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Global supply chains after COVID-19: the end of the road for neoliberal
globalisation?
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1. Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic
globalization. China’s growing economic and military power had already provoked a bipartisan
determination in the United States to decouple China from US-sourced high technology and
intellectual property and try to force Allies to follow suit. Increasing public and political pressure to
meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance
on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to
strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation. - Niblett (2020)
The recent outbreak of novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has generated enormous
social and economic change. Government responses around the world have been
extraordinary, ranging from financial stimulus packages to unprecedented social
distancing restrictions and bans on international travel. Border closures and mobility
restrictions have been widely credited with restricting the spread of the virus. While
Accounting, Auditing &
The authors would like to sincerely thank James Guthrie and Lee Parker for their encouragement, Accountability Journal
support and insightful comments as well as two anonymous reviewers who contributed significantly to © Emerald Publishing Limited
0951-3574
improving the quality of the paper. DOI 10.1108/AAAJ-06-2020-4634
AAAJ restrictions on movement will likely be relaxed over time, the COVID-19 crisis is likely to have
an enduring impact, especially given that it reinforces a number of trends already in play. The
crisis has prompted questions about the need for business travel, provided political fodder for
nativists favouring greater protectionism and tighter border control, and disrupted
fragmented international supply chains. This article focusses on the latter, examining the
impact of the pandemic on global supply chains and its implications for the future of supply
chain arrangements.
The rise of neoliberalism since the 1970s has dramatically transformed the industrial
practices of countries across the globe. Harvey (2005, p. 2) defines neoliberalism as “a theory
of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade”. According to
this view, the state is assigned a limited economic role: determining property rights, enforcing
contracts and regulating the money supply. A compound of two overused and conceptually
stretched ciphers, [1] the term neoliberal globalisation refers to the complex of ideas and
policies that ideologically underpin international free trade and privatisation initiatives. Key
tenets of neoliberal globalisation include privatising state-owned enterprises and services,
reducing public spending, orienting economies towards export, liberalising investment and
trade, and slashing protectionist subsidies (Bakre et al., 2017; Lehman et al., 2016; Ellwood
and Newberry, 2007). Fostering free trade on an international scale has given rise to a range of
supra-national governing bodies, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as
free trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These
bodies advocate for minimal controls on business, unrestricted foreign investment,
privatisation of state assets, competitive (i.e. low cost, deunionised) and flexible
(temporary, part-time and contract-based) labour markets, and the implementation of
international standards, such as the IFRS (Zhang et al., 2012).
Especially since 1980, the world’s manufacturing production has been increasingly
structured in what has become known as global supply chains (or global value chains). Raw
materials and intermediate goods are now frequently shipped across the globe several times
before final products are exported to final consumers around the world, coordinated by
accounting technologies predicated on global labour arbitrage, cost minimisation, lean
inventory management and tax avoidance (Hopper et al., 2017; Froud et al., 2014; Anderson
and Dekker, 2009). These design, measurement and analysis tools have consolidated global
value chains and a new geography of value creation and capture. China has become the most
important link in many global supply chains – as a large customer of global commodities,
primary manufacturer and assembler and a major consumer marketplace. Foxconn
exemplifies mainland China’s standing as “the world’s factory” producing goods for many
of the world’s best-known electronics companies, including Apple, Sony and Intel [2].
The outbreak of COVID-19 has emphatically highlighted the vulnerabilities of global
supply chains and led to widespread questioning of their future. The precipitous drop in
industrial production in China – a fall of 13.5% in the first two months of 2020 (see Figure 1) –
has ricocheted throughout the globe. While it is still too early to properly quantify the effects
of supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic, the initial decline in production in China
has had a large impact on producers and consumers in countries up and down supply chains
and hastened the decline in Sino-American trade, already underway as a result of ongoing
trade disputes between China and the US.
