Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8 (2023) 100678

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Regular Article

Adopting and practicing resource nationalism in Africa: A case of

Tanzania’s State Mining Corporation
Japhace Poncian
Department of History, Political Science and Development Studies, Mkwawa University College of Education, P O Box 2513, Iringa, Tanzania

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Many resource-rich countries in Africa have at one time or the other resorted to resource nationalism in a bid to
Resource nationalism increase economic benefits and bolster state and public participation. But has this translated into improved
State owned enterprises resource governance? With a focus on Tanzania’s State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), this paper critically
STAMICO
examines whether the adoption of resource nationalism results in actual practice and improved resource
Tanzania
governance. The paper shows that the pattern has been the same throughout: adoption of resource nationalist
measures has not automatically translated into actual practice in terms of improved resource governance ca­
pacity. State enterprises have been established but the state has not injected capital into them to enable them
spearhead resource nationalism into what the state wants to achieve. Consequently, resource nationalism ap­
pears to be politically motivated as a strategy to address opposition without having to invest into birthing what
resource nationalism aspires to achieve.

1. Introduction behind such a move to increase state role in resource extraction is

Resource nationalism has become a common policy tool to respond
to various challenges associated with resource extraction across
different regions of the world. It is one of the resource governance ap­
proaches adopted in almost all resource-rich countries of the world in
varying degrees (Andreasson, 2015; Angosto-Ferrández & Fernando,
2021; Childs, 2016; Laux & Molot, 1978; Wilson, 2011). Even though
there is no commonly agreed definition of resource nationalism, it is
generally used to refer to measures taken by resource-rich governments
to increase their bargaining power relative to multinational extractive
companies as a way of increasing the socio-economic contribution of
resource extraction (Vivoda, 2009; Wilson, 2015). Many studies have
tended to associate the recurrence of resource nationalism with circles of
resource booms suggesting that resource-rich governments resort to
nationalist policies when commodity prices go up (Bremmer & John­
ston, 2009; Vivoda, 2009). This is especially truer in the context of
developing countries whose weak influence in international political
economy usually pushes them to negotiate unfavourable deals with
multinational corporations when in dire economic state in order to
attract foreign capital and technology into their resource sectors. To
these countries, resource nationalism becomes appealing when com­
modity prices go up, making them adopt new or reform their existing
laws and policies to capture more economic rents and benefits. The push
usually grounded in anti-colonial experiences of many resource-rich
developing countries; making these countries very ‘sensitive to losing
control over their natural resources’ and result in adoption of resource
nationalism as ‘a symbol of sovereignty’ (Sikri, 2010, p. 10). This is the
context in which recurrent resource nationalism in Africa can partly be
understood.
For over fifty years of independent Africa, resource nationalism has
continued to appeal to both political leaders and the public. Emerging as
part of the broader nationalist development strategy to undo the colonial
economic legacy inherited by independent African countries, resource
nationalism has evolved to become a common policy response to dy­
namic circles of resource booms. Several African countries have sought
to promote broad-based growth and development through, among
others, nationalist policies. At independence, African countries adopted
nationalisation policies as a way of countering the legacy of an extrac­
tivist colonial economic inheritance. Across countries such as Tanzania,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Uganda, the state moved to nationalise major
means of production in order to increase national control over their
resources and economies (Aleksandrovskaia et al., 1977; Nyahunzvi,
2014; Rood, 1976; Wilson, 1990). Since then, resource nationalism has
kept recurring despite a short break, thanks to neoliberal reforms in the
continent. Given its resurgent nature and the justifications accompa­
nying its adoption, what evidence is there to show for resource

E-mail address: japhace.poncian@muce.ac.tz.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2023.100678
Received 9 September 2022; Received in revised form 12 June 2023; Accepted 7 September 2023
2590-2911/© 2023 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
J. Poncian
nationalism in terms of how resource nationalist policies have promoted
and improved Africa’s capacity to harness its extractive resources?
Using a case of Tanzania’s State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), this
paper critically examines whether the adoption of resource nationalism
has improved Africa’s governance capacity to develop its resources
sector. Methodologically, the paper is based on existing scholarly liter­
ature as well as primary documents such as government/corporate re­
ports. Thus, the paper uses literature review as a data collection and
analysis tool (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016). As a systematic way of
collecting and synthesizing previous research, literature review as a
method can potentially address research questions with a power that no
single study has (Snyder, 2019). This paper critically engages with the
literature on resource nationalism in order to determine whether there is
connection between the adoption and implementation of resource
nationalism as a resource governance approach. As such, an integrative
review was used. Also known as a critical review, an integrative review
assesses, critiques, and synthesises the literature on a research topic to
generate new theoretical frameworks and perspectives (Snyder, 2019).
In operationalising the methodology, I made use of the google scholar
search engine to search for academic literature on resource nationalism.
Search terms used to gather sources were resource nationalism, resource
nationalism in Africa, and resource nationalism Tanzania. On top of the
academic literature reviewed, I also reviewed grey literature including
government and corporate reports, civil society reports and analyses.
These were referenced to generate evidence in support of the paper’s
argument.
