ukcsts001_iss1

Guidelines for HAZOP Studies UKCS-TS-001
Contents
Authorisation for Issue

Amendment Record
Amendment Summary
Distribution List
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Paragraph Page
Uncontrolled
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Definition 1
1.2 Limitations 1
1.3 HAZOP and Other Hazard Identification Techniques 1
1.4 General Application of HAZOP 3
1.5 Application to New Facilities 4
1.6 Application to Existing Facilities 4
1.7 Scope 5
1.8 HAZOP Objectives 6
1.9 Contractor Conducted HAZOP 6
1.10 Vendor Equipment 7
2 Team Composition 7
2.1 Importance of the HAZOP Study Chairman 7
2.2 The Team 8
2.3 Competency of Team Members 8
3 Preparation and Planning 10

3.1 Timing and Programme 10
3.2 Drawings and Information Required 10
3.3 Venue 11
September 2001 Issue 1 i

UKCS-TS-001 Guidelines for HAZOP Studies
Contents (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
4 HAZOP Study Method 11

4.1 Selecting Elements of the Process for Study 12
4.2 Establishing Design Intention 12
4.3 Selecting and Applying Guidewords 13
4.4 Identifying Causes of Deviations 14
4.5 Defining Consequences 14
Uncontrolled
4.6 Considering Existing Safeguards 14
4.7 Agreeing Action Required 14
4.8 Recording 15
4.9 Issuing Worksheets 16
5 Batch Operations 16
6 Programmable Systems 17
7 Report Preparation and Issue 18

7.1 Report Contents 18
7.2 Report Draft Issue 19
7.3 Report Authorisation 20
7.4 Archiving of Report and Drawings 20
8 Follow-up 20
9 Computer Recording of HAZOP Studies 21
Table
1 Summary of Hazard Identification Techniques 2
Addendum 1 References
Addendum 2 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklists
Addendum 3 Typical Example of a Completed HAZOP Study

Worksheet
ii September 2001 Issue 1

Authorisation for Issue
Issue Authority
Name: Jon Turnbull
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

Uncontrolled
Technical Authority
Name: David Aberdeen
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG
September 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

Amendment Record
For Audit Use

Amendment Incorporated By
Checked
Number
Name Signature Date Signature Date
Uncontrolled
AMOSAF.171
September 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Amendment Summary
Issue No Date Description

Issue 1 September 2001 First issue.
Uncontrolled
September 2001 Issue 1 vii/viii

Distribution List
Holders of Controlled Hard Copy
Copy Copyholder Location
01 To be advised
Virtual Copyholders
Copy Copyholder
Uncontrolled
01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

02 Document Technical Authority (David Aberdeen)
September 2001 Issue 1 ix/x

Preface
Purpose
This document provides guidance on the use of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies as a
means of ensuring technical integrity and meeting the requirements of the Operations Integrity
Assurance System.
This document uses the accumulated experience of HAZOP chairmen to define good practice
and should therefore be used as a basis for conducting HAZOP studies unless an equivalent
equally effective approach can be demonstrated.
Uncontrolled
Guidance is given on applicability, methodology and organisation of HAZOP studies. Reference

is also made to other related hazard identification methods.
Status
This document is reasonably up-to-date. Potential areas for revision include:
• If Process Hazards Management (PHM) is adopted then the guidelines may need to be
revised to reflect these requirements; for example, the PHM requirement for periodic
review of HAZOP studies and the consequent increased level of reporting of HAZOP
findings (the extent to which reporting by exception is appropriate)
• Further guidance is perhaps needed on conducting preliminary HAZOP studies early in the
design of a new project and the role of HAZOP in the Capital Value Process (CVP)
• The table of the various hazard identification methods should perhaps be extracted as a
stand-alone document to serve as a road map to other documents in the bookshelf
• Further guidance on maintaining an approved list of HAZOP chairmen (individuals rather than
organisations). Individual Business Units should maintain a list (currently UTG maintains a
list for use by the Business Units if required)
Review and Update

This document will be subject to 12-monthly review and update, when document holders will
have the opportunity to express opinions and suggest improvements.
However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document. As
such, any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an
Amendment Proposal proforma which is available electronically on the UK Upstream SMS
website, from the Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor or from the Technical Authority.
All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.
September 2001 Issue 1 xii

Responsibility of Copyholders
It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to
maintain the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly
incorporated and acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant
Technical Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (UKCS-DCM-001).
Uncontrolled
xiii September 2001 Issue 1

List of Abbreviations
AFC Approved for Construction

BU Business Unit
CVP Capital Value Process
DNV Det Norske Veritas
EDP Emergency Depressurising
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Uncontrolled
HAZID Hazard Identification

HAZOP Hazard and Operability
LSA Low Specific Activity
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
NRV Non-return Valve
P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram
PFD Process Flow Diagram
PHM Process Hazards Management
PHSER Project HSE Review
SIMOPs Simultaneous Operations
SRB Sulphur Reducing Bacteria
September 2001 Issue 1 xiv/xv

1 Introduction
1.1 Definition
A Hazard Operability (HAZOP) study is carried out by a team led by an independent
Chairman. It is a formalised and systematic technique for identifying hazards and
operability problems; not for solving or quantifying them (Addendum 1 Ref 1).
The system or procedure to be studied is divided into small elements and the design
intention of each of these elements is explained to the team.
A checklist of guidewords is then systematically used to identify potential hazards and
operability problems which might arise from deviations from that design intention.
The possible causes of such deviations are listed together with the consequences,
the existing safeguards and the team recommendations to limit severity or reduce the
Uncontrolled
possibility of hazards arising.
1.2 Limitations
The HAZOP methodology is primarily designed to review the information shown on
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and in associated operating procedures.
Information not shown on the P&IDs (eg layout details) and modes of operation not
covered by the procedures available to the team will not be covered fully and will need
to be covered by separate reviews.
HAZOP studies usually only consider hazards arising from one or at most two credible
failures and therefore will tend not to cover all low frequency catastrophic or multiple
failure events. These major accident events are best identified by a top down approach
such as Hazard Identification (HAZID) (Addendum 1 Ref 2) or fault tree analysis.
The effectiveness of the study in identifying and assessing credible hazards relies on the
knowledge, experience and motivation of the team members as well as the competence
of the Chairman leading the study.
1.3 HAZOP and Other Hazard Identification Techniques

The term HAZOP has special significance in that it implies that the design/procedure has
been rigorously analysed for hazards. There are limitations in the technique but to use
the term HAZOP for less rigorous preliminary studies is clearly likely to lead to a
mistaken confidence in the integrity of the design/procedure.
The HAZOP methodology, as defined in Paragraph 1.1, is powerful because for process
systems it involves a systematic analysis of the design as represented by P&IDs to
identify hazards. It is equally applicable to batch/sequential operations when the analysis
includes the systematic review of the procedures alongside that of the P&IDs. HAZOP
studies can also be conducted on critical subsystems such as hydraulic power/control
systems and seal systems which may not be fully represented on the main process
P&IDs. The term HAZOP should be reserved for these types of studies.
September 2001 Issue 1 1