This paper has two primary aims. The first is to consider how COVID-19 has exposed
vulnerabilities in global supply chains. To this end, the paper traces the key drivers of major
developments in global supply chains and how these are underpinned by the rise and impacts
of neoliberal globalism. Using the Australian automotive sector as a case study, it
demonstrates the way that policy settings in Australia have successively deprioritised
Global supply
chains after
COVID-19
Figure 1.
Industrial production
in China
domestic manufacturing, reflecting trajectories elsewhere in the global north. The second is to
consider likely trajectories for global supply chains as well as their implications for supply
chain accounting (Gold and Heikkurinen, 2018; Free, 2007, 2008; Seal et al., 2004). We present
three broad scenarios for the future of supply chains post-COVID-19. In doing so, we
document a series of supply chain accounting and planning techniques and practices likely to
attract increasing future research interest as firms seek to build resilience in their supply
chains. These include risk management, new supply measures, strategic supply chain
mapping and functional redundancy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the way that neoliberal
globalisation has acted to consolidate manufacturing, particularly unskilled manufacturing,
in the global south. Section 3 presents the Australian car manufacturing sector as a case study,
documenting a series of neoliberal policies that have acted to deprioritise manufacturing in
Australia. This is followed by Section 5, a discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on the future
of neoliberal globalisation and global supply chains. Three different scenarios for the future
are presented in Section 6. Whichever way these scenarios play out, we suggest a series of
supply chain accounting techniques that are likely to garner increasing attention as
organisations prepare for a broader range of disruptive risks. The final section summarises
the major arguments of this paper and presents a series of future research opportunities.
Land-scarce regions
China 45.5 2.3
Other South Asia 22.3 2.2
India 16.1 10.4
Other East Asia 13.4 5.4
Land-scarce OECD 1.1 7.0
Land-abundant regions
Latin America 1.1 3.8
Land-abundant OECD 5.8 6.5
Middle East and North Africa 10.8 1.0
Table 1. Former Soviet sphere 12.5 4.6
Exports by broad Sub-Saharan Africa 14.2 3.4
sector, 1985–2014 World 0.8 3.6
changes Source(s): Wood (2017)
These workers are producing manufacturing goods primarily as part of global supply chains, Global supply
the lead firms of which are based in northern countries. Transnational firms rely on two chains after
methods for accessing global supply chains. The first is foreign direct investment through
subsidiaries. The second is arm’s-length contracts with suppliers in the global south. Much of
COVID-19
the high value-added pre-production (research and development, and design) and
postproduction (marketing, logistics and distribution) segments are retained in developed
countries with developing countries specialising in the lower value-added mass production
segment (Jones et al., 2013; Hopper et al., 2009).
In this way, neoliberal globalisation has promoted transnationalisation of production.
Empirical indicators of the increasing organization of production across borders includes
“the phenomenal increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions; the increasing
transnational interlocking of boards of directorates; the increasingly transnational
ownership of capital shares; the spread of cross-border strategic alliances of all sorts; and
the increasing salience of transnational peak business associations” (Robinson, 2008, p. 30).
As a consequence, workers in different countries have been brought into unprecedented
competition with each other often coordinated through coercive supply chain accounting
practices (Free, 2007). Yet, while northern countries advocate free trade, they can still restrict
it; for example, technological advances foster the global transmission of knowledge and
spawn new producers of technology, but many developing countries do not reap the benefits
because rich countries’ patent and copyright systems restrict developing countries’ access.
Moreover, as Murphy and Willmott (2015) point out, neoliberalism is predicated on the notion
of free market capitalism and the myth that contractual relationships are always between
equals. However, by disaggregating value chain processes into units that can be performed
anywhere in the world without costly regulation, those controlling the strategic configuration
of value chains are able to maximise their share of profit; costs are incurred in low-wage
economies, revenues are realised in high priced markets with profits captured
disproportionately by elites in the global north, in turn leading to growing inequality. It
also produces increased instability and what has been termed “barge economics” (Palley,
2019) as multinational corporations coordinate their production to exploit the lowest possible
wage rates [4]. For the most part, large scale outsourcing of production has resulted in low
wage growth in high-wage economies.