The rest of the paper proceeds by first reviewing the theoretical and
empirical studies on resource nationalism globally. This is followed by
reviewing the trajectory of resource nationalism in Africa and what the
evidence suggests as regards its effectiveness. Thereafter, the paper
turns to the case of Tanzania’s STAMICO to explore the evidence from
socialist to state developmentalist eras on the effectiveness of resource
nationalism in promoting Tanzania’s capacity to harness its extractive
resources. The paper shows that far from improving Africa’s resource
governance, resource nationalism as practiced through state enterprises
has failed to transform the trajectory of resource extraction. Concluding
remarks are provided at the end.
2. Resource nationalism: conceptual review and global
manifestation
Throughout the world, resource-rich countries have sought to
manage their extractive resources either through market-based ap­
proaches such as resource liberalism or state developmentalist ap­
proaches (Singh & France, 2013; Wilson, 2011). In many developing
countries such as those in Latin America and Africa, state devel­
opmentalism expressed in resource nationalism and/or neo-extractivism
has become a dominant approach to extractive resources governance in
an attempt to increase the socio-economic contribution of resources and
address the negative ramifications of a neoliberalised resource gover­
nance (Angosto-Ferrández & Fernando, 2021; Paz & Ramírez-Cendrero,
2021; Poncian, 2019b; Roder, 2018; Saunders & Alexander, 2018).
As an approach to resource governance, resource liberalism is an
offspring of neoliberal reforms that engulfed the world from around the
1980s. In relation to the resources sector, resource liberalism entails ‘a
state relying on international market mechanisms for the development
of its natural resources through relatively liberal trade and investment
policies’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 285). Reliance on international market
mechanisms for management of national resources involves a range of
policy choices including abandoning restrictive trade policies; adopting
and maintaining an open foreign direct investment (FDI) regime to
attract multinational corporations; and avoiding restrictive local content
conditions on firms (Singh & France, 2013; Wilson, 2011). This was the
approach emphasised and supported by the International Financial In­
stitutions in their support for Africa’s economic recovery. The World
Bank, for instance, pursued this approach as evidenced in its 1992
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Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8 (2023) 100678
Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992). In this strategy, the
Bank advised resource-rich African countries to liberalise their resource
sector in order to attract foreign capital and technology into their mining
sector. Consequently, African governments reformed their mineral pol­
icy, legal and regulatory regimes along the lines of the Bank’s Strategy
resulting in what some analysts have described as investor friendly and
over-generous mining codes (Emel & Huber, 2008; Emel et al., 2011).
However, as the promised benefits of resource liberalism were not
forthcoming and the public grew more impatient with the strategy,
further reforms were unavoidable. This is the context in which resource
nationalism appealed to policy makers in Africa and beyond.
Although widely used in scholarly analyses of resource governance,
resource nationalism is a contested concept. Whereas there has been a
tendency to present resource nationalism as antithetical to market-based
approaches, Childs (2016) cautions of the danger of treating it as a bi­
nary between state versus private control of resources. He argues that
doing so reduces its conceptual range down to a language of economics
alone, overlooks the political dimensions of identity and justice, and
negatively differentiates different types of resource nationalism between
a global north/south divide (Childs, 2016, pp. 540–41). This conceptual
contention notwithstanding, resource nationalism refers broadly to
measures taken by resource-rich states to increase the role and partici­
pation of the state in resource extraction as a strategy not only to control
the conduct of multinational corporations but also to increase economic
benefits of resource extraction. Resource nationalism describes ‘the
tendency for (nation) states to assert economic and political control over
natural resources found within its sovereign territory’ (Childs, 2016, p.
539). In the context of resource liberalism hinted about above, resource
nationalism has risen to challenge the notions of market based resource
governance in Latin America, Asia and Africa by seeking to bring the
state back into resource extraction politics (Andrews & Nwapi, 2018;
Grugel & Singh, 2013; Singh, 2014; Saunders & Alexander, 2018).
Resource nationalism is premised on the use of selective interventionist
policies to achieve higher levels of economic gains from resource
extraction. These interventionist policies may include: the use of export
controls and/or participation in international commodity cartels to in­
crease profits from resource extraction; placing on multinational firms
minimum levels of local ownership through FDI controls or nationali­
sation; and establishment of local beneficiation and value addition ac­
tivities to promote linkages with the rest of the economy (Wilson, 2011,
p. 285). Although framed as a counter to resource liberalism in many of
the existing studies, resource nationalism predates neoliberalism.
Resource nationalism is a global phenomenon, taking place in both
developed and developing countries though in various forms
(Andreasson, 2015; Bremmer & Johnston, 2009; Laux & Molot, 1978).
Bremmer and Johnston (2009) identify four main varieties of resource
nationalism which have been adopted by different countries in Africa
and beyond. These include revolutionary resource nationalism, eco­
nomic resource nationalism, legacy resource nationalism, and soft
resource nationalism. Revolutionary resource nationalism is considered
to be the worst form given its consequence on international capital
(Andreasson, 2015; Bremmer & Johnston, 2009). Accordingly, revolu­
tionary resource nationalism, exemplified by practices of countries such
as Venezuela and Russia, is ‘linked to broader political and social up­
heaval, not merely directed at the natural-resource sector’ and which
may result in outright nationalisation of resource extraction (Bremmer
& Johnston, 2009, p. 150).
