ED-130A Guidance for the Use of Portable Electronics Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft

The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
L’Organisation Européenne pour l’Equipement de l’Aviation Civile
GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF PORTABLE

ELECTRONICS DEVICES (PEDS) ON BOARD
AIRCRAFT
This document is the exclusive intellectual and commercial property of EUROCAE.

It is presently commercialised by EUROCAE.
This electronic copy is delivered to your company/organisation for internal use exclusively.
In no case it may be re-sold, or hired, lent or exchanged outside your company.
ED-130A
December 2016
Supersedes ED-130 (2006)
102 rue Etienne Dolet Tel: 33 1 40 92 79 30

92240 MALAKOFF, France Fax: 33 1 46 55 62 65
Web Site: www.eurocae.net Email: eurocae@eurocae.net
GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF PORTABLE
ELECTRONICS DEVICES (PEDS) ON BOARD
AIRCRAFT
This document is the exclusive intellectual and commercial property of EUROCAE.

It is presently commercialised by EUROCAE.
This electronic copy is delivered to your company/organisation for internal use exclusively.
In no case it may be re-sold, or hired, lent or exchanged outside your company.
ED-130A
December 2016
Supersedes ED-130 (2006)
© EUROCAE, 2016
i
FOREWORD
1. This document was prepared jointly by EUROCAE Working Group 99 “Portable

Electronic Devices” and RTCA SC-234 “Portable Electronic Devices”, and was
approved by the Council of EUROCAE on 8 December 2016.
2. EUROCAE is an international non-profit making organisation in Europe.
Membership is open to manufacturers and users of equipment for aeronautics,
trade associations, national civil aviation administrations, and, under certain
conditions, non-European organisations. Its work programme is principally
directed to the preparation of performance specifications and guidance
documents for civil aviation equipment, for adoption and use at European and
world-wide levels.
3. The findings of EUROCAE are resolved after discussion amongst Members of
EUROCAE and in collaboration with RTCA Inc, Washington D.C., and/or the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Warrendale PA, U.S.A., through their
appropriate committees.
4. This document supersedes ED-130 “Guidance for the Use of Portable
Electronics Devices (PEDs) On Board Aircraft” (2006).
The definition of coupling has been deleted out of ED-130A, because they are
now given inside ED-239, section 2.
Spurious emissions from PEDs are now not tackled anymore by operational
procedures as in ED-130, but by demonstrating path losses from typical PED
locations to NAV/COM/SURV receiver interfaces. Values are referenced now in
the new ED-239. The evaluation methods refer to ED-239 section 4.
The aircraft analysis and test methods regarding protection against the
intentional transmissions of PEDs have been simplified, for example is the HIRF
qualification considered a good enough environment to demonstrate both PED
tolerance and HIRF protection. For non HIRF aircraft a test or analysis
methodology is given in section 6 of the document. Also referenced levels for
required equipment protection have been adapted to the HIRF consistent
requirements in ED-239, section 3, due to past experience and for the sake of
consistency.
5. This document is technically identical to RTCA DO-363.
6. EUROCAE performance specifications and other documents are
recommendations only. EUROCAE is not an official body of the European
Governments. Its recommendations are valid as statements of official policy
only when adopted by a particular government or conference of governments.
7. This publication is based on material submitted by various participants during
the SC approval process. Neither the SC nor RTCA has made any
determination whether these materials could be subject to valid claims of
patent, copyright or other proprietary rights by third parties, and no
representation or warranty, expressed or implied is made in this regard. Any
use of or reliance on this document shall constitute an acceptance thereof “as
is” and be subject to this disclaimer.
© EUROCAE, 2016
ii
8. Copies of this document may be obtained from:
EUROCAE
102, rue Etienne Dolet
92240 MALAKOFF
France
Telephone: 33 1 40 92 79 30
Fax: 33 1 46 55 62 65
Email: eurocae@eurocae.net
Website: www.eurocae.net
© EUROCAE, 2016
iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) requested that RTCA, Inc. and EUROCAE form a special
committee to present an up-to-date evaluation of the use of portable electronic
devices (PEDs) on board civil aircraft with emphasis on intentional transmitters such
as mobile phones, wireless RF network devices, and other wireless-enabled devices
such as personal digital assistants (PDAs).
RTCA Special Committee 234 (SC-234) and EUROCAE Working Group 99 (WG-99)
included representatives from consumer electronic, avionics manufacturers, aircraft
manufacturers, airlines, aircraft operators, regulatory agencies, and related industry
associations.
This report addresses the specific Terms of Reference to address aircraft design to
tolerate operation of PEDs. Previous RTCA reports on aircraft interference from PEDs
have emphasized risk assessments and then recommended restrictions on the use of
PEDs on board the aircraft. This report departs from the earlier RTCA reports, and is
directed to aircraft design recommendations that lead to aircraft tolerance to both
intentional RF transmissions and spurious RF emissions from PEDs.
There are two aspects to the aircraft design recommendations in this report. One
aspect defines aircraft system and equipment RF susceptibility qualification
recommendations that provide tolerance to RF from intentionally transmitting PEDs.
This is commonly referred to as protection from PED back door coupling. The
recommendations closely follow existing practices for aircraft system high intensity
radiated field (HIRF) protection. Acceptable test approaches for verifying the aircraft
system RF susceptibility qualification are defined.
The second aspect defines acceptable interference path loss (IPL) between aircraft
radio receivers and PEDs that emit spurious RF. This is commonly referred to as
protection from PED front door coupling. Extensive analysis of measured PED
spurious emissions was performed previously so that the interference path loss
targets are based on statistics of actual PED emissions rather than regulatory
specifications. Interference path loss test methods are defined.
This report also defines recommended approaches for demonstrating tolerance with
aircraft design to meet regulatory requirements including aspects of aircraft alteration
and continued airworthiness.
This report is intended to supersede previous applicable guideline documents RTCA
DO-294 and EUROCAE ED-130. All propositions define are intended to be in line with
the Revision of RTCA DO-307A/ED-239.
© EUROCAE, 2016
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................1

1.2 Scope .........................................................................................................................2
1.3 Definition and Abbreviation ........................................................................................3
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................7
CHAPTER 3 AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANACE ASPECTS ......................................................................9
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 9

3.2 Regulatory Requirements ............................................................................. 11
3.3 PED Operational Guidance .......................................................................... 12
3.4 PED Tolerance Routes ............................................................................................12
3.5 Front Door Coupling Requirement ..........................................................................15
3.6 Back Door Coupling Requirements .........................................................................15
3.6.1 HIRF Tolerant Aircraft ..............................................................................................17
3.6.1.1 Full HIRF Tolerant Aircraft. ...................................................................................18
3.6.1.2 Partial or Non HIRF Tolerant Aircraft. ...................................................................18
3.7 Tracking Devices .....................................................................................................20
3.8 Certification Applicant Supporting Operators ..........................................................20
3.8.1 Supporting Documentation ......................................................................................21
3.8.1.1 Standard Documentation: .....................................................................................21
3.8.1.2 Additional Documentation: ....................................................................................21
3.8.1.3 Supplemental Documentation ...............................................................................22
CHAPTER 4 AIRCRAFT SAFETY ASSESSMENT ...............................................................................24
4.1 Functional Hazard Assessment ...............................................................................24

4.2 Safety Management System (SMS) Approach ........................................................26
4.2.1 Likelihood Assessment ............................................................................................26
4.2.2 Risk Acceptance ......................................................................................................27
4.2.3 Decision Making ......................................................................................................27
4.2.4 Suggested Method ..................................................................................................28
4.3 Systems and Equipment To Meet Front & Back Door Coupling .............................29
4.4 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................29
CHAPTER 5 FRONT DOOR COUPLING DEMONSTRATION ..............................................................30
5.1 Purpose ...................................................................................................................30

5.2 Overview ..................................................................................................................30
5.3 Applicability and Scope ...........................................................................................30
5.4 Approach to Front Door Tolerance ..........................................................................31
5.4.1 Changes to Aircraft that Affect IPL ..........................................................................32
5.4.2 System Safety..........................................................................................................33
5.4.3 Mitigation and Analysis of IPL Data .........................................................................33
5.4.4 Similarity of IPL Measurements to Other Aircraft ....................................................34
5.5 Supporting Documentation ......................................................................................35
5.6 RTCA DO-307A/ED-239 IPL Test Method Lessons Learned .................................35
© EUROCAE, 2016
iii
CHAPTER 6 BACKDOOR COUPLING DEMONSTRATION .................................................................37
6.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................37

6.1.1 Backdoor Coupling Assessment Requirements ......................................................38
6.1.2 High Level Process Summary .................................................................................39
6.2 Backdoor Coupling Assessment Process ...............................................................40
6.2.1 Perform Aircraft Risk Assessment ...........................................................................43
6.2.2 Perform Technologies and frequency band risk evaluation ....................................43
6.2.3 Identify Systems and Equipment Requiring Evaluation ..........................................44
6.2.4 Perform Aircraft Safety Assessment .......................................................................45
6.2.5 Analyze Existing Data ..............................................................................................46
6.2.5.1 Individual equipment qualification or laboratory tests ...........................................46
6.2.5.2 Using Existing Results ..........................................................................................46
6.2.5.3 Part Similarity ........................................................................................................47
6.2.5.4 Similarity Across Airframes ...................................................................................47
6.2.6 Prepare and Conduct A/C Testing...........................................................................48
6.2.7 Perform Final Risk Assessment ..............................................................................48
6.2.7.1 Identify Risk Acceptance Level .............................................................................48
6.2.7.2 Establish Continued Airworthiness Requirements ................................................49
6.2.7.3 Implement Monitoring and Control Program .........................................................49
6.3 Methods for Aircraft Testing ....................................................................................50
6.3.1 Technology-specific test point determination ..........................................................51
6.3.2 PED Tolerance Test signal definition ......................................................................52
6.3.3 Systems under Test .................................................................................................53
6.3.4 Test Locations .........................................................................................................53
6.3.5 Zonal Test ................................................................................................................53
6.3.6 Local Test ................................................................................................................54
6.3.7 Test Equipment .......................................................................................................54
6.3.8 Regulatory Aspects .................................................................................................55
6.3.9 Test Execution .........................................................................................................55
6.3.10 Zonal Test ................................................................................................................56
6.3.11 Local Test ................................................................................................................56
6.3.12 Test Documentation ................................................................................................56
6.3.12.1 RF Exposure Safety Precaution .........................................................................56
6.3.12.2 Test Equipment Calibration ................................................................................57
6.3.12.3 Test Conditions & Environment ..........................................................................57
6.3.13 Post-Test .................................................................................................................57
6.3.13.1 Post Test Analysis ..............................................................................................57
6.3.13.2 Troubleshooting and Mitigations ........................................................................58
6.3.13.3 Risk Assessment Validation Criteria ..................................................................59
6.4 Deliverables .............................................................................................................59
CHAPTER 7 SUSTAINING AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANCE .................................................................60
7.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................60

7.1.1 Background and Challenges ...................................................................................61
7.1.2 Sustaining Aircraft PED Tolerance ..........................................................................61
7.1.3 Factors on PED Tolerance ......................................................................................61
7.1.4 PED Tolerance and Continued Airworthiness .........................................................62
7.1.5 Impact on Configuration Management ....................................................................62
7.2 Alteration Considerations ........................................................................................62
7.2.1 Additional Alteration Considerations .......................................................................62
7.3 General Maintenance ..............................................................................................63
7.3.1 Maintaining Front Door Coupling PED Tolerance - Evaluating Maintenance
Actions .................................................................................................................... 63
7.3.2 Maintaining Back Door Coupling PED Tolerance - Evaluating Maintenance
Actions .................................................................................................................... 66
© EUROCAE, 2016
iv
7.4 Configuration Management .....................................................................................70

7.4.1 Experience and Best Practices................................................................................70
7.4.2 Industry Demands ...................................................................................................71
7.4.3 Range of PED Tolerance Analysis ..........................................................................72
7.4.4 Affected Aircraft Configuration.................................................................................72
7.4.5 Guidance for Configuration Management for Sustained PED Tolerance ...............73
7.4.5.1 Sustaining PED Tolerance ....................................................................................73
7.4.5.2 Transferability of PED Tolerance Substantiation Results .....................................74
7.4.6 Guidance for Configuration Management Documentation ......................................74
7.4.6.1 Suggested Approaches: ........................................................................................74
7.4.6.2 Alternate Documentation Approach: .....................................................................75
7.5 Operational Considerations .....................................................................................75
7.5.1 Non-Technical Operations Aspects .........................................................................76
7.5.2 Continuing Consideration of Non-Technical Operations Aspects ...........................76
7.5.3 Technical Operations Aspects .................................................................................76
7.5.4 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness – Necessitated for PED Tolerance .........77
7.5.5 Safety Program Data Collection and Reporting – Necessitated for PED
Tolerance ........................................................................................................... 77
CHAPTER 8 MEMBERSHIP...................................................................................................................78
APPENDIX A SMS EXAMPLES. ........................................................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B 2X.1309. ........................................................................................................................... B-1
APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF WHEN PEDS CAN BE USED ............................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D ADDITIONAL OEM DOCUMENTATION ........................................................................ D-1
APPENDIX E ASSESSMENT OF THE FIELD STRENGTH GENERATED BY INTENTIONAL

TRANSMITTERS………………………………………………………………………… ........ E-1
APPENDIX F PREPARING AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE INTENTIONAL RADIO EMISSION OF

PEDS………………………………………………………………………………………... ...... F-1
APPENDIX G EXEMPLARY PROCEDURE FOR FUNCTIONAL AIRCRAFT TESTING… .................. G-1
APPENDIX H INDEX OF DEFINITIONS………………………………………… ....................................... H-1
APPENDIX I INDEX OF REFERENCES………………………………………………... ........................... I-1
IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTION FORM
© EUROCAE, 2016
v
TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1-1: Appendix Cross Reference .......................................................................................................... 2
Table 3-1: FAA PED Regulations and Guidance ........................................................................................ 11
Table 3-2: EASA PED Regulations and Guidance ...................................................................................... 11
Table 3-3: Back Door Demonstration Methods ........................................................................................... 16
Table 3-4: Example of Equipment/System Additions For PED Tolerant Aircraft ........................................ 17
Table 3-5: FAA Amendment Levels ............................................................................................................ 17
Table 3-6: EASA CS Amendment Levels .................................................................................................... 18
Table 6-1: Back-Door Coupling Paths ......................................................................................................... 37
Table 6-2: Detailed Explanations to Figure 6-1 ........................................................................................... 40
Table 6-3: Example Output from Aircraft Safety Assessment ..................................................................... 45
Table 6-4: Frequency ranges for full PED tolerant aircraft .......................................................................... 52
Table 6-5: CW test signal power for full PED tolerant aircraft ..................................................................... 52
Table 6-6: Pulse Test Signal Power for Full PED Tolerant Aircraft ............................................................. 52
Table 6-7: Example RF exposure limits ...................................................................................................... 57
Table A-1: Front Door Risk Assessment ................................................................................................. A-12
Table E-1: Evaluated wireless communication standards ......................................................................... E-1
Table E-2: Pulse, amplitude modulated standards ................................................................................... E-5
Table E-3: Radiated power and resulting waveforms for pulse, amp, modulated standards .................... E-6
Table E-4: Radiated power and resulting waveforms for pulse, amp. modulated standards
(continuation) ................................................................................................................... E-7
Table E-5: FDMA/CDMA (CW-like) standards ........................................................................................ E-11
Table E-6: Radiated power and waveforms for FDMA/CDMA (CW-like) standard ................................. E-12
Table E-7: Radiated power and waveforms for FDMA/CDMA (CW-like) standard (continuation) .......... E-13
Table E-8: Frequency ranges for full PED tolerant aircraft ..................................................................... E-24
Table E-9: CW test signal power for full PED tolerant aircraft ................................................................ E-24
Table E-10: Pulse test signal power for full PED tolerant aircraft ........................................................... E-24
Table F-1: MEF / dB according to number of sources and minimal distance d between them,
12 dB is covering all scenarios. ....................................................................................... F-2
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Document Overview .................................................................................................................... 1
Figure 3-1: Section Overview ...................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 3-2: General Overview Of Front Door PED Tolerance ..................................................................... 13
Figure 3-3: General Overview Of Back Door PED Tolernace ..................................................................... 14
Figure 3-4: Example Of FAA TCDS Showing Initial TC Date ...................................................................... 19
Figure 3-5: Example Of FAA Partial Tolerant Aircraft ................................................................................. 19
Figure 3-6: Example Of FAA SC Tolerant Aircraft....................................................................................... 19
Figure 5-1: Establishing Front Door Tolerance ........................................................................................... 31
Figure 6-1: Process Overview for Aircraft Backdoor Compatiblity Assessment ......................................... 39
Figure 6-2: Backdoor Coupling Assessment Flow Chart ............................................................................ 42
Figure 6-3: Final Risk Assessment Process ................................................................................................ 48
Figure 6-4: Aircraft Backdoor Test Options ................................................................................................. 51
Figure 6-5: Example for Test Setup ............................................................................................................ 55
Figure 7-1: High Level Flow Chart Overview of Section 7 .......................................................................... 60
Figure 7-2: Maintaining Front Door Coupling PED Tolerance ..................................................................... 64
Figure 7-3: Maintaining Back Door Coupling PED Tolerance ..................................................................... 67
Figure A-1: Flight Phases ........................................................................................................................ A-11
Figure E-1: Test waveform for standards using TDMA or CSMA/FHSS schemes ................................... E-9
Figure E-2: CW-waveform for standards providing no pulse modulation ................................................ E-14
Figure E-3: Field strength levels onto EUT for worst-case scenario for pulse-modulated T-PED
signals including 6dB margin ......................................................................................... E-16
Figure E-4: Field strength levels onto EUT for CW-like T-PED signals including 6dB margin ............... E-17
Figure E-5: Power levels at a 0.1 m distance between test antenna and EUT for pulse
modulated (TDMA) T-PED signals including 6dB margin ............................................. E-18
© EUROCAE, 2016
vi
Figure E-6: Power levels at a 0.1 m distance between test antenna and EUT for CW-like
(FDMA) T-PED signals including 6dB margin ............................................................... E-19
Figure E-7: Derived radiated field strength levels for pulse-modulated (TDMA) T-PED signals
including 6 dB margins for laboratory equipment qualification ...................................... E-20
Figure E-8: Derived radiated field strength for CW like (FDMA) T-PED signals including 6 Db
margins for laboratory equipment qualification ............................................................. E-21
Figure E-9: Derived radiated power levels for 0.1m distance between test antenna and EUT
for pulse-modulated (TDMA) T-PED signals including 6 dB margins for
laboratory equipment qualification ................................................................................. E-22
Figure E-10: Derived radiated power levels for 0.1m distance between test antenna and EUT
for CW-like (FDMA) T-PED signals including 6 dB margins for laboratory
equipment qualification .................................................................................................. E-23
© EUROCAE, 2016
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The PED ARC (Aviation Rulemaking Committee) established in 2013 made
recommendations to clarify and provide guidance on allowing PEDs usage from gate
to gate without compromising the continued safe operation of the aircraft. This lead to
the creation of the FAA operation guidance, see Appendix C. On EASA side, specific
acceptable means of tolerance and guidance material to allow PED operation gate-to-
gate can be found in TABLE 3-2. The guidance contained in these FAA and EASA
references are only intended for operational approval, they do not cover methods
acceptable for aircraft certification.
This report includes some of the ARC’s recommendations for allowing additional PED
usage on airplanes as well as expanding on the operational guidance. It also provides
additional methods for demonstrating PED tolerance. This document supplements
existing guidance provided in DO-307 (and later revisions) / ED-239 (and later
revisions), updates the previous ED-130 and supersedes DO-294. An overview of the
document is provided in FIGURE 1-1.
(Section 1) Introduction, Scope and Definitions
(Section 2) Background
A/C PED Tolerance Aspects

(Section 3.1 & 3.2) - Regulatory Requirements &
Certification Basis of A/C -
Define PED Compliance Routes

(Section 3.3) (in accordance with Appendix C)
Front Door Back Door
Perform Safety Assessment

- Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)
(Section 4)
or
Safety Management System (SMS)
Demonstrate Demonstrate
(Section 5) Front Door Back Door (Section 6)
Compliance Compliance
(Section 7) Sustaining Aircraft PED Tolerance
*) Depending on the permit of PED usage, both routes shall be

considered
FIGURE 1-1: DOCUMENT OVERVIEW
© EUROCAE, 2016
2
The existing guidance from DO-307 (and later revisions)/ED-239 (and later revisions),
DO-294 and previous ED-130 have been referenced several times within this report.
These references have to be recognized in two different manners. First, in a historical
context referencing to documents in place at the time of issuance of this report and
second as a link to this report when activities could result from this reference.
The ED-130A document will have Appendices that match the DO-363. The
Appendices are formatted differently from ED-130 and TABLE 1-1 provides cross
reference between ED-130 and the new ED-130A / DO-363. Information of Annex’s
not listed are given in the main report is considered to be outdated.
TABLE 1-1: APPENDIX CROSS REFERENCE
ED-130 ED-130A/DO-363
ANNEX 2 - “ASSESSMENT OF THE FIELD Appendix E

STRENGTH GENERATED BY INTENTIONAL
TRANSMITTERS”
ANNEX 5 - “PREPARING AIRCRAFT TESTING Appendix F

AGAINST THE INTENTIONAL RADIO EMISSION
OF PED”
ANNEX 6 – “PROCEDURE FOR FUNCTIONAL Appendix F

AIRCRAFT TESTING”
ANNEX 7 - “AIRCRAFT TESTING EXAMPLE Appendix F

TEST PROCEDURE”
ANNEX 9 - “INDEX OF DEFINITIONS” Appendix F
ANNEX 10 - “INDEX OF REFERENCES” Appendix F
1.2 SCOPE
This report provides specific recommendations for operators as well as certification
applicants performing aircraft Type Certificate (TC), Supplemental Type Certificate
(STC) and Amended Type Certificate (ATC) to show how aircraft avionics and
electrical system can be tolerant to the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs)
throughout various phases of flight. The aircraft design guidance meeting regulatory
requirements address any kind of PEDs, including transmitting PEDs Although
throughout this document the word Applicant is used, the guidance in this document is
applicable to STC/TC/ATC applicants and Operators. It is acknowledged that per the
regulation in TABLE 3-1 & TABLE 3-2 that no CFR 14 Part 23/25/27/29 and EU
Regulation 965/2012 regulatory approval is required for in-flight use of PEDs.
The report recommends specific RF immunity requirements for aircraft systems that
are exposed to PED intentional RF transmissions (back door coupling) and specific
Interference Path Loss requirement for those radio systems that can be vulnerable to
PED spurious emissions through antennas (front door coupling). The front door
coupling is essentially unchanged from previous guidance produced in DO-307, with
additional guidance provide for similarity. Additional guidance is provided related to
meeting regulatory requirements is discussed in section CHAPTER 3 that needs to be
considered when complying with aircraft PED tolerance. For aircraft that successfully
meet the requirements in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this report, aircraft operators will have
high assurance that the aircraft electrical and avionics systems will have and maintain
aircraft PED tolerance even in critical phases of flight.
© EUROCAE, 2016
3
This guidance, nor current FAA/EASA policy, recommend mandatory requirements for
aircraft PED interference tolerance. It does provide standard methods to demonstrate
aircraft PED tolerance. It is highly recommended that PED tolerance is demonstrated
for aircraft that are intended to be operated as air carriers (e.g. FAA Part 121).
When the recommendation of this document is followed, it provides control of
interference to avionics and electrical system from the operation of PEDs. The EMC
tolerance aspect for a new wireless system installation that enables transmitting PEDs
should be certified on an aircraft under a TC/STC/ATC. Methods from aircraft level
testing from section CHAPTER 6 can supplement EMC demonstration for the installed
wireless service.
When demonstrating aircraft PED tolerance, the following items are considered to be
out of scope for this document:
1. Operational aspects of PED use that are related to crew procedures and
stowage Guidance for this can be found in, FAA InFO 13010 and InFO
13010SUP, EASA Annex to Decision 2014/029/R, Part-CAT AMC/GM Issue 2,
Amendment 1 and ICAO Circular 340 AN/198 for example.
2. Interference to terrestrial communication networks and spectrum licensing is not
addressed. Similarly, health concerns are not a subject of this document.
3. Country specific telecommunication regulations that disallow the use of PEDs
on aircraft (e.g. the case of FCC with cell phones).
4. Country or region specific telecommunication regulation and certification
requirements for Short Range Devices (SRDs) in terms of used frequencies,
radiated power and operational modes.
1.3 DEFINITION AND ABBREVIATION
The terms defined in this section are important terms used in this document.
ACSTC—Aircraft Supplemental Type Certificate
Amended Type Certificate (ATC)—A type certificate which has received FAA approval
to modify the aircraft design from its original design. An ATC approves not only the
modification, but also how that modification affects the original design.
Approved Aircraft Configuration –The aircraft configuration, including modifications, an
authority has approved design and substantiation data as part of a certification
process. PEDs are not included in the Approved Aircraft Configuration.
Back Door Coupling—PED radio frequency transmissions that are radiated within the
aircraft and received by aircraft electronic systems through their interconnecting wires
or electronic equipment enclosures.
Cargo Tracking Device—PEDs that are designed for use on aircraft in locations
inaccessible to the flight crew during flight.
CFR—Code of Federal Regulations
Certification Review Item (CRI)—EASA documentation that is used to track and record
the resolution of a certification subject which requires clarification or interpretation or
represents a major technical or administrative issue.
CMM—Component Maintenance Manual
Controlled Portable Electronic—A controlled PED (C-PED) is a PED subject to
administrative control by the operator using it. This will include, inter alia, tracking the
allocation of the devices to specific aircraft or persons and ensuring that no
unauthorized changes are made to the hardware, software or databases. A controlled
PED will also be subject to procedures to ensure that it is maintained to the latest
amendment state. CPEDs can be assigned to the category of non-intentional
transmitters (PEDs) or intentional transmitters (T-PEDs).
CRC—Crew Rest Compartment. In the CRC PEDs can be use by the crew (flight crew
and/or cabin crew)
© EUROCAE, 2016
4
Critical Phases of Flight

Fixed Wing: Critical phases of flight include the take-off run, the take-off flight
path, the final approach, the missed approach, the landing, including the landing
roll, and any other phases of flight as determined by the pilot-in-command or
commander.
Rotorcraft: Critical phases of flight include taxiing, hovering, takeoff, final
approach, missed approach, the landing and any other phases of flight as
determined by the pilot-in-command or commander.
EASA—European Aviation Safety Agency
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration
FIN—Tail Number
Front Door Coupling—PED radio frequency emissions that are radiated within the
aircraft, and received by aircraft radio receivers through their antennas installed on the
aircraft.
FHA—Functional hazard assessment. A systematic, comprehensive examination of
airplane and system functions to identify failure classifications minor, major,
hazardous, and catastrophic for various failure conditions that may arise as a result of
a malfunction or a failure to function. The definition of failure classifications is shown in
Appendix B section B.1.
GA—General Aviation.
Gate to Gate—phases of flight including taxing into and out of the gate area.
GSM—Global System for Mobile Communications. This is a European
telecommunications standard
High Energy Radiated Fields (HERF). See HIRF also.
High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)—Electromagnetic environment that exists from
the transmission of high power RF energy into free space. This also referred to has
HERF and Radio Frequency Energy Protection in various certification materials.
HMI—Human Machine Interface
Full HIRF Tolerant Aircraft— Aircraft that met HIRF requirements at its initial TC
In Flight Entertainment— Entertainment available to aircraft passengers during a flight.
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA)—provides a way to keep products
airworthy. ICA provide documentation of required methods, inspections, processes,
and procedures. The ICA must contain information on each item or part, as
appropriate, installed on the product.
Intentional Emissions—(also: intentional radiation) Emissions that are intentionally
generated by the devices. These emissions are useful signals with well-defined
characteristics, emitted for communication and command purposes. The intentional
emissions from transmitting PEDs occur in licensed frequency bands, allocated by the
international and national telecommunication authorities
IPC—Illustrated Parts Catalog
IPL—Interference Path Loss - The amount of energy lost traveling from the PEDs
inside the aircraft to the aircraft radio receiver.
Issue paper—provides a means for identifying and resolving significant technical,
regulatory, and administrative issues occurring during the FAA certification process.
Local Testing—Part-specific isolation testing with test equipment targeting individual
parts installed in the aircraft, similar to ED-14 / DO-160 Section 20 test setup, but on
the aircraft.
LTE—Long-Term Evolution, commonly marketed as 4G LTE, is a standard
for wireless communication of high-speed data for mobile phones and data terminals.
May—The use of this term indicates an implementation characteristic that is
permissible and completely left to the vendor’s decision.
© EUROCAE, 2016
5
Medical Portable Electronic Device (M-PED)—A PED that is medically necessary to

support physiological functions, such as automated external defibrillators (AED),
airborne patient medical tele monitoring (APMT) equipment, and portable oxygen
concentrators. Medical equipment necessary to support physiological functions may
be used at all times and does not need to be switched-off.
MRO—An organization responsible for Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul of aircraft
and/or aircraft parts. In typically vernacular, an MRO is a separate entity from an air
carrier’s maintenance organization.
Non-PED Tolerant Equipment List—A list which identifies the aircraft equipment (at
part number level) that has been determined not to be PED tolerant. As defined in
section 3.8.1.
Non-HIRF Tolerant Aircraft—An aircraft that has no HIRF regulations or Special
Conditions listed on the TCDS/STC.
NFC—Near Field Communication. It is a set of protocols that enable two electronic
devices, one of which is usually a portable device such as a smartphone or tablets, to
establish RF wireless radio data communication with each other. Typically, the
devices must be within 20 cm of each other. NFC capability is found in many in-seat
IFE systems.
Operator—The entity authorized by the FAA for air carrier operations conducted under
regulations in per TABLE 3-1 & TABLE 3-2. For non-air carrier operations, the
Operator is the Pilot In Command.
Partial-HIRF Tolerant Aircraft—An aircraft where initial TC was non HIRF tolerant
however various upgrade of electrical and avionics systems may have picked up HIRF
regulations or Special Conditions/CRIs.
PED—Portable Electronic Device
PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer
electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of
the cargo and that are not included in the approved aircraft configuration. All
equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under this definition. The
electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or
non-rechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power
sources.
PEDs include the following two categories:
(1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions,
sometimes referred to as spurious emissions. This category includes, but is not
limited to, calculators, cameras, radio receivers, audio and video players,
electronic games and toys; when these devices are not equipped with a
transmitting function.
(2) Intentional transmitters can radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as
part of their intended function. In addition, they may radiate non-intentional
transmissions like any PED. The term ‘transmitting PED’ (T-PED) is used to
identify the transmitting capability of the PED. Intentional transmitters are
transmitting devices such as RF-based remote control equipment, which may
include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as ‘private mobile
radio’), mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computers with mobile
phone data connection wireless local area network (WLAN) or Bluetooth
capability. After deactivation of the transmitting capability, e.g. by activating the
so-called ‘flight mode’ or ‘flight safety mode’, the T-PED remains a PED having
non-intentional emissions.
PED Immunity—System is considered to have PED immunity when it is not
susceptible to the RF energy emitted by PEDs.
PED-relevant part—A component/LRU part number identified in, the IPC, see
section 7.4.4.
PED Tolerance—Equipment or system is PED tolerant when it is demonstrated
through analysis and test that the installed equipment or system is not adversely
affected by RF energy emitted by PEDs.
© EUROCAE, 2016
6
PED-Tolerant Equipment List—A list which identifies the aircraft equipment (at a part
number or system level) that has been determined to be PED tolerant. As defined in
section 3.8.1.
RFID—Radio Frequency Identification
Shall—The use of this term indicates a requirement.
Should—The use of this term indicates a characteristic that is highly recommended
but is not required.
SMS—Safety Management System
STC—Supplemental Type Certificate. This is an amendment to the type certificate of
an aircraft that is usually by a certification applicant other than the original
manufacturer of the aircraft.
Spurious Emissions—(also: unintentional or non-intentional emissions / radiation)
Emissions that are non-intentionally emitted, and result from the internal electrical
operation of the devices. These emissions represent energy that is wasted from the
devices. All PEDs radiate low-level spurious emissions as a consequence of their
internal electrical operation.
TC—Type Certificate
TSO—Technical Standard Order
Tracking Devices—Wireless devices used to monitor the cargo being transported on
board the aircraft. Examples of these devices include RF ID, data loggers and
electronic bag tags.
Type Certificate Data Sheets (TCDS)—A formal description of the aircraft, engine or
propeller. It lists limitations and information required for type certification including
airspeed limits, weight limits, thrust limitations, etc. It provides the certification basis
for each aircraft model listed on the TCDS.
TCDS can be viewed on EASA website https://easa.europa.eu/document-library/type-
certificates for example and FAA website
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFra
meset
UMTS—Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems. Mobile cellular system for
networks based on GSM.
Zonal Testing—Testing performed to illuminate aircraft zones and cover all parts
installed within the zones. Typical zones include the cockpit/flight deck, cargo areas,
avionics bays and cabin sections.
© EUROCAE, 2016
7
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Portable electronic devices, hereinafter referred to as “PED” or “PEDs”, that may be

carried by passengers and crewmembers on board aircraft are seen as a necessity by
passengers for comfort and business needs and therefore there is a high expectation
that the airlines allow and the aircraft tolerate their use during flight. These PEDs are
becoming smaller, have powerful complex computing capability, and incorporate many
features and functions, including the ability to communicate wirelessly such as
Wireless LAN, Bluetooth, NFC and Cellular. In addition to the hand held PEDs there
are devices on board the aircraft such as cargo tracking devices, data loggers, RFID
and electronic bag tags which might need special consideration.
PEDs are understood as any kind of portable electronic device, typically but not limited
to consumer electronics. However, PEDs are not considered parts of the approved
aircraft configuration since they are not considered to be installed equipment in the
aircraft. Any portable equipment that is able to consume electrical energy generally
falls under the PED definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal
sources, such as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or external power
sources such as power outlets in aircraft cabins. All these PEDs are commonly
considered a “PED“, i.e. there is no distinction between non-transmitting PED,
Transmitting-PED, Controlled Portable Electronic Device (C-PED), Medical Portable
Electronic Device (M-PED), etc. Any equipment that consumes electrical energy will
also radiate radio frequency (RF) noise. This RF noise, along with any intention PED
transmitting radio frequencies, has the potential to interfere with the aircraft electrical
and avionics systems.
The industry has struggled to develop consistent and cost effective processes to
manage PED tolerance of an aircraft due to the ever changing nature of the
technology, as well as actual threat. A few of the biggest challenges involve aircraft
equipment configuration control as well as maintaining compatibility with changes to
wireless and cellular technologies. Most airlines operate aircraft containing a wide
range of different part numbers with fleets comprising of planes delivered between
various aircraft OEM effectivity blocks. In addition, avionics-equipment manufacturers
constantly upgrade equipment designs throughout a system’s evolution, e.g. parts
obsolescence.
Airlines operators are also offered several interchangeable part options that may not
be stocked within the airline’s inventories. This creates an enormous burden to
evaluate all equipment and sustain the aircraft’s PED tolerance.
Initial aircraft PED tolerance guidance, given in RTCA DO-294, DO-307A/ED-239 and
EUROCAE ED-130 documents, does not include the latest information available. Also
industry experience in dealing with PED requirements over the past decade and
beyond has evolved.
Therefore, existing guidance was considered outdated or inconsistent, and needed to
be updated especially with respect to:
1. MRO and operator concerns about procedures
2. New PED radio standards and technologies (RFID, UMTS, LTE, LTE adv, NFC
etc.)
3. FAA and EASA approach for gate-to-gate use of PED
4. IPL requirement for instrument landing systems
5. Guidance for continuous airworthiness
6. EMC of wireless services
7. Harmonization of backdoor requirement with HIRF certification requirements.
© EUROCAE, 2016
8
RTCA Special Committee SC-234 and EUROCAE Working Group WG-99 were
tasked to publish a more up to date aviation industry accepted guidance and best
practices to ensure aircraft is PED tolerant for the life of the aircraft and to streamline
the process to help some of the challenges mentioned above.
The members of the SC-234 and WG-99 have taken into consideration the following
aspects in particular to develop such guidance:
1. Industry experience with expanded passenger PED use and with in-flight
wireless services and their integration from an EMC point-of-view.
2. Improved/increased knowledge about the functioning of wireless-radio
transmission technologies, including realistic and probabilistic evaluation
approaches.
3. Advancements in avionics systems with respect to electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC).
4. Existing regulatory authorities’ policy documents on expanding passenger PED
use on aircraft.
5. Harmonization by publishing technically equivalent RTCA and EUROCAE
documents.
6. The FAA PED Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) Report (9/30/13).
© EUROCAE, 2016
9
CHAPTER 3
AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANACE ASPECTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This section outlines guidance for aircraft that will allow use of PEDs throughout
various phases of flight, refer to FIGURE 3-1. The current FAA and EASA regulatory
requirements for the control of PED interference is contained within the operating
rules, such as those identified in section 3.2. While the operators are primarily
responsible for meeting PED tolerance, the STCs and TCs can also use this guidance
and establish PED tolerant aircraft as part of the TC or STC that would support
operator tolerance. The necessary equipment/system qualifications (for back door
coupling) as well as aircraft assessment of radio receiver’s immunity to spurious
emissions (front door coupling) can all be achieved as part of the STC or TC process
under 2X.1309 (a).
When the TC/ATC/STC certification applicant is installing a new wireless system then
the certification applicant is responsible to make sure the installed system does not
interfere with aircraft avionics and electrical systems (electromagnetic compatibility). In
addition to this per the current FAA policy statement (at the time of release of this
document) and per EASA project specific Certification Review Item (CRI) the
certification applicant is required to meet aircraft back door tolerance also for
transmitting PEDs intended for use with the installed wireless system. The necessary
aircraft front door tolerance for transmitting PEDs that will be communicating with the
installed wireless service is the responsibility of the operator under the rules identified
in TABLE 3-1 & TABLE 3-2. The front and back door PED (includes both intentional
and unintentional) tolerance can be achieved by the use of the guidance in this
document. Furthermore, front door PED tolerance can also be achieved by restricting
the use of transmitting PEDs during critical phases of flight. The restriction can be
requiring transmitting PEDs to be in airplane mode or by turning them off. No
restriction is necessary in regards to back door effects for unintentional transmitting
PEDs.
Electromagnetic compatibility between installed wireless systems and other aircraft
systems, as required by 14 CFR Part 23.1431, 25.1353, 25.1431, 27.1351, 29.1353 &
29.1431 is not within the scope of this guidance. Methods from aircraft level testing
from section CHAPTER 6 can supplement EMC demonstration for the installed
wireless service
The guidance is limited to PED tolerance and does not deal with the operational
aspect required for things such as stowage, PED identification, and any other crew
operating requirements.
Equipment and systems that have failure modes that are classified as Major,
Hazardous or Catastrophic, and Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder are
candidates for needing to be PED tolerant. Equipment that have failure conditions that
are classified as Minor and lower does not need to meet the PED tolerance
requirement. The failure classifications should be derived from the safety assessment
performed for the aircraft. The PED tolerance should be to intentional transmitters for
backdoor coupling and spurious emissions via front door coupling of radio receivers
depending on the use of PEDs during critical phases of flight.
When the aircraft has demonstrated PED tolerance by meeting requirements
DO-307A/ED-239 for backdoor and front door coupling requirements the aircraft is
considered to be PED tolerant for all types of PEDs. In some cases, only specific
PED technology will be demonstrated (e.g. only Wi-Fi) and the aircraft will then be
considered as PED tolerant for that specific technology. There may be other reasons
for airliners restricting the use of PEDs as a result of operational/local regulatory
requirements. These considerations fall into other operational aspect of PED tolerance
and is considered to be outside the scope of this document.
© EUROCAE, 2016
10
The primary method for PED tolerance is meeting the backdoor and front door
coupling requirements described in this document. In addition, continued airworthiness
needs to be considered for continuing to meet PED tolerance for the service life of the
aircraft. Sustained PED tolerance is applicable to both new equipment being installed
as well as the impact to existing PED tolerant equipment.
(Section 3) Aircraft PED Tolerance Aspects
(Section 3.1 & 3.2) Regulatory Requirements &

