27/06/2024

1)Kerala HC Orders Production Of Transwoman Allegedly Being Forced To Undergo

'Conversion Therapy', Restrains Any Surgeries On Her Till Then
The Kerala High Court received a Habeas Corpus petition concerning Elida Rubielle, a trans
woman allegedly undergoing forced conversion therapy at Amrita Hospital in Kochi. The
Division Bench of Justice Amit Rawal and Justice Easwaran S. ordered her to be produced in
court on Monday and instructed that no surgeries should be performed on her in the interim.
Elida's friend filed the petition, claiming that after her transgender identity was revealed, she
faced severe mental and verbal abuse from her family. Following this, she sought help from an
NGO, which filed a complaint with the Palarivattom police station. Despite disclosing her
situation to the police in the presence of her father, Elida was not properly investigated but
instead instructed to return home with her father.
Subsequently, Elida was taken to Amrita Hospital where she was allegedly coerced into signing
consent forms. She expressed fears of being subjected to conversion therapy, with the Head of
Psychiatry reportedly threatening to label her as mentally ill if she attempted to leave. The
petition emphasizes that conversion therapy is scientifically unsupported and condemned as a
practice that attempts to alter queer individuals' sexual orientation or pressure them into forced
marriages. It cites the Supreme Court's decision in Nalsa v Union of India, which recognized
transgender identity as integral to self-determination, dignity, and freedom. The High Court,
which had previously ordered strict action against forced conversion therapies, is now seized of
this urgent matter.
2) Motor Accident | Gauhati High Court Pulls Claimant For Concealing Compensation For
Vehicle Loss Received From Own Insurer, Imposes Cost
The case discussed involves a decision by the Gauhati High Court to set aside an award granted
by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to a Ford EcoSport owner. Here’s a breakdown of the
key points and reasoning behind the court's decision:
The claimant, who had filed for compensation due to damage to his vehicle, did not disclose that
he had already received compensation from his own insurer, TATA AIG. This lack of disclosure
was crucial because it undermined the principle of utmost good faith that is fundamental in
insurance contracts. The court emphasized that it is mandatory for a claimant to disclose all
relevant facts to ensure transparency and fairness in insurance claims.
The insurer of the alleged offending vehicle argued that the claimant's failure to disclose the
prior compensation amounted to seeking double benefits — once from his own insurer and again
from the insurer of the other vehicle involved in the accident. This goes against the principles of
insurance law, which aim to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure claims are made in good faith.
The court reiterated that a claim under an insurance contract must be made in utmost good faith.
By not disclosing the prior settlement with TATA AIG, the claimant acted in a manner contrary
to this obligation. The court found that the Tribunal erred in not considering this non-disclosure
as a significant factor in the case.
In light of the concealment and the attempt to enhance the award without proper grounds, the
court dismissed the claimant's appeal for an enhanced award. Additionally, a cost of Rs. 5,000
was imposed on the claimant, emphasizing that such frivolous litigations should not be
encouraged.
The court also clarified that while the claim before the Tribunal was related to damage to the
vehicle (a tort claim), the compensation received from TATA AIG was under a contractual
arrangement. However, this distinction did not justify the non-disclosure, as both claims arose
from the same incident involving the vehicle.
Overall, the decision underscores the importance of full disclosure and good faith in insurance
claims. It serves as a reminder that claimants must provide complete and accurate information to
avoid legal consequences such as the dismissal of their claims and potential costs.

3) 22-Yr-Old Differently Abled Person Moves Kerala High Court Seeking Permission To Take
Driving License Test
A 22-year-old citizen, who is 40% physically disabled with a small upper right limb having three
fingers, has approached the Kerala High Court alleging that he has been unjustly denied the
opportunity to take the driving license test. He argues that this denial violates his fundamental
rights guaranteed under Articles 14 (right to equality), 19 (right to freedom), and 21 (right to life
and personal liberty) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner contends that the authorities,
specifically the Regional Transport Officer and Deputy Transport Commissioner, refused to
permit him to apply for the driving license test citing inability to modify the vehicle for his
suitability. Despite possessing the necessary skills and medical clearance to drive with
permissible modifications as per the Motor Vehicles Act, his requests were turned down.
According to the plea filed by multiple advocates on his behalf, the petitioner asserts that the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are being arbitrarily applied to deny him equal treatment.
He emphasizes that his physical disability should not preclude him from participating in the
driving license test, especially when he meets all necessary criteria to operate a vehicle safely
with minor adjustments. The petitioner seeks the High Court's intervention to uphold his right to
equal opportunity and to direct the authorities to conduct a fair driving license test for him. The
matter is scheduled for consideration by the court soon.