The more frequent and common resource nationalism variety is
economic resource nationalism. By this, resource-rich countries adopt
economic policies that are more constraining on multinational corpo­
rations with a view of generating more economic gains from resource
extraction. In essence, economic resource nationalism seeks to rebalance
resource benefits by ‘shifting a larger share of commodity revenues from
international to domestic hands’ without necessarily investing in actual
political control and ownership of resource extraction projects (Brem­
mer & Johnston, 2009, p. 151). A good example from Africa, for
J. Poncian
instance, is South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legis­
lation which mandates local content requirements in the mining sector
and the rest of the economy as a means not only to increase fiscal ben­
efits but also to promote inclusive mineral extraction and foster local
linkages (Andreasson, 2015; Butler, 2013). Because of its focus on
generating more revenues, economic resource nationalism arguably
prominently takes place more frequently in times when commodity
prices are high culminating in a windfall profit (Mwaba &
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2021; United Nations, 2017).
The third variety of resource nationalism, legacy resource nation­
alism, usually draws on the historical track-record of resource nation­
alism to further take nationalist measures in the extractives sector.
Building on popular and political dynamics regarding international
capital investment, countries may be forced to adopt radical resource
nationalist measures that build on a history of similar measures and/or
popular disapproval of market-based resource management (Bremmer &
Johnston, 2009). Some examples here include nationalisation of oil as­
sets in Mexico and Kuwait which has central to national political and
cultural identity (Bremmer & Johnston, 2009). In Africa, Nigeria, which
nationalised the assets of British Petroleum, has been cited as an
example case of legacy resource nationalism (Andreasson, 2015).
Tanzania can also fit in this variety given its recurrent resource
nationalism and its recent measures which reportedly threated to
nationalise mineral and energy resource governance (Jacob & Pedersen,
2018; Poncian, 2019b).
The last variety is soft resource nationalism which has reportedly
taken place in developed economies. Soft resource nationalism,
although with similar motives to those of economic resource nation­
alism, seeks to increase economic benefits of resource extraction without
‘tearing up existing contracts and using arbitrary tactics’ (Bremmer &
Johnston, 2009, p. 152). Instead, countries use established regulatory or
legislative channels to impose royalty increases or tax changes (Brem­
mer & Johnston, 2009). In Africa, Ghana’s extractive sector under the
National Democratic Congress (NDC) government has been cited as a
case of soft resource nationalism (Hickey & Mohan, 2021). However, it
should be noted that categorising OECD countries such as Australia,
Canada, Britain, and USA as soft resource nationalist countries runs the
risk of undermining the record of some of these countries as regards
other varieties of resource nationalism. Canada, for instance, is reported
to have undertaken economic nationalist measures in the resources
sector in the past (Bucheli, 2009; Laux & Molot, 1978). Doing so further
runs the risk of portraying the Global North as a good example as
opposed to the Global South which is usually portrayed in a bad light
regarding resource nationalism (Childs, 2016).
What is apparent from the foregoing review is the fact that resource
nationalism is a global phenomenon that manifests in a variety of ways.
The political, social and economic dynamics of the country are very
important in determining the manifestation of resource nationalism. It is
also important to note that although developing countries have been
accused of harbouring tougher resource nationalism, there are empirical
evidence showing that this is not only limited to developing countries;
advanced economies have equally undertaken similar measures. Irre­
spective of the manifestation and the Global North-South divide, it can
safely be noted that resource nationalism has been used by elites to
overcome the collective action problems created by elite factionalism,
protect high-performing organisations, and build a shared project be­
tween politicians and extractive resource technocrats; and in the crea­
tion of fiscal regimes with varied success in attracting investment and
catalysing production (Hickey & Mohan, 2021). Given this, it is
important therefore to examine the record of resource nationalism in
terms of whether it has been a success or not by closely looking at Africa.
3. Resource nationalism in Africa: what does the evidence
suggest?
There has been a surge in resource nationalism in Africa in the past
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Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8 (2023) 100678
two decades as governments have sought to address increasing
inequality in the continent (Burgess & Beilstein, 2013). From South
Africa to Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Angola, and
many other countries, resource nationalism has swept across the polit­
ical landscape of resource governance in the continent. However, it
should be emphasised that resource nationalism is not a recent phe­
nomenon in Africa; it has been one of the defining features of resource
politics in post-independent Africa. At independence, some African
countries adopted economic nationalisation policies as part of their
nation building and efforts to address socio-economic inequality
inherited from colonialism (Isaacs-Martin, 2011; Kim, 2018; Kohnert,
2009). Countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Ghana
adopted economic nationalist policies gauged on what became known as
African socialism (Arrighi & Saul, 1968; Kim, 2018; Lal, 2015; Lösch,
1990).
With economic nationalist policies, post-independent African coun­
tries sought to strengthen state and public ownership of major means of
production through measures such as nationalisation of major means of
production. In Zambia, for instance, the government nationalised its
copper mining sector in order to improve the conditions of the rural poor
and reduce unemployment in urban areas (Libby & Woakes, 1980;
Limpitlaw, 2011; Murapa, 1976). In Ghana, the first independent gov­
ernment regime moved from moderate to radical socialist policies by
which a series of economic nationalisation was done including the
nationalisation and state takeover of most of the gold and diamond
mining operations, the banking and insurance industries, and industrial
development (Swoyer et al., 2011). In Nigeria, the oil sector was
nationalised during the 1970s with assets of British Petroleum (BP), for
instance, nationalised in 1979 for political reasons (Frynas, George, &
Wood, 2001). In Angola, the MPLA government formed a state enter­
prise, Sonangol, in 1976 and forced multinational oil companies to form
joint ventures and production-sharing agreements with Sonangol (Fry­
nas et al., 2001). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), mining
activities were nationalised in what the government dubbed as nation­
alisation and Zairianisation (Geenen & Claessens, 2013; Gibbs, 1997).