Certification Basis
(Section 3.3)
Front Door Back Door
DO-307()/ DO307()/ YES
YES ED-239() ED-239()
Tolerant A/C and/or full
& HIRF & No
No Change Change
to A/C Sustain Aircraft
Sustain Aircraft
PED Tolerance PED Tolerance
Section 7 NO NO Section 7
Perform System Perform System Safety

(Section 4.1/4.2)
Safety Assessment When
Assessment required by Section 6
ssessment
(SMS)
(Section 4.3.1/4.3.2) List of Receivers List of Equipment to

with Criticality Be Tested for Back
>=MAJ Door Coupling
(Section 3.4/3.5) Demonstrate Front Demonstrate Back

Door Tolerance Door Tolerance
Section 5 Section 6
(Section 3.7) Certification Applicant Supporting Operators
FIGURE 3-1: SECTION OVERVIEW
© EUROCAE, 2016
11
3.2 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

Use of portable electronic devices on board aircraft is governed by aircraft operating
regulations, not the aircraft airworthiness regulations. TABLE 3-1 lists the FAA
regulations and guidance that address use of portable electronic devices. TABLE 3-2
lists the EASA regulations and guidance for the use of portable electronic devices.
Currently there are no specific aircraft certification regulations that address portable
electronic devices.
In FAA regulations 14 CFR 121.306 and 135.144, acceptable PED use must be
determined by the aircraft operator, which for these regulations is the air carrier
certificated under part 119. Under 14 CFR Part 125.204, the operating certificate
holder must determine acceptable PED use. For general aviation operations, 91.21
states: In the case of an aircraft operated by a holder of an air carrier operating
certificate or an operating certificate, the determination [of acceptable PED use]
required by paragraph (b)(5) of this section shall be made by that operator of the
aircraft on which the particular device is to be used. In the case of other aircraft, the
determination may be made by the pilot in command or other operator of the aircraft.
TABLE 3-1: FAA PED REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE

FAA PED Regulations FAA PED Guidance
14 CFR 91.21 (1963)
14 CFR 121.306 (1999)
AC 91.21-1C
14 CFR 125.204 (1999)
14 CFR 135.144 (1999)
On EASA side, Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and the relevant

amendments, Commission Regulations (EU) No 800/2013 and 379/2014 make it the
operators’ responsibility to demonstrate that any PED use on-board is safe and does
not affect adversely the performance of the aircraft systems and equipment.
TABLE 3-2: EASA PED REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE

EU Regulation EASA Guidance Comment
(ED Decision)
AMC/GM CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Commercial Air Transport
Operation
(EU) 965/2012 (2014/029/R)
& Amendments
AMC/GM NCC.GEN.130 Non-commercial operations
with complex-motor-powered
(2014/030/R)
aircraft
© EUROCAE, 2016
12
3.3 PED OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

Operators may follow guidance contained in this document to obtain operational PED
use approvals. For operators that want to expand the use of PEDs then the use of
operator guidance issued by the appropriate certification agency is acceptable.
Examples of FAA and EASA guidance is provided in Appendix C. The Appendix C
guidance should not be used when PED tolerance is required as part of the aircraft
Type Certification or Supplemental Type Certification. Applicants obtaining certification
approvals should follow this document or DO-307 in order to comply with certification
airworthiness requirements.
The use of PEDs on board aircraft is governed by the aircraft operating regulations,
not the aircraft airworthiness regulations. For aircraft that must comply with the
operating regulations in FAA parts 121 and 135, the part 119 certificate holder, not the
pilot in command, is responsible for determining acceptable PED use. Therefore,
demonstration of PED tolerance for a particular aircraft model by the certification
applicant is most useful for aircraft that are intended for use by air carriers under parts
121 and 135. For aircraft intended for operation under the fractional ownership
regulations, such as part 91 subpart K, the management specifications for the
management program can address acceptable use of PEDs on board aircraft under
their management.
FAA has provided guidance in AC 20-164 where aircraft manufacturers and aircraft
modifiers can demonstrate aircraft PED tolerance and to have the PED tolerance data
approved by FAA under an aircraft TC, amended TC, or STC applications. This
guidance allows the certification applicant to demonstrate aircraft PED tolerance,
considering the conditions created by the use of PEDs as a foreseeable operating
condition under 14 CFR/EASA CS 23.1309, 25.1309, 27.1309 and 29.1309. The data
approved by FAA or EASA can be used by the aircraft operator to determine
acceptable use of PEDs on their aircraft, to comply with the operating regulations
listed in TABLE 3-1 & TABLE 3-2.
These requirements for the operating certificate holder or the fractional ownership
program management service to determine acceptable PED use for their aircraft result
in the need to demonstrate PED tolerance for aircraft models by the aircraft
certification applicant, particularly for new or significantly modified aircraft designs.
Typically, these are high performance, complex aircraft that must comply with
airworthiness regulations in parts 25 and 29.
For aircraft that are operated under the general operating regulations in part 91, the
pilot in command is responsible for determining acceptable PED use. Many of these
aircraft are certified under airworthiness regulations in parts 23 and 27. In most
cases, the pilot in command can adequately determine acceptable PED use for that
specific aircraft. Therefore, demonstrating PED tolerance by the aircraft certification
applicant for aircraft certified under parts 23 and 27 is encouraged, but is not an
aircraft certification requirement.
3.4 PED TOLERANCE ROUTES
The primary Tolerance method for showing for PED tolerance is meeting the front
door and back door coupling. In addition, sustaining aircraft PED tolerance needs to
be considered for the service life of the aircraft. Sustained PED tolerance should apply
to both new equipment being installed as well as the impact to existing PED tolerant
equipment.
A general approach to PED showing tolerance is shown in FIGURE 3-2 and
FIGURE 3-3. The approach for back door will vary for aircraft with different HIRF
certification basis, see section 3.5. The front door coupling requirement is the same for
all aircraft.
© EUROCAE, 2016
13
Equipment that are already tolerant to ED-130 / DO-307 for back door or front door
coupling do not require further analysis if:
i) The front and back door coupling are not impacted by design changes from any
modification made to the aircraft; OR
ii) A design change increases the criticality of existing equipment/system. E.g. a
system that is currently minor is now being used to support Major or higher
functions on the aircraft, through software or hardware changes.
More details can be found in section CHAPTER 5 and section CHAPTER 6 for
tolerance methods.
Front Door
Assessment
Aircraft DO-307
NO
YES Front Door Compliant
Any Design
Pursue Front Door
YES Changes being YES
Compliance
Made
Verify Existing PED

Tolerant Equipment YES
Restrict PED
Continue To Meet Operation
PED Tolerance. See
Section 7.2 Safety Assessment
Determine MAJ &
NO Higher Radios
See Sec 4.0
Perform Front
Front Door Door Coupling
Compliant Assessment
Section 3.5
Sustaining A/C
PED Tolerance
See Sec 7.0
FIGURE 3-2: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FRONT DOOR PED TOLERANCE
© EUROCAE, 2016
14
Back Door
Assessment
Aircraft Full HIRF

Compliant per 3.6.1.1 OR
NO
DO307 Compliant
YES
Adding Wireless
service
NO
Verify Exisitng PED

Back Door Tolerant Equipment
Continue to Meet PED YES
Other Design YES
Changes
Compliant Tolerance
See section 7.2.1
NO
Document Path Through Is the a/c Expanding

NO PED usage
Flow Diagram
YES
Follow guidance of CVR/FDR/MAJ/HAZ/CAT

Sustaining A/C PED Appropriate Certification Equipment Must Be PED
Tolerance Authority See Section 3.6 Tolerant, See Section 3.6
See Sec 7.0
When Require d
By S ection 6
Perform PED System Safety Assessment

Per section 4.0
Equipment, that Needs to Address Back Door Coupling

See Section 4.3.1
Perform Back Door Coupling

Assessment
Section 3.6
FIGURE 3-3: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF BACK DOOR PED TOLERNACE
© EUROCAE, 2016
15
3.5 FRONT DOOR COUPLING REQUIREMENT

The front door requirements are provided in this section with detailed tolerance
guidance provided in section CHAPTER 5. Front door coupling requirement is for
radio receivers that could be susceptible to interference from RF coupling into the
radio antennas. In order to ensure that the receiver is not susceptible the aircraft
installation must be such that there is sufficient isolation between the PEDs and the
antenna(s) connected to the radio receiver of concern. Having sufficient isolation will
result in the signal from the PEDs to the antenna to be attenuated so that the receiver
cannot detect this noise from the PEDs. The amount of energy lost traveling from the
PEDs inside the aircraft to the aircraft radio receiver is the Interference Path Loss
(IPL).
For critical phases of flight where the PEDs are allowed to be operated, the aircraft
radio receivers with failure conditions that are major and higher shall meet the IPL
target levels shown in TABLE 4-7 of ED-239 / DO-307A for equipment being qualified
for front door coupling. The determination of failure classification of equipment may be
required through the aircraft safety assessment process. See section CHAPTER 4 for
more details.
Any combination of aircraft testing/analysis/similarity may be used to determine the
IPL between PEDs in the aircraft and each radio receiver of concern. See section
CHAPTER 5 for detailed guidance on meeting tolerance for front door coupling.
IPL measurement is independent of radio transceivers and therefore while the radios
themselves do not need to meet any front door requirement they must be considered
for back door assessment, per section 3.6. Any active antennas or amplifiers used
between the antennas and the radios must also address back door assessment.
3.6 BACK DOOR COUPLING REQUIREMENTS
The back door requirements are provided in this section with detailed tolerance
guidance provided in section CHAPTER 6. The primary tolerance method for back
door tolerance is via aircraft assessment and aircraft/equipment testing. Similarity and
analysis may also be used when appropriate in lieu of testing.
Equipment on an aircraft that are considered to be Full HIRF tolerant are also
considered to be back door tolerant. Therefore no additional back door coupling
consideration is needed for these aircraft.
The following requirements are for Non-HIRF or Partial HIRF Aircraft. The
determination of failure classification for aircraft equipment shall be determined
through the aircraft safety assessment process. See section 4.1 for more details.
1. If a new on board wireless services is being installed, then CVR/FDR and
equipment with MAJ/HAZ/CAT failure conditions must be PED tolerant per one
of the methods described in TABLE 3-3.
2. Once the Aircraft is PED tolerant then any changes to the aircraft should follow
TABLE 3-4.
© EUROCAE, 2016
16
TABLE 3-3: BACK DOOR DEMONSTRATION METHODS
Methods for Demonstrating Back Door Tolerance

Part Number/
Classification Laboratory Testing Aircraft Testing Meets HIRF System Tracking
(Note 3) (Note 1) Requirements
CAT Analysis and Analysis or on aircraft See section All equipment part
laboratory testing of testing and as 3.6.1 numbers must be
all equipment part described in section tracked such that
numbers per CHAPTER 6 of this only PED tolerant
TABLE 3-1 of document. part numbers are
ED-239 / DO-307A. installed when
transmitting PEDs
are allowed to be
used by
passengers.
MAJ/HAZ Analysis and Analysis or on aircraft See section As a minimum the
laboratory testing of testing and as 3.6.1 system shall be
equipment per described in section 6 documented.
TABLE 3-1 of of this document. Tracking of part
ED-239 / DO-307A. numbers is
optional.
Testing of Testing of alternative

alternative equipment part
equipment part numbers that perform
numbers that the same functions as
perform the same the tested equipment is
functions as the optional.
tested equipment is (Note 2)
optional.
(Note 2)
CVR/FDR Same as MAJ/HAZ Same as MAJ/HAZ NA Same as MAJ/HAZ
above above. above.
NOTE 1: The testing can include all transmitting PED types or be limited to certain technology. In the
latter case aircraft would not allow operation of transmitting PEDs not tested, unless further
analysis is provided.
NOTE 2: If interference is occurring, in the field, as a result of alternative part numbers not tested then
these part numbers shall be treated as Non-PED tolerant, unless other installation mitigation
is in place to prevent PED interference.
NOTE 3: There is no technology restriction if equipment qualification shows that there is no
susceptibility at the levels and frequency ranges tested per TABLE 3-1 of ED-239 /
DO-307A.
© EUROCAE, 2016
17
TABLE 3-4: EXAMPLE OF EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM ADDITIONS FOR PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
Tracking Notes
Add Alternative Part Number For An Existing PED Tolerant System
CAT Include part number on the Test and analysis per TABLE 3-3.
PED Tolerant Equipment List
Add A New System (New Function)
CAT Include all systems part No additional testing/analysis required. CAT systems
numbers on the PED will be levied with HIRF requirement and therefore PED
Tolerant Equipment List tolerance is automatically met via HIRF Rule/Special
condition.
HAZ/MAJ No Tracking at a part number No additional testing/analysis required. Note 1

level. The PED Tolerant
Equipment List can include it
a PN level or at a system
level.
NOTE 1: No additional tolerance is necessary for the following reasons:

i) Most new systems will already meet some level of HIRF qualification.
ii) EASA has requirements for MAJ and HAZ systems. The same systems are likely
installed on aircraft that include EASA HIRF requirements that is the same as
T-PED requirements.
iii) FAA policy memo dated Feb 26 2008 encourages applicants to meet HIRF
requirements for MAJ/HAZ systems, to allow EASA validations.
iv) The exposure to an aircraft from not achieving the above and resulting in
interference is considered to be low. If interference does result in the field from the
above, then the susceptible equipment shall be tracked and not allow PED
operation when these part numbers are installed.
3.6.1 HIRF Tolerant Aircraft

The following sections identify the degree with which aircraft are HIRF tolerant. The
aircraft Type Certification Data Sheet or Supplemental Type Certification data sheet
can be used to determine the level HIRF tolerance an aircraft may hold.
Below is example of regulatory certification basis that meets HIRF requirement for
systems performing catastrophic (CAT), hazardous (HAZ) and major (MAJ) functions.
Other certification authorities may have similar requirements.
For the FAA Amendment levels that include FAA HIRF requirements are:
TABLE 3-5: FAA AMENDMENT LEVELS
14 CFR 23.1308 14 CFR 25.1317 14 CFR 27.1317 14 CFR 29.1317
Amd 57 (Sep 2007) Amd 122 (Sep 2007) Amd 42(Sep 2007) Amd 49 (Sep 2007)
NOTE: If Part (d) of the above rule is used then it may be limited to CAT functions only,
similar to the FAA Special Condition.
© EUROCAE, 2016
18
European certified aircraft after 1987 to the JAA Special Conditions or the EASA CRIs
are considered HIRF tolerant. EASA CS Amendment levels that include HIRF
requirements:
TABLE 3-6: EASA CS AMENDMENT LEVELS
CS 23.1308 CS 25.1317
Amdt 23/4 (Jul 2015) Amdt 25/17 (Jul 2015)
FAA HIRF Special Condition that was applied to only systems performing CAT
function was introduced 1987.
3.6.1.1 Full HIRF Tolerant Aircraft.
This is an aircraft that met the FAA/EASA HIRF rule or EASA CRI/JAA Special
Condition, or similar regulatory requirement from other certification authorities, at its’
initial TC. The significance of “initial” is that all the systems and equipment were
considered for HIRF certification. Any changes to the aircraft by OEM or STC would
require the change to meet the certification basis of the initial TC which would include
HIRF. Examples of the HIRF regulations met at initial TC would be FAA 14CFR
2X.1317/23.1308 or EASA CS 2X.1317/23.1308 or HIRF Certification Review Item
(CRI) or JAA HIRF Special Condition.
Aircraft that meet the Full HIRF requirements will have cockpit voice and flight data
recorders that either meet the ED-239 / DO-307A TABLE 3-1 requirements, are
located in areas of the aircraft where transmitting PEDs cannot be operated, or are not
susceptible to PEDs due to impervious construction and durability. For these full HIRF
compliant aircraft no further action is required for CVR and FDR equipment.
To verify Full HIRF status all models listed in the TCDS must either have the
FAA/EASA HIRF rule or EASA CRI/JAA Special Condition listed in the cert basis.
Using this assessment process the following aircraft have been determined to be Full
HIRF tolerant: A320, A330, A340, A350, A380, B777, B787, CS100, EMB-145,
ERJ-170, and ERJ-190 series.
3.6.1.2 Partial or Non HIRF Tolerant Aircraft.
3.6.1.2.1 Partial HIRF Tolerant Aircraft
A partial tolerant aircraft is one where initial TC may not have included HIRF
certification basis however various upgrade of electrical and avionics systems may
have picked up HIRF regulations or Special Conditions (SC) / Certification Review
Items (CRI). The FAA SC only applies to equipment with catastrophic failure
conditions. The HIRF rule, JAA SC and EASA CRIs all apply to equipment with
catastrophic/hazardous/ major failure conditions. The rest of the equipment are
sometimes referred to as being grandfathered and they retain their original certification
basis, which does not include HIRF and so they do not meet the HIRF requirement.
When demonstrating aircraft PED tolerance, the determination of HIRF certification
basis for the aircraft may need to look at prior certification basis to understand HIRF
certification basis of all equipment. The TCDS will identify HIRF certification basis via
regulations (to be determined via amendment level of certification basis) or Special
conditions. The initial TC date is often shown on the TCDS, that can also be used to
help determine whether the HIRF basis was likely or not at initial TC, based on when
HIRF certification requirements were introduced, ref section 3.6.1.1.
In FIGURE 3-4 the first aircraft was introduced in 1969 and HIRF requirements were
not introduced until 1987 If the aircraft is still in-service, the aircraft would be
considered partially HIRF tolerant if there were some system modifications that are
HIRF tolerant, or the aircraft is considered non HIRF tolerant if no such HIRF tolerant
modifications have taken place.
© EUROCAE, 2016
19
FIGURE 3-4: EXAMPLE OF FAA TCDS SHOWING INITIAL TC DATE
In FIGURE 3-5 equipment that complied with Amendment 77 of Part 25 regulations

would not have met FAA HIRF rule for CAT/HAZ/MAJ but the limited equipment
(G5000) meeting Amendment 122 would have met the HIRF requirement.
FIGURE 3-5: EXAMPLE OF FAA PARTIAL TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
FIGURE 3-6 shows FAA HIRF Special Conditions (sometimes also referred to as
“Radio Frequency Energy Protection”), applicable to limited avionics equipment. One
has to review the SC to understand the equipment applicability.
FIGURE 3-6: EXAMPLE OF FAA SC TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
© EUROCAE, 2016
20
3.6.1.2.2 Non HIRF Tolerant Aircraft

Non HIRF tolerant aircraft is one that has no HIRF regulations or Special Conditions
listed on the TCDS/STC/ATC. Therefore, no system or equipment on the aircraft
meets HIRF regulations or Special Conditions.
3.7 TRACKING DEVICES
The following guidance may be used by the operator as an alternate method for an
assessment (for partial or non HIRF tolerant aircraft) on how to allow PEDs that aren’t
easily accessible in flight and cannot be turned off manually in the event of an
emergency.
The aircraft can be considered PED tolerant to Tracking Devices during all phases of
flight when the Tracking Device meets the following requirements:
a) The Tracking Device meets the RF radiated emissions limits defined in ED-14D
change 1 / DO-160D change 1 (or later revisions), Environmental Conditions
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, Section 21, Category H for
Tracking Devices located in areas which are in direct view of the radio
receiver’s antenna and Category M for all other locations, during all modes of its
operation. Testing of the Tracking Device must include any peripheral devices
that will be used with the device during normal operations. Typically, peripherals
include external sensors or associated wiring. For additional Guidance, refer to
User Guide ED-234 / DO-357, Supplement (Change 1) to ED-14G / DO-160G.
b) The Tracking Device is designed with a minimum of two independent means to
turn off completely. This can be accomplished by turning off the cellular or
mobile functions, or a combination of both when airborne. These independent
methods must use different sources to identify flight. For example, a Tracking
Device designed to sense rapid altitude changes and acceleration to turn off
cellular transmissions is an acceptable design feature that meets the
requirement. Redundant sources of the same information, such as two vertical
accelerometers, would not be an acceptable design.
c) The transmissions of the Tracking Device are limited to short periods of time
(less than 1 second per 1 000 seconds) and cannot be continuous.
d) In order to provide assurance on the Tracking Device design and production,
the Tracking Device manufacturer substantiated data includes the following
documents as part of the evaluation package:
1. Pictures of the Tracking Device and any peripheral attachments,
2. Product label,
3. Operational description and technical specifications of the Tracking
Device and peripheral attachments,
4. Manufacturer statement of strict design and production controls
5. Failure mode and effects analysis report of the Tracking Device and any
peripheral attachments,
6. EMI assessment report documenting the emission levels
3.8 CERTIFICATION APPLICANT SUPPORTING OPERATORS
The certification applicant can perform all the work necessary to show both front door
and/or back door tolerance has been met, to support expansion of PED use or
installation of wireless services. This can be achieved in accordance with advisories
as provided in part FAA & EASA 2X.1309 document.
The necessary knowledge base needed for PED-tolerance demonstration is
predominantly with the certification applicant. Therefore, their certification effort may
benefit from unrestricted access to qualification data. However, operators performing
the same task typically do not have access to all necessary qualification data. The
certification applicant may submit its data of aircraft PED tolerance in accordance with
ED-239 / DO-307A and/or with this guidance material for approval by the responsible
certification authority.
© EUROCAE, 2016
21
If the certification applicant chooses to demonstrate aircraft PED tolerance, then the
applicant should provide documentation and any amendments to support airline
operation and maintenance/repair processes. Note that per the current FAA policy
statement (at the time of release of this document) and the EASA project specific
CRIs, the certification applicant is required to meet aircraft back door tolerance for
transmitting PEDs intended for use with the installed wireless system, while the
Operator is required to meet front door tolerance.
The aircraft PED tolerance should be documented in an appropriate form and
maintained to include the guidance references to which the aircraft PED tolerance has
been achieved (e.g. RTCA DO-307 or DO-363 or ED-130A, etc.). Any modification on
an aircraft that impacts PED tolerance should result in an update of the documentation
to whether the PED tolerance is maintained or if there are any limitations. Revised
information should be distributed by the responsible design organization to the
operator.
Any instructions for sustaining aircraft PED tolerance should be specified in the
instructions for continued airworthiness and be documented by the certification
applicant in an appropriate form to the operator (see section 5.7 of ED-239 /
DO-307A).
In section 3.8.1 a distinction is made between standard and aircraft documentation
(e.g. IPC), additional documentation and supplemental documentation.
3.8.1 Supporting Documentation
3.8.1.1 Standard Documentation:
Illustrated Parts Catalogue (IPC) is a list of components and parts approved for the
installation on accordant aircraft (type and/or serial number). It provides parts
information for both preferred parts and those interchange parts for replacement
cases. The responsibility for the validity of the IPC as such remains vested with the
airframe OEM.
PED tolerance information as part of the IPC is not considered common practice.
However, airframe OEMs shall offer the opportunity to add PED tolerance flag notes
or highlighting to their IPC. PED tolerance information as part of the IPC for all post-
delivery alterations should be processed through the airframe OEM. However, the
aircraft operator remains responsible for always keeping the PED tolerance
information up-to-date.
If the IPC is to remain untouched but PED tolerance is still to be documented, then
additional documentation providing equipment PED-tolerance information should
supplement the IPC.
3.8.1.2 Additional Documentation:
Additional documentation can be an OEM Tolerance Letter/Memo, a Service
Letter/Service Information Letter/In-Service Information, or a document of similar
quality bearing technical and/or operational statements regarding the status of aircraft
PED tolerance.
Tolerance Letter/Memo: Aircraft OEMs may issue tolerance letters that
communicate the status of their aircraft PED tolerance. Such communications
act as an official statement to show tolerance of an aircraft or its equipment (in
the context of this document to e.g. PED tolerance). An example is provided in
Appendix D.
Service Letter (SL): A service letter can be a technical and/or operational
OEM statement in regards to aircraft PED tolerance and for safe aircraft
operation, usually related to a specific system or process. This document can
be issued by the OEM upon request by the operator, or at the OEM discretion
based on new or additional cognitions.
© EUROCAE, 2016
22
Service Information Letter (SIL): Similar to a service letter, a service

information letter can be a technical and/or operational OEM statement in
regards to aircraft PED tolerance and for safe aircraft operation, usually related
to a specific system or process. This document can be issued by the OEM upon
request by the operator, or at the OEM discretion based on new or additional
cognitions.
In-Service Information (ISI): The ISI is technically no different than the SIL.
The ISI is meant to be the designated successor of all SILs; however, both the
SIL and ISI are issued simultaneously during a transition period.
Examples of letters are included in Appendix D.
Additional documentation as above is considered acceptable means of substantiation
of aircraft PED tolerance (for e.g. certification, continued airworthiness purposes),
when the data has been approved as part of the TC/ATC/STC.
3.8.1.3 Supplemental Documentation
Based on the aircraft operator’s responsibility for any post-delivery aircraft alteration
(potentially affecting front door PED tolerance and/or back door PED tolerance), the
responsibility for the PED tolerance of an airplane remains vested with the operator.
Therefore, it is common practice that operators utilize further additional documentation
to document aircraft PED tolerance, broken down into which equipment are PED
tolerant and which equipment are not PED tolerant. This supplemental documentation
is usually issued by the operators’ engineering/design departments or certification
applicant. This supporting documentation supplements standard documentation used
to achieve configuration management and sustained PED tolerance.
Non-PED Tolerant Equipment List: This is a list which identifies the aircraft
equipment (at part number level) that has been determined to be non-PED tolerant.
The intolerance of aircraft equipment has been evaluated and verified via analysis
and/or on-aircraft testing, or in some cases the equipment has not yet been evaluate
and therefore must be considered non-PED tolerant. The list may include approval for
the installation of equipment that was proven PED tolerant. The list would comprise of
a list of Hazardous and Major systems (see section 6.2 #1 for system definition)
including cockpit and flight data recorder shown to be PED tolerant. It would also
contain a list of equipment part numbers performing Catastrophic functions. In
addition, the list should also identify the type of PED technologies that have been
assessed, if a technology specific demonstration was made. If all the frequencies per
section 6.3.2 and test methodologies per section 6.2.5.2 or if equipment qualification
testing is used to meet backdoor tolerance, then no technology specific limitations
needs to be listed.
NOTE: In accordance with operational-safety demands as well as operational
benefits, a Non-Qualified Equipment List should state the preferred
option.
As a consequence, this list should be used as a single equipment list for configuration
management purposes according to the process as shown in FIGURE 7-3. This list
would show only those part numbers to be considered for sustainable PED tolerance.
Ideally, the non-PED tolerant equipment list does not come as a separate document,
but its information shall be incorporated in standard documentation used for
maintenance (e.g. IPC).
PED Tolerant Equipment List: This is a list which identifies the aircraft equipment
(on part number level) that has been determined to be PED tolerant, and/or - as noted
to be PED-tolerant but subject to limitations/mitigations. The list of aircraft equipment
has been evaluated and verified via analysis and/or on-aircraft testing. There may be
equipment not appearing on this list because it is not PED-tolerant or has never been
evaluated for PED tolerance. This can mean either that the equipment is not flight-
safety relevant or that the equipment is relevant for a safe flight but cannot be installed
as it is not PED-tolerant. Therefore, the list does not provide approval for installation
and operation in a cellular and wireless transmitting environment.
© EUROCAE, 2016
23
Additionally, the nature of a PED tolerant equipment list bears an increased effort to
establish and manage PED tolerance data due to the increased number of parts
compared to the non-PED tolerant equipment list approach. The list would comprise of
a list of Hazardous and Major systems (see section 6.2 #1 for system definition)
including cockpit and flight data recorder shown to be PED tolerant. It would also
contain a list of equipment part numbers performing Catastrophic functions. In
addition, the list should also identify the type of PED technologies that have been
assessed, if a technology specific demonstration was made. If all the frequencies per
section 6.3.2 and test methodologies per section 6.2.5.2 or if equipment qualification
testing is used to meet backdoor tolerance, then no technology specific limitations
needs to be listed.
These two guidance options for additional documentation should be used during
maintenance or repair to ensure all equipment installed is proven PED tolerant. This
documentation should be referenced as part of a standard maintenance/repair
process.
In lieu of the above a single equipment list that shows which equipment are PED
tolerant and which equipment are not PED tolerant would also be acceptable.
© EUROCAE, 2016
24
CHAPTER 4
AIRCRAFT SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The aircraft safety assessment process should be planned and managed to provide
the necessary assurance that all relevant failure conditions have been identified and
that all significant combinations of failures which could cause catastrophic,
hazardous and major failure conditions have been considered. The aircraft safety
assessment should be done ahead of testing if the plan is to use equipment
qualification to meet backdoor PED requirements. For front door coupling radio
systems that have failure conditions that are classified as Major and higher are
required to be assessed for front door coupling. If the guidance provided in Appendix
A can be applicable to the aircraft being considered, then most of the radio systems
can be sufficiently mitigated such that the only system that need to be considered is
those used for instrument landing systems.
There are two approaches that can be taken to perform the aircraft safety
assessment:
1. Functional Hazard Assessment (section 4.1)
2. Safety Management System (SMS) (section 4.2) – Only for Front Door.
4.1 FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT
A system level Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is a qualitative assessment. It
considers a failure or combination of system failures and their effect on the aircraft.
The various classification of failure conditions is based on crew workload, reduction in
safety margins or functional capabilities as well as potential for injury to occupants.
These classifications are further discussed in Appendix B. There is guidance in
AC23.1309 (Appendix 1), AC25.1309, AC25-11, SAE ARP4761 that provides
guidance on developing functional hazard assessments also. Individual systems may
also have FAA or EASA advisory material that may also provide system safety
requirements, e.g. AC20-151B (TCAS II) or AC20-138D (Navigations Systems).
It is important to note that this document is not presenting guidance suggesting the
applicant perform a complete hazard assessment of the aircraft, but instead provide
sufficient assessment by a knowledgeable person. The assessment can determine the
highest classification for the system and broadly apply to all parts of the system,
reducing the need to produce detailed failure conditions. Additional analysis can be
performed if additional mitigations is required. The applicant shall produce a
consolidated list of systems under test, the considered functions of that system, the
failure classification of those functions and any mitigation as proposed by this
document.
When performing the safety assessment, the following should be considered:
1) The components that make up the system are as follows:
a. Fault trees produced as part of 2X.1309 safety assessment, if available,
can be examined to help determine which equipment can contribute to
the failure conditions.
b. The fault tree will often have multiple redundant systems and their
associated failure modes feed into an AND gate for a given specific
failure condition hazard.
c. For PED safety assessment it is not necessary for all these redundant
systems to be PED tolerant. Consideration should be given to whether
the aircraft will maintain PED tolerance if the aircraft is allowed to
dispatch with equipment inoperative.
© EUROCAE, 2016
25
2) There may be multiple failure conditions for any given box with different failure
classifications. If there is upset during the test, then the upset can be analyzed
to determine the classification of the failure condition. This may reveal that the
classification is MIN and therefore no remedy for the upset is required or that
the classification is lower than what the system was originally classified to. In
the latter case this may reduce laboratory test levels required per TABLE 3-1 of
ED-239 / DO-307A.
3) Can the component of the system be susceptible to PED? Switches,
electromechanical relays are example of electrical components that are not
susceptible to PED interference.
4) Random failures do not need to be combined with PED environment.
5) Digital signals that have error detection would be prone to loss of data rather
than misleading data. As an example the GPS signal to the antenna, for front
door consideration, would likely result in loss of data rather than misleading
data in the presence of PED spurious emissions.
For front door it is recommended that the format and guidance shown in Appendix A
be followed. An example backdoor FHA is shown in Appendix B.
The identification of failure conditions and their classifications is not considered to be
within the scope of this document since they can be aircraft specific. Some typical
examples of catastrophic failure conditions and systems/equipment (that might be
involved in the failure) for the aircraft a shown below. These should not be considered
as the complete list.
Failure conditions that can be catastrophic for the aircraft:
1. Misleading display of vertical and lateral guidance during Instrument Landing –
ILS system
2. Non-restorable loss of display of all navigation information coupled with a total
loss of communication functions – NAV and COM systems
3. Loss or HMI of primary flight display information such as attitude/heading/
airspeed/altitude – Displays, AHRS/IRS, ADC Computer/Smart Probes.
4. Loss or erroneous operation of flight control (pitch, roll, yaw) systems.
1. The loss is for fly-by-wire
2. Erroneous operations for both fly-by-wire and non-fly-by-wire (e.g. hardovers).
5. Slow or rapid loss of pressurization - Pressurization control/monitor
6. Loss of Thrust control (FADEC, Auto-throttle)
7. Loss of or misleading primary engine parameters – Displays, Engine
computers.
8. Inadvertent or loss of fly-by-wire braking or nose wheel steering.
9. Loss of Anti-ice
10. Loss of or erroneous operation of Hydraulic functions (landing gear control
surfaces)
11. Loss of fuel to engines - Fuel system monitor/control
© EUROCAE, 2016
26
4.2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) APPROACH

This is an alternative but similar method to the traditional 2X.1309 analysis. This
assessment identifies and classifies functional failure conditions associated with the
operation of the aircraft systems, with a failure classification of major and above. SMS
example is provided in Appendix A. The examples are for front door coupling.
4.2.1 Likelihood Assessment
Likelihood assessments can be quantitative, qualitative or include portions of both.
1. Quantitative Assessment: A quantitative assessment is an analytical process
that applies mathematical methods to assess system and airplane safety.
Quantitative assessments are often used in certification of systems to determine
the acceptable probability for failure. This drives aircraft design and system
reliability to ensure that the failure rates meet the assessed probability. Aircraft
systems are designed to be fail-safe and use a combination of methods such as
design integrity and quality; redundant systems, back-up systems, component
reliability, service experience and margins of safety to ensure these systems
meet the necessary criteria.1 For typical aircraft certification quantitative
assessment, the rate of failure of systems resulting in a catastrophic event must
be shown to be extremely improbable. This means that the likelihood of
occurrence must be less than 1 in 1,000,000,000 (10-9) flight hours for the
particular aircraft model in the phase of flight that the function that the system
performs is used. Since passenger PED use varies greatly and is not
measured in any fashion, it makes justification of PED use based on
quantifiable operational experience very difficult. This is especially true for
those phases of flight, such as take-off and landing, where operators currently
ask passengers to turn PEDs off.
2. Qualitative assessment: Qualitative assessments are analytical processes
that assess system and airplane safety in a subjective, non-numerical manner.
These assessments use processes such as analysis of system failures and the
effect they have on the system’s function, as well as the expected response.
These processes depend on the technical data for the system operation and are
based on engineering experience and operational judgment.
In this assessment, the likelihood for interference from PEDs includes both
quantitative (where possible) and qualitative assessments using a systematic,
deductive, high-level examination of potential PED introduced failures. This
assessment includes a review of operational service experience (service difficulty
reports, aviation safety reporting system data and other operator specific data),
evaluation of known PED spurious emissions, a review of existing technical studies
accomplished in the various RTCA PED activities and a review of the current PED
industry statistics.
For the purpose of this assessment, the evaluation of likelihood associated with the
failure conditions use definitions as follows:
1. Probable failure conditions are those failure conditions anticipated to occur one
or more times during the entire operational life of each airplane.
2. Remote failure conditions are those failure conditions that are unlikely to occur
to each airplane during its total life but that may occur several times when
considering the total operational life of a number of airplanes of this type.
3. Extremely remote failure conditions are those failure conditions not anticipated
to occur to each airplane during its total life but which may occur a few times
when considering the total operational life of all airplanes of this type.
4. Extremely improbable failure conditions are those failure conditions so unlikely
that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all
airplanes of one type.
1 FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A - System Design and Analysis / EASA AMC 25.1309
© EUROCAE, 2016
27
4.2.2 Risk Acceptance