Table 1 reflects broad patterns of changes in the composition of economies throughout the
globe. From 1985 to 2014, manufacturing’s share of exports for the world as a whole was
stable. However, it rose precipitously for developing countries, particularly China (rising by
45.5%) and land-scarce developing nations in Asia with limited primary sector resource
endowments (with a rise of 22.3%). In contrast, manufacturing sectors in organisation for
economic co-operation and development (OECD) countries registered sharp declines in their
global share of manufacturing employment. This structural shift in manufacturing has been
conditioned by education levels, access to primary resources, literacy and government policy.
Overall, this has led to a global pattern of structural change in growing economies whereby
the primary sector’s share of GDP and employment tends to diminish as manufacturing
expands, which subsequently gives way to a larger service sector (Syrquin and Chenery,
1989; Syrquin, 1988).
Accordingly, in terms of manufacturing output, China has been the major beneficiary of
global neoliberalism. In 2003, 8% of the global export of manufacturing came from China; by
2018 it was a staggering 19% (Garcıa-Herrero et al., 2020). China currently produces nearly
30% of manufactured goods, 50% of stainless steel and 80% of printed circuit boards in
smartphones and laptops (Rustici, 2020). Figure 2 shows China’s current amalgamation in
global supply chains across sectors as measured by the Grubel–Lloyd Index (GLI) of intra-
industry trade [5]. Chinese manufacturing is now vital to global supply chains producing
precision instruments, and automotive, communication and equipment machinery.
AAAJ
Figure 2.
China integration in
global supply chains,
by sector
Manufacturing is organised in global supply chains (also known as global value chains),
controlled by multinationals, wherein production is separated into distinct parts, each
representing the transmission of commercial value. The annual sales of multinationals now
represent half of global GDP, and the majority of international trade now occurs within
multinationals (that is, firms trading with themselves). These supply chains are instrumental
in connecting world production, located mainly in the global South, to final consumption in
the global North, with the financial coffers often channelled through tax havens (Sikka, 2010)
by exploiting transfer pricing arrangements (Sikka and Willmott, 2010). General Motors’
supply chain alone comprises over 20,000 businesses worldwide, predominantly in the form
of parts suppliers, located right across the globe. Companies such as Nike and Apple,
headquartered in the US, offshore their production to subcontractors, with production carried
out according to their precise digital specifications under arm’s length contracting, or so-
called non-equity modes of production (Gold and Heikkurinen, 2018; Clarke and Boersma,
2017). Global offshoring of jobs by multinationals has resulted in a substantial employment
shift from the global north to the global south over the last three decades.
Figure 3.
A long-run downward
trend in protectionism:
effective rates of
assistance (ERA)a,
1970–1971 to
2018–2019b
Concomitant with the decline of the automotive industry has been an overall decline in
manufacturing in Australia. Manufacturing’s share of Australia’s GDP peaked in the 1960s at
25%, halving to 13% by 2001–2002 and 10.5% by 2005–2006. Over this period, the state has
intervened to imbue greater market freedoms. High domestic wages are frequently presented
as the reason for the demise of the automotive sector in Australia (Browne-Yung et al., 2020;
Clibborn et al., 2016), but, in fact, Government policy changes were the major driver of the
collapse of the Australian automotive industry (Clibborn et al., 2016, pp. 3, 12–13) pointing to
the decline in industry protection, the weakness of industry policy intervention, and the
commodity boom-induced appreciation of the Australian dollar which placed pressure on
profit margins as key factors. This coincided with policy settings in Asia seen to be hospitable
to international car manufacturers (see Figure 4).
In summary, as the past four decades of the automotive sector in Australia reflect,
neoliberal globalisation has reshaped lives and economies as it has travelled, transferring
thousands of manufacturing jobs from the global north to the global south and concentrating
new centres of production. Accounting calculations and rhetorics have played a pivotal role
in the uptake in the ideas associated with neoliberal globalisation – providing analyses and
projections that galvanise policy positions, inculcating performance measures and loan
covenants employed by the major transnational regulatory bodies and supply chain
accounting techniques that have prioritised low-cost supply and channelled surpluses to the
global north. Since the 1970s, neoliberal ideals of deregulation, privatisation, efficiency and
cost reduction, labour flexibility and free trade have become widely accepted emblems of
sensible and responsible public policy. COVID-19 may be the impetus that fundamentally
disrupts this trajectory.
