Journal of Supply Chain Management

2018, 54(4), 62–85

© 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

TOWARD RELATIONSHIP RESILIENCE: MANAGING

BUYER-INDUCED BREACHES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRACTS DURING JOINT BUYER–SUPPLIER
PROJECTS
LUTZ KAUFMANN AND JENS ESSLINGER
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management

CRAIG R. CARTER
Arizona State University

This research examines buyer–supplier relationship resilience associated with

a psychological contract breach by the buying organization. Our study covers
the span of buyer-induced negative events from prebreach to postrepair.
Specifically, we investigate the role of the nature of the interorganizational
and interpersonal relationships in preventing initial trust loss (prebreach)
and the effectiveness of different repair processes (penance and regulation)
in promoting subsequent trust repair (postbreach). The effects are analyzed
on two levels: interorganizational and interpersonal. We use social exchange
theory to derive the study’s hypotheses and a scenario-based role-playing
experiment to test them. The results suggest that effective interorganizational
trust repair can help to transform the nature of an interorganizational buyer–
supplier relationship from adversarial to collaborative. Furthermore, initially
adversarial interpersonal ties exacerbate the extent of interorganizational
trust loss in collaborative interorganizational buyer–supplier relationships,
while collaborative interpersonal ties help prevent initial interorganizational
trust loss. Our study makes three contributions. First, it extends the psycho-
logical contract literature by investigating purchasing managers’ mitigation
strategies in response to a buyer-induced negative event. Second, it accounts
for the role of interpersonal ties in buyer–supplier relationship resilience.
Third, it underscores the effectiveness of trust repair mechanisms, such as
penance and regulation, in actually improving buyer–supplier relationship
resilience after a psychological contract breach.

Keywords: psychological contract breach; buyer–supplier relationship resilience;

trust; social exchange theory; scenario-based experiments

INTRODUCTION contracts to manage their exchanges (Granovetter, 1985;

Buyer–supplier relationships frequently suffer from
conflict (Bai, Sheng & Li, 2016) or face the threat of
opportunism (Williamson, 2008), causing supply chain
members to rely on contracts (written or unwritten) to
mitigate these risks (Eckerd & Girth, 2017; Lumineau &
Henderson, 2012). Particularly in situations in which
contractual relationships involve high monitoring and
structuring costs, such as during joint new product devel-
opment (NPD) projects, managers often rely on alterna-
tive governance mechanisms in addition to written
Hill, Eckerd, Wilson & Greer, 2009; Lumineau & Malho-
tra, 2011; Macaulay, 1963; Malhotra & Murnighan,
2002). As such, they form subjective exchange agree-
ments that introduce a distinctly psychological element
into contractual relationships (MacNeil, 1985)—
namely, an individual’s idiosyncratic interpretation of
the terms and conditions of an exchange (Eckerd, Hill,
Boyer, Donohue & Ward, 2013; Rousseau, 1989). Psy-
chological contracts are inherently perceptual and can
coexist with other types of contracts, such as written

