PLS2607/202/1/2019

Tutorial letter 202/1/2019

Philosophy of Science
PLS2607

Semester 1

Department of Philosophy, Practical and

Systematic Theology
Discipline of Philosophy

IMPORTANT INFORMATION:
This tutorial letter contains important information
about your module.
 CONTENTS

Page

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3
2. General comments on Assignment 02 (unique number: 781338) .................................................. 4
3. Assessment criteria used to evaluate essays in Philosophy of Science ........................................ 6
4. Specific comments related to Assignment 02 (Unique number: 781338) ....................................... 6
5. The examination ......................................................................................................................... 17
6. Use of myUnisa for examination revision .................................................................................... 18

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1. Introduction

Dear students of PLS2607: Philosophy of Science,

In the second assignment you were given the following task:

Carefully read the following case study which demonstrates change within scientific theories:

“Before 1905 there had been numerous unsuccessful efforts to detect changes in the speed of
light, due to the motion of the Earth through the ether. Attempts were made by Fitzgerald,
Lorentz and others to construct a mathematical model of the electron (which was then
conceived to be the chief constituent of all matter) that would explain how rulers contract when
moving through the ether in just the right way to keep the apparent speed of light unchanged.
Einstein instead offered a symmetry principle, which stated that not just the speed of light, but
all the laws of nature are unaffected by a transformation to a frame of reference in uniform
motion. Lorentz grumbled that Einstein was simply assuming what he and others had been
trying to prove. But history was on Einstein’s side. The 1905 Special Theory of Relativity was
the beginning of a general acceptance of symmetry principles as a valid basis for physical
theories” (Weinberg, 2007:197).

This analysis of a particular theme in the history of science can be extended – by induction –
to demonstrate how scientific theories are tentative.

Comparing the theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, explain how scientific theories
develop and advance – if they believe that they do – keeping close reference to the case
study cited.
[100 marks]

Your essay should have comprised an introduction, body and a conclusion, with a total word
count of not more than 1000 words. Moreover, correct referencing techniques should have been
employed.

In this follow-up tutorial letter we will provide some explanation of the problems under
consideration. Firstly, though, we draw your attention to some other issues which may be

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helpful in the writing of philosophical essays. This information should assist you in the
successful completion of the examination essays. It is imperative that your responses be
written in essay format. Essays composed of bullet points are not acceptable.

2. General comments on Assignment 02 (unique number: 781338)

Despite our emphasis on a number of fundamental issues required for a successful

philosophical essay, the following points – garnered from our experience of assessing
Assignment 02 – apply (please pay careful attention to them and attempt to integrate the advice
contained therein into your exam essays):

2.1. Structure of essays:

Although referring in Tutorial Letter 201 to the structure of essays – as well as Assignment
02 having the particular instruction that the assignment was to be written as an essay –
some students did not write Assignment 02 in the format of an essay: comprising an
introduction, body and a conclusion.

Skill in writing essays is both useful and necessary for the successful completion of your
examination.

2.2. Plagiarism:

Some students have not taken care in avoiding plagiarism. It is essential that you ensure
that every idea used in your essays – which is not your own unique work – is referenced. In
other words, references should not only be given for quotations. But for every idea which
is not your own unique idea. By doing this, you avoid plagiarism.

For future reference, the Discipline of Philosophy’s Tutorial Letter 301

(WYSALLB/301/2019) may be of great assistance to you, whether or not you are a
Philosophy student.1

1If you have not received Tutorial Letter 301 with your study material you are able to locate it on myUNISA: once
you have accessed PLS2607’s webpage select “Official Study Material”, after which you will see the link for
“Tutorial Letter 301 (Both) for WYSALLB”.
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Please take note that in the examination you are not required to provide references in your
essays.

2.3. Responding to the topic posed:

Some students in Assignment 02 have not kept to responding to the topic posed. It is
imperative that your essay be relevant to the topic, and not a generalised summary of a
somehow vaguely related issue. Without this being done, your marks suffer immensely.

This is usually a significant problem in the writing of the examination essays, too. Only by
maintaining relevance to the question posed will your essay obtain a good result. Perhaps
an important suggestion in the process of writing your examination essays, is that you
KEEP THE QUESTION ASKED/TOPIC POSED IN MIND throughout the essay-writing
process. It may help to write the question/topic at the top of each page, to keep you
directed.