4) Campus Violence By Teachers Is A Very Serious Matter, Cannot Be Condoned By Receiving

An Apology Letter: Madras High Court
The Madras High Court recently addressed a case involving protesting teachers from
Pachaiyappa's Trust College and their attempt to quash a criminal case registered against them
for violent protests on campus. Justice G Jayachandran dismissed the petition seeking to quash
the case, emphasizing that receiving an apology letter cannot bypass criminal law procedures.
The court noted that the teaching staff had protested during a college committee meeting chaired
by an interim administrator, a former High Court judge appointed to streamline administration.
The protests resulted in a police complaint by the interim administrator, leading to a criminal
investigation and filing of a final report. In response to the petitioners' plea to quash the case
based on providing an apology letter, the court stated that campus violence is a serious matter
that cannot be condoned merely by an apology. It highlighted that while the Criminal Procedure
Code provides for options like plea bargaining or compounding of offenses, bypassing these
procedures through an apology letter does not serve the interests of justice. Previously, the
petitioners pointed out instances where similar petitions were allowed by the court upon
submission of apology affidavits. However, in this case, the court refused to accept such an
approach, indicating that where a criminal offense has been established, proper legal procedures
should be followed.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the quash petition but granted liberty to the petitioners to pursue
legal remedies such as plea bargaining or compounding before the trial court. This decision
underscores the court's stance on maintaining discipline and upholding the law within
educational institutions, even amidst administrative changes and protests.

5) Nothing Confidential About Property Register Kept In Public Office In Modern Era Of Right
To Information & Transparency: Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court recently addressed a case where a petitioner sought a certified copy of a
property register related to a criminal trial but was denied by the trial court citing confidentiality
under Rule 225 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, Kerala 1982. Here’s a summary of the court's
decision and reasoning:
The petitioner, involved in a criminal trial under various sections of the IPC, applied for a
certified copy of a property register maintained in connection with the trial. The trial court
dismissed his application, considering the property register to be a non-judicial and confidential
record under Rule 225.
Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas of the High Court disagreed with this characterization. The court
opined that a property register maintained in a public office like a court is not confidential or
non-judicial in nature, especially in the context of modern transparency and the right to
information. The court emphasized the importance of the property register in administering
justice, particularly in criminal trials.
The court interpreted Rule 225, which restricts the issuance of certified copies of confidential or
non-strictly judicial papers without the court’s orders. It clarified that the property register does
not fall under such a category and therefore should not have been denied to the petitioner.
Highlighting that denying access to the property register could hinder the petitioner's defense in
the criminal trial, the High Court set aside the trial court’s order. It directed the trial court to
issue a certified copy of the property register to the petitioner promptly, emphasizing that it is
legally improper to deny access to documents held in a public office that could potentially aid a
defendant in their defense. In conclusion, the Kerala High Court's decision underscores the
principle of transparency and the right to information, particularly in legal proceedings, by
ensuring access to records like property registers that are crucial for administering justice.