62 Volume 54, Number 4

 Toward Relationship Resilience
contracts (Robinson, 1996; Shore & Tetrick, 1994). Psy-
chological contract breach occurs when an individual
perceives that the exchange partner has failed to fulfill
the reciprocal obligations of the psychological contract
(Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989). This can
lead to negative relational outcomes for both partners
involved (Tomprou, Rousseau & Hansen, 2015).
Psychological contract breaches are a form of adverse
event. The mechanisms by which organizations manage
such adverse events likely affect the resilience of the
buyer–supplier relationship. Research in the field of psy-
chology defines resilience at the individual level as “the
ability to bounce back from negative emotional experi-
ences and flexibly adapt to the changing demands of
stressful experiences” (Hu, Zhang & Wang, 2015; p. 18;
see also Block & Kremen, 1996) and as “occasions in
which, following adversity, the focal individual observes
his or her relationship with a relational other as being
stronger than it was prior to the adversity” (Thompson
& Korsgaard, 2018; p. 4) at the interpersonal relation-
ship level. At the supply chain level, Sheffi and Rice
(2005, p. 41) define resilience as “the ability to bounce
back from a disruption.” Similarly, Christopher and Peck
(2004, p. 2) conceptualize supply chain resilience as
“the ability of a system to return to its original state or
move to a new, more desirable state after being dis-
turbed” and note that “the implication in this definition
is the notion of flexibility, and given that the desired
state may be different from the original, “adaptability”
also earns a place in our thinking.”
Our research falls in between these levels of the indi-
vidual and the supply chain, by examining buyer–sup-
plier relationship resilience. Building on extant
definitions, we define buyer–supplier relationship resi-
lience as the extent to which a buyer–supplier dyad can
absorb negative events and recover—potentially to an
even more desirable state. This definition encompasses
resilience as both a process (absorption of negative
events) and an outcome (the recovery to a more desir-
able state) (Hu et al., 2015). We operationalize buyer–
supplier relationship resilience by investigating one crit-
ical dimension of resilience (Hu et al., 2015)—that is,
trust, or specifically the potential interorganizational
and interpersonal trust loss and subsequent recovery
associated with the breach of a psychological contract.
In particular, we examine psychological contract
breaches that lead the buying firm to trigger unexpected
negative events for the supplier during a joint NPD pro-
ject (e.g., unexpected reduction of financial budgets,
shifted deadlines, project delays). We argue that these
buyer-induced events affect the supplier’s trust in the buy-
ing firm and might lead to behaviors indicative of a
breakdown or crisis if the relationship is not restored to
a state of agreement going forward (Akkermans & van
Wassenhove, 2018; Tomprou et al., 2015). We examine
this phenomenon within the scope of a joint NPD
October 2018
project. NPD projects involving suppliers are character-
ized by high levels of risk and uncertainty (Leifer,
McDermott, O’Connor, Peters & Rice, 2000) and fre-
quently suffer from mistakes made earlier in the NPD
process (Khurana & Rosenthal, 1997). These mistakes
can lead to delayed product launches (Cohen, Eliashberg
& Ho, 1996; Kim & Wilemon, 2002), unfavorable bud-
get changes (Kim & Wilemon, 2002), budget escalation
problems (Schmidt & Calantone, 2002), and even the
termination of ongoing projects (Balachandra, 1984;
Green, Welsh & Dehler, 2003).
We therefore argue for an extension of the extant
focus on contract governance in joint NPD (e.g., Ryall
& Sampson, 2009) to provide a more complete under-
standing of the effects of psychological contract
breaches, and subsequent responses to remedy the
breach, on buyer–supplier relationship resilience. In
the wake of this holistic approach of analyzing the
changes in interorganizational trust from prebreach to
postrepair, we argue that the supplier’s relational
responses to the unexpected negative event are likely
to depend on the initial nature of the interorganiza-
tional relationship. Moreover, we expect that the inter-
personal ties between the supplier’s sales manager and
the buying organization’s purchasing manager influ-
ence the supplier’s relational responses at the interor-
ganizational level as well (Gligor & Autry, 2012).
We rely on social exchange theory (SET) and posit that
the nature of an interorganizational buyer–supplier rela-
tionship, defined as whether the relationship is collabo-
rative or adversarial (Heide & John, 1990, 1992; Heide &
Stump, 1995; Williamson, 2008) at the time the negative
event occurs, affects the way supply chain partners
1) evaluate unexpected negative events emanating from
a buying organization’s psychological contract breach
and 2) approach subsequent repair processes. We
hypothesize that compensational/monetary repair pro-
cesses are more effective at repairing interorganizational
trust in initially adversarial interorganizational relation-
ships, while regulatory/nonmonetary processes are more
effective at repairing trust in initially collaborative
interorganizational relationships. Selecting a repair pro-
cess based on the initial nature of the interorganizational
relationship is more likely to lead to effective trust repair
and, thus, relationship resilience going forward. In line
with our assertion about the importance of accounting
for the role of interpersonal relationships, we further posit
that collaborative ties between individuals are likely to
make collaborative interorganizational relationships
resilient to interorganizational trust loss following such
a negative event.
In the next two sections of our paper, we introduce
hypotheses concerning the roles of both individuals
and organizations in interorganizational trust loss and
interorganizational trust repair. We then describe the
methodology used to collect our study’s data.
63
 Journal of Supply Chain Management
Afterwards, we present our analyses and results. We
next discuss our study’s findings and contributions.
We conclude by discussing the study’s limitations and
highlight opportunities for future research in the area
of buyer–supplier psychological contracts in the final
section of the paper.
INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST LOSS
We rely on SET as the theoretical foundation in
developing our hypotheses surrounding interorganiza-
tional trust loss (Rousseau, 1995). Although its roots
lie at the individual level, previous supply chain man-
agement (SCM) research has extended SET to intraor-
ganizational and interorganizational contexts (Das &
Teng, 2002; Muthusamy, 2005). SET stipulates that
any interaction between two entities constitutes an
exchange of resources that can be economic or social
(Homans, 1958) or, according to the psychological
contract literature, transactional or relational in nature
(Rousseau, 1990; Shore & Tetrick, 1994). While eco-
nomic exchanges highlight the financial and more
tangible aspects of the relationship (Lo & Aryee,
2003), social exchanges involve rewards that are pro-
vided voluntarily and on which no exact price can be
put (Blau, 1968; Das & Teng, 2002). Individuals or
firms usually enter a relationship with the expectation
of a reward from that interaction (Emerson, 1962;
Homans, 1958; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). As such, both
partners are motivated to attain rewards and avoid
punishments (Griffith, Harvey & Lusch, 2006). In
repeated interactions, they compare the benefits with
those of other exchanges and maintain the relation-
ship as long as the incurred rewards exceed those of
the available alternatives (Lambe, Wittmann & Spek-
man, 2001). When providing a reward, partners trust
that the counterpart will reciprocate by returning the
benefit over time (Homans, 1958). Positive interac-
tions produce relational exchange norms that, in turn,
guide a partner’s future behavior (Blau, 1964).
The extant literature typically considers collabora-
tive interorganizational relationships to be a desir-
able characteristic of joint NPD efforts (Johnston,
McCutcheon, Stuart & Kerwood, 2004). However,
buyers and suppliers can have both collaborative and
adversarial interorganizational relationships. Given
the high technological uncertainty of NPD, buying
firms often have limited alternatives when selecting
viable suppliers (Kull, Oke & Dooley, 2014). Research
further suggests that collaborative interorganizational
relationships can lead to an overreliance on an
exchange partner’s knowledge. Such behavior, includ-
ing the lack of attention paid to the veracity and (in)-
completeness of the exchanged information, is likely
to hamper NPD capabilities and diminish project out-
comes (Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven, 2006).
64 Volume 54, Number 4
The Nature of Interorganizational Relationships
and Interorganizational Trust Loss
Interorganizational relationships emerge as two or
more organizations exchange knowledge and informa-
tion (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Extant literature has
shown that these relationships can be either collabo-
rative or adversarial in nature (e.g., Heide & Stump,
1995; Johnston et al., 2004; McCutcheon & Stuart,
2000). Collaborative relationships are characterized
by a norm of information exchange (Heide & John,
1992), continuity (Heide & John, 1990), and coopera-
tion for mutual gain (Williamson, 2008). By contrast,
adversarial relationships are characterized by relatively
little voluntary cooperation (Heide & John, 1990),
and a general uncertainty about the continuity and
time horizon of future interaction (Williamson,
2008).
When the buying firm is the cause of a negative
event emanating from a psychological contract breach,
it has failed to fulfill the supplier’s reward expecta-
tions or, in other words, is in breach of the perceived
obligations toward the supplier. According to SET,
relational costs begin to outweigh the benefits
incurred, and the supplier will likely reciprocate
(Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall & Ambrose, 2013; Thomas,
Thomas, Manrodt & Rutner, 2013). As trust is usually
affected the most by negative events, particularly dur-
ing innovation-related projects (Ng, Lam & Feldman,
2010), we rely on the trust loss literature to examine
its effect on collaborative and adversarial interorgani-
zational relationships. We define interorganizational
trust loss as the extent to which the negative event
causes trust to deteriorate at the organizational level
(Dirks, Lewicki & Zaheer, 2009). We argue that the
supplier is likely to adjust its relational expectations
of and perceived obligations toward the buying firm
after a negative event by reducing its willingness to
display trusting behaviors accordingly (Dirks & Ferrin,
2001). The extent of interorganizational trust loss is
thus contingent on the initial nature of the interorga-
nizational relationship that explicitly defines the sup-
plier’s reward expectations.
In collaborative interorganizational relationships, suppli-
ers have established relational psychological contracts
with the buying firm and thus expect to receive eco-
nomic and/or social exchange benefits. As previous
exchanges have been characterized by mutual coopera-
tion, continuity, and a norm of information exchange
(Heide & John, 1990, 1992; Williamson, 2008), an
unexpected negative event likely constitutes a breach
of the supplier’s high reward expectations. It involves
an economic loss and a breach of the buying firm’s
social obligations toward the supplier. As a response,
we thus expect the supplier to lose interorganizational
trust. The negative event likely increases uncertainty in
the NPD project and reduces the supplier’s expectations
 Toward Relationship Resilience
of receiving an equitable division of exchange benefits
over time (Lambe et al., 2001; Robinson, Kraatz &
Rousseau, 1994; Thomas et al., 2013).
In adversarial interorganizational relationships, interac-
tions are built on transactional psychological contracts
and thus are characterized by little voluntary coopera-
tion and a general uncertainty about the continuity of
the relationship (Heide & John, 1992; Williamson,
2008). Exchanges are considered independent events
that are purely economic in nature (Shore & Tetrick,
1994), and they differ from social exchanges in that
they do not involve any long-term reciprocal expecta-
tions and obligations (McDonald & Makin, 2000).
Adversarial interorganizational relationships do not
necessarily reflect negative experiences from prior
exchanges, but often result from an organization’s dis-
position to trust or institutional restrictions put on
certain buyer–supplier relationships (McKnight, Cum-
mings & Chervany, 1998). An unexpected negative
event therefore does not violate any social obligations,
but only reflects a breach of the buying firm’s transac-
tional obligations toward the supplier (Robinson
et al., 1994). Consequently, we expect both collabora-
tive and adversarial interorganizational relationships
to suffer from the negative event, but argue that the
effect is likely to be stronger for collaborative rather
than adversarial interorganizational relationships.
While in adversarial relationships the event tends to
create mere inequity in the economic exchange, it
affects collaborative relationships by breaching the
socioemotional obligations that are most critical to
relational contracts. We therefore expect the loss in
interorganizational trust to be stronger in collabora-
tive interorganizational relationships, as the event
may have the effect of damaging relational obligations
in ways that may be irreparable (Robinson et al.,
1994). Thus:
H1a: An unexpected negative event leads to interor-
ganizational trust loss in collaborative interorgani-
zational relationships.
H1b: An unexpected negative event leads to
interorganizational trust loss in adversarial interor-
ganizational relationships.
H1c: An unexpected negative event leads to greater
interorganizational trust loss in collaborative
interorganizational relationships than in adversarial
interorganizational relationships.
The Role of Interpersonal Relationships in
Interorganizational Trust Loss
We further expect an interaction between the nature
of the interpersonal relationship and the interorganiza-
tional relationship in their effect on the extent of
October 2018
interorganizational trust loss following an unexpected
negative event. Interpersonal relationships refer to the
relational posture of an individual toward a counter-
part and thus develop through relational interactions
between business partner employees being directly
connected in a supply chain (Gligor & Autry, 2012).
They lead to social-psychological bonds, such as
mutual norms, sentiments, and friendships over time
(Ring & van de Ven, 1994), and are thus inherently
distinct from interorganizational relationships in that
they are usually expressive rather than instrumental,
based on voluntary rather than involuntary interac-
tions, and have a communal rather than reciprocal
orientation (Grayson, 2007). Partners can thus pro-
vide or receive benefits (or punishments) without cre-
ating a feeling of obligation to reciprocate (Fischer,
1982; Gligor & Autry, 2012; Silver, 1990). Prior SCM
research has examined relationships from an interor-
ganizational (e.g., Pulles, Veldman, Schiele &
Sierksma, 2014) or interpersonal (e.g., Huang, Gat-
tiker & Schwarz, 2008) perspective. We propose a
reciprocal relationship between both levels, with nei-
ther alone being sufficient to fully understand the
exchange mechanisms between supply chain partners
(Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone,
1998). Specifically, we differentiate between collabora-
tive and adversarial interpersonal relationships, and
thus investigate four combinations of either conso-
nance or contention between the individual and the
larger relational nature held by the organization
(Liedtka, 1989).
In collaborative interpersonal relationships, individuals
are focused on developing solutions to the problems
at hand rather than jumping to conclusions about the
personalities involved (Zaheer et al., 1998). Both
managers are confident about resolving conflicting sit-
uations, so periodic disagreements may not lead to a
fear of exploitation (Zaheer et al., 1998). In the con-
text of SET, collaborative interpersonal ties imply that
individuals put faith in the moral integrity of their
counterpart to achieve an equitable split of benefits
over time (Lambe et al., 2001). We therefore propose
that when experiencing a buyer-induced negative
event, the sales manager will likely mitigate her or his
retaliatory sentiments against the purchasing manager
by relying on the goodwill that both have already
developed, which will decrease the supplier’s motiva-
tion to reciprocate accordingly. While interorganiza-
tional relationships are conditioned by organizational
role responsibilities, individuals likely rely on the nat-
ure of the interpersonal relationship as a first refer-
ence when deciding on their response to an
unexpected event (Ring & van de Ven, 1994). As such,
we expect collaborative interpersonal ties to attenuate
the positive association between the (initial) nature of
the interorganizational relationship and the extent of
65
 Journal of Supply Chain Management
interorganizational trust loss. For collaborative inter-
personal ties, interorganizational trust loss will thus
be weaker for collaborative and stronger for adversar-
ial interorganizational relationships.
In adversarial interpersonal relationships, individuals
are typically unwilling to accept periodic disagree-
ments. The purchasing manager’s actions are usually
less predictable, and the sales manager is less confi-
dent that apparent issues will be resolved (Zaheer
et al., 1998). We therefore expect that when suffering
from an unexpected negative event, the sales manager
will question the moral integrity of her or his counter-
part and refuse to postpone anticipated economic
exchange benefits (Lambe et al., 2001; Ring & van de
Ven, 1994). As such, the sales manager will likely
view the event as more costly, which will increase the
supplier’s motivation to reciprocate accordingly. We
therefore expect adversarial interpersonal ties to exacer-
bate the positive association between the (initial) nat-
ure of the interorganizational relationship and the
extent of interorganizational trust loss. For adversarial
interpersonal ties, interorganizational trust loss will
thus be stronger for collaborative and weaker for
adversarial interorganizational relationships. There-
fore:
H2a: Collaborative interpersonal relationships lead
to weaker interorganizational trust loss in collabo-
rative interorganizational relationships than in
adversarial interorganizational relationships.
H2b: Adversarial interpersonal relationships lead to
stronger interorganizational trust loss in collabora-
tive interorganizational relationships than in adver-
sarial interorganizational relationships.
A summary of the interorganizational trust loss
hypotheses of our research model is provided in the
upper section of Figure 1. We next develop hypothe-
ses related to the second phase of our model—interor-
ganizational trust repair—as shown in the lower
section of Figure 1.
INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST REPAIR
The Nature of Interorganizational Relationships
and Interorganizational Trust Repair
Interorganizational trust repair involves overcoming
the salient negative expectations that arose from the
unexpected negative event. As such, it refers to the
extent to which the repair processes cause trust to
increase at the interorganizational level (Dirks et al.,
2009) and thus can dictate how the nature of the
interorganizational relationship develops postrepair to
achieve buyer–supplier relationship resilience.
Drawing on SET, we expect the extent of interorgani-
zational trust repair to be contingent on the relational
66 Volume 54, Number 4
behaviors of the buying firm and the supplier’s reward
expectations (Blau, 1964; Lambe et al., 2001; Wagner,
Coley & Lindemann, 2011). Consistent with our rea-
soning employed in Hypothesis 1, we posit that ini-
tially collaborative interorganizational relationships
are likely to recover more strongly from an unex-
pected negative event than initially adversarial interor-
ganizational relationships. Thus, they will react more
strongly in terms of both interorganizational trust loss
and repair.
For initially collaborative interorganizational relation-
ships, we expect the exchange norms and the sup-
plier’s expectation of future interaction to strongly
motivate the firm to maintain the relationship by tak-
ing into account the anticipated future rewards it will
likely receive (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Wil-
liamson, 2008). The supplier’s confidence in achieving
an equitable split of social and/or economic exchange
outcomes over time, thus maintaining “positive net
obligations” (Robinson et al., 1994, p. 139), will
likely induce the firm to reestablish interorganiza-
tional trust.
For initially adversarial interorganizational relation-
ships, we argue that the absence of social obligations
and the high uncertainty in the continuity and time
horizon of future interaction will limit the supplier’s
motivation to engage in future exchanges with the
buying firm (Bercovitz, Jap & Nickerson, 2006; Wil-
liamson, 2008). As the supplier’s behavior is driven
by the extent to which anticipated and realized eco-
nomic benefits deviate from each other, we expect the
incurred losses stemming from the negative event to
decrease the firm’s confidence in achieving an equita-
ble division of economic outcomes over time. The
firm’s willingness to return any exchange benefit stem-
ming from the buying organization’s substantive
response will thus be rather low, such that interorga-
nizational trust may only increase to a limited extent
(Lambe et al., 2001). Overall, we expect the extent of
interorganizational trust repair to be higher if the nat-
ure of the relationship is collaborative rather than
adversarial. Thus:
H3a: Initially collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships recover from an unexpected negative
event in terms of interorganizational trust repair.
H3b: Initially adversarial interorganizational rela-
tionships recover from an unexpected negative
event in terms of interorganizational trust repair.
H3c: Initially collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships recover to a greater extent from an unex-
pected negative event than initially adversarial
interorganizational relationships in terms of trust
repair.
 Toward Relationship Resilience