Resource nationalism has indeed been part and parcel of extractive
resource governance politics in post-independence Africa. One question
that rises from this, however, is: what does the evidence tell us in those
countries that adopted resource nationalism?
Evidence from the existing literature suggests that resource nation­
alism has had dynamic consequences on Africa’s extractive politics. One
of the key areas where resource nationalism has had a lasting impact is
the establishment and functioning of state owned enterprises. Several
resource rich African countries have established state owned enterprises
(SOEs) to oversee state interests in resource extraction. Some of these
include Gecamines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sonangol in
Angola, Debswana in Botswana (50% state owned), NNPC in Nigeria and
ZMDC in Zimbabwe. These SOEs have had mixed performance with
some running bankrupt, others performing better. For instance, Gec­
amines was reported to have run bankrupt by 2003 even though it later
emerged to become a key gatekeeper to investment in copper and cobalt
sectors (World Bank, 2007). Critics have described Gecamines as a cash
machine for the state, generating revenues from privatisation and other
deals most of which are unaccounted for (Global Witness, 2017; The
Carter Centre, 2017; World Bank, 2007). In Nigeria, the NNPC is known
for having failed to transform Nigeria’s oil sector for the betterment of
the country. Studies have shown that NNPC failure has largely been a
result of government interference, funding issues, political indecision,
theft and pipeline attacks, cost of spare parts, maintenance issues,
operating capital, feedstock supply, staff training and competence issues
(Iheukwumere et al., 2021; Thurber et al., 2010).
Corruption and embezzlement have also been identified as key issues
limiting the performance of NNPC; for instance, it was reported in 2014
that $20 billion in NNPC oil sale revenues had gone missing (Sayne
et al., 2015). Whereas African countries have found it fashionable to
establish SOEs, they have failed to capitalise and support these SOEs for
J. Poncian
socioeconomic transformation. African states have kept complaining
about how multinational companies sabotage them but have not used
the same amount of energy to promote their SOEs. The subsequent case
of Tanzania’s STAMICO presented below sheds more light on this.
Not only is resource nationalism contradicted by the performance of
SOEs, studies have also shown that resource nationalism has been
detrimental to other areas. For instance, in a study conducted on Tan­
zania’s oil and gas sector, resource nationalism has been shown to un­
dermine the capacity of state institutions responsible for energy sector
regulation because of direct political interference in the agencies (Ped­
ersen, Jacob, and Bofin 2020a; 2020b). This came as the government
moved from a softer economic resource nationalism characteristic of the
2005–2015 period to more radical resource nationalism gauged on
reasserting sovereignty, redefining resource ownership and increasing
state control and surveillance which characterised President Magufuli’s
administration (Pedersen et al., 2020b). Further, evidence from South
Africa indicate that resource nationalism in the form of Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE) has failed to transform the country’s mining in­
dustry in favour of broad based South Africa’s socio-economic trans­
formation (Bowman, 2019). This is because of the contestation over its
implementation which has manifested in the government systematically
weakening the spirit of the BEE thus providing opportunity for the
mining companies to undermine, (re)frame, (in)validate or reject some
aspects of BEE (Bowman, 2019; Makgoba, 2019).
What emerges from the foregoing review is that resource-rich Afri­
can countries have tended to rush into adopting resource nationalist
measures as a fashionable policy choice but without making adequate
plans to execute the reforms to achieve intended development goals.
Even where resource nationalism has resulted in some gains, say in
employment, state ownership and participation, and other local content
requirements, these have been eroded by inefficiencies, mismanage­
ment, unaccountable and less transparent governance systems, lack of
proper planning and insufficient investment into measures that would
see the gains sustained (Bogopane, 2013; Fauconnier & Mathur-Helm,
2008; Kahn, 2014; Pedersen et al., 2020b). Looking more closely on
Tanzania’s case sheds some more light on this.
4. Resource nationalism in Tanzania: an overview
Resource nationalism has been endemic to Tanzania’s extractive
resources development policy. Except for the late 1990s to 2005 period
where resource liberalism was a key policy, resource nationalism has
virtually dominated most of the post-independence era. Its roots trace
back to the late colonial period during which extractive resources were
attempts to nationalise diamond mining by the colonial government
were made in the 1940s in order for the colonial government to secure
more economic benefits (Lissu, 2001). The independent government
built on this foundation as it undertook socialist informed nationalist
measures in the extractive resources and the rest of the economy. First
emerging as part of the broader socialist nationalisation agenda,
resource nationalism has persistently been part of much of the reforms in
the extractive sector. In this section, I provide an overview of resource
nationalist reforms in Tanzania’s post-independence era. It should be
remembered that Tanzania adopted a socialist development strategy in
late 1960s enshrined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Accordingly,
the Arusha Declaration emphasised the need to place the ownership of
natural resources and other means of production in the hands of the
public through the state (TANU, 1967). Because of this, extractive re­
sources and their development were nationalised, the state assumed a
centralist development strategy and private investment was discouraged
(Poncian, 2019a). The key assumption was that these resources should
be used for the betterment of Tanzanians and should be exploited by the
Tanzanians themselves. If not exploited by Tanzanians, extractive re­
sources would better ‘remain in the ground until we had educated our
engineers to be able to mine them for our own benefit as a nation’
(Chachage, 2010, p. 4). This socialist development strategy was based
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Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8 (2023) 100678
on an understanding that international capital and multinational cor­
porations were plunderers, imperialist and exploitative for Tanzania to
leave the fate of its valuable resources and the future of the country’s
development in their hands (Nyerere, 1968).