The term Preliminary HAZOP, if used, should be limited to the use of the above
methodology but applied to a selection of preliminary P&IDs. This early application of
HAZOP techniques (on the understanding that a full HAZOP will be done at a later stage)
is particularly applicable to novel design features because problems can then be
eliminated at an early stage with minimal impact on project cost. For these and similar
non-standard applications of HAZOP type methodology which do not meet the full intent
of these guidelines, it is recommended that the term critical safety review (Addendum 1
Ref 4) is used to avoid confusion.
Other hazard identification methodologies can be applied at different stages in
development and address different representations of the process/facility
(eg schematics or Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)). They may well involve subdividing
the area to be studied into manageable elements and applying a checklist to each of
these elements but they should not be called HAZOP studies.
Uncontrolled
Some techniques look at broader issues in less detail (eg concept reviews during initial
stages of development); others analyse highly specific issues in detail eg Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEAs). A comparison of some of these other hazard identification
techniques with the terminology currently used is summarised in Table 1.
Method Application Advantages Limitations Ref

HAZOP Review of P&IDs and Powerful systematic Information not on 1
associated procedures. technique. P&IDs. Operating modes
Normally applied to not covered by
approved for construction procedures.
issue.
Catastrophic/multiple
failures.
Team
knowledge/experience.
Critical Review of P&IDs and Flexible use of Less structured and 4
Safety associated procedures. HAZOP technique possibly less rigorous.
Review and other hazard Relies on leader/team
identification judgement to adjust
methods. scope of review.
Simple Can be applied to any Flexible approach Can be superficial in the 5, 6
Checklist operation at any stage with guideword absence of a technique
from concept to selection which can for supporting the
abandonment (eg be specific to the systematic application of
pre-commissioning nature of the appropriate guidewords.
checklist, Stage 1 task operation and its
risk assessments). status.
Table 1 Summary of Hazard Identification Techniques
2 September 2001 Issue 1

Method Application Advantages Limitations Ref

What If At any stage. Brainstorming Difficult to structure to
technique. ensure systematic
Can be applied in a
coverage of hazards.
structured manner to Novel hazards not
Strongly reliant on the
selected areas. previously considered.
imagination of team and
Supplement to more
leader facilitation of the
rigorous approaches.
process.
Good forum for
operational input.
HAZID Top level identification of Formal recording of Uses checklist but 2
Study major hazards. hazards for relies strongly on the
Uncontrolled
subsequent detailed experience of the team

Application of
analysis. to identify the less
guidewords to process
obvious hazards.
units or offshore Can be applied at any
Causation mechanism
modules. stage and updated in
not necessarily defined.
the course of the
project.
Task Review of procedures Good forum for Needs prioritised 5, 6
Analysis using checklists. operator input, selective use on most
Applicable to procedures development of critical activities.
including those not written procedures Association with the
associated with P&IDs. and training aids. process/P&IDs requires
more structured HAZOP
approach.
Concept Application of a broad A wide range of Study structure and 6
Safety range of project-specific hazards identified early selection of appropriate
Review guidewords to PFDs, in the project. elements and
schematics etc. Inherently safer guidewords relies
options selection. strongly on team leader.
FMEA Considers component Detailed analysis of All failure modes 6
failure modes of (eg potential critical considered and hence
mechanical or electronic system components time-consuming and
devices) and potential failures (eg only applicable to critical
consequences. programmable devices and systems.
systems, hydraulic
Applied at detailed
systems).
design.
Table 1 Summary of Hazard Identification Techniques (cont’d)

1.4 General Application of HAZOP

The HAZOP technique was developed to identify the hazards associated with complex
chemical processes but can be applied to any system which has a process flow
sequence. It can also be applied to batch or sequential operations (refer to Paragraph 5),
and by careful selection of guidewords, to the review of procedures. It is equally
applicable to well operations particularly where novel techniques are to be employed
(Addendum 1 Ref 3).
1.5 Application to New Facilities

In BP, all new continuous and batch process designs, including selected hazard related
utility systems, are subjected to a HAZOP study.
The technique is normally applied when the design is essentially complete (Approved for
Uncontrolled
Construction (AFC) issue P&IDs). However it is increasingly used earlier in the design so
that most of the problems can be addressed during the detailed design phase hence
reducing the number of actions arising from the main HAZOP on completion of the
design or enabling subsequent changes to be covered by a rigorous design change
review procedure.
All subsequent design changes, including those resulting from HAZOP
recommendations should be reviewed and, where appropriate, subjected to a follow-up
HAZOP study.
1.6 Application to Existing Facilities

The technique can also be applied to existing plant P&IDs or procedures to identify
potential hazards or operability problems which have not already become evident
from operating experience or to review non-standard operations or procedures not
previously covered.
Modifications involving significant changes to P&IDs (including removal of plant),
changes to how the process operates and/or changes to the associated safety systems
should also be the subject of HAZOP studies.
The scope should clearly indicate whether the HAZOP is to be limited to the
modifications only or applied to the whole plant. All interfaces (process/utilities) between
existing plant and modifications should be identified and reviewed. Particular attention
should be paid to tie-ins to existing plant.
Minor changes to plant and operations can be subject to a Critical Safety Review
(Addendum 1 Ref 4) whereby the review team decides on the selective use of HAZOP
techniques appropriate to the change.
HAZOP techniques are also applicable as a means of hazard identification in carrying out
a Stage 2 Task Risk Assessment of operational changes and non-standard operations.
Strategic Management of Change (UKCS-CHM-001) should give guidance on the
mechanism whereby appropriate use is made of HAZOP and other hazard identification
techniques.

1.7 Scope
The scope should formally be agreed between the client/project and the HAZOP study
Chairman before the study commences. It should not be assumed that the client always
knows what a HAZOP study is, the requirements for an effective study, the limitations of
the technique or the extent of the responsibilities of the HAZOP Team. In particular,
it should be emphasised that the HAZOP study is primarily concerned with identifying
hazards and operability problems – not solving them or quantifying risks.
If the client requires the HAZOP Team to carry out further HAZOP studies on solutions
to the identified problems proposed by the project, this requirement should be covered
at the outset. Follow-up studies should only be undertaken when the main study is
completed and must not be allowed to disrupt the main study.
The briefing memo and subsequent report should identify the scope of the study
including the extent of coverage of:
Uncontrolled
• Process and utility drawings

• Drilling equipment
• Vendor packages
• Operating procedures
• Batch or sequential operations (eg pigging, well intervention)
• Various modes of operation:
- Startup/shutdown
- Preparation for maintenance
- Construction and commissioning
It is equally important to identify areas and levels of detail not covered by the study
(eg utilities such as Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment,
hydraulic systems etc); perhaps they are not hazardous, not safety critical or being
covered by other reviews.
The inclusion of guidewords for the various modes of operation will ensure that some
attention is given to these aspects but it should be understood that a full review of the
startup and shutdown operations, for example, can only be done when procedures
are available.
Cause and effect charts will be used for reference in the HAZOP study to check that
appropriate action is taken (as represented on the charts) to control the hazards
identified in the course of the P&ID/procedure review. A complete review of the charts,
logic diagrams or indeed the overall control and shutdown systems is not normally
included in the scope of a conventional process design HAZOP. Such supplementary
requirements should therefore be separately identified in the HAZOP terms of reference.
The Project/Business Unit Team are primarily responsible for identifying HP/LP interfaces
as part of the design process and should preferably mark up the HAZOP P&IDs with
the HP/LP interfaces. The HAZOP technique often identifies potential causes of
overpressuristion and hence is a useful check on HP/LP interfaces and design cases
which may have been missed in the design process.

