Kapur Surya Foundation

An Historical Perspective On Indian Foreign PolicyAuthor(s): ATUL KUMAR

Source: World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues , Vol. 14, No. 1 (SPRING
2010), pp. 102-111
Published by: Kapur Surya Foundation

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48505047

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 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN
FOREIGN POLICY

Indian foreign policy has gradually evolved from the arguably impractical
idealism of its early post-colonial years towards an increasingly pragmatic
realpolitik, founded on the perception of its national imperatives as a
predominant power in Asia. Faced with an unstable and unpredictable
Pakistan, backed by both China and the US, India is no longer bound by its
ideological and military alliance with the defunct USSR and finds itself at
the heart of a troubled and strife-prone region in which it has few if any
reliable friends in a climate of escalating global rivalry for power and resources.

ATUL KUMAR

I
n real terms, Indian foreign policy came into being with the advent of
independence in 1947. Until then the nation, as a satellite of the British Empire,
had no diplomatic identity and eschewed the postulates of foreign policy
dictated by the erstwhile rulers. India’s role in the First World War and the subsequent
course of its rudimentary diplomatic overtures were constrained by prevailing British
influences. The ambiance that prevailed at the time of independence is illustrated
by the excerpt below from an address by Jawaharlal Nehru as Vice Chairman of
the Viceroy’s Executive Council (a precursor to self-governance) on September 7,
1946.
“We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of
groups aligned against one another, which have led to two world wars and
which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale. … We seek no
dominion over others and we claim no privileged position over other
peoples” (K C Pant, “Philosophy of Indian Defence” in Jasjit Singh and

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 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Vatroslav Vekaric (Eds), Non-Provocative Defense: The Search For Equal

Security, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989).
Although one may appreciate the idealistic intent of such a policy of peaceful
coexistence bereft of narrow alignments and the desirability of peaceful laissez faire,
this basic postulate has an inherent flaw. Humanity by nature is gregarious and
given to alignments of convenience for subjective interests. To maintain and nurture
an attitude of oriental detachment amidst this ambiance was and is a tall order.
Political rhetoric aside, the pragmatic approach would have been to resort to a
cautious alignment with one of the
power blocs primarily for regional The idealistic intent of a policy
security and stability. However, such a of peaceful coexistence bereft of
tie-up at that point in history would narrow alignments and the
have required a deep understanding of desirability of peaceful laissez
the prevalent power equations. In faire, have an inherent flaw.
hindsight, it is evident that India only Humanity by nature is given to
realised the flaw in its initial foreign alignments of convenience for
policy structure after the 1962 Chinese subjective interests. To maintain
débâcle, when it had to appeal to the and nurture an attitude of
United States (US) for assistance. The oriental detachment amidst this
course of foreign policy in India and the ambience is a tall order.
major events that shaped it make an
interesting study. At this point, it is pertinent to analyse the various options open
to India in terms of the erstwhile power blocs as well as its then preferred option of
non-alignment for a fuller understanding of the prevalent equation.

The USA

Firmly entrenched in its own concept of democratic ideals, the US has always
sought advocates of its policies all over the globe. Initially, it had designed to win
over India through liberal developmental assistance such as PL 480, etc with the
proviso that the latter joins the Cold War military alliance of the Southeast Asian
Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Central
Treaty Organization and SEATO were projections of the US’s anti-communist
measures in a world increasingly divided along opposing political ideologies.
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 AT U L K U M A R

The USSR

Like the US, the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
sought to spread its ideological tentacles by creating similar strategic pact
organisations that dispensed economic largesse and security cover in return for host
nations agreeing to play a satellite role. The Warsaw Pact and its allies saw Europe
as the primary target continent with Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, etc yielding to the
Soviet Union’s coercive diplomacy. India having declared itself as an advocate of
non-alignment and Panchsheel, at some point developed a strong sense of kinship,
camaraderie and dependence with the erstwhile USSR. The first cause of India’s
disillusionment with the US and its search for an alternative backer was the
membership of Pakistan in the US sponsored SEATO alliance. This recruitment
was part of Washington’s grand strategy for containing the Soviet Union and despite
vehement Indian protest, it provided liberal military assistance to its South Asian
ally. With a strong China to the north and northeast and a rapidly militarising
Pakistan to the west, India was forced to put its non-aligned posture on hold and
approach the USSR as a counterbalance. Notwithstanding its initial apathy, the
Soviet Union took a considered decision to assist India, thereby striking a lasting
alliance of convenience, which cooled-off only after the break-up of the former.
The pact between the two nations though not ratified by any official endorsement
of communism or the Warsaw Pact by India, existed in an atmosphere of mutual
approval of all major strategic decisions.
China