What evolved from the Ujamaa political economy of development
was a statist approach to extractive resources development. To actualise
this approach, state owned enterprises were established to champion
state ownership and interest in the extractive resources sector. Key state
owned enterprises established then were the State Mining Corporation
(STAMICO) established in the early 1970s, the Tanzania Petroleum
Development Corporation (TPDC) established in the late 1960s, and the
National Development Corporation (NDC) established in 1965. These
state owned enterprises managed a portfolio of extractive projects dur­
ing the socialist era. STAMICO, for instance, had several projects under
its subsidiary companies, namely, the Tanzania Gemstone Industries
Limited (TGI), Tanzania Diamond Cutting Company Limited (TANCUT),
Nyanza Salt Mines (T) Ltd, and the Williamson Diamonds Limited where
STAMICO owned 50% shareholding on behalf of the Government (State
Mining Corporation, 2015). However, as liberal economic reforms of the
1980s and 1990s came in, direct state participation in mining activities
was shoved and state enterprises were earmarked for privatisation.
STAMICO was earmarked for closure following a Cabinet decision in
1996 and was placed under the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform
Commission in 1997 (State Mining Corporation, 2015). It should be
emphasised here that the socialist reforms which introduced the first
wave of resource nationalism in Tanzania did not result in a transformed
extractive sector in terms of state investment, production, exports and
revenue earnings. Instead, inefficiencies, undercapitalisation, mineral
smuggling, and declining mineral production characterised the 1970s
and 1980s (Chachage, 1993, 1995; Lissu, 2001; Poncian, 2019a). By one
account, attempts by the government to revive and expand large scale
mining through resource nationalist measures proved to be doomed
even though this failure could not wholly be blamed on nationalist
policies (Lissu, 2001). Not even the government relaxation of state
participation in mining ventures through the 1979 Mining Act could
attract in large capital in the form of aid or joint ventures with private
investors (Lissu, 2001). It was not until the 1990s when liberal reforms
were undertaken that the mineral sector growth in terms of foreign
capital investment interest started picking up.
The liberal economic reforms undertaken by Tanzania from early
1990s ushered in a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based approach to
extractive resources development. This approach liberalised the sector
resulting, as several studies have shown, in unprecedented inflows of
international capital, opening up of several large scale mining projects
and an increase in mineral production and exports (Curtis, 2012; Curtis
& Lissu, 2008; Emel & Huber, 2008; Lange, 2006, 2008). However, due
to the lopsided nature of the liberalised mining legal regimes, these
developments did not translate in more economic benefits to the state
and the public in terms of revenues, employment, and other local con­
tent areas (Emel & Huber, 2008; Emel et al., 2011; Lange, 2011; Makene
et al., 2012; Newenham-Kahindi & Marcus, 2011).
This imbalance between unprecedented mining sector development
and benefit flows to the state and the public ushered in a second wave of
resource nationalism beginning the mid-2000s. This ushered in a series
of policy and legal reforms starting the late 2000s to the late 2010s
which ultimately brought the state back into mining business (Jacob
et al., 2016; Kinyondo & Villanger, 2017; Lange and Kinyondo, 2016;
Poncian, 2019b; Roder, 2018). Among others, these state devel­
opmentalist reforms revived the state enterprises, increased state
participation in extractive activities, reformed the fiscal regime to in­
crease revenues from resource extraction, and sought to reassert state
sovereignty and renegotiate resource contracts (Jacob, 2019; Jacob
et al., 2016; Jacob & Pedersen, 2018; Poncian, 2021; Roder, 2018).
These are all captured in the various extractive legislation including the
Mining Policy of 2009, the Mining Act 2010, the National Natural Gas
Policy 2013, the National Energy Policy 2015, the Petroleum Act 2015,
J. Poncian
the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act, the Extractive Industries
(Transparency and Accountability) Act 2015, the Natural Wealth and
Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017, the Natural Wealth and
Resources (Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017, and the
Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2017.
It is in this state developmentalist resource nationalism that the
STAMICO and TPDC were revived and their job description expanded in
line with state objective to increase its participation in resource
extraction. This being the case, it suffices to ask a question here: what
does the evidence tell us in regards to revived state enterprises as an
arena through which the state practices resource nationalism? I try to
answer this question by closely examining the performance of
STAMICO.
5. Practicing resource nationalism through state enterprises in
Tanzania’s STAMICO
It is one thing proclaiming resource nationalism and entirely a
different thing bringing it to life. Scholarly analyses from across Africa
point to the fact that resource nationalism may not live up to the hype it
normally comes with. In this section, I draw on the performance of
Tanzania’s state mining enterprise, the STAMICO, to show the disparity
between adopting resource nationalism and improved resource gover­
nance capacity. Among others, resource nationalism usually seeks to put
the state at the centre of resource extraction as one of the ways of
ensuring resource extraction responds to national development goals.