6) Those In Power Would Conceal Everything If Not For Media: Karnataka HC Extends Interim
Protection To News Head For “Oversight” In Depicting Muslims
In a recent case before the Karnataka High Court, Justice M Nagaprasanna emphasized the
critical role of the media, referring to it as the "fourth estate" and asserting its importance in
society. The observations came during proceedings related to a petition filed by Ajit
Hanumakkanavar, Head of News & Programmes at Suvarna News channel. Ajit was booked
under Section 505(2) of the IPC for allegedly causing communal disharmony by using a
Pakistani flag to represent the Muslim community of India during a show aired on May 9. Ajit
sought the quashing of the complaint, explaining that the depiction was an oversight and was
rectified within an hour of broadcast, accompanied by a public apology on all social media
platforms of the channel. During the hearing, Ajit's advocate argued that the allegation of
creating religious rifts was unfounded as per the details of the case, and therefore, Section 505(2)
should not apply. However, the prosecution countered by accusing Ajit of disseminating fake
news habitually, and contended that professional oversight could not justify such actions. In
response, Public Prosecutor BN Jagadeesh made remarks suggesting that today's media is
responsible for various societal nuisances, implying a broad criticism. This statement led Justice
Nagaprasanna to intervene, asserting the importance of the media in today's world. The judge
remarked that without the media, those in power could conceal everything from the public,
underscoring the media's role as a vital pillar of democracy. Justice Nagaprasanna cautioned
against painting the entire media sector negatively due to occasional misuses, highlighting that
such occurrences are not unique to the media alone. In light of these considerations, the court
maintained its earlier directive to refrain from taking any immediate coercive action against Ajit.
It granted the State Public Prosecutor (SPP) two weeks to submit objections, ensuring that no
harassment under the guise of investigation would occur until the next hearing. This case
underscores ongoing debates regarding media responsibility and freedom of expression in India,
reflecting judicial scrutiny over communal disharmony allegations and media representation's
broader societal impact.

7) Raising Issue Of Non-Service Of Bills At Appellate Stage Not Permissible; Calcutta High
Court Upholds 50% Interest Waiver On Property Tax
In a recent decision, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal of an assessee regarding the
waiver of interest on property tax and upheld the decision to impose the modified demand. The
case involved an appellant who was one of the owners of a property where the property tax was
initially set at Rs. 165 per quarter in 1998. Subsequently, in 2004–2005, the property tax was
increased to Rs. 1115 per quarter. The appellant claimed to have regularly paid the property tax
but disputed the notice of demand for arrears issued by the municipality for the years 2011–2012,
2012–2013, and 2013–2014, along with current dues till the 4th quarter of 2014–2015, which
included surcharge and interest. The appellant sought to pay the arrears in installments due to
financial difficulties but was declined by the municipality. The matter was taken to court, where
a single judge upheld the notice of demand but waived 50% of the interest imposed on the
appellant. However, the Bally Municipality appealed against this decision, arguing that the
appellant had not raised any objection regarding non-receipt of bills during the arrears period in
their initial representations or petitions. They further contended that there was no municipal
scheme to waive interest on property taxes.
The High Court, in its ruling, noted that the appellant had not previously raised the issue of non-
receipt of bills during the arrears period until the appeal stage. The court emphasized that
municipalities are required to maintain records for three years, and currently, the relevant bills
were not available. The court deemed the appellant's attempt to raise this issue belatedly as an
attempt to evade liability. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and
directed the municipality to issue a notice of demand to the appellant based on the single judge's
order. The appellant was instructed to make the payment within a specified timeframe, failing
which interest at a rate of 10% would accrue until the amount was settled. This decision
highlights the court's stance on procedural fairness and the importance of timely raising issues in
legal proceedings, particularly in matters concerning financial obligations like property taxes.