1.8 HAZOP Objectives

The objective of a HAZOP study is to check overall process design to search for
operating deviations and process interactions which could lead to hazardous situations or
operability problems. These might include:
• Safety and occupational health hazards to workers
• Damage to equipment/Business Unit
• Operability/maintainability problems
• Plant non-availability
• Product quality
• Environmental emissions
• Construction and commissioning hazards
Uncontrolled
Any particular areas to be included/omitted from the scope of the study or particular
sensitivities arising from, for example, the materials handled or the plant location should
be identified in the scope and conveyed to the team prior to the start of the study.
1.9 Contractor Conducted HAZOP

In most major projects the responsibility for the conduct of HAZOP studies is that of the
engineering design contractor as part of the design review.
It is strongly recommended that guidance is sought by the project regarding
the following:
• Contractor’s detailed HAZOP study procedure including design change review,
follow-up HAZOP studies and acceptance procedure for responses to HAZOP
recommendations
• The individual proposed as Chairman of the HAZOP Team, normally selected from an
approved list of experienced HAZOP Chairman
• The HAZOP Team composition; in particular to ensure a measure of independent
BP involvement and operational input
• The HAZOP study reporting procedure
Where long-term partnering contracts are established, the alliance procedures should be
updated to reflect the contents of these guidelines and be audited as part of the Project
HSE Review (PHSER) system.

1.10 Vendor Equipment

Vendor packages should be integrated into the main HAZOP study, where possible, with
the appropriate vendor representative present for the review of large or specialist
packages. Where this is not practicable then individual vendor package HAZOP should
preferably be done by the same core team with the vendor representative in the main
contractor’s office to ensure consistency and coverage of package interfaces.
Similarly, well completion/tree details and the various well intervention activities should
be integrated with topsides HAZOP as far as possible with appropriate well operations
personnel on the HAZOP Team.
2 Team Composition
Uncontrolled
The HAZOP study technique cannot compensate for lack of knowledge or experience
so the Study Team should include the various disciplines appropriate to the
system/procedure being studied.
Typically for topsides HAZOP, process engineering, mechanical engineering and
commissioning or operations expertise would be required. Drilling/well intervention
HAZOP would require drilling/well operations expertise. Other specialists, such as
control engineers, may be required part-time or throughout, depending on the system
being reviewed.
A secretary leaves the other team members free to concentrate on the details of the
study without the added burden of completing the logsheets. The secretary may also
deal with other administrative matters, such as organisation of meetings, circulation of
typed logsheets, reports etc.
2.1 Importance of the HAZOP Study Chairman

The Chairman must be independent from the design of the system. It is the Chairman’s
task to ensure that the technique is systematically applied, that the team members are
motivated and that their expertise is used effectively. He does not need expert
knowledge of the system being studied since this is provided by the technical members
of the team. However, chairmen with process design or operating backgrounds and a
basic level of understanding of the system being studied are usually more readily
accepted by the other team members.
The Chairman must have proven study-chairing ability appropriate for the complexity
of the study and be able to plan and lead the whole HAZOP study through its
various stages.
He must also ensure that clear and precise records and reports are prepared and
should take formal responsibility for the recommendations which he should agree
with his team.
The BP Project Team/client may not be able to judge the acceptability of a proposed
HAZOP Study Chairman. They should be encouraged to take advice to obtain an
approved list of suitably qualified chairmen.

2.2 The Team

The Team needs to be a balanced mix of knowledgeable project personnel and external
experienced personnel who are independent from the project.
An independent team member is defined for the purposes of these guidelines as one
who has had no direct role in the design of the system being reviewed and has no
reporting relationship with the design organisation which could degrade objectivity in
reviewing the design.
The typical core Study Team for a topsides HAZOP should be:
• Independent Chairman
• Secretary
• Independent Process Engineer
Uncontrolled
• Operations Representative
• Project Process Engineer
This core team should be supplemented by other project discipline engineers (full-time
or part-time), appropriate to the nature of the study.
The Team should be as small as possible for each review session and preferably no
larger than six people. For small studies on minor modifications, a smaller team can be
achieved by some combination of roles.
A key member of every HAZOP Team is the Independent Process Engineer who leads
the role of ‘free thinking’.
2.3 Competency of Team Members
2.3.1 Chairman
The Chairman should typically be a chartered engineer with at least 10 years experience
in design and preferably commissioning or operations. He should be able to
demonstrate, through HAZOP study training and experience, the ability to lead HAZOP
studies in oil and gas related systems and should have the motivation and leadership
capabilities to chair an exhaustive multidiscipline review of the technical information
presented.
Because of the crucial role of the Chairman, UTG maintains a recommended list of
experienced HAZOP chairmen for use by the Business Units and their alliance
contractors and will consider proposals for additions to the list on the basis of their
qualifications, training, experience and past performance. If appropriate, an experienced
Chairman can be used to participate in the study sessions and review the HAZOP report
as a means of confirming their suitability.
Where Business Units and their alliance contractors wish to use other personnel to lead
safety studies, a similar procedure should be followed to develop the approved list of
study leaders for HAZOP studies and other similar safety studies (eg critical safety
reviews and HAZID studies).

The route to qualification and inclusion on a list of approved HAZOP Chairman

should include:
• Attendance at a HAZOP training course
• Participation in HAZOP in other roles
• Leading similar safety studies
• Chairing small HAZOP studies supported by an experienced Chairman
2.3.2 Secretary
The secretary should be sufficiently familiar with the technology/terminology of the
study and competent to accurately record the proceedings on the study worksheets with
minimum guidance from the chairman so as not to delay the progress of the study.
For computer worksheet production, the secretary must also have keyboard skills and be
Uncontrolled
familiar with the package used.
2.3.3 Independent Process Engineer

The experience and discipline requirements should match the system/procedure being
studied. For a topsides process HAZOP, the Independent Engineer should typically have
a degree in chemical engineering and be a chartered engineer with at least 5 years
experience including process design (more for major projects or innovative technology),
preferably in the oil and gas sectors. Should preferably have attended a HAZOP training
course or, at the very least, have been thoroughly briefed in the study technique before
embarking on the study.
2.3.4 Operations Representative

Should have experience equivalent to the Independent Process Engineer and particular
operating expertise in systems of the type being studied. For changes to existing
systems, the Operations Representative must be familiar with the Installation being
changed. The Operations Representative would invariably have served as an offshore
production engineer or a production supervisor or in similar appointments on an onshore
installation as appropriate for the design to be reviewed.
2.3.5 Project Process Engineer (Designer)

Normally the Lead Process Engineer for the design and may be from the engineering
design contractor or BP. On some projects this could be the Project Engineer. Will be
required to explain the design intention for every part of the system to be reviewed and
have the authority to obtain the assistance/attendance of other project disciplines
as required.
2.3.6 Discipline Specialists

Additional project discipline specialists, knowledgeable in the design must be available
as full or part-time members of the team to support the Project Process Engineer and
help the Team understand the design intention and the inbuilt safeguards.
The Project Discipline Engineers on the Team will need be familiar with the reference
documentation listed in Paragraph 3.2.