This, however, does not mean that these intentions are actually realised.
The case of STAMICO analysed here sheds light on this.
The State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) was established in 1972
through the Public Corporations Act to take over mining operations
which were previously under the National Development Corporation
(NDC) and to become a custodian of mining operations on behalf of the
state (Jacob, 2020). Particularly, STAMICO became a major government
entity tasked with overseeing the development of the mining sector,
exploring new mining areas and fully operating the mines that were
nationalised during the socialist period (Jacob, 2020). In essence, the
establishment of STAMICO in the early 1970s was in fulfilment of the
policy of economic nationalism which introduced resource nationalism
under the auspices of the late 1960s socialist reforms. It was established
to actualise state participation in mining activities especially given the
fact that government and party officials were increasingly becoming
impatient with a market based development approach. Following its
establishment, STAMICO quickly assumed all roles ranging from
exploration, extraction, processing, trade and so forth.
According to the State Mining Corporation (Establishment) Order,
1972, STAMICO was established to perform eight functions, namely, to
carry on the business of prospectors, miners, producers, refiners,
graders, cutters, storers, suppliers, buyers, sellers and distributors of
minerals; to conduct or engage in mineral prospecting and mining op­
erations; to acquire by agreement and hold interests in any undertaking,
enterprise or project associated with the exploration, prospecting and
mining of minerals and for such purposes to obtain, exercise, carryout
and use any mining lease, licence, concession, franchise, authority,
power, right or privilege which any government, public body or other
authority may be empowered to grant; to acquire shares or interest in
any firm, company or other body of persons engaged in mining of, or in
prospecting, refining, grading, producing, cutting, processing, buying or
selling or marketing of minerals; to manage the affairs of any corpora­
tion, company, firm or other body the interest of which are transferred
to or acquired by the Corporation; to carry on its business, operations,
and activities as principal agent, contactor or otherwise, and either
alone or in conjunction with any other persons, firms or bodies corpo­
rate; to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to uphold and
support the credit of STAMICO and to obtain and justify public confi­
dence, and to avert or minimise any loss to the Corporation; and to do
anything or enter into any transaction which can facilitate the proper
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and efficient carrying on of its activities (United Republic of Tanzania
1972).
In discharging its functions during its early years of operation,
STAMICO became a holding company taking on all extractive subsidiary
companies which were previously under NDC; these included the
Tanzania Gemstone Industries Limited (TGI) alongside its gemstone
mining companies and projects; Williamson Diamonds Limited; Tanga­
nyika Meerschaum Corporation; Nyanza Salt Mines (T) Ltd; and
Tanzania Diamond Cutting Company Limited (TANCUT) (State Mining
Corporation, 2015). All these activities required appropriate capital­
isation of the corporation. Given that it was established as part of
broader economic nationalist policies, STAMICO’s capitalisation and
shareholding were a sole responsibility of the state (United Republic of
Tanzania, 1972). Looking at the Establishment Order, it is obvious that
there was a lot the state wanted to achieve from its participation in
mining activities. Similarly, there was a lot the state had to do to make
STAMICO functional to the extent of delivering the envisaged benefits.
However, empirical evidence suggest otherwise. For instance, it has
been shown that the economic crisis that hit Tanzania during the 1970s
and 1980s meant that STAMICO was under-capitalised resulting in its
failure to increase gold production at the time when prices for gold in the
international market were rising (Jacob, 2020; United Republic of
Tanzania, 2008). The lack of state financing of STAMICO that drove the
mining sector into underperformance and collapse of mining operations
throughout the country forced the government to end state monopoly of
mining and to allow all Tanzanians to become involved in the minerals
trade (Jacob, 2020). This ushered in a wave of legal, policy and fiscal
reforms in the sector which transformed the sector from resource
nationalism to a neoliberal governance regime. In effect, this meant that
STAMICO, like other public parastatals, was to be closed, a decision
which was made in 1996 only to be overturned in 2008 (State Mining
Corporation, 2015).
Following the return of resource nationalism in the period after
2005, STAMICO was revived to continue championing for state partic­
ipation in mining activities. A Presidential inquiry commission (the
Bomani Commission) formed to inquire into the mining sector and
advise the government accordingly proposed, among others, to revive
STAMICO because it still had ‘an outstanding importance in the mining
sector’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 2008). The government subse­
quently paid heed to this advice and made provisions in the mining
policy formulated in 2009 and the Mining Act enacted in 2010 for direct
state participation in mining activities through a state owned enterprise
(Jacob, 2020; United Republic of Tanzania, 2009). Following this,
STAMICO’s Establishment Order was, in 2010/2011, reviewed and
amended to assign additional roles to STAMICO (State Mining Corpo­
ration, 2015). According to the amended Establishment Order, STAM­
ICO has such newer roles as carrying out consultancy services, contract
works, feasibility and environmental studies; establish corporate entities
or firms for the purposes of carrying out projects or engaging in mining
of, prospecting, refining, grading, producing, cutting, processing,
buying or selling or marketing of minerals; to participate in any stock
market as appropriate; to promote, facilitate or support transformation
of artisanal and small scale mining into well organised, sustainably
productive and environmentally conscious medium scale mining oper­
ations; and to import, export, manufacture and maintain mining
equipment and machinery (United Republic of Tanzania 2015). As a
result, STAMICO came back into business and acquired several projects.