After completing your essay, read through it, edit it, and continue to ask whether or not
your written work corresponds to the topic you have been asked to write on.

2.4. A philosophical approach to writing essays:

Tutorial Letter 201 contained a detailed explanation of the Hegelian Dialectic. Still, it is
important to emphasise that in writing any Philosophical essay – particularly in ones where
you are asked to “critically discuss” a topic – a dialectical method assists the development
of a critical analysis.

The Hegelian Dialectic can be illustrated as follows:

Critical reflection on a “thesis” results in the

development of an “anti-thesis”
Dialogue between
the ideas of the
Thesis Antithesis “thesis” and that of
the “anti-thesis”
form a new idea, a
“synthesis”.
Synthesis

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 In both your third assignment and your examination essays you will again be required to
critically analyse or evaluate topics. This implies more than simply explaining a theory.
We require engagement with theories in your own words and with your own thoughts once
you have explained the theory under discussion. The employment of the Hegelian Dialectic
will assist you in this process in your examination essays.

3. Assessment criteria used to evaluate essays in Philosophy of Science

Tutorial Letter 201 contained a full inclusion of the rubric employed in the assessment of essays
within Philosophy of Science. Please bear this in mind when determining your performance in
Assignment 02 and in the completion of your examination essays.

4. Specific comments related to Assignment 02 (Unique number: 781338)

Let us now return to the essay question, wherein you were posed the following:

Carefully read the following case study which demonstrates change within scientific theories:

“Before 1905 there had been numerous unsuccessful efforts to detect changes in the speed of
light, due to the motion of the Earth through the ether. Attempts were made by Fitzgerald,
Lorentz and others to construct a mathematical model of the electron (which was then
conceived to be the chief constituent of all matter) that would explain how rulers contract when
moving through the ether in just the right way to keep the apparent speed of light unchanged.
Einstein instead offered a symmetry principle, which stated that not just the speed of light, but
all the laws of nature are unaffected by a transformation to a frame of reference in uniform
motion. Lorentz grumbled that Einstein was simply assuming what he and others had been
trying to prove. But history was on Einstein’s side. The 1905 Special Theory of Relativity was
the beginning of a general acceptance of symmetry principles as a valid basis for physical
theories” (Weinberg, 2007:197).

This analysis of a particular theme in the history of science can be extended – by induction –
to demonstrate how scientific theories are tentative.

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Comparing the theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, explain how scientific theories
develop and advance – if they believe that they do – keeping close reference to the case
study cited.
[100 marks]

The instructions that you were given for the assignment’s successful completion were as
follows:

1. Your essay must be written in correct essay format, including an introduction, body, and
conclusion.
2. Indicate the number of words your essay comprises, ensuring that it does not exceed the
limit imposed of 1000 words.
3. Every idea used – not only direct quotations – must be referenced correctly both in the text of
your essay and in a bibliography, according to the prescribed format, namely the Harvard
Referencing Method (for more information please consult Tutorial Letter 301 [WYSALLB]).
4. In addition to using the study guide, you are required to make use of at least two other
sources (e.g. journal articles, books, online sources, etc.).
5. Kindly do not use Wikipedia.
6. If you need to consult a Philosophical encyclopaedia, make use of the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu) or the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://www.iep.utm.edu).
7. Pay careful attention that your essay is written in the “philosophical method” as outlined in
Tutorial Letter 201.

We will explain the assigned topic in more than 1000 words to expose the topic to you.
Moreover, may we encourage you to pay careful attention to the manner of writing employed in
this section. It will be useful for you to employ a similar style in your examination essays. It
should also be pointed out that Philosophy is not a discipline which has “model” answers – there
are multiple ways and approaches to respond to a topic. The assessor looks for consistency
and the demonstration of sustained argument.

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4.1. Development in scientific theories

Much of what this Philosophy of Science module centres about is the theme of how science
develops in its theories, if indeed, it does. According to the South African Student’s Dictionary,
“development” is:

“... [T]he process of growing, changing and progressing... Development is

work done on studying and improving on previous or basic models,
designs or techniques...” (1996:253).

