ORGANlZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DEClSlON PROCESSES #, 436-453 (1989)

Cognitive Style and Decision Making

RAYMOND G. HUNT,FRANK J. KRZYSTOFIAK,JAMES R. MEINDL, AND
ABDALLA M. YOUSRY
State University of New York at Buffalo

In order to test hypotheses on relations between decision making and indi-

viduals’ cognitive styles, a standardized decision task was simulated according
to a specific multiphase model of decision process. It portrayed a scenario in
which different pairs of advisors of contrasting cognitive styles (analytic-
intuitive) proposed strategies to a manager for handling payoffs in international
business dealings. Subjects, whose cognitive styles were previously measured,
were asked to choose one advisor’s proposals in each of three meetings cor-
responding to different phases of the decision process. ANOVA demonstrated
a congruence of subjects’ (decision-makers’) cognitive style (analytic-
intuitive) and preferred strategy over phases of the decision process. These
results substantiated both the hypothesized dependence of decision process on
decision-maker personality and the model used to specify the decision pro-
cess. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc.

Empirical work on decision making has been normative and dominated

by rationalist perspectives (Abelson & Levi, 1985). The “decisions” com-
monly studied are the ones Simon (1976) called “programmed” and Keen
and Scott Morton (1978) call “structured.” They are decisions for which
notions of process are essentially irrelevant (March, 1981), meaning that
such decisions imply an immediate mechanical connection of behavioral
outcomes with environmental conditions. In so reflexive an S-R model,
analyses of any process of decision making can add little to one’s ability
to predict human action.
Most observers doubtless agree, however, that structured decisions
hardly exhaust the varieties of human choice. Many, probably most, hu-
man decisions are more judgmental than mechanical. Process is distinctly
relevant to them. Indeed, it may well be as Dery (1983) says, that people
do not “normally face a choice situation, but events that call for evalu-

This paper is based on a dissertation submitted by Abdalla M. Yousry in partial fulfiiment

of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, SUNY at Buffalo. We are
grateful for the comments of several readers of drafts of this paper, especially John B. Miner
and an anonymous reviewer. The authors are listed alphabetically, with no indication of
seniority of authorship. Yousry now is at Bowie State University. Requests for reprints
should be sent to Raymond G. Hunt, Department of Organization and Human Resources,
School of Management, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260.
436
0749-5978189 $3.00
Copyright 0 1989 by Academic Press, Inc.
Au rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 437

ation and interpretation” (p. 322). If this is true, then arguably the key
questions in decision analysis have less to do with mechanics of choice
than with “thinking practices” (Weick, 1979).
The essential theoretical argument here is that “decision” is a short-
hand way of speaking about something that is quite complex and not
directly observable, i.e., “cognitive and symbolic processes by which
actors . . . build and communicate models of their ‘realities,’ apply them
to ‘cases,’ and use them to organize action” (Hunt, in press). It is these
complexities we are talking about when we speak somewhat vaguely of
“decision processes.” Their analysis requires a shift of focus from
choice, per se to the ways human actors interact with and interpret their
situations.
Hammond (1981) has commented that it is hard to find research that
deals with intersections of decision makers and environments. Abelson
and Levi’s (1985) recent review, for example, recognizes a potential for
decision-maker effects on decision processes, but reports virtually noth-
ing substantive in the matter. Cognitive style, for instance, is mentioned
in one brief paragraph, and that is effectively the only recognition of
personality.
Taylor’s (1984) recent book includes a section on the role of psycho-
logical characteristics in decision making, which mentions attitudes and
styles, and Taylor observes that “interests, personality, and motivations
of decision makers . . . exert a major influence on idiosyncratic decision-
making behaviors (e.g., amount of information sought and processing
rate)” (p. 101). Mostly, however, discussion of the decision-maker vari-
able is conceptual and normative not empirical or descriptive, Moreover,
as the examples mentioned in the quotation from Taylor suggest, refer-
ence in these discussions commonly is to input or outcome aspects of
decision making rather than to process.
A similar orientation can be seen in Bass’ (1983) text on organizational
decision making. He treats the individual as a “constraint” on these
phenomena and talks about the role of personality, competence, and
styles, among other things, but again, emphasis is on what is done (e.g.,
willingness to make difficult choices) or with what effects (e.g., postde-
cision confidence), rather than on how it is done.

Cognitive Style

The present study examines relations between decision-maker charac-

teristics, specifically cognitive style, and decision processes ( or, more
exactly, predecision processes) and strategies. A concentration on cog-
nitive style follows from the immediacy of its connection with the
“thinking practices” central to our understanding of decision processes.
438 HUNT ET AL.