FIGURE 1
Relationship Resilience: Summary of Research Models for Interorganizational Trust Loss and Repair

Interorganizational Trust Loss Scenario

Interpersonal Relationship
(Collaborative/Adversarial)

H2
Trust Loss
Unexpected Negative Event in Collaborative/Adversarial
H1 Interorganizational Relationships

Interorganizational Trust Repair (Post-Breach) Scenario

Interpersonal Relationship
(Collaborative/Adversarial)

Initially (Collaborative/Adversarial) H5
Interorganizational Relationship H3

H4
Interorganizational Trust Repair

Substantive Response
(Penance/Regulation)
by the Buying Organization

Substantive Responses by the Buying
Organization
Extant literature provides a range of responses on
how damaged trust can be repaired (for a comprehen-
sive review, see Dirks et al., 2009). Repair processes are
“activities by one or both parties [to] substantively
return the relationship to a positive state” (Dirks et al.,
2009; p. 69) and can be verbal responses, such as
apologies, or substantive responses, such as fixed pay-
ments (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels & Murnighan, 2002;
Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006; Sitkin & Roth,
1993). While verbal responses might be discounted as
“cheap talk,” particularly in business-to-business con-
texts, substantive responses involve a tangible element
that adds credence to the buying organization’s actions
(Dirks, Kim, Ferrin & Cooper, 2011). We therefore
investigate two types of substantive responses by the
buying organization that are commonly accepted in
both theory and practice (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002;
Gillespie & Dietz, 2009) and that are likely to reconcile
a firm’s self-interests with the intention of maintaining
the relationship (Blau, 1964; Ring & van de Ven, 1994):
penance and regulation. Both responses are grounded
in relational governance mechanisms (Liu, Luo & Liu,
2009; Lusch & Brown, 1996) and aim to restore the
transactional and/or relational obligations of the psy-
chological contract.
Penance reflects a substantive response on which a
compensational repair process builds. Here, the buy-
ing organization attempts to elicit the supplier’s per-
ception of repentance for having caused the negative
event by offering a monetary compensation to correct
the negative state (Bottom et al., 2002; Lewicki &
Bunker, 1996). In contrast to legalistic remedies stem-
ming from contractual obligations (e.g., Sitkin &
Roth, 1993), penance aims to recover the buyer–sup-
plier relationship by adjusting the transactional obli-
gations of the psychological contract to restore equity
in the economic exchange (Robinson et al., 1994).
Following this short-term economic benefit, the sup-
plier is likely to develop positive expectations of
future exchanges and be motivated to maintain the
interorganizational relationship. Ideally, the supplier
believes that the buyer counterpart regrets having
caused the negative event and is committed to reform-
ing the negative state by paying a substantive amount
(Dirks et al., 2011). When being offered a monetary
compensation after having suffered from an unex-
pected negative event, the supplier is thus likely to
return that benefit and view the interorganizational