8) Mere Technicalities Ought Not To Impede Justice: Sikkim HC Condones Delay In Filing
Appeal By Accused Who Were Unable To Engage Private Counsel
In a recent decision, the Sikkim High Court has condoned a significant delay in filing a criminal
appeal, considering the circumstances faced by the petitioners. Here are the key points of the
case:
The petitioners had filed a criminal revision petition against an order of the Session Court that
had rejected their application for condonation of a 388-day delay in filing an appeal. The
petitioners were convicted under Sections 454 and 380 of the IPC by a Magistrate's order dated
24th August 2022.
The High Court noted that the delay in filing the appeal was primarily due to the petitioners'
attempt to engage a private counsel after their conviction. However, being incarcerated, they
faced challenges in securing legal representation in a timely manner. The responsibility of
finding counsel fell on the wife of one of the petitioners, as they were unable to take quick action
while in jail.
Referring to the Supreme Court's judgment in G. Ramegowda v. LAO (1988 AIR 897), the High
Court emphasized the principle that the expression 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay
should be interpreted liberally in the interest of justice. The Court highlighted that delays in
preferring appeals should generally be condoned unless there is gross negligence, deliberate
inaction, or lack of bona fides on the part of the party seeking condonation.
In this case, the High Court found mitigating circumstances in favor of the petitioners. It
acknowledged their right to engage a private counsel of their choice, especially if they were
dissatisfied with the legal aid counsel provided. The Court affirmed that petitioners should not be
hindered by mere technicalities when seeking justice.
Consequently, considering the absence of gross negligence or deliberate inaction by the
petitioners and the challenges they faced while incarcerated, the High Court exercised its
discretion to condone the delay in filing the appeal. This decision underscores the court's
commitment to ensuring access to justice and accommodating the practical difficulties faced by
parties in legal proceedings, particularly in criminal cases involving personal liberty and legal
representation.

9) No Person Should Be Denied Quality Medical Treatment On Economic Ground, State's Duty
To Cater Heath Needs Of All: Madras High Court
The Madras High Court recently addressed a case concerning the bond period for postgraduate
doctors, emphasizing several critical points regarding healthcare service and the obligations
under bond agreements.In this case, two postgraduate doctors approached the court seeking to
count their service during the COVID-19 pandemic towards fulfilling their mandatory bond
period. The State opposed this plea, arguing that the doctors were duty-bound to attend patients
even during their course, and that such service could not be considered as additional to their
bond obligations. The court, presided over by Justice SM Subramaniam, dismissed the doctors'
plea. The judge highlighted that the essence of the medical profession is to serve humanity, and
doctors cannot adopt a selective approach to patient care. The bond scheme, according to the
court, serves multiple purposes: ensuring access to education, providing specialized healthcare in
government institutions, and delivering essential services to economically vulnerable sections of
society. Justice Subramaniam underscored that during the COVID-19 crisis, many individuals
across various sectors selflessly contributed to the nation's well-being. However, he deemed it
unjustifiable for doctors to use this period of service to evade their bond obligations. The court
stressed the importance of upholding contractual obligations and the broader societal benefits
derived from such bonds.
It's notable that a prior decision by Justice GR Swaminathan had taken a different stance,
allowing COVID-19 duty to count towards the bond period. However, Justice Subramaniam's
bench upheld the government's position that the bond period reduction from two years to one
year had already been implemented through a government order, and thus the doctors were
required to comply accordingly.
In conclusion, the Madras High Court's decision reinforces the principle that professional
commitments, especially in critical sectors like healthcare, must be honored without selective
interpretations. It affirms the role of government policies like bond schemes in ensuring
equitable healthcare access and professional accountability among medical practitioners.

10) Discrepancies Between Dates Of Creation And Signing Assessment Order; Bombay High
Court Quashes MVAT Order Passed Beyond 4 Years
In a recent case before the Bombay High Court, the validity of an assessment order under the
Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act (MVAT) was contested on grounds of limitation and
procedural irregularities. The petitioner, a dealer in IT and electronic equipment, challenged an
assessment order and notice of demand issued for the financial year 2015-16. The crux of the
petitioner's argument was that the assessment order, which was digitally signed on June 23,
2020, and served on June 24, 2020, was beyond the statutory limitation period of four years from
the end of the relevant assessment year, which in this case was March 31, 2016. The petitioner
contended that according to Section 23(2) of the MVAT Act, no assessment order shall be made
after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Since the assessment
order was finalized and digitally signed in June 2020, well after the expiration of the limitation
period ending on March 31, 2020, it was argued to be barred by limitation.
On the other hand, the department argued that the assessment order was actually prepared and
dated March 19, 2020, and the digital signature on June 23, 2020, was merely for the purpose of
electronic service. They relied on an affidavit to support this claim. However, the court noted
that the SAP system, which records such orders, did not reflect any order dated March 19, 2020,
and instead showed the digital signing date of June 23, 2020. The High Court, in its ruling,
emphasized that the assessment order must be deemed to have been passed on the date it was
digitally signed and issued, not on the earlier date of preparation. Since the digital signing
occurred after the expiration of the statutory limitation period, the court held that the assessment
order was indeed passed beyond the prescribed time limit. Therefore, the court quashed and set
aside the assessment order and notice of demand. This decision underscores the importance of
strict adherence to statutory timelines in tax assessments and highlights the judicial scrutiny
applied to procedural compliance in administrative actions under tax laws.