In the development of the risk assessment criteria, the acceptability of risk was
evaluated using the risk matrices of Appendix A is included in this document in the
following manner: Acceptable (green), Acceptable with mitigation (yellow), and
Unacceptable (red).
1. Unacceptable. Where combinations of avionics system failure effect severity
and likelihood cause risk to fall into the ‘red area’, the risk has been assessed
as unacceptable. Systems with catastrophic failure effects are considered to
have an unacceptable level of risk and therefore, a more structured qualitative
assessment is required using the RTCA DO-307A/ED-239 path loss
measurement procedure to ensure that the system meets the latest criteria for
PED tolerance.
2. Acceptable with Mitigation. Where the risk assessment falls into the ‘yellow
area’, the risk may be accepted under defined conditions of mitigation. An
example of this scenario would be an assessment of the impact of an
inoperative aircraft component redundant to other aircraft systems or
operational controls that constitute a mitigating action that could make an
otherwise unacceptable risk acceptable, as long as the other systems are
available and the defined procedure is implemented. These situations also
require continued special emphasis during the operator’s safety management
system continuous improvement safety evaluation function (or equivalent).
3. Acceptable. Where the assessed risk falls into the ‘green area’, expanded PED
use is accepted without further analysis. The objective in risk management
should always be to reduce risk to as low as practicable regardless of whether
or not the assessment shows that it can be accepted as is. This is a
fundamental principle of continuous improvement.
Residual risk considers the possible controls and mitigations that may be established
to reduce the initial assessed risk, based on failure effect severity and likelihood, to an
acceptable level. For this to occur, the operator must determine that the controls and
mitigations identified are appropriate for their aircraft and operational profile, that the
risk control and/or mitigation technique has been implemented and has been validated
to be effective. See also sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4.
4.2.3 Decision Making
The assumptions and the failure effects for interference established in Section
CHAPTER 3, Hazard Identification, established the baseline for setting the mitigations
and controls for each system function. The mitigation and controls that are identified
in Appendix 2 consider the effect of the PED interference on the function of the
avionics system(s). The recommended controls listed identify operational procedures,
operator PED allowance policy or aircraft system testing to address the failure
classification of the failure effect.
The following residual risks are listed in Appendix B and are based on the mitigations
and controls as follows:
1. Acceptable – When the hazard level associated with the effect was established
to be minor, the mitigation necessary to address the failure mode is already
addressed as part of standard practices or operating procedures.
2. Acceptable with mitigation – Depending on the hazard level and the effect,
this mitigation could be handled as part of standard practices or operating
procedures; could have requirements for additional aircraft systems to be used
as a cross check of independent systems; prohibition of PED allowance; or
collection of data that determines PED use is acceptable. In order to use this
assessment as basis for allowing expanded PED use, an operator must
determine that the controls and mitigations identified are appropriate for their
aircraft and operational profile that the risk control and/or mitigation technique
has been implemented and has been validated as specified in section 4.2.4.
© EUROCAE, 2016
28
When mitigation involves dependency on other system functions, the operator

must assess and address any changes required to their minimum equipment list
(MEL) allowance for that system as well as the non-normal procedures for the
operations involving those systems. For example, if an operator mitigates the
impact of misleading information during an ILS coupled approach by cross
referencing the aircraft position by using the aircraft’s position based on GPS
position, then GPS function is required for that operation. The operator should
revise the MEL to reflect the inoperative GPS functions impact on the ability to
perform that operation.
3. Acceptable only with listed mitigations – In instances where the failure mode
could result in a catastrophic condition, the mitigation and controls listed are the
only acceptable means to address the failure mode. In order to allow expansion
of PED use during these operations, the system must be tested to ensure that
the interference path loss requirements for front door interference given in
ED-130A / DO-363 or ED-239 / DO-307A have been met. The operator must
possess the data to support this determination. Until that data is obtained, the
operator must prohibit the use of PEDs during the listed avionics system
function or alternatively, prohibit the use of the listed flight operation.
4.2.4 Suggested Method
A vital part of any safety management system approach is to continuously monitor the
performance of the changed functions and measure its performance against planned
goals. When an operator expands of use of PEDs into new phases of flight, they
should adopt the principles of safety assurance to validate those operations.
Three important aspects of safety assurance are safety performance monitoring
measurement and review; management of change; and continuous improvement of
the safety system.
1. Safety performance monitoring and measurement should be the process by
which the safety performance is verified in comparison to its safety policies and
objectives. This process should include:
2. Safety reporting – Train flight crews to report intermittent or transient avionics
problems that they notice during these operations. This should not focus on the
PEDs as a suspected cause, but rather reporting all anomalies.
3. Safety reviews including trending of data – Operators should incorporate
reviews of problem and trends as part of their reliability process.
4. Safety audits – Operators should conduct safety audits of their operations to
ensure crew tolerance with company procedures. This should include
evaluation of the level of competency and training of their crews.
Management of change should be a formal process that identifies how expansion of
use of PEDs may affect their established processes and procedures. The affect, and
the process or procedures used to address that affect should be documented.
Continuous improvement of the safety system should rectify situations identified
through safety assurance activities, paying particular attention to critical systems. The
operator should assess any problems with expected performance and their
implications in operational safety. Take necessary actions to address these problems.
NOTE: If a problem is identified that has been confirmed to be caused by PED
use, that information should be shared with the aviation industry via one
of the available reporting mechanisms. Provide as much detail as
possible on how the interference was attributed to PED operation and
include details such as type of device and location in the aircraft where
device was operated.
© EUROCAE, 2016
29
4.3 SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT TO MEET FRONT & BACK DOOR COUPLING
The failure conditions identified under the safety assessment are examined to
determine the systems and components that can cause the failure condition identified.
These components are then subject to the appropriate back door and front door
testing and analysis.
4.4 CONCLUSION
This safety assessment for the two types of PED interference coupling mechanisms
can be addressed to provide an acceptable level of safety for expanded PED use. For
back-door interference (as discussed in section 3.6), system protection is provided in
several ways including meeting certain HIRF and wireless system installation design
requirements. For front door interference (as discussed in section 3.5), there are
several mitigations available.
1. PED Tolerance – The best mitigation for front door interference is to obtain data
to show the system meets the interference path loss requirements for
interference as shown in ED-130A / DO-363 or ED-239 / DO-307A have been
met. This is a requirement for systems that have a Major and higher failure
condition.
2. Operational Mitigations – For systems that have major failure conditions, the
mitigations are handled as part of standard practices or operating procedures.
Hazardous effects require additional aircraft systems to be used as a cross
check of independent systems. This may involve additional crew training to
heighten the awareness of these requirements.
3. Operational Limitations – If an operator opts to not perform a function described
in the safety assessment, then that function does not have to be considered as
part of their safety assessment so long as appropriate PED limitation is in place
when the untested function is operational.
4. PED use prohibition – If an operator chooses to use this mitigation, they must
assess their current PED crew and passenger instructions and make necessary
changes to convey the appropriate information.
© EUROCAE, 2016
30
CHAPTER 5
FRONT DOOR COUPLING DEMONSTRATION
5.1 PURPOSE
This section of the document is intended to be an aid for operators wanting to
demonstrate tolerance to front door coupling, as detailed in ED-239 / DO-307A.
5.2 OVERVIEW
Front Door Tolerance is demonstrated through test and analysis. This testing is not a
test of avionics system susceptibility to RF energy, but rather it tests whether a signal
from a PED located inside an aircraft could have enough RF energy for that energy to
travel from the source, to outside the aircraft, through the avionics system’s receiving
antenna and cable, to the receiver interface where the avionics component (e.g.,
receiver) plugs into the cable. The RF path loss, is also known as Interference Path
Loss (IPL), see ED-239 / DO-307A, section CHAPTER 4. A high Interference Path
Loss (IPL) is desirable.
The intentional emissions from PEDs occur in licensed frequency bands, allocated by
the international and national telecommunication authorities. The aeronautical radio
navigation and communication frequencies are internationally harmonized and the
telecommunication authorities ensure that no other RF service is assigned within
these bands; these are protected bands. Therefore, there is a separation between the
frequency bands used for aeronautical radio navigation and communication and those
used by any intentional PED not intended for aeronautical purpose. Since aircraft
receivers possess a high immunity level against signals outside their operating
frequency ranges, the potential for front-door interference caused by intentional
radiated emissions is negligible.
A “front door” effect is when the disturbing signal is emitted by the PEDs or the
TPEDs, received by the aircraft antennas and disturbs the aircraft RF receivers. Since
no PED should be intentionally transmitting in the aviation frequency band. Only the
Spurious radiation from PEDS will be considered. Spurious radiation from PEDS
have the possibility of coupling through apertures in the fuselage to antennas thus
causing the interference with the navigation, communication, and surveillance
receivers.
The purpose of this section is to clarify ED-239 / DO-307Aas to:
1. Overall flow of establishing Front Door Tolerance to ED-239 / DO-307A.
2. What types of mitigation to IPL measurements could be used
3. What changes would impact Front Door Tolerance
4. IPL and Front Door assessment to similar aircraft
5.3 APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
This Aid to Operators is applicable to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) part 119 certificate holders and 91 subpart K (91K) program managers.
When followed, it provides an acceptable method of tolerance for 14 CFR part 91.21,
part 121.306, part 125.204, or part 135.144, as applicable, when allowing expanded
use of PEDs various phases of flight.
The use of the terms “aircraft operator(s)” and “operator” throughout this document is
applicable to operations conducted under 14 CFR parts 91K, 121, 125 and 135.
Reference section 0 for more information.
Portions of FAA publications InFO13010 and InFO13030SUP, as well as, ED-239 /
DO-307A and EASA AMC guidance material have been used in the creation of this
section. Reference Appendix C for more information.
© EUROCAE, 2016
31
5.4 APPROACH TO FRONT DOOR TOLERANCE

FIGURE 5-1 presents the Decision Tree for Establishing Front Door Tolerance. Note
that TABLE 4-7 of ED-239 / DO-307A takes into account the functional aspects (i.e.,
GPS, ILS, VHF, etc.) of avionics receivers and not the receiver system, per se. (For
example, an ILS receiver must meet the same minimum operational performance
(MOPS) parameters independent of the equipment manufacturer.) TABLE 4-7 of
ED-239 / DO-307A addresses the receiver susceptibility. The IPL measurements are
independent of receiver system susceptibility and only impacted by A/C shielding,
cabling, antenna gain and Aircraft configuration.
The subsequent paragraphs provide more information on the overall Front Door
Tolerance approach. TABLE 5-1 presents supporting text to the Decision Tree.
Front Door
Compliance
Approach
IPL Test Approach Analysis Approach

(1)
Plan to Test Aircraft
to DO-307A/ED-
239?
Yes No
(2)
Test to DO- (6)
307A/ED-239 SMS, analysis,
Criteria. Refer similarity
to DO-307 rationale will
Section 4 and be used
Appendix B
No
(3)
Does the IPL meet the
DO-307A/ED-239
Table 407 IPL? (7)
Mitigation and
Control Acceptable
per Appendix A?
Yes
(4)
Update
No
documentation.
(8)
(5) Done. Front Door
Done. Front Door compliance not achieved.
compliance Restrict Usage of PEDs or
achieved consider testing IPL
Consider Testing
FIGURE 5-1: ESTABLISHING FRONT DOOR TOLERANCE
© EUROCAE, 2016
32
TABLE 5-1: NOTES TO FIGURE 5-1 ESTABLISHING FRONT DOOR TOLERANCE

Note Explanation
1 Is there a plan to test the Aircraft for IPL and compare the measurements to TABLE 4-7 of
ED-239 / DO-307A? If Yes, go to #2 and perform IPL test in accordance with ED-239 / DO-307A
section 4 and Appendix B. If No, go to #6. This assumes that you will mitigate the IPL already
measured, use the SMS approach of analysis presented in Section CHAPTER 4 and Appendix A,
or will be establishing a similarity to other Aircraft. Refer to Sections 5.4.3 or 5.4.4
2 Test the Aircraft for IPL. Refer to ED-239 / DO-307A Section CHAPTER 4 and Appendix B for
testing methodology.
3 Does the IPL data meet TABLE 4-7 of ED-239 / DO-307A? If yes, go to #4 and update
documentation.
If No, go to #6 and plan to mitigate issues or perform similarity analysis.
4 Update relevant documentation. Refer to Section 5.5 herein.
5 Done. Front Door Tolerance can be demonstrated in accordance with ED-239 / DO-307A.
6 Approach is to use Appendix A SMS example, similarity to other aircraft, or other analysis. Refer
to Sections 5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, herein
7 Mitigation and Control acceptable per Appendix A? If yes, go to #4 and update documentation.
Otherwise, go to #8
8 Issues were not corrected through mitigation, analysis or similarity to other aircraft. Front
Tolerance was NOT achieved using this approach. Restrict usage of PEDs and refer to Appendix
C. May want to consider testing for IPL.
5.4.1 Changes to Aircraft that Affect IPL

If no changes were made to the aircraft that could influence the Front Door Tolerance
and the aircraft is shown to be tolerant to the IPL data found in TABLE 4-7 of ED-239 /
DO-307A, then no further action is required. However, if relevant changes were made
that could influence the Front Door IPL, then a retest may be required or mitigation
techniques used to bring the IPL data into tolerance.
The following paragraphs provide changes that could affect the IPL measurements.
These are not all encompassing but provide known changes that could affect the
attenuation and thus the IPL data. Changes to aircraft which could affect the tolerance
of avionics receivers to PED spurious emissions should be analyzed. Early
coordination and discussions between the applicant and the regulatory authority is
highly encouraged.
1. Changes to cargo doors, cabin doors, emergency exits, windows or other
apertures in the fuselage
Changes to aircraft doors, exits, windows or any aperture on the fuselage may
influence the leakage of emissions from the internal part of the aircraft to the
exterior and thus the overall interference path loss. These include changes in
bonding and seams. Apertures in the fuselage behave as radiating structures
above the frequency related to the maximum aperture dimension l by l=/2 (half
wavelength). Therefore, the IPL of systems operating at lower frequencies (e.g.
VHF, VOR, ILS) is expected to be mostly affected by the leakage through larger
apertures, such as aircraft doors and cockpit windows. For systems with higher
operating frequencies, cabin windows and other smaller apertures are
additionally significant in the coupling, especially if they are relatively close to
the respective system antenna.
© EUROCAE, 2016
33
2. Either changing, adding, or repositioning of the aircraft antennas

Replacement of existing antennas with new antenna models or altered radiation
characteristics may modify the IPL of the respective navigation or
communication system in so far as antenna characteristics like matching,
resonances, gain, and radiation pattern (as well as the interaction with the
fuselage) have changed. Basically, an antenna in close proximity to another
antenna can influence each other’s radiation pattern. For antenna
repositioning, the coupling behavior can be significantly different; the IPL may
decrease especially for the areas inside the aircraft close to relevant leakage
points. In addition, any structural change in the fuselage exterior that could
affect the coupling to aircraft antennas should be analyzed.
Moving an antenna can place the antenna closer to a fuselage RF leakage
point, resulting in a smaller IPL. Changing an antenna to an antenna with a
higher RF gain can result in a smaller IPL.
3. Changes to the aircraft furnishing
Considerable changes to the aircraft interior can also influence the coupling
path. Aircraft furnishing can attenuate electromagnetic waves before they leave
the fuselage through leakage points. In general, layout changes including the
movement of monuments do not have a significant impact on the IPL.
If the initial aircraft IPL measurements were performed on an empty aircraft, the
IPL measurements are worst and do not have to be re-measured. If the initial
aircraft IPL measurements were performed on a typical airline layout, the IPL
measurements are representative and do not have to be re-measured. On the
other hand, creating sections without furnishing, especially near leakage points,
or major changes in the aircraft interior can cause an undesirable IPL reduction
and may require test and/or analysis.
4. Modification of the cables or addition of components between the antenna and
the receiver RF input
Changes made to the navigation and communication system between the
antenna and the receiver may have to be analyzed as well. This is the case for
a relocation of the transceivers which may lead to a significant shorter cable
leading from the receiver to the antenna.
5. Change aircraft radio receivers
The interference path loss is independent of the aircraft radio receiver
performance. The susceptibility characteristic of a receiver influences only the
target IPL, not the measured IPL. Appendix A of ED-239 / DO-307A shows the
calculation of the target IPL. A reassessment of IPL tolerance is not needed if
the minimum performance standards applying to radio receivers are met.
5.4.2 System Safety
Front Door Tolerance is associated with aircraft receiver systems. In addition,
ED-239 / DO-307A TABLE 4-7 takes into account the criticality level when deriving the
IPL data for specific receivers. Appendix A provides an example of Mitigation and
Control using the SMS approach.
5.4.3 Mitigation and Analysis of IPL Data
In the event that the interference path loss target values defined in ED-239 / DO-307A
are not achieved after actual aircraft test measurements are taken, there may be ways
in which failure to meet the IPL target value(s) could be mitigated.
Depending on the zone of the aircraft where the test measurements were taken (for
example the forward cargo hold) it could be stated that the installation of a passenger
wireless system allows for the activation/use of PEDs in the passenger cabin area
only, and not in the area of the aircraft where IPL target values were not met.
Therefore, the constraint to meet the target IPL value between that zone of the aircraft
and that antenna receive may not necessarily be required.
© EUROCAE, 2016
34
Mitigation techniques may include:

1. Aircraft changes:
a. Gaskets added to the apertures,
b. Shielding material added to windows with proper treatment or bonding,
c. Addition of wave-attenuation material in the cabin, e.g. absorbing films
together with the thermal-acoustic insulation,
d. Moving antenna location,
2. Receiver system changes:
a. Adding out-of-band filtering to the receiver path to reduce spurious
emissions from interfering with the receiver. For example, LO/IF mixing
products could be filtered,
b. Adding in attenuation to the receiver path (note that this will also reduce
the signal at the RF input of the receiver),
3. Other mitigations:
a. Adjusting the MEF in order to adapt the IPL values of ED-239 / DO-307A,
Section CHAPTER 4. For example, the number of seats may be
decreased thus reducing the number of possible PEDs,
b. Section 5.4.1 can be used to help mitigate IPL discrepancies. In other
words, the changes that effect IPL measurements listed in section 5.4.1
can also be used to help mitigate IPL measurements.
c. Interpreting the percentile in TABLE 4-7 of ED-239 / DO-307A. See
section 5.4.2herein for further information,
d. Restricting usage of PEDs to specific phases of flight.
All mitigation methods have to be verified, proved or tested for later reference.
These are just of few of the possible methods that may be used to mitigate IPL target
value deficiencies. If methods to mitigate the inability to meet the IPL target values
are attempted, early coordination and discussions between the applicant and the
regulatory authority is encouraged.
5.4.4 Similarity of IPL Measurements to Other Aircraft
In order to perform the similarity analysis, data must be gathered on the aircraft where
the IPL measurement was made and on the aircraft where similarity will be used. This
data includes length, number and positions of windows/doors/apertures, antenna
specifications/characteristics, Avionics, position of measurement, and the actual IPL
measurements on the initial aircraft. If the aircraft is the same model, it is relatively
easy to show similarity and a direct comparison between antenna locations, antenna
gains and IPL margin can be used. However, for differing aircraft, the following data is
needed for each receiver/antenna system being analyzed:
1. IPL target requirement from ED-239 / DO-307A (this includes the MEF)
2. Measured IPL from the tested, or initial, aircraft (this provides IPL margin). This
includes all positions measured and the reported minimum IPL
3. Cable losses from the system measured
4. Geometry of the initial measured aircraft (i.e. fuselage diameter, distance from
the antenna to major aperture, etc.)
5. Geometry of the targeted aircraft
6. Antenna specifications/characteristics of the targeted aircraft.
© EUROCAE, 2016
35
Front Door similarity from the measured aircraft to the target aircraft can be claimed if:
1. Fuselage is the same or greater size than the measured aircraft and similarly
constructed
a. Similarly, constructed aircraft implies same geometric size of the
fuselage, fuselage material, number and size of
windows/apertures/doors, location of the antennas, and similar avionics
receiver systems.
2. Distance of antenna(s) from major aperture is equal or greater
a. Apertures are similar, that is, number of windows doors, etc. are similar
b. Distance from major aperture to antenna is the same or greater;
therefore, IPL is the same or greater
3. The initial aircraft IPL measurements were performed on an empty aircraft.
a. Although not required, this allows for a “worse case” IPL measurement to
be used for a comparison to other aircraft. IPL measurements performed
in an empty aircraft are assumed to be more severe than measurements
performed in a full completed aircraft. That is, if the initial measurements
of the IPL were performed on an “empty” aircraft (e.g., no seats, carpet,
etc.), adding absorptive material will only improve the IPL.
Based on the paragraphs above, data collected on one airplane can be used to show
Front Door Tolerance to other airplanes provided the aircraft have similar construction,
apertures, antenna locations, and avionics receivers.
NOTE: If one criterion of the paragraph 5.4.1 is affected the similarity approach
may be compromised. A thorough analysis, comparison, and
investigation of each difference needs to be performed.
As always, if a similarity analysis is attempted, early coordination and discussions
between the applicant and the regulatory authority is highly encouraged.
5.5 Supporting Documentation
The type certification applicant may demonstrate aircraft PED tolerance to intentional
transmissions (section 3 of ED-239 / DO-307A), spurious emissions (section 4 of
ED-239 / DO-307A), or both. The Airplane/Rotorcraft Flight Manual (or Supplement)
should provide appropriate instructions regarding the PED tolerance approval of the
aircraft (see section 5 of ED-239 / DO-307A). Any maintenance activities instructions
required to maintain the level of tolerance should be specified in the instructions for
continuing airworthiness (see section 5 of ED-239 / DO-307A). Section CHAPTER 3
provides further information on documentation required to show PED tolerance. Also,
once the Front Door Tolerance assessment has been accomplished maintenance
activities aspects (Section CHAPTER 7) needs to be considered.
5.6 ED-239 / DO-307A IPL TEST METHOD LESSONS LEARNED
ED-239 / DO-307A section 4 and Appendix B provide the methodology for establishing
the IPL measurements and comparing the results to the target IPL. The following
bullets provide some information on finding the initial IPL in aircraft. They are not
prioritized and do not encompass all lessons learned. It is highly encouraged that
experienced RF engineers be involved in the IPL measurements.
1. When using polarized transmit antennas, both horizontal and vertical
measurements should be obtained at every position measured,
2. In accordance with ED-239 / DO-307A Appendix B, the lowest IPL should be
used since this will give the worst case IPL data,
3. Ensure that the measurement is at least 6-10dB above the noise floor of the
Spectrum Analyzer or Network Analyzer,
4. Ensure that the bandwidth of the Spectrum Analyzer or Network Analyzer can
measure the entire test signal transmitted,
5. Do not modulate the transmitted signal,
6. Depending on the transmitted power, do not use the receive antenna for
transmitting as this may damage the Avionics antenna,
© EUROCAE, 2016
36
7. The measurement can be performed with a Network analyzer because the

isolation is bidirectional hence we can keep only the better parameter between
the S12 and the S21,
8. During testing, ensure that the aircraft antenna is actually receiving the test
signal. Minimize extraneous coupling through the test cables, DC blocking
(used for GPS), pre-amps, or any electronic device added for the testing. This
can be accomplished by segregating the test equipment (cables, measurement
instrument, etc.) from the test antenna,
9. The alternate method provided in ED-239 / DO-307A Section B.10 is an
acceptable approach to measuring IPL. However, using the reverberation
chamber method is a worst case measurement since the Q (Quality Factor) of
the airplane is unknown and may increase the measurement, thus reducing the
IPL. More information on Q and reverberation can be found in ED-14D change
1 / DO-160D change 1 and ED-234 / DO-357.
10. A relevant national telecommunications regulatory body (e.g., FCC) license may
be required when performing IPL measurements, depending on the amplitude.
In addition, the Airport Tower may need to be notified if performing this test at
an airport. Due diligence is required,
11. Ensure that all test equipment has a current calibration,
12. In the lower frequency ranges, the antenna dimensions may cause problems in
that way, that the positioning to the ED-239 / DO-307A is impossible, since the
interior is too narrow arranged. In this case shorter antennas, e.g. short bi-cone
antennas, may be used taking into account an antenna correction factor in
tolerance with DO-294C chapter 5.C.1.
© EUROCAE, 2016
37
CHAPTER 6
BACKDOOR COUPLING DEMONSTRATION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Back-door coupling includes the IRU, IRC, NIRU, NIRC, CEI, and CCT coupling paths
defined in table below. The table was adapted from ED-118 and ED-239 / DO-307A.
TABLE 6-1: BACK-DOOR COUPLING PATHS

Conclusions
PED
from
emission Coupling path Nomenclature Coupling type
previous
type
studies
Direct coupling
Must be
Intentional to equipment IRU Back Door
considered
Radiated Units
emissions Coupling to
(useful equipment Must be
IRC Back Door
signals) input considered
and Cables
Direct coupling Interference is
Non intentional to equipment NIRU Back Door unlikely in any
Radiated Units case
emissions Coupling to
Interference is
(spurious equipment
NIRC Back Door unlikely in any
emissions) input
case
and Cables
Already
considered as
Coupling to part
Equipment CEI Back Door of aircraft
Inputs equipment
installation
Conducted
certification
spurious
Already
emissions
considered as
Cross Talk part
(cable to cable CCT Back Door of aircraft
coupling) equipment
installation
certification
Directly conducted RF susceptibility, that is, IRC, NIRC, CEI and CCT, which could
result from RF emissions conducted from a PED through an in-seat power supply or
data port should be controlled by the in-seat power supply or data port certification
requirements. Per Section 2.2.4 from ED-239 / DO-307A, back-door interference from
spurious PED radiated RF emission (NIRU, NIRC) is unlikely, and does not need to be
addressed for aircraft PED tolerance or system compatibility. Therefore, IRU
(intentional radiated emission direct coupling to equipment units) is the only back-door
coupling susceptibility that needs to be evaluated for PED tolerance.
© EUROCAE, 2016
38
This section provides an acceptable means to perform a backdoor coupling

assessment and demonstration. It outlines the safety based risk assessment process
and guides the applicant on how to conduct aircraft level testing. Applicants should
prepare for testing/analysis or leverage previous results unless the aircraft certification
basis meets the Full HIRF criteria outlined in Section 3.6.1, or the PED technology has
an acceptable safety risk based on low power or high frequency. The procedures in
this section outline various risk assessments and mitigations that can limit the extent
of analysis and testing.
6.1.1 Backdoor Coupling Assessment Requirements
A backdoor coupling assessment is required when intentionally transmitting PEDs are
used on-board an aircraft. Typically, tolerance must be shown by applicants in order
to support the installation of a wireless or cellular system that enables the connection
of transmitting PEDs. Although the use of PEDs is an operator requirement,
applicants should consider the use of transmitting PEDs as a foreseeable operating
condition for tolerance under 14 CFR/EASA CS 23.1309, 25.1309, 27.1309 and
29.1309. See Section 0 and 3.2 for further guidance on the certification requirements.
The backdoor coupling assessment should follow a safety based risk assessment that
evaluates the RF hazard and resulting functional failure effects. All required systems
whose failure could lead to Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure conditions along
with cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders, must be assessed for PED
tolerance. Some systems can be excluded from detailed test and analysis based on
their location in the aircraft and proximity from intentionally transmitting PEDs. Other
mitigations include examining technology risk, leveraging existing results, and
performing similarity assessments which can limit the amount and type of aircraft test
or analysis.
The safety based risk assessment starts by determining the aircraft HIRF certification
basis, see Section 3.6.1 for HIRF aircraft classifications. The safety risk is acceptable
for aircraft that meet Full HIRF requirements. Therefore, a backdoor coupling
demonstration is already completed and the applicant does not need to perform
additional assessments, tests, or create unique continued airworthiness requirements.
Partial and Non-HIRF aircraft have some inherent safety risk and therefore require a
more careful consideration.
For all Partial HIRF or Non-HIRF aircraft, applicants should evaluate the technologies
that will communicate with the connectivity system. Section 6.2.2 presents certain
technologies (e.g. Bluetooth) with acceptable risk levels that do not require detailed
assessment. Further analysis is required if the aircraft does not meet the Full HIRF
requirements and the technology risk is not inherently accepted. Applicants should
start the assessment by identifying the aircraft systems and equipment requiring
evaluation. Equipment with failure modes classified as Catastrophic, Hazardous, or
Major along with cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders, require a backdoor
assessment. Some systems and equipment can be eliminated from the assessment
based on their location in the aircraft. See definition of aircraft PED Zones Section
6.2.3. The applicant shall then perform an Aircraft Safety Assessment to categorize
the systems and equipment based upon the failure classification. The Safety
Assessment should separate systems and equipment into systems which support
functions whose failure condition would be classified as a catastrophic failure as well
as systems which support functions whose failure condition would be classified as
Hazardous/Major failure. All Catastrophic part numbers require a dedicated
assessment while Hazardous/Major systems and cockpit voice and flight data
recorders can follow risk based safety approach described herein. Note, if an
applicant would like to isolate components within a catastrophic system and identify
those parts which only support non-catastrophic failure functions, they may do so in
their Safety Assessment in order to reduce testing.
© EUROCAE, 2016
39
Other risk mitigations include performing a backdoor coupling assessment by analysis.

Equipment that complies with the ED-14 / DO-160 Section 20 (RF susceptibility levels)
shown in ED-239 / DO-307A TABLE 3-1 meets requirements for demonstrating
backdoor compatibility. However, access to this data from Avionics manufacturers is
often difficult to obtain, at least for parties not involved with the equipment
installations. It may be possible to identify which category RF susceptibility tests were
performed by reviewing TSO information, CMM, Installation Manuals, or other source
data. Often the equipment TSO tag has the ED-14D change 1 / DO-160D change 1
version and qualification string from which this can also be determined. Applicants
may also perform similarity analyses that take credit for other aircraft tests or
comparable part numbers with previous test data. See section 6.2.5 for a list of
available mitigations and analysis techniques.
The applicant should develop a complete list of systems and equipment that will be
tested on the aircraft or in a laboratory once all mitigations have been exhausted.
Testing will then be accomplished in accordance with the Section 6.3 procedures.
Interferences encountered during testing should be classified based on significance
and available risk mitigations. The applicant can then perform a final risk assessment
and determine whether the risk is acceptable, acceptable with mitigation, or
unacceptable. The final risk classification will determine part number configuration
control requirements as well as the continued airworthiness procedures.
6.1.2 High Level Process Summary
A high level overview of the back-door compatibility assessment process is presented
in FIGURE 6-1 with process descriptions in TABLE 6-12.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Perform A/C HIRF Assess existing
Start Pre-Test Identify Systems Perform Aircraft Prepare for Test Perform A/C Testing
and Technology Risk analysis or test data
Analysis Requiring Evaluation Safety Assessment (if applicable) (if applicable)
Assessment (if applicable)
7 8 9 10 11
Analyze Assess Risk for Establish Continued Implement
Start Post-Test Develop
Interferences Hazardous and Airworthiness Monitoring and End
Analysis Documentation
(if applicable) Major Systems Requirements Control Program
FIGURE 6-1: PROCESS OVERVIEW FOR AIRCRAFT BACKDOOR COMPATIBLITY

ASSESSMENT
© EUROCAE, 2016
40
TABLE 6-2: DETAILED EXPLANATIONS TO FIGURE 6-1

Ref # Detailed Explanation
1 A/C HIRF Risk Assessment
Utilize definitions of Section 3.6.1 to determine the HIRF certification basis of
the target airframe. If the Airframe is a Full HIRF aircraft, an acceptable
level of safety has been reached and no additional backdoor coupling
assessment is required.
Technology Risk Assessment
For Partial HIRF and Non-HIRF aircraft follow guidance in Section 6.2.2 to
determine whether technology risk is accepted or requires additional
assessment through test and analysis.
2 Evaluate systems and equipment requiring assessment following guidance
from Section 6.2.3.
3 Perform Aircraft Safety Assessment to classify systems and equipment into
2 categories: Catastrophic and Hazardous/Major. Use methods described in
Section 4.1 and 6.2.4.
4 Perform analysis to leverage existing results, establish PED tolerance using
ED-14 / DO-160 data, or complete similarity analysis. The analysis
techniques are used to reduce the level of testing required. See Section
6.2.5.
5 Develop a list of systems and equipment without previous test results or the
ability to substantiate PED tolerance through analysis. This is the list of
systems and equipment requiring test. Prepare for test following Section
6.2.6.
6 Perform testing in accordance with Section 6.3 recommended test methods.
Alternatively, test the system and equipment in a laboratory per
ED-14 / DO-160 Section 20 requirements defined in ED-239 / DO-307A
TABLE 3-1.
7 Equipment may show RF susceptibilities during test. Follow Section
6.3.13.2 to troubleshoot interferences and determine if mitigations are
available or if equipment is not tolerant to PED backdoor coupling.
8 Compile test and analysis data to determine if positive test results exist for:
 100% of systems supporting functions with Major and/or Hazardous
failure conditions
 100% of systems supporting required voice and data recorders
 100% of part numbers supporting functions with Catastrophic failure
conditions
Establish final risk acceptance level following process in Section 6.2.7.
9 Develop documentation in accordance with Section 6.4.
10 Establish any continued airworthiness requirements that need to be included
in the applicant’s Instructions for Continued airworthiness report. See
Section 6.2.7.2.
11 Operators shall implement control and monitoring program per Section
6.2.7.3.
6.2 BACKDOOR COUPLING ASSESSMENT PROCESS

The Backdoor Coupling Assessment process follows the tenants from the Safety Risk
Management (SRM) process. The hazard associated with IRU (intentional radiated
emission direct coupling to equipment units) must be assessed and mitigated to
assure required systems perform intended function under the PED operating
environment. Aircraft that comply with Full HIRF requirements have already
demonstrated sufficient mitigation and meet the criteria for PED backdoor coupling
demonstration. Some technologies do not pose a safety risk and therefore can be
considered acceptable without mitigations, see Section 6.2.2. All other technologies
used on Non-HIRF or Partial-HIRF require a backdoor coupling assessment.
© EUROCAE, 2016
41
The safety risk associated with transmitting PEDs is understood throughout the
aviation industry. The committee involved with the publication of this specification has
considerable experience performing PED tests across multiple different aircraft type.
Results have been collected for 4,000 parts with very limited number of observed
interferences. The reason for the limited number of observed interferences is likely
due to the low probability of signals radiating at an affecting frequency, power level,
and illuminating the equipment to its vulnerable side. There are a lot of factors that
have to be lined up to result in equipment upset since the PEDs are not intentionally
radiating the aircraft systems. The types of failures resulting from the interferences
shown during tests are typically not above the Major category. Major failures on an
aircraft are an accepted risk under the system safety process and allow a reduced
safety margin when compared to catastrophic failures. Pilots are well within their
capabilities to handle major failure conditions and still able to land the aircraft safely.
Several of the systems with observed interferences have cross checks and post
appropriate annunciations to warn the pilot for system malfunctions. Furthermore, in-
service experience shows very few PED related incidents over the last 15 years,
despite the proliferation of passenger devices and connectivity system installations
and is further helped by electronic component miniaturization consuming less power.
Even though the safety risk for transmitting PEDs is low it still must be assessed on an
aircraft basis. However, assessing the level of severity and applying a reduction in
requirements is a practical way to address the risk. This tiered approach has been
used in other areas such as HIRF and Lightning as well as damage tolerance and
fatigue evaluation of structure. Catastrophic failures will not be compromised and
therefore require more rigor in the testing and analysis procedures. A reduced set of
requirements can apply to equipment performing functions leading to Hazardous and
Major failures, as well as cockpit voice and flight data recorders. Leveraging previous
applicant experience, in-service history, and operational mitigations can lower the
safety risk for this equipment. To this end, all equipment performing catastrophic
functions must have a detailed assessment involving dedicated analysis and/or test.
Equipment involved with Hazardous or Major failures can be analyzed or tested at the
system level. See following definitions below:
1. System Level Analysis & Testing: This is required for systems and equipment
with Hazardous or Major failure conditions along with cockpit voice recorders
and flight data recorders. Analysis or testing is accomplished at a system level
irrespective of the specific part numbers used in the system. Part number
configuration control is not required. As an example an applicant may
demonstrate PED tolerance for a TCAS system by performing an on-aircraft
test. If the TCAS system does not exhibit interference the TCAS system on that
particular aircraft type can be established as PED tolerant. The applicant or
operator does not need to track the specific part numbers associated with the
various interchangeable parts for systems with Hazardous or Major failure
conditions along with cockpit voice and flight data recorders. The PED risk is
mitigated by performing a system level assessment as well as leveraging
applicant experience, in-service history, RF shielding/protections inherent within
avionic system designs, and taking credit for common design philosophies used
throughout a particular fleet.
2. Part Level Analysis & Testing: This is required for systems and equipment with
Catastrophic failure conditions. Analysis or testing is accomplished at a part
number level. Part configuration control is required. An applicant
demonstrating PED tolerance for a system with Catastrophic failure conditions
would need to collect analysis or test results for each LRU within the system
that have functional failures that could lead to catastrophic failures. Because of
the severity of the risk, it must be mitigated by dedicated test or analysis for all
equipment performing functions that could lead to catastrophic failures.
© EUROCAE, 2016
42
In order to demonstrate PED backdoor coupling tolerance, the following criteria must
be met via test or analysis:
 100% of systems supporting functions with Major and/or Hazardous failure
conditions along with cockpit voice and data recorders. When the system can
consist of multiple alternative part numbers then analysis and testing shall be
accomplished for at least one set of components/parts that make up a system.
 100% of part numbers supporting functions with Catastrophic failure conditions.
Analysis and testing must be accomplished for each component or part installed
on the aircraft.
See flow chart in FIGURE 6-2 for Backdoor Coupling Assessment Process.
Start
Yes
Full HIRF
Done
Aircraft?
No
Yes
Low Risk
Technology?
No
Implement
Identify Systems
Monitoring and
Requiring Test
Control Program
Classify Systems and Assess Risk Level

Equipment by CAT and Apply
and HAZ/MAJ Mitigations
Yes
Perform Analysis
100% Systems and 100%
and Assess Existing
CAT Parts covered?
Results
No
Perform A/C Testing
Collect and Analyze

Results
FIGURE 6-2: BACKDOOR COUPLING ASSESSMENT FLOW CHART
© EUROCAE, 2016
43
6.2.1 Perform Aircraft Risk Assessment

The first step in assessing the aircraft risk is to understand the original design and
certification levels of the airframe. Using Section 3.6.1 the HIRF certification level of
the aircraft can be identified. The assessment is considered complete if the airframe
is determined to be a Full HIRF. The safety risk is accepted due to the aircraft
systems and equipment meeting the RF susceptibility requirements defined by the
HIRF regulations. Aircraft that do not have HIRF under the original TC cert basis
require further evaluation for backdoor PED tolerance.
6.2.2 Perform Technologies and frequency band risk evaluation
While it is the goal of this document to provide a means to assess an aircraft’s
tolerance to all commercially utilized technology standards, the certification applicant
is only required to consider the uplink technologies supported by the installed system.
Most WLAN systems utilize the same frequency for uplink and downlink and therefore
allow for a simple selection when considering test and analysis assessment points.
However, most cellular technologies use slightly different frequencies between the
uplink and downlink bands. Both uplink and downlink frequencies will be part of the
aircraft environment when connectivity systems are installed. The cellular downlink
bands emulate signals emitted by terrestrial networks using the installed picocell
and/or Network Controlling Unit. The uplink frequencies are those radiated by various
transmitting PED devices. The applicant should prove aircraft system backdoor
tolerance with the downlink frequency bands through on-aircraft tests with the
connectivity system installed. This is part of the applicant’s CFR/EASA CS 23.1431,
25.1431, 27.1431 and 29.1431 showings of compliance. The backdoor coupling
demonstration described in this document addresses the uplink frequencies for each
technology used by PEDs on board the aircraft.
Not all intentional transmitted signals affect aircraft systems by back-door coupling.
The severity of a backdoor coupling threat is determined by output power, frequency,
duty cycle and proximity. If it is determined, that certain technologies do not affect the
aircraft systems, transmitting PEDs using these technologies can be considered to
present an acceptable level of risk and be treated like non-transmitting PEDs. If a
technology cannot be classified as a low risk on its own, the technology must be
assessed in conjunction with the known aircraft certification, design and testing basis
as defined in this section.
1. Low Power technologies
Experience shows that low-power emission levels do not affect aircraft systems.
The low-power emission limit is 100mW EIRP (equivalent isotropic radiated
power). Wireless communication standards which are limited to this level do not
need to be analyzed for backdoor coupling. This includes Bluetooth
(IEEE 802.15.1), ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4). 100mW may be conservatively
considered representative maximum operating power of normal in-band WLAN
(IEEE 802.11) output power level in the 2.4GHz ISM band. Other devices
include radio microphones, on site paging devices, wireless audio applications
and radio hearing aids as low power technologies.
2. High Frequency technologies
Experience shows that back-door coupling mechanisms become less effective
with increasing frequency. To create a significant effect by back-door coupling
in frequencies above 8GHz extremely high field strengths are needed. Those
fields may be created by radar systems but not by portable devices. Therefore,
wireless communication standards using frequencies above 8GHz do not need
to be analyzed for backdoor coupling. This includes planned Wi-Fi
(IEEE 802.11) in the 60GHz band.
© EUROCAE, 2016
44
3. Near Field Communication (NFC)