In terms of ideology though China was communist, it had global aspirations

independent of the USSR and its satellites. Under Mao Tse-tung it was the only
nation that had the strategic and ideological wherewithal to chart a foreign policy
course independent of the US or the Soviet Union. Soon after the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, the Government of India
extended official recognition on December 30, 1949 and was the second non-
communist country to do so after Burma. It was hoped that this would strengthen
the immemorial friendship between the two countries and be conducive to the
stability of Asia and world peace.

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 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

THE FIFTIES: HALCYON YEARS OF AMBIVALENCE

T he preponderance of political leaders and philosophers such as Mahatma

Gandhi, Nehru and Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan in the ruling elite of India in
the immediate post-independence era brought an element of altruism and idealism
into its polity. The early years of freedom were the formative period for all policies
on international understanding and diplomacy with laissez faire as the bulwark.
Nehru served as his own foreign minister and throughout his life remained the
chief architect of India’s foreign policy. During his premiership, Nehru tried to
identify the country’s foreign policy with anti-colonialism and anti-racism. He
also promoted India’s role as a
peacemaker, which was an extension of With a strong China to the north
Gandhian policies and deeply rooted in and northeast and a rapidly
the indigenous religious traditions of militarising Pakistan to the west,
Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism. Like India was forced to put its non-
most foreign policies, India’s was based aligned posture on hold and
first on its government’s perceptions of approach the USSR as a
national interests and security counterbalance.
considerations. India’s foreign policy
defined by Nehru as non-aligned was based on the Five Principles of Panchsheel—
mutual respect for other nations’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression,
non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful
coexistence.
In the 1950s, India attempted to play a subject role in international politics
even though it did not possess all the necessary attributes. It endeavoured to overcome
its power weaknesses by politically mobilising African and Asian nations and by
assuming for a time, the leadership of non-aligned nations. Washington considered
this policy not only an obstacle in the way of its containment of the Soviet Union
but also an attempt to create an additional global force. It thus launched a policy of
military containment and neutralisation of India through the military build-up of
Pakistan in 1954. These years of diplomatic vacillations and ambiguity were
characterised by a general unwillingness in India to address foreign policy issues in
perspective and with pragmatic foresight and instead benevolent idealism was

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 AT U L K U M A R

resorted to. The one noteworthy occasion when this utopian garb was temporarily
laid aside for practical considerations was during the period of Kashmir’s accession.
In its first major diplomatic endeavour India only managed a cease-fire on an “as-is
where-is basis” and was saddled with a United Nations (UN) military observer
group to enforce the brokered peace. However, the least New Delhi had hoped for
was a withdrawal of Pakistani forces to the delineated international border.

THE SIXTIES: PANCHSHEEL, NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE CHINESE DEBACLE

T he next decade began as the era of Panchsheel and non-alignment and India
hoped that the border issues over the validity of the McMahon line, incursions
into Aksai Chin and military action in Tibet by the Chinese would be resolved by
discussions, as it did not have the appropriate military preparedness to counter
China’s coercive diplomacy. The coup de grâce to India’s global role occurred in the
1962 military defeat, which revealed that the country’s role pretensions were
inconsistent with its capabilities. Nehru’s attempts to play a global leadership role
failed, because of the widespread recognition after 1962 that India was not master
in its own house. Indian diplomacy and statesmanship could not prevent a war
with China, nor could its ill-equipped and ill-prepared military machine sustain it.
The Chinese invasion humiliated India, shook its position in the international
sphere and gave it its first object lesson that utopian foreign policies are often
ignored in the face of pragmatic geopolitical compulsions so that a military backup
to diplomacy is a pre-requisite. The upshot of the episode was that India’s non-
aligned principles were put at least temporarily on the backburner, while it appealed
to the US for economic and military sustenance.
The handling of the 1965 war and negotiations by the new Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri with Pakistan in Tashkent were indicative of an era of decisive
diplomacy as opposed to the earlier vacillations. India required a firm regional base
in South Asia, as local hegemony is a pre-requisite for broader ambitions.
Henceforth, India moved away from diffuse goals such as world peace towards
concrete national interests such as defence and economic growth and an increased
realism about diplomacy emerged. Since India lacked the internal economic base
to build military technological capabilities, it resorted to borrowing them from

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 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

the US and the USSR. This bi-alignment diminished India’s role among non-
aligned countries.