11) [S. 306 IPC] Compliant Filed Before A Lawful Authority Cannot Amount To Abetment To
Suicide: Kerala High Court
In a significant judgment, the Kerala High Court has clarified the interpretation of abetment to
suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) concerning the act of filing a
complaint before a lawful authority. Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas, delivering the verdict,
emphasized that filing a complaint cannot be equated to abetment of suicide unless there is clear
evidence of instigation or goading to commit such an act. The case before the court involved
petitioners who were accused under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC, alleging
abetment to suicide. The prosecution's case rested on suicide notes left by the deceased, which
named the petitioners as responsible for his decision to end his life. The notes specifically
mentioned that the deceased took this extreme step after being summoned to the police station in
connection with a complaint filed by the petitioners. The petitioners sought to quash the final
report filed against them, arguing that merely filing a complaint against someone does not
constitute abetment to suicide. They contended that their actions were lawful and did not intend
or foresee that the deceased would take his own life as a consequence of the complaint.
Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas, in his ruling, cited legal precedents and emphasized that for an act
to qualify as abetment under Section 306, there must be a clear intent to instigate or provoke the
deceased to commit suicide. Mere allegations or complaints to a lawful authority, such as the
police, do not inherently suggest abetment. The court underscored the importance of individuals
being able to approach authorities with grievances without fear of legal repercussions under
abetment laws. Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Mahendra Singh and Another v.
State of M.P., the High Court reiterated that harassment or even serious allegations made against
the deceased do not automatically amount to abetment unless there is evidence demonstrating a
direct link between the alleged harassment and the act of suicide. The judgment further noted
that interpreting filing complaints as abetment would have adverse consequences, potentially
dissuading people from seeking legal remedies for grievances, which would be contrary to the
principles of justice and a welfare state. Ultimately, the Kerala High Court found no substantial
evidence to support the allegation that the petitioners intended or abetted the deceased to take his
own life. Consequently, the court allowed the petition and quashed the final report filed against
the petitioners, emphasizing the need for a clear link between the alleged act and the act of
suicide to establish abetment under Section 306 of the IPC.

12) No Permission Needed When Minerals Extracted From One's Property Aren't Transported,
Only Liability Is To Inform Authorities & Pay Royalty: Kerala HC
In a significant ruling, the Kerala High Court has clarified the requirements under the Kerala
Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, particularly in cases where minerals are extracted for
specific purposes on private property without any intention of transporting them outside the
premises. Justice C. Jayachandran presided over the case and outlined the key provisions that
govern such activities. The petitioner in this case sought to excavate granite from their property
to construct boundary walls for a pond intended for agricultural use. The issue arose when a stop
memo was issued against this activity, citing Rule 104 of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 2015, which mandates obtaining a permit or lease for extraction and transportation of
minerals. However, the petitioner argued that Rule 106 is applicable in their case. Rule 106
allows for extraction of minerals without a quarrying permit or lease under certain conditions,
specifically for construction purposes such as building residential buildings or common facilities.
Importantly, the rule stipulates that if the extracted minerals are used on the property from where
they were extracted and not transported outside, the person needs only to inform the competent
authority and pay the royalty for the minerals used.
Justice C. Jayachandran examined the language of Rule 106 and emphasized that its application
hinges on whether there is transportation of minerals involved. Since the petitioner intended to
use the granite solely for constructing the boundary walls of the pond within their property and
not for transportation elsewhere, the Court held that Rule 106 indeed applied. The Court clarified
that the expression "such as" in the rule's language broadens its scope beyond just residential
buildings or common facilities, thereby covering other specific purposes like agricultural pond
construction. Furthermore, the Court underscored that Rule 104 pertains to larger-scale activities
that necessitate government permission due to their potential environmental impact or public
interest implications. In contrast, Rule 106 provides a streamlined process for minor activities
where minerals are used locally without transport. The High Court's decision reinforces the
principle that individuals should be able to undertake minor mineral extraction activities on their
property for legitimate purposes without undue bureaucratic hurdles, as long as environmental
and legal standards are adhered to. It also places responsibility on authorities to monitor and
prevent unauthorized transportation of minerals, ensuring compliance with the law while
facilitating reasonable use of natural resources for private purposes.