Near field communication as per ISO/IEC 18092 and ISO/IEC 14443 does not
restrict a maximum output power by means of an EIRP value. Instead a
maximum magnetic field strength (7.5 A/m) at the target location is given. From
this and the technology of the NFC antenna it can be concluded that the emitted
power levels are far below 100mW EIRP. Therefore, NFC as per
ISO/IEC 18092 and ISO/IEC 14443 is a low-power technology and does not
have to be evaluated for back door coupling.
4. Ultra-Wideband communication (UWB)
UWB devices for communication or location typically emit peak power of less
than 100mW EIRP. In this case these UWB devices can be treated like low
power technology and do not need to be evaluated any further for back door
coupling (see also ED-118).
Any other wireless technology needs to be assessed against the applicable aircraft
and installed system via Section 6.3 unless it can also be shown to operate under a
100 mW power level. Examples and elaboration on these items are included in
Appendix E.
6.2.3 Identify Systems and Equipment Requiring Evaluation
The first step in the process requires the applicant to evaluate which systems and
equipment require evaluation. Per Section 3, Equipment and systems that have
failure modes that are classified as catastrophic, hazardous, or major as well as
cockpit voice and flight data recorders are candidates for needing PED tolerant
demonstrations. However, many systems and equipment can be excluded due to
location within the aircraft along with accessibility of transmitting PEDs.
PED Zones
Any locations within the aircraft where transmitting PEDs can be operated in normal
flight must be considered for PED tolerance demonstration. These locations should
include but are not restricted to:
 the passenger cabin,
 the cockpit and flight deck,
 cargo bays,
 baggage compartments,
 crew rest areas/compartments,
 lavatories
 galleys.
If the PED tolerance demonstration is based on aircraft testing, the test antenna
should be placed in above mentioned PED areas.
Additionally, relevant equipment may be installed behind walls or in compartments
directly adjacent to PED areas. Since PED emissions are considered a local threat,
conductive material or conductive structures between the PED and the equipment of
concern may reduce the EM fields produced by the PED to a level of non-concern at
the equipment location. Engineering judgment or experience from previous tests
should be used to determine if equipment behind non-conductive walls need to be
considered for PED tolerance demonstration. If engineering judgment or experience
in previous tests show that this equipment could be affected, then this equipment
should be analyzed to a reasonable reduced level of PED emissions.
© EUROCAE, 2016
45
6.2.4 Perform Aircraft Safety Assessment

The regulations in 14 CFR 25.1309, and the associated guidance for this regulation in
FAA Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A are typically used to perform system safety
assessments and classify failure conditions according to their severity. Applicants
shall classify systems based upon 2 categories: (1) equipment performing functions
that would lead to catastrophic failures and (2) equipment performing functions with
hazardous or major failure effects. Refer to Section 4.1 for more information regarding
the Aircraft Safety Assessment process.
It is important to note that this document is not presenting guidance suggesting the
certification applicant perform a complete hazard assessment of the aircraft, but
instead provide sufficient classification and justification of the applicable systems
under test to determine which category these systems fall into. It is suggested that the
certification applicant provide a consolidated list of systems requiring an assessment,
the considered functions of that system, the failure classification and justification of the
classification as well as the intended mitigation. The failure classification should be
considered the most severe failure of each of the systems. Reference TABLE 6-3 as
a consolidated example.
TABLE 6-3: EXAMPLE OUTPUT FROM AIRCRAFT SAFETY ASSESSMENT
Catastrophic Failure
System Failure
Function Classification Mitigation
Description Classification
Justification
Loss of HF voice
Aircraft utilize HF
communications would System must be
High Frequency communications when
Hazardous/ increase crew workload assessed. Part
(HF) VHF (Line of Sight)
Major but would not prevent number control is
Transceiver communications is not
continued safe flight and not required.
sufficient.
landing.
Monitors the airspace Operational mitigations
System must be
Traffic collision around an aircraft for are available for TCAS
Hazardous/ assessed. Part
avoidance other aircraft equipped failures; MMEL allows
Major number control is
system (TCAS) with a corresponding dispatch with TCAS
not required.
active transponder inoperative.
Performs flight safety
Provides air data All part numbers
critical functions related
Air Data Inertial (airspeed, angle of including the
to aircraft speed,
Reference attack and altitude) interchangeable
Catastrophic orientation, and position.
System and inertial reference parts must be
Loss of this information
(ADIRS) (position and attitude) assessed and
would prevent continued
information controlled.
safe flight and landing.
Performs flight safety
critical functions by All part numbers
displaying attitude, including the
Electronic Flight Provide Flight Critical heading, airspeed, interchangeable
Catastrophic
Displays Performance Data altitude. Loss of this parts must be
information would prevent assessed and
continued safe flight and controlled.
landing.
© EUROCAE, 2016
46
6.2.5 Analyze Existing Data

After the applicant has identified all systems and equipment requiring test it should
evaluate whether any existing data can be used for PED tolerance demonstration in
order to preclude aircraft testing. If applicable, the applicant will compare the list of
systems and equipment evaluation with existing analysis or test results. This section
describes the various analysis methods that can be considered. Systems and
equipment that are classified as Major, Hazardous or Catastrophic, and have been
shown to meet the FAA/EASA HIRF regulation or EASA/JAA HIRF special condition,
are considered PED tolerant for back door effects. Similarly, systems and equipment
that are classified as Catastrophic and that have been shown to meet the FAA HIRF
special condition are also considered PED tolerant for back door effects.
6.2.5.1 Individual equipment qualification or laboratory tests
Systems which fulfill either HIRF qualification criteria for major, hazardous or critical
systems or TABLE 1 in section 3 of ED-239 / DO-307A are considered PED tolerant.
Proof of lab qualification standards can be accessed via the ED-14 / DO-160
Environmental Qualification Form, and sometimes presented in a Environmental
Qualification Form included on the LRU’s label. It may also be possible to identify
which category RF susceptibility tests were performed by reviewing TSO information,
CMM, Installation Manuals, or other source data.
6.2.5.2 Using Existing Results
Applicants involved with connectivity system installations typically have experience
performing backdoor coupling tolerance demonstrations. The applicant should review
prior test data to determine whether it can be applied towards new projects.
Consideration should be made based on the technologies tested in prior experience
along with airframe, systems, and part numbers tested.
Experience has shown that the use of personal mobile communication devices has
been steadily increasing. However, the actual power transmitted by any given single
device within a given frequency band is generally reducing. This is due to a number of
factors, including closer proximity and improved design of ground base-stations
(allows for smaller PED batteries and longer life), more efficient use of spectrum
(addressing the necessity to allow multiple devices to share the limited bandwidth),
and the need to not cause interference to other devices or to other radios contained
on the same device. It is forecast that emission from future PEDs will be no more
severe threat than today's devices and may be less severe.
In addition, it is recognized that the susceptibility of any electronic component has a
certain “bandwidth” as well as a susceptibility power level. During susceptibility testing,
either on board the aircraft or in the laboratory, the frequency band ranges and power
levels used are well in excess of the actual devices being used on board the aircraft
and provide considerable margin as well as the ability to extrapolate the results across
the entire frequency range and modulation characteristics of the current and future
systems. Therefore, it can be assessed that an aircraft, which is tolerant against
todays PEDs emissions, will also be tolerant against similar type threats in future. As a
conclusion, aircraft that have been demonstrated tolerant against all relevant
cellphone standards and wireless data communication standards at that time can be
regarded as fully PED tolerant similar to a certification as per ED-239 / DO-307A.
© EUROCAE, 2016
47
6.2.5.3 Part Similarity

Identical parts (e.g. same part number) in different aircraft can be considered similar, if
they are installed in a similar manner (e.g. bonding) in a similar aircraft RF
environment.
If previous test results exist for one particular model of aircraft, it becomes easier
through technical assessment or analysis to apply these results to other models as to
avoid additional testing. When similarity can be demonstrated (same family of aircraft)
it is sufficient to consider only the differences between an already qualified aircraft and
that aircraft under consideration. Similarity analysis includes for example the
differences in, aircraft wiring protection against RF exposure, location of aircraft
equipment, and the criticality of the aircraft equipment.
1. Software updates which are not hardware relevant (i.e. do not enable hardware
previously disabled) to LRUs from the same manufacturer do not require any
additional analysis or testing on basis that the physical hardware and aperture
design is not changing that could affect PED susceptibility.
2. Hardware changes to LRUs from the same manufacturer require an engineering
assessment to the type of change implemented. Certain vendor documentation
may be required to aid in this assessment.
a. Vendor Service Bulletins that describe the change from the previous part
number to the new part number.
b. Component or Aircraft Maintenance Manuals (CMM/AMM) that give the
physical depiction and breakout of the unit.
c. Installation Manuals.
d. Wiring Diagram Manuals (WDM) or Interconnectivity Diagrams (ICD) that define
the wiring interfaces and connections.
3. Same form, fit and function alone are not sufficient to conclude on similarity.
6.2.5.4 Similarity Across Airframes
It is possible that parts tested on one aircraft model can be similarly applied to other
aircraft models if the justification allows for this type of applicability. The criteria to be
used in the justification may vary depending upon the aircraft test methods used,
Zonal or Local Testing as described in more detail in section 6.3.
When assessing similarity to an aircraft tested using the Local Test method (reference
section 6.3.4.2), the following criteria need to be considered:
1. LRU wiring configuration
2. LRU Bonding
3. Other local installation characteristics which may affect RF absorption /
reflection, such as proximity to metallic structures.
If the Zonal method (reference Section 6.3.4.1) is used, then the applicant may also
need to include some or all of the following criteria, in addition to the considerations
listed above:
1. LRU location differences between the test aircraft and the new aircraft model
being evaluated.
2. Aircraft characteristics which may affect RF absorption / reflection between the
antenna transmit locations on the test aircraft and test aircraft LRUs, as
compared to the new aircraft model being evaluated.
3. Aircraft size or interior layout differences that would affect the power levels seen
by the LRUs.
Note that the criteria to be considered are the same irrespective of whether the test
aircraft and new aircraft being evaluated differ in size, were manufactured by different
OEMs, or if the two aircraft are merely minor model variants within a major model
family.
© EUROCAE, 2016
48
6.2.6 Prepare and Conduct A/C Testing

Testing is required if the certification applicant is unable to leverage existing results,
analysis, or complete similarity assessments. The certification applicant should
identify all remaining systems and equipment requiring assessment and prepare for
aircraft test. Follow section 6.3 to conduct aircraft testing. Before a testing program is
executed, the certification applicant should identify which systems require a part
number assessment and which require only a system level assessment.
6.2.7 Perform Final Risk Assessment
The final risk assessment is performed once the applicant has collected results for
100% of systems with Catastrophic, Hazardous or Major failure conditions and
voice/data recorders as well as 100% Catastrophic part coverage. The applicant
assesses the results obtained through testing to determine whether the backdoor
coupling risk can be accepted, accepted with mitigation, or unaccepted. The process
assesses mitigations including continued airworthiness requirements. Documentation
is developed in accordance with Section 6.4. Finally, the operator should incorporate
a monitor and controlling program to continuously assess the PED safety risk.
See flow chart in FIGURE 6-3 for final risk assessment process.
Collect Aircraft Test Identify Risk Determine Develop Monitor

Results Acceptance Level Mitigations Documentation effectiveness
FIGURE 6-3: FINAL RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
6.2.7.1 Identify Risk Acceptance Level

The applicant can evaluate the final risk level once testing or analysis is completed
and results collected. The risk should be classified using the below three levels:
Unacceptable. The PED risk is unacceptable unless one of the below two
conditions are met. The use of PED technology cannot be used on board an aircraft
if the risk is classified as Unacceptable.
Acceptable with Mitigation. The PED risk is acceptable if the following conditions
have been met via test or analysis with positive results:
 100% of systems supporting functions with Major and/or Hazardous failure
conditions
 100% of systems supporting required voice and data recorders
 100% of part numbers supporting functions with Catastrophic failure conditions
Configuration control processes are required mitigations for equipment performing
functions that could lead to catastrophic failures. Interferences observed during test
can be mitigated by use of placards restricting PED use or information provided to
the operator. Other mitigations may address continued airworthiness procedures
that require a new PED backdoor assessment if the connectivity system changes
technologies or cabin or other aircraft alterations affect the test results. See section
6.2.7.2 for further details.
Acceptable. The PED risk is acceptable if the aircraft meets the Full HIRF criteria or
the PED technology is classified as low risk. See sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.
© EUROCAE, 2016
49
6.2.7.2 Establish Continued Airworthiness Requirements

The applicant must identify and inform the aircraft operator of any limitations
associated with the future alterations or equipment changes on the aircraft. All
catastrophic parts must have a backdoor coupling assessment if PED technologies
are permitted during flight. In addition, all hazardous/major systems and voice/data
recorders require backdoor coupling assessment at the system level. The applicant
shall furnish a list of catastrophic parts with demonstrated PED tolerance. The list
shall also include the hazardous/major systems and voice/data recorder systems that
have been successfully assessed. If applicable, the list should identify any parts that
were shown as susceptible along with mitigations to address the risks. Operators are
required to maintain aircraft configurations with systems and equipment that have
demonstrated PED tolerance. The Operators can use the applicant supplied systems
and equipment list or follow other methods accepted by their local regulatory authority.
Some test methods produce results that are dependent upon the cabin layout. If the
results are impacted by cabin or other aircraft modification, then the applicant must
identify any limitations involving future alterations.
See section 7.0 for additional guidance in regard to Continued Airworthiness
requirements.
6.2.7.3 Implement Monitoring and Control Program
A vital part of any safety management system approach is to continuously monitor
the performance of the changed functions and measure its performance against
planned goals. When an operator expands the use of PEDs, they should adopt the
principles of safety assurance to validate those operations. Operators should
implement a monitoring a control program to continuously assess the PED risk.
Three important aspects of safety assurance are safety performance monitoring
measurement and review; management of change; and continuous improvement of
the safety system. Safety performance monitoring and measurement should be
the process by which the safety performance is verified in comparison to its safety
policies and objectives. This process should include:
1. Safety reporting - Train flight crews to report intermittent or transient system
problems that they notice during these operations. This should not focus on
the PEDs as a suspected cause, but rather reporting all anomalies.
2. Safety reviews including trending of data – Operators should incorporate
reviews of problem and trends as part of their reliability process.
3. Safety audits – Operators should conduct safety audits of their operations to
ensure crew tolerance with company procedures. This should include
evaluation of the level of competency and training of their crews.
Management of change should be a formal process that identifies how expansion of
use of PEDs may affect their established processes and procedures. The affect,
and the process or procedures used to address that affect should be documented.
Continuous improvement of the safety system should rectify situations identified
through safety assurance activities, paying particular attention to critical systems.
The operator should assess any problems with expected performance and their
implications in operational safety. Take necessary actions to address these
problems.
NOTE: If a problem is identified that has been confirmed to be caused by PED
use, that information should be shared with the aviation industry via
one of the available reporting mechanisms. Provide as much detail as
possible on how the interference was attributed to PED operation and
include details such as type of device and location in the where device
was operated.
© EUROCAE, 2016
50
6.3 METHODS FOR AIRCRAFT TESTING

Testing becomes required as defined by the certification applicant’s risk assessment
and test plan in Section 6.2. It is not expected to test every part on every aircraft, but
instead, establish a testing and continued airworthiness program that sets up an
adequate level of testing and configuration control based on the risk level.
Two basic test data point approaches and test execution approaches exist. Both
approaches within each of the methods are acceptable means of showing tolerance.
Therefore, the applicant will select a PED Coverage Method and the Test Execution
Method. The overall approach is summarized in Section 6-4 and the following
paragraphs provide more detail on the selections. However, these methods are not
exclusive as Local Testing may be required as a result of effects observed during
Zonal Testing.
PED Coverage Methods (select one):
The PED Coverage Method selection involves a decision whether the on address
PED technologies that will be used on the aircraft or to cover all widely used PED
technologies.
1. Technology-Specific Demonstration: Perform assessment for only the
technologies that will be used on the aircraft, for example, those that will
interface with an on-board connectivity system. This method does not
establish complete aircraft PED tolerance and the operator will therefore be
responsible preventing the on-board use of other technologies using
procedures detailed in section 7.5.
2. PED Tolerance: Perform assessment to cover the technologies that are widely
used by PEDs. This method establishes complete aircraft PED tolerance and
testing is conducted using a standardized set of frequency bands, power
levels and modulations detailed in section 6.3.2.
Test Execution Methods:
The Test Execution Method decision determines how the test environment will be
applied on the aircraft, leading to tests covering equipment located within areas of the
aircraft (‘Zonal Testing’) or covering specific items of equipment (‘Local Testing’):
1. Zonal Testing: Testing is performed to illuminate aircraft zones and cover all
parts installed within the zones. Typical zones include the cockpit/flight deck,
cargo areas, avionics bays and cabin sections.
2. Local Testing: Part-specific isolation testing with test equipment targeting
individual parts installed in the aircraft, similar to ED-14 / DO-160 section 20 test
setup, but on the aircraft.
If using Zonal Testing, a high-power signal is radiated from a limited number of test
positions, each one illuminating a zone under test. Parts within the particular zone are
demonstrated to be PED tolerant if no interference effects are observed and no further
assessment of those parts is required. However, any effects found during Zonal
Testing are to be assessed further, including by performing Local Testing where
necessary.
Local Testing is performed with PED-representative signal powers with the
transmitting antenna located close the required parts. Parts are demonstrated to be
PED tolerant if no interference effects are observed and no further assessment of
those parts is required, even if the Local Testing is the result of effects observed
during Zonal Testing. However, any effects observed during Local Testing have to be
evaluated further.
The remainder of this section lays out the necessary steps to accomplish a complete
testing sequence. This includes establishing test plans (determination of test levels,
test frequencies and test locations), test execution process and the post-test analysis.
© EUROCAE, 2016
51
FIGURE 6-4: AIRCRAFT BACKDOOR TEST OPTIONS
6.3.1 Technology-specific test point determination

The signal levels to be used can be based upon the specific technologies being
simulated and will be determined by the magnitude of the PED transmitted signal and
other applicable factors. Test frequencies can be calculated using the guidance in
section 6.3.2, limited to the specific frequency bands utilized by the PED technologies
of interest (e.g. only considering IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi frequency bands). If another
methodology is used to determine the test frequencies, for example reducing the
number of discrete test frequencies with a corresponding increase in the transmit
power level, additional analysis and/or justification may need to be provided to
demonstrate that the specific PED technologies under consideration have been
adequately represented. Aircraft that have been demonstrated tolerant against all
relevant cellphone standards and wireless data communication standards at that time
can be regarded as fully PED tolerant similar to a certification as ED-239 / DO-307A.
© EUROCAE, 2016
52
Advantages of a technology-specific demonstration include:

 The test scope can be reduced to address only the specific technologies of
interest
 The process of obtaining test licenses from local regulatory agencies may be
simplified based upon a reduced test scope
Drawbacks of this approach include:
 The testing performed is limited to the specific technologies considered at the
time of test, and additional testing may be required as PED technology
standards evolve over time, or if the operator later desires to expand the PED
operational approval to a greater set of PED technologies.
6.3.2 PED Tolerance Test signal definition
The method described in this section determines test signals to demonstrate tolerance
against specific wireless technologies or full tolerance against current and future
transmitting PEDs. The test shall be performed to verify that the possible
electromagnetic threat caused by PEDs is less than the susceptibility threshold of the
aircraft electronic systems. To achieve this, the test shall be performed with the signal
generator producing representative test signals.
The test signal that needs to be considered is dependent on the PEDs communication
standards planned to be used on the aircraft. The test signal properties that need to
be determined are frequency range, power and modulation. In Appendix B it is shown,
how these values can be determined for any communication standard. The tables
below show the applicable values for the most common cellphone and data
communication standards. Using this data, the test signals can be determined for
specific cases of wireless PEDs.
For general use, a test in the frequency ranges shown in TABLE 6-7, with continuous
wave and pulse modulation and a test power shown in TABLE 6-5 and 6-6 is
recommended for a full backdoor coupling tolerance against PEDs. This is considered
equivalent with certification as per ED-239 / DO-307A section 3:
TABLE 6-4: FREQUENCY RANGES FOR FULL PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT

410 - 495 MHz 698 - 960 MHz 1430 - 1514 MHz
1626 - 1661 MHz 1710 - 1999 MHz 2010 - 2030 MHz
2110 - 2180 MHz 2300 - 2496 MHz 2500 - 2700 MHz
3600 - 3800 MHz 5150 - 5900 MHz
TABLE 6-5: CW TEST SIGNAL POWER FOR FULL PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
EIRP for Zonal EIRP for Zonal EIRP for Local Alternative Field
Test in dBm Test in dBm Test in dBm Strength for
(cabin/cargo) (cockpit) Local Test in V/m
0.00 - 8.00 42 36 36 Refer to ED-239 /
GHz DO-307A
TABLE 3-1
above 8GHz Test not necessary
TABLE 6-6: PULSE TEST SIGNAL POWER FOR FULL PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
0.00 - 8.00 42 36 36 Refer to ED-239 /
GHz DO-307A
TABLE 3-1
© EUROCAE, 2016
53
Frequency stepping:
After necessary frequency ranges have been determined, the actual test frequencies
have to be defined. Constrains beyond the control of a test engineer may have to be
respected e.g. available test licenses. Ideally the frequency range is divided into test
frequencies analogue to ED-14 / DO-160 with 100 frequencies per decade roughly
logarithmically spaced. This is equivalent to a frequency stepping of 2.3%.
If external constraints prevent this ideal frequency stepping, the test frequencies can
be arranged so that every frequency in the range under test is not more than 2.3%
away from an initially foreseen test frequency. In this case the overall number of test
frequencies shall still be at least 100 per decade. If this is still not possible, other
means of compensation should be considered.
6.3.3 Systems under Test
All aircraft systems relevant for testing shall be completely installed and fully
operational. Their functional tests shall be successfully completed. Also, existing in-
flight entertainment system and other non-essential equipment (e.g. galley equipment)
should be operational. The aircraft should be in a configuration that represents the
conditions during a typical flight.
For sustaining aircraft PED tolerance, it is necessary to record the part numbers of the
aircraft systems under test (major components). The purpose of this is to establish the
aircraft at the time of test and the results of this test which may be applicable for
similar considerations for follow-on installations on other aircrafts. For this application,
major components are defined as the major data processing and data displaying
components, such as those found in the flight deck, equipment bays and equipment
racks. Relays, switches, or other similar devices that typically are not affected by
electromagnetic fields from the established aviation environment are not necessary to
be recorded.
6.3.4 Test Locations
Test locations are those locations where the test antenna is placed in the aircraft.
Define all test locations with position and approximate antenna height above floor
level.
6.3.5 Zonal Test
Place test antennas inside the aircraft as required by the PED zones as indicated
below. If only a limited number of systems require testing and a zonal approach is
chosen, the number of required test positions can be reduced to only the PED zones
containing the systems to be tested, accordingly.
The antenna positions are selected from the following possibilities.
1. Cockpit / Flight Deck
One antenna position about 1m aft of center instruments and 1m above floor is
sufficient to illuminate the full cockpit/flight deck
2. Cabin
In large aircraft, several antenna positions in the cabin are needed to illuminate
the cabin area. It is recommended to select positions in the cabin center aisle
and additional in positions in between as required (approx. every 8m). In
aircraft layouts with two aisles the antenna can be positioned in either of those
aisles or in the middle of both.
In small aircraft one antenna position in the middle of the cabin is sufficient.
Larger cabin sections that are separated by attenuating installations, e.g. by
monuments or walls, shall be tested individually.
In general lavatories and galleys are covered by the cabin test positions.
Repetitive installation of equipment throughout the aircraft length does not
require multiple test positions.
© EUROCAE, 2016
54
3. Cargo Area
Since an empty cargo bay is a highly reflective environment, one antenna test
position in each cargo bay is sufficient to illuminate the whole bay. The center of
the cargo bay should be chosen.
4. Other locations (e.g. crew rest areas)
Testing in crew rest areas should also be considered if they are extra rooms as
well as all other overhead or underfloor facilities.
6.3.6 Local Test
For Local Test the test antenna is placed in a close distance of approximately 10 to
20 cm distance to equipment or system. Out of PED zones 1 meter may also be
considered valid, because the equipment is located outside of the PED zones (see
6.2.3). It may be for example located behind walls or linings, while the test antenna is
placed in the same distance to the wall or lining. It is sufficient to place the test
antenna in PED zones.
6.3.7 Test Equipment
The test setup typically comprises the following equipment:
1. A Signal Generator for creating the test signals determined in section 6.3.2
2. A Power Amplifier for amplifying the test signals to the required level
3. A Power Splitter/Coupler for dividing the signal generator or power amplifier
output into a branch to the test antenna and a branch for the test signal control
and monitoring loop
4. A Test Receiver, generally a spectrum analyzer, for monitoring the test signal
and checking the power level
5. A Test Antenna for radiating the test signal
6. An Electric Field Meter/Probe for monitoring the field strength generated by the
test setup
7. Cables to connect the different components of the test setup
In addition to the setup’s internal signal control and monitoring loop, an electrical field
meter should be used to verify on a sample basis that the field strength generated by
the test setup stays within the correct limits.
Ideally, the antenna types to be used are mono-cone or bi-cone antennas because of
their broadband characteristics exhibited over the required frequency range. Dipole-
type antennas are not recommended because of their narrowband characteristics.
Additionally, low or no directivity is important to approximate an isotropic radiator
scenario.
All transmit power given in this section is the EIRP radiated by the test antenna. EIRP
can be obtained from the forward power compensated by antenna cable loss; antenna
gain of low directivity antennas may be disregarded (i.e. assumed to be 0 dBi),
provided the calibrated gain is within a range of -1 to +4 dBi. The gain simplification is
justified by near-field effects and will mostly provide to an increase of the safety
margin.
If the transmitted power is calibrated in free space conditions in advance, the test can
be performed open loop. FIGURE 6-5 displays an example setup.
© EUROCAE, 2016
55
FIGURE 6-5: EXAMPLE FOR TEST SETUP
6.3.8 Regulatory Aspects

Transmission of test signals to simulate the RF environment in the aircraft caused by
the operation of PEDs in authorized frequency bands requires coordination with the
relevant national telecommunications regulatory body and spectrum owners. It needs
to be clarified whether a dedicated or general license for the test signal transmissions
is required. This should be done well in advance, as the process leading to
authorization can be lengthy.
Relevant parameters for the application will be defined by the relevant regulatory
body, but generally include the location of test, date of test, time frame during the day,
transmit power levels, desired frequency ranges and the desired number of discrete
frequencies for transmission within each frequency band and dwell time at each
particular frequency.
In the case that some frequencies will not be released for test transmission by the
local regulatory body, follow the guidance in section 6.3.2 to determine appropriate
alternative test frequencies, while maintaining sufficient coverage across the PED
frequency band(s).
6.3.9 Test Execution
As discussed in section 6.3 testing can be performed using:
 Zonal Testing supplemented, where interference effects are observed, by
limited Local Testing on affected parts; or
 Directly performing Local Testing on all parts required to be assessed for
PED tolerance.
© EUROCAE, 2016
56
6.3.10 Zonal Test

The first part of the Zonal Test approach and the parts installed within a given zone
are under test from a single transmitting antenna location on the aircraft. If
interference effects are observed during the Zonal Test, the affected parts shall be
subjected to further assessment, which may include a requirement for conducting
Local Testing on those parts. However, if no effects are observed, the parts tested
are demonstrated to be PED-tolerant and no further assessment is required for those
parts.
An acceptable approach is to configure all aircraft systems as near to flight conditions
as possible and monitor with the help of competent observers. Competent observers
are e.g. flight test engineers, pilots, ground test engineers or persons familiar with the
A/C technology. The test starts by illuminating the zone under consideration with RF-
signals from the test setup. If an antenna with linear polarization is used, the antenna
should be positioned in at least two orthogonal orientations. Typically, vertical and
horizontal orientations are chosen.
When the test has started, the observers have the task to assess the influence from
the test signal on the system area under observation. The relevant test results, all
findings or malfunctions, of all systems shall be documented during test as well as all
frequencies and test positons at which these occur.
A test cycle may include engine and APU runs as well as the operation of hydraulics
and pneumatics.
6.3.11 Local Test
If Local Testing was the selected method or if effects were observed during Zonal
Testing, parts are tested with a PED-representative power.
The signal level for this local test can be determined as per section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2 and
the Zonal Test and/or analysis may result in a reduced range of frequencies needing
to be tested. The test is performed at a close distance between the transmitting test
antenna and the part under test and at a level that is representative of the actual EIRP
of PED technologies.
6.3.12 Test Documentation
The test documentation and reports should contain precise description of testing and
results of the measurement performed. These documents should be usable to
reproduce the tests in the exact same way. Findings of abnormalities should be
clearly identified in the test report. Following information should be documented:
1. System/Equipment showing abnormality
2. Observed abnormal effect
3. Radiated frequency and transmit power level
4. Location of transmitting antenna
6.3.12.1 RF Exposure Safety Precaution
For the operation of test equipment on-board the A/C the appropriate safety
instructions shall be obeyed. During the test electromagnetic fields will be generated
inside the cabin at an increased power level. For safety reasons the amplification shall
be limited to legally permitted power density levels, to ensure the safety of the testing
staff, persons witnessing and observers and a minimum safety distance for personnel
shall also be established. This distance, along with the power density limits are given
by the country’s health standard. Some essential limits for testing are listed in
TABLE 6-7. In order to keep to the limits at a distance of approximately 0.5 m from the
emitter, an absolute limit on the Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) is to be
maintained. This has to be considered for the selection of the amplification level
required to perform the test.
© EUROCAE, 2016
57
TABLE 6-7: EXAMPLE RF EXPOSURE LIMITS

Interference to Limit for EIRP /dBm Limit for EIRP (dBm) Remarks
other services General (d = 0.5 m) Occupational (d = 0.5m)
must be Public distance Exposition
avoided. Exposition (W/m²)
Frequency (W/m²)
range
f / 200 MHz 38...45 f / 40 MHz 45...52 Duration ≥ 6
400 MHZ –
minutes
2000 MHZ
2000 MHz – 10 45 50 52 Duration ≥ 6

300 GHz minutes
6.3.12.2 Test Equipment Calibration

Test equipment must be shown to deliver at least the minimum requirements identified
in 6.3.1. Equipment that is needed to confirm the applied test levels shall be
adequately calibrated. When appropriate, all test equipment calibration standards
should be traceable to national and/or international standards.
6.3.12.3 Test Conditions & Environment
There is no general requirement for the location of the aircraft under test. Small
reflections from metallic structures outside of the aircraft can be tolerated. The aircraft
systems NAV/COM/SURV and other deemed necessary shall be operational and
configured as close to flight as necessary for the systems under test.
This normally requires the aircraft to be located in an open space.
A ground test engineer, a pilot or a comparable professional support
engineer/technician is needed to power on/off and control the aircraft systems over the
whole test duration since set-up.
Perform following steps:
1. Define test support requirements; for instance, a ground test engineer,
regulatory agency representative, pilot and/or a comparable professional
support engineer is needed to power on/off and control/evaluate the aircraft
systems throughout the tests
2. Identify best practices from testing in the field (i.e. do no conduct testing in a
fully enclosed hanger, stay away from areas of the airport with systems
outputting strong RF emissions like the ILS).
6.3.13 Post-Test
If testing has been completed without interference, no posttest analysis is required.
The required systems and parts should be assessed against the testing plan
developed in Section 6.2 and the test plan should be executed until the test plan is
exhausted. An observed interference is not necessarily grounds for test failure. The
subsequent sections will detail the certification applicant’s posttest analytical options
and path forward.
6.3.13.1 Post Test Analysis
After the backdoor coupling test was conducted, the ground test report has to be
evaluated. The test results which were documented in the ground test report have to
be checked and determined whether the test is passed or failed. A predefined
PASS/FAIL Criteria List has to be consulted.
Relevant PASS/FAIL criteria are (examples):
1. airworthiness requirements,
2. additional requirements by the local authority
3. operational requirements.
© EUROCAE, 2016
58
Any customer requirements may be included in the PASS/FAIL criteria but are not
relevant for showing tolerance on wireless standard immunity.
Alternatively, it is also acceptable to document the findings and assess them within a
post-test safety analysis.
6.3.13.2 Troubleshooting and Mitigations
The output of the aircraft susceptibility testing may produce results which cause some
level of interference displayed by the system under test. Any interferences witnessed
during testing may provide information indicating that a problem could exist under
certain conditions. A safety analysis should be conducted whereby the identified
hazards are analyzed for their likelihood and consequence of occurrence, and
appropriate mitigation is determined. Additionally, the applicant is encouraged to
identify the threshold in which the interference presents itself and determine if the
power level is a realistic situation which might occur onboard the aircraft.
This document depicts a similar decision-making process flow to what was described
in DO-294, beginning with the comprehensive list of interferences discovered in the
testing process, and ends with mitigation of all safety risks, as well as selected
acceptable risks. The process has three outcomes. After assessing the risks and the
effects and evaluating the mitigations, the risk assessment can conclude:
1. The risks are significant and cannot be mitigated, therefore, use of the PED
technology (or technologies) under consideration cannot be allowed on the
subject aircraft.
2. The risks are significant but can be mitigated by specific documented actions,
therefore use of the PED technology (or technologies) under consideration may
be allowed on the subject aircraft, contingent on implementation of the
mitigation actions.
3. There are no significant risks, therefore, use of the PED technology (or
technologies) under consideration may be allowed without further restriction
other than those used for the control of PEDs (in general) on the subject aircraft.
Interference effects apply to the potential failure of a function provided by the aircraft
system(s) that is (are) required for type certification or by operating rules, such that the
consequence of improper functioning would reduce safety margins. The organization
seeking to allow use of PEDs should have, or develop, a process that serves to
identify the outcome(s) of electromagnetic interference with affected system.
The safety analysis step is to assess the risk(s) of the identified failure mode on the
operation of the aircraft. This crucial step involves anticipating what operational
outcomes can be anticipated as a result of an identified EMI interference. The
organization seeking allowance should formulate as extensive a list of potential failure
modes and effects as possible.
It is important to note that multiple potential safety effect outcomes are possible for
any potential emitter-path-victim scenario. Each should be assessed separately. For
example, a single emitter-path-victim interference scenario could produce a warning
light indication and also an un-commanded flight control event. These two effects then
might subdivide to:
1. The level of automation used by the flight deck crew to control the aircraft in
view of a warning signal from the automatic systems
2. Flight path control
3. Crew attention interruption with a corresponding increase in crew workload.
Another variable in assessing risk for an effect is the phase of flight in which it occurs.
The phase of flight information developed in earlier process steps should be used for
this purpose. For example, suppose that the victim in an emitter-path-victim scenario
is the glide slope receiver. This system is critical during the approach phase, but not in
cruise. For this reason, there would be good reason to stipulate this finding as a safety
risk below the sterile cockpit altitude but not above that level. A mitigation of this
unacceptable risk could be to prohibit use of the PED technology below the sterile
cockpit altitude, for example.
© EUROCAE, 2016
59
In some cases two or more mitigating actions will be necessary to fully diminish a
safety issue as indicated by the, notation to “consider mitigations singly and in
combination” for each of the three mitigating paths portrayed. For example, a
hardening action may considerably reduce the risk of interference to a relatively low
probability but not eliminate it from consideration. A companion procedural mitigation
may be required to isolate the effect by phase of flight or by a crew workaround
contained in procedural documentation.
6.3.13.3 Risk Assessment Validation Criteria
Once all testing and analysis options have been executed for a platform the
certification applicant should review the complete data distribution now available to
them. If all systems and required parts have been tested without interference no
further risk classification is required, but if an interference has been found on a
catastrophic failure condition system that cannot be mitigated via section 6.3.8.2, then
the part number must be excluded from the list of acceptable part numbers and
reported to the operator as such. The same applies if an interference is found on a
hazardous/major failure condition system or voice/data recorders, the certification
applicant must blacklist the part and report the information to the operator. All non-
compatible parts with unmitigated interferences must be tracked. If a possibility exists
that the unmitigated interference cannot be isolated to a given manufacture or
application, all part numbers which might be utilized for that system should be
assessed.
6.4 DELIVERABLES
Once the PED backdoor coupling tolerance evaluation described in the previous
sections has been completed, a detailed Tolerance Report should be provided to the
aircraft certification authorities or the approving organization. This report should
contain all the information relevant to the PED tolerance evaluation, including details
of any testing performed, risk assessments included in the evaluation, mitigation
steps, etc. The report should clearly state the technical approval of either a
technology specific demonstration (see section 6.3.1), or a statement of PED
tolerance (see section 6.3.2), as well as any instructions for continued airworthiness
that will be communicated to the operator (see section 7), flight manual modifications,
or modifications to established maintenance practices, such as limitations on aircraft
equipment interchangeability.
© EUROCAE, 2016
60
CHAPTER 7
SUSTAINING AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANCE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The preceding sections of this document provided guidance on methods to
demonstrate that an aircraft is Portable Electronic Device (PED) tolerant through
testing and/or analysis of the front door and back door radio frequency (RF) coupling
effects of PEDs. Consequentially after having demonstrated aircraft PED tolerance,
this section focuses on the definition of guidelines and considerations that operators
should take into account in order to sustain that aircraft PED tolerance. A general
overview on the content of this Sustaining Aircraft PED Tolerance section and the
structure of guidelines provided herein is shown in FIGURE 7-1.
FIGURE 7-1: HIGH LEVEL FLOW CHART OVERVIEW OF SECTION 7
© EUROCAE, 2016
61
7.1.1 Background and Challenges