October 2018 67
 Journal of Supply Chain Management
relationship more positively than it did immediately
following the event (Tomprou et al., 2015).
Regulation builds on a social repair process and
offers a monitoring system that helps augment trust-
ing behavior going forward (Nakayachi & Watabe,
2005). Here, the buying organization offers to imple-
ment relational policies to provide means for control-
ling behavior, but without any use of legal
mechanisms (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Sitkin & Roth,
1993; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). The supplier benefits
from this repair process if its expectations are to
receive long-term social rewards that decrease the
uncertainty involved in the NPD project (Clark,
1989). As such, regulation focuses on rebuilding the
relational obligations damaged by the negative event
and thus increase the inherent value of the interorga-
nizational relationship (Robinson et al., 1994). By
taking actions to avoid similar violations in the future,
regulation reflects a buying organization’s general
intention to compensate the supplier (Dirks et al.,
2011; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009).
Interactions Between the Nature of
Interorganizational Relationships and
Substantive Responses
Extant research has not yet investigated potential
interactions between the nature of interorganizational
relationships and social and psychological approaches
to trust repair. Repair processes tend to be discussed
in general terms (e.g., Eckerd & Handley, 2015; Kim,
Ferrin, Cooper & Dirks, 2004), advocating their use to
effectively recoup trust in buyer–supplier relationships.
However, little emphasis has been put on how firms
can effectively use them to rebuild interorganizational
relationships that differ in terms of their initial nature.
Drawing on SET, we argue that suppliers are likely to
compare the positive signals stemming from penance
or regulation with their expectations of the interorga-
nizational relationship to decide on their willingness
to restore interorganizational trust. Thus, while we
expect both substantive responses to create favorable
expectations of future interactions that may induce
the supplier to reciprocate accordingly (Nyaga et al.,
2013; Pulles et al., 2014; Thomas et al., 2013), we
propose that the extent of interorganizational trust
repair is likely to depend on whether the substantive
response matches the supplier’s reward expectations.
For initially collaborative interorganizational relation-
ships, we posit that regulation may prove more effective
than penance at restoring interorganizational trust. As
the exchange is typically characterized by norms of
information exchange and mutual cooperation, we
argue that the implementation of relational structures
that ensure some form of regularity and control are
likely to fulfill the supplier’s reward expectations most
effectively. In contrast with (short-term) monetary
68 Volume 54, Number 4
compensation resulting from penance, regulation
enhances long-term trusting behavior and the provision
of other social benefits going forward (Lambe et al.,
2001). As such, it aims to restore the relational
exchange obligations that have been initially breached
and which are most central to relational (psychologi-
cal) contracts (Rousseau, 1990). Thus:
H4a: Regulation is more effective than penance at
repairing interorganizational trust in initially collab-
orative interorganizational buyer–supplier relation-
ships than in initially adversarial interorganizational
relationships.
For initially adversarial interorganizational relation-
ships, we propose that penance may be more effective
than regulation at restoring interorganizational trust.
Such exchanges are characterized by a strong focus on
project profitability (due to the high uncertainty in
the continuity and time horizon of future interaction)
rather than the fulfillment of the buying organiza-
tion’s social/relational obligations. We thus expect
monetary reward offers to be more effective at resolv-
ing the breach and regaining a supplier’s interorgani-
zational trust by correcting the initially violated
imbalance of transactional outcomes (Bottom et al.,
2002; Griffith et al., 2006; Sarin & Mahajan, 2001).
Penance reflects a buying organization’s repentance
for having caused the disruption and should fulfill the
profit-seeking motives of SET by correcting the mere
inequity in the economic exchange (Dirks et al., 2011;
Lambe et al., 2001; Robinson et al., 1994), thus
restoring the balance between inducements and con-
tributions (Robinson et al., 1994). Thus:
H4b: Penance is more effective than regulation at
repairing interorganizational trust in initially adversar-
ial interorganizational buyer–supplier relationships
than in initially collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships.
The Role of Interpersonal Relationships in
Interorganizational Trust Repair
Similar to our reasoning employed in Hypothesis 2,
we expect the nature of the interpersonal relationship
to interact with the nature of the interorganizational
relationship to affect the extent of interorganizational
trust repair. For collaborative interpersonal ties, we
posit that the sales manager will likely reconsider her
or his relationship with the purchasing manager after
having suffered from an unexpected negative event.
Violating the expectations of behaving with integrity is
likely to leave a continuing residue of inequity, such
that any repair process may not help alleviate the
retaliatory sentiments stemming from the negative
event (Bottom et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2013). The
sales manager’s diminished faith in the moral integrity
 Toward Relationship Resilience
and goodwill of the purchasing manager likely causes
the manager to question her or his previous emo-
tional investments in the relationship and thus
strongly decreases confidence in the counterpart’s
trusting behaviors (McAllister, 1995; Ring & van de
Ven, 1994). Accordingly, we expect the benefits associ-
ated with either repair process to appear less reward-
ing to the supplier, such that the motivation to
reciprocate and, thus, to restore interorganizational
trust will likely be mitigated (Cropanzano & Mitchell,
2005; Lambe et al., 2001). Overall, we expect collabo-
rative interpersonal ties to attenuate and distant ties
to exacerbate the positive association between the ini-
tial nature of the interorganizational relationship and
the extent of interorganizational trust repair. Thus:
H5a: Collaborative interpersonal relationships lead
to weaker interorganizational trust repair in collab-
orative interorganizational relationships than in
adversarial interorganizational relationships follow-
ing the buying organization’s repair process.
H5b: Adversarial interpersonal relationships lead to
stronger interorganizational trust repair in collabo-
rative interorganizational relationships than in
adversarial interorganizational relationships follow-
ing the buying organization’s repair process.
METHODOLOGY
We used a vignette-based experimental methodology
to collect the study’s data (Eckerd, 2016; Rungtu-
sanatham, Wallin & Eckerd, 2011). We selected this
methodology for two reasons. First, vignettes are fre-
quently employed to examine complex relationship
phenomena, such as those studied in behavioral SCM
research (e.g., Hada, Grewal & Lilien, 2013). Second,
they provide distinctive advantages in terms of con-
trol, efficiency, and responsiveness (Siemsen, 2011).
In this study, 12 treatment conditions result from a
2 9 2 9 3 factorial experimental design. The manip-
ulated factors are the nature of the interorganizational
relationship (collaborative versus adversarial), the nat-
ure of the interpersonal relationship (collaborative
versus adversarial), and the repair process (penance,
regulation, and no substantive response as a control
condition).
Three-Stage Experimental Design
We carefully constructed our study’s vignette follow-
ing Rungtusanatham et al. (2011). We developed the
scenario from extant literature and existing, proven
vignettes (e.g., Thomas, Fugate & Koukova, 2011) and
pretested it in interviews with experienced managers.
The pretest participants deemed the study realistic.
Participants in all 12 conditions received identical
October 2018
introductory prebreach (i.e., Stage 1), transitional
event (i.e., Stage 2), and concluding postbreach (i.e.,
Stage 3) sections of the scenario, but were assigned
different manipulations pertaining to the cell to which
they were assigned (see Appendix A for a full descrip-
tion of the vignette). In the scenario, participants
assumed the role of a sales manager at a company
supplying technical components to the electronics
industry. In their role, they were involved in a joint
NPD project. In Stage 1, all participants were given
identical information about the current NPD project
phase and also received a brief description of the pro-
duct being developed to ensure a realistic scenario.
Next, they received condition-specific information
describing either a collaborative or an adversarial
interorganizational relationship and either a collabo-
rative or an adversarial interpersonal relationship. We
ensured random assignment of the scenarios. After
reading the first part of the scenario, respondents were
asked to assess the relationship in terms of their per-
ceived “base” level of the interorganizational and
interpersonal trust in the buying organization and
purchasing manager, respectively. The level of trust to
assess the respective state of a relationship has been
frequently used in extant organizational behavior
(e.g., Dirks et al., 2009), marketing (e.g., Doney &
Cannon, 1997), and SCM (e.g., Bstieler, 2006; Wang,
Craighead & Li, 2014) literatures.
In Stage 2, the participants continued reading the
scenario, now describing the unexpected negative
event, a project delay. The participants were again
asked to judge their perceived level of interorganiza-
tional and interpersonal trust in the buying organiza-
tion and purchasing manager, respectively. The extent
to which both interorganizational and interpersonal
trust decreased, as compared with the initial, pre-
breach assessment, reflects the extent of interorganiza-
tional and interpersonal trust loss, respectively.
In Stage 3, participants read descriptions of one of
the three repair processes and were again asked to
judge the perceived level of interorganizational and
interpersonal trust. We viewed the extent to which
both interorganizational and interpersonal trust chan-
ged as compared with the assessment postbreach/pre-
repair as reflecting the extent of interorganizational
and interpersonal trust repair, respectively. As the tim-
ing of the repair process can affect judgments of trust
repair (Tomlinson, Dineen & Lewicki, 2004), we indi-
cated that the repair processes occurred the day after
the unexpected negative event.
Pilot Test, Sample, and Measures
Before data collection, we conducted a pilot test
with 225 participants (Mage = 22.4 years; 66.2 percent
male) enrolled in a general management program
and 115 managers from a survey research firm
69
 Journal of Supply Chain Management
(Mage = 48.4 years; 58.3 percent male) for measure-
ment refinement purposes. Their comments led to
minor changes in wording to enhance comprehensi-
bility of the items and clarity of meaning before dis-
tributing the experiment to the study population. For
our main data collection, we recruited 605 sales and
supply managers from a survey research firm
(Mage = 39.2 years; 57.2 percent male) (Lee, Seo &
Siemsen, 2018; Schoenherr, Ellram & Tate, 2015). All
participants were prequalified, as they needed to have
experience in sales and/or purchasing. Participants’
average sales and/or purchasing experience was
6.4 years, and their average experience in general was
18.3 years. Of the 605 managers, 333 (55 percent)
further indicated frequent involvement in similar (in-
novation-related) buyer–supplier projects, similar to
the one provided in this study. We also conducted a
hierarchical regression analysis with an additional
control variable for the participants’ experience (expe-
rience versus no experience) and found no significant
effect on our dependent variables. Table 1 provides an
industry breakdown of the sample.
We adapted constructs for the dependent variables
from existing, seven-point Likert scales. We used con-
firmatory factor analysis to assess the validity and reli-
ability of the measures. No items were dropped and
the model showed acceptable goodness-of-fit values
(see Appendix B for all scale items, factor loadings,
and reliability indicators). Average variance extracted
(AVE) values were greater than .50 (Hair, Black, Babin
& Anderson, 2010), and Cronbach’s alpha values
exceeded the .70 threshold (Kline, 2000). A post hoc
analysis revealed that statistical power was well above
the threshold of .80, suggesting that the sample size
was large enough for our research (Blome, Schoenherr
& Kaesser, 2013; Fugate, Stank & Mentzer, 2009).
Manipulation Checks
We used three categorical multiple-choice questions
to check the manipulations of the initial nature of the
TABLE 1
Industry Breakdown
Industry Sector f Percent
1. Automotive 11 1.8
2. Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals 13 2.1
3. Consumer Goods 158 26.1
4. Electronics 52 8.6
5. Industrial Machinery 17 2.8
6. Services including 207 34.2
Financial Services
7. Other 147 24.3
N = 605.
70 Volume 54, Number 4
interorganizational relationship (“Please indicate how
you would consider the business relationship between
the buying company BYR and your company, SPLR”),
the initial nature of the interpersonal relationship
(“Please indicate how you would consider the inter-
personal relationship between the purchasing manager
Pat and you, Sam”), and the repair processes (“Please
indicate how you, in your role as Sam, would assess
the nature of Pat’s reaction on behalf of BYR”). Chi-
square analyses of responses to the first and second
manipulation check questions revealed significant dif-
ferences across the two interorganizational relation-
ship conditions (v2(1) = 376.5, p < .001) and the two
interpersonal relationship conditions (v2(1) = 514.1,
p < .001), respectively. Chi-square analyses of
responses to the third question revealed significant
differences across the three repair process conditions
(v2(4) = 1088.7, p < .001). As our control condition,
we used a repair process without a substantive
response. The transgressor only implicitly acknowl-
edged the damage to the buyer–supplier relationship
by acting kind toward the partner but did not offer an
explicit apology or reparation for the negative event.
Prior research has labeled this behavior as a “no apol-
ogy” condition (Tomlinson et al., 2004).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Table 2 shows the data means, standard deviations,
and correlations. We conducted preliminary analyses
to provide evidence for the effect of the unexpected
negative event on interorganizational trust loss and
the effect of the repair processes on interorganiza-
tional trust repair in both types of interorganizational
relationships (see Eckerd & Handley, 2015). The anal-
yses, depicted in Figure 2, allow us to establish the
face validity of our data.
We evaluate our hypotheses in two stages. After
mean-centering the variables to create interaction
terms, we used regression analysis. We did not use
hierarchical linear modeling to test the direct, indirect,
and moderation effect, as our sampling process did
not result in a two-level nested data structure
(Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007). If necessary, we
performed additional analyses using analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA). Stage 1 (Hypotheses 1 and 2) exami-
nes the breach scenario and includes three submodels.
Our dependent variables are the change in interorga-
nizational trust (i.e., interorganizational trust loss and
interorganizational trust repair).
In line with previous studies (e.g., Eckerd & Handley,
2015), we calculate interorganizational trust loss as the
interorganizational trust level after the unexpected neg-
ative event less the initial interorganizational trust level
before the event. Similarly, we calculate interorganiza-
tional trust repair as the interorganizational trust level
 Toward Relationship Resilience