3 Preparation and Planning

3.1 Timing and Programme
For major projects it is not possible to have a ‘one-bite’ HAZOP study. Due to the
ongoing development of the design, it is necessary to plan for at least three phases of
HAZOP study:
(1) P&IDs for main initial HAZOP study.
(2) P&IDs significantly changed since initial HAZOP study plus vendors’ P&IDs and
fresh P&IDs.
(3) Late design changes including those made during construction.
For some projects an additional preliminary HAZOP study may be justified at the
Uncontrolled
preliminary P&ID stage (refer to Paragraph 1.3).
A specific programme should be issued to team members before the first HAZOP study
meeting. The programme should include a schedule of all the P&IDs to be studied and
the approximate time allocated.
At the first meeting of the HAZOP Team, a thorough briefing on the design and
operation should be provided by the Project Process Engineer.
The Chairman should ensure that all team members understand the scope of the study
and brief any members not familiar with the HAZOP technique.
3.2 Drawings and Information Required

Full size HAZOP master P&IDs should be tabled for the HAZOP study. It is important
that all members focus on one drawing that can be seen clearly from their positions at
the table.
The Team will also require additional reference documentation to be available, with
project personnel present familiar with their contents, typically including:
• Process flow diagrams
• General arrangement drawings
• Piping class specifications
• Engineering design data sheets (including relief valve data sheets)
• Vessel inventories
• Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system functions
• Emergency Depressurising (EDP) system functions
• Commissioning procedures
• Startup procedures
• Operating procedures
• Shutdown procedures

• Maintenance procedures
• Cause and effect Diagrams
• Relevant vendors’ P&IDs
• Preceding studies, eg FMEA on programmable systems
• Operating and maintenance philosophy
• Safety philosophy
• Design philosophies
• Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs)
In practice the various commissioning, operating and maintenance procedures are often
not available in time for review by the HAZOP Team and hence require review at a
later stage.
Uncontrolled
The cause and effect charts are important reference documents in every HAZOP study.
The HAZOP Team, with a detailed knowledge of the P&IDs, is in a unique position to
review the cause and effect charts against the P&IDs and the hazards identified during
the study. However, it should be understood that the conventional process design
HAZOP does not systematically review the cause and effect charts.
3.3 Venue
A dedicated room which has the following attributes should be provided for study
sessions:
• Sufficient room and tabletop laydown area for team members to deploy drawings and
documents
• Flipcharts, whiteboards etc to allow presentations and explanations to be made
• Wall area to pin up master copies of drawings
• Paper, pencils, dry marker and highlight pens, sticky labels etc
• Acceptable levels of noise, lighting, temperature, humidity etc
Ideally the team should have access to a model of the plant being studied and be able to
visit and photograph the site, if it already exists. If the study is carried out on an existing
site then operations representatives should not be ‘on duty’ or prone to being called
away from study sessions.
4 HAZOP Study Method

Following the design briefing by the Project Process Engineer it may be appropriate to
formally or informally review some general aspects of the design prior to starting the
conventional HAZOP process. Topics might include:
• Programmable systems
• Materials of construction/corrosion prevention

• Maintenance philosophy
• Startup/shutdown procedures
• Pressure containment/relief philosophy
• Inventory isolation and depressurisation
• Layout drawings/model
• Noise and safety data sheets
• Environmental emissions
This initial review will help the Team understand the overall picture and if the general
findings are recorded in the normal manner, it may reduce the need for repetition of
general concerns in the main part of the study.
The conclusion of this initial review may redefine the scope of the study and/or
Uncontrolled
recommend that separate reviews are required to cover some of these aspects in
more detail.
Following completion of the initial briefings and other general team discussions the
Chairman will initiate the HAZOP process by selecting a starting point for the study. This
is typically one of the main process feed lines.
4.1 Selecting Elements of the Process for Study

The first step in applying the HAZOP study technique is to select an element of the
system, ie a line, vessel or procedural step. The function of this element should be
described by the process design specialist in the Team.
To ensure that the design intentions/functions of each element can be easily and clearly
understood by the Team only small elements of the system should be considered. There
is a temptation to consider larger elements to speed up the process but this typically
results in confusion during the study, ambiguity in the study records and failure to
consider properly the potential deviations and associated hazards.
Note: The criterion for selecting an element of the process for study is that the
guidewords should apply uniformly throughout every part of the element.
Any relaxation of this criterion, at the discretion of the HAZOP Chairman, should only be
adopted for simple or low hazard systems.
Particular care is required on pipeline manifold systems where for example
‘reverse flow’ will have different implications for different branches on the system.
Similarly in reviewing, for example well operations, the status of valves/well barriers may
change if too large a procedural step is selected for review.
4.2 Establishing Design Intention

The precise design intention of the process/procedure element to be studied must be
established and understood by all team members. The Chairman should ensure that this
intention is recorded on the worksheet.

If some elements (equipment/lines) have more than one operating mode then the
Chairman should ensure that the design intention and design parameters are understood
for each mode. For complex situations, each mode of operation should be considered as
a separate element and all guidewords applied to each operating mode.
4.3 Selecting and Applying Guidewords

The HAZOP technique was founded on an original list of guidewords that was composed
of deviations of the main process parameters:
• Flow
• Temperature
• Pressure
• Composition
Uncontrolled
For batch or sequential operations, deviations from the intended sequential step were
added to the list.
The success of the technique has resulted in the scope being extended by a growing list
of guidewords and reference documents to review. To some extent this is justified in
that it is unlikely that the process (P&IDs and procedures) will receive the same degree
of detailed analysis at any other stage.
However, given that the basic HAZOP methodology is already an exhausting, intensive
exercise, there is a danger that the Team will be overloaded and/or lose confidence in
the value of the technique if the list of guidewords is excessive and/or largely irrelevant.
Further, the inclusion of guidewords such as startup, maintenance, commissioning,
layout may suggest a more rigorous review of these aspects than may be practicable
given the information (procedures) available to the Team. Early identification of
problems (as indicated on the P&IDs) is valuable but further review is likely to be
required (eg reviews of layout/operability/human factors, startup and commissioning
procedures etc).
The list of guidewords appropriate to the system being studied should be presented by
the Chairman and agreed by the Team at the start of the study. Once agreed, this list
should then normally be applied to all process elements. Where several systems are
being reviewed, the Team may wish to tailor the list of guidewords for one or more of
the systems, particularly if batch operations are involved.
Since the list of guidewords impacts on the scope of the study this should be planned in
advance, agreed with the client where appropriate and clearly documented in the
HAZOP report.
The list of guidewords included in Addendum 2 contains a core set which should be
applied to all P&ID HAZOPs and a supplementary set which should be used selectively
along with any other additional system-specific guidewords based on the scope of the
study and the nature of the systems being studied.