And it allows us to build upon the efforts of a number of others who have
considered the effects of cognitive style on decision making (see Robey &
Taggart, 1981). The stylistic notion has been traced to the concept of field
dependence and considerations of the impact of such a dimension on
problem solving and decision making:

Field independence is the ability to separate an object or phenomenon from its

environment. Individuals showing high field independence were thought to prefer
problem solving approaches which emphasized detail and basic relationships. The
field dependent person shows less ability (or perhaps less inclination) to separate
objects from their environment. Field dependent individuals would prefer more
global, perhaps intuitive, approaches to problem solving. (Henderson & Nutt,
1980, p. 372)

A related set of categories contrast “Analytic” and “Intuitive” indi-

viduals. The analytic individual is seen as concentrating on detail and thus
as breaking that which is observed into component parts. In contrast the
intuitive individual comprehends the field as an integrated whole. Such
consistent differences in individuals’ perception and assimilation of infor-
mation amount to “styles” of thinking which define how a person comes
to grips with complex problems, both in terms of conscious strategies and
unconscious habits.
A number of studies have considered stylistic impact on managerial
decision making (Robey & Taggart, 1981). In the past decade this work
has often recognized the possibility of stylistic differences on a number of
dimensions which impact decision making. McKenney and Keen (1974)
acknowledged both an information-gathering and an information-
evaluation dimension of style. The information-gathering dimension dif-
ferentiates receptive, data-sensitive (i.e., analytic) individuals from per-
ceptive data-filtering (i.e., intuitive) individuals. The information-
evaluation dimension differentiates systematic, structured decision
makers (i.e., analytic) from holistic, trial and error (i.e., intuitive) prob-
lem solvers. Combination of the two dimensions results in four cognitive
styles: systematic-perceptives, systematic-receptives, intuitive-
perceptives, and intuitive-receptives.
Based on a Jungian scheme Mitroff (1983) utilized a similar classifica-
tion scheme which recognized that individuals differ in the way that they
acquire information and in the methods that they use to process data. The
information-acquisition dimension differentiates individuals who are sen-
sation-oriented (S) from those who are intuition-oriented (I). The sensa-
tion-oriented information acquirer prefers structured problems which in-
volve routine and detail while the intuitive prefers unstructured problems.
The information-evaluation dimension differentiates those individuals
who adopt a thinking (T) approach when evaluating information from
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 439

those who adopt a feeling (F) approach. Again these dimensions are seen
as being independent and thus, combine to produce four basic composite
styles: Sensation-Thinking (ST), Sensation-Feeling (SF), Intuition-
Thinking (NT), and Intuition-Feeling (NF). Each individual is thought to
be predominately of one type.
The research reported here concentrated on sharply contrasting
“Analytics” and “Intuitives.” Analytics are people who, for example,
when gathering information tend to be attentive to detail whereas Intu-
itives focus on patterns; and when evaluating information, analytics de-
tine the quality of a solution largely in terms of the method whereas
Intuitives defend a solution in terms of “fit” (Keen, 1973).
There are three reasons for adopting a categorization scheme that nar-
rows the number of “styles” from four to two. First, it has not been
uncommon for studies to find effects on only one of the stylistic dimen-
sions. Behling, Gifford, & Tolliver (1980) found intuitives to be more risk
prone than sensers in a betting situation. Henderson and Nutt (1980)
found that Sensation-Thinking (ST) styles were associated with a greater
degree of risk aversion than were Sensation-Feeling (SF) styles. Second,
Keen (1973) provided evidence that the dimensions of cognitive style are
not empirically independent. Systematic subjects were more likely to be
thinking information evaluators and intuitives were more likely to be
feeling. Thus, the majority of individuals would be classified as consis-
tently analytic or consistently intuitive in both information evaluation and
information gathering. Finally, the behavioral implications of a style
which mixes analytic information gathering with intuitive information
evaluation or vice versa are not clear. Recognizing, however, that such
mixtures are empirically likely prompts us to add a “mixed-in-type” cat-
egory to the two “purer” analytic and intuitive ones, and to expect that
such individuals will sometimes prefer analytic and sometimes intuitive
decision strategies.
The structure of decision making. A simple schematic model of deci-
sion making (see Fig. 1) would conceive of it in terms of three interacting
components, namely, the decision maker, the task, and the decision con-
text or situation. These components are assumed to influence both the
decision process and eventual decision outcomes.
To illustrate: a decision maker (DM) may be viewed as a stable per-
sonality bringing to a task certain beliefs, predispositions, skills, experi-
ences, and a distinctive cognitive style, all of which sum-up to describe
the DM’s personality. Meanwhile, a focal decision task (DT) is a
“demand” property of an actor’s environment that serves to orient at-
tention. It would be describable in terms of its structure and content.
Finally, the decision situation (DS) refers to ecological or contextual fac-
tors or conditions, both conceptual and circumstantial, in which both the
 HUNT ET AL.

