which the judge will use for some greater good. Dworkin is
seeking to create a third way and in between approaches - where the judicial role is striking a midway course between
fidelity on the one hand and creativity on the other.
Form of interpretation.
For Dworkin, law is an interpretive concept, the meaning of every law is exercised in interpretation. Dworkin says that
legal reasons are a form of interpretation, and they are neither mechanical nor completely open-ended like a blank
canvas. Therefore, the idea is not to create new laws or adhere strictly to existing ones, but to interpret the law in a way
that combines elements of fidelity and creativity within the existing framework. He compares this to literary criticism or
artistic interpretation, which involves giving an object meaning while adhering to its limitations. Dworkin argues that
judges are bound by laws and cannot decide a case from a blank canvas. They work within a framework, maintaining
fidelity to the past while having the freedom to adapt the law moving forward.
Hard case and indeterminacy of law
Hart, an orthodox theorist, outlines that even positivism at some level must account for the justice and injustice of the
laws, because the law does require some social conscience, or simply obedience cannot come without justice. Thus, the
new understanding shifts from commands (as by Austin) to rules. A critical element in Hart's theory is the 'rule of
recognition'. Hart believed that it was important for people to retain a sense of responsibility and evaluate what the law is
asking them to do, rather than something they presumably had to obey. Hart’s innovation lies in asserting that law’s
validity stems from social recognition rather than mere obedience and the legal system is found in its acknowledgment by
society's key actors.
Moreover, Hart believes that even if rules aren't clear cut, it doesn't mean judges have to use morality in their decisions.
Instead, they look at the purpose and policy behind the law. This isn't the same as looking at morality, because the purpose
of a law might not always match up with what's considered morally right. Just because legal language can be unclear, it
doesn't mean judges have to consider morality.
Hart acknowledges that while judges have some discretion in making laws, their powers are limited. They are restricted by
the limitations of existing law and by the specific cases they handle, which prevent them from making large-scale changes
or introducing new laws. Dworkin disagrees, he believes that the law is not just made up of legal rules but also legal
principles, and judges should make decisions based on the principles underlying the legal rules, especially when judges
encounter hard cases where the law is absent.
For Dworkin, judges are always constrained by the law and there is no law beyond the law, however, the hard and
easy cases are always a part of an interpretive choice. Moreover, Dworkin argues that hard cases don’t collapse due to a
'rule shortage' when legal answers aren't simply found in rules and the court should use the legal principles. That’s evident
from his analysis of the case Riggs v Palmer, where despite no law preventing a murderer from inheriting from the
victim's will, the court, per Dworkin's view, used the principle of "no man profiting from his own wrong" to justify a new
interpretation of the wills statute. This is an example where the ‘rules + discretion’ model failed to provide clear answers.
Disagreements in cases like Riggs reveal the argumentative nature of the law, where the judges sought the right answer by
discussing principles within the law. Hard cases, according to Dworkin, aren't simply about rule application or language
ambiguity, but they involve theoretical disagreements about the law's principles, standards, and purposes. He sees hard
cases as pivotal, highlighting the law's inherent contestability, calling for interpretive decisions.
Constitution and Hybrid interpritivism
Hybrid interpretivism, as by Raz, involves extending the effect of norms into unregulated situations. Dworkin's work
highlights that the main interpreter target is consistency, or ‘integrity’ if you will, which is a key foundation of law.
Moreover, the interpreter identifies a set of principles that together justify the given set of norms. Thus, there are two given
sets of norms: one given by institutions, and one that represents actual moral principles. Dworkin expands that the law is a
hybrid creature of separate legal norms, one grounded in social facts, the other in moral facts and interpretation blends
them together. Interpreting a constitution or statute requires not contradicting the text or attempting to identify the
author's intentions. Instead, judges have the responsibility of interpreting meaning within the context of the Constitution.
This is linked to writing a chapter in a chain novel, where each author contributes to the story while maintaining fidelity to
previous chapters. Dworkin's approach illustrates a compromise between legal formalism's fidelity and legal realism's
instrumentalism.
Political views
Dworkin admits that different judges can reach varying conclusions because constitutional theory necessitates judgments
about political and moral philosophy. However, Dworkin firmly asserts that judges cannot act as deputy legislators and
provides two reasons for this objection. First, it infringes upon the democratic ideal that a community should be governed
by elected officials who are accountable to the electorate. He contends, "The judge, not being elected, must not substitute
his own will as against the legislature." His second objection to judicial originality is that if a judge invents a new law
during a case and applies it retroactively, the party that loses the case would be penalised not for violating a pre-existing
law, but rather a new one created after the particular event.