THE SEVENTIES: RISE OF DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRES

W ith the Cold War at its peak, India was pushed on to the centre stage of
action in the early 1970s. In this period, the country gave concrete proof of
its capability to become a regional superpower in the twenty-first century. During
the Bangladesh Crisis, India was staggered by the American warning that it should
expect no assistance in the event of Chinese intervention (Kuldip Nayar, India
After Nehru, New Delhi: Vikas, 1977, p 187 and Zareer Masani, Indira Gandhi: A
Biography, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1975, p 238). To In the 1950s, India endeavoured
counter the US–China alliance against to overcome its power
India, in a masterly balance of power weaknesses by politically
move, Indira Gandhi entered into a mobilising African and Asian
Treaty of Friendship with the USSR. nations and by assuming the
When war erupted and with the US and leadership of non-aligned
China diplomatically and militarily nations. Washington considered
neutralised by the USSR, India was able this an obstacle in its
to inflict a severe military defeat on containment of the Soviet Union
America’s proxy—Pakistan in 1971. but also an attempt to create an
Thus, India created a new strategic additional global force.
environment and emerged as the pre-
eminent power in South Asia. Its nuclear test in 1974 was an indicator that it
would endeavour to maintain its pre-eminence in the subcontinent as well as its
independent status.

THE EIGHTIES

D uring the 1980s, India came into its own in terms of foreign policy. The
success of the 1971 War, a stronger military and a more mature nation were
part of the reason. In addition, increasing domestic troubles led to the need for

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 AT U L K U M A R

greater engagement with the world, as the emergence of the media increased
“international pressure”. The country began to play a greater role in Asian fora,
engaged several countries bilaterally and increased its UN peacekeeping engagements.
However, internal troubles and political turmoil stopped it from achieving a truly
global status in economic terms. Furthermore, the decade started on an ominous
note for India’s strategic concerns. The US stepped up its presence in the Indian
Ocean by expanding facilities at Diego Garcia and instituted Rapid Deployment
Forces culminating in the establishment of its Central Command. The Soviet armed
intervention in Afghanistan was used as an excuse by Pakistan to arm itself on an
unprecedented scale, triggering off a virtual arms race in the subcontinent. In the
neighbourhood, Sri Lanka became a
The Chinese invasion humiliated growing security concern due to the
India, shook its position in the involvement of outside powers like
international sphere and gave it China, Israel and Pakistan. India
its first object lesson that utopian reasserted its dominance by initiating the
foreign policies are often ignored Indo–Sri Lanka Accord and
in the face of pragmatic implemented it through peacekeeping
geopolitical compulsions so that operations, which mustered wide
a military backup to diplomacy international approval. Indo–US
is a pre-requisite. relations improved during the second
half of the 1980s with greater cultural
exchanges, scientific cooperation and trade. With the resumption of civil rule in
Pakistan in 1988, India’s relations with Islamabad also reached a more cordial level,
though the South Asian thaw proved to be brief.

THE NINETIES: THE POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

T he nineties began with changes of lasting importance in the international

political system. The break-up of the USSR, the dissolution of the Soviet
bloc and the collapse of the socialist system violently shook affected states and
inter-state relations, requiring all countries to redefine their stand in international
politics and reorient their foreign policy accordingly. The first significant change in
India’s foreign policy, attendant with reforms in its economic policy, took place