For new or unusual applications, the list of guidewords should be discussed with
HSEQA. This can act as a way of updating the list of supplementary guidewords in
Addendum 2 for selective use.
HAZOP studies applied to procedures can be expected to have a reduced set of process
guidewords with the emphasis on sequential step deviations in order to identify the
potential for human errors of omission etc and other concerns specific to the procedure
step being considered.
4.4 Identifying Causes of Deviations

Realistic causes should be established for the deviations proposed and appropriately
grouped. For example, causes of no flow are likely to include upstream supply failures
and downstream blockages which may have different consequences and safeguards.
Uncontrolled
4.5 Defining Consequences
The Chairman should challenge the HAZOP Team to identify all credible hazard and
operability consequences of the deviation. It is good practice at this point to discount the
safeguards to ensure a full discussion of the inherent consequences of the deviation.
4.6 Considering Existing Safeguards

The next step is to judge whether the engineering and safety systems, as presented in
the P&IDs and other engineering information, can cope with the consequences of
all deviations.
4.7 Agreeing Action Required

If the Team judges that the engineering and safety systems are unlikely to cope with the
consequences of all deviations, or an operability feature requires attention, then a
recommendation should be made.
Recommendations can be specific hardware or procedural items for action or
consideration. Alternatively, the HAZOP Team may have no specific solutions and rather
than waste time trying to redesign the plant they should recommend that the Project
Team reviews the concern and takes appropriate action or that further studies are
conducted to resolve the concern.
The recommendations should be worded so as to be reasonably stand-alone because
they may become detached from the remaining contents of the worksheet during the
follow-up process.
The Chairman should have every recommendation read out at the time it is raised in the
session. The team members should be obliged to agree it at the time.
Note: The use of computer HAZOP recording packages greatly assists this process.

The Chairman/secretary may wish to reword the HAZOP records to improve their clarity
and this is quite acceptable as long as this does not change the essence of
recommendations. The worksheets should be circulated to all team members for
comments after the review sessions. Assigning responsibility for action is normally done
by the client (BU/Project) as part of the follow-up procedure.
Risk ranking can be used as a means of prioritising actions, or cost-benefit analysis,
particularly on existing facilities (Addendum 1 Ref 8). It can be done by the HAZOP Team
or as part of the follow-up procedure; possibly only on items where the balance of cost
benefit is not obvious.
4.8 Recording
‘Full Recording’ of all deviations, causes and consequences on worksheets provides a
record for audit of HAZOP study proceedings but is very time-consuming and wasteful of
Uncontrolled
resources. ‘Recording by Exception’ is recommended. Reliance is then placed on

selection of a competent experienced Chairman to apply all the necessary
guidewords/deviations and ensure that all valid concerns are recorded.
However, the general approach should be to endeavour to record all significant
hazards/concerns even when the subsequent discussion accepts the effectiveness of
the safeguards provided and hence makes no further recommendation. With this
approach, the Team will often find that the process of recording the concerns and
existing safeguards reveals important recommendations which would have otherwise
been missed.
For manual recording, the HAZOP worksheet should be A3 size which is the most
suitable for the secretary to fill in during study sessions.
It is often necessary to use a large area of the worksheet to record a detailed ‘design
intention’ and this may include a description of a ‘mode of use’ of the system studied.
This is particularly relevant when reviewing changes to existing plant. Any computerised
HAZOP study package should have the flexibility for recording such information (refer to
Paragraph 9). The discipline of recording such information serves to clarify for the Team
the exact modes of use of the engineering system (refer to Paragraph 4.2 regarding
treatment of multiple operating modes).
Each recommendation must be sequentially numbered. If the same recommendation
applies to another section of the P&ID studied later, it should be given a separate unique
number, albeit with a note referring to the initial recommendation.
The names of all team members and participants should be recorded on the initial
worksheet for each review session (refer to Addendum 3).
The HAZOP master P&IDs should be clearly marked up by the Chairman (using suitably
coloured highlighters) and archived for future reference by BP. It is very helpful for the
Chairman or secretary to mark on the drawings the number of each recommendation
close to the relevant point on the P&ID. This may be done outside review sessions.
The Chairman should sign and date all HAZOP master P&IDs.

4.9 Issuing Worksheets

Worksheets should be checked by the HAZOP Team, preferably on a daily basis,
to ensure that they are complete and readily understood. This particularly applies on a
large study when otherwise considerable time may elapse between creating and
checking the worksheets. Otherwise, team members should be invited to comment on
worksheets on completion of the study or when issued in the draft report.
As soon as possible after the final HAZOP review session, the HAZOP worksheets
should be issued in draft manuscript form to the Project and/or BU Team Job Officer.
The recommendations should not be altered by the Chairman outside the review
sessions without team consultation except for improving clarity and making factual or
grammatical corrections.
If the Chairman wishes to make supplementary recommendations (eg regarding
Uncontrolled
additional studies) these should be recorded in the main report but it is suggested that
for the purposes of follow-up, any such recommendations should also be numbered and
included as an attachment to the worksheets.
5 Batch Operations
Batch operations should be identified before HAZOP studies commence as the
application of guidewords/deviations to batch operation systems is more complex than
their application to continuous systems. Examples are the launching and receiving of
pipeline pigs. It normally requires the simultaneous application of guidewords to both the
procedural step and the associated equipment used for the step. The HAZOP is in fact
normally driven by a review of the procedural steps with the P&ID review resulting as a
natural consequence of this process.
The HAZOP Chairman should develop a batch operations HAZOP technique applicable to
the operation/system to be reviewed. Further guidance on the use of such techniques is
available from UTG.
Some components of batch HAZOP techniques are given below:
(1) Review the physical location of the operation and the relevant engineering
equipment/instruments.
Consider the nature and proximity of neighbouring plant/operations.
(2) Select a set of guidewords based on the list for sequential operations
supplemented by the main process parameter guidewords of ‘flow’, ‘temperature’,
‘pressure’ appropriate to the nature of the operation (refer to checklists in
Addendum 2).
(3) Follow step-by-step operating procedures and identify the system used, including
the process/utilities interfaces, and mark up the P&ID as appropriate.