TABLE 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Construct Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
a
1. Gender 1.58 .5
2. Interorganizational Trust Level 4.84 1.39 .01 .
(Initial/PreBreach)
3. Interorganizational Trust Loss 1.95 1.21 .04 .50**
4. Interorganizational Trust Repair .79 1.42 .08 .18** .16**
5. Interpersonal Trust Level 4.22 2.14 .00 .48** .17** .02
(Initial/PreBreach)
6. Interpersonal Trust Loss 1.04 1.20 .05 .31** .50** .08* .56**
7. Interpersonal Trust Repair .64 1.31 .08* .11** .07 .65** .30** .11**
a
Correlations are shown below the diagonal; N = 605; *p < .05; **p < .01; Female was coded as 1, and male was coded as 2.

FIGURE 2
Mean Values of Interorganizational Trust PreDisruption (Stage 1), PostDisruption (Stage 2), and PostRepair (Stage 3)

Interorganizational Trust Stages 1-3 Interorganizational Trust Stages 1-3

7 7
6 6
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
1 2 3a 3b 3c 1 2 3a 3b 3c

Collaborative Interorganizational Relationship Adversarial Interorganizational Relationship

Note: 1 = Stage 1 Interorganizational Trust Level (PreBreach); 2 = Stage 2 Interorganizational Trust Level (PostBreach/PreRe-
pair); 3a = Stage 3 Interorganizational Trust Level (PostRepair)/Penance; 3b = Stage 3 Interorganizational Trust Level (PostRe-
pair)/Regulation; 3c = Stage 3 Interorganizational Trust Level (PostRepair)/No Apology.

after the repair process less the interorganizational trust
level after the event but before the buying organiza-
tion’s repair process. The results of a within-subjects
ANOVA show a significant decrease of interorganiza-
tional trust in both collaborative and adversarial
interorganizational relationships following an unex-
pected negative event (F = 11.89, p < .01). Moreover,
the results (Table 3, Models 1–3) show that the effect is
stronger for a collaborative than an adversarial interor-
ganizational relationship (Model 2, b = .34, p < .01).
Next, the findings show a significant interaction
between the type of the interorganizational relationship
and the type of the interpersonal relationship in affect-
ing interorganizational trust loss (Model 3, b = .64,
ΔR2 = .06, p < .01).
Overall, the results provide support for Hypotheses 1a–
1c and 2a–2b, indicating that both collaborative and
adversarial interorganizational relationships suffer
from an unexpected negative event in terms of
interorganizational trust loss and that the effect is
stronger for collaborative than adversarial interorgani-
zational relationships. In addition, this direct relation-
ship is weaker when the interpersonal relationship is
collaborative and stronger when the interpersonal
relationship is adversarial in nature (Figure 3).
Stage 2 (Hypotheses 3–5) examines the repair
scenario and includes four submodels to evaluate
interorganizational trust repair. The results of a within-
subjects ANOVA show that both initially collabora-
tive and adversarial interorganizational relationships
recover from the negative event in terms of interorgani-
zational trust repair (F = 13.48, p < .001), thus provid-
ing support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. However, the
results (Table 4, Models 4–7) further show that the
effect of the initial nature of the interorganizational
relationship on interorganizational trust repair is in the
opposite direction of that hypothesized (b1 = .46,
p < .001). Initially collaborative interorganizational

October 2018 71
 Journal of Supply Chain Management

TABLE 3
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Interorganizational Trust Loss

Dependent Variable (DV): Interorganizational Trust

Loss
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Construct B SE B SE B SE
Control Variables
(Constant) 1.8*** .16 1.78*** .16 1.8*** .16
Gender .10 .10 .11 .10 .10 .10
Main Effects
Initial Nature of Interorganizational .34** .10 .33** .10
Relationshipa
Initial Nature of Interpersonal Relationshipa .33** .10 .33** .10
Moderating Effect
Initial Nature of Interorganizational .64** .19
Relationship 9 Initial Nature of
Interpersonal Relationship
F .97 8.27*** 9.04***
R2 .00 .04 .06
Adjusted R2 .00 .04 .05
N = 605; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
a
Adversarial was coded as 0, and collaborative was coded as 1.

repair processes (Model 5, b1 = 2.05, p < .001;

FIGURE 3 b2 = 1.13, p < .001, respectively). This suggests that
Interorganizational Trust Loss (for Different Types of both penance and regulation are positively related to
the Interpersonal Relationship) interorganizational trust repair, regardless of the initial
nature of interorganizational relationship. Last, the
Interorganizational Trust Loss results indicate a nonsignificant interaction between
-2.50 the initial nature of the interorganizational relationship
and the initial nature of the interpersonal relationship
-2.00 in affecting interorganizational trust repair (Model 6,
Collaborative b = .15, ΔR2 = .42, n.s.), thus also failing to support
-1.50 Interpersonal
Relationship Hypotheses 5a and 5b (Figure 4).
-1.00 Adversarial We performed additional ANOVA tests based on the
Interpersonal results. We used planned contrasts to evaluate whether
Relationship
-0.50 the two groups that received either penance or regula-
Collaborative Adversarial tion as a repair process were statistically different from
Interorganizational Interorganizational
Relationship Relationship the control group. The results suggest that both repair
processes had a significant and positive (p < .001)
effect on interorganizational trust repair compared
with receiving no apology. Furthermore, pairwise
comparisons showed significant differences (p < .001)
relationships recover less from an unexpected negative between both repair processes, as well as between
event than initially adversarial relationships. Thus, each repair process and the control condition, respec-
Hypothesis 3c is not supported. Next, the results show tively. Additional ANOVA tests showed that penance
a nonsignificant interaction between the initial type of was more effective than regulation at increasing
the interorganizational relationship and the repair pro- interorganizational trust for collaborative interorgani-
cesses in affecting interorganizational trust repair zational relationships (p < .001) and also significantly
(Model 7, b1 = .11, n.s.; b2 = .08, n.s., respectively), more effective for adversarial interorganizational rela-
thus failing to support Hypotheses 4a and 4b (Figure 4). tionships (p < .001). Table 5 provides a summary of
However, the results show significant main effects of the the outcomes of the hypotheses.

72 Volume 54, Number 4

 Toward Relationship Resilience

TABLE 4
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Interorganizational Trust Repair

DV: Interorganizational Trust Repair

Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Construct B SE B SE B SE B SE
Control Variables
(Constant) .12 .21 .23 .16 .22 .16 .22 .16
Gender .20 .12 .05 .09 .05 .09 .04 .09
Extent of Interorganizational .18** .06 .29*** .04 .30*** .04 .30*** .05
Trust Loss
Extent of Interpersonal .00 .06 .05 .05 .06 .05 .06 .05
Trust Loss
Main Effects
Initial Nature of .46*** .09 .46*** .09 .47*** .09
Interorganizational
Relationshipa
Initial Nature of Interpersonal .06 .10 .07 .10 .06 .10
Trust Relationshipa
Repair Process (Penance)b 2.05*** .11 2.06*** .11 2.06*** .11
Repair Process (Regulation)c 1.13*** .11 1.14*** .11 1.14*** .11
Interaction Effect
Initial Nature of .15 .18 .15 .18
Interorganizational
Relationship 9 Initial Nature
of Interpersonal Relationship
Initial Nature of
Interorganizational
Relationship 9 Repair
Process Interaction
Initial Nature of .11 .21
Interorganizational
Relationship 9 Repair
Process (Penance)
Initial Nature of .08 .22
Interorganizational
Relationship 9 Repair
Process (Regulation)
F 6.18*** 62.14*** 54.43*** 43.44***
R2 .03 .42 .42 .42
Adjusted R2 .03 .42 .41 .41
N = 605; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
a
Adversarial was coded as 0, and collaborative was coded as 1.
b
No apology was coded as 0 (baseline), penance was coded as 1, and regulation was coded as 0.
c
No apology was coded as 0 (baseline), penance was coded as 0, and regulation was coded as 1.

DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS relationship resilience from prebreach of trust to

This study uses SET and investigates psychological postrepair, we find that both collaborative and adver-
contract breaches that lead the buying firm to trigger sarial interorganizational relationships suffer from an
unexpected negative events for the supplier. Using a unexpected negative event in terms of interorganiza-
holistic approach that investigates buyer–supplier tional trust loss and that the effect is stronger for

October 2018 73
 Journal of Supply Chain Management

FIGURE 4
Interorganizational Trust Repair (for Different Types of the Interpersonal Relationship and Different Types of
Repair Processes)

Penance: Interorganizational Trust Repair Regulation: Interorganizational Trust Repair

2.50 2.50

2.00 2.00
Collaborative Collaborative
1.50 Interpersonal 1.50 Interpersonal
Relationship Relationship
1.00 Adversarial 1.00 Adversarial
Interpersonal Interpersonal
Relationship Relationship
0.50 0.50
Collaborative Adversarial Collaborative Adversarial
Interorganizational Interorganizational Interorganizational Interorganizational
Relationship Relationship Relationship Relationship

Interorganizational Trust Repair

2.50

2.00

1.50
Penance
1.00 Regulation

0.50
Collaborative Adversarial
Interorganizational Interorganizational
Relationship Relationship

collaborative than adversarial interorganizational rela-
tionships. In terms of interorganizational trust repair,
we find opposite results of those hypothesized:
interorganizational trust repair was stronger for ini-
tially adversarial and lower for initially collaborative
interorganizational relationships. While the effect on
interorganizational trust loss confirms our expectation
and is in line with SET predictions, the effect on
interorganizational trust repair is rather surprising.
According to SET, firms assess the economic and/or
social outcomes from their exchanges and compare
them with their initial expectations (Dwyer, Schurr &
Oh, 1987). As collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships are built on a general expectation of future
interaction and confidence in achieving an equitable
split of exchange outcomes over time, the supplier’s
motivation to restore interorganizational trust is
expected to be higher than in adversarial interorgani-
zational relationships (Williamson, 2008).
An explanation for this finding, however, could be
that breaching the social obligations toward the sup-
plier alters the nature of an interorganizational rela-
tionship from collaborative to adversarial
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). The supplier may
thus regard the negative event as a failure to recipro-
cate previously provided exchange benefits and
respond by treating the interorganizational relation-
ship as more of an economic/transactional exchange
(Blau, 1968). Previous literature provides some sup-
port for this argument, in that violating relational psy-
chological contracts may have the effect of nullifying
relational obligations and thus change the very nature
of the social relationship (Robinson et al., 1994).
Breaching the supplier’s high expectations of receiving
exchange benefits may thus prevent favorable reciproc-
ity behaviors from emerging and undermine its inten-
tion to restore interorganizational trust accordingly.
Another surprising finding is that adversarial interor-
ganizational relationships recovered from the negative
event, such that the interorganizational trust level
postrepair exceeded the initial/prebreach interorgani-
zational trust level, at least when the repair process
was financial in nature. Thus, when taking the interor-
ganizational trust loss and repair scenarios as discrete
events, our results suggest that a buying firm’s breach
of its transactional obligations does not lead to a

74 Volume 54, Number 4

 Toward Relationship Resilience

TABLE 5
Summary of Outcomes for the Hypotheses Tested

Hypotheses Hypotheses Statement Outcomes

H1a An unexpected negative event leads to interorganizational Supported**
trust loss in collaborative interorganizational relationships.
H1b An unexpected negative event leads to interorganizational Supported**
trust loss in adversarial interorganizational relationships.
H1c An unexpected negative event leads to greater Supported**
interorganizational trust loss in collaborative
interorganizational relationships than in adversarial
interorganizational relationships.
H2a Collaborative interpersonal relationships lead to Supported**
weaker interorganizational trust loss in collaborative
interorganizational relationships than in adversarial
interorganizational relationships.
H2b Adversarial interpersonal relationships lead to stronger Supported**
interorganizational trust loss in collaborative
interorganizational relationships than in adversarial
interorganizational relationships.
H3a Initially collaborative relationships recover from an Supported***
NPD disruption in terms of interorganizational trust repair.
H3b Initially adversarial relationships recover from an Supported***
NPD disruption in terms of interorganizational trust repair.
H3c Initially collaborative interorganizational relationships Not supported
recover to a greater extent from an NPD disruption
than initially adversarial interorganizational relationships
in terms of interorganizational trust repair.
H4a Regulation is more effective than penance at repairing Not supported
trust in initially collaborative interorganizational
buyer-supplier relationships than in initially adversarial
interorganizational relationships.
H4b Penance is more effective than regulation at repairing Not supported
in initially adversarial interorganizational buyer-supplier
relationships than in initially collaborative
interorganizational relationships.
H5a Collaborative interpersonal relationships lead to Not supported
weaker interorganizational trust repair in collaborative
interorganizational relationships than in adversarial
interorganizational relationships following the
buying organization’s repair process.
H5b Adversarial interpersonal relationships lead to stronger Not supported
interorganizational trust repair in collaborative
interorganizational relationships than in adversarial
interorganizational relationships following the
buying organization’s repair process.
**p < .01; ***p < .001.

strong decrease in interorganizational trust. However,
in terms of interorganizational trust repair, our results
suggest that a buying firm’s use of penance as a sub-
stantive response triggers high motivation on the sup-
plier’s side to engage in future exchanges with its
counterpart. A buying firm’s skill in effectively
responding to a negative event may thus even con-
tribute to the development of interorganizational trust
by motivating the supplier to reciprocate accordingly
(Lambe et al., 2001). The psychology literature con-
ceptualizes such a development as the thriving phase
(Hu et al., 2015; Solinger, Hofmans, Bal & Jansen,