Given this definition, the history of science – which appears to be evolving in scientific theories
– directs us to the opinion that science is not static, but develops. This would be considered as
a “traditional” approach, which historical evidence supports. The discoveries and theoretical
innovations of Galileo Galilei (ACE 1564 – 1642), for example, were built upon his exposure to
those who had considered the movements of celestial bodies before him. Among these are the
works of Nicolaus Copernicus (ACE 1473 – 1543), Giordano Bruno (ACE 1548 – 1600), and
Tycho Brahe (ACE 1546 – 1601). In a similar vein, while Albert Einstein brought science far
beyond the imaginings of Isaac Newton, he nevertheless “built upon” Newtonian physics to
reach his “theory of relativity”.

Reflecting on the progress and development of science, Chalmers explains:

“If someone wants to deny that Galileo’s physics was an advance on

Aristotle’s or that Einstein’s was an advance on Newton’s then he or she is
just not using the word science in the way that the rest of us are”
(1999:142).

Chalmer’s “traditional” interpretation of the history of scientific theories, keeps to an approach

wherein scientific theories are considered to develop towards more detailed knowledge of
phenomena, “... enlarging its range and depth of explanation...” (Rosenberg, 2012:137-138).
However, this “unity of science” approach seems to oversimplify the complex nature of reality
and of the theories that attempt to explain that reality (2012:139). Moreover, in this
consideration, not enough emphasis is given to the problem that a theory may in fact be false,
and if that is the case, the false theory cannot contribute to the positive evolution of a collection
of theories that adequately explain how things are (2012:139).

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Some Philosophers of Science have resisted the traditional approach, arguing instead that the
grand narrative of science does not develop as a coherent whole. With this approach, their
conceptions of science itself take interesting and novel perspectives, as we shall see when we
consider the work of Thomas Kuhn. In this light, Weinberg’s explanation of historical events in a
particular scientific theory’s development (our assignment question), could be challenged
(2007:29). To bring this back to your attention, we quote Weinberg (from your assignment topic)
in full:

“Before 1905 there had been numerous unsuccessful efforts to detect

changes in the speed of light, due to the motion of the Earth through the
ether. Attempts were made by Fitzgerald, Lorentz and others to construct
a mathematical model of the electron (which was then conceived to be the
chief constituent of all matter) that would explain how rulers contract when
moving through the ether in just the right way to keep the apparent speed
of light unchanged. Einstein instead offered a symmetry principle, which
stated that not just the speed of light, but all the laws of nature are
unaffected by a transformation to a frame of reference in uniform motion.
Lorentz grumbled that Einstein was simply assuming what he and others
had been trying to prove. But history was on Einstein’s side. The 1905
Special Theory of Relativity was the beginning of a general acceptance of
symmetry principles as a valid basis for physical theories” (Weinberg,
2007:29).

4.2. Karl Popper on scientific theory development

Karl Popper’s work is a reaction to the Logical Positivists while Thomas Kuhn’s theoretical
approach was developed in contrast to that of Popper. They explored the manner in which
scientific theories emerge and hold their own: Popper viewed this development as occurring
through the process of falsifying a theory, whereas Kuhn emphasised incommensurable
paradigms and shifts between paradigms. For Kuhn, development was paradigm specific,
providing no reasonable grounds for choice between paradigms but outlining a very clear
development of science within a particular paradigm.

In Popper’s Philosophy of Science, the aim of science was construed to be bound up with the
advancement of science: theories develop “... in terms of testable and falsifiable universal laws
and initial conditions” (1983:134). Science happens by the proposal of hypotheses and the
deconstruction of these proposals. This process of negative development is a result of the
identification of instances that counter a theory proposed. For instance, when considering
Weinberg’s explication of Einstein’s theory of relativity as radically different to other theoretical
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constructions of changes in the speed of light, we see how a counter-attempt alters entire
hypotheses:

“The acceptance of one counterinstance... immediately falsifies the law...”

(Prevos, 2005).

Hume’s “Problem of Induction” was founded in inductive inferences being “supported” by single
observations of particular phenomena resulting in induced universalised conclusions (theoretical
constructions) (Howson, 2000:182). However, for Popper, induction was not a problem, as it
was irrelevant to the scientific method as a complete misconstrual of the facts (2000:182).
Popper proposed that scientists sometimes jump to conclusions after just a single observation.
Popper, therefore, implied that their “positively” supported hypotheses were false. In his
account, repeated observations and experiments serve as tests of scientific hypotheses rather
than as justifications of theories or hypotheses.