(4) Define the design intention for each step including the intended condition of the
relevant equipment on P&IDs and/or layout drawings.
For example, coloured discs can be placed on valves to show positions (green for
open, orange for ‘in-position’ and red for closed). If items are being moved during
the batch process, use ‘models’ on the layout drawings, eg show railcars with
counters or coloured blocks.
(5) Having defined the design intention, apply the selected set of guidewords to
identify deviations and potential hazards.
(6) Consider existing safeguards referring as necessary, to the cause and effect
diagrams and make further recommendations as appropriate.
(7) Complete the HAZOP of the P&ID for sections not covered by the review of the
procedures.
Uncontrolled
6 Programmable Systems
One of the limitations of HAZOP studies is that they consider only one or possibly two
coincident failures. For conventional control systems this will involve considering single
control loop failures leading to process deviations and single common cause failures
such as loss of power/instrument air and associated valve fail safe positions.
For programmable systems there is a similar potential for single loop failures and service
failures which can be addressed in the HAZOP in the normal way but there are also
additional failure modes which may lead to multiple loop failures (Addendum 1 Ref 7).
However, given independent hard-wired safety systems designed to cater for control
system failures, these types of failure on well-designed programmable control systems
are not normally of concern in a conventional process design HAZOP.
To reduce the demand rate on safety systems, the control system needs to be of high
reliability and this is achieved by building in redundancy and diversity into the critical
areas of the system design. Potential hardware failures are normally assessed by FMEA
which analyses the potential failure modes of the system components and their effects
on the performance of the system.
Software failures are minimised by function testing but because of the difficulty in
eliminating software errors, programmable systems are not normally used for safety
critical systems. Whilst this remains the case there is no requirement for the
conventional process HAZOP to review such systems.
It is, however, appropriate that the output of the FMEA of the control system should be
available as a reference document and that the HAZOP Team is informed of any residual
areas of concern for review prior the start of the conventional process HAZOP.
Pilot studies have used HAZOP type techniques to review the consequences of multiple
failures by selectively applying guidewords to the programmable systems. If this
approach is adopted, it is recommended that this review is considered as a separate
exercise preceding the conventional HAZOP of the process design (Addendum 1 Ref 9).

7 Report Preparation and Issue

7.1 Report Contents
A typical HAZOP report should consist of the following:
(1) Contents List
(2) Summary
Usually no more than half a page, highlighting any major concerns, general
comments on the design and recommendations for further studies.
(3) Introduction
This should include:
- Reference to the formal initiation document for the study
Uncontrolled
- Scope of study
- The team members
- Study session dates
This section should cover the study methodology (particularly any novel aspects).
It should identify any difficulties in meeting the terms of reference (eg deficiencies
in documentation available for review) and include recommendations for any
further studies.
(4) Description of the Systems
This is a brief description of the process studied and the modes of operation.
(5) Principal Recommendations from the HAZOP Study
(a) General Recommendations
General recommendations and findings not specific to any single element of
the design, eg drawing discrepancies, general design and operating features.
(b) Recommendations Relating to Specific Worksheet Actions
These are groupings of principal recommendations, some of which refer to
several P&ID elements, eg HP/LP interfaces, piping specifications.
Note: For follow-up/action tracking purposes it is suggested that all
recommendations should be numbered and included on the
worksheets including any supplementary recommendations from
the Chairman.
(6) References
(a) List of P&IDs subjected to HAZOP study (including revision numbers).
(b) List of other drawings and documents consulted.

(7) HAZOP Checklist

As a basis for selecting the guidewords, the HAZOP Chairman should use the
checklists given in Addendum 2 together with any additional guidewords added to
reflect the particular nature of the system studied.
(8) HAZOP Team Worksheets
All worksheets should be typed and included as A4 copies of the original
A3 masters.
(9) Distribution List
Distribution lists will be specific for different studies but distribution should
typically include:
- Project engineer
Uncontrolled
- BU/client
- HAZOP Chairman
- Library copy BU and/or Project
(10) Appendices
Appendices which should be included are:
- Formal terms of reference/proposal memorandum for the HAZOP study
- Reference reports/items (if any)
(11) Report Numbers
Each report should have a unique number provided by the Project, BU or HSEQA
as appropriate.
7.2 Report Draft Issue

Draft record sheets should preferably be issued to the Team for comment at the end of
each session and at the end of the study. A draft report should be issued for review and
comment to the following:
• Project engineer
• BU/client
• Chairman
• Selected team members
The purpose of this draft review is mainly to correct any factual errors and ensure
that the identified hazards and associated recommendations are clearly stated and
understood.

7.3 Report Authorisation

All reports should be signed by the HAZOP Chairman.
All Project/BU organised HAZOP study reports should be authorised by the Project/BU
Manager or his appointee.
7.4 Archiving of Report and Drawings

A master copy of the HAZOP study report and HAZOP master P&IDs should be archived
by Project/BU Team as appropriate.
8 Follow-up
Uncontrolled
It is the responsibility of the Project Engineer and/or the BU Job Officer (if appropriate) to
formally follow up the actions arising from a HAZOP study.
Recommendations may be accepted, modified, referred to further consideration or
rejected. The reasons for not accepting the recommendation should be recorded as part
of the follow-up documentation. Care should be taken that modified recommendations
still fully address the concern identified by the HAZOP Team.
The study client (Project or BU Team) should assign responsibility for assessing the
responses to all HAZOP study recommendations to ensure they have been accurately
interpreted by the project, whether further studies are required and whether responses
can be closed out.
Normally, the project response will be audited as part of the BP Technical Safety Audit
Procedure.
The project should establish a design change procedure which should include a
sequential design change list. All design changes after the main HAZOP should be
assessed by a Safety Engineer and the appropriate discipline engineer (usually process)
to determine if fresh HAZOP studies are required.
To maintain an auditable record, all report recommendations and project and/or BU
Group responses must be retained (eg using the LOCOS or other equivalent action
tracking system).
It is quite helpful for the HAZOP Chairman to be involved in the early stages of the
actions closeout procedure to help ensure that the hazards are understood and to assist
in the review of the project responses to the HAZOP Team recommendations. If such
additional involvement of the Chairman is required then this should be made clear in the
terms of reference.

9 Computer Recording of HAZOP Studies

The use of computer recording packages can offer significant advantages. These include:
• Completion of the record sheets is visible to the HAZOP Team so that the logic and
accuracy of the study process is readily understood by the team members and agreed
actions are clearly displayed
• Printed copies of record sheets are available at the end of each session
• Some packages include documentation for closing out the actions
• Some packages lead the progression through the guidewords freeing the Chairman to
concentrate on the other matters and also adding to the credibility of reporting by exception
With the improving keyboard skills of engineers and the ease of computer editing there
is also the potential advantage in speeding up the completion of the record sheets.
Uncontrolled
For this to be realised however, the secretary needs to have good keyboard skills and be
familiar with the computer package being used. Some packages are not very
user-friendly and would require a significant period of familiarisation prior to the HAZOP.
The potential disadvantages of using computer recording mainly relate to the
deficiencies in the design of the package software. These might include:
• Secretary lacking in keyboard skills
• Team overly concerned with correcting typing errors and ‘word smithing’ (minor
corrections are easily made outside the main HAZOP sessions)
• Secretary and/or Chairman unfamiliar with package; package not user-friendly
• Risk of loss of data if computer or package fails (package design and autosave should
ensure that data lost is minimal)
• Inflexibility in the package which interferes with the HAZOP process
• Lack of overall visibility of record sheets and package scanning limitations when
referring to previous entries (periodic printing out and flexible package scanning
capability overcome this potential problem)
Such problems need to be addressed so that the Team is not distracted from the
purpose of the study and can realise the benefits of using this method of recording
outlined above.
The longer the duration of the study the greater the advantage in using a computer
recording package. Short studies, eg 1-day duration, may not justify the effort involved in
package familiarisation, setting up computer equipment prior to study etc.
A standard VDU screen is quite acceptable for a short study involving a small team of
four or five people. However, for a longer study with five or six people a larger screen
should be used to enable all members of the team to see the screen whilst enabling the
secretary to have a comfortable arrangement.
Devices designed to be placed on top of overhead projectors are not recommended as
they are too intrusive in terms of space, noise and lighting requirements and can be of
poor optical quality particularly after extended use/overheating.