Decision
Tosk(DT)

Decision Decision Decision

Maker(DM) ProcesdDP) Outcome (DO)
4

1I
Decision
Situation(DS)

FIG. 1. A model of decision making.

decision maker and task are embedded, such as time pressure and deci-
sion importance, for instance.
Decision process (DP) is a complex variable. The term signifies an
array of implicit (cognitive) “strategies” and explicit behavioral “events”
distributed over several “stages” preliminary to and culminating in re-
sponse selection. Finally, decision outcomes (DO) encompass postdeci-
sion performance output, i.e., a “product,” action, including ex post
evaluation of output from the decision process, and by implication, sat-
isfaction with the process as well as its outcomes (Naylor, Pritchard, &
Ilgen, 1980).
This study focuses specifically on relationships between decision mak-
ers’ (DM) characteristics (cognitive style) and the decision process (DP),
given an ill-defined decision task (DT) of considerable importance (DS).
Postdecision output (DO) is not broached by the study.
Research hypotheses. The major hypothesis in the study posits a con-
gruence of cognitive style (DM) with decision strategy (DP) which would
be evident over the various stages in the decision process. Thus:
Hl. Respondents will tend to prefer decision strategies or courses of action that
correspond to their particular styles. Therefore, expressed or preferred decision
strategies (DP) will vary as a function of the decision maker’s cognitive style (DM).

METHOD’
Specification of the decision-maker variable (cognitive style). Opera-
tionalization of cognitive style as the DM variable in this research was
effected via the short form of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI),
a standardized instrument designed to measure bivariate forms of two

’ More detailed information on data collection and analysis methods can be found in
Yousry (1986).
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 441

stylistic dimensions (Myers, 1962). Each question on the instrument rep-

resents one dimension: information-gathering through sensing or intuit-
ing, or information-evaluation through thinking or feeling. Respondents
choose from statements and adjectives that describe their usual feelings,
actions, and preferences. An individual’s style is defined as a difference
in response scores between questions indicating different styles. For in-
stance, if a subject’s total scores are higher for “sensing” than for
“intuition” on the information-gathering dimension, the subject would be
viewed as tending to be sensing (i.e., analytic). If a subject’s total scores
are higher for “thinking” than for “feeling” on the information-
evaluation dimension, the subject would be viewed as tending to be think-
ing (i.e., analytic). Subjects who were analytic on both information gath-
ering and evaluation were placed in the analytic category. Conversely,
subjects who were intuitive on both dimensions were placed in the intu-
itive category. Finally, subjects who were intuitive on one dimension and
analytic on the other were considered to be mixed-in-type.
Specification of the decision process. Operationalization of the deci-
sion process (DP) for this study was required (1) to express clearly and
consistently two contrasting decision strategies expressive of distinctive
cognitive styles, and (2) to assure that such expression was done within
the framework of a detailed theory-based simulation of the overall deci-
sion process. Bahl and Hunt (1984) have presented a framework for com-
parative analyses of decision making in complex organizations that was
used here. This model served, in effect, as both a definition of “decision
process” and as a template for designing a specific simulation of that
process. The model is divided into three descriptive segments: (1) Event
Analysis (i.e., specification of the activity-actor-location nexus of deci-
sion), (2) Participant Analysis (the characteristics of a decision’s roster of
actors), and (3) Decision Content Analysis. The last of these is of interest
here as a specification of “decision process.” Therefore, a moderately
detailed summary of it follows.
The Bahl-Hunt model divides decision making into four distinct fea-
tures: (1) a definition of the situation in the form of a cognitive “model” ;
(2) a set of alternatives; (3) the selection of a choice; and (4) an overt
action. Each of these is assumed to be, in some degree, susceptible of
influence by characteristics of a DM. Our interest is in the first three of
them.
The model further divides decision making into three “periods”: pre-
decision, decision, and postdecision (implementation). As shown in Fig.
2, the “Decision Period” begins with a “Presentation of Choice,” which
is an outcome of a prior “evocation” process. The initial Presentation of
Choice is linked with decision, per se, via certain “Processes of Choice”
(e.g., “Redefinition” and “Selection”). The model treats Presentation of
 442 HUNT ET AL.

Pre-Decision Post Decision

Decision Period
Period Period

FIG. 2. Flow-chart summary of Bahl-Hunt decision-making model.