Figure 4.
Manufacturing share
of GDP in Australia
and medicines has been a rallying cry for self-sufficiency. The pandemic has given rise to
national control of supply in extraordinary ways. Early in the pandemic China did not
authorise mask exports, meaning that even the Chinese production of the American
conglomerate 3M could not be exported to the US. Similarly, the US invoked the Defense
Production Act to prevent 3M from supplying premium masks to Canada and Latin America.
In mid-April, Syria became the 76th country to impose export restrictions on emergency
medical supplies like ventilators and masks (Global Trade, 2020). Concern with self-
sufficiency in relation to medical equipment has, in turn, spilt over to wider concerns about
reliance on international suppliers (IBIS World, 2020).
Moreover, the COVID-19 crisis comes at a time where global neoliberalism is already
under attack from growing nationalist populism. According to Palley (2019), neoliberal
globalisation now confronts severe challenges from “above” and “below”. From below, it is
being confronted by the anger and resentment of working-class voters in developed
economies, manifesting as right-wing populism – Trump in the US, Brexit in the UK and the
emergence of the Alt-right in Europe (e.g. Marie Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the
Netherlands, Nigel Farage in the UK and the Vlaams Belang Party in Belgium) [11]. And in
many ways, the COVID-19 crisis is the perfect fuel for nationalist paranoia; stemming out of
China, with a botched WHO handling of the pandemic, and devastating consequences for
citizens. From above, it is being challenged by a US elite concerned by growing geopolitical
threats [12]. COVID-19 is further straining US–China relations at a time of increasing hostility
between the world’s two largest economies. As the number of COVID-19 deaths has grown
dramatically in the US, Trump has canvassed a range of initiatives, including new tariffs and
sanctions and ordering federal pension funds not to invest in China, that significantly further
undermine geopolitical relations.
The pandemic has emerged as China increasingly seeks to influence geopolitical power
relations and international trade. A central plank of China’s international positioning is the
so-called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an umbrella initiative which encompasses
transportation infrastructure, multilateral financing, and technology transfer between
partner countries to facilitate the flow of goods, investment and people. Since its inception, it
has unleashed an enormous set of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects carried
out by Chinese enterprises in a wide number of countries on the so-called BRI route (as
Figure 5 illustrates, the BRI comprises two parts: (1) the “Belt” – the roads/rails/pipelines in
the regions of Asia and Europe and (2) the Maritime Road – noting that more than 90% of the
AAAJ
Figure 5.
The belt and road
initiative routes
world trade in terms of volume is moved by sea, comprising maritime routes connecting
Southeast Asian nations (Th€ urer et al., 2020). The BRI is focussed on countries in the global
south with high populations but limited international connectivity. Promising to enrich the
economies of China and 65 partner countries, it has the potential to significantly disrupt
global supply chains, deviating trade from traditional routes. It has generated deep
scepticism and concern about China’s expansionist attitude (Kalaria, 2020).
Furthermore, while neoliberal globalisation elevates the market and profit above
environmental considerations (Lehman, 2009), growing recognition of the existential threat
posed by climate change is placing increasing pressure on global supply chains. Climate
change activism is increasingly forcing governments and businesses to focus on the
environmental impacts of neoliberal globalisation. Beyond these forces, there is an increasing
recognition that neoliberal reforms have widened inequality of both wealth and income
internationally between developed and developing states as well as domestically within
Western nations due to less progressive tax systems and less generous social welfare
payments. Fundamentally, are there more important things than economic growth?