Some of these projects include the Kiwira coal mine (100%); Biharamulo
gold mine (99%); Buckreef Gold Mine (45%); Mererani Tanzanite Mine
(50%); Kigosi Gold Mine (45%); Buhemba gold mine (100%) and Kabulo
coal mine (100%) (Jacob, 2020); and holds 26 prospecting licenses
across the country (HakiRasilimali, 2020a).
The revival of STAMICO came at the time when the state was
increasingly coming back into direct participation in economic devel­
opment. Apart from reforms in the mining sector, the government had
also revived its erstwhile long- and medium term economic and
J. Poncian
development planning with five year development plans revived.
Further, like how the political dynamics within the ruling TANU back in
the 1960s had pushed President Nyerere’s government to go for eco­
nomic nationalism, the increasing electoral competition and strength­
ened opposition appeal and performance as well as general popular
dissatisfaction with proceeds from liberalised mining reforms pushed
the government to revert to resource nationalism including the revival
of STAMICO (Jacob, 2020; Poncian, 2019b).
A major question that arises is what difference has the revival of
STAMICO during the period after 2010 made? I noted above that
STAMICO failed to live up to the purpose for which it was established
during the first wave of resource nationalism due to limited and/or lack
of government financing. Has this changed during the second and third
waves of resource nationalism in the period after 2010? Existing evi­
dence suggests that this is still the main challenge. For instance, a five
year budget analysis conducted by HakiRasilimali shows that STAMICO
has been a loss making entity and is indebted:
STAMICO, through its subsidiaries, has been operating under loss.
This has resulted to lowered production in gold by 58% for the period
of 2015–2018. The losses are due to huge debts, low investment
impacting company engagement in production, and not making
profits from its subsidiaries. Notably, up to 2019 STAMICO has an
outstanding debt of Tshs 67 billion (HakiRasilimali, 2020a:3).
HakiRasilimali’s analysis tallies with reports by the parliamentary
standing committee on energy and minerals which have also raised the
issue of financing as a critical hindrance to STAMICO’s performance
(Bunge la Tanzania, 2020; Parliament of Tanzania 2018; 2019). In its
2017–2018 report for instance, the committee reported that STAMICO
failed to implement its functions properly due to several factors. Some of
these include lack of funding which inhibits its ability to establish new
projects; and its being required to perform several functions without
being given adequate funding (Parliament of Tanzania, 2018). In the
2018/2019 financial year, whereas STAMICO was allocated Tanzania
shillings 13.6 billion (9 billion of which was set for the Kiwira coal and
Buhemba gold mines) for development expenditure, only 2.7 billion was
disbursed to the corporation by February 2019, and this catered for
salaries and other charges (HakiRasilimali, 2019). STAMICO’s subsidi­
ary, namely, STAMIGOLD, reportedly operated at loss for three
consecutive years i.e. 2015/2016 to 2017/2018 due to huge debts, low
investment and failure of the company to engage in production
(HakiRasilimali, 2019; United Republic of Tanzania, 2019); coinciden­
tally, this was a time during which resource nationalism was high on the
economic landscape of Tanzania. In terms of losses, for instance,
STAMICO reported a loss of 1.97 billion shillings in 2017/18 (HakiR­
asilimali, 2020b).
The worrisome state of STAMICO is not only seen in its frequent
losses but also in its inability to develop and/or execute its licences due
to lack of financing. In the 2015/16 report by the Controller and Auditor
General, it was reported that STAMICO had 11 prospecting licences is­
sued between 2007 and 2014 but had only worked on one of them; the
rest remained unworked due to lack of funds (United Republic of
Tanzania 2017). Such a poor performance and limited financing is why
the parliamentary standing committee on energy and minerals
concluded by doubting the government’s intentions to develop and
improve the corporation (Bunge la Tanzania, 2017).
Apart from funding issues, the disparity between adopting resource
nationalism in state owned enterprises and improved resource gover­
nance capacity is also reflected in the independence of STAMICO from
state and political interference. Independence of state owned enterprises
from undue state and political interference is one of the key de­
terminants of enterprise performance (Thenmozhi & Aghila, 2020;
Schneider, 2019, p. 896). Does resource nationalism result in indepen­
dent state owned enterprises in Tanzania? Existing research warns of the
danger of state owned enterprises becoming crippled by patronage and
elite capture (Cooksey, 2017; Corrigan, 2014; Fjeldstad et al., 2003;
6
Social Sciences & Humanities Open 8 (2023) 100678
Maganga & Jacob, 2016; Tangri, 1999). Further, research on Tanzania’s
oil and gas sector has shown that radical resource nationalist reforms
adopted by Tanzania in the period after 2015 undermined the autonomy
and capacity of two critical state owned enterprises, namely, the
Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) and Energy and
Water Utility Regulatory Authority (EWURA) (Pedersen, Jacob, and
Bofin 2020). The mining sector was not left immune from the impact of
radicalised resource nationalism on the independence of STAMICO.