Choice, Redefinition, and Selection as distinct “stages” of a Decision

Period.
Attention here focuses on decision processes that are preliminary to
actual selection (decision); that is to say, on (a) the definition of the
situation in the form of a “Presentation of Choice,” and (b) on the im-
mediate sequelae of this in the decision period, specifically the “Pro-
cesses of Choice.”
The Bahl-Hunt model includes a detailed coding scheme for represent-
ing an array of categories descriptive of the decision process. It divides
these categories into “facets,” which are rubrics and major constructs of
decision making and its contexts (e.g., the various terms in Fig. 2), and
“variables” which are specific measurements of the facets (e.g., indica-
tors of the form and content of the “Presentation of Choice”).
The simulated decision process for this study concentrated on facets of
the Decision Period that are preliminary to actual choice. It therefore
included predecisional facets of the Bahl-Hunt model respecting the Pre-
sentation of Choice, Redefinition of the initial Presentation, and Selec-
tion.
As will be described more fully below, a scenario was constructed on
the skeleton of the multistage Bahl-Hunt model in the form of dialogue
between actors representing contrasting cognitive styles. The “units” of
the dialogue consisted of paired statements of problem-solving strategy
representing contrasting analytic or intuitive versions of the same several
facets of the Bahl-Hunt model (see Table 1). Subjects were required to
choose the actor they agreed with, thereby revealing their own strategic
preferences.
The decision task. The decision process thus simulated was in the form
of a fictional case encompassing three stages of decision defined in ac-
cordance with Bahl and Hunt’s model (i.e., presentation of choice, re-
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF DECISION PROCESS SIMULATION
Stage A: Initial presentation of choice to decision maker
Characteristics of
Facet analytic style (Joe)
Form/method Reactive, oriented to the
present, status quo (e.g.,
‘I . . we should establish clear
financial policies consistent
with both the U.S. and other
countries’ laws . . .”
Organizational Top management, line authority
locus/
responsibility
Linkages: Confined internally to financial
extensity, policies and controls
intensity
Substance Operations/tactics, short-run
policies
Range of Procedural, technical,
sources of economic (limits of discretion,
constraint on cost-benefit aspects)
choice
Stage B: Assessments/redefinitions
Characteristics of
Facet analytic style (Bill)
Planning Setting early specific objectives
organized in means-ends
fashion; goal-directed, rigidly
followed formal plan or
method (e.g., “. . . tighten our
financial controls . . .
cost-benefit analysis . .
specify objectives and
constraints . . formal method
or plan . .“)
Searching Conduct orderly sequential
search for relevant information
detailed within narrow
specified topics
Reviewing/ Break analysis into discrete
Analyzing and steps, conscious of where any
Processing of step fits within overall plan
Information and complete steps
sequentially extracting direct
implications
MAKING 443
(SEE TEXT)
Characteristics of
intuitive style (Bob)
Proactive, adaptive, futuristic
(e.g., “. . . we should go
beyond these technical
measures to devise new
methods and creative
approaches . .“)
Delegative, participative
Extensive internally and
externally, open to
environment
Both long-run and short-run
strategic policies
Strategical, geared to
socio-political environment
and interpersonal
considerations
of presentation of choice
Characteristics of
intuitive style (Frank)
Flexible, liberal, allow for
frequent definitions or changes
keeping “big picture” in mind
(e.g., “. develop a
long-range plan to deal with
situations as they arise . .
executive and outside
specialist meetings . . assure
cross-flow of ideas .
explore need for .
legislative changes”)
Sensitive to cues, bring to bear
concepts and expectations to
screen and filter data within
broad topics; aggregate data
Consider interrelations, pattern
among steps, relating each to
overall situation and mindful
of overall implications and
together fitness, hence liable
to jump from one step to
another
 HUNT ET AL.

TABLE I-Continued
Evaluating and Apply normative standards Use a variety of socio-political
control or bearing on cost-benefit and economic standards,
management analyses within rigid and explorative, consultative,
of activities regulated internal controls and external control oriented,
centralization; cooptative to negotiatory as to
inharmonious environmental environmental pressures
interests
Stage C: Selection processes
Characteristics of Characteristics of
Facet analytic style (Tom) intuitive style (Mike)
Structure of Vary in mutual distinctiveness, Vary in differentiation,
alternatives originating inside organization, originating outside
conventional, emphasize organization, creative,
specificity of resolution (e.g., brain-stormly and unfamiliarly
“ . . . keep the alternatives identified; emphasize
distinct . . . evaluate them generality of resolution (e.g.,
one-by-one . .“) IL. . . be a little loose about
the options . . examine their
pros and cons in
compensatory relation . . .
widen our pool of
choices . .“)
Criteria for Explicit, specific, selective so Versatile, proliferated so that
evaluating that solution quality is solution quality is justified in
alternatives defended in terms of method terms of tit, i.e., solution
followed through meshes with the various
constraints and elements
discovered as one proceeds
with continuous reappraisal
“Mechanism” Essentially cognitive, deliberate; Intuitive, implicit; socially
of selection socially narrowed to accommodative to others’
among beliefs, preferences, and
alternatives interests

definition, selection). Derived from a case by Nehemkis (1977) found in

Steiner and Miner, the scenario revolved around a controversial question
of “payoffs” by American companies overseas and their associated legal,
ethical, cultural, and financial implications. In the case, top management,
concerned about possible damage to the company’s image and the impact
of these transactions on its profit and financial situation, was reviewing
the matter for policy determination. This case was chosen, first, because
its strategic content was low in “structure,” i.e., ambiguous and complex
(Keen & Scott Morton, 1978), and therefore gave freedom for the expres-
sion of individuals’ personal predilections. Second, because it also was
interesting, the case seemed likely to hold subjects’ attention and to be
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 445