The error of the inductivist, in the traditional mode of “doing” science – from Popper’s
perspective – is to consider that observations and experiments give rise to theory when these
observations and experiments are themselves partially derived from theory and are designed to
test it.

According to Popper, scientific theories are not the outcome of observations. Rather, they are
removable conjectures when they clash with observations that are the result of an intention to
test a theory. Popper proposed that in the development of scientific theories, observation cannot
be prior to theory because theory is presupposed by any observation, as he proposed:

“[O]bservations… are always interpretations of the facts observed … they

are interpretations in the light of theories” (1972:107).

In the construction of theories, all worthwhile new theories raise new problems related to the
conducting of previously un-thought of observational tests. Hence, in Popper’s view, science is
constantly preoccupied with problems of increasing depth and fertility in suggesting new
problems. Problem solving, then, is the fundamental activity and the essential problem of
survival for any scientific theory. But, theories which generate problems to be solved are highly
falsifiable because they can be readily testable: they can be examined and compared with
observable facts. An hypothesis with high empirically measurable content is thus one with a
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more accurate description of reality wherein every possible observation would constitute a test
which is a potential falsification of it.

From the Falsificationist approach, the best theory is one that has stood up to the tests and is
testable in the most rigorous way. For a theory to be conditionally accepted it must survive tests
under which its predecessors broke down. Indeed, in our case-study, the Einsteinian theory has
survived rigorous testing where its predecessors have not (Weinberg, 2007:29). This makes it a
stronger and more preferable scientific theory, for the time being, though counter-evidence may
change that if/when it arises.

“‘When should a theory be ranked as scientific?’ or ‘Is there a criterion for

the scientific character or status of a theory?’... I wished to distinguish
between science and pseudo-science; knowing very well that science
often errs, and that pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth”
(Popper, 2009:472).

Popper considered the “traditional” demarking feature of science – inductive, empirical

methodology (as espoused by the Positivists) – as inadequate (2009:472). Any theory which
was to be considered science had to conform to the following stringent criterion:

1. “Risky predictions” should be the criteria for corroborations of theory,

where the result is counterintuitive, unexpected, etc., rather than
seeking theory confirmation which was expected;
2. Scientific theories must be refutable, not unfalsifiable;
3. All scientific theories must be testable;
4. Evidence that corroborates a theory must be the product of an “...
unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory...” (Popper, 2009:473-474).

Thus, Popper argued, science developed through the process of falsifying theories as a result of
the identification of problems so proving a theory false such that another, stronger theory would
arise to replace the preceding theory (1965:222). The developmental process is negative, being
that which characterises science from other systems of understanding.

“... [T]his picture of science—as a procedure whose rationality consists in

the fact that we learn from our mistakes—is not quite good enough. It may
still suggest that science progresses from theory to theory and that it
consists of a sequence of better and better deductive systems. Yet what I
really wish to suggest is that science should be visualized as progressing
from problems to problems—to problems of ever increasing depth”
(Popper, 1965:222).
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When a theory is assessed for its strength it will be in terms of how well it responds to
explaining a problem faced which emerges from that particular theory clashing with observable
evidence:

“If... its explanatory success matches that of the existing theories, and
additionally, it explains some hitherto anomalous phenomenon, or solves
some hitherto unsolvable problems, it will be deemed to constitute an
advance upon the existing theories, and will be adopted” (1965:222).

If not, the theory will continue to be assumed as false until corroborating evidence can be found
to deem the theory “not false” at this particular moment. For Falsificationists, progress in
science is proving that a particular theory is false as movement is made from scientific problem
to scientific problem, and in response as theories arise to attempt to solve these problems.

Popper’s approach to the progress of science is not without its serious problems. Consider the
following two points of critique offered:

1) Observation statements behind falsification may be false:

Observations are partly founded in prior experiences and expectations of observers. If a

potentially refutable theory predicts something, observations may be unconsciously interpreted
in a way that refutes it. Because scientists can make mistakes, they too perceive what their own
preconceptions (theories) lead them to.

For instance, Galen’s medical theories proposed that blood flows from the right side of the heart
to the left through holes in the wall between the heart chambers. However, the 16th century
anatomist Vesalius could not find these holes. Vesalius assumed that they must be
imperceptibly small. For Vesalius, the holes definitely existed, because this was what the
influential Galen’s theory maintained. The function of the heart as a circulatory pump was only
discovered by Harvey in the 17th century.