Ensuring sustained aircraft PED tolerance is dependent on aircraft-configuration
management and potentially certain aircraft-maintenance documentation (such as, but
not limited to the Illustrated Parts Catalogue IPC) listing installed part numbers and
approved interchangeable part numbers.
NOTE: The approved interchangeable part numbers may not necessarily be PED
tolerant.
Aircraft operators are realizing the impacts on aircraft sustained PED tolerance with
regards to aircraft equipment configuration and interchangeable parts, because these
interchangeable parts may potentially limit the operator’s flexibility in regards to
continuous PED operation. These approved interchangeable parts may not be
documented as PED tolerant or in fact not even be PED tolerant, and therefore this
required information may not be transparent to the aircraft operator.
Often at remote line maintenance stations not all aircraft interchangeable parts are
stocked. An occasion may arise where the only available approved/interchange part
(needed to remedy an aircraft problem), has not been proven PED tolerant.
Generally sustaining PED tolerance is considered an effort involving both system
engineering (for the definition of requirements for proof and sustainability) and
maintenance personnel (for the actual physical labor on the aircraft).
However, during typical aircraft operation, maintenance personnel must have all the
data necessary to perform maintenance on an aircraft. Additional interaction with
systems-engineering organization is not intended at this stage. Processes and
procedures to maintain aircraft PED tolerance should preserve this operational
relationship.
7.1.2 Sustaining Aircraft PED Tolerance
PED tolerance generally means certain aircraft systems show no unacceptable
adverse effects after being subjected to tests at specified frequencies and levels of RF
energy being impinged on the aircraft systems. Additionally, subsequent analysis
determines that an aircraft is tolerant to front door and back door coupling effects.
The outcome of the tests and/or analysis is valid only for the approved configuration of
the aircraft as tested or for which the analysis was performed against. Altering the
aircraft in any way from the approved configuration in which it was tested or upon
which the analysis was done could invalidate the results and therefore making the
aircraft no longer PED tolerant.
7.1.3 Factors on PED Tolerance
Aircraft are determined to be PED tolerant through testing and/or analysis of the
aircraft and aircraft systems.
 Front door tolerance is determined through testing and/or analysis in
accordance with Section 5.
 Back door tolerance is determined through testing and/or analysis in
accordance with Section 6.
PED-tolerance impacts from intentional aircraft alterations can be managed through
establishment of alteration review and approval procedures, and adherence to proper
Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS) procedures. FIGURE 3-2 and
FIGURE 3-3 of this document examine aircraft alteration considerations.
PED tolerance can also be impacted by maintenance practices that affect the methods
by which RF energy couples into aircraft systems. Examples are changes in door seal
composition (if special seals were installed in order to achieve IPL levels),
repositioning wires, connector corrosion, wire shielding damage, etc. PED tolerance
impacts from maintenance practices requires the examination of Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness (ICA) and tolerance with EWIS practices and principals,
tolerance with High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) related maintenance tasks and
with reliable aircraft configuration management. In general, however, standard
maintenance practices including configuration control of Catastrophic failure condition
equipment is sufficient to maintain PED tolerance.
© EUROCAE, 2016
62
Section 7.3 and 7.4 of this document addresses in more detail General Maintenance
and Configuration Management considerations.
7.1.4 PED Tolerance and Continued Airworthiness
Airworthiness is restricted to aircraft systems, parts, equipment, etc. installed on an
aircraft and therefore part of the certification. This is independent from PED tolerance
per definition. PED tolerance does not affect the general aircraft airworthiness, which
is considering the aircraft itself, and this aircraft airworthiness is unaffected by PED
radiation exposure from devices brought in by passengers or crew. Therefore, the
audience for the processes described herein (maintenance personnel, crew/flight
crew/flight ops) differs from that of FIGURE 3-2 and FIGURE 3-3 (engineering).
7.1.5 Impact on Configuration Management
The existence of a Configuration-Management System and Process is essential to
ensure the approved configuration for all specific serial-number airframe.
In day-to-day operations it is desirable to the personnel performing aircraft
maintenance or repair tasks to not have to involve their engineering staff and/or
technical decision makers. To achieve this, personnel performing aircraft
maintenance or repair tasks are required to use standard and fail-safe methods to
determine:
 That the equipment (and their function as intended), parts and materials are
approved for the aircraft (including, but not limited to PED tolerance
information).
 The approved processes and documentation to implement repairs.
 The approved processes and documentation to perform maintenance on the
aircraft (including, but not limited to replacement/exchange of equipment,
according to IPC).
Section 7.4 (Configuration Management) of this document addresses this in more
detail.
7.2 ALTERATION CONSIDERATIONS
Continued airworthiness solely addresses the requirements and guidance for
maintaining the aircraft in an approved configuration. This means that any action to
the aircraft leading to a deviation from its current approved configuration would be
considered an alteration. This requires an assessment according to the processes
defined in FIGURE 3-2 or FIGURE 3-3 for the effects the alteration may have in both
front door and back door coupling and is not subject of this section.
The impact on the PED tolerance of an aircraft due to alterations to that aircraft though
will be different for HIRF certified aircraft (as defined in Section 3) than on aircraft that
have partial HIRF certification or non-HIRF certified aircraft (as defined in Section 3).
7.2.1 Additional Alteration Considerations
The following need to be taken into account when considering aircraft alterations and
continued aircraft PED tolerance.
 The operator’s aircraft design/system department is responsible to ensure the
availability of valid design approvals and maintenance procedures (the latter
resulting from those approvals) to maintain continued PED tolerance of the
aircraft.
 The initial engineering evaluation for the aircraft PED tolerance as covered in
FIGURE 3-2 and FIGURE 3-3.
 Operators and their (post holding) maintenance department should use
Section 7 guidance for sustaining aircraft PED tolerance, without the need for
(technical) decision making by maintenance personnel.
© EUROCAE, 2016
63
Thus, this section is directing operators to follow standard-maintenance guidance

already established by the operator’s aircraft system/design department. In case the
guidance does not have PED considerations incorporated, the operator may need to
develop this guidance from the processes provided in FIGURE 3-2 or FIGURE 3-3 of
this document.
7.3 GENERAL MAINTENANCE
General maintenance is activity that is performed by a technician in accordance with
approved documents or other directives. (e.g. IPC, Maintenance Manual). General
maintenance tasks that could lead to a reduction/loss of PED tolerance should include
appropriate cautions in those documents.
 Interchangeability of equipment is described in Section Error! Reference
source not found.7.4 Configuration Management
 Maintenance necessary to sustain PED tolerance of the aircraft is described
Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.
When general maintenance is performed on the aircraft by the technician, decisions in
regards to if those actions will impact the PED tolerance of the aircraft must not be
made by that technician. Those technician’s actions, regardless of what they may be,
will have already been approved by the airline’s design/systems organization, and
have already been evaluated in regards to what their effects may have on the aircraft’s
PED tolerance.
7.3.1 Maintaining Front Door Coupling PED Tolerance - Evaluating Maintenance
Actions
If configuration management is correctly implemented (see 7.4), it is safe to assume
that general maintenance does not affect the Interference Path Loss (IPL) values and
PED tolerance by front door coupling.
FIGURE 7-2 presents a decision tree guide to aid the operators in support of
maintaining front door coupling PED tolerance on their aircraft. The subsequent table
is supporting text to the decision tree and provides more detailed information on the
overall maintaining front door coupling PED tolerance approach.
© EUROCAE, 2016
64
FIGURE 7-2: MAINTAINING FRONT DOOR COUPLING PED TOLERANCE

1 When aircraft are initially determined to be PED tolerant, the operator must
decide on how to document repairs or maintenance actions that may cause the
aircraft to no longer be PED tolerant, and how to make this information directly
available to maintenance personnel.
Possible PED tolerant configuration documentation methods-
Option 1
During initial front door coupling PED tolerance testing and analysis per
FIGURE 3-2, take into account all parts that are approved for installation on
the aircraft and that may affect the front door test or analysis results. The goal
is to ensure that no approved maintenance procedures or approved parts
could cause the aircraft to no longer be front door coupling PED tolerant.
Option 2
Indicate in the approved aircraft maintenance documents the actions or parts
that have not been determined through testing or analysis to show they do not
negatively impact front door coupling PED tolerance. Performing such
maintenance actions or installing such parts should be followed by steps to
ensure the aircraft is operated with procedures consistent with non-PED
tolerant aircraft.
© EUROCAE, 2016
65

With Option 2 some aircraft maintenance actions could negatively impact front
door coupling PED tolerance.
Some of the examples given below may be considered maintenance actions
that could impact front door coupling PED tolerance.
Examples:
• Replacing a door or window seal with an interchangeable seal that has not
been assessed for impact on front door coupling PED tolerance (if special
seals were installed in order to achieve IPL levels).
• Replacing a radio receiver line replaceable unit (LRU)-to-antenna coax
with an interchangeable coax that has not been assessed for impact on
front door coupling PED tolerance.
• Replacing windows, which include flight deck, doors, and passenger cabin
widows with interchangeable windows that have not been assessed for
impact on front door coupling PED tolerance (if special windows were
installed in order to achieve IPL levels).
The operator may need to take into account any subsequent design type
actions and the impact of incorporating such designs could have on the aircraft
PED tolerance. Thus, any subsequent design documentation (Service
Bulletin, Engineering Bulletin, etc.) should support sustained PED tolerance
per se.
When subsequent design documentation is received, the operator should have
established an internal review process to determine the impact this change
may have on aircraft front door coupling PED tolerance. As an alternative, the
operator may request the author of the subsequent design documentation to
perform an assessment and provide a conclusion in their subsequent design
documentation of its impact to aircraft front door PED tolerance.
If the aircraft is tolerant to ED-239 / DO-307A Section 4, then any change to

the aircraft that maintains the ED-239 / DO-307A tolerance will maintain the
front door coupling PED tolerance. If not it, should be considered an alteration
and re-establishing the front door coupling PED tolerance may be necessary.
If a part that can negatively affect the front door coupling path loss has been
changed, then proceed to step 3.
If a part that can negatively affect the front door coupling path loss has not
been changed, then proceed to step 2.
2 If it has been determined that there have been no changes to the aircraft that
could affect the front door coupling path loss, then the aircraft PED tolerance
front door coupling PED tolerance has been maintained.
It may be necessary to document this assessment based on local regulatory

requirements.
3 If it has been determined that a maintenance change to the aircraft does
indeed affect the aircraft’s front door coupling PED tolerance, it should be
decided if unrestricted PED usage is still necessary and should be continued.
If unrestricted PED usage is still desired, then proceed to step 5.
If unrestricted PED usage is no longer desired, then proceed to step 4.
© EUROCAE, 2016
66

4 If unrestricted PED usage is not desired, even if only temporarily, appropriate
actions must be taken to ensure the aircraft is operated consistent with
restricted PED usage.
An example is;
Initiate new crew procedures to have PEDs turned off during certain flight
conditions. [ref FAA InFO 13010SUP]
5 If it has been determined that there could be changes to the aircraft that could
negatively affect the front door coupling path loss and unrestricted PED usage
is still desired, then the guidelines defined in FIGURE 3-2 for establishing front
door coupling PED tolerance must be followed.
The type of activity that may need to be performed as defined in FIGURE 3-2
could include:
• An Aircraft Safety Assessment
• An Aircraft Analysis
• An Aircraft Test
The operator’s engineering department may be able to perform such

assessment, analysis, or testing per guidance in FIGURE 3-2. However, if
unable to or in doubt, the operator should still use FIGURE 3-2 for continued
guidance and consult with the original alteration applicant as well.
7.3.2 Maintaining Back Door Coupling PED Tolerance - Evaluating Maintenance

Actions
If configuration management guidance in Section 7.4 is implemented, it can be
assumed thereafter that general maintenance will not affect PED tolerance by back
door coupling.
FIGURE 7-3 presents the decision tree guide to aid the operators in support of
maintaining back door coupling PED tolerance on their aircraft. The subsequent table
is supporting text to the decision tree and provides more detailed information on the
overall maintaining back door coupling PED tolerance approach.
© EUROCAE, 2016
67
FIGURE 7-3: MAINTAINING BACK DOOR COUPLING PED TOLERANCE

1 The HIRF Special Condition requirements have been applied to all aircraft
certified in the US and Europe since the late 1980’s but in a slightly different
manner. Both the US Regulatory Authority and the European Regulatory
Authority required the applicant to demonstrate PED tolerance for systems
with a Catastrophic failure condition, but only the European authorities
required PED tolerance for systems with Hazardous and Major failure
conditions as well. While this may seem like a large discrepancy in evaluating
PED tolerance, the net effect is not large because most if not all new Part
25/23 aircraft certification projects since the late 80’s have met both FAA and
JAA/EASA requirements, with the JAA/EASA special conditions implemented
through certification review items (CRIs) and technically mirrors the rule that
the FAA published in 2007 (as defined in Section 3).
© EUROCAE, 2016
68
If the full tolerance to the HIRF regulations or Special Conditions are part of
the type certification of the aircraft, including an assessment of the Cockpit
Voice Recorder (CVR) & Flight Data Recorder equipment (FDR), then proceed
to step 2.
If the full HIRF regulations or Special Conditions are not part of the certification
of the aircraft, then proceed to step 4.
2 If the full HIRF regulations or Special Conditions are part of the certification of
the aircraft for the relevant systems with a Major, Hazardous, or Catastrophic
failure conditions, including the CVR and FDR equipment, the requirement to
maintain this protection is established at the time of type certification and is
part of the continued airworthiness of the aircraft.
Therefore, the Operator must maintain the aircraft’s full HIRF certification basis
in order to provide a readily acceptable means for maintaining back door
coupling PED tolerance.
3 If PED tolerance is maintained to FAA and/or JAA/EASA full HIRF regulations
or special conditions, or if it has been determined that there have been no
changes to the aircraft that could affect the back door coupling PED tolerance,
then the aircraft PED tolerance back door coupling PED tolerance has been
maintained.
It may be necessary to document this assessment based on local regulatory

requirements.
4 When aircraft are initially determined to be PED tolerant, the operator must
decide on how to identify and document future repairs or maintenance actions
that may cause the aircraft to no longer be PED tolerant and how to make this
information available to maintenance personnel.
For partial or non-HIRF certified aircraft, after the initial aircraft PED tolerance
evaluation during a new connectivity system installation or other separate
action, only that equipment that showed unacceptable adverse effects to PEDs
or systems with a Catastrophic failure condition that are not HIRF certified
need to be assessed and tracked.
Possible PED tolerant configuration documentation methods-
Option 1
During initial PED back door tolerance testing and analysis, take into account
all parts that are approved for installation on the aircraft and that may affect the
back door test or analysis results. The goal is to ensure that no approved
maintenance procedures or approved parts could cause the aircraft to no
longer be longer back door coupling PED tolerant.
Option 2
Indicate in the approved aircraft maintenance documents, actions or parts that
have not been determined through testing or analysis to show that they do not
negatively impact back door coupling PED tolerance. Performing maintenance
actions or installing such parts must be followed by steps to ensure the aircraft
is operated with procedures consistent with non-PED tolerant aircraft.
With Option 2 some aircraft maintenance actions could negatively impact the
back door coupling PED tolerance. Although some examples below may be
considered aircraft alterations, they are none the less shown for illustrative
purposes.
© EUROCAE, 2016
69
Examples:
• Replacing aircraft equipment that have a Catastrophic failure condition with
an alternate part number (replacement of PED-relevant parts).
• A change to the installation design of the aircraft equipment with a
Catastrophic failure condition (change of PED-relevant system).
• A location change of the aircraft equipment with a Catastrophic failure
condition (relocation of PED-relevant part).
NOTE: In regards to sustaining PED tolerance, PED-relevant parts are:

• Those parts that are required in order to meet full HIRF
certification requirements of the aircraft.
• Those parts with a Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure
condition that are HIRF certified and were evaluated for PED
tolerance during the initial connectivity installation aircraft
PED tolerance assessment on a partial HIRF certified aircraft.
• Those parts with a Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure
condition that are not HIRF certified and were evaluated for
PED tolerance during the initial connectivity installation
aircraft PED tolerance assessment on a partial HIRF or non-
HIRF certified aircraft.
• Those parts with a Major or Hazardous failure condition that
were tested and failed during certification of a newly installed
connectivity system on a partial or non-HIRF certified aircraft.
• Those part numbers that are required in order to achieve IPL
levels.
The operator may need to take into account any subsequent design type
actions and the impact of incorporating such designs could have on the aircraft
PED tolerance. Thus, any subsequent design documentation (Service
Bulletin, Engineering Bulletin, etc.) should support sustained PED tolerance
per se. When subsequent design documentation is received, the operator
should have established an internal review process to determine the impact
this change may have on aircraft back door PED tolerance. As an alternative,
the operator may request the author of the subsequent design documentation
to perform an assessment and provide a conclusion in their subsequent design
documentation of its impact to aircraft back door PED tolerance.
If the aircraft is tolerant to ED-239 / DO-307A Section 3 (back door coupling

PED tolerance), then any change to the aircraft that maintains the ED-239 /
DO-307A tolerance will maintain the back door coupling PED tolerance. If it
cannot be determined that the aircraft alteration does not impact the back door
coupling PED tolerance, then re-establishing the back door PED tolerance
may be necessary. See FIGURE 3-3 of this document.
If a part that can negatively affect the back door coupling PED tolerance has
been changed, then proceed to step 5.
If a part that can negatively affect the back door coupling PED tolerance has
not been changed, then proceed to step 3.
5 If it has been determined that a maintenance change to the aircraft does
indeed affect the aircraft’s back door coupling PED tolerance, it should be
decided if unrestricted PED usage is still desired.
If unrestricted PED usage is still desired, then proceed to step 7.
If unrestricted PED usage is no longer desired, then proceed to step 6.
© EUROCAE, 2016
70

6 If unrestricted PED usage is not desired, even if only temporarily, appropriate
actions must be taken to ensure the aircraft is operated consistent with
restricted PED usage.
Examples:
• Disable connectivity system and restrict PED usage (Wi-Fi functionality on
PEDs not allowed).
• Initiate new crew procedures to have PEDs turned off during certain flight
conditions. [ref FAA InFO 13010SUP]
7 If a part that can negatively affect the back door coupling PED tolerance has
been changed and unrestricted PED usage is still desired, then the guidelines
defined in FIGURE 3-3 for establishing back door coupling PED tolerance
must be followed.
The type of activity that may need to be performed as defined in FIGURE 3-3
could include:
• An Aircraft Safety Assessment
• An Aircraft Analysis
• An Aircraft Test
In addition, as part of the assessment it may be necessary to disable the

aircraft’s passenger/crew connectivity system and restrict PED usage until the
aircraft is back into a PED tolerant configuration.
The operator’s engineering department may be able to perform the

assessment, analysis, or testing per guidance in FIGURE 3-3. However, if
unable to or in doubt, the operator should still use FIGURE 3-3 for continued
guidance and consult with the original applicant as well.
7.4 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

Configuration management as it pertains to this section deals with the management of
aircraft configurations based on equipment interchangeabilities, with no anticipated
involvement by the operator’s systems engineering during routine aircraft
maintenance, and with the certification basis of the aircraft remaining unaffected. In
terms of PED tolerance, configuration management affects both processes and
documentation, and this section provides top-level guidance for proposed steps as
well as applicable documentation.
Also, this section focuses on configuration management for aircraft that are partially
HIRF certified or non-HIRF certified aircraft. All HIRF tolerant aircraft do not require
PED related configuration management as long as the HIRF status of the aircraft
remains sustained upon any sort of equipment change.
The following sub sections are intended to provide supplemental information about the
history and best practices to sustain PED tolerance, industry demands, and the
boundary of configuration management.
7.4.1 Experience and Best Practices
In regards to on-aircraft part testing, sometimes due to alternated part number
equipment availability only the equipment installed on the day of the testing can be
investigated at that time. Aircraft operations may not allow for the testing of additional
part numbers that are interchangeable according to the IPC (but not installed at the
time of testing), due to usual unavailability of aircraft for the extended testing.
However, any additionally part number available for analysis (and not left unevaluated)
is appreciated by operators. Therefore, in order to ensure sustained PED tolerance
operators may utilize a three-faceted approach to review if untested or alternate
Catastrophic failure condition parts are PED tolerant (see Section CHAPTER 6).
© EUROCAE, 2016
71
 PED zonal assessment

 Substantiation based on equipment-qualification data for those data available
(e.g. ED-14 / DO-160 Section 21 test data)
 Testing of a part number on applicable.
NOTE 1: Equipment qualification data such as ED-14 / DO-160 Section 21 data is
often not available to non-OEM parties such as airlines or
engineering/maintenance providers.
All PED-relevant part numbers for a specific aircraft type, plus their PED-tolerance
evaluation result is summarized in supplemental documentation (see paragraph 7.4.6
for documentation) and is to be used in operation.
NOTE 2: In regards to sustaining PED tolerance, PED-relevant parts are:
 Those parts that are required in order to meet full HIRF certification
requirements of the aircraft.
 Those parts with a Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure
condition that are HIRF certified and were evaluated for
PED tolerance during the initial connectivity installation aircraft
PED tolerance assessment on a partial HIRF certified aircraft.
 Those parts with a Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure
condition that are not HIRF certified and were evaluated for
PED tolerance during the initial connectivity installation aircraft
PED tolerance assessment on a partial HIRF or non-HIRF certified
aircraft.
 Those parts with a Major or Hazardous failure condition that were
tested and failed during certification of a newly installed
connectivity system on a partial or non-HIRF certified aircraft.
 Those part numbers that are required in order to achieve IPL
levels.
7.4.2 Industry Demands
In the past the industry has been challenged with the high number of different aircraft
configurations that were required to be managed in the context of PED tolerance.
Additionally, the industry often lacked definitive guidance for the range of parts
required to be investigated. In fact, the number of part numbers taken into
consideration may have turned out to be interpreted as unreasonably high, and in
many cases of uncertainty more units were investigated than technically necessary.
This also affects the configuration management and accordant documentation if more
part numbers and results than is necessary need to be handled (see section 7.4.5 and
7.4.6 for guidelines).
Another demand from the industry was the reuse of PED tolerance substantiation
results and multi-aircraft applicability. The ability to transfer substantiation results from
one aircraft (type A) to another aircraft (type B) turned out undefined. Thus a
configuration change may turn out non-critical as a select part number is considered
PED tolerant on one aircraft (type A) and therefore does not change the aircraft
configuration of another aircraft (type B) although this part is classified PED-relevant
(see Section 7.4.5.2 for guidelines).
© EUROCAE, 2016
72
7.4.3 Range of PED Tolerance Analysis

Aviation authority regulations generally allow for the following acceptable means to
substantiate PED tolerance of aircraft LRUs and systems in terms of back-door
coupling PED tolerance (see FIGURE 3-3).
 PED Zonal Assessment
 Analysis of equipment qualification data
 On-aircraft testing (expose PED-relevant units with RF radiation equivalent to
passenger PEDs intentional transmissions)
 HIRF assessment.
In case of failure to any of those three approaches listed to show that the aircraft is
PED tolerant to back door coupling, other means to mitigate potential risk are
sometimes used.
Front-door coupling PED tolerance is not usually affected by configuration-
management considerations, unless the parts are interchanged such as:
 The receiving antenna is exchanged with an interchangeable antenna that has
not been assessed for impact on front door PED tolerance.
 The receiving antenna RF cabling is exchanged with an interchangeable cable
that has not been assessed for impact on front door PED tolerance.
 The windows, window seals or any other components that are required in order
to achieve IPL levels are exchanged with interchangeable components that
have not been assessed for impact on front door PED tolerance.
However, any front-door scenario would likely be associated with an alteration of the
aircraft and require a re-assessment to determine if the IPL levels are maintained.
(see FIGURE 3-2 for accordant handling guidelines).
7.4.4 Affected Aircraft Configuration
In order to lower the effort to cover all different configurations within an operator’s
aircraft fleet in terms of PED tolerance, this document defines that a group of
airframes of different tail signs can be considered to have the same configuration if
they have the same systems/functionalities and same part numbers installed. In an
effort to increase the efficiency and maintain safety in maintenance, operation and
documentation management, all parts are considered PED-relevant for sustained PED
tolerance, which are classified as:
 Those parts that are required in order to meet full HIRF certification
requirements of the aircraft.
 Those parts with a Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure condition that are
HIRF certified and were evaluated for PED tolerance during the initial
connectivity installation aircraft PED tolerance assessment on a partial HIRF
certified aircraft.
 Those parts with a Catastrophic, Hazardous, or Major failure condition that are
not HIRF certified and were evaluated for PED tolerance during the initial
connectivity installation aircraft PED tolerance assessment on a partial HIRF or
non-HIRF certified aircraft.
 Those parts with a Major or Hazardous failure condition that were tested and
failed during certification of a newly installed connectivity system on a partial or
non-HIRF certified aircraft.
 Those part numbers that are required in order to achieve IPL levels.
Thus, only those part numbers considered PED-relevant of an aircraft configuration
become applicable for sustained PED tolerance.
© EUROCAE, 2016
73
7.4.5 Guidance for Configuration Management for Sustained PED Tolerance

This section will provide actual guidance for the aircraft Configuration Management in
the context of sustained PED tolerance – based on industry demands (7.4.2) and best
practices (Section 7.4.1). Both front-door and back-door aspects are discussed in
general – with clear focus on back-door coupling PED tolerance aspects. Additionally,
guidelines for the transfer of PED-tolerance results between aircraft (types) are
introduced.
7.4.5.1 Sustaining PED Tolerance
1. Front Door Tolerance
The necessity to sustain PED tolerance towards front door coupling PED
tolerance is considered unlikely in operation. However, in the rare case that
parts affecting front door coupling PED tolerance need to be replaced by an
alternate part number (if special parts were installed in order to achieve IPL
levels), processes as described in FIGURE 7-2 should be followed. If such a
part requires a reassessment on its PED-tolerance capabilities, see the
guidelines in Section 7.3 (General Maintenance) and FIGURE 3-2 (Front Door
Coupling PED Tolerance).
2. Back Door Tolerance
Back-door considerations are more likely to become applicable as it applies
during aircraft operation and to affect configuration management as described
in FIGURE 7-3.
For full HIRF certified aircraft (as defined in Section 3) configuration
management:
 Configuration management of equipment with a Major, Hazardous or
Catastrophic failure condition, including assessment of the CVR and
FDR, is not required. Maintaining the full HIRF certification of the aircraft
will maintain the aircraft PED tolerance.
For partial HIRF or non-HIRF certified aircraft (as defined in Section 3)
configuration management:
 After the initial aircraft PED tolerance evaluation during a new
connectivity system installation or other separate action, new installations
or modifications to systems with a Catastrophic failure condition that do
meet HIRF certification requirements do not need to be assessed or
tracked for PED tolerance as long as the HIRF certification of those
systems is maintained.
connectivity system installation or other separate action, only those
systems with a Catastrophic failure condition that do not meet HIRF
certification requirements need to be tracked and reassessed for PED
tolerance if changes occur to those systems.
connectivity system installation or other separate action, new installations
or modifications to systems with a Major or Hazardous failure condition
do not need to be assessed or tracked for PED tolerance.
In addition, equipment with Major, Hazardous or Catastrophic failure conditions
or flight data or cockpit voice recorders that were found to have unacceptable
adverse effects from PEDs during the initial PED tolerance airplane
testing/evaluation need to be tracked and assessed.
© EUROCAE, 2016
74
Comment: In regards to the addition of new or altered systems on a PED

tolerant aircraft that have Major or Hazardous failure conditions, it is believed
that those failure conditions and the risk they pose can been adequately
mitigated due to the following (reference Section 6.2):
 Any current EASA (or JAA) aircraft certified since the introduction of HIRF
has required that Major or Hazardous failure conditions be addressed,
therefore any new or altered system will be required to address the HIRF
requirements, which in return will meet the PED back door coupling
effects requirement.
 Any current FAA aircraft certified since 2007, as a result of the Policy
memo “Application of the High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Protection
Rule under 14 CFR 21.101”, the FAA has “HIGHLY” recommend that
Major or Hazardous failure conditions be address.
 The new systems being designed and certified are the same
systems/technologies, regardless of FAA or EASA certification and
therefore it is a reasonable assumption that they are being designed to
meet PED tolerance and/or the HIRF rule and that any system currently
or in the future that has not been tested is an ever shrinking pool and per
the TOR does not merit the cost associated with tracking this equipment.
 There is considerable “on-aircraft” testing and experience to show that
these systems are not being affected by PEDs.
7.4.5.2 Transferability of PED Tolerance Substantiation Results
Transferability of PED tolerance results means the application of substantiation data
from one aircraft (type A) to another aircraft (type B). This transferability is primarily
affecting its back door coupling PED tolerance only (see FIGURE 7-3).
PED zonal assessment may not be considered sufficiently transferable to another
aircraft type. However, if a component is determined PED tolerant through on-aircraft
testing on a particular aircraft (type) or through analysis of its qualification data, its
PED tolerance should be transferable to another type of aircraft without limitations in
most cases. Additional installation analysis, taking into account zones and
comparable installation environment (but not limited to rack mount, adjacent boxes,
shielding and distance to radiation sources) is required. The accordant similarity
evaluation of the installation environment is subject to engineering judgment.
7.4.6 Guidance for Configuration Management Documentation
All relevant documentation to determine or prove PED tolerance is introduced in
Section 3 already. Thus, this section is intended to provide guidance for the
documentation of sustained PED tolerance.
Abiding by the guidelines from the two-faceted approach (see Section 7.4.5.1) the
following should remain vested with the operator:
 Responsibility for the determination of PED-relevant parts (for those capable to
perform)
 Responsibility for the evaluation of the PED-tolerance status of parts (either the
full set of all parts or the reduced set, if only those PED-relevant parts are pre-
defined by operator).
Thus, the operator should provide documentation/information about the PED tolerance
status of parts, supplementing the information contained in the IPC.
7.4.6.1 Suggested Approaches:
In an effort to increase efficiency of configuration management and to sustain PED
tolerance information through any stage of maintenance and/or operation, the use of
only one single document is recommended. This single-source document should bear
all information to both:
 Perform maintenance tasks (such as parts interchange – or similar) and
 Maintain the PED-tolerance status of the aircraft.
© EUROCAE, 2016
75
Thus, a combination of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-borne IPC data

and operator-borne supplemental documentation is recommended: an operator-
managed enhanced IPC, named operator IPC (OIPC). As is sometimes the case, an
operator’s enhanced IPC documentation may contain data from many sources
including original IPC data as well as data from PED tolerant equipment lists.
This document should then contain:
 Original IPC data
 Data from PED tolerant equipment lists
 Flags/notes/similar means for those parts considered PED-relevant (this data is
optional and is only meant to reduce the number of parts to be investigated for
PED tolerance)
 Flags/notes/similar means for those parts considered PED-relevant and
classified as not PED tolerant (this follows the logic of the NPTEL).
This philosophy of only flagging PED-relevant parts reduces the data set (which
equals the quantity of part numbers) to be considered. Additionally, in case of part
interchangeability, parts classified as not PED tolerant should be flagged as such and
need to be regarded by engineering/maintenance personnel when sustaining PED
tolerance is desired.
7.4.6.2 Alternate Documentation Approach:
In case an airline operator chooses to or is not capable of using the single source
document (enhanced IPC / operator IPC, OIPC) the common-practice approach is still
considered an acceptable means to manage configuration management and
sustained PED tolerance:
 Use the IPC (without any additional information incorporated by the operator)
for general equipment management
 Additionally, use the PED Tolerant Equipment List (PTEL) or Non PED Tolerant
Equipment List (NPTEL) to document the PED- tolerance status in conjunction
with the IPC
NOTE: None of those single documents is considered a stand-alone document to
prove sustained PED tolerance and to manage the configuration of
aircraft towards PED tolerance. Thus, the combined handling of two
individual documents comes along with increased work load for
maintenance. Additionally, the operator needs to ensure that either
NPTEL or PTEL are used in conjunction with the IPC for e.g. equipment
interchange, rather than only using the IPC (which would disregard any
PED-tolerance information). Therefore, the approach of using the IPC in
conjunction with NPTEL or PTEL does not state the preferred option, but
is considered an alternate accepted means.
7.5 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
After an operator determines that an aircraft is PED tolerant using methods and
processes in prior sections of this document, the operator may desire to allow
passengers or crew to use their PEDs throughout all flight phases or as it is commonly
known “gate-to-gate.” This section discusses non-technical topics an operator may
need to consider so as to not unintentionally make the gate to gate PED use program
invalid. Those non-technical – or in other words: non-aircraft / non-system related
topics include procedures for crew and operation to ensure sustained experience of
safe flight.
© EUROCAE, 2016
76
7.5.1 Non-Technical Operations Aspects

In order to implement a gate-to-gate passenger PED usage program for PED tolerant
aircraft, an operator may need to amend one or more of the following:
 Operator’s carry-on baggage manual
 Operator’s cabin attendant procedures manual
 Flight crew’s procedures manual
 Passenger guidance material (such as seat-back pocket instructions or similar)
 Crew training content
 Maintenance training content
 Flight safety manual.
In addition, if the aircraft is not fully PED tolerant, there may be restrictions on PED
use during sensitive (critical) flight phases (e.g. certain weather conditions and
approaches).
If the aircraft was previously demonstrated to be PED tolerant (as shown in section
7.3), then if certain interchangeable components have not been determined to be PED
tolerant, use of these components may require that the PED gate-to-gate use program
be modified to restrict PED using during sensitive (critical) flight phases.
7.5.2 Continuing Consideration of Non-Technical Operations Aspects
Operators should amend their processes and procedures so that any changes to the
non-technical operations aspects and others factors that were necessary to implement
the gate-to-gate PED use program, automatically trigger an evaluation of said factors
on the continuation of the gate-to-gate PED use program.
Operators should create processes and procedures so that the impact of changes to
the non-technical operations aspects and other factors that were necessary to
implement the gate-to-gate PED use program, is not reliant on personal knowledge, or
as commonly called, tribal knowledge.
These processes and procedures should be created such that the maintenance
organization has the information needed to trigger alternate operations as related to
PED use, or trigger new crew procedures related to PED use, without needing to
consult with the operator’s aircraft system/design organizations.
7.5.3 Technical Operations Aspects
The determined PED tolerance of aircraft that are partially HIRF certified or aircraft
with no HIRF certification depends on the outcome of the back door coupling RF
interference testing or analysis (FIGURE 3-3). If it was determined that the PEDs
could be used through all phases of flight (gate-to-gate) with no restrictions,
subsequently replacing an avionics component with a non-PED tolerant component
may require that the PED usage have restrictions, such as for example, (but not
limited to) not allowing PED use during category II/III landings.
Operators should amend their processes and procedures so that the replacement of
PED-relevant and at the same time PED tolerant components with non-PED tolerant
components (which may result in PED use restrictions) is communicated to the flight
crews. This communication method needs to be reliable and fail safe.
Flight crews may have to implement alternate procedures such that PED use
restrictions are communicated to passengers, and enforced. Example methods of
communicating the change of PED tolerance of the aircraft to the flight crews include;
appropriate aircraft logbook entries, cockpit placards, notations in flight planning
documents.
If an aircraft is operating with a restricted gate-to-gate PED program due to the
replacement of a PED tolerant component with a non-PED tolerant component, and
the Operator desires this to be a temporary condition, the operator should have
processes and procedures in place to document the temporary nature of this
condition, and the steps necessary by maintenance personnel to remove this
temporary condition.
© EUROCAE, 2016
77
7.5.4 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness – Necessitated for PED Tolerance

In the initial establishing of aircraft PED tolerance per FIGURE 3-2 and FIGURE 3-3,
there may have been an outcome that resulted in the need to create specific
instructions for continued airworthiness requirements in order to mitigate a PED
tolerance shortcoming. These requirements would have typically been mandated by
the applicant seeking PED tolerance declaration or by a regulatory authority if the PED
tolerance determination is part of a TC or STC data package. It is up to the operator
to fully understand that these instructions for continued airworthiness requirements
may exist, and to ensure their ability to maintain PED tolerance to them may be
necessary in order to maintain the PED tolerance of their aircraft.
7.5.5 Safety Program Data Collection and Reporting – Necessitated for PED
Tolerance
During their initial activities to expand the use of PEDs, per Section 6.2.7.3 operators
are instructed to implement a monitoring and control program to methodologically
collect PED use expansion related data and report it in order to continuously assess
the PED risk. If such a monitoring and control program process was implemented or
perhaps already exists, it is important that the operator continue to be active in the
aspects associated with this program, which include any safety reporting, safety
reviews, and safety audits activities
© EUROCAE, 2016
78
CHAPTER 8
MEMBERSHIP
RTCA Special Committee SC-234 / EUROCAE WG-99

Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs)
Co-Chairs Organization
Robert Kebel Airbus

National Institute for Aviation Research (NIAR) at
Billy Martin
Wichita State University
Stephan Schulte Lufthansa
Secretary Organization
Nuria RIERA TriaGnoSys GmbH
Designated Federal Officer Organization

Brian Verna Federal Aviation Administration
RTCA Program Director Organization

Karan Hofmann RTCA, Inc.
EUROCAE Technical Programme Manager Organization

Anna von Groote EUROCAE
Technical Leads Organization

Andrew Diaz Panasonic Avionics Corporation
David Hartze The Boeing Company
Jamie Lutkus Astronics Corporation
Praf Patel Garmin Ltd.
Franck Poirier Dassault Aviation
Thiemo Stadtler Airbus
Kenneth Webb Rockwell Collins, Inc.
Members Organization
Mike Airey LSA Electromagnetics
Jamal Aldabbas Etihad Airways
Maqbool Aliani Ligado Networks
Livanna Anderson Federal Aviation Administration
Susan Beard Rockwell Collins, Inc.
Patrick Bloodworth Rosen Aviation
Sven Bogner EuroAvionics Navigationssysteme GmbH & Co. KG
© EUROCAE, 2016
79
Martin Brodbeck Swiss International Air Lines Ltd.