taken seriously. The scenario was designed as a sequence of three sepa-

rate meetings between a single manager and different pairs of advisors.
Each meeting corresponded to one stage of Bahl and Hunt’s decision
model (i.e., presentation of choice, redefinition, or selection). The advi-
sors were called upon to give their opinions on a policy for dealing with
the payoff issue. Advisors’ statements were written in couplets so as to
express consistently two contrasting cognitive styles (analytic and intu-
itive) across a succession of Bahl-Hunt within-stage decision facets.
To illustrate: Bahl and Hunt (1984) identify five descriptive facets of the
“presentation of choice,” one of which is “form/method.” They code
this facet as either “reactive” or “proactive.” So, in constructing a sim-
ulation based on these facets, and taking into account the properties of
MBTI stylistic “types,” analytic advisors’ statements were phrased to
reflect a reactive, present-oriented posture (e.g., “we should establish
clear financial policies consistent with both the U.S. and other countries’
laws and regulations”). Intuitive advisors’ statements were assigned an
adaptive, future-oriented, proactive attitude (e.g., “. . . we should go
beyond these technical measures to devise new methods and creative
approaches . . . “>. Corresponding couplets were prepared for each facet
within the three Bahl-Hunt decision stages.
Table 1 summarizes the structure of the simulation, by stage, of the
Bahl-Hunt model. The facets of each stage are listed in the left-hand
column. The remaining columns correspond to the binary code categories
for each facet as mapped onto the two MBTI types, which are indicated
by the column headings. The translation of the codes into dialogue for the
simulation is illustrated in the table. Complete coded scripts are available
from the first author.
Subjects in the simulation were asked to “identify with” the manager
decision maker and, at the end of each meeting, to express a preference
for one of the alternative courses of action advocated by the two advisors
present for that meeting (one an analytic and the other an intuitive deci-
sion strategy). Thus, the structure of the simulation allowed substantial
latitude for the expression of subjects’ individual cognitive style prefer-
ences and a means of observing indications of them in the form of the
style-relative strategic choices.
Experimental Design and Procedures
Overview. The design for testing the research hypotheses of congru-
ence of style with decision strategy throughout the decision process was
basically an analysis of variance model with three levels of the indepen-
dent or DM variable (analytic, mixed-type, and intuitive). The dependent
variable, of course, was the decision process (DP), or, more exactly the
frequency with which the subjects expressed a preference for one or
446 HUNT ET AL.

another advisor’s decision strategy. The simulated decision process used

a single decision task and situation, as described above, thus holding
these two variables constant across subjects.
General procedures: Pretesting the simulated decision process. As a
validity check, a pretest was done on whether the two stylistic themes
expressed in the scenario dialogue were actually perceived by subjects in
ways consistent with those intentions. For this purpose, a questionnaire
was designed consisting of two sets of 5-point semantic differential rating
scales. One set included style-related adjectives (e.g., open-closed), and
the other contained “control” adjectives (e.g., effectiveineffective) that
bore on ethical bias, social desirability, and other effects that could have
been confounded with style.
Fifty-three management students comparable to those expected to par-
ticipate in the main experiment were given an instrument containing the
scenario and rating scales and asked to rate each one of the pair of advi-
sors according to their (the subjects’) perceptions of the advisors’ ap-
proaches to the issues discussed in the “minutes” of the meetings. The
same rating scales were used following each of the three meetings de-
scribed in the scenario.
Results ofpretest. Ifresponses to stylistic adjectives showed significant
and appropriate differences in subjects’ perceptions of the advisors, and
no differences for the neutral-to-style or “control” adjectives, then it
could be concluded that the scenario dialogue for the experimental sim-
ulation was working as intended, i.e., was expressing reasonably “pure”
stylistic contrast. Separate scores from rating the six advisors on adjec-
tives, both stylistic and neutral-to-style, over all subjects, were generated
to test mean differences between each pair of advisors on each adjective.
A t test was performed on the means for each pair of advisors (over all
subjects regardless of style) on each adjective (see Tables 2 and 3). Sig-
nificant differences between the means among advisors were found on 8
of 10 stylistic adjectives. Evaluation of “effectiveness,” a neutral-to style
item, resulted in no significant difference for the first pair of advisors, a
significant difference for the second pair (.005), and a marginally signiti-
cant difference for the third pair (.028). “Analytic” advisors were viewed
as somewhat more “effective” in their approaches. Ratings on a third pair
of advisors on the adjective “ethical-unethical” showed that the intuitive
advisor was judged highly unethical by most subjects. To eliminate pos-
sible confounding with stylistic biases or preferences, the wording of the
case script for the third meeting was changed to make the intuitive advisor
sound more ethical, and to balance the dialogue within the couplet so that
the analytic advisor would not seem comparatively more ethical. Results
for all pairs of advisors on “clear-unclear” indicated no significant dif-
ferences .
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 447