As this example illustrates, the facts by which a theory should be tested are not always
independent of the theory, which is itself conceived and developed in accord with prior
theoretical constructions.
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2) Science is not practised in a falsificationist manner:

Another commonly raised objection against Popperian falsificationism, is that scientists do not
actually try to falsify theories and hypotheses. Instead, scientists seek to verify their theories
rather than to prove them false!

Why would a scientist need to work to prove a theory true by providing confirmatory evidence?

What responses can you conceive of which may assist in supporting Popper’s approach to
scientific development?

4.3. Thomas Kuhn, paradigms and “development”

Differently to Popper, Thomas Kuhn focused upon the development of specific scientific
paradigms rather than on development in terms of the whole scientific enterprise. Development,
for Kuhn was from paradigm-to-paradigm, though he saw no relationship between between
these paradigms.

A Kuhnian “paradigm” refers to “… the general theoretical assumptions and laws and the
techniques for their application that the members of a particular scientific community adopt”
(Chalmers, 2009:108). A paradigm is more than a theory, as it comprises an entire worldview,
including the metaphysical and ideological assumptions made by the paradigm-specific
scientific community, as well as the criterion they use to assess their theories (Bortolotti,
2008:118). A “paradigm”, then, is an entire scientific project in which individual scientists and
scientific communities have high stakes.

Because Kuhn proposes that “normal” science necessarily functions from within one dominant
paradigm, it is this paradigm which demarcates “science” from “non-science” (because “science”
is what occurs within the paradigm) (Chalmers, 2009:109). “Non-science” does not have a
dominant paradigm (2009:109). From its practitioners, a paradigm is strengthed by their
continued attempts to align the paradigm’s theories and observed data (2009:110). It is
assumed from within the paradigm, though, that there are tools available within it for further
explanation and alignment between theory and observation (2009:110).
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Movement from paradigm-to-paradigm is not necessarily a result of the emergence of
anomalies within a dominant paradigm (Chalmers, 2009:110). Sometimes, these are like
“puzzles” to be solved from within a paradigm (2009:110). On other occasions, a crisis in a
dominant paradigm emerges due to anomalies that question the dominant paradigm (Bartolotti,
2008:122). These could have “… a psychological effect…” on the practitioners of the paradigm:
scientists are obliged to seriously consider whether or not their paradigm fits with the
observations made, and if not, the explanatory power of the paradigm needs to be questioned
(Bartolotti, 2008:122). This period, is, however, also characterised by “normal scientists”
resisting the anomaly or being unwilling to change their paradigm, because they have seriously
vested interests in the paradigm (Chalmers, 2009:113). Defense is a natural human reaction,
which points to the fact that science is not purely objective but is the activity of subjective,
emotive beings.

Since Kuhn acknowledges that anomalies tend to arise and that one single anomaly cannot
discount an entire paradigm, when should a paradigm be changed? Only after an accumulation
of anomalies have presented themselves (Bortolotti, 2008:123). Thus, a crisis’ urgency is
determined by the seriousness with which the practitioners of “normal science” can take a newly
formed paradigm. For Kuhn, this development in the emergence of a new paradigm is a
sudden, revolutionary moment:

“… [T]he new paradigm, or a sufficient hint to permit later articulation,

emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a
man deeply immersed in crisis” (Kuhn in Chalmers, 2009:114).

The new paradigm – emerged in reaction to the prior one – will be vastly different from the old:
“[E]ach paradigm will regard the world as being made up of different kinds of things” (Chalmers,
2009:114). The rival paradigms may not be able “to speak” to one another. What will be
considered as important will be dependent on the paradigm’s view of how things are
(2009:114). From the perspective of Kuhn, with regard to our case study, the difference
between Einstein and his predecessors is so radical that communication between the two sets
of paradigms becomes very hard.

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Kuhn’s scientific paradigms result in supporters of the rival paradigms disagreeing with one
another, remaining in their supporting paradigms: it is that supporters of different paradigms see
the world differently which makes the paradigms incommensurable (2009:116-117).