Erik Borgstrom Element Materials Technology
Venkata Bottu Rossell Techsys
Thomas Brueggert Thales Group
David Carson The Boeing Company
Bassam Chamas Panasonic Avionics Corporation
Adrian Cioranu EUROCAE
Elysabeth Cummings Rosen Aviation
Wolfgang Doering EMC Consulting
Bruce Donham The Boeing Company
Sylvain Dumont AEROCONSEIL
Santanu Dutta Ligado Networks
Achim Enders TU Braunschweig
Alexander Engel EUROCAE
Heiko Fimpel Silver Atena
Elisha Fitzsimmons Rosen Aviation
Michael Franceschini Honeywell International, Inc.
Ismael Garcia Ligado Networks
Brad Green Honeywell International, Inc.
Dan Griffith The Boeing Company
Michael Groeninger EuroAvionics Navigationssysteme GmbH & Co. KG
Association of Air Transport Engineering and
Kenjiro Hijikata
Research (ATEC)
Brian Hint Federal Aviation Administration
Maria Teresa Iniguez-Yarza European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
Association of Air Transport Engineering and
Tatsuro Ito
Research (ATEC)
Howard Jordan Hawker Beechcraft Corporation
Stephan Keil Etihad Airways (EUROCAE member)
Nsizwa Khumalo Etihad Airways (EUROCAE member)
Joachim Kienzler-Cleuvers Lufthansa
Paul La Pietra Honeywell International, Inc.
Lillian Lagaly AEROCONSEIL
Dennis Lewis The Boeing Company
Erik Miller American Airlines, Inc.
Patrik Moravek Honeywell International, Inc.
Joe Morgan Aspenta International, Inc.
Mike Mowry Astronics Corporation
Sal Navidi Honeywell International, Inc.
Lee Nguyen Federal Aviation Administration
Truong Nguyen NASA
Brian Norris American Airlines, Inc.
Rafael Nunes German Aerospace Center DLR
Ajay Parikh Ligado Networks
Keith Peavler Honeywell International, Inc.
Karl-Heinz Rademacher Lufthansa
Steven Rines Zodiac Aerospace
Jörg Rohwer Lufthansa
© EUROCAE, 2016
80
Friedhelm Runge European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

Fred Sabale Etihad Airways
Massoud Sadeghi Federal Aviation Administration
Shohreh Safarian Federal Aviation Administration
Reinhard Sauerschell EMC Consulting
Siegfried Schoenfelder Airbus
Carsten Schwarzbach Lufthansa
Scott Shahinian Southwest Airlines
Timothy Shaver Federal Aviation Administration
Gu Shimin CARERI
Bernald Smith Soaring Society of America
Geoff Stearn Ligado Networks
Harry Steck Globatrac
Jonathan Tanner Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation
Kim Wee Tey Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Brad Thurow Appareo
Guus Vos National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
David Walen Federal Aviation Administration
Greg Weatherford Panasonic Avionics Corporation
Markus Werner TriaGnoSys GmbH
Matthew Williams The Boeing Company
Alex Wilson The Boeing Company
Ben Wong United Airlines, Inc.
Naruto Yonemoto Electronic Navigation Research Institute (ENRI)
Dan Zanette Electronics Test Centre
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-1
APPENDIX A
SMS EXAMPLES
A.1 RADIO SYSTEM ANALYSIS – FRONT DOOR

Different types of radio systems are analyzed to determine their potential failure
mechanism from spurious emissions associated with PEDs. Much of the work here
has been leveraged from the PED ARC report.
A.1.1 ADF, HF and HF Datalink
The ADF, HF voice, and HF datalink radios, which operate at frequencies below 30
MHz, have been determined in ED-239 / DO-307A & ED-130 to have sufficient
protection from PED emissions and does not require further analysis. This is because
the physics of PED emissions in these frequency ranges preclude meaningful
emissions at these frequencies. Since PEDs are physically small, they cannot radiate
frequencies with wavelengths significantly larger than the dimension of the PED. For
example, the wavelength of the upper frequency range of the HF voice transmitter
(30 MHz) is 10 meters, resulting in a quarter wavelength of 2.5 meters and one-tenth
wavelength (where radiators begin to act as transmission lines) of 1 meter, which is
much larger than the typical PED.
A.1.2 Marker Beacon
The Marker Beacon system has been determined in ED-239 / DO-307A &
ED-130 to have sufficient protection from PED emissions and does not require further
analysis. This is because the statistical PED emissions reported in ED-239 /
DO-307A, TABLE 4-5 are already significantly lower than the aggregate receiver
interference threshold. Thus, the Marker Beacon system is not affected by
PED-induced spurious emissions.
A.1.3 Instrument Landing Systems (ILS)
Localizer2 - The Localizer (LOC) provides a reference signal aligned with the runway
centerline and deviation signals when the airplane is displaced left or right of the
extended runway centerline. The linear coverage area for this signal is approximately
3 degrees either side of the extended runway centerline from a point emanating at the
far end of the runway. The LOC data are displayed to the crew on the primary flight
displays.
The localizer transmitter operates on one of 40 ILS channels within the frequency
range of 108.10 to 111.95 MHz. The signal transmitted by the localizer consists of two
vertical fan-shaped patterns that overlap, at the center. They are aligned with the
extended centerline of the runway. The right side of this pattern, as seen by an
approaching aircraft, is modulated at 150 Hz. The left side of the pattern is modulated
at 90 Hz. The overlap between the two areas provides the on-track signal.
The width of the navigational beam may be varied from approximately 3º to 6º, with 5º
being normal. It is adjusted to provide a track signal approximately 700 ft. wide at the
runway threshold. The width of the beam increases so that at 10 NM from the
transmitter, the beam is approximately one mile wide.
2 RTCA/DO-195, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Airborne ILS Localizer

Receiving Equipment Operating within the Radio Frequency Range of 108-112 MHz, Prepared
by SC-153, November 17, 1986.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-2
With special authorization, the localizer system can be also used for low visibility take-
off guidance. Operators may be authorized takeoff minimums with a visibility of 300
feet runway visual range (RVR). For these operations, the airport ground localizer
equipment must meet stringent requirements. The airport facility must also have
certain equipment installed and operating. These include taxiway lead-on lights
serving the takeoff runway; at least two RVR sensors and High Intensity Runway
Lights (HIRL).
NOTE: This assessment does not address low visibility localizer take-off operations. If an
operator chooses to allow PED use during these operations, they must assess the
associated risks. The failure modes for the localizer function remain the same as in
this assessment, however the hazard levels for the failures were not available when
this assessment was completed and must be determined.
Glide Slope3 – The ILS glide slope provides a vertical flight path (nominally 3-degree
descent angle) to a point in the landing zone of the runway. The vertical coverage is
approximately 0.7 degrees on either side of the vertical reference path. The GS data is
displayed to the crew on the primary flight displays. The GS signal is transmitted on a
carrier frequency using a technique similar to that for the localizer. The center of the
glide slope signal is arranged to define a glide path of approximately 3° above
horizontal (ground level). The beam is 1.4° deep (0.7° below the glide-path center and
0.7° above).
The ILS glide slope is produced by a ground-based UHF radio transmitter and
antenna system, operating at a range of 329.30 MHz to 335.00 MHz and is also
modulated with 90 Hz and 150 Hz tones, with a 50 kHz spacing between each
channel. The transmitter is located 750 to 1,250 feet (ft.) down the runway from the
threshold, offset 400 to 600 ft. from the runway centerline.
The pilot (or the autopilot) controls the aircraft so that the glide slope indicator remains
centered on the display to ensure the aircraft is following the glide path to remain
above obstructions and reach the runway at the proper touchdown point (i.e., it
provides vertical guidance).
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted by the ILS, the
applicable failure modes are denial of service, degradation of service and misleading
information. The operation of the ILS system usually requires the antennas for
redundant systems (when installed) to be located in close proximity. Due to antenna
placement, it is possible that redundant ILS systems may suffer simultaneous
interference events (common mode failures).
Denial of service is similar to an inoperative localizer ground station. The interfering
PED(s) would prevent the aircraft system from receiving the desired signal. The
aircraft system would indicate or “flag” this failure to include blanking of the ILS
indication of the displays.
Degradation of service is very similar to denial of service. The ILS system may or may
not indicate a failure flag, and may appear as though the reference signal is too weak
to be received (i.e. out of range). A momentary flag, or brief needle deflections, or
both, may occur. This is similar to when obstructions or other aircraft pass between
the transmitting antenna and the receiving aircraft.
Misleading information is when the aircraft system is affected by PED interference in
such a way that the system displays the incorrect information. The ILS data is used
by the flight director displays and autopilot to guide the aircraft on final approach.
When used for a coupled autopilot approach, ILS signals autonomously control the
flight path of the airplane. EMI induced dithering of ILS position data during coupled
approach operations could cause erratic aircraft motion and/or the aircraft to be
improperly positioned during the approach.
3 RTCA/DO-192, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Airborne ILS Glide Slope
Receiving Equipment Operating within the Radio Frequency Range of 328.6 – 335.4 MHz,
Prepared by SC-153, July 19, 1986
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-3
The localizer and glide slope receivers are susceptible to noise-like interference and to
single-frequency continuous wave (CW) interference from PED emissions. The
localizer and glide slope receivers detect signals in 90 and 150 Hz sidebands around
the carrier frequency and provide guidance signals based on the amplitude ratio for
the 90 and 150 Hz sidebands. Noise-like interference and CW interference result in
errors in the indicated guidance signals. CW interference can also result in the
receiver locking on to the interfering signal instead of the intended carrier signal, again
resulting in indicated guidance signal errors.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with ILS systems are listed in
Appendix 2, table reference number 1.00. The failure condition classification (defined
in section 4 of this document) of the ILS systems functions range minor effects to
catastrophic effects depending on the usage and level of integration with other
systems.
A.1.4 VHF Omnirange4 (VOR)
A VOR is a ground-based electronic navaid transmitting 360° azimuth signals on
assigned carrier frequencies ranging from 108.0 to 117.9 MHz. The VOR uses a
reference signal and a variable signal to transmit the bearing information.
The reference signal is a 30 Hz signal radiated omnidirectionally in 360 degrees of
azimuth with a constant phase. The variable signal is also a 30 Hz signal which
rotates around the ground station at a set speed (varies depending on type of VOR)
and the signal phase varies with respect to direction of transmission.
In the composite VOR signal, the carrier is transmitted from one antenna and the
sidebands are transmitted from a separate antenna. In space these two signals will
produce an amplitude modulated signal. A 9960 Hz sub-carrier frequency is deviated
by + or – 480 Hz at a 30Hz rate. Then the frequency modulated sub-carrier is
amplitude modulated on the carrier. Radial information is derived from the difference
in time between the two signals. The resulting phase difference is used by the
airborne equipment.
The VOR function and display varies. An Omni-Bearing Indicator (OBI) is the
traditional VOR indicator used in general aviation. It consists of a knob to rotate an
"Omni Bearing Selector" (OBS), and the OBS scale around the outside of the
instrument, used to set the desired course. The display’s “course deviation indicator"
(CDI) is centered when the aircraft is on the selected course, or gives left/right
steering commands to return to the course. A TO-FROM indicator shows whether
following the selected course would take the aircraft to, or away from the station. On
electronic displays, the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) combines heading
information with the navigation display.
In addition to traditional enroute and approach navigational functions provided by
direct use of VOR, its use has also been incorporated into various flight management
systems (FMS) as a method to update the position accuracy of these systems. The
FMS Area Navigation (RNAV) function provides navigation display based on the
system’s navigation database. Typically, position updates from at least two VOR
stations, or one VOR/DME station is required by these systems to indicate the aircraft
position on a moving map, or display course deviation relative to a waypoint (virtual
VOR station).
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted by the VOR, the
applicable failure modes are denial of service, degradation of service and misleading
information. The operation of the VOR system usually requires the antennas for
redundant systems (when installed) to be located in close proximity. Due to antenna
placement, common mode failures for this system are possible.
4 RTCA/DO-196, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Airborne VOR Receiving

Equipment Operating within the Radio Frequency Range of 108-117.95 MHz, Prepared by
SC-153, November 17, 1986
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-4
Denial of service is similar to an inoperative VOR ground station. The interfering

aircraft system would indicate or “flag” this failure to include blanking of the VOR
indication of the displays.
Degradation of service is very similar denial of service. The VOR system may or may
not indicate a failure flag, and may appear as though the reference signal is too weak
to be received (i.e. out of range). A momentary flag, or brief needle deflections, or
both, may occur.
Misleading information is when the aircraft system is affected by PED interference in
such a way that the system displays the incorrect information. The VOR data is used
by the flight management system or traditional indicator to provide navigational
direction to the pilots. EMI induced dithering of VOR position data during operation
could cause the aircraft to be improperly position for navigation or non-precision
approach.
The VOR receivers are susceptible to noise-like interference and to single-frequency
continuous wave (CW) interference from PED emissions. The VOR systems detect
the variation in signal phase and time to determine the correct course for the system.
Noise-like interference and CW interference result in errors in the indicated guidance
signals. CW interference can also result in the receiver locking on to the interfering
signal instead of the intended carrier signal, again resulting in indicated guidance
signal errors.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with VOR systems are listed in
Appendix 2, table reference 2.00. The failure condition classification (defined in
section 4 of this document) of the VOR systems functions range minor effects to
hazardous effects depending on the usage and level of integration with other
systems.
A.1.5 VHF Comm (including Voice and VDL Modes, 2 and 3)
Very High Frequency Communication is the standard civil aviation short range
communication system. VHF Comm operates in the frequency band from 118.000
MHz to 137 MHz. VHF is used by ground control facilities and aircraft or by aircraft
and other aircraft on one of 760 possible frequency channels with 25 kHz spacing
between channels. Current International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
regulations require VHF channel spacing of 8.33 kHz. This expands the number of
available VHF channels to 2280. Another VHF service available is weather
information transmitted from ground stations.
VHF uses line of sight space wave transmissions with a theoretical range of 123 miles
between an aircraft at a height of 10,000 ft and a ground station at sea level. In
practice, however, useable range will also vary depending upon factors such as
transmitter power, receiver sensitivity, atmospheric and temperature conditions,
ground station geographical situation, and any obstruction in between aircraft and
ground station (i.e. mountains, hills and trees). As a general rule, satisfactory two-way
communication can typically be maintained up to 200 miles dependent on the aircraft
height.
The principle operations of VHF voice and data systems are divided into three
categories; Air Traffic Services (ATS), Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC), and
Aeronautical Administrative Communications (AAC). ATS and AOC are services
required for the safety and regularity of flight. AAC messages are associated with the
airline commercial management communications.
VHF Voice Comm radio operations use amplitude modulation, predominantly, double
sideband modulation of the assigned VHF carrier frequency for voice communication.
Four VHF channels, 136.900, 136.925, 136.950, and 136.975 MHz are reserved for
data communications worldwide.
VHF Digital Link (VDL) has defined standards for VDL Modes 2-4 which provide
different capabilities. VDL Mode 2 operation is based on the Carrier Sense Multiple
Access (CSMA) scheme to support data link compatibility. VDL Mode 3 allows
simultaneous voice and data link capability using the Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) architecture.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-5
A VDL Mode 2 CSMA transmitter uses feedback from the receiver to determine
whether another transmission is in progress before initiating a transmission. If a
carrier is sensed, the station waits for the transmission in progress to finish before
initiating its own transmission. The VDL Mode 2 uses a 25 kHz spaced VHF channel
of a modulation scheme called Digital 8-Phase Shift Keying (D8PSK) providing a data
rate of 31.5 kilobit/second. This is the highest data rate that can be achieved in a 25
kHz channel with a maximum range of 200 nautical miles. This required the
implementation of VHF digital radios.
VDL Mode 3 uses the D8PSK modulation scheme and the TDMA media access
control scheme. VDL Mode 3 allows for functionally simultaneous voice and data link.
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted by the VHF Comm,
the applicable failure modes are denial of service and degradation of service.
Misleading information is not considered a viable failure mode. The VHF antennas are
installed at various locations on the aircraft, typically not in close proximity. This
significantly decreases the likelihood of common mode failures.
Denial of service for VHF Comm can occur in basically two ways. For voice
communications, EMI can cause audible tone interference at a high enough level that
desired communication voice reception may become completely unintelligible. For
voice and data communications, the interfering signal can also block the receipt of the
tuned channel.
Degradation of service is very similar to denial of service. For voice communications,
EMI induced audible tone interference occurs at a lower level or intermittently at a
higher level, rendering desired voice communication reception difficult. For data
communications, the interfering signal can also block or corrupt the receipt of
messages.
Misleading information is not considered a viable failure mode. VHF Comm voice and
data services provide audible and visual data to the pilots. EMI interference cannot
introduce audible or data communications that are contrary to what is intended. While
it may be argued that loss of individual parts of a voice string or blockage of individual
data messages could result in misunderstanding of the desired communication, these
faults are caused by denial or degradation of the receipt of the intended signal, not as
a result of introduction of misleading information.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with VHF Comm systems are
listed in Appendix 2, table reference 3.00. The failure condition classification (defined
in section 4 of this document) of the VHF Comm systems functions range from minor
effects to major effects depending on the number of communication systems are
affected and the ability of the crew to select and use another communications system.
A.1.6 Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)
DME is a radio aid for short and medium-distance navigation. It is a secondary type of
radar that allows several aircraft to simultaneously measure their distance from a
ground reference (DME transponder). The distance is determined by measuring the
propagation delay of a radio frequency (RF) pulse that is emitted by the aircraft
transmitter and returned at a different frequency by the ground station.
The DME provides distance to a runway when the DME is collocated with an ILS
station. En route or terminal area distance information is provided when a DME is
collocated with a VOR.
DME equipped aircraft transmit encoded interrogating pulse pairs on the beacon's
receiving channel. The beacon replies with encoded pulse pairs on the airborne
equipment’s receiving channel, which is 63 MHz apart from the beacon’s channel.
The DME transmits and receives in the range 962-1213 MHz. The transmitted pulses
are paired 12 μsec apart, each pulse lasting 3.5 μsec. The pulse-pair repetition rate
ranges from 5 to 150 pulse pairs per second.
The interval between the interrogation emission and the reply reception provides the
aircraft with the slant range information from the ground station; this information
displays on the cockpit indicator.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-6
The aircraft’s receiver receives and decodes the transponder’s reply. Then it
measures the lapse between the interrogation and reply and converts this
measurement into electrical output signals. The beacon introduces a fixed delay,
called the reply delay, between the reception of each encoded interrogating pulse pair
and the transmission of the corresponding reply.
The transponder periodically transmits special identification pulse groups that are
interwoven with the reply and squitter pulses; the aircraft decodes these special
pulses as Morse tones keyed with the beacon code identification.
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted by the DME system,
Misleading is not considered as a viable failure mode. The DME systems may be
susceptible to both broad and narrow band PED interference emissions. The
antennas for redundant systems (when installed) are usually located in close
proximity. Due to antenna placement, common mode failures for this system are
possible.
Denial of service is similar to an inoperative DME system. The interfering PED(s)
would prevent the aircraft system from receiving the desired signal. The aircraft
system would lose the distance indication and may or may not indicate or “flag” this
failure.
Degradation of service shares some of the same failures denial of service. The DME
system would experience data dropout and no replies to a portion of the
interrogations. The PED interference may cause individual data dropouts caused by
disruption to the received pulse signals. The system may or may not indicate an
intermittent failure flag.
Misleading information is not considered a viable failure mode. The information used
by DME systems consist of pulsed pairs that vary in both time and frequency. The
aircraft’s receiver uses a stroboscopic technique to recognize the replies to its own
interrogations among the many other pulses transmitted by the beacon. Each reply to
a DME interrogation is offset in time by 50ms. The distance to the station is then
derived by determining the signal in space transmission time between the
interrogation and the reply paired pulses. In order for a PED EMI to cause misleading
information, it would have to introduce a random combination of pulses that are the
same shape and frequency of the intended signal. The introduced pulse then would
have to be timed with the receipt of the interrogation replay. Finally, the timing of the
pulsed paired separation would have to correlate with the specific equation that would
cause the system to indicate consistent distance information. The probability for this
type of failure to occur is so extremely low that this failure mode is not considered
viable.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with DME systems are listed in
Appendix A TABLE A-1. The failure condition classification (defined in section 4 of
this document) of the DME systems functions are minor effects.
A.1.7 Transponder Systems
The avionics transponder systems include Mode A/C Transponder Receiver; Mode S
Transponder Receiver systems; Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) and Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
Mode A/C Transponder – The Mode A/C Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
(ATCRBS), is a secondary surveillance radar system developed for use within the air
traffic control system for more precise position reporting of planes. It is used in
conjunction with the primary radar, to determine the presence of planes in the
airspace. ATCRBS supplements this positional information with positive identification
and altitude information, allowing controllers to track each plane more precisely and
efficiently.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-7
The ATCRBS system is an interrogation-based system that is comprised of a ground-

based interrogator and an on-plane transponder. On the ground, an ATCRBS sensor
sends out an interrogation signal (using the 1030 MHz frequency band) from a rotating
antenna to aircraft flying in its sector. Aircraft that are equipped with transponders
receive these interrogations and send back a reply (using the 1090 MHz band). There
are two primary types of interrogations; Mode A interrogations are used for plane
identification information, and Mode C interrogations are used for altitude information.
Mode S Transponder – The Mode S transponder provides the functions of existing
ATCRBS transponders; (Modes A and C; identification and altitude reporting) but
because of its design characteristics, is able to do so in a more efficient manner.
Each interrogation contains the unique address of the aircraft for which it is intended.
A Mode S transponder receiving an interrogation examines it for its own address. If
the address corresponds, the transponder generates and transmits the necessary
reply; all other aircraft ignore the interrogation.
This type of interrogation management ensures that no overlapping replies arrive at
the interrogator's antenna and prevents random replies from interrogators with
overlapping areas of coverage. This technique improves Secondary Surveillance
Radar (SSR) performance and increases system capacity.
The operation of Mode S transponders by the flight crew is identical to conventional
transponders (ATCRBS). The Mode S transponder is required for TCAS II operation.
Universal Access Transceiver – A Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) refers to a
data link that operates on a frequency of 978 MHz intended to serve the majority of
the general aviation community. UAT system supports Automatic Dependent
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), Flight Information Service – Broadcast (FIS-B) and
Traffic Information Service - Broadcast (TIS-B).
UAT will allow aircraft equipped with "out" broadcast capabilities to be seen by any
other aircraft using ADS-B In technology as well as by FAA ground stations. Aircraft
equipped with ADS-B In technology will be able to see detailed altitude and vector
information from other ADS-B Out equipped aircraft as well as FIS-B and TIS-B
broadcasts. The FIS-B broadcast will allow receiving aircraft to view weather and flight
service information.
The UAT system is specifically designed for ADS-B operation. UAT is also the first link
to be certified for "radar-like" ATC services in the United States. UAT is the only ADS-
B link standard that is truly bidirectional: UAT users have access to ground-based
aeronautical data (FIS-B) and can receive reports from proximate traffic (TIS-B). UAT
equipped aircraft can also observe each other directly with high accuracy and minimal
latency.
ADS-B Transponders – ADS-B-equipped aircraft exchange information on one of two
frequencies: 1090 or 978 MHz. ADS-B extends the message elements of Mode S
with additional information about the aircraft and its position. This is known as the
extended squitter and is referred to as 1090ES.
ADS-B enhances air traffic controllers’ ability to identify and guide aircraft. It can also
provide coverage in areas where radar is not possible, like the Gulf of Mexico or
remote regions of Alaska.
ADS-B enables properly equipped aircraft to broadcast their identification, position,
altitude, and velocity to other aircraft and to ATC. By 2020, all aircraft operating within
designated ADS-B airspace will be required to comply with the equipment
performance requirements of ADS-B Out.
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted by the transponders,
Misleading is not considered as a viable failure mode. The antennas for redundant
systems (when installed) may be located in close proximity. Depending on antenna
Denial of service is similar to an inoperative transponder system. The interfering
aircraft system would indicate or “flag” this failure.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-8
Degradation of service is very similar denial of service. The transponder system may
or may not indicate a failure flag, The PED interference may cause individual data
dropouts caused by disruption to the received pulse signals.
Misleading information is not considered a viable failure mode. The information used
by transponder systems consist of digital framing pulses. Each reply to a transponder
consisted of a framing pulse, some combination of the possible data pulses, and
another framing pulse. The typical pulse transmit duration is approximately 20ms. In
order for a PED EMI to cause misleading information, it would have to introduce a
random combination of pulses, synchronized in time with the receipt of the
interrogation reply, that is formatted with the exact pulse amplitude and duration that
correlates with the transponder desired information. The probability for this type of
failure to occur is so extremely low that this failure mode is not considered viable.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with ILS systems are listed in
section 4 of this document) of the transponder systems functions are major effects.
A.1.8 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Interrogator Receiver
TCAS is a system that is designed to alert a flight crew to the potential of conflicts with
other aircraft within the area. The system uses the existing ATCRBS system and the
capabilities of Mode S transponders to coordinate with other TCAS equipped aircraft.
TCAS II provides two types of advisories to the flight crew; a traffic advisory which
informs the flight crew that there are other aircraft in the vicinity, and a resolution
advisory that advises the flight crew a corrective or preventative action is required to
avoid an intruder aircraft.
TCAS system processes used to accomplish this function are organized into several
elements. First, the system surveillance sensors collect information about the intruder
aircraft (e.g., its relative position and velocity) and pass the information to the
computer to determine whether a collision threat exists. If a threat is identified, the
system threat-resolution computations determine an appropriate response. If the
intruder aircraft also has TCAS, the response is coordinated through a data link to
ensure that each aircraft maneuvers in a compatible direction.
Collision avoidance maneuvers generated and displayed by TCAS are treated as
advisories to flight crews, who then take manual control of the aircraft and maneuver
accordingly. Pilots are trained to follow TCAS advisories unless doing so would
jeopardize safety.
Surveillance of the air traffic environment is based on air-to-air interrogations
broadcast once per second from antennae on the TCAS aircraft using the same
frequency (1030 MHz) and waveform as ground-based air traffic control sensors.
Transponders on nearby intruder aircraft receive these interrogations and send replies
at 1090 MHz. Two types of transponders are currently in use: Mode S transponders,
which have a Mode S address, and older ATCRBS transponders, which do not have
unique addressing capability. To track ATCRBS intruders, TCAS transmits “ATCRBS-
only all-call” interrogations once per second; all ATCRBS aircraft in a region around
the TCAS aircraft reply. In contrast, Mode S–equipped intruders are tracked with a
selective interrogation once per second directed at that specific intruder; only that one
aircraft replies.
The antennas used by TCAS include a directional antenna that is mounted on the top
of the aircraft and either an omnidirectional or a directional antenna mounted on the
bottom of the aircraft. Most installations use the optional directional antenna on the
bottom of the aircraft. In addition to the two TCAS antennas, two antennas are also
required for the Mode S transponder. One antenna is mounted on the top of the
aircraft while the other is mounted on the bottom. These antennas enable the Mode S
transponder to receive interrogations at 1030 MHz and reply to the received
interrogations at 1090 MHz.
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted and received by the
TCAS system, the applicable failure modes systems are denial of service and
degradation of service. Misleading is not considered as a viable failure mode. The
TCAS uses antennas installed on the top and the bottom of the aircraft fuselage.
However, since it is a single system, common mode failure is not relevant in this case.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-9
Denial of service is similar to an inoperative TCAS system. The interfering PED(s)

would prevent the aircraft system from receiving the desired signal and associated
messages. The aircraft system would indicate or “flag” this failure.
Degradation of service is very similar denial of service. The TCAS system may or
may not indicate a failure flag, The PED interference may cause individual data
dropouts caused by disruption to the received pulse signals.
Misleading information in not considered a viable failure mode5. The information used
by TCAS systems consist of digital framing pulses. Each reply to a TCAS
interrogation consisted of a framing pulse, some combination of the possible data
pulses, and another framing pulse. In order for a PED EMI to cause misleading
information, it would have to introduce a random combination of pulses, synchronized
in time with the receipt of the interrogation reply. Each pulse has very tight
specifications for position, width, and rise and fall times. The transponder signal is
complex and is difficult to create accidentally. The probability for this type of failure to
occur is so extremely low that this failure mode is not considered viable.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with TCAS systems are listed in
section 4 of this document) of the transponder systems functions are major effects.
A.1.9 Global Positioning System (GPS)/Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
GPS (GNSS) provides accurate, worldwide navigation capability with a high degree of
availability. GPS navigation information is used to supply the aircraft three-
dimensional position, velocity, track data, time, and other information to other aircraft
subsystems for use in that system’s navigation, guidance or performance
computations. GPS systems used for precision navigational operations, such as
approach and landing have been developed to take into account GPS system
outages.
GPS signal data is modulated onto several carrier frequencies. Broadcast in the
1559-1610 MHz frequency range is called L1. Broadcast the 1164-1215 frequency
band is called L5 (or E5) is an aeronautical navigation band.
The signal data is a binary-coded message that contains basically three parts. The
first part contains the GPS date and time, plus the satellite's status and an indication
of its health. The second part contains orbital information called ephemeris data and
allows the receiver to calculate the position of the satellite. The third part, called the
almanac, contains information and status concerning all the satellites; their locations
and PRN numbers.
GPS outages are a normal operating condition and can occur anywhere in the NAS
due to unintentional interference. The aircraft-level effect from losing GPS positioning,
velocity, and timing is a complex problem that depends on the GPS equipment design
and the degree of integration with other systems. GPS outputs are being integrated
into a variety of functions beyond traditional navigation data. For example, GPS data
is being used for Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS); synthetic vision
systems; ADS-B; and as sensors in air data attitude heading reference system
(ADAHRS) inputs to electronic primary flight displays. There are a wide range of
integrations from legacy aircraft with self-contained GPS navigation units and a simple
autopilot interface to new production aircraft with digital cockpits using integrated
modular avionics providing the advanced functions mentioned above and more
(including potential GPS time applications).
Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS): This system is designed for Category I
precision approach. GPS/WAAS and European Geostationary Navigation Overlay
Service (EGNOS) are examples of these systems.
5 See discussion “False TCAS Advisories and PEDs” at

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_321.htm
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-10
Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS): This system uses ground-based

pseudolite emitting signal having similar characteristics of GPS. An example is
GPS/Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), designed for Category II/III precision
approach.
EMI Failure Modes – Because of the type of signal transmitted by the GPS system,
the applicable failure modes systems are denial of service and degradation of service.
Misleading is not considered as a viable failure mode. The antennas for redundant
systems (when installed) may be located in close proximity. Depending on antenna
Denial of service is similar to GPS system outage. The interfering PED(s) would
prevent the aircraft system from receiving the desired signal. This would result from
an increase in the carrier to noise ratio (CNR) at the aircraft’s system antenna. The
aircraft system would indicate or “flag” this failure. For GPS, the type and extent of
aircraft system status varies depending on the navigational performance level the
system was designed to provide. GPS system user interfaces (displays or control
input devices) simply provided “No Computed Data”, or “System Fail” warnings. Some
systems indicate the number of satellites tracked. GPS systems designed for precision
navigation include indication of GPS signal availability and accuracy information.
Specific system documentation provides information about how GPS data is used by
the aircraft systems and how to determine degradation of GPS signal reception.
Degradation of service is similar to denial of service. The GPS system may or may
not indicate a failure flag, by raising the CNR, reception of individual satellites may be
prohibited. As the number of received satellites decreases, GPS system performance
is affected.
Misleading information in not considered a viable failure mode. In order for a PED
EMI to cause misleading information, it would have to introduce an error on the binary-
coded messages from all of the received satellites. The probability for this type of
failure to randomly occurring is so extremely low that this failure mode is not
considered viable.
EMI Failure Effects – The failure effects associated with GPS systems are listed in
section 4 of this document) of the GPS systems functions are major effects.
A.1.10 AMS(R)S SATCOM
SATCOM is a long range radio communication system that provides both voice and
data communication capabilities. These systems are primarily used when the aircraft
is out of range of VHF communication system. The phase of flight that these systems
are used is during cruise. Since the cruise phase of flight PED usage allowance is a
long time accepted practice, no additional analysis of SATCOM was accomplished in
the report. If an operator uses SATCOM during other phases of flight, the system
criticality must be evaluated to determine if expanded PED use during that flight phase
maintains an acceptable level of risk for that operation.
A.1.11 Radio Altimeter and Weather Radar
The 4 GHz radio altimeter, the 5 GHz weather radar, and the 9 GHz weather radar
systems have been determined in ED-239 / DO-307A & ED-130 to have sufficient
protection from PED emissions to not require further analysis. Each of these systems
use a very directional antenna, limiting the coupling between the PED emission and
the receiver. Furthermore, PED-induced increases in the receiver noise floor only
affect receiver outputs at the far limits of coverage where the impact of such effects
has minimal operational impact. Critical operation of such systems, e.g., wind shear
detection or decision height determination only occur at close ranges where the
received signal level is sufficient to overcome PED-induced increases in the noise
floor.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-11
A.1.12 Microwave Landing System (MLS)

At the time of this analysis, there were no active MLS systems in the US public
airspace system. If an operator uses a MLS system as part of their operations, a risk
assessment similar to this one must be accomplished to determine the failure modes
PED interference could introduce to the system and associated hazards. This must
be evaluated before use of PEDs on aircraft using MLS systems can be expanded into
the approach and landing phases of flight.
The different flight phases in the preceding tables are per the figure below.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Parked Taxi Takeoff & Climb Cruise Descent Approach Landing

Departure &
to IAF IAF or flaps Taxi to
takeoff to and/or flaps to visual Gate
transition-to- reference to
climb altitude landing
and/or gear
up
10’000 AGL 10’000 AGL
FIGURE A-1: FLIGHT PHASES
NOTE: The tables in Appendix A has been formatted for electronic viewing and
may also be printed on 11" x 17" paper.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-12
TABLE A-1: FRONT DOOR RISK ASSESSMENT
XS = Denial of service
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
DS = Degradation of signal
ML = Misleading information
Hazard Class
Failure Residual Risk: (See section 8.0)
Table Mode and
Ref. Avionics System Function Codes Effect of PED interference on aircraft operation Mitigations Recommended Controls Remarks
1.00 ILS (Localizer and Glideslope) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4

1.01 Loss of ILS function during non-precision XS/DS This could cause the crew to transition a visual MIN 6, 7 No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
approach. Not coupled to autopilot and approach or execute a missed approach procedure. failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
flight director flags appear. This would result in a slight increase in crew failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
workload as they plan for an alternate approach
procedure.
1.02 Loss of ILS function during non-precision XS/DS The crew would take manual control of the aircraft MIN 6, 7 No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
approach. Coupled to autopilot. Flight and transition to a visual approach or execute a failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
director flags appear and autopilot missed approach procedure. This would result in a failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
disengages. slight increase in crew workload as they plan for
an alternate approach procedure
1.03 Misleading information during non- ML This could cause the crew to transition to visual a MIN 6, 7 No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
precision approach. Not coupled to approach or execute a missed approach failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
autopilot. procedure. This would result in a slight increase in failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
crew workload as they plan for an alternate
approach procedure
1.04 Misleading information during non- ML The crew would take manual control of the aircraft MIN 6, 7 No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
precision approach. Coupled to autopilot. and transition to a visual approach or execute a failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
routine missed approach procedure. This would failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
result in a slight increase in crew workload as they
plan for an alternate approach procedure
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-13
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
1.00 ILS (continued) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4
1.05 Loss of ILS function during CAT I precision XS/DS This would cause the crew to execute a routine MAJ 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable: Adoption of the mitigations
approach. Not coupled to autopilot and missed approach procedure. This would result in Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) provide an acceptable level of
flight director flags appear. an increase in crew workload. system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. risk for allowing operation of
and GS systems. PEDs during this operation.
The mitigations for denial of
Option 2. Acceptable with mitigation: service, degradation of
Do not allow the use of PEDs during these approaches. (Yellow) service and misleading
Operator procedures to have passengers shut off information are driven to the
devices. most severe hazard
Option 3. Acceptable with mitigation: classification for that
operation.
Aircraft system and pilot function, such as: (Yellow)
A. Crew cross checks using the radio altimeter and Operator has procedures and equipment to assess
altimeter validates that the aircraft height at the final aircraft position along course of approach.
approach fix is correct.
B. Use of TAWS (EGPWS) based alerting would alert the
pilots to terrain and obstacles (as equipped).
C. Crew cross checks using a FMS and/or GPS display of
the desired track (lateral position) for the aircraft.
Improper function of an ILS system would result in the
aircraft not being on course, and the FMS and/or GPS
display would show the discrepancy.
D. Crew cross checks using VOR radial to cross check
lateral position on approach.
E. Monitoring other information sources, including but
not limited to, marker beacon, DME, timing from fixes, etc.
to validate position on approach.
Option 4. Acceptable:
Do not allow CAT I approaches. (Green)
Remove CAT I operation from OPS Spec.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-14
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
1.00 ILS (continued) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4
1.06 Loss of ILS function during CAT I precision XS/DS The crew would assume manual control of the MAJ 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable: Adoption of the mitigations
approach. Flight director flags appear and aircraft and execute a routine missed approach Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) provide an acceptable level of
autopilot disengages. procedure. This would result in an increase in crew system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. risk for allowing operation of
workload. and GS systems. PEDs during this operation.
The mitigations for denial of
Operator procedures to have passengers shut off information are driven the
classification for that
Option 3. Acceptable with mitigation:
operation.
altimeter validates that the aircraft height at the final position along course of approach.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-15
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
1.00 ILS (continued) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4
1.07 Misleading information during CAT I ML May result in no action taken by the crew until MAJ 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable: Adoption of the mitigations
precision approach. Not coupled to visual conditions were obtained. This would Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) provide an acceptable level of
autopilot. require crew to initiate a go-around procedure. system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. risk for allowing operation of
This would result in an increase in crew workload and GS systems. PEDs during this operation.
and a reduction in safety margin. The mitigations for denial of
Option 3. Acceptable with mitigation: operation.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-16
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
1.00 ILS (continued) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4
1.08 Misleading information during CAT I ML May result in no action taken by the crew until HAZ 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable: Adoption of the mitigations
precision approach. Coupled to autopilot. visual conditions were obtained. The crew would Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) provide an acceptable level of
assume manual control of the aircraft and initiate system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. risk for allowing operation of
a go-around procedure (or initiate an auto-pilot and GS systems. PEDs during this operation.
TO/GA). This would result in an increase in crew The mitigations for denial of
workload and a reduction in safety margin. Option 2. Acceptable with mitigation: service, degradation of
Option 3. Acceptable with mitigation: operation.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-17
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
1.00 ILS (continued) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4
1.09 Loss of ILS function during CAT II/III XS/DS This would cause the crew to execute go-around MAJ 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable: (See remarks) The mitigations for denial of
precision approach. Not coupled to procedure. This would result in an significant Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) service, degradation of
autopilot and flight director flags appear. increase in crew workload and decrease in safety system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. service and misleading
margin. and GS systems. information are driven to the
most severe hazard
Option 2. Acceptable with mitigation: (See remarks) classification for that
Do not allow the use of PEDs during these approaches. (Yellow) operation.
Operator procedures to have passengers shut off (See table reference numbers
devices. 1.11 and 1.12)
Option 3. Acceptable: (See remarks)
Do not allow CAT II/III approaches. (Green)
Remove CAT II/III operation from OPS Spec.
1.10 Loss of ILS function during CAT II/III XS/DS The crew would assume manual control of the MAJ 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable: (See remarks) The mitigations for denial of
precision approach. Flight director flags aircraft and execute a go-around procedure. This Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) service, degradation of
appear and autopilot disengages. would result in an significant increase in crew system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. service and misleading
workload and decrease in safety margin. and GS systems. information are driven to the
most severe hazard
Option 2. Acceptable with mitigation: (See remarks) classification for that
Do not allow the use of PEDs during these approaches. (Yellow) operation.
Operator procedures to have passengers shut off (See table reference numbers
devices. 1.11 and 1.12)
Option 3. Acceptable: (See remarks)
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-18
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
1.00 ILS (continued) 4.3.4.3 4.3.4.3.3 4.3.4.3.4
1.11 Misleading information during CAT II/III ML May result in no action taken by the crew until CAT 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable with only the listed mitigations: The mitigations for denial of
precision approach. Not coupled to visual conditions were obtained. This may not Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) service, degradation of
autopilot. provide the crew sufficient time to initiate a go- system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. service and misleading
around or cause the aircraft to blunder in its and GS systems. information are driven to the
approach. This would result in an significant most severe hazard
increase in crew workload and significant Option 2. Acceptable with only the listed mitigations: classification for that
decrease in safety margin. Do not allow the use of PEDs during these approaches. (Yellow) operation.
Operator procedures to have passengers shut off
devices.
Option 3. Acceptable with only the listed mitigations:

1.12 Misleading information during ML May result in no action taken by the crew until CAT 6, 7 Option 1. Acceptable with only the listed mitigations: The mitigations for denial of
CAT II/III precision approach. Coupled to visual conditions were obtained. The crew could Front door path loss must be assessed to ensure the (Green) service, degradation of
autopilot. emergency disconnect the autopilot, assume system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC Possess data that shows system compliance. service and misleading
manual control of the aircraft (or initiate an auto- and GS systems. information are driven to the
pilot TO/GA) and may not provide the crew most severe hazard
sufficient time to initiate a go-around or cause the Option 2. Acceptable with only the listed mitigations: classification for that
aircraft to blunder in its approach. This would Do not allow the use of PEDs during these approaches. (Yellow) operation.
result in an significant increase in crew workload Operator procedures to have passengers shut off
and decrease in safety margin. This would result in devices.
an significant increase in crew workload and Option 3. Acceptable with only the listed mitigations:
significant decrease in safety margin. Do not allow CAT II/III approaches. (Green)
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-19
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
2.00 VOR 4.3.4.4. 4.3.4.4.2 4.3.4.4.3.