Influential post-mortems of neoliberal globalisation are being drafted with increasing
regularity (Palley, 2019; King, 2018). It remains to be seen how COVID-19 acts to hasten anti-
globalist trends. However, at the supply chain level, the pandemic is likely to have far-
reaching effects. In response to COVID-19 national taskforces have been formed in many
nations, including Australia, which have ventilated concerns about reliance on other nation’s Global supply
outputs and called for greater degrees of onshoring. These developments call into question chains after
the sustainability of existing patterns of global supply.
COVID-19
Manufacturing risks These include strikes, accidents and poor working conditions
Transportation risks Disruptions to transportation and logistics as a result of industrial labour action,
accidents or government controls
Financial risks For example, fluctuations in exchange rates, wages and currency
Information risks Examples include IT system breakdowns, information delays and lack of
transparency
Demand risks Sudden surges or collapses in demand, forecasting errors and misinformation
Supply risks Examples include over-reliance on a single supplier or narrow supply base, supplier
disruption and supplier bankruptcy
Macro risks These include things like natural disasters, disease, war and major economic Table 2.
downturns An overview of supply
Source(s): Adapted from Ho et al. (2015) chain risks
AAAJ management, underpinned by more diverse sourcing and digitisation, is likely to be fused into
regular decision-making and planning procedures to facilitate an authentic risk culture that is
receptive and resilient (Ivanov and Dolgui, 2019; Wiengarten et al., 2016).
1. Globalisation trends (1) How have organisations in the global north transformed their global supply
chains post-COVID-19?
(2) How are emerging shifts in geopolitical relations likely to impact neoliberal
policies and global supply chains?
(3) How will China’s Belt and Road Initiative impact global supply chains post-
COVID-19?
2. Risk management (1) How are supply chain risk and opportunity assessments increasing resilience
and efficiency within supply chain management?
(2) What strategies have enabled organisations to reduce the severity of
disruptive global events to their supply chain?
(3) How do firms implement supply chain resilience modelling?
(4) How are digital supply networks created and aligned with an organisations’
business and risk management strategy?
3. Risk analytics (1) How are advanced predictive data analytics and visualisation tools utilised for
real-time risk reporting?
4. Reporting and (1) How do organisations disclose multi-tier global supply chain performance and
assurance risks?
(2) How are organisations utilising and disclosing systematic supplier audits to
monitor, evaluate and report supply chain risks?
5. Emerging (1) How are organisations leveraging emerging technologies such as artificial
technologies intelligence, Big Data, blockchain, process automation, robotics, to protect their
supply chain operations?
(2) How is the adoption of emerging technologies such as Big Data analytics
Table 3. aiding firms in developing supply chain risk resilience from disruptive global
Selected areas for events?
research on global (3) How is Blockchain utilised as a system in highlighting visibility between
supply chains supply chain echelons to prevent supply chain network failure?
First, there has been inadequate attention within accounting research to the relationships
between the organisation of capitalism in global supply chains and geopolitical power
relationships and neoliberal government policies. The primary focus in accounting research
has been on mechanisms for mobilising networks to increase profit and efficiency, in which
considerations of power and politics are largely neglected. Geopolitical tension post COVID-19
and the evolution of China’s BRI initiatives are likely to substantially shape supply chain
accounting in ways that accounting research has not considered to date.
Second, COVID-19 is likely to bring risk management approaches squarely into focus.
Empirical research is essential to understanding emerging risk management methodologies
and measures that seeks to manage the threats of supply chain vulnerability and
downstream supply chain impacts (Ivanov and Dolgui, 2020). Significant monitoring of
supply chain risk measures has the potential to assist decision-makers in real-time
responding to risk. Third, so-called risk analytics – the application of descriptive, predictive
and prescriptive data analytic techniques to supply chain data – is an area likely to garner
increasing attention (Heckmann, 2016).
COVID-19 has created a strong impetus for firms to go back through their supply chains.
A fourth area warranting further researcher attention is the way that companies audit multi-
tier suppliers as well as how reporting boundaries are involved in the definition and
distribution of risks along the supply chain (see Antonini et al., 2020). Finally, creating smart
and nimble supply chains capable of weathering future storms will require innovation.