TABLE 2
MEAN RATINGS OF ANALYTIC AND INTUITIVE ADVISORY ON STYLISTIC CHARACTERISTICS
-
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Characteristic Analytic Intuitive Analytic Intuitive Analytic Intuitive
Proactive-
reactive 3.51 2.92+ 3.66 2.74* 3.68 2.55***
Open-closed 3.89 I .74*** 3.28 2.06** 3.68 2.13***
Quantitative-
qualitative 3.87 2.11*** 3.81 2.51*** 3.75 2.34***
General-
specific 3.72 2.38*** 3.83 2.30*** 4.26 1.64***
Narrow-broad 3.83 1.96*** 3.77 1.81*** 4.04 1.81***
Flexible-
inflexible 4.06 2.26*** 3.40 2.38*** 4.00 2.2s***
Cautious-
venturesome 4.30 1.96*** 3.57 2.53*** 3.68 2.2a***
Complex-simple 3.38 2.53*** 2.94 2.58 n.s. 3.21 2.49*
Deliberate-
impulsive 4.11 2.42*** 3.89 2.74*** 3.66 2.74*
Emotional-
2.74 2.34 ns. 3.04 2.55 n.s. 2.51 2.40 n.s.
____-
*p < .05.
** p < .Ol.
***p < .ool.

Subject style determination. In order to determine the cognitive style of

individual subjects, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (M-B) was admin-
istered to 143 subjects in a classroom setting in advance of the experi-
ment. Students were asked to write their names or the maiden names of
their mothers on the questionnaire, in order for them to be identified by
their styles for further analysis. The experiment was presented as a reg-

TABLE 3
t TEST BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND INTUITIVE ADVISORS ON NONSTYLISTIC ADJECTIVES

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Characteristic Analytic Intuitive Analytic Intuitive Analytic Intuitive
Effective-
ineffective 3.40 3.28 n.s. 3.81 3.42** 3.70 3.36*
Clear-unclear 4.34 3.83 ns. 3.79 3.34 n.s. 3.98 3.49 n.s.
Ethical-
unethical 3.83 3.53 n.s. 3.87 3.81 n.s. 3.98 3.30***

* p < .os.
**p < .Ol.
*** p < ,001.
448 HUNT ET AL.

ular class-related assignment, but students were told that their participa-
tion was voluntary and they could leave without adverse consequences.
All students remained in class and all produced usable responses.
Response scoring. The Myers-Briggs scoring procedures were modi-
fied to generate a breakdown of subject styles into three categories: An-
alytics, Intuitives, and those Mixed-in-Type. Traditional M-B scoring
differentiates between two dimensions of style (information gathering and
information evaluation) which produce four stylistic categories: sensing
vs intuition (the two approaches to information gathering) and thinking vs
feeling (the two approaches to information evaluation). Within this frame-
work if an individual expressed a preference for a sensing mode of infor-
mation gathering and a thinking mode of information evaluation the indi-
vidual was classified as an analytic. Conversely if an individual expressed
a preference for an intuitive mode of information gathering and a feeling
mode of information evaluation the individual was classified as an intu-
itive. Finally, if the subject was not consistent across the two dimensions
of information processing, he/she was classified as mixed-in-type. Ana-
lytics accounted for 41.4% of the total sample, intuitives for 28.9%, and
mixed-in-type for the remaining 29.7%.

The Experiment

Experimental materials. The experimental instrument consisted of a

four-part package:
(1) general instructions on its purpose and substance;
(2) a description of the events and the situation involved in the case;
followed by,
(3) specific instructions about the nature and structure of the instru-
ment; and
(4) a narrative case consisting of the “minutes” of three separate meet-
ings (representing stages of the decision process) between the head of a
company and three different pairs of advisors. These minutes incorpo-
rated the advisors’ cognitive style-specific point and counterpoint argu-
ments. The minutes of each meeting were followed by two elements:
(a) A summary by the company’s head of the discussion in the pre-
ceding meeting. This briefly restated the positions taken by each advisor
in order to help the subjects focus on their essential contrast.
(b) The summary was followed by detailed procedural directions to
the subjects. Each was asked to adopt the role (put himself in the position)
of the company’s head, confronted with the problem basic to the case,
and listening to the advice and arguments of his advisors as set forth in the
narratives (minutes) of the meetings. At each of the meetings, the subject
was instructed to choose an approach or course(s) of action he thought
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 449

best for the company to follow, based on the arguments of the advisors
and his/her own perception of the problem. This choice was indicated by
circling the name of the advisor who advocated that particular course of
action preferred by the subject. This was done on a simple binary (forced-
choice) scale anchored by the first names of the two advisors (given in
Table 1).
Subjects. The population from which the experimental sample was
drawn consisted of three sections of an undergraduate introductory orga-
nizational behavior course enrolling four sections totaling 210 junior and
senior students. One section (N = 55) was used for pretesting. In the
other three, 128 students (94% of enrollment) were present and partici-
pated in the experiment. They ranged in age from 19-25, and two-thirds
were male.
The experimental procedure. The instrument described above was ad-
ministered in single sessions separately to each of the three classes. Fol-
lowing its completion, subjects were debriefed as to the nature of the
experiment, and questions were answered.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