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 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

under the stewardship of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, the initiator of India’s
“New Look” foreign policy. These policy changes resulted from the prevailing
international environment at the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the
former Soviet Union and its global countervailing power, the need for India to
detach its foreign policy from domestic minority vote bank considerations and
from the necessity to focus on neglected regions. These imperatives manifested in
the thrust for a strategic partnership with Israel in West Asia, the quest for a substantive
relationship with the US and the “Look East” initiative.
The late 90s saw the rise of US unilateralism and the new American policies of
pre-emption and military intervention in global affairs without restraint. At the
same time under the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, nuclear tests, vast increases
in defence spending after the Kargil War and the rapid growth of the economy,
enabled India to become internally
strong and for the first time assert itself During the 1980s, India came
on the world scene. The efforts of more into its own in terms of foreign
than fifty years, some successful and policy. The country began to
others not, began to bear fruit. India’s play a greater role in Asian fora,
ambitions as a global power suddenly engaged several countries
became useful to other players due to bilaterally and increased its UN
contemporary geopolitical shifts. The peacekeeping engagements.
rise of terrorism, India’s strategic
location, the rise of economics over politics,the need for Western powers to expand
their influence in Asia and the fading away of the negativity linked to its alliance
with the USSR during the Cold War, led to India becoming a favoured partner for
many in the world.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

T he years from the latter half of the 1990s until 2004, witnessed a Bharatiya
Janata Party government in power, which maintained the overall general
direction of Rao’s foreign policy. Its tenure coincided with the post-Cold War era,
the rise of American unilateralism and new policies of pre–emption and unrestrained
military intervention in global affairs. India becoming a nuclear power with the

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 AT U L K U M A R

“Buddha Smiling” tests, the 9/11 attacks in the US and the resultant “Global war
on terrorism” were highlights of this period which demanded Indian responses.
However, greater attention was accorded to building-up Indo–US strategic
cooperation, normalising relations and
The nineties began with changes enlarging cooperation with China,
in India’s foreign policy, attendant besides Vajpayee’s personal
with reforms in its economic commitment to bringing Pakistan to the
policy The late 90s saw the dialogue table.
efforts of more than fifty years, Counterterrorism initiatives, energy
some successful and others not, security, globalisation and the opening
bear fruit. India’s ambitions as a of new markets all directly benefit
global power suddenly became influential countries. The major debates
useful to other players due to today concern the degree of India’s
contemporary geopolitical shifts. engagement with the US, its handling
of China and the Islamic world and its
lofty international goals in contrast with its image as a poor, underdeveloped nation.
The initial years of the twenty-first century, in terms of international and political
developments influencing India’s foreign policy, presented the following broad
picture.
• The US in its tactical obsession with Pakistan placed the emerging Indo–US
strategic partnership on the backburner and India was no longer a priority. The
war on terrorism and the urgent need to control the oil reserves of the Middle
East dictated terms. Some mitigation to the American stand was provided by
the civilian Nuclear 123 Agreement.
• Russia realised that it was no longer a “natural ally of the West” and the post-
Cold War knee-jerk reaction of forging a strategic alliance with China did not
bring all the desired fruits.
• China, despite a phenomenal rise in trade with India and a flurry of visits by
senior leaders has yet to give up its strategic nexus with Pakistan. The PRC
continued with the military build-up and establishment of the infrastructure
of its presence in Pakistan.
• The Indian subcontinent presented a dismal security environment. Pakistan
strategically buoyed by American economic, military and political aid persisted

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 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

in its illusions of achieving strategic parity with India and did not display any
signs of political maturity or willingness to pursue conflict resolution. Turmoil
and conflict also continued in Nepal and Sri Lanka, while Bangladesh under its
previous political dispensation was hostile to it huge neighbour and emerged as
an alternative base for Pakistan’s long-standing proxy war against India. However,
the trend in Dhaka has now been reversed.
• The international community remained divided on important issues of trade,
climate change and global recession.
Since the tragic terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, there is
immense pressure on Indian policy makers and on Foreign Minister S M Krishna
regarding the direction of policy towards Pakistan while repeated cross border
incursions by the Chinese army on the disputed northern borders are also a cause of
concern. To talk or not to talk with Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is
the question–as Shakespeare would have said.
Thus, India’s history of masterly inactivity belies its professed willingness to act
cogently and decisively at times of strategic need. It appears caught in a time-warp
in which the psychological tussle of delinking from the past and stepping into a
cathartic present seems too onerous a task for its rulers and statesmen. They would
do well to heed some lessons in heralding positive change from the former President
of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, who hastened the severance of his country’s
ties with its communist past with profound wisdom, redeemed a USSR living on
worthless paper money in an inflation-ridden economy and took it on the road to
progress even at the expense of traumatic initial setbacks. However in India,
transformation is so far taking place gradually and in measured steps.

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