Risk Assessment No. RA-PAR00395-S1.

Status - Stage 1 Draft Page 1

Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment RA-PAR00395-S1 Stage 1 Draft

Gooseneck Removal
Work Site Location / Operation / Project Reference Procedures
Acergy Eagle GI-25 Flexible Jumper Replacement

Approvals
Stage 1 : Denis MOREAU Stage 2 :

Meeting Attendees
Date Name Job Company Name Job Company
06 Oct 2010

General & Project-specific Safety Requirements

01 Appropriate PPE 12 Competent Person 18. CAPP Offshore 21. CNSOPB OSH 22. SIMOPS
11 Tool Box Talks 17. Env Management Training Requirements Procedure / Matrix
Plan Requirements
19. CAPP Offshore
Lifting And Rigging
Guidelines

Risk Assessment Tasks

Num Task Hazard
Set Up Vessel On 1) Proximity to FPSO &
1 Site subsea structures
2) DP failure
3) Adverse weather
4) SIMOPS on site (Supply
vessels, other vessels at
buoy for maintenance,
Loading and Ofloading of
FPSO in tandem mode
with tugs involved, surfers,
...)
5) Vessel blackout
Consequences Risk Level Corrective measures Residual risk
Damage to subsea E2 = M 1) Permit / authorisation E1 = M
equipment and production for entering 500m zone
lines Use of fan beam ref.
Damage to FPSO system (keeping in mind
Damage to vessels that FPSO has excusrion)
ROV and integrity surveys
of tower with depths and
positions of subsea items.
2) DP class 2 with manual
control backup
DP trials performed
outside 500m zone
3) Review weather
conditions prior to start of
work
Vessel Escape route to be
defined (drawing)
4) SIMOPS plan,
Permit to work managed
by Client,
5) Maintenance plan,
regular inspection

Num Task Hazard
Deployment Of 1) Entanglement of ROV
2 Divers And tether / divers umbilical
Equipment with surrounding
structures.
2) Dropped objects /
uncontrolled movements
of lift.
3) Weather conditions
4) Clash of bell on subsea
equipment during normal
operation as well as in
case of DP excursion
Consequences Risk Level Corrective measures Residual risk
Damage to Sub Sea D3 = M 1) Raise awareness. D2 = M
equipment. Diving bell and ROV TMS
Damage to Vessel to remain above highest
equipment. point on Riser Tower.
Divers injury. Tool box talks.
Deck Personnel injury. Good communications.
Diving supervisor as single
point of command.
2) Good rigging practises.
Good communications.
Certified equipment
All equipment to be
secured to top of tower
away from edge.
Use lashings / taglines as
required.
Qualified personnel.

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Risk Assessment No. RA-PAR00395-S1. Status - Stage 1 Draft Page 2

3) Weather forecast to be
check prior to start of
operation under diving
superivisor decision.
4) Diver bell to be
posiitonned above riser
tower structure.

Num Task Hazard Consequences Risk Level Corrective measures Residual risk
Un-bolting Of 1) Equipment under Injury to divers E3 = H 1) D2 = M
3 Gooseneck pressure (bolt tensioning, Damage to gooseneck, Tool Box talks / Raise
Connections nut splitters) riser & spool flange faces awareness.
2) Presence of methanol in Damage to ROV Equipment familiarity.
the line Secure tools.
3) Uncontrolled movement Testing of equipment prior
of gooseneck / equipment to use.
4) ROV/divers SIMOPS 2)
5) ROV/ structure clash Raise awareness.
6) presence of pressurized Extensive & conservative
gas inside the gooseneck flushing performed &
7) Potential clash during MeOH level measured at
deployement of crane FPSO.
hook/tool basket with Consider pumping 10 m"
subsea asset. of methanol back into the
8) Dropped objects (loose line (from subsea end) to
bolts / pieces when take realistic sample of the
opening flanges) MeOH level in goosneck
(ACTION).
Divers to stand clear
during bolts
tensioning/release.
Hydraulic equipment
activated from surface.
Get back to bell during
flange opening
Once connection is
broken: stand-by period to
let MeOH get out & mix in
water.
ROV to take samples to
check MeOH
concentration at
gooseneck (Total to
confirm accuracy of
measurements / Acergy to
confirm method of
sampling (ACTION) )
Use of disposable
coveralls for divers.
Gas alarms inside diving
bell.
3)
Detailed task plan.
Follow correct
de-tensioning procedure.
Tool Box talks.
Protect flange faces
ASAP.
Good rigging practises and
Certified rigging
Test air bag prior to start of
operation.
4)
Single point of
command/supervision
Good communications and
awareness.
5)
ROV to keep safe distance
during standby periods.
Singhle point of command.
6)
Consider reducing
hydrostatic column
pressure by pumping water
out of jumper inside I-tube
(TBC).
Divers to stand clear
during bolts
tensioning/release.
ROV to inspect connection
before divers return to site.
Contingency = cut through
gooseneck using ROV
grinder to equalise

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pressure.
7)
Use of mini-beacons on
crane wire.
Pre-installation survey
performed and subsea
structures displayed on
Navipac screen.
ROV to monitor
deployment.
8)
Add lashings to
tooling/falling parts.
Consider placing nut
splitters under flanges.

Num Task Hazard Consequences Risk Level Corrective measures Residual risk
Lifting Gooseneck Off 1) Injury to Divers / personnel D3 = M 1) C2 = L
4 Tower Dropped objects Damage to permanent Certified rigging/equipment
2) equipment Secure tools
Swinging loads. Good communication and
3) supervision.
Entrapment of divers / Single point of command
ROV entanglement ROV monitoring
4) 2)
Use of lift bag. Protect flange faces
Good communication and
supervision.
Single point of command
Use of tag lines / lashings
on gooseneck
Ensure static rigging
correct height to transfer
load safely and within
divers excursion limits
Use of mini-beacon on
crane wire.
Zero crane line meter
when entering splash
zone.
Ensure gooseneck is
rigged to minimise
movements during load
transfer.
3)
Good communication and
supervision.
Single point of command
Raise awareness
Tool box talks
Good tether management
4)
Follow Acergy / IMCA
guide lines on use of lift
bags.
Ensure lift bag is inspected
for leaks before use.
Connection points on
buoyancy tanks inspected
during pre-installation
survey.

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