As regards the hypothesis of congruence (H.l) of personality or deci-
sion-maker cognitive style and strategy preference over phases of the
decision process, Table 4 shows that 46% of intuitive subjects chose
intuitive advisors at all stages of the decision process, another 35% of
intuitive subjects chose a combination of analytic and intuitive advisors,
and 1% of intuitive subjects chose analytic advisors at all stages of the
decision process. In contrast, 57% of analytic subjects chose analytic
advisors at all stages of the decision process, another 30% of analytic

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY FOR CHOICE OF ADVISOR BY SUBJECTS COGNITIVE STYLE

Subjects cognitive style

Choice of advisor Intuitive Mixed Analytic Total
_
Intuitive advisor selected at
every stage of the decision process 45.95% 36.84% 13.21% 29.69%
Mixed: both intuitive and analytic
selected during the decision process 35.14% 36.84% 30.19% 33.59%
Analytic advisor selected at
every stage of the decision process 18.92% 26.32% 56.60% 36.72%
Total (n) 37 38 53 128

Chi-Sq. df Signif.
19.15 4 0.001
450 HUNT ET AL.

subjects chose a combination of analytical and intuitive advisors, and

only 13% of analytic subjects chose intuitive advisors at all stages of the
decision process. Finally, the mixed-in-type subjects chose purely ana-
lytic almost as frequently as they chose purely intuitive advisors. All of
this is in keeping with the congruence hypothesis.
Analysis of variance with repeated measures. An analyses of variance
was computed on the subjects’ choice of advisors over the three stagesin
the decision process. This analysis assessedthe relationship between the
three style categories (analytic, intuitive, and mixed-in-type) and the fre-
quency with which subjects selected or supported analytic advisors over
three stages of the simulated decision process. As hypothesized, style
showed a strong main effect @ < .OOl) on decision strategies. Intuitives
supported an average of 1.00 analytic and 2.00 intuitive advisors. Mixed-
in-type subjects selected an average of 1.29 analytic advisors and 1.71
intuitive advisors. Analytic subjects selected 2.11 analytic advisors and
0.89 intuitive advisors. The results are summarized in Table je2
Summary and Conclusion
This study was done in order to examine relations between decision-
makers’ characteristics and the predecisional processes by which deci-
sion tasks/problems are defined and management strategies selected. It
was hypothesized that these strategies are a function of the decision-
makers’ personality, specifically in this study, the decision-maker’s
“thinking practices” or cognitive style. The basic objective of the re-
search, therefore, was to test a fundamental hypothesis about the con-
gruence of a decision-maker’s cognitive style and strategy preferences
over the phases of a decision process.
A standardized decision task was simulated in the form of a case de-
signed in accord with a specific model of decision processes. In it, dif-
ferent pairs of specialists, differing in style, gave advice to a company’s
head about how to handle a strategic issue confronting the firm. Subjects
were asked to choose one from each pair of advisors, in each of three

TABLE 5
ANALYSISOFVARIANCEOFTHENUMBEROFANALYTICADVISORS SELECTED
Source of variation Sum Sq. df MSq. F Signif.
Cognitive style 30.58 2 15.29 11.17 .ooo
Residual 171.14 125 1.37
Total 201.72 127 1.59

’ Parametric and nonparametric analyses produced virtually identical results.