A new paradigm will, however, meet its own anomalies resulting in a new crisis, a revolution,
and the eventual emergence of another paradigm. This is the perpetually cyclical, Kuhnian
approach to the “development” of scientific paradigms.

Whilst Kuhn’s theoretical construction has been widely embraced, especially by social
scientists, it is certainly not without its flaws. Among the principal points of critique levelled
against Kuhn is at his notion that revolutions – movement from the rejection of one paradigm to
the embracement of another as a result of a crisis in the original dominant paradigm – are
instantaneously.

“It is all very well painting a heroic picture of Einstein as making a major
advance by having the originality and courage to challenge some of the
fundamental principles of physics, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that it took two hundred years of detailed work within the Newtonian
paradigm and one hundred years of work within theories of electricity and
magnetism to reveal the problems that Einstein was to recognize and
solve with his theories of relativity” (Chalmers, 2009:119-120).

Oftentimes scientific theories are the result of long periods of development of hypotheses from
observations, the testing of these theories to confirm or deny them, and so on. While it may
happen that discoveries could occur and result in swift paradigm change, a more nuanced
approach accommodating both rapid and gradual changes in paradigms would better account
for the development of scientific theories.

On a second point of critique, Kuhn’s theory that paradigms exist in different worlds – and thus,
unable to communicate with one another – asserts that a paradigm’s content is relative to that
particular paradigm alone, rather than to another one (Chalmers, 2009:122). What standards
can be applied across paradigms to judge which paradigm is stronger? (2009:122) Without
standards can judgement be made between paradigms? Kuhn responds, asserting the
importance of criterion in paradigm choice, thus insinuating progress in science (for, if one
chooses between paradigms because one is “better” than another, science has developed
towards better explanation):

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 “[L]ater scientific theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in
the often quite different environments to which they are applied. That is
not a relativist’s position, and it displays the sense in which I am a
convinced believer in scientific progress” (Kuhn in Chalmers, 2009:122).

Thomas Kuhn responded to his critics, demonstrating some commitment to a notion of change
and development within and between scientific paradigms (1998). He states that in his earlier
work, “I [had] considered the ways scientists are brought to abandon one time-honoured theory
or paradigm in favor of another” (1998:212). He argued that a change in paradigm is for the
better advancement of science, when that change is the product of the collective decision
making of the particular scientific community (1998:212). Problematic, however, is that Kuhn
could be seen as adopting a consensus approach to truth: that which the many believe is closer
to truth. But, can we say that something is as it is simply because a majority of people have
declared it as such?

Kuhn continues on a sarcastic note (referring to the take of critics on himself):

“Kuhn believes, I am told, that ‘the decision of a scientific group to adopt a

new paradigm cannot be based on good reasons of any kind, factual or
otherwise’” (1998:212-213)

In response, he states unequivocally:

“Reports of this sort manifest total misunderstanding and I have

occasionally said as much…” (1998:213).

Kuhn explains that he holds to five characteristics which make for a good scientific theory,
namely: “… accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness – all are standard criteria
for evaluating the adequacy of a theory” (1998:213). These are clearly stated criterion by which
to compare scientific theories, but, says Kuhn, even with these criterion in place subjective
issues arise in theory/paradigm selection:

“When scientists must choose between competing theories, two men fully
committed to the same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach
different conclusions. Perhaps they interpret simplicity differently or have
different convictions about the range of fields within which the consistency

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criterion must be met… With respect to divergences of this sort, no set of

choice criteria yet proposed is of any use” (1998:213).

4.4. Conclusion

In our discussion on the topic of development within scientific theories, it is important to

remember that while Popper proposes an understanding of science which focuses upon the
development of series of scientific problems, Kuhn conceives development as localised in
particular paradigms rather than as a broad scientific pursuit. The latter extreme view is toned
down in Kuhn’s newer writings, as quoted above.

From either perspective – whether between scientific problems in falsification, or within and
between paradigms – science appears to develop in a manner that deepens human
understanding of reality. The history of the evolution of science as an ever-more successful
explanatory tool demonstrates its growth and progress.

5. The examination

The scope of the examination which you will sit for in May/June 2019 (the dates of which will be
made available to you) covers the entire content of the module. Be guided by your study
guide as to the module’s content. This will also inform you as to the relevant parts of the
prescribed reading with which you need to be familiar.

The examination is a two hour paper. You need to give yourself adequate time to complete the
paper.