While technological advances in supply chain management are long-standing (e.g. Free et al.,
2000), documenting new organisational developments that draw upon emerging
technologies frequently grouped together under the umbrella of Smart Manufacturing
and Industry 4.0 – AI, Big Data, blockchain, 3D printing, digital twins, process automation, Global supply
robotics, automated material and transportation systems and predictive tools – is a vital area chains after
for empirical management accounting and supply chain research.
COVID-19
8. Conclusion
Even before the outbreak of COVID-19, neoliberal globalisation was exhibiting signs of ill-
health. In many ways, the pandemic has acted to accelerate trends that were already in
motion, including US–China tension, the politicisation of the free movement of people,
goods and capital across borders and growing advocacy of self-reliance. Many of the key
drivers of globalisation – shipping, capital flows, our understanding of comparative
advantage and economies of scale – will, of course, not disappear into a vacuum. But driven
by a combination of changes in government policies, nativist sentiment and corporate
crisis management planning, it seems likely that neoliberal globalisation will be
transformed.
We expect that COVID-19 is likely to accelerate changes to the trajectory of global supply
chains. While decades of optimisation have enabled businesses to whittle down unit costs
across the supply chain, these gains have come at a cost. COVID-19 has exposed the way that
global supply chains are fundamentally unresponsive to changes in geopolitics or customer
demand. The pandemic is likely to fuel a growing shift for national manufacturing
sovereignty but how wide these localising tendencies run remains to be seen. For now, signals
of post-COVID-19 intent are universally localising. On 12 May 2020, India’s prime minister
Narendra Modi declared that a new era of economic self-reliance in India had begun. Japan’s
stimulus package expressly includes subsidies for companies that repatriate factories from
abroad. Leaders from the European Union have used the language of “strategic autonomy”.
In the US, the Trump administration has urged Intel and others to build plants at home. It has
also instructed its main federal pension fund to stop buying shares in Chinese companies. The
Economist reports that countries representing 59% of world GDP have tightened their rules
on foreign investment this year, in a tangible sign of nation-first politics (The Economist,
2020). These developments coincide with a growing backlash against the increasingly free
flow of information, ideas, money, jobs and people, growing US–China tension and the rise of
nativist populism in much of the global north.
In conclusion, the WHO’s labelling of the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic on 11 March
2020 may also usher a new epoch in international geopolitics. However, this is unlikely to
bring a return to the golden age of national sovereignty and domestic manufacturing. Such a
resurgence generates its own set of risks. Narrow-minded nativism could arrest global trade
and challenge international development progress, as well as undermine international co-
operation at a time when collective action is essential to action on climate change, public
health and mass migration of people fleeing war-torn regions. If nothing else, the COVID-19
crisis illustrates that global cooperation is critical if future pandemics are to be avoided or the
effects of such outbreaks minimised.
Notes
1. The economic, political and cultural dimensions of globalisation are often conflated. The term
neoliberal globalisation highlights political and economic elements – underscoring that
globalisation is a human-made and ideologically driven set of processes.
2. Taiwanese Foxconn Technology Group (Foxconn) is the largest global manufacturer of electronic
components and third largest technology company by revenue, despite no brand of its own and
controversial labour practices. Foxconn’s operating model integrates “large-scale resources of high-
end mass manufacturing of electronic products, extensive networks of supply-chain management
logistics” (L€
uthje and Butollo, 2017, p. 220) with substantial engineering/R&D capacity.
AAAJ 3. To this end, a 1992 OECD study claimed that open international trade would produce by 2002 an
annual gain of US$477bn (in 1992 prices), with US$221bn of that amount accruing to developing
countries (Goldin and Van der Mensbrugghe, 1992).
4. This term draws on former CEO of General Electric Jack Welch’s comments that he would ideally
like to have “every plant you own on a barge” to exploit low cost labour low taxes, subsidies and the
absence of regulatory costs (Palley, 2019).