The venue and room arrangement/lighting need to take into account the use of computer
recording.
A number of computer packages are available including:
• Lihou Package (previously recommended by HSEQA)
• Primatech (BP Chemicals have acquired a worldwide multi-user license on behalf of
the BP Group)
• Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Hazsec (quite flexible in operation and screen layout)
Each of these packages has its own particular advantages and disadvantages. Probably
the most important factor is that the secretary and Chairman are familiar with the
software and can use it effectively.
Some of the advantages of computer recording can be obtained by simply using a
Uncontrolled
pre-prepared set of tables in a standard mouse operated software package such as Word
for Windows/Word for Mac. This simplifies the package familiarisation aspects and is
perhaps appropriate for studies of short duration. It also has the advantage that the
record sheets can be imported directly into the HAZOP report and any closeout
documentation.
Further advice on the selection and use of computer recording packages can be obtained
from UTG.

Addendum 1
References
(1) A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies, Chemical Industries Association Limited,
London, CIA, 1981.
(2) Guidelines for HAZID studies (UKCS-TS-002).
(3) HAZOP Study Techniques for Well Operations. Report No WEO/HP/93/024.
(4) HSEQA Guidelines for Critical Safety Reviews (HSQ 01.05.16).
(5) Integrated Safe System of Work (UKCS-SSW-002).
Uncontrolled
(6) Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, F P Lees, ISBN 0 408 10604 2.
(7) Programmable Electronic Systems in Safety Related Applications (Parts I and II), Health
and Safety Executive.
(8) HSEQA Guidelines on the Loss Potential Matrix (HSQ 01.05.05).
(9) Guidelines on the Application of HAZOP Techniques to Systems Containing
Programmable Systems.
References
September 2001 Issue 1 Add 1-1/2
Addendum 2
HAZOP Study Guideword Checklists
Paragraph Page
1 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklist – Core Set 1
2 HAZOP Study Guideword

Checklist – Supplementary Set 2
3 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklist – Supplementary

Uncontrolled
Set for Sequential Operations 4
4 HAZOP Guideword Checklist – Supplementary

Set for Well Operations 4

September 2001 Issue 1 Add 2-i/ii
1 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklist – Core Set

This core set of guidewords should be used for all process design HAZOP studies.
Guideword Deviation Examples of Potential Problems

Flow No/Less High pressure; stagnant lines, line/instrument tapping
blockages, filter blockages.
More Undesirable flow, leakages, high velocity/erosion, vents
and overflows, draining/sampling, flexible failure,
seal/gasket failure, environmental emissions, inventory
minimisation/isolation, well barrier failure/testing.
Uncontrolled
Reverse Utilities contamination/overpressure, reverse rotation,

NRV failure, vessel overfill.
Misdirected Unexpected routings, transfer errors, interlocks and
locked valves, identification and labelling, operational
flexibility/complexity.
Temperature High Elastomeric materials, corrosion, thermal
expansion/creep, location of temperature probes,
decomposition, personnel protection, fire.
Low Embrittlement, hydrates/freezing, flashing liquids,
depressurisation, low ambient temperatures.
Pressure High HP/LP interfaces, hydraulic surge, explosive boiling, gas
breakthrough, liquid overfill, compressor settle-out, tube
rupture, deadheaded pump, thermal expansion,
chemical reaction, fire exposure, vent/relief blockages,
restriction orifice corrosion/erosion/removal.
Low Vacuum failures, air ingress, cooling/condensing of
condensables (eg steam), vent/flame arrestor blockages,
gravity discharge/pump out.
Level/Elevation High/Low Vessel overfill, high static head. Line routing, deadlegs,
liquid accumulation, cavitation, gas blowby, loss of
interface.
Composition Change Contamination with air, water, liquids/gases/solids,
Viscosity/ slugging, chemical additives, corrosion products, sand,
Density mol sieve, lost circulating fluids etc.
Erosion High Localised failure, choked valves, straight tees,
unbalanced flows.
Deposition Problems Radioactive scale, pyrophoric scale, sand, wax,
asphaltenes hydrate, ice, debris etc.

September 2001 Issue 1 Add 2-1

Corrosion High Dissimilar materials, stress corrosion cracking, H2S, CO2
composition/contamination/temperature/pressure
effects, blockages due to buildup of corrosion scale,
under lagging corrosion, pitting, stray currents,
SRB activity.
Services Failure Power, heating/cooling medium, instrument air,
hydraulics, nitrogen/fuel gas purge.
Maintenance Problems and Access, layout, isolation, draining/venting/purging,
Inspection Requirements pyrophorics/radioactivity maintainability/reliability, lifting,
Testing vessel entry, pressure/leak/function testing, condition
Uncontrolled
monitoring, spares.
Startup/ Problems and Non-standard conditions, human errors.
Shutdown Requirements Emergency shutdown requirements, sequential
operations.
Other An opportunity for Chairman to prompt team members
to raise any other concerns.
2 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklist –

Supplementary Set
Guidewords should be selected from this supplementary set as appropriate to the nature
of the system and scope of the HAZOP.

Chemical More/Less Unexpected chemical/biological reaction, incomplete
reaction.
Reaction/ Problems Level/interface measurement problems.
Biological
Foaming
Impact External Dropped objects, small bore fittings, swinging loads,
ships/helicopters.
Internal Pig operations, hydrate plug, loose internals.
Hammer Problems Steam hammer, hydraulic surge.
Vibration More Fatigue failures, thermal well failures, critical speed,
well movement.
Ignition Sources Uncertified equipment, static, hot surfaces.

Add 2-2 September 2001 Issue 1

Catalyst Regeneration Sequential operation.
Change
Ventilation Less Gas accumulation, fumes, oxygen enrichment, oxygen
deficiency, pressurisation.
Reliability Low Instruments/equipment reliability.
Operability Problems Equipment operability/suitability, ergonomics,
system complexity/flexibility, potential for human
error/exposure, instrument visibility, procedures, critical
information/alarms presentation, response time/action,
manning.
Uncontrolled
Human Factors Supervision, handover, training, clear responsibilities,

remote/local control.
Sampling Problems Provision of sampling/draining/venting facilities, routing.
Draining/Venting Batch operation, human error, uncontrolled release,
filter change.
SIMOPs Problems Well intervention, drilling, well test, construction,
commissioning/decommissioning, maintenance.
Layout/Access Problems Maintenance, operations, emergency escape routes.
Construction Problems
Commissioning Problems
Environmental Concerns Emissions/spills to air, land, water.
Health Concerns Toxic materials in process, additives, construction
materials, sampling/draining/venting procedures.
Noise, radioactivity.
Noise High Pumps, compressors, engines, high velocities, chokes,
vents, exhausts.
Cracking Problems Thermal decomposition, stress corrosion cracking, brittle
fracture, weld quality.
Radiation Thermal Ionising Personnel protection, flare LSA scale, nucleonic
instruments.
Velocity/Speed High/Low Erosion, noise deposition.
Drawing Errors
Weather Problems Severe weather conditions, high/low winds, high/low
temperatures, tides, flooding, combined loads etc.