Tight state control and interference over STAMICO through appoint­
ments of members of the board of directors and decision making au­
tonomy has shaped STAMICO’s performance. Since the adoption of
radical resource nationalist reforms in 2017, STAMICO has been led by
retired army officers appointed by the president suggestive of what some
researchers describe as the militarisation of mineral resource gover­
nance (Huggins & Abel, 2019). More important is STAMICO’s inability
to make critical decisions independent of the central government
clearance. For instance, STAMICO cannot singlehandedly make a deci­
sion to close down its subsidiary companies without approval from the
Treasury Registrar; the consequence of this is delayed decisions such as
in the case of STAMICO seeking advice from Treasury Registrar since
2017 over the closure of its subsidiary Kyerwa Tin Company Limited but
no advice has been given (Ofisi ya Taifa ya Ukaguzi, 2022).
International mining companies have for so long been accused of
environmental degradation (Fayiah, 2020; Liam, Eric, and Katherine
2010; Haslam & Pablo, 2016). Part of the reasons for why resource rich
countries have increasingly adopted resource nationalist policies is the
need to address negative environmental consequences of mining activ­
ities (Haslam & Pablo, 2016). But does adopting resource nationalism by
strengthening state participation in mining activities result in positive
outcomes and/or capacity to promote sustainable mining activities?
Drawing on the STAMICO case in Tanzania, I argue here that state
participation in mining activities does not necessarily promote sustain­
able mining. For example, whereas STAMICO is required to invest in
environmental remediation and recovery after mining by maintaining a
well-funded environmental rehabilitation fund, reports by the
Controller and Auditor General (CAG) show that STAMICO has not kept
to its responsibility of setting aside 1% of its raw revenues from mineral
sales (Ofisi ya Taifa ya Ukaguzi, 2020). This implies that STAMICO does
not take environmental rehabilitation seriously.
Further, whereas private mining companies have had poor record on
human rights including those related to fair compensation and reset­
tlement of displaced communities (Lange & Kinyondo, 2016; Makene
et al., 2012; Obi, 2008), resource nationalist reforms are usually pre­
sented as embodying, among others, notions of procedural justice such
as those in free prior informed consent (Childs, 2016; Gudynas, 2016).
While this is theoretically the case, the state owned enterprises such as
STAMICO and NDC present a different perspective suggestive of the fact
that resource nationalism may not translate to justice and improvements
when it comes to community rights such as fair compensation and
resettlement. Evidence indicate that STAMICO and NDC delay paying
compensation to communities and/or pay lower rates of compensation
for communities in various regions where its iron and coal projects are
located (Ofisi ya Taifa ya Ukaguzi, 2022; Jacob, 2018; Pedersen &
Jacob, 2017).
Finally, looking at the performance of STAMICO in terms of trans­
parency and accountability, two critical areas which civil society orga­
nisations have long campaigned for, one realises that resource
nationalism may not provide a better alternative to mainstream inter­
national mining companies. Some studies have shown that there have
been secrecy in agreements and contracts signed as partnerships, private
joint ventures and mineral development agreements between STAMICO
and other companies resulting in non-transparency and lack of
accountability (Lobe et al., 2019). For instance, whereas the former
owner of Tulawaka gold mine, Barrick Gold Corporation, was reportedly
more transparent and accommodative of community concerns, STAM­
ICO which took over the mine has reportedly been perceived by
J. Poncian
communities as non-transparent and non-inclusive in terms of its
engagement with surrounding communities and corporate social re­
sponsibility (Rhee et al., 2018).
6. Conclusion
This paper drew on the case of Tanzania to critically examine
whether resource nationalism has improved Africa’s capacity to manage
and use its natural wealth for socio-economic transformation. Evidence
from Tanzania’s State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) suggests that
resource nationalism has been more of a political tool to silence
dissenting voices within the ruling regime and from the opposition. This
means that resource nationalism, at least in the Tanzanian context, has
consistently been adopted at times during which popular and elite op­
position to mainstream extractive strategy is high. This was the case
during the 1960s when elites within the government were growing
impatient of a private sector led development strategy, thus forcing
President Nyerere to introduce a socialist development strategy which
institutionalised resource nationalism. As the liberal reforms of the
1990s failed to deliver the anticipated benefits from mining and oppo­
sition parties grew stronger in terms of popular appeal and electoral
performance, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) revisited resource
nationalism during the 2005–2017 period.
Arguably, since resource nationalism has usually been politically
motivated, it has not translated into transformed extractive resource
development. State owned enterprises such as STAMICO established
following resource nationalist measures have not lived up to the goals
for which they were established. Lack of funding and capitalisation,
state interference in their functioning, and inability to address negative
consequences of liberalised mining activities are all suggestive of the
inability to resource nationalism to transform the dynamic of mineral
politics in Tanzania. Coupled with inefficiencies in their operations,
practising resource nationalism through state owned enterprises has
actually reproduced such challenges as corruption, rent seeking and
mismanagement. Thus, evidence from the Tanzania case suggests that
there is usually a huge gap between adopting and practising resource
nationalism; resource-rich countries find it fashionable to adopt
resource nationalist measures for political reasons but rarely move into
actualising the measures for improved capacity to harness resources for
socio-economic transformation. These challenges make the sector un­
stable as the government keeps reforming the sector in response to
public outcries: it just becomes one round of resource nationalist reforms
replacing another one without necessarily transforming the political and
economic dynamics of the sector.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Japhace Poncian: Conceptualization, Methodology, Study design,
Formal analysis, Resources, Writing – original draft, Writing – review &
editing, Project administration.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
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