 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 451

consecutive meetings, representing stages of the decision process. It was

expected that a subject having a particular style would choose advisors
(i.e., strategies/courses of action) expressive of the same style.
Analysis performed on the data generated by the experiment generally
confirmed the hypothesis of congruency of cognitive style and decision
strategy. Other recent studies have also shown differential effects of cog-
nitive style on aspects of decision making. Kotteman and Remus (in
press), for example, found that style affected decision-maker behavior
during learning, although not actual performance; and Volonino (1987)
reports finding a relationship between the sensing-intuition variable and
decision quality (but no effect of thinking-feeling). Thus, the results here
generally substantiate both the basic theoretical argument on the depen-
dence of decision processes upon decision-makers’ characteristics and
the basic predecisional model that was used to specify the decision pro-
cess.
Several factors may limit the generalizability of these conclusions. One
of them has to do with the case used in the experiment and the design of
the simulated dialogue. Obviously, the case sampled only a limited range
of decision tasks and situations. While this was a deliberate control device
here, it nevertheless can be seen as a threat to the experiment’s external
validity.
More importantly, perhaps, it may be asked whether or not the
“dependent” decision process variable here is not simply another mea-
sure of cognitive style. Indeed, behavioral choice items are often used to
indicate individual differences. The problem here is a common one of
course in any investigation requiring indirect measurements, as of phe-
nomena such as “decision process.” There are several things to be said
on the point, however, as it bears on this study. One is that the manifest
content of the MBTI, used to indicate subjects’ cognitive styles, and the
simulated decision process used here to obtain indications of their pre-
ferred decision strategies were very different. We would not, for instance,
counsel using our case as a substitute for the MBTI. Nor were the results
of the study so robust as to suggest redundancy. They were, however,
strong enough to lend credibility to the idea of looking further at the
effect, possibly by asking subjects to describe how they frame problems
and then using this information to describe their “evoked strategies” of
choice.
At any rate, the experiment was a clear, if necessarily indirect, dem-
onstration of a relationship between decision-maker attributes and deci-
sion processes, and a kind of validation of the MBTI as well. Further, the
conceptual model (Bahl-Hunt) on which the study was based proved
serviceable as a means of structuring research on the subject. Additional
studies, in the field and laboratory, can reasonably seek to explore this
452 HUNT ET AL.

model in more detail both in direct observation of decision-maker behav-

ior and experimental analyses of interactions of particular decision-maker
characteristics with specific tasks and situations. In addition, more de-
tailed theoretical development of relations between selected individual
differences variables and decision processes would help research in this
field move beyond the mainly demonstrational.

REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P., & Levi, A. (1985). Decision making and decision theory. In G. Lindzey 62
E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., pp. 231-309). New
York: Random House.
Bahl, H. C., & Hunt, R. G. (1984). A framework for systems analysis for decision support
systems. Information and Managemenr, 7, 121-131.
Bass, B. M. (1983). Organizational decision making. Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Behling, O., Gifford, W. E., dz Tolliver, J. M. (1980). Effects of grouping information on
decision making under risk. Decision Sciences, 11, 272-283.
Dery, D. (1983). Decision making, problem-solving and organizational learning. Omega, 11,
321-328.
Hammond, K. R. (1981). Principles of organization in intuitive and analytical cognition
(Report No. 231). University of Colorado, Center for Research on Judgment and Policy,
February.
Henderson, J. C., & Nutt, P. C. (1980). The influence of decision style on decision-making
behavior. Management Science, 26, 371-386.
Hunt, R. G. (in press). On the Metaphysics of choice, or when decisions aren’t. In R. L.
Cardy, S. M. Puffer, & J. M. Newman (Eds.), Information processing and decision
making in organizations. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Keen, P. G. W. (1973). The implications of cognitive style for individual decision making.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Business
Administration.
Keen, P. G. W., & Scott Morton, M. (1978). Decision support systems: An organization
perspective. Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley.
Kotteman, J., & Remus, W. (in press). When and how cognitive style impacts decision
making. Management Science.
March, J. G. (1981). Decision-making perspective: Decisions in organizations and theories
of choice. In A. H. Van de Ven & W. J. Joyce (Eds.), Perspectives on organizational
design and behavior (pp. 205-244). New York: Wiley.
McKenny, J., & Keen, P. (1974). How managers’ minds work. Harvard Business Review,
52,7%90.
Mitroff, I. I. (1983). Archetypal social systems analysis: On the deeper structure of human
systems. Academy of Management Review, 8, 387-397.
Myers, I. (1962). The Myers-Briggs type indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists
Press.
Naylor, J. C., Pritchard, R. D., 62 Ilgen, D. L. (1980). A theory of behavior in organiza-
tions. New York: Academic Press.
Nehemkis, P. (1977). Business payoffs abroad: Rhetoric and reality. In G. A. Steiner &
J. B. Miner (Eds.), Management policy and strategy: Text, readings and cases (pp.
801-824). New York: MacMillan.
Robey, D., 62 Taggart, W. (1981). Measuring managers’ minds: The assessment of style in
human information processing. Academy of Management Review, 6, 375-383.
 COGNITIVE STYLE AND DECISION MAKING 453

Simon, H. A. (1976). Administrative behavior (3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan.

Taylor, R. N. (1984). Behavioral decision making. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Volonino, L. (1987). An empirical investigation of the impacts of information load on
decision quality and decision confidence in multi-criteria decision making. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, School of Management, State University of New York at Buffalo.
Weick, K. (1979). Cognitive processes in organizations. In Barry M. Staw (Ed.), Research
in organizational behavior (Vol. 1, pp. 41-74). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Yousry, A. M. (1986). An experimental study of cognitive style on individual decision mak-
ing processes. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of Management, State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo.
RECEIVED: October 22, 1987