October 2018 75
 Journal of Supply Chain Management
2016). Similar findings in the services marketing liter-
ature also confirm the existence of a so-called recovery
paradox, in which a customer’s postfailure satisfaction
exceeds the prefailure satisfaction (McCullough, 2000).
Unfavorable events can thus even strengthen relation-
ships when they are successfully managed (H€ ubner,
Wagner & Kurpjuweit, 2018; Tax & Brown, 1998).
Next, our results provide evidence for a significant
interaction between the nature of the interorganiza-
tional relationship and the nature of the interpersonal
relationship, showing that the effect on interorganiza-
tional trust loss is weaker for collaborative and stron-
ger for adversarial interpersonal relationships.
However, this interaction was not significant for
interorganizational trust repair. Our results therefore
suggest that an effective mitigation of interorganiza-
tional trust loss in collaborative interorganizational
relationships can be achieved only under conditions
of strong social-psychological bonds between individ-
uals. Emotional investments, expressions of genuine
care and concern for the counterpart’s welfare, and a
general belief that these sentiments will be recipro-
cated are thus effective means in collaborative interor-
ganizational relationships (McAllister, 1995).
These results further corroborate previous statements
made in the extant negotiations literature (e.g.,
Lewicki & Stevenson, 1997), confirming the expecta-
tion that collaborative interpersonal relationships are
conducive to the development of mutually beneficial
outcomes; however, we find this to be the case only
under conditions of collaborative interorganizational
relationships. Our results therefore lend support to
the notion that interorganizational and interpersonal
relationships operate quite differently in relational
exchanges, so failing to account for the role of inter-
personal relationships limits understanding of how
unexpected events affect relational outcomes at the
interorganizational level (Zaheer et al., 1998). More-
over, the results indicate that collaborative interpersonal
relationships may even help interorganizational rela-
tionships become resilient against similar negative
events in the future. Investments in interpersonal ties
may thus enable supply chain partners to jointly
develop the ability to anticipate and overcome similar
unexpected negative events in the future, and allow
the interorganizational relationship to recover.
Next, the results show that both penance and regula-
tion facilitate buyer–supplier relationship resilience by
positively affecting interorganizational trust repair and
that the effect is stronger for penance than for regula-
tion. These findings are in line with SET predictions,
suggesting that the provision of exchange benefits
resulting from the buyer’s substantive response likely
creates favorable expectations of future interactions and
induces the supplier to reciprocate accordingly (Nyaga
et al., 2013; Pulles et al., 2014). Penance and
76 Volume 54, Number 4
regulation are thus effective means for correcting the
subjective inequity in the exchange relationship and,
ultimately, rebuilding interorganizational trust (Robin-
son et al., 1994). However, contrary to our expecta-
tions rooted in SET that buying organizations best use
regulation to repair initially collaborative interorganiza-
tional relationships and penance to recoup trust in ini-
tially adversarial interorganizational relationships, our
results provide no evidence for an interaction between
the nature of the interorganizational relationship and
the repair processes. Instead, a post hoc analysis reveals
that regulation was generally less effective than penance
at repairing interorganizational trust, regardless of the
initial nature of the interorganizational relationship.
These results therefore suggest that interorganizational
trust repair is most effective when providing benefits
that focus on restoring equity in the economic
exchange, regardless of the initial nature of the interor-
ganizational relationship (Lambe et al., 2001).
At first glance the lack of significant results might
seem counterintuitive, particularly in view of prior
research findings highlighting the effectiveness of social
rewards at rebuilding trust (e.g., Dirks et al., 2011).
However, we argue that regulation may potentially
encourage suppliers to overcome their concerns with
the (mid- to long-term) predictability of the buying
firm’s actions, but fail to provide the (short-term) bene-
fits necessary for them to strongly rebuild interorganiza-
tional trust (see Desmet, de Cremer & van Dijk, 2011).
As such, regulation may only be effective under condi-
tions of truly long-term buyer–supplier relationships,
which suppliers may consider difficult to achieve within
the scope of a joint NPD project. Suppliers might be
constrained to strongly rebuild interorganizational trust
following a social repair process when involved in pro-
jects with restricted time horizons and high levels of
risk and uncertainty (Leifer et al., 2000). This finding
therefore represents an important boundary condition
(Busse, Kach & Wagner, 2016) for the use of social
repair processes when working to rebuild interorganiza-
tional trust in an innovation-related (NPD) context.
Another plausible explanation could be that
penance reflects a purely buyer-induced repair process
that is presumably awarded to the supplier, while reg-
ulation requires the joint effort of the buying firm
and the supplier, and thus only reflects a proposition
to implement relational policies. As such, although
previous findings in the conflict literature suggest that
successful repair processes demand “the efforts of
both the offending and offended parties, since both
play a critical role in maintaining the expressive
order” (Ren & Gray, 2009; p. 107), we suggest that
positive relational developments are more likely when
the repair process constitutes an effort that is actually
awarded rather than just proposed. Furthermore, we
argue that regulation may contrast with a sales
 Toward Relationship Resilience
manager’s incentive scheme being usually based on
creating short-term economic rather than long-term
relational benefits (John & Weitz, 1989). Thus,
although regulation may offer signals for long-term
trusting behavior and the fulfillment of social obliga-
tions going forward (Dirks et al., 2011), the repair
process may still fail to induce sales managers to
appreciate such benefits (Murphy, 2004).
Theoretical Contributions
Our study offers several contributions to theory.
First, we examine suppliers’ responses to unexpected
negative events occurring in joint NPD projects and
emanating from a buyer’s psychological contract
breaches. As such, our study advances understanding
of the role of the buying organization’s relational
positioning toward the supplier in the wake of such
an event. In doing so, our findings shed more light
on the effects of psychological contract breaches on
the supplier’s interorganizational trust toward the
buyer. Our results indicate that collaborative interorga-
nizational relationships suffer more from a negative
event and then recover less than adversarial interorga-
nizational relationships. Accounting for the nature of
the interorganizational relationship is thus critical
when assessing the effect of unexpected negative
events on relational outcomes.
Second, by adapting SET predictions to both the inter-
personal and interorganizational levels of analysis
(Makadok, Burton & Barney, 2018), our study highlights
the role of interpersonal relationships in affecting buyer–
supplier relationship resilience, operationalized as
interorganizational trust loss and repair. Specifically, it
responds to Carter, Meschnig and Kaufmann’s (2015)
call for multilevel SCM research, and sheds light on how
interpersonal relationships affect the way suppliers eval-
uate such buyer-induced events and approach subse-
quent recovery efforts. Our results suggest that
collaborative interpersonal relationships mitigate the
effect of the initial nature of the interorganizational rela-
tionship on interorganizational trust loss in collabora-
tive interorganizational relationships; conversely,
adversarial interpersonal relationships exacerbate the
effect on interorganizational trust loss. Our results fur-
ther suggest that collaborative interpersonal relation-
ships are ineffective at mitigating interorganizational
trust repair. Collaborative interpersonal relationships are
thus critical to buyer–supplier relationship resilience in
two ways: they mitigate interorganizational trust loss in
collaborative interorganizational relationships and do
not hamper, and can even facilitate, the recovery process.
As such, our results contribute to the understanding of
buyer–supplier relationship resilience by highlighting
the criticality for firms to effectively manage their inter-
personal relationships in the face of unexpected negative
events occurring at the interorganizational level.
October 2018
Finally, our results shed light on the effectiveness of
social and psychological approaches to interorganiza-
tional trust repair. By testing two types of repair pro-
cesses, penance, and regulation, we provide insights
into how buying firms can effectively recover the neg-
ative relational perceptions stemming from the nega-
tive event and, in doing so, regain the supplier’s
interorganizational trust. Our results suggest that
penance is generally most effective at repairing
interorganizational trust, regardless of the initial nat-
ure of the interorganizational relationship; the use of
penance even helps the recovery from an initially
adversarial interorganizational relationship to a
postrepair interorganizational trust level that exceeded
the prebreach interorganizational trust level. These
results therefore contribute to the use of relational
governance mechanisms in buyer–supplier relational
exchanges by showing which substantive responses
can be the most effective for recovery.
Managerial Contributions
Our study holds several implications for supply man-
agers. First, we generate insights into the effectiveness of
repair processes following an unexpected negative event.
Our results suggest that when the buying firm breaches a
psychological contract, supply managers should consider
offering monetary compensation when trying to rebuild
damaged trust at the interorganizational level and, ulti-
mately, generate successful project outcomes. This pre-
scription holds regardless of the initial nature of the
interorganizational relationship. Offering the supplier
economic benefits seem to be a necessary response to
repair damaged trust. Second, our results highlight the
criticality of interpersonal relationships, showing that
collaborative interpersonal ties mitigate interorganiza-
tional trust loss in collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships. Managers must therefore realize that having a
collaborative personal relationship with their counter-
parts (usually sales managers; Kaufmann, Rottenburger,
Carter & Schlereth, 2018) can generate substantial resili-
ence benefits for collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships when suffering from an unexpected negative
event; conversely, adversarial interpersonal relationships
can incur additional relational costs. Investments in col-
laborative interpersonal ties thus seem to function as a
protective mechanism at the organizational level. One
implication of this finding is that the frequent practice of
job rotation (Ortega, 2001) may have detrimental effects
on trust repair.
Last, the findings suggest that unexpected events can
be an opportunity for the buying firm to strengthen
relational ties with suppliers with which the relation-
ship has so far not been collaborative. Managers
should therefore understand that effectively handling
such events may even change an interorganizational
relationship from adversarial to collaborative and thus
77
 Journal of Supply Chain Management
contribute to the development of buyer–supplier rela-
tionship resilience. However, given the heterogeneity
inherent to supply managers’ behaviors and the strong
variability in negative events that might occur during
buyer–supplier exchanges, the consideration of failures
as opportunities to build trust among partners is
likely to be extremely risky for organizations (Smith &
Bolton, 1998). We therefore suggest that organizations
focus on doing it right the first time, given that poor
handling of such events may even lead to a stronger
decrease in interorganizational trust, thus producing a
double deviation effect (Bitner, Booms & Tetreault,
1990; Maxham & Netemeyer, 2002).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The findings should be viewed in light of the study’s
limitations, which in turn provide avenues for future
research. This study focused on examining the role of
interpersonal and interorganizational trust in buyer–
supplier relationship resilience. Extant SCM literature
has often used other factors such as commitment,
information sharing, relational norms, and conflict res-
olution to assess supply chain partners’ relational atti-
tudes toward each other (Kim & Choi, 2015). Future
research could thus rely on these factors to assess the
effect of unexpected negative events on collaborative
and adversarial buyer–supplier relationships.
Prior research also indicates that the power-depen-
dence structure (Brito & Miguel, 2017; Chae, Choi &
Hur, 2017; Huo, Flynn & Zhao, 2017; Reimann &
Ketchen, 2017) may affect relationships at both the
interpersonal and interorganizational levels. Future
research could thus address the interaction between
power and trust or dependence and trust at multiple
levels of analysis. In our study, we assumed a bal-
anced distribution of power, stating that terminating
the relationship with the buying firm could take some
effort but would not necessarily affect the supplier’s