5. The GLI is calculated on products categorized as manufacturing intermediate inputs (e.g. parts and
components), computed at the industry level (as defined by the 4-digit Harmonized System
classification) and then aggregated at the sectoral level using bilateral trade shares. The GLI is then
used as a proxy, measuring the percentage of a given country’s exports in each industry that is
vulnerable to supply disruption in China (UNCTAD, 2020).
6. The Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme, established in 2001 to encourage
competitive investment, innovation and economic viability, covered up to 15% of the cost of eligible
plant and equipment and 50% of eligible R&D investments.
7. In 2013, Thailand imported the “Ford Territory” vehicle, pricing it at an “unattractive” $100,000 (AU
retail $38,000) with the inclusion of non-tariff duties such as registration fees, pricing it out of the
domestic market despite its free trade agreement with Australia (Allen Consulting Group, 2013).
8. As at May 2020, Thailand government is planning to extend long-term 99-year land leases to foreign
investors.
9. Automotive residents such as GM and Ford in Thailand’s automotive hubs of Rayong/Pathum
Thani have taken advantage of an eight-year corporate tax exemption period, permits to remit
money in foreign currencies (ASEAN Briefing, 2018), land ownership rights and relaxed visa and
permit processes for foreign automobile industry advisers (Tajai et al., 2017).
10. For example, ventures in the industry can be 100% foreign owned and do not require a Vietnamese
national as a director.
11. It should be noted that there are both right-wing and left-wing anti-globalisation activists,
personified by populists of the right such as Trump and the populists of the left such as Bernie
Sanders. Extreme right-wing groups see globalisation as a threat to national economies and
national identity. Right-wing exponents of anti-globalism do not argue in favour of an alternative
globalisation but suggest nationalism and particularism as cures for the problems caused by the
dominant form of globalisation. Supporters of left-wing anti-globalism argue that the capitalist logic
underlying globalisation results in asymmetrical power relations (both domestically and
internationally) and in the treatment of every aspect of life – including health, the environment,
education and culture – as a commodity.
12. Palley (2019) sets out four reasons why neoliberal globalisation has created tension between the
world’s two largest powers, the US and China: (1) globalisation has diminished the US industrial
base; (2) there has been massive technology inflow and expansion of China’s industrial base, both of
which have enhanced China’s military capacity; (3) China has developed a strategic chokehold over
the global supply chain and (4) neoliberal globalisation has been structured to produce large trade
surpluses for China (Palley, 2019), enabling it to accumulate huge foreign exchange reserves that
provide a defensive shield against US financial power and an asset for wooing Allies.
13. Hype relating to the industrial use of new digital technologies in manufacturing currently outstrips
the reality, however important inroads have been made in some sectors. The use of industrial robots
has increased since 2010, concentrated in global north countries (Mayer, 2018). The use of additive
manufacturing has also escalated though frontier 3D-systems, allowing for decentralised batch
production of final goods from multiple materials (Ernst and Young, 2016). These new technologies
are expected to be widely accessible by 2022–2025, drawing sustenance from advances in big data
and cloud computing. Widespread use of artificial intelligence in manufacturing is expected by
2025–2026.
14. For example, Nike has discussed plans to digitize its supply chain and introduce 1,200 automated
machines and near-shoring in the US, thereby reducing lead times from 60 days to approximately
10 days. This would result in substantial cost savings in shipping expenses, import duties and costs Global supply
caused by over-production. It would also generate 30% fewer stages in the production process and
imbue greater resilience (Wilding, 2020). chains after
15. In Australia and elsewhere, modern slavery legislation has been enacted forcing organisations to
COVID-19
undertake supply chain mapping and risk-assessments of their operations and supply chains. The
Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) requires an entity based or operating in Australia with an annual
consolidated revenue of over A$100m to report annually on the risk of modern slavery in its
operations and supply chain; actions taken to assess and address those risks; and the effectiveness
of such actions.
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COVID-19
Corresponding author
Clinton Free can be contacted at: clinton.free@sydney.edu.au
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