13) Appeal Under Section 54 Of Land Acquisition Act Not Maintainable Against Orders Of
Executing Court: Tripura High Court
In a recent judgment, the Tripura High Court clarified the scope of appeals under Section 54 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act), particularly in relation to orders issued by the
Executing Court during the execution proceedings. The case involved the Union of India, which
was impleaded in a Land Acquisition matter during the execution stage. The Executing Court
subsequently passed an order disallowing objections filed by the Union of India. Dissatisfied
with this decision, the Union of India filed an appeal before the Tripura High Court under
Section 54 of the LA Act, seeking to challenge the order of the Executing Court. Justice Biswajit
Palit, while considering the appeal, examined the provisions of Section 54 of the LA Act. The
Court observed that Section 54 explicitly allows appeals only against judgments or awards made
by the Court under the LA Act, not against specific orders issued during execution proceedings.
Therefore, the High Court held that an appeal under Section 54 was not maintainable against the
order of the Executing Court disallowing the Union of India's objections. The High Court
emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 54 is clear: it provides a right of appeal
specifically against final judgments or awards in land acquisition cases, ensuring parties can
challenge substantive decisions that affect their rights under the LA Act. Since the order dated
25.01.2024 issued by the Executing Court was not a final judgment or award, but rather an order
passed during the execution process, the appeal filed by the Union of India was deemed
impermissible under Section 54.
In conclusion, the Tripura High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of India,
reaffirming that appeals under Section 54 of the LA Act are limited to challenging judgments or
awards and do not extend to challenging orders issued in the course of execution proceedings.
This judgment underscores the procedural framework under the LA Act, ensuring clarity on the
types of decisions that can be appealed within the statutory framework governing land
acquisition disputes.

14) No Legal Right, Can't Say Fee Is Exorbitant: Madras High Court Dismisses Plea To Reduce
Application Fee For AIBE
The Madras High Court recently addressed a plea seeking to reduce the application fee for the
All India Bar Examination (AIBE) conducted by the Bar Council of India. Here’s a summary of
the key points from the court's decision:
The court observed that unlike the enrolment fee prescribed under the Advocates Act, there is no
statutory provision specifying the examination fee for the AIBE. The absence of a specific
statutory provision meant there was no legal basis upon which a writ of mandamus could be
issued to reduce the fee.
The court emphasized that for a writ of mandamus to be issued, the applicant must demonstrate
the existence of a legal right that is being infringed upon. In this case, since there was no
statutory provision governing the examination fee, the petitioner could not establish such a legal
right.
The court further noted that even in the absence of a statutory violation, it could still intervene if
the fee amount was deemed exorbitant. However, the court found that the application fee of Rs.
3,500/- for the AIBE (Rs. 2,500/- for SC/ST candidates) was not exorbitant considering the
nature of the examination and its administrative costs.
The court referenced Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, which specifies enrolment fees
significantly lower than those charged by State Bar Councils in practice. It noted ongoing legal
proceedings in the Supreme Court regarding these fees but clarified that the present case dealt
specifically with the AIBE application fee, not enrolment fees.
Ultimately, the Madras High Court dismissed the plea filed by the advocate seeking a reduction
in the AIBE application fee. It concluded that since there was no statutory provision prescribing
a specific examination fee and considering that the fee amount was not found to be exorbitant,
there were no grounds for the court to intervene.
This decision underscores the importance of statutory provisions in determining the legality of
fees imposed by regulatory bodies and highlights the court's role in ensuring that fees, while
reasonable, do not unduly burden applicants.