operations. Research could also examine differences in
the severity of unexpected negative events emanating
from a buying organization’s psychological contract
breach. Whereas our study considered a rather severe
breach event, future research could examine differ-
ences in severity with respect to their effect on trust
damage and repair (e.g., Eckerd et al., 2013).
Future research might also investigate additional
means by which to strengthen buyer–supplier relation-
ship resilience. Organizations might jointly develop
potential scenarios and corresponding contingency
plans, address the need for relationship resilience
through joint training, and build resilience into con-
tracts through contingency clauses.
There are some limitations to our data. Although
the use of vignette studies is consistent with similar
studies in the buyer–supplier relationship context and
78 Volume 54, Number 4
is a valid approach to examine SCM phenomena
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2011), we acknowledge the
limitations in presenting a restricted number of repair
processes to the participants. Future research could
therefore explore which repair processes, preferably
with an exclusive focus on economic repair processes,
may fulfill the supplier’s reward expectations most
effectively. Extant literature provides an extensive list
of feasible types of financial rewards, within both an
intraorganizational (e.g., Gupta, Raj & Wilemon,
1986; Sarin & Mahajan, 2001) and interorganizational
(e.g., Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009) context.
Another limitation of our data is that participants
provided their answers right after having read the sce-
nario, thus putting them within the immediate reach
of the negative event. Their answers may thus be
potentially biased, as participants may fail to appro-
priately recognize the relational benefits that regula-
tory repair processes likely provide long-term (Dwyer
et al., 1987). Social repair processes require an
extended time horizon, suggesting that equity is usu-
ally calibrated over a series of exchanges (Dirks et al.,
2009). Future research, using, for example, process
studies, could therefore provide additional insights
into the effectiveness of relational repair processes by
testing their impact on relational outcomes over an
extended period (e.g., throughout different phases of
an ongoing NPD project).
Finally, similar to prior research on service recovery
(e.g., Maxham & Netemeyer, 2002), we suggest that
future research examines the impact of experiencing
multiple negative events over the course of a joint
NPD project. Our study only considered a single event
and subsequent recovery effort, so it remains largely
unclear how multiple unexpected negative events and
subsequent recovery efforts of the buying firm would
affect buyer–supplier relationship resilience.
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Lutz Kaufmann (Ph.D., University of Giessen) is a
professor of supply chain management at WHU—Otto
Beisheim School of Management in Vallendar/Dues-
seldorf, Germany. His research focuses on supply
management and B2B negotiations. He is a member
of the editorial review boards of several journals, a
member of the editorial advisory boards of the Journal
of Purchasing & Supply Management and the Interna-
tional Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Manage-
ment, and he serves as the European Regional Editor
of the Journal of Supply Chain Management. His work
has appeared in numerous journals, including the
Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Business Logistics,
 Toward Relationship Resilience
Journal of Operations Management, International Journal
of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Journal
of International Marketing, Journal of Supply Chain
Management, and Journal of Purchasing & Supply
Management. Lutz Kaufmann may be contacted at:
kaufmann@whu.edu
Jens Esslinger (Ph.D., WHU—Otto Beisheim School
of Management) is a Researcher at WHU—Otto
Beisheim School of Management in Vallendar/Duessel-
dorf, Germany. His research interests include B2B nego-
tiations, supply chain disruptions, and the impact of
psychological contracts on buyer–supplier relationships.
Jens Esslinger may be contacted at: jens.esslinger@
whu.edu
Craig R. Carter (Ph.D., Arizona State University) is
a professor of supply chain management and Dean’s
Council of 100 Distinguished Scholar in the W.P.
Carey School of Business at Arizona State University.
His primary research stream focuses on sustainable
supply chain management. A second, more recent area
of research examines behavioral, decision-making phe-
nomena within supply management contexts. A third
research focus considers and analyzes the status and
evolution of research in the supply chain management
discipline, and provides guidance and thought leader-
ship regarding future research directions in the disci-
pline. Dr. Carter’s research has appeared in the
leading supply chain management journals, including
the Journal of Supply Chain Management, Journal of Busi-
ness Logistics, and Decision Sciences Journal. He serves
as an Advising Editor for the Journal of Supply Chain
Management and as an Associate Editor for the Journal
of Business Logistics, Journal of Operations Management
and Decision Sciences Journal.
APPENDIX A
VIGNETTE: SCENARIO AND
MANIPULATIONS
Participants received one of 12 experimental condi-
tions based on a combination of three of the follow-
ing scenarios:
Scenario (Introduction)
You are Sam Morris, a member of the central sales
department at SPLR. SPLR is a medium-sized com-
pany that supplies technical components to the elec-
tronics industry. The company operates in a highly
competitive market and puts a strong focus on
developing innovative products. As a sales manager
at SPLR, your task is to manage customer
October 2018
relationships. Currently, you are facing the following
situation: SPLR and one of its business customers,
BYR, have initiated an innovation project to jointly
develop a new hard disc drive (HDD). If successful,
the new product would have a large impact on both
BYR’s and SPLR’s profits; an efficient and effective
execution of this innovation project is therefore
important.
At the moment, the innovation project is at the end
of the Business/Technical Assessment stage. You have
already provided BYR with the requested assessment
of the new HDD and agreed with your counterpart,
Pat Hill, central purchasing manager at BYR, that BYR
will provide you with the signed documents today.
These are intended to approve the Product Concept
Development stage and enable SPLR to continue with
the innovation project.
Scenario (collaborative interorganizational
relationship/adversarial interorganizational
relationship)
SPLR has been working with BYR before. During
this time, you have developed a close business relation-
ship/maintained an arms-length business relationship that
is largely governed by mutual norms of exchange rather
than by formal contracts/formal contracts rather than by
mutually agreed upon exchange norms. Both of you value
the social nature of your relationship/your relationship is
purely transactional in nature with reasonably strong/
rather weak relational ties and a high degree of/relatively
little cooperation. SPLR is keen to continue this relation-
ship in order to be able to do business with BYR in the
future and hence receive long-term financial and nonfinan-
cial benefits from the exchange/SPLR is generally uncertain
about the continuity of the relationship beyond this innova-
tion project and therefore focuses exclusively on receiving
financial benefits from the exchange—without developing
any long-term reciprocal expectations from and obligations
toward BYR.. Overall, you wouldn’t say that you are
too dependent on BYR. Should any major problems
arise, SPLR is generally able to replace BYR and
execute this and future similar innovation projects
with a different partner. Terminating the relationship
with this buying company could take some effort,
but would not necessarily hurt your company’s
operations.
Scenario (collaborative interpersonal
relationship/adversarial interpersonal
relationship)
You have been working with Pat ever since you
started to interact with BYR. During this time, Pat
has practically always been a cooperative
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partner/counterpart/barely ever been a cooperative part-
ner/counterpart. Pat is generally willing/typically not will-
ing to exchange information on a regular basis with
you or to assist you in case you have any problems.
As such, both of you treat each other in a highly
respectful manner/rather disrespectful manner and usu-
ally/rarely take the other’s welfare into consideration
when making important decisions. You are confident/
not always confident about Pat’s honesty and are there-
fore very motivated/not motivated to maintain this rela-
tionship on a personal level, even/particularly if it
takes you some effort.
Scenario—Continued (project delay)
Yesterday at 8 p.m., you noticed that BYR did not
meet today’s deadline of your joint innovation pro-
ject. Your R&D department informed you that BYR
did not sign off on the necessary documents to
approve the finalized technical specifications you
determined over the past months. As a result, you
cannot proceed with the development of the new
HDD. Today, on October 25, 2017, at 11:30 a.m.,
you and your colleagues at SPLR observed that you
have not received any notification from BYR. You
do not know the reason and whether BYR will
approve the next stage of the project soon, although
you know that the project will eventually move for-
ward. Furthermore, you do not know whether BYR
will provide you with a justification for the delay
and whether the company will offer you any sup-
port to make up for this unexpected negative event.
Although the delay does not constitute a breach of
BYR’s formal contractual obligations toward SPLR—
given the very risky nature of joint innovation pro-
jects, formal contracts usually do not account for
such unexpected events—the event severely disrupts
your company’s project schedule. You cannot pro-
ceed with the product concept development without
having the final approval for the technical specifica-
tions from BYR and know that any delay would be
expensive for SPLR. Your company already invested
significant amounts into new machinery and will
therefore run into cash flow problems if you are
not able to generate sales from the new product
soon.
84 Volume 54, Number 4
Scenario (substantive response/general
introduction that all participants received)
During a brief telephone conference at 2 p.m. on Octo-
ber 25, 2017, Pat explained the situation by stating: “I
am contacting you to inform you that the innovation
project suffered from some setbacks. At the moment, we
are not able to sign off on the contract with the technical
specifications for the new HDD and therefore cannot
approve the product concept development stage. The
reason is that there have been significant miscalculations
made by our accounting department. The total project
costs have been estimated too low, which now have a
severe impact on the overall profitability of the entire
innovation project. As such, we are currently not able to
approve the next stage of the product development pro-
cess before we receive a final decision from our Chief
Purchasing Officer (CPO). We hope to find a solution
for this issue very soon.
(penance)
Anyway, although we are not contractually obligated to
take any action, we would like to make up for this inconve-
nience. Therefore, we would like to compensate you. We
will also cover any additional costs that you may incur as a
result. Also, if there is any other way I can make up for
the delay, please let me know.”
(regulation)
Anyway, although we are not contractually obligated to
take any action, we would like to make up for this inconve-
nience. Therefore, we would like to invite you to join our
strategic supplier council. It will provide you with better
transparency of the processes at BYR in the future. The
other companies that compose the Council have found
membership to be quite valuable. Membership, for exam-
ple, includes monthly conference calls where we discuss the
latest market trends and how we can jointly leverage our
innovation capabilities. We are doing this as a signal of
respect to show you that our business relationship is of
utmost importance to us. Also, if there is any other way I
can make up for the delay, please let me know.”
(no repair process/implicit acknowledgement control)
At the moment, we are not able to fulfill scheduled tar-
gets. However, we are aware of this issue and hopefully
will resolve it as soon as possible. Regarding the delay, I
assume this should not be an issue for you. With your
excellent team and problem-solving skills, we are sure that
you will find a good solution for this issue.”
 Toward Relationship Resilience

APPENDIX B
CONSTRUCT ITEMS AND RELIABILITY

SFL (N = 605)
Interorganizational Trust (adapted from Morgan and Hunt (1994); prebreach: a = .97; postbreach/
prerepair: a = .97; postrepair: a = .97; AVE = .87)
This buying company treats my company, SPLR, fairly and justly. .91
This buying company has high integrity. .94
This buying company can be counted on to do what is right. .96
This buying company is sincere in its promises. .95
This buying company is an organization my company, SPLR, trusts completely. .89
Interpersonal Trust (adapted from Morgan and Hunt (1994); prebreach: a = .99; postbreach/prerepair:
.99; postrepair: .97; AVE = .95)
Jan treats me fairly and justly. .97
Jan has high integrity. .98
Jan can be counted on to do what is right. .98
Jan is sincere about promises. .98
Jan is a person I trust completely. .96
SFL = standardized factor loadings (AMOS); a = Cronbach’s alpha.
Measures of overall model fit: v2/d.f. = 4.16; RMSEA = .072; GFI = .96; AGFI = .93; NFI = .99; CFI = .99; TLI = .99.

October 2018 85