2.01 Loss of all VOR radio navigation XS/DS During non-precision VOR approach, the crew MIN 3, 4, 6, No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
information accompanied by VOR would respond to this by executing a routine 7 failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
indication. missed approach procedure. This would result in a failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
slight increase in crew workload as they plan for
an alternate approach procedure.
2.02 Display of hazardously misleading VOR ML During non-precision VOR approach, crew could HAZ 3, 4, 6, Option 1 Acceptable with mitigation:
radio navigation information to both pilots. unknowingly lose accurate information relevant to 7 - Hazardous system classification is only applicable to (Yellow) Operator procedures to have passengers shut
the aircraft’s location and flight path. This could aircraft that use VOR as primary navigation source and off devices.
result in disorientation near the ground and cause possess no other navigation reference.
a considerable workload increase for the crew. - Front door path loss may be assessed to ensure the (Green) Possess data that shows system compliance
system meets requirements of DO-294/DO-307 for the LOC
and GS systems.
MIN 3, 4, 6, Option 2. Acceptable:

7 For aircraft equipped with other navigational references, (Green) No additional controls required due to
the hazard is minor. classification of failure. Pilot will follow appropriate
procedures
3.00 VHF Voice Comm, VDL Modes 2&3 4.3.4.5. 4.3.4.5.2 4.3.4.5.3.
3.01 XS/DS- Loss of primary communications XS/DS Communications must be transferred through an MIN 2, 3, 4, No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
radio, with secondary VHF COM functioning alternate radio that uses a different antenna 6, 7, 8 failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
properly location. The crew workload may slightly increase failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
until the problem is solved.
3.02 Loss of all primary communications radios XS/DS When the flight crew realizes communication has MAJ 2, 3, 4, Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional Acceptable with mitigation:
been lost, the appropriate procedure will be 6, 7, 8 mitigation required due effect of failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional
followed to a safe landing. This would result in a controls required due effect of failure.
significant increase in workload to the crew.
3.03 Loss of data linked communications XS/DS Crew obtains data via voice or other comm MIN 2, 3, 4, No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
methods. Slight increase in crew workload. 6, 7, 8 failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
3.04 Loss of Controller-Pilot Data Link XS/DS Loss of CPDLC capability would result in use of MIN 2, 3, 4, No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
Communications (CPDLC) contingency procedures established in the 6, 7, 8 failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
applicable geographic region. Slight increase in failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
flight crew workload due to reversion to voice
communication.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-20
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
4.00 ATC SSR Xpndr, Mode S, UAT and ADS-B

4.3.4.7 4.3.4.7.5 4.3.4.7.6
4.01 Intermittent loss of transponder DS Intermittent loss of transponder function would MIN 2, 3, 4, No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
result in lapse of altitude information, aircraft 6, 7 failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
position/track, aircraft identification information failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
and other required information vital to air traffic
controllers. Often, the transponder is integrated
with ADS-B and that functionality would also be
intermittently lost. Intermittent reporting of
aircraft position information, if lapse exceeds
limits of air traffic automation, could require
communication with ATC to re-establish
identification. Intermittent TCAS "off" indications
could also occur. Crew and ATC workload would
increase.
4.02 Complete loss of transponders XS Loss of all transponder function would result in MAJ 2, 3, 4, Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional Acceptable with mitigation:
loss of altitude information, aircraft position/track, 6, 7 mitigation required due effect of failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional
aircraft identification information and other controls required due effect of failure.
required information vital to air traffic controllers.
Often, the transponder is integrated with ADS-B
and that functionality would also be lost. Aircraft
position information would be lost to other aircraft
in the vicinity using TCAS and Traffic Information
Services-Broadcast (TIS-B). With loss of ADS-B, the
flight crew would have to avoid Class A, class B,
and class C airspace, or require special handling
from ATC. Significant increase in crew workload
and decrease in safety margins.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-21
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
5.00 TCAS 4.3.4.8 4.3.4.8.2 4.3.4.8.3

5.01 Loss of TCAS when in an advisory situation XS/DS TCAS does not alter or diminish the pilot’s basic MIN 3, 4, 6, No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
authority and responsibility to ensure safe flight. 7 failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
Since TCAS does not respond to aircraft which are failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
not transponder equipped or aircraft with a
transponder failure, TCAS alone does not ensure
safe separation in every case. Loss of TCAS
functionality will result in a slight decrease in
safety margins. The crew must rely on visual
separation if operating under VFR conditions or
ATC provided separation if operating IFR under
IMC conditions.
6.00 DME 4.3.4.6 4.3.4.6.2 4.3.4.6.3

6.01 Loss of DME information during approach. XS/DS DME issued to provide distance to touchdown for MIN 6, 7 No additional mitigation required due to classification of Acceptable:
No data or erratic data displayed. ILS approaches. When specified in an the approach failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional controls required due to classification of
procedure, DME is used in lieu of the outer marker, failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures.
can be used as a back course final approach fix,
and is used to establish other fixes on the localizer
course. This would result in a slight increase in
crew workload.
(continued)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix A
A-22
(As certificated)
Phase of flight
Hazard Class
Table Mode and
7.00 GNSS (L1/L5/E5) 4.3.4.9 4.3.4.9.2 4.3.4.9.3

7.01 Loss of all GPS navigation information for XS/DS Loss of GPS navigation information during this MAJ 2, 3, 4, Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional Acceptable with mitigation:
terminal area navigation (including operating phase could result in flight crew 6, 7 mitigation required due effect of failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional
departures) and nonprecision Approach discontinuing GPS approach and potentially controls required due effect of failure.
(e.g. LNAV or RNP <1, RNAV SIDs) required missed approach.
Loss of GPS function during departure would not
significantly impact the RNAV SID operations
because the selection of ground based NAV aids,
the navigation system accuracy would not degrade
to an unacceptable level within the time frame of
the departure.
The crew may resort to other navigational systems
if available. This would result in a reduction in
safety margin, and a increase in crew workload.
7.02 Loss of all GPS navigation information XS/DS Loss of GPS navigation information during this MAJ 6, 7 Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional Acceptable with mitigation:
during nonprecision approach with Vertical operating phase occurs prior to the final approach mitigation required due effect of failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional
Guidance (LNAV/VNAV) waypoint (FAWP), the approach should not be controls required due effect of failure.
completed since GPS may no longer provide the
required accuracy. The crew may resort to other
navigational systems if available. This would
result in a significant reduction in safety margin,
and a significant increase in crew workload.
7.03 Loss of all GPS navigation information XS/DS Loss of GPS navigation information during this MAJ 6, 7 Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional Acceptable with mitigation:
during LP/LPV and GNSS Category I/II operating phase occurs prior to the final approach mitigation required due effect of failure. Pilot will follow appropriate procedures. No additional
approaches. waypoint (FAWP), the approach should not be controls required due effect of failure.
completed since GPS may no longer provide the
required accuracy. If the flag/status annunciation
appears after the FAWP, the missed approach
should be executed immediately. This would
result in a significant reduction in safety margin,
and a significant increase in crew workload.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix B
B-1
APPENDIX B
2X.1309
FAILURE CONDITION CLASSIFICATIONS

For the purpose of this assessment, the failure condition classification provided by
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 23.1309-1E6 is used, and is considered to be applicable to
Part 25/27/29. A failure condition is defined as an undesired condition that can have
an effect on either the airplane or its occupants, or both, either direct or consequential,
which is caused (or attributed to) by the associated PED interference. Failure
conditions are classified according to their severity, with least severe first:
1. No safety effect (NSE). Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety
(that is failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the
airplane or increase crew workload).
2. Minor (MIN). Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce airplane
safety and involve crew actions that is within their capabilities. Minor failure
conditions may include a slight reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload (such as routine flight plan
changes), or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.
3. Major (MAJ). Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane
or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent
that there would be a significant reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities. In addition, the failure condition has a significant increase in crew
workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency; or a discomfort to the flight
crew or physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including
injuries.
4. Hazardous (HAZ)/Severe Major. Failure conditions that would reduce the
capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be the following:
 A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
 Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew cannot be
relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or
 Serious or fatal injury to an occupant other than the flight crew.
5. Catastrophic (CAT). Failure conditions that are expected to result in multiple
fatalities of the occupants, or incapacitation or fatal injury to a flight
crewmember normally with the loss of the airplane.
NOTE: The phrase “are expected to result” is not intended to require 100 percent
certainty that the effects will always be catastrophic. Conversely, just
because the effects of a given failure, or combination of failures, could
conceivably be catastrophic in extreme circumstances, it is not intended
to imply that the failure condition will necessarily be considered
catastrophic.
6 This AC was used to expand the failure condition categories to include “hazardous” failures.
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A - System Design and Analysis may also be used.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-1
APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF WHEN PEDS CAN BE USED
The following tables provide a step by step process of during which phases of flight
the T-PED can or cannot be used for existing aircraft that want to expand the use of
PEDs. If a new wireless service is installed then it must meet ED-239 / DO-307A, ref
sections 3.5.
C.1 FAA Operator Guidance
This aid to operators is applicable to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(14 CFR) part 119 certificate holders and 91 subpart K (91K) program managers.
When followed, it provides an acceptable method of tolerance for 14 CFR part 91
section (§) 91.21, part 121 § 121.306, part 125 § 125.204, or part 135 § 135.144, as
applicable, when allowing expanded use of PEDs for various phases of flight. The use
of the terms “aircraft operator(s)” and “operator” throughout this document is
applicable to operations conducted under 14 CFR parts 91K, 121, 125 and 135.
C.1.1 Back Door Interference Assessment Summary
Describe HIRF certification basis and/or subsequent PED immunity

demonstration. Answer Yes or No.
Y N Back Door Interference Assessment
1. Aircraft that meet Section 3 of ED-239 / DO-307A No further back-door

Aircraft system tolerant to Intentionally transmitting PEDs, analysis required.
Back Door Coupling
2. PED tolerance demonstration per Issue Paper No further back-door

associated with the installation of a wireless local analysis required.
area network - or - similar capability.
• At installation, other systems may have received
PED Tolerance Qualification
additional testing beyond that of a Failure

classification of Catastrophic, but the documentation
was not required for certification.
• Back-door interference tolerance is provided for the
frequency ranges of PEDs used on the aircraft.
3. PED tolerance demonstration testing and analysis No further back-door
done using other acceptable methods. Test must be analysis required.
comprehensive and operator must have data to
support the testing.
• PED testing in support of previous PED use
allowance determination, such as WiFi system or cell
phone testing done to support inflight use, may be
acceptable. Must be supported by assessment of
critical systems in the expanded phase of flight to
ensure the previous testing covered these systems.
• Back-door interference tolerance is provided for the
frequency ranges of PEDs used on the aircraft.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-2
Y N Back Door Interference Assessment
4. Aircraft Type Certificated or system installed that No further back-door

meet FAA or EASA HIRF Regulations. (Follow analysis required.
decision flow chart in Section C.1.3) Meeting HIRF
specifications, Special Conditions (e.g., 25-302-SC), or
regulations
• Catastrophic systems have been tested at a
minimum.
HIRF Qualification
• Operational Required equipment has not been

tested.
• At certification, other systems may have received
additional testing but the documentation was not
required.
5. Aircraft Type Certificated or system installed prior Back door tolerance
to HIRF Regulatory Specifications in effect in 1987. not demonstrated.
Aircraft certified prior to 1987 do not have verified RF
immunity. Additional assessment
or test required
• Tolerance to ED-239 / DO-307A has not been met.
• At certification, other systems may have received
additional testing but the documentation was not
required.
C 1.2 Front Door Interference Assessment Summary

Appendix A provides Functional Hazard Risk Assessment (FHRA), and contains a
safety risk assessment for operators to assess the avionics configuration of their fleet,
and the failure modes associated with different types of communications and
navigation equipment with respect to electromagnetic interference. The assessment
outlines mitigations and controls that the operator needs to adopt to expand PED use
into various phases of flight. This is based on the work done by the ARC committee.
Y N Front Door Interference Assessment
1. Aircraft that Meet FAA RTCA ED-239 / DO-307A No further front-door

Section 4 analysis required.
Aircraft systems tolerant to unintentional emissions from
Interference path Loss (IPL)
PEDs, Front Door Coupling
2. Aircraft system function with Catastrophic, No further front-door

Hazardous or Major failure condition (see risk analysis required.
assessment (Appendix A), “Hazard Class” column)
documented to meet the interference path loss
requirements of ED-239 / DO-307A and DO-294.
Documented system tolerance to unintentional emissions
from PEDs, Front Door Coupling
3. Aircraft system function with Catastrophic, Must mitigate and

Hazardous or Major failure condition (see risk apply controls. Risk
assessment, Appendix A) NOT documented to meet assessment actions
the interference path loss requirements of ED-239 / for required
DO-307A and DO-294. catastrophic.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-1
C.1.3 Determine Aircraft HIRF Applicability

How do I find out what level of HIRF protection has been applied to my aircraft?
1. Find the type certificate data sheet (TCDS)1 for the make and model aircraft being assessed.
2. Check the Type Certification basis for your aircraft make and model. Does it include Amendment Nos. 23–57,
25–122, 27–42, or 29–49 (by aircraft certification part as applicable)? Is the associated amendment number
captured in a “through” statement? (e.g., 25-109 through 25-124) (See example 1, next page)
a. YES - The aircraft has incorporated the necessary HIRF certification levels. No further review necessary.
Done.
b. NO – Proceed to step 3
Tip – Use the search function in Adobe to help locate the necessary requirements. We suggest that you look for
key words such as “basis” or (25-122) to locate the text in the document. Once located, check the section’s
applicability to ensure the associated aircraft is addressed.
3. Search the TCDS for HIRF special conditions. Is there one listed for your make and model? (See example 2,
next page)
a. YES – Record the special condition number. Done, verify. Look-up the special condition2. Review the
special condition to ensure it covers electrical and electronic systems.
If not, go to step 5.
b. NO – Proceed to step 4.
Tip –Suggest that you look for key words such as “high” or “lightning” to locate the text in the document. Once
located, check the section to ensure the associated aircraft is addressed.
Tip - Special conditions that cover these systems have also been called “Protection From Lightning and Unwanted
Effects of Radio Frequency (RF) Energy” If a HIRF search fails, try this approach
4. Is there a HIRF Special Condition applicable to aircraft electrical and electronic systems for your make and
model aircraft? (use same search tips)
a. YES - Record the special condition number and return to the TCDS for your make and model. Search the TCDS
to verify that the special condition is listed for your aircraft.
b. NO – Proceed to step 5.
5. Is there a HIRF Special Condition applicable to specific critical electrical or electronic systems on your make and
model aircraft? (use same search tips)
a. YES – record special condition number(s) and the system(s) covered. Proceed to step 6.
b. NO – Proceed to step 7
6. Review your critical aircraft systems to determine if any electrical or electronic systems were certified with a
Hazard Class (failure condition) of ‘catastrophic’. Does a special condition cover your critical system(s)?
a. YES – The critical systems are adequately covered for PED tolerance to back-door interference. Done.
b. No – Proceed to step 7.
Tip – Some special conditions are applicable for a change to the TC when it is revised to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature. If your TCDS lists a special condition and the language of
the special condition does not specify your model, look for language in the special condition that applies it to future
changes. (See example 3, page 13)
7. The critical systems for your aircraft cannot be determined to be PED tolerant to back door interference based
on HIRF certification. Testing and analysis for critical systems (those certified with a catastrophic failure effect) to
ensure PED tolerance to back-door interference must be (or have been) accomplished.
Aircraft Make/Model Examples:
Example 1: HIRF as part of standard aircraft certification basis:
TDCS Excerpt, Gulfstream VI. Link3
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-2
Example 1: HIRF addressed as a Special Condition:

TCDS Excerpt, certain Boeing 737 series aircraft:
Link to Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-1324:

Excerpt: “Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 as of the effective date of these special conditions.“
Example 2: HIRF addressed as a Special Condition:
TCDS excerpt from 25-ANM-109 that shows it applicable to future changes:
NOTE 1: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameset
NOTE 2: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSC.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameset
NOTE 3: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/0/92fadb614112af7686257bcf00
57bccd/$FILE/ T00015AT_Rev_4.pdf
NOTE 4: http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSC.nsf/0/139AA0B66F69B63D86256BE300
69EC41 ?OpenDocument&Highlight=25-anm-132
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-3
C.1.4 Analysis And Mitigation

The table below applies the results of the assessment of both front door and back
door PED tolerance and determines the phases of flight where PEDs can remain on
and be used.
STEP 1: Back-Door Tolerance STEP 2: Front Door Tolerance STEP 3. Acceptable Phases
of Flight
Which rows in Section 1.1, Back Which rows in Section 1.2, Front
Door Interference, are checked Door Interference, are checked Tally the results. A ‘YES” in
Yes? Yes? STEP 1 and a “YES” in STEP
A ‘YES’ to any A ‘Yes’ to A ‘YES’ to A ‘Yes’ to 2means that this phase of
of the ONLY Questions 1 or ONLY operations is permitted. See
Questions 1 – Question 5 will 2 results in a Question 3 will notes if your aircraft results in
4 results in a require YES, below: require risk either a ‘NO’ or ‘LIMITED’.
YES, below for additional assessment,
all phases of assessment or and Check permitted phases
operation: testing for mitigations / below:
certain phases controls.
of operation:
Yes Yes Yes Yes Parked: Passenger
boarding and seating to
door close.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Taxi Out: Push back,

taxi from gate to (but not
including on) the runway.
Yes NO 1 Yes Yes Take-off & Departure.

Take-off transition to
climb altitude/or gear-up
Yes Yes Yes Yes Climb: From ‘transition

to climb altitude’ and/or
gear retraction to through
10,000 ft. AGL and onto
cruise altitude.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Cruise: (currently

authorized)
Yes Yes Yes LIMITED 2 Descent: From top of

descent through 10,000
ft. AGL to IAF and /flaps
Yes NO 1 Yes LIMITED 2 Approach: From IAF to

visual reference or
landing.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Landing & Taxi to Gate:

Begins at airplane
touchdown, and
concludes when airplane
is parked for passenger
unloading.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-4
NOTE 1: NO: Additional analysis and/or testing of avionics or electrical systems

that have major, hazardous or catastrophic failure effects as certified
must be done to address back-door PED tolerance.
NOTE 2: LIMITED: See Appendix A.
1. Reference the ‘Phase of Flight’ column and look for a ‘6’ or ‘7’,
‘Descent’ or ‘Approach’ respectively.
2. Identify the Avionics Systems, the failure modes that have been
presented with respect to EMI. Apply the necessary mitigations
and controls as indicated, at a minimum for those items with a
“Hazard Class” at certification of ‘Catastrophic’, ‘Hazardous’ or
‘Major’.
3. For operations (such as CAT II or CAT III), where the Failure
classification is ‘Catastrophic’, the listed Mitigations and Controls
are mandatory.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-5
C.2 EASA OPERATOR GUIDANCE
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-6
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-7
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-8
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-9
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-10
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-11
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-12
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-13
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-14
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-15
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix C
C-16
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix D
D-1
APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL OEM DOCUMENTATION
D.1 PED Tolerance Statement Letter To Operator - Template
[Company / Certification Applicant providing this letter to the operator]

To: [Operator Name]
[Date]
[Title]
[Address]
Copy: [Name]
Subject: Aircraft PED Tolerance Statement [more description if needed]
Approval: Reference [number] approved by [EASA / FAA / DO / …] on [Date]

Other References: [a, b, c, …]
Applicable to: [aircraft effectivity / MSN or fleet / sub-fleet(s)]
Dear Mrs. / Mr. [Name],

This letter is intended to describe the aircraft PED tolerance obtained by [Company / Certification
Applicant providing this letter to the operator] in support of
[ an expansion of PED use /
or
installation of wireless service(s) [WiFi / Cellular / …], received under the
[FAA / EASA TC / ATC / STC] number [XYZ] ].
Back Door Coupling and Front Door Coupling requirements comply with [4, 5, 6 of RTCA / EUROCAE
DO-363 / ED-130A and / or Sections 3 and 4 of ED-239 / DO-307A].
[For HIRF tolerant aircraft …]
Back Door Coupling requirements are fulfilled by
[meeting FAA HIRF requirements according to …
[14 CFR 23.1308, Amdt 57 (Sep 2007) /
14 CFR 25.1317, Amdt 122 (Sep 2007) /
14 CFR 27.1317, Amdt 42(Sep 2007) /
14 CFR 29.1317, Amdt 49 (Sep 2007)]
and / or
EASA HIRF Special Condition (SC) according to …
[CS 23.1308, Amdt 23/4 (Jul 2015) /
CS 25.1317, Amdt 25/17 (Jul 2015)]
and / or
EASA Certification Review Item (CRI) [number] assigned to EASA project [number] .
as its initial TC. ]
Therefore, no additional back door coupling consideration is needed by the operator.
[For Non-HIRF / Partial HIRF tolerant Aircraft …]

Since the aircraft is [Non-HIRF / only Partial HIRF] tolerant, the determination of failure classification
for Major, Hazardous and Catastrophic aircraft systems and equipment, considering also CVR/FDR,
has been determined through a system safety assessment process as described in Sections 4 of
RTCA / EUROCAE DO-363 / ED-130A.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix D
D-2
Back Door Coupling requirements are fulfilled by

[ analysis and laboratory testing of all equipment part numbers per Table 3-1 of RTCA
DO-307A/ED-239 /
analysis and/or on aircraft testing and as described in section 6 of RTCA / EUROCAE
DO-363/ED-130A document.]
Based on the above PEDs/transmitting PEDs can be used in the flight deck, the cabin and the cargo
area.
[The tolerance of the use of PEDs/transmitting PEDs are declared with the following Notes /
Limitations / Recommendations: …]
The tolerance with the above does not constitute an operational approval. Such authorization must be
obtained by the operator from appropriate authorities.
It is the responsibility of the operator to sustain and operate the aircraft in a configuration that will allow
the continued safe use of (transmitting) PEDs within the operational limitations of the installed wireless
service(s).
For some guidance Section 7 of RTCA / EUROCAE DO-363 / ED-130A can be referred to.
[Name of the Company / Certification Applicant providing this letter to the operator] will also provide
aid to the operator in the form of an approved [Non-PED / PED] tolerant equipment list and through
regular updates of [that Non-PED / PED] tolerant equipment list [and/or the aircraft Illustrated Parts
Catalog / …].
Sincerely,
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix D
D-3
D.2 PED Tolerance Statement Letter To Operator - Example
The PED Company
To: Mr. John Airline August 15, 2016

Vice President Operations
Timbuktu 12345
Copy: Mr. Larry Deputy

Mrs. Lea Secretary
Subject: Aircraft PED Tolerance Statement to the installed and certified WiFi service
‘Unlimited Bandwidth’ on Timbuktu Airline’s long-haul fleet B747-400
Approval: Reference 10052188 approved by EASA on July 28, 2016

Other References: :
a) The PED Company letter regarding FAA approved front door and back door coupling analysis and
testing, 22 April 2014.
b) The PED Company letter 543-11-00815, "FAA Approved Front Door and Back Door coupling
Analysis and Testing
Applicable to: Timbuktu Airline’s B747-400 sub-fleets, effectivities 2025, 2024, 2023
Dear Mrs. / Mr. Airline,

This letter is intended to describe the aircraft PED tolerance obtained by The PED Company in
support of the installed Wi-Fi service ‘Unlimited Bandwidth’ on Timbuktu Airline’s long-haul fleet B747-
400, received under the FAA STC number ST03123XY and validated by the EASA under STC number
10040123.
Back Door Coupling and Front Door Coupling requirements comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of RTCA /
EUROCAE DO-363 / ED-130A, and Sections 3 and 4 of RTCA DO-307A / ED-239A.
Since the aircraft is only Partial HIRF tolerant, the determination of failure classification for Major,
Hazardous and Catastrophic aircraft systems and equipment, considering also CVR/FDR, has been
determined through a system safety assessment process as described in Sections 4 of RTCA /
EUROCAE DO-363 / ED-130A. Back Door Coupling requirements are fulfilled by analysis and on
aircraft testing and as described in section 6 of RTCA / EUROCAE DO-363 / ED-130A document.
Based on the above PEDs/transmitting PEDs can be used in the flight deck, the cabin and the cargo
area.
The tolerance of the use of PEDs/transmitting PEDs are declared with the following Notes:
1. In the flight deck and in the corridor of the flight deck privacy area, the use of transmitting
PEDs is restricted to Wi-Fi only (use of GSM, 3G, 4G, and other standards is not permitted in
this area).
The tolerance with the above does not constitute an operational approval. Such authorization must be
obtained by the operator from appropriate authorities.
It is the responsibility of the operator to sustain and operate the aircraft in a configuration that will allow
the continued safe use of (transmitting) PEDs within the operational limitations of the installed wireless
service(s). There is additional guidance in Section 7 of RTCA / EUROCAE DO-363 / ED-130A.
The PED Company will also provide the operator with an approved Non-PED tolerant equipment list.
Any STC updates in the future that affect the Non-PED tolerant equipment list will be made available.
Sincerely,
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-1
APPENDIX E
ASSESSMENT OF THE FIELD STRENGTH GENERATED BY

INTENTIONAL TRANSMITTERS
The appendix E of ED-130A / DO-363 is equivalent to the Annex 2 of the ED-130. Its
purpose is to outline the principle how test levels used in section six of the main
document have been derived.
The use of wireless communication inside the aircraft cabin creates an internal
electro-magnetic, RF environment. This annex evaluates the EMI potential of several
wireless communication signals, including those intentionally emitted by transmitting
personal electronic devices (transmitting PED).
From Specific values general envelopes and maximum needed values are derived for
qualifying non-HIRF aircraft against the impact transmitting PED or using associated
radio standards.
For this purpose, general features of radio communication signals are investigated.
The EMI potential is characterized with the help of EMI threat criteria. They reflect the
time domain representation and further radio signal characteristics such as occupied
frequency spectrum, modulation techniques, number of parallel transmitting portable
mobile devices and transmission power levels. The threat criteria are introduced
before the evaluation of the different radio communication standards starts. The
following communication standards are evaluated:
TABLE E-2: EVALUATED WIRELESS COMMUNICATION STANDARDS
Professional or
Application
Mobile Phone Data Communication Personal Mobile
Radio
Access Schemes
TDMA (time division GSM, i-DEN, IS-136 IEEE 802.11a, b, g, TETRA
multiple access) DAMPS, PDC, PHS ZigBee
CSMA (carrier (IEEE 802.15.4)
sense multiple
access)
CDMA (code UMTS, NAMPS, MOBITEX II, TETRAPOL, EDACS,
division multiple AMPS, CDMAone, Bluetooth Project25/APCO25,
access) CDMA2000 PMR446, MPT-1327
FDMA (frequency
division multiple
access)
Subsequently, according to the groups of access schemes according to TABLE E-2,

the standards are characterized with the help of two simplified representative signal
waveforms.
The test levels associated with the waveforms depend on the transmitted power of the
T-PED and the potential distance between the equipment under test and the T-PED.
Field strength levels, which in general refer to a close distance of 0.1 m between T-
PED and equipment under test and power levels needed, are shown, which apply for
aircraft testing (retrofit qualification). The power levels in this section refer to a test
procedure, where the testing antenna is located at a close distance from the EUT.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-2
This appendix also introduces an envelope for the entire frequency range between
300 MHz and 6 GHz, with no gaps, even for frequencies where no T-PED standards
are in use, which applies for laboratory equipment qualification. For field strength
based qualification two levels are proposed for CW-like standards. The first (higher
level) is valid for equipment, which may be located in close proximity (up to 0.1m) to
the T-PED. The lower field strength level is valid for equipment which is located at a
distance greater than 1m to the T-PED. The same applies for the TDMA-like pulse
modulated waveform. In addition, for both test waveforms, the transmitted power
applicable for testing is given.
An additional feature of the internal electromagnetic transmitter environment is that the
worst-case illumination of equipment by T-PEDs is a very local phenomenon, i.e. it’s
effects extend only to the close vicinity of the device, in contrast to the EMI impact of,
for example, the EMI external environment that includes high intensive radiated fields
(HIRF). However, the HIRF qualification of an aircraft is acceptable to identify an
aircraft being tolerant against PED backdoor effects (See ED-239 / DO-307).
E.1 EMI CHARACTERIZATION OF RADIO COMMUNICATION STANDARDS
Every standard allocates frequency bands that may be used by the given technology.
Almost all technologies employ frequency division duplex (FDD) signals, i.e. use
paired bands for uplink and downlink. Some wireless communication standards also
use the time division duplex method (TDD), separating uplink and downlink in
predetermined timeslots. Of primary interests for EMI in avionics from internal sources
is the uplink spectrum because this is the transmission that will be generated within
the aircraft, by the T-PED. The downlink spectrum becomes of interest, if a pico-cell is
to be installed on board the aircraft.
The communication standards result in a set of signal waveforms, which represent
their EMI potential sufficiently and can be separated in groups by modulation
techniques. There are four mainly used access schemes: TDMA, CSMA, FDMA and
CDMA scheme. Of these, the main modulation techniques are FM, Phase Modulation,
AM or pulse modulation.
Transmitting Power and Field Strength
For the given standards, usually either the maximum ERP (effective radiated power)
or the EIRP (effective isotropic radiated power) are specified, the latter being related
to the electric field strength (E) and distance from the antenna (r) in the far field
(distances greater that one wavelength) as:
EIRP  1
E 
4 r
Where  = 120π Ω is the impedance of free space. This simplification safely covers
worst case levels.
Criteria for Assessment of the EMI Potential of Radio Communication Standards
The different modulation schemes can be categorized into three classes. They
represent different categories of radio signals EMI potential, acknowledging that AM or
FM, or PM signals pose different interference risks to electronic circuitry and
installations. The criteria defined are based on the following assumptions:
The EMI threat s linked with sudden signal amplitude changes, generally increasing
along with the signal amplitude’s time derivative. Signal amplitude changes occur due
to so-called access schemes of a wireless standard. These access schemes can be
separated into TDMA, FDMA or CDMA. TDMA results in PM with fast changes of the
time derivative. FDMA and CDMA do not affect the signal amplitude.
Some amplitude modulations such as QAM or AM cause amplitude changes but still
no pulse modulation, since these changes are less significant than pulse modulation
for the EMI potential.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-3
EMI criterion A (Amplitude change):

Pulse Modulation signals are represented with a general PM-type test signal. Pulse
modulation safely covers amplitude modulations at the same peak power level, if the
pulse repetition frequency (PRF) and the amplitude change frequency are in the same
order of magnitude. In this document pulse repetition cycles in the range between 0.5
ms and 50 ms are considered similar in terms of their EMI behaviour (see TDMA,
CSMA, M-QAM).
The EMI potential increases along with signal power level. The signal energy has a
minor influence. Example: The energy is the product of power and signal-on-time. This
way an electronic system can safely be exposed to a considerable amount of energy
density provided the power level is low and the signal-on-time is long. In the same
way, for pulse modulated signals, the duty cycle plays a minor role, because the
influence of the energy (= power ∙ signal-on-time ∙ duty-cycle) is less significant than
the influence of the power.
EMI criterion B (Power and field strength level):
An EMI test signal representing a wireless signal needs to reflect the radio signal’s
nominal power or field strength level (affects all standards, modulations or access
schemes).
The effects of frequency or phase changes due to modulation techniques are
negligible. Therefore, frequency modulation (FM), binary phase shift keying (BPSK),
quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK), /4-differential quadrature phase shift keying
(/4-DQPSK), frequency shift keying (FSK) and Gaussian minimum shift keying
(GMSK) can be represented by continuous waves. This is substantiated by [9].
EMI criterion C (Modulation):
If just frequency changes or phase changes occur in the modulation, a continuous
wave (CW) EMI test signal sufficiently represents the standards useful signal
modulation (see FDMA, CDMA, phase modulation, frequency modulation, BPSK,
GMSK, QPSK, π/4-QPSK).
E.2 WIRELESS COMMUNICATION STANDARDS

The following sections present widely used wireless communication standards. They
are classified depending on whether they are pulse or amplitude modulated (TDMA,
CSMA/CA) or if they are continuous-wave-like (FDMA, CSMA). For each standard a
table summarizes its main features, i.e. frequency bands, the maximum transmitted
power, and additionally the maximum electric field strength at a short distance (0.1m)
and at a standard distance of 1m. For additional detailed information about the
communication standards see [8-20].
E.2.1 Pulse and Amplitude Modulated Standards
Pulse and amplitude modulated standards are classified in three groups: mobile
phone standards, data communication standards and professional mobile radio
standards. The modulation types, uplink and downlink frequencies, EMI character field
strength at distances of 0,1m and 1m, EIRP, PRF (pulse repetition frequency) and
duty cycle are listed. The number of channels is also listed. This is useful for
estimating superposition effects by the MEF (multiple equipment factor) as explained
further in Appendix F. For all standards the number of transmitters corresponds to
specification values of each protocol.
For GSM it is assumed that ground network structures and reuse of channels in the
ground network lead to a visibility of less than 25% of the ground network channels
within the aircraft. Therefore, just 25 % of the channels are used simultaneously for a
worst-case consideration, that all mobile phones were connected without pico-cells or
similar system provisions on board the aircraft.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-4
EMI characteristic
For each of the modulations the EMI potential is determined by the pulse modulated
signal structure caused by the TDMA or CSMA/CA access schemes (depending on
the standard), which cause a rapid change of the signal amplitude. Therefore, all
these standards can be characterized by EMI criteria A, B and C. Inside the pulses,
they are all phase modulated, so in a representative test signal for these technologies,
it’s not necessary to implement the modulation type, since it does not affect the EMI
characteristic because it causes no abrupt amplitude changes.In the case that
amplitude modulation is also present along with the access scheme, it is expected for
the access scheme to cover the amplitude modulation.
Radiated power and resulting waveforms
The electric field strength values used in the calculations for the test signal are the
values found at a distance of 0,1m as well as the standard 1m distance for all
standards. A safety margin has been applied for the determination of the levels. For
each modulation an EMI test signal can be represented by a pulse modulated signal
with the corresponding PRF and duty cycle. All these results are summarized.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-5
TABLE E-3: PULSE, AMPLITUDE MODULATED STANDARDS
TDMA (pulse-, amplitude modulated) Mobile Phone Standards
Downlink Frequency EMI Field strength (r=0.1m) Field strength (r=1m) PRF
Wireless Standard Modulation type Uplink Frequency (MHz) EIRP (W) Duty cycle N. of channels
(MHz) Character (V/m) (V/m) (Hz)
460,4 – 467,6 (GSM400)
450,4 – 457,6 (GSM400) 9 (GSM400)
869 – 894 (GSM850)
824 – 849 (GSM850) 77 (GSM) 7,7 (GSM) 2 (GSM) 32 (GSM850)
GMSK 921 – 960 PM
GSM 876 – 915 (GSM900+E+R) 55 (PCS1900, 5,5 (PCS1900, 1 (PCS1900, 217 12,5% (0,576 ms) 32 (GSM900+E+R)
(EDGE: 8PSK) (GSM900+E+R) (EMI A, B, C)
1710 – 1785 (DCS1800) DCS1800) DCS1800) DCS1800) 94 (GSM1800)
1805 – 1880 (DCS1800)
1850 – 1910 (PCS1900) 75 (GSM1900)
1930 – 1990 (PCS1900)
806 – 825 851 – 870 11,1 16,7%
PM, AM
i-DEN 16QAM 896 – 901 935 – 940 77 (max) 7,7 (max) 2 (max/usual) 22,2 33,3% (15 ms) 40/MHz
(EMI A, B, C)
1453 – 1465 1501 – 1513 33,3 50%
869 – 894 (IS-136 and
IS-136/ 824 – 849 (IS-136 and IS-54) PM 55 (AMPS) 5,5 (AMPS) 1 (AMPS) 16,7% (3,33 ms) 832
/4-DQPSK IS-54) 50
TDMA/DAMPS 1850 – 1910 (IS-136) (EMI A, B, C) 42,4 (TDMA) 4,24 (TDMA) 600mW (TDMA) 33,3% (6,66 ms) 1800
1930 – 1990 (IS-136)
832 – 834
887 - 889
838 – 846 141 (max)
893 – 901 PM 14,1 (max) 6,6 (max) 16,7% (3,33 ms)
PDC DQPSK 860 – 885 55 (usual) 50 1600
915 – 958 (EMI A, B, C) 5,5 (usual) 1 (usual) 33,3% (6,66 ms)
810 – 828
1477 – 1501
1429 – 1453
PM
PHS /4-DQPSK 1895 – 1918 7,8 (max) 0,8 (max) 20 mW (max) 200 12,5% (0,625 ms) 300
(EMI A, B, C)
UMTS TDD
824 - 849, 1850 – 1900 PM 77 (max) 7,8 (max) 2 (max) Up to
(at present not in QPSK 0,66 ms 7
1900 – 1920, 2010 - 2025 (EMI A, B, C) 27 (usual) 2,8 (usual) 0,25 (usual) 750
use)
CSMA/CA (pulse modulated) Data Communication Standards

EMI Field strength (r=0.1m) Field strength (r=1m) PRF
Wireless Standard Modulation type Uplink Frequency (MHz) Downlink Frequency (MHz) EIRP (W) Duty cycle N. of channels
Character (V/m) (V/m) (Hz)
BPSK, QPSK, 5,15 – 5,25 GHz (1)
PM, AM 38,7 (w. 6 dBi ant. 4 us (OFDM
IEEE 802.11 a 16QAM, 64QAM, 5,25 – 5,35 GHz (2) 3,9 (w. 6 dBi ant. Gain) 500mW N/A 12
(EMI A, B, C) Gain) symbol interval)
OFDM 5,725 – 5,825 GHz (3)
500mW (100 mW is
2,4 – 2,4835 GHz
the most prolifersted
BPSK, QPSK 2,471 – 2,497 GHz PM
IEEE 802.11 b, g 38,7 3,9 level, also mandatory N/A 20 us (Slot time) 3 (non overlapping)
(CCK,PBCC) 2,4465 – 2,4835 GHz (EMI A, B, C)
upper limit in the
2,445 – 2,475 GHz
Europe)
868 – 868,6 1 (for 868 MHz)
ZigBee PM 11 (max) 1,1 (max) 2 mW – 40 mW 15 ms (Slotted
BPSK, OQPSK 902 – 928 N/A 10 (for 915 MHz)
(IEEE 802.15.4) (EMI A, B, C) (with 6 dBi ant. gain) (with 6 dBi ant. gain) (with. 6 dBi ant. gain) CSMA/CA)
2400 – 2483,5 16 (for 2,4 Ghz)
2.402 - 2.480 GHz (1)
17,3 (max) (1) 1,73 (max) (1) 100 mW (1)
2.447 - 2.473 GHz (2) PM 79 (1)
Bluetooth GFSK 3 (max) (2) 0,3 (max) (2) 2,5 mW (2) 1600 89,28 us
2.448 - 2.482 GHz (3) (EMI A, B, C) 23 (2) (3) (4)
2 (max) (3) 0,2 (max) (3) 1 mW (3)
2.473 - 2.495 GHz (4)
TDMA (pulse modulated) Professional Mobile Radios (PMR)

EMI Field strength (r=0.1m) Field strength (r=1m) PRF
Wireless Standard Modulation type Uplink Frequency (MHz) Downlink Frequency (MHz) EIRP (W) Duty cycle N. of channels
Character (V/m) (V/m) (Hz)
380 – 390 390 – 400
410 – 420 420 –430 PM
TETRA /4-DQPSK 220 (max) 22 (max) 16 (max/usual) 17,6 25% (14,167 ms) 18
450 – 460 460 – 470 (EMI A, B, C)
870 – 888 915 – 933 © EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-6
TABLE E-4: RADIATED POWER AND RESULTING WAVEFORMS FOR PULSE, AMP,
MODULATED STANDARDS
TDMA (pulse-, amplitude modulated) Mobile Phone Standards
Recommended
Wireless EIRP for High- EIRP for Local
Signal waveform
Standards Power Zonal Test Test (W)
(W)
Repetition time = 8*0.576 ms
4 (GSM)
GSM 16 W 4 (PCS1900,
t
DCS1800)
Pulse duration = 0.576 ms
Repetition time = 30, 45, 90 ms
i-DEN 16 W 4
t
Duty cycle = 15 ms, with 16 kHz Amplitude