3 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklist – Supplementary

Set for Sequential Operations
These guidewords should be used to HAZOP sequential operations (procedures)
supplemented by a selection of guidewords from the preceding core and supplementary
sets appropriate to the nature of the operations and scope of the HAZOP.

Sequence Step Omitted Step not done, handover, split responsibilities.
Incomplete Step only partially completed or delayed.
Valve Errors Valve open or closed in error prior to/during step.
Uncontrolled
Too Short/Long Operation completed too slowly or too quickly.
Too Late/Early Insufficient or excessive delay before moving on to the
next step or following completion of previous step.
Wrong Order Step done out of sequence.
Wrong Action An incorrect action substituted for the correct action.
Extra Action Another action completed as well as the action
intended.
SIMOPs Any other simultaneous activity which may impact on
the overall safety of the operations.
4 HAZOP Guideword Checklist – Supplementary Set for

Well Operations
Well operations should be viewed as batch/sequential operations and hence the
procedures should be reviewed using the guidewords for sequential operations (eg step
omitted) with a small selection of core process parameter guidewords (eg more flow,
high pressure, high temperature) and supplementary guidewords (eg SIMOPs, layout,
access problems) which specifically address the nature of operation and the scope of
the study. For example, the following supplementary guidewords might be included in
the list used to HAZOP a drilling operation.


Rate of None/Less
Penetration
More
Weight on Bit None/Less
More
Reverse
Hook Load None/Less
More
Elevation More
Uncontrolled
Less
Orientation Other Than
Torque None/Less Slipping
More Jamming
POOH Rate None/Less Stuck pipe
More
Wear More
Barriers Failure Lack of testing, fluid level, straddling
Equipment Operability Visibility, height/clearance maintenance, certification,
jamming, slipping
Failure
Supervision Problems Handover, remote/local control, communications
Note: Drilling operations also include process type topsides equipment (eg mud tanks)
and links to hydrocarbon processing systems which need to be reviewed as part
of the drilling operation.

September 2001 Issue 1 Add 2-5/6
Addendum 3
Typical Example of a Completed
HAZOP Study Worksheet
TABLE NO: 1-0 DOCUMENT REF; REVISION

SK/TH0081/z001
DOCUMENT TITLE: Gas Import Thistle – Alpha Letdown TEAM MEMBERS:
Heater Replacement DRC, DA, WG,
CHWT, NW
Uncontrolled
PLANT SECTION: Import Gas Supply Line 4in 1A15B1-3204-GP, 4in 1A115b1-3205-GP
and 4in 1A6B1-32-7-GP
DESIGN INTENT: Import of gas through the 1st stage letdown heater and 2nd stage
letdown heater
Inlet conditions 2000psi 5oC
Discharge from 1st stage 1980psi 60oC
Inlet to 2nd stage heater 1000psi 35oC
Discharge from 2nd stage heater 980psi 40oC
o
Discharge from 2nd stage pressure letdown valve PCV-2939 250psi 20 C
Typical Example of a Completed HAZOP Study Worksheet

Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguards Action

Flow Failed closed Closure of RV 2912/3 Confirm suitability of
XCV-2016 and XCV-2016 and and 2910/1 fail-open mode on PCVs
No/Less
XCV-2002. simultaneous and which requires RV operation
opening of PCVs blowdown to protect HP/LP interfaces.
2939 and 2943 valve
potentially XCV-2015.
causing
overpressure.
Flow Partial blockage Progressive loss DPI across Ensure DPI’s performance is
of heat of heat exhangers reliable at the high operating
No/Less
Uncontrolled
exchanger exchanger and TSLLs pressures. Ensure double
passages. surface/ downstream block and bleed available for
Debris arising performance. of PCVs. DPI in view of potential
from previous Possible reliability problems. Check
Witch’s hat
use as export erosional operational experience of
strainers.
line may be effects. heaters with Gyda and
dislodged by Wytch Farm with particular
planned pigging reference to sizing of
operation. witch’s hat. Ensure pigging
procedures are such that
they minimise the potential
to block.
Flow Fail open of Potential High Consider changing fail
PCV-2939 overpressure. pressure status of PCVs 2939 and
More
system and As above. and high 2943. (The Team
hence operation flow alarms acknowledges there is a
Very high
of RV-2910 and requiring possible adverse affect on
velocities in
2911. manual security of gas supply.)
exchangers.
intervention.
Similar for
Entrainment of
PCV-2943.
debris.
Typical Example of a Completed HAZOP Study Worksheet


ukcsts001_iss1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ukcsts001_iss1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Guidelines for HAZOP Studies UKCS-TS-001

Authorisation for Issue

3 Preparation and Planning 10

September 2001 Issue 1 i

4 HAZOP Study Method 11

7 Report Preparation and Issue 18

9 Computer Recording of HAZOP Studies 21

Addendum 2 HAZOP Study Guideword Checklists

Addendum 3 Typical Example of a Completed HAZOP Study

ii September 2001 Issue 1

Authorisation for Issue

Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG

September 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

For Audit Use

September 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Issue No Date Description

September 2001 Issue 1 vii/viii

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

September 2001 Issue 1 ix/x

Guidance is given on applicability, methodology and organisation of HAZOP studies. Reference

Review and Update

September 2001 Issue 1 xii

xiii September 2001 Issue 1

AFC Approved for Construction

HAZID Hazard Identification

September 2001 Issue 1 xiv/xv

possibility of hazards arising.

1.3 HAZOP and Other Hazard Identification Techniques

September 2001 Issue 1 1

Method Application Advantages Limitations Ref

Table 1 Summary of Hazard Identification Techniques

2 September 2001 Issue 1

Method Application Advantages Limitations Ref

subsequent detailed experience of the team

Table 1 Summary of Hazard Identification Techniques (cont’d)

September 2001 Issue 1 3

1.4 General Application of HAZOP

1.5 Application to New Facilities

1.6 Application to Existing Facilities

4 September 2001 Issue 1

• Process and utility drawings

September 2001 Issue 1 5

1.8 HAZOP Objectives

1.9 Contractor Conducted HAZOP

6 September 2001 Issue 1

1.10 Vendor Equipment

2.1 Importance of the HAZOP Study Chairman

September 2001 Issue 1 7

2.2 The Team

2.3 Competency of Team Members

8 September 2001 Issue 1

The route to qualification and inclusion on a list of approved HAZOP Chairman

familiar with the package used.

2.3.3 Independent Process Engineer

2.3.4 Operations Representative

2.3.5 Project Process Engineer (Designer)

2.3.6 Discipline Specialists

September 2001 Issue 1 9

3 Preparation and Planning

3.2 Drawings and Information Required

10 September 2001 Issue 1