In the examination, you will be provided with four possible essay questions, and you need to
choose any two: be careful not to focus too much on a single topic and not enough on others.
As the entire syllabus of the module will be examined, it would certainly not be prudent to
attempt to “spot” learn.

You may access past examination question papers on myUnisa – under “Official Study Material”
on the module’s site – and these will give you an idea of the sort of questions that you will be
asked. Please be aware, though, that examination questions from past papers are not repeated.

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Please ensure that you are seated in the examination venue 15 minutes prior to the
commencement of the examination, and that you have your identity document(s) and student
card with you. You will also need to have sufficient stationery in your possession to complete
writing the examination.

6. Use of myUnisa for examination revision

As the examination nears you are encouraged to make use of a particular forum within the
Discussion Forum page, namely the “Examination Revision Discussion Forum”.

This forum was created with the specific intention of providing students the opportunity to post
any problem you may have with the content of the module prior to your examination. It will
proceed as follows:

 Every new topic/problem should be posted as a new topic on the “Examination Revision
Discussion Forum”.
 We will take note of new topics, but will not immediately respond. Rather, YOU should
respond initially to assist your fellow students.
 Once we have seen activity related to a specific topic with which students are having
difficulty, and with which there has been some grappling, we will intervene to assist you, if
this is needed.

Please also be reminded of the learning units on the myUnisa page. You will find additional
content relevant to each study unit of this module there.

As you would also be aware by now, Ms. Lerato Posholi is the e-tutor for this module. If you
have been assigned to her group, please employ her knowledge and skill in your examination
preparation. We believe that in following this interactive approach to learning and examination
preparation, students will gain a great deal of knowledge by assisting one another.

If you have any further problems or difficulties with this module, or should you require
clarification of anything contained in this tutorial letter, please do feel free to contact your
lecturers.

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 PLS2607/202/1/2019

Sincerely,

Prof. Callum D. Scott & Dr. Yolandi Coetser

Discipline of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology
Telephone: +27 12 429 6207 Telephone: +27 12 429 6596
e-mail: scottcd@unisa.ac.za e-mail: coetsym@unisa.ac.za

Bibliography:

(Please make use of the format of this bibliography as an example of the

bibliographic format that is required for use in your own assignments [i.e. the
Harvard Method]. More information is available as an additional resource on the
PLS2607 myUnisa page. Kindly consult this valuable tool.)

1. Bortolotti, L. 2008. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Polity Press.

2. Chalmers, A.F. 1999. What is this thing called science? Third Edition. Maidenhead: Open
University Press.
3. Grearson, P. & Higgleton, E. 1996. South African Student’s Dictionary. Manzini: Macmillan
Boleswa Publishers (Pty) Ltd.
4. Howson, C. 2000. “Induction and the Uniformity of Nature.”, pp. 181-183, in: W.H. Newton-
Smith. (ed.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Malden & Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd.
5. Kuhn, T.S. 1998. “Objectivity, value judgement, and theory choice.”, pp. 212 – 224, in J.A.
Kourany (ed.). Scientific Knowledge: Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science. Belmont:
Wadsworth Publishing Company.
6. McHenry, L. 2009. Popper and Maxwell on Scientific Progress. Retrieved 15 August 2011
from the World Wide Web, URL: http://www.csun.edu/~lmchenry/publications.html.
7. Popper, K.R. 1965. Conjectures and Refutations. New York: Harper and Row.
8. Popper, K.R. 198. Realism and the aim of science. London: Routledge.
9. Popper, K.R. 2009. “Science: Conjectures and Refutations.”, pp. 471-488, in: T. McGrew,
M. Alspector-Kelly & F. Allhoff (eds.). Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology.
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
10. Popper, K.R. 1972. The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
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11. Prevos, P. 2005. Origins of Modern Philosophy: The Problem of Induction. Retrieved 23
February 2010 from the World Wide Web, URL:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.125.4707&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
12. Rosenberg, A. 2012. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. Third Edition.
New York: Routledge.
13. Thornton, S. 2009. “Karl Popper”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009
Edition). Retrieved 15 August 2011 from the World Wide Web, URL:
http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=popper.
14. Weinberg, S. 2009. “Living in the multiverse.”, pp. 29-42, in: B. Carr (ed.). Universe or
Multiverse? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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