Modulation (50% maximum)
3.33 ms or 6.66 ms
IS-136/ 4 (AMPS)
16 W
TDMA/DAMPS t 2,4 (TDMA)
20 ms time frame = 6x3,33 ms or 3x6,66 ms
3.33 ms or 6.66 ms
PDC 16 W 4
20 ms time frame
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-7
5 ms = 8 0.625 ms
t 16 W 80 mW
PHS
t
0.625 ms
Up to 1,33 ms
UMTS TDD
(at present not in t
t 16 W 1
use)
0,66 ms
TABLE E-5: RADIATED POWER AND RESULTING WAVEFORMS FOR PULSE, AMP.
MODULATED STANDARDS (CONTINUATION)
CSMA/CA (pulse modulated) Data Communication Standards
Recommended
Signal waveform
(W)
t
4W
IEEE 802.11 a 16 W
IEEE 802.11 b t 16 W 800mW***
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-8
ZigBee
t 16 W 160 mW
(IEEE 802.15.4)
15 ms
625 s= 7 89.28s
400 mW (1)
Bluetooth t 16 W 10 mW (2)
4 mW (3)
89.28 s
TDMA (pulse modulated) Professional Mobile Radios (PMR)

Recommended
Signal waveform
(W)
14.167 ms
TETRA t 16 W 4W
56.67 ms time frame
* r = 0,1 m
** r = 1 m
*** The European standard allows a maximum of 100mW transmitted power for the
IEEE 802.11 b,g. On the US market there are a few devices with up to 500mW.
However, these are rare and the testing levels are high enough.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-9
Test Signal (EMI Character of TDMA and CSMA/FHSS Standards)

The EMI test signal for aircraft tests should provide a pulse modulation with a PRF in
the range of 200 Hz and a small duty cycle in the range of 0.625 ms, which are
considerably useful values for these parameters. This signal is, according to EMI
criterion A, sufficiently covering all the investigated signal waveforms. With the values
from the tables along with the corresponding frequency bands for each standard, the
tailored field strength levels and power levels for retrofit qualification (full aircraft
testing) are shown along the frequency spectrum in. With these levels, a mask or
envelope is then constructed for the field strength and power levels. This envelope
results in test levels for a frequency range between 300 MHz and 6 GHz, meaning that
these levels are the ones used for laboratory equipment qualification.
The signal modulation (BPSK, QPSK, FSK etc.) occurring during the duty cycle,
according to EMI Criterion C, has no additional influence on the EMI character of a
signal. During the duty cycle, a continuous wave signal is therefore adequate, and the
rapid changes in amplitude are covered by the pulse modulation. Therefore, the test
waveform according to FIGURE E-1 covers the EMI characteristic of the TDMA and
CSMA standards investigated above.
Repetition time = 5 ms
Pulse duration = 0.625 ms
FIGURE E-1: TEST WAVEFORM FOR STANDARDS USING TDMA OR CSMA/FHSS SCHEMES
EMI characteristic:
Adequate test levels for laboratory equipment qualification depend on both, the
standard and possible distance between device and equipment under test. They are
given in ED-239 / DO-307A, and are to be applied in connection with the test
procedures discussed in section 6 of the document.
E.2-2 FDMA/CDMA and other CW-like Standards
The following table shows all FDMA/CDMA (CW-like) standards classified in three
groups: mobile phone standards, data communication standards and professional
mobile radio standards, as was done in the previous case. For each one of them the
modulation type, uplink and downlink frequencies, EMI character, field strength at
distances of 0,1m and 1m, and EIRP. The number of channels is also listed. This is
useful for deriving a MEF (Multiple equipment factor) as explained in Appendix F. It
refers to the amount of physical channels (i.e. carrier frequencies) since the number of
signals present in the environment is what is important for this calculation. This will be
explained later in more detail. For all standards the number corresponds to
specifications values of each protocol.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-10
EMI characteristic
For each of the modulations the EMI potential is determined by the level of the
continuous wave-like signal structure caused by the FDMA or CDMA access schemes
(depending on the standard), which are characterized by constant signal amplitude.
Therefore, all these standards can be characterized by EMI criteria B and C. From
the standards analysed here, all are phase or frequency modulated (some CDMA
standards also include amplitude modulation), so in a representative test signal for
these technologies, it’s not necessary to implement the modulation type since it does
not affect the EMI characteristic because it causes no amplitude changes as it was
stated in [9]. A representative test signal should be then a continuous wave signal.
Transmitted power and resulting waveforms
The electric field strength has not been calculated for testing on aircraft. Appropriate
field strength levels can be taken from ED-239 / DO-307A TABLE 3-1. Aircraft testing
in the Zonal/Local Test method can be performed with the help of the transmitted
power values: using the usual values along with a margin.
For each level independent modulation an EMI test signal can be represented by a
continuous wave signal.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-11
TABLE E-6: FDMA/CDMA (CW-LIKE) STANDA
FDMA/CDMA (CW-like) Mobile Phone Standards

Wireless EMI Field strength (r=0.1m) Field strength (r=1m)
Modulation type Uplink Frequency (MHz) Downlink Frequency (MHz) EIRP (W) N. of channels
Standard Character (V/m) (V/m)
410 – 420; 450 – 460 420 – 430; 460 – 470
1,65
479 – 484; 776 – 794 489 – 494; 746 – 764
CW 70 (BC0 = Class III) 7 (BC0 = Class III) (BC0 = Class III)
CDMA2000 QPSK/OQPSK 806 – 849; 870 – 925 832 – 834; 835 – 946 20
(EMI B, C) 55 (BC1 = Class III) 5,5 (BC1 = Class III) 1
1710 – 1785; 1850 – 1910 915 – 960; 1805 – 1880
(BC1 = Class III)
1920 – 1980 1930 – 1990; 2110 – 2117
824 – 849 869 – 894
CW 110 (max) 11 (max) 4 (max)
UMTS FDD QPSK 1850 – 1910 1930 – 1990 12
(EMI B, C) 27 (usual) 2,74 (usual) 0,25 (usual)
1920 – 1980 2110 – 2170
CW 141 (max) 14,1 (max) 6,6 (max) NAMPS: 2496
NAMPS/AMPS FM 824 – 849 869 – 894
(EMI B, C) 55 (usual) 5,5 (usual) 1 (usual) AMPS: 832
1,65
824 – 849 869 – 894 CW 70 (BC0 = Class III) 7 (BC0 = Class III) (BC0 = Class III)
CDMAone BPSK 20
1850 – 1910 1930 – 1990 (EMI B, C) 55 (BC1 = Class III) 5,5 (BC1 = Class III) 1
(BC1 = Class III)
FDMA Data Communication Standards

Wireless EMI Field strength (r=0.1m) Field strength (r=1m)
Modulation type Uplink Frequency (MHz) Downlink Frequency (MHz) EIRP (W) N. of channels
Standard Character (V/m) (V/m)
415 – 430
CW
MOBITEX II GMSK 820 – 870 110 (max) 11 (max) 4 (max/usual) 20
(EMI B, C)
895 – 910
FDMA (CW-like) Professional Mobile Radios

Wireless Modulation EMI Field strength (r=0.1m) Field strength (r=1m)
Uplink Frequency (MHz) Downlink Frequency (MHz) EIRP (W) N. of channels
Standard type Character (V/m) (V/m)
CW
PMR446 FM 446 49 (max) 4,9 (max) 0,8 (max/usual) 8
(EMI B, C)
130 – 200 N/A, depends on
Project25/ CW
C4FM/ QPSK 360 – 512 173 (max) 17,3 (max) 10 (max/usual) modulation
APCO25 (EMI B, C)
800 – 941 technique
CW
MPT-1327 FFSK Any approved for mobile communication 220 (max) 21,9 (max) 16 (max) N/A
(EMI B, C)
70 – 520
CW
TETRAPOL GMSK 746 –888 110 (max) 11 (max) 4 (max/usual) 4–8
(EMI B, C)
915 – 933
136 – 174 (1)
1520 (1)
380 – 512 (2)
CW 173 (max) 5280 (2)
EDACS GMSK 806 – 821 (3) 17,3 (max) 10 (max/usual)
(EMI B, C) 1200 (3) (4)
851 – 866 (4)
400 (5)
896 – 901 (5)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-12
TABLE E-7: RADIATED POWER AND WAVEFORMS FOR FDMA/CDMA (CW-LIKE) STANDARD
FDMA/CDMA (CW-like) Mobile Phone Standards
Recommended
EIRP for
Wireless EIRP for High-
Signal waveform Local Test
Standards Power Zonal
(W)
Test (W)
CDMA2000 t 16W 4W
t
UMTS FDD 16W 1W
NAMPS/AMPS 16W 4W
t t
CDMAone t
16W 4W
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-13
FDMA Data Communication Standards

Recommended
Signal waveform
Standards Power Zonal Test (W)
Test (W)
MOBITEX II 16W 4W
t
t
TABLE E-8: RADIATED POWER AND WAVEFORMS FOR FDMA/CDMA (CW-LIKE) STANDARD
(CONTINUATION)
FDMA (CW-like) Professional Mobile Radios
Recommended
Signal waveform
(W)
PMR446 16W 4W
t t
Project25/
t 16W 4W
APCO25
MPT-1327 16W 4W
t
t
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-14
TETRAPOL 16W 4W
t
t
EDACS 16W 4W
t
t
* r = 0,1 m
** r = 1 m
Test Signal (EMI Character of CDMA/FDMA Mobile Phone Standards)
In order to specify an appropriate waveform for the equipment qualification test
procedure the signal characteristics of CDMA/FDMA standards have been
investigated. The following signal covers a wide class of investigated signal
waveforms presented in TABLE E-7 and TABLE E-8. With the values from these
tables along with the corresponding frequency bands for each standard, the field
strength levels and power levels for non HIRF aircraft qualification (full aircraft testing)
are shown along the frequency spectrum in TABLE E-9 through TABLE E-11. With
these levels, a mask or envelope is then constructed for the field strength and power
levels environment.
For further simplification it is recommended using levels given in section 6 of the main
document. They include sufficient amplification for aircraft testing
FIGURE E-2: CW-WAVEFORM FOR STANDARDS PROVIDING NO PULSE MODULATION
EMI characteristic:
The EMI test signal for standards with FDMA or CDMA scheme can be characterized
by EMI criterion B and EMI criterion C.
The CDMA/FDMA standards EMI behaviour is sufficiently represented by the
continuous waveform according to FIGURE E-2.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-15
E.2.3 Conclusion on Test Signal Waveforms

The investigation of several radio communication standards and the application of the
EMI criteria for several modulations resulted in two basic signal waveforms adequate
to qualify equipment against the environmental impact due to radio communication
services.
One signal waveform reflects the widely used pulse modulation (TDMA) behavior of
the most popular mobile communication standards, GSM. The other waveform is a
simple continuous wave as already used today within ED-14 / DO-160D and E. This
continuous wave represents the EMI potential of the CW-like radio communication
standards which have no amplitude changing features, neither in their access
schemes nor in their signal modulation principle.
The evaluation of adequate test levels is inherently done in the previous sections, but
the levels depend on the potential distance between the T-PED and the equipment
under test and on the test procedure. This will be treated in the following section.
E.2.3.1 Field Strength Levels and Power Levels
For retrofit testing, it is adequate to select the radio standard, which is expected on
board aircraft. FIGURE E-5 shows adequate power test levels for a close distance
(~ 0.1 m) test procedure between EUT and T-PED for the pulse-modulated waveform.
FIGURE E-6 shows the same for the CW-like waveforms.
For full aircraft testing, against PED-tolerance the multiple equipment effect of a given
number of simultaneous T-PED sources used inside the aircraft In addition the entire
fuselage cross-section needs to be sufficiently illuminated. This is ensured by applying
of the Multiple Equipment Factor (MEF) evaluation (see Appendix F). Alternatively,
using the values stated in TABLE E-9 through TABLE E-11 are satisfactory.
The values presented in TABLE E-10 and TABLE E-11 are the basis for the
qualification levels given in section 6 of this document.
In addition, an evaluation of the functionality of pico-cells is adequate, as the protocols
of such radio communication systems may in general allow power setting of T-PEDs
and have the option to reduce this way the possible impact of radio signals. Other
systems may prevent in addition the unwanted transmission of mobile phones to
ground located base stations.
For laboratory equipment qualification the values out of TABLE 3-1 in ED-239 /
DO-307A are recommended. For field strength testing the qualification values are
displayed for equipment, which may be located at short range (~ 0.1 m) between EUT
and electronic device. For higher distance (> 1m) between EUT and electronic device
a test level of ~20 V/m is adequate (FIGURE E-7 and FIGURE E-8).
With the required levels, shown in this section, a mask or envelope is constructed for
the field strength and power levels, as shown in FIGURE E-7 to FIGURE E-10. This
envelope gives test levels for a frequency range between 300 MHz and 6 GHz used
for laboratory equipment qualification.
The below displayed power levels can be used for the transmitted power test
procedure. They refer to a single T-PED illuminating a device from a close distance of
10 cm.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-16
200
Standards covered:
180
IEEE802.11a,
IEEE802.11b,
ZigBee,
160 154 V/m
GSM,
iDEN,
IS-136,
140
PDC,
PHS
Field strength/ V/m
Bluetooth
120
110 V/m
100 98 V/m
80
60
49 V/m
40 35 V/m
22 V/m
20
0
450,2-457,6 MHz
868-868,6 MHz
1453-1501 MHz
1785 MHz
1850 MHz
1710 MHz
1918 MHz
2483,5 MHz
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
5725 MHz
806 MHz
849 MHz
958 MHz
5825 MHz
5150 MHz
5250 MHz
5358 MHz
2400 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-3: FIELD STRENGTH LEVELS ONTO EUT FOR WORST-CASE SCENARIO FOR PULSE-MODULATED T-PED SIGNALS INCLUDING 6DB
MARGIN
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-17
200
Standards covered:
180
UMTS
AMPS/NAMPS
160 CDMAone
CDMA2000
140
Field strength/ V/m
120
110 V/m
100
78 V/m
80
60
40
20
0
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
479-484 MHz
776-824 MHz
824-849 MHz
870-925 MHz
1710 MHz
1785 MHz
1850 MHz
1910 MHz
1980 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-4: FIELD STRENGTH LEVELS ONTO EUT FOR CW-LIKE T-PED SIGNALS INCLUDING 6DB MARGIN
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-18
8W Standards covered:
8
IEEE802.11a
IEEE802.11b
ZigBee
7
GSM
iDEN
IS-136
6 PDC
PHS
Bluetooth
Power / W
4W
4
3,2 W
3
1 800 mW
400 mW
160 mW
0
450,2-457,6 MHz
806 MHz
849 MHz
1453-1501 MHz
1710 MHz
1785 MHz
1850 MHz
1918 MHz
2483,5 MHz
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000

868-868,6 MHz
5825 MHz
958 MHz
5725 MHz
2400 MHz
5150 MHz
5250 MHz
5358 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-5: POWER LEVELS AT A 0.1 M DISTANCE BETWEEN TEST ANTENNA AND EUT FOR PULSE MODULATED (TDMA) T-PED SIGNALS
INCLUDING 6DB MARGIN
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-19
9
Standards covered:
UMTS
8 AMPS/NAMPS
CDMAone
CDMA2000
7
6
Power / W
4W
4
2W
2
0
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
776-824 MHz
824-849 MHz
1710 MHz
1850 MHz
870-925 MHz
1785 MHz
1910 MHz
1980 MHz
479-484 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-6: POWER LEVELS AT A 0.1 M DISTANCE BETWEEN TEST ANTENNA AND EUT FOR CW-LIKE (FDMA) T-PED SIGNALS INCLUDING 6DB
MARGIN
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-20
IEEE802.11a*,
IEEE802.11b*,
200 ZigBee*,
GSM*,
Close distance to T-PED's
180 IDEN*,
Normal distance to T-PED's
IS-136*,
PDC*,
160
150 V/m
PHS*,
Bluetooth*,
140 TETRA**
Field strength/ V/m
120
110 V/m
100
IEEE802.11 (+),
80
IEEE802.11b (+),
ZigBee (+),
GSM (+),
60 IDEN (+),
50 V/m
IS-136 (+),
40 PDC (+),
PHS (+),
20 V/m Bluetooth(+),
20
TETRA (++)
0
1500 MHz
2000 MHz
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
5600 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-7: DERIVED RADIATED FIELD STRENGTH LEVELS FOR PULSE-MODULATED (TDMA) T-PED SIGNALS INCLUDING 6 DB MARGINS FOR
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
* Level for equipment in a distance 0.1 m…1 m to T-PED’s

** Level for equipment in a distance 0,3 m… 2,5 m to T-PED’s
(+) Level for equipment in a distance > 1 m to T-PED’s
© EUROCAE, 2016 (++) Level for equipment in a distance > 2,5 m to T-PED’s
Appendix E
E-21
200
UMTS FDD*
Close distance to T-PED's AMPS/NAMPS*
180 Normal distance to T-PED's CDMAone*
CDMA2000*
PMR446*
160 Project25/APCO25**
Mobitex II**
EDACS**
140
TETRAPOL**
MPT-1327***
Field strength/ V/m
120
110 V/m
100
80 V/m UMTS FDD(+)

80 AMPS/NAMPS(+)
CDMAone(+)
60 CDMA2000(+)
PMR446(+)
Project25/
40 35 V/m APCO25(++)
Mobitex II(++)
20 V/m EDACS(++)
20 TETRAPOL(++)
MPT-1327(++)
0
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
2000 MHz
850 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-8: DERIVED RADIATED FIELD STRENGTH FOR CW LIKE (FDMA) T-PED SIGNALS INCLUDING 6 DB MARGINS FOR LABORATORY
EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
* Level for equipment in a distance 0.1 m…1 m to T-PED’s

© EUROCAE, 2016 ** Level for equipment in a distance 0,4 m… 2,5 m to T-PED’s
*** Level for equipment in a distance 0,6 m… 2,5 m to T-PED’s
(+) Level for equipment in a distance > 1 m to T-PED’s
(++) Level for equipment in a distance > 2,5 m to T-PED’s
Appendix E
E-22
Standards covered:
8
IEEE802.11a
IEEE802.11b
ZigBee
7 GSM
IDEN
IS-136
6 PDC
PHS
Bluetooth
Power / W
4W
4
1 800 mW
0
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
2000 MHz
1500 MHz
5600 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-9: DERIVED RADIATED POWER LEVELS FOR 0.1M DISTANCE BETWEEN TEST ANTENNA AND EUT FOR PULSE-MODULATED (TDMA)
T-PED SIGNALS INCLUDING 6 DB MARGINS FOR LABORATORY EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-23
6
Power / W
4W
4
2W
2
1
400 mW
0
300 1300 2300 3300 4300 5300 6000
850 MHz
2000 MHz
Frequency/ MHz
FIGURE E-10: DERIVED RADIATED POWER LEVELS FOR 0.1M DISTANCE BETWEEN TEST ANTENNA AND EUT FOR CW-LIKE (FDMA) T-PED
SIGNALS INCLUDING 6 DB MARGINS FOR LABORATORY EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-24
E.4 POWER LEVEL AND FIELD STRENGTH ENVELOPES FOR EQUIPMENT

QUALIFICATION AND/OR AIRCRAFT TESTING
For equipment qualification section 3 out of ED-239 / DO-307A, TABLE 3-1 should be
used. values are sufficient for present and upcoming standards.
TABLE E-9 through TABLE E-11 below provide a summary of the field strength and
power levels presented in FIGURE E-3 through FIGURE E-10 and can be used for
A/C testing. The values in section 6 (also TABLE E-10 through TABLE E-11) are those
which demonstrate PED tolerance. All transmit power given is the EIRP radiated by
the test antenna. EIRP can be obtained from the forward power compensated by
antenna cable loss; antenna gain of low directivity antennas may be disregarded (i.e.
assumed to be 0 dBi), provided the calibrated gain is within a range of -1 to +4 dBi.
The gain simplification is justified by near-field effects and will mostly provide to an
increase of the safety margin.
TABLE E-9: FREQUENCY RANGES FOR FULL PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT

410 - 495 MHz 698 - 960 MHz 1430 - 1514 MHz
1626 - 1661 MHz 1710 - 1999 MHz 2010 - 2030 MHz
2110 - 2180 MHz 2300 - 2496 MHz 2500 - 2700 MHz
3600 - 3800 MHz 5150 - 5900 MHz
TABLE E-10: CW TEST SIGNAL POWER FOR FULL PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
0.00 - 8.00 42 36 36 Refer to ED-239 /
GHz DO-307A
table 3-01
TABLE E-11: PULSE TEST SIGNAL POWER FOR FULL PED TOLERANT AIRCRAFT
0.00 - 8.00 42 36 36 Refer to ED-239 /
GHz DO-307A
table 3-01
E.5 FREQUENCY STEPPING

After necessary frequency ranges have been determined, the actual test frequencies
have to be defined. Constraints beyond the control of a test engineer may have to be
respected e.g. available test licenses. Ideally the frequency range is divided into test
frequencies analogue to ED-14 / DO-160 with 100 frequencies per decade roughly
logarithmically spaced. This is equivalent to a frequency stepping of 2.3%. If external
constraints prevent this ideal frequency stepping, the test frequencies can be arranged
so that every frequency in the range under test is not more than 2.3% away from a
test frequency. In this case the overall number of test frequencies shall still be at least
100 per decade. If this is still not possible, other means of compensation should be
considered.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix E
E-25
E.6 CONCLUSION
Usually, aircraft equipment is qualified against both radiated and conducted RF
susceptibility to ensure that abnormal behaviour is not experienced due to interference
effects being caused by the RF environment which covers both the HIRF threat and
also the RF electromagnetic compatibility between the aircraft systems and
equipment. For this purpose, a general test procedure, levels and test signal
waveforms are described in the EUROCAE/RTCA standard ED-14 / DO-160 D or
ED-14 / DO-160 E section 20.
The levels within ED-239 / DO-307A, TABLE 1 are considered satisfactory, to cover
any mobile standards. This includes any current and future wireless standards for
PED, including personal mobile radios.
In practice it has turned out during the past decade that application of CAT R,
ED-14D change 1 / DO-160D change 1 (change notice 1 or later), section 20, is
satisfactory to demonstrate immunity. Lower levels such as CAT T, ED-14D change 1/
DO-160D change 1, section 20, are satisfactory for equipment performing functions of
major criticality.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix F
F-1
APPENDIX F
PREPARING AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE INTENTIONAL RADIO

EMISSION OF PEDS
The appendix F of ED-130A / DO-363 is equivalent to the Annex 5 of the initial edition
ED-130. All procedures that had been introduced here in the initial version of ED-130
have been replaced by section 6. In the previous version of this document there also
had been an introduction how potential constructive superposition of radio signals had
been derived. This part is still contained in this appendix in order to maintain
traceability. Its purpose is to outline how test levels used in section six of the main
document have been derived.
The information described in this appendix has been developed in the initial edition of
ED-130, for the case that re-qualification of the aircraft equipment is not possible and
testing is required e.g. for Non-HIRF aircraft. Today, also the general methods in
sections 6 and levels in tables F-8 through F-9 in appendix F are sufficient to cover all
multiple equipment effects. Therefore, this appendix may be considered for
information.
In the first place, the determination of the EMC environment that will be created by the
use of the T-PED technology in question is necessary. This information may be
obtained based on the T-PED characterization sub process defined in reference [1],
section 3.1
To account for effects caused by simultaneous use of multiple T-PEDs a multiple
equipment factor (MEF) had been introduced in ED-130A and DO-294C. This penalty
factor covers the following aspects:
1. Multiple locations
2. Superposition effects including effects from multiple reflections inside the cabin
and radiation from multiple devices (see MEF)
3. Safety margin
Detailed information about the derivation and assessment of the MEF can be found
here and in [4].
Also, appropriate locations for the transmitting antenna need to be chosen. These
should be representative for locations, where T-PEDs may operate (e.g. cabin, but
also cargo compartment).
Aircraft Testing Preparation (Multiple device risk assessment for aircraft
interaction testing)
Multiple device risk assessment for aircraft interaction testing
Several effects are connected to the simultaneous use of multiple transmitting portable
electronic devices (T-PEDs), which affect the overall field strength level emitted from
T-PED inside the aircraft, i.e.:
1. Spurious emissions from T-PED may accumulate (including intermodulation)
2. Intentional transmission protocol from T-PED
3. The possibility to operate a "fault mode" T-PED increases with respect to the
number of T-PEDs on board the aircraft
All three effects are covered by applying levels out of TABLES 6-5 and 6-6.
Accumulation of spurious emissions
Spurious emissions are safely covered by path loss limits as outlined inside
ED-239 / DO-307A or later issues. Accumulation is included in the IPL values of
ED-239 / DO-307A, section 4.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix F
F-2
Accumulation of Intentionally Transmitted Signals from T-PEDs

T-PEDs usually follow a given, well-controlled transmitter-receiver protocol that limits
the simultaneously intentionally transmitted signal for a small number of single T-
PEDs operating at the same frequency at the same time.
This number of T-PEDs can be evaluated based on the number of sources, i.e.
number of channels or actual transmitters
Based on the technology under analysis, there are 2 specific cases: For technologies
based on the TDMA access scheme, the number of sources used for choosing the
MEF is equal to the number of operating channels (i.e. carrier frequencies) in the
vicinity of the A/C and not to the number of transmitting devices itself, since one
channel can support several devices (up to 8 devices per channel for GSM, for
example, but still there is only one signal at one channel). On the other hand, for the
CDMA access scheme, the number of sources does correspond to the number of
devices inside the A/C, since all communication action is simultaneous. According to
this, for a given standard, the number of sources (channels) that corresponds to the
frequency band to be analysed is taken. This number is modified if there is any
network or aircraft restriction like mentioned before, and the resulting number of
sources is then used to select the proper MEF.
With such values, fault mode T-PED issues (transmission at maximum power, not
regulated) are covered. From [4], with the sources placed concentrically around one
source in the origin, the MEF vs. minimal distance d between sources is calculated:
A 12 dB value for the amplification is safely covering all superposition effects for the
high power pretest and will mainly be used to illuminate the entire cabin cross-section
from a typical aisle position of the transmit antenna.
A 6 dB amplification is recommended for narrower test antenna areas i.e. the cockpit
or for the lower power test in case of a finding. For near field investigations the
application of a MEF is not needed because the closest PED will dominate the RF
coupling effect.
TABLE F-12: MEF / DB ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF SOURCES AND MINIMAL DISTANCE D

BETWEEN THEM, 12 DB IS COVERING ALL SCENARIOS.
d / (m) /
# of 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
sources
1 3dB 5dB 7dB 8dB 10dB 10dB 11dB 12dB 12dB
1,5 3dB 5dB 6dB 7dB 8dB 9dB 9dB 10dB 10dB
5 0,5dB 0,5dB 1dB 1dB 2dB 2dB 2dB 2dB 3dB
This MEF is safely covered by using test levels or equipment qualification as per
Appendix F /Section 6 of this document or application of ED-239 / DO-307A Section 3
TABLE 3-1. Note that 12 dB are suggested for the high power pre-test. It is not
needed, to add an additional multiple equipment amplification factor on top of the
levels given in section CHAPTER 6 since it is already considered in the applicable
tables.
NOTE: The use of actual T-PED devices instead of dedicated test-signal
generators is not adequate, due to poor test reproducibility and possibly
not representative T-PED location inside the aircraft. In addition, the
safety margin cannot be demonstrated
.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-1
APPENDIX G
EXEMPLARY PROCEDURE FOR FUNCTIONAL AIRCRAFT
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-2
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-3
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-4
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-5
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-6
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-7
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-8
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-9
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-10
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-11
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-12
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-13
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-14
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-15
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix G
G-16
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix H
H-1
APPENDIX H
INDEX OF DEFINITIONS
16 QAM 16- Quadrature Amplitude Modulation

3GPP2 Third-Generation Partnership Project 2
ADC American Digital Cellular System
AM Amplitude Modulation
AMPS Advanced Mobile Phone Standard
BPSK Binary Phase Shift Keying
C4FM Constant Envelope 4 Level Frequency Modulation
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
CW Continuous Wave
DAMPS Digital American Mobile Phone System Standard
DCS1800 (See PCS1900)
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
DQPSK Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
DUI Device under investigation
EDACS Enhanced Digital Access Communication System
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EIRP Effective Isotropic Radiated Power
ERP Effective Radiated Power
ETSI European Telecommunication Standards Institute
EUT Equipment under test
FCC Federal Communication Commission
FDD Frequency Division Duplex
FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
FHSS Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
FM Frequency Modulation
FSK Frequency Shift Keying
GSM Global System for Mobile telephony
GMSK Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
HIRF High Intensity Radiated Field
HSCSD High Speed Circuit Switched Data
i-DEN Proprietary mobile phone standard by Motorola
IRA Intentional Radiated emissions coupled through Antennas
IRC Intentional Radiated emissions coupled trough Cables
IRU Intentional Radiated emissions coupled onto Units
IS-136 Basis of the TDMA cellular and personal communication services
(PCS)
IS-54/ IS-136 Second-generation (2G) mobile phone system
ISM Industrial, Scientific, Medical
LTE Long Term Evolution (Radio Standard)
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix H
H-2
LRU Line Replaceable Unit

MEF Multiple Equipment Factor
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MPT-1327 Trunked Radio Standard developed by the British Department of
Trade and Industry
M-QAM Multiple Quadrature Amplitude Modulation
Mobitex II International Mobile Communication Standard developed by
Ericsson
NAMPS North American Mobile Phone System Standard
NIRA Non Intentional Radiated emissions coupled trough Antennas
NIRC Non Intentional Radiated emissions coupled trough Cables
NIRU Non Intentional Radiated emissions coupled onto Units
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplex
OQPSK Offset Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
PCS1900 Personal Communication System 1900. PCS1900 is not a
standardized system but refers to a collection of mobile systems
that operate in the 1900 MHz band in the United States. One of
these systems is a derivative of the GSM or DCS1800. Other
standards are CDMA/IS-95 and TDMA/IS-136.
PDC Personal Digital Cellular
PHS Personal Handy phone Standard
PMR Personal (or Professional) Mobile Radio, e.g. PMR 446
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency
PROJECT 25/APCO25 Mobile Communication Standard for e.g. governmental and
public safety use
QPSK Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
RS Radiated Susceptibility
TDD Time Division Duplex
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio Standard
TETRAPOL Terrestrial Trunked Radio Standard, e.g. for the public safety
sector
T-PED Intentionally transmitting portable electronic device
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
USDC US digital Cellular
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix I
I-1
APPENDIX I
INDEX OF REFERENCES
[1] RTCA DO-294C, “Guidance on Allowing Transmitting Portable Electronic

Devices (T-PEDs) onboard Aircraft”, prepared by SC-202, October 2004.
[2] EUROCAE ED-118, “Report on electromagnetic compatibility between
passenger carried portable electronic devices (PEDS) and aircraft systems”,
November 2003.
[3] International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP),
“Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric, Magnetic and
Electromagnetic Fields (up to 300 GHz)”, 1998.
[4] Robert Kebel, Philipp Argus: “Assessment of Multiple Equipment
Electromagnetic Emissions”, RTCA DO-294, prepared by SC-202, Appendix
5.E, Hamburg, November 2003.
[5] JAA TGL Nr. 29, “Guidance concerning the use of Portable Electronic Devices
Onboard Aircraft”, JAA Administrative and Guidance material, October 2001.
[6] EUROCAE WG-58, “Report on electromagnetic compatibility between
passenger carried Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) and aircraft systems”,
October 2003.
[7] RTCA DO-233, “Portable Electronic Devices Carried Onboard Aircraft”, RTCA,
August 1996.
[8] LAN/MAN STANDARDS COMMITTEE, “Supplement to IEEE Standard for
Information Technology, PART 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Higher-Speed Physical Layer
Extension in the 2.4 GHz Band”, p. 52, IEEE Computer Society.
[9] EN 61000-4-3, “Electromagnetic Compatibility”, Appendix A, November 2003.
[10] Bluetooth, “Specification of the Bluetooth System”, version 1.1, Part A: Radio
Specification, February 22 2001.
[11] TIA/EIA/IS-91-A, “Base Station-Mobile Station Compatibility Specification for
800 MHz Cellular, Auxiliary and Residential Services”, Telecommunications
Industry association, November 1999.
[12] TIA/EIA-95-B, “Base Station-Mobile Station Compatibility Specification for
Wideband Spread Spectrum Cellular Systems”, Telecommunications Industry
association, March 1999.
[13] ARIB STD-53-C. S0002-B, “Physical Layer Standard for CDMA2000 Spread
Spectrum Systems”, Association of Radio Industries and Business, April 19
2002.
[14] Gunnar Heine, “GSM Networks: Protocols, Terminology and Implementation”,
Artech House, Boston London, 1999.
[15] MOTOROLA, “Software Release 9.1: iDEN Technical Overview”, Chapter 3:
Operating Characteristics, 68P81095E55-E, August 2000.
[16] ARIB RCR STD-27 J, “Personal Digital Cellular Telecommunication System
ARIB Standard”, Chapter 3: Technical Requirements for Radio Facilities,
Association of Radio Industries and Business, May 30 2002.
[17] Dr.-Ing. Wolfgang Granzow, “3rd Generation Mobile Communications Systems”,
version 1.12, August 1 2000.
[18] ETSI TR 101 683, “Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN), HYPERLAN
Type 2, System Overview”, Chapter 5: Spectrum Utilization Parameters, V1.1.1,
ETSI, February 2002.
© EUROCAE, 2016
Appendix I
I-2
[19] ETSI EN 300 328-1, “Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio Spectrum

Matters (ERM); Wideband Transmission systems; Data transmission equipment
operating in the 2,4 GHz ISM band and using spread spectrum modulation
techniques; Part 1: Technical characteristics and test conditions”, Chapter 5:
Technical Characteristics, V1.3.1, ETSI, December 2001.
[20] LAN MAN Standards Committee of the IEEE Computer Society, “Information
technology Telecommunications and information exchange between systems;
local and metropolitan area networks; specific requirements; part 11: Wireless
LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications”,
ANSI/IEEE Standard 802.11, 1999.
[21] Bill Strauss, thesis, “Portable Electronic Devices Onboard Commercial Aircraft:
Assessing the risks”.
[22] Bill Strauss, M. Granger Morgan, Jay Apt, Daniel D. Stancil, “Unsafe At Any
Airspeed?”, IEEE Spectrum, March 2006.
[23] EUROCAE ED-130 “Guidance for the Use of Portable Electronic Devices
(PEDs) On Board Aircraft” December 2006.
[24] RTCA DO-307A / EUROCAE ED-239, “Aircraft Design and Certification for
Portable Electronic Device (PED) Tolerance" .
[25] Gronwald, F.; Kebel, R.; Stadtler, T.: “Compensation of unavailable test
frequencies during immunity measurements”, Proceedings ESA Workshop EMC
in Aerospace, Venice, 2012.
[26] FCC OET Bulletin 65 Evaluating Tolerance with FCC Guidelines for Human
Exposure to Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields.
© EUROCAE, 2016
IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTION FORM
Name: Company:
Address:
City: State, Province:
Postal Code, Country: Date:
Phone: Fax:
Email:
Document : ED- / DO- Sec: Page: Line:
[ ] Documentation error (Format, punctuation, spelling)

[ ] Content error
[ ] Enhancement or refinement
Rationale (Describe the error or justification for enhancement):
Proposed change (Attach marked-up text or proposed rewrite):
Please provide any general comments for improvement of this document:
Return completed form to:

EUROCAE
Attention: Secretariat General
102 rue Etienne Dolet
92240 Malakoff - France
Email: eurocae@eurocae.net
© EUROCAE, 2016

ED-130A Guidance for the Use of Portable Electronics Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ED-130A Guidance for the Use of Portable Electronics Devices (PEDs) on Board Aircraft

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment

L’Organisation Européenne pour l’Equipement de l’Aviation Civile

GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF PORTABLE

This document is the exclusive intellectual and commercial property of EUROCAE.

102 rue Etienne Dolet Tel: 33 1 40 92 79 30

This document is the exclusive intellectual and commercial property of EUROCAE.

1. This document was prepared jointly by EUROCAE Working Group 99 “Portable

8. Copies of this document may be obtained from:

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................7

CHAPTER 3 AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANACE ASPECTS ......................................................................9

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 9

CHAPTER 4 AIRCRAFT SAFETY ASSESSMENT ...............................................................................24

4.1 Functional Hazard Assessment ...............................................................................24

CHAPTER 5 FRONT DOOR COUPLING DEMONSTRATION ..............................................................30

5.1 Purpose ...................................................................................................................30

CHAPTER 6 BACKDOOR COUPLING DEMONSTRATION .................................................................37

6.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................37

CHAPTER 7 SUSTAINING AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANCE .................................................................60

7.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................60

7.4 Configuration Management .....................................................................................70

APPENDIX A SMS EXAMPLES. ........................................................................................................... A-1

APPENDIX B 2X.1309. ........................................................................................................................... B-1

APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF WHEN PEDS CAN BE USED ............................................................... C-1

APPENDIX D ADDITIONAL OEM DOCUMENTATION ........................................................................ D-1

APPENDIX E ASSESSMENT OF THE FIELD STRENGTH GENERATED BY INTENTIONAL

APPENDIX F PREPARING AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE INTENTIONAL RADIO EMISSION OF

APPENDIX G EXEMPLARY PROCEDURE FOR FUNCTIONAL AIRCRAFT TESTING… .................. G-1

APPENDIX H INDEX OF DEFINITIONS………………………………………… ....................................... H-1

APPENDIX I INDEX OF REFERENCES………………………………………………... ........................... I-1

IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTION FORM

(Section 1) Introduction, Scope and Definitions

A/C PED Tolerance Aspects

Define PED Compliance Routes

Perform Safety Assessment

(Section 7) Sustaining Aircraft PED Tolerance

*) Depending on the permit of PED usage, both routes shall be

FIGURE 1-1: DOCUMENT OVERVIEW

TABLE 1-1: APPENDIX CROSS REFERENCE

ANNEX 2 - “ASSESSMENT OF THE FIELD Appendix E

ANNEX 5 - “PREPARING AIRCRAFT TESTING Appendix F

ANNEX 6 – “PROCEDURE FOR FUNCTIONAL Appendix F

ANNEX 7 - “AIRCRAFT TESTING EXAMPLE Appendix F

ANNEX 9 - “INDEX OF DEFINITIONS” Appendix F

ANNEX 10 - “INDEX OF REFERENCES” Appendix F

Critical Phases of Flight

Medical Portable Electronic Device (M-PED)—A PED that is medically necessary to

Portable electronic devices, hereinafter referred to as “PED” or “PEDs”, that may be

AIRCRAFT PED TOLERANACE ASPECTS

(Section 3) Aircraft PED Tolerance Aspects

(Section 3.1 & 3.2) Regulatory Requirements &

Perform System Perform System Safety

(Section 4.3.1/4.3.2) List of Receivers List of Equipment to

(Section 3.4/3.5) Demonstrate Front Demonstrate Back

(Section 3.7) Certification Applicant Supporting Operators

FIGURE 3-1: SECTION OVERVIEW

3.2 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

TABLE 3-1: FAA PED REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE

On EASA side, Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and the relevant

TABLE 3-2: EASA PED REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE

3.3 PED OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

Verify Existing PED

FIGURE 3-2: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FRONT DOOR PED TOLERANCE