ukcsts014_iss1

Best Practice QRA UKCS-TS-014
Contents
Authorisation for Issue

Amendment Record
Amendment Summary
Distribution List
Preface
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Section 1 Methods and Models – BP Best Practice

Section 2 Areas for Comparison
Section 3 Index System for QRA Technical

Alignment Information
Section 4 BP Contacts/Custodians
Section 5 Information Input Forms
Addendum 1 References
Addendum 2 HSQ Controlled Documents

Addendum 3 Safety Engineering Guidance Documents
November 2001 Issue 1 i/ii

Authorisation for Issue
Issue Authority
Name: Jon Turnbull
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

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Technical Authority
Name: David Aberdeen
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG
November 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

Amendment Record
For Audit Use

Amendment Incorporated By
Checked
Number
Name Signature Date Signature Date
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AMOSAF.171
November 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Amendment Summary
Issue No Date Description

Issue 1 November 2001 First issue.
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November 2001 Issue 1 vii/viii

Distribution List
Holders of Controlled Hard Copy
Copy Copyholder Location
01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen
Virtual Copyholders
Copy Copyholder
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01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

02 Document Technical Authority (David Aberdeen)
03 EoS Document Controller (David Taylor)
04 EoS Operations Excellence HSE Consultant (David Egan)
05 OIM, Magnus
06 OIM, North West Hutton
07 OIM, Thistle
08 NWH/Thistle HSE Adviser
09 BSG SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Malcolm)
10 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Faulkner)
11 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Thompson)
12 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Carl Thomessen)
13 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Justin Haigh)
14 CNS SMS Co-ordinator (Jim Blacklaws)
15 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (David Robertson)
16 NBU EPU SMS Co-ordinator (David Egan)
17 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (John Beaumont)
18 NSI SMS Co-ordinator (Ann Rosbrook)
19 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Malcolm Watson)
20 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Simon Robinson)
21 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Bruce Morrison)
November 2001 Issue 1 ix/x

Preface
Document Status
The document is reasonably up to date although only exists in draft form.
This document is intended to provide a basis for maintaining some standardisation in the
methods and models used in the Quantified Risk Assessments (QRAs).
QRAs provide the risk data which is quoted in Safety Cases and is used as a basis for assessing
compliance with Risk Acceptability Criteria.
The main areas needing revision include:
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• Use of OIR/12 data for predicting release frequencies

• Use of same for predicting ignition frequencies
• Gas dispersion and explosion modelling
• Fire modelling
• Updating references and data sources
• Harmonisation with Amoco procedures
• Ongoing research data
Discussions are currently in progress with QRA consultants on the use of the OIR/12 data for
release frequencies and ignition probabilities.
The results of Phase 3b of the Explosion Joint Industry Project are currently being processed
and it is anticipated that these results can also be incorporated into the document in 2002.
Review and Update

This document will be subject to 12-monthly review and update, when document holders will
have the opportunity to express opinions and suggest improvements.
However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document.
As such, any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an
Amendment Proposal proforma which is available electronically on the UK Upstream SMS
website, from the Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor or from the Technical Authority.
All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.
November 2001 Issue 1 xi

UKCS-TS-014 Best Practice QRA
Responsibility of Copyholders
It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to
maintain the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly
incorporated and acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant
Technical Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (UKCS-DCM-001).
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xii November 2001 Issue 1

List of Abbreviations
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

BA Breathing Apparatus
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Vapour Expansion
BOP Blowout Preventer
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
DNV Det Norske Veritas
E&P Exploration and Production
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EER Evacuation, Escape and Rescue

ESD Emergency Shutdown
F&G Fire and Gas
HAZID Hazard Identification Study
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HP/HT High Pressure/High Temperature
HSQ Health, Safety and Quality
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IRA Individual Risks per Annum
JIP Joint Industry Project
LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas
MHSW Management of Health and Safety at Work
NRV Non-return Valves
OIR Offshore Incident Report
OREDA Offshore Reliability Data
PFP Passive Fire Protection
PLL Potential Loss of Life
QRA Quality Risk Assessment
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
TR Temporary Refuge
UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
November 2001 Issue 1 xiii/xiv

Section 1
Methods and Models – BP Best Practice
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 1
1.1 QRA Technical Alignment – Areas for Comparison 1
1.2 BP Input 2
1.3 Internal Contacts and BP/External Consulting Support 2
1.4 HSQ Controlled Documents 2
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1.5 Safety Engineering Guidelines 2

November 2001 Issue 1 1-i/ii
1 Introduction
During 1993 a consistency review of Safety Case Quality Risk Assessments (QRAs), and
a ‘formal safety assessment’ lessons learned workshop were conducted. These
activities highlighted a number of areas where improvements could be made and led to
the development of a QRA strategy. This strategy addressed three main areas:
• Procurement
• Technical
• Communications
In 1994 a qualification exercise for QRA and other related services was undertaken,
leading to a significantly reduced supplier base.
A QRA Technical Alignment Programme has been set up to improve the consistency and
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comparability of the risk assessment work carried out for BP.

This document contains an overview of what BP would currently consider to be best
practice. Additional work is being carried out to compile similar information from two of
the currently pre-qualified QRA consultants, DNV Technical and WS Atkins. BP will then
be in a position to review whether, and where, there are significant differences, enabling
them to decide where they need to clarify, document and enforce their preference.
For completeness, a list of controlled documents and safety engineering guidelines are
also included as they set out the overall framework within which a BP QRA study is
undertaken and establish a preferred approach in some areas.
1.1 QRA Technical Alignment – Areas for Comparison

The first stage of the exercise was to create a list of all the areas within a QRA model
which would be included in the review and comparison. Although it is recognised that
the overall QRA framework also has a significant impact on the QRA results there has
been no attempt to address that issue as part of this exercise.
The list of QRA areas was compiled by starting with the main headings and then splitting
them down to more detailed levels. A copy of the list is given in Section 2. The input
forms are generally filled in at Level 4 although there are a few which have been
completed at a level higher.
A numbered index list was made from the list of QRA areas which assigned numbers to
each area of the QRA being reviewed. A copy of that list is given in Section 3.

November 2001 Issue 1 1-1
1.2 BP Input
Items underlined in Section 3 indicate where a form has been completed by XEU.
Section 5 contains the completed input forms.
Although a summary of the BP ‘rule set’ is included in each case, there is much more
background detail available in some cases. A reference list is given in Addendum 1.
Copies of all these references are stored in HSQ.
1.3 Internal Contacts and BP/External Consulting Support

BP has identified internal contacts for the various QRA areas.
In some areas specialist support is available from Group Resource and Engineering
based in Sunbury.
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In other areas certain external consultants are considered to be market leaders.
A list identifying the contacts is given in Section 4.
1.4 HSQ Controlled Documents

The overall approach to safety management is set out in BP Exploration Europe HSE
Management System (HSQ 10.02.05 rev 1).
Addendum 2 contains a list of HSQ Controlled Documents. These include a number
which are relevant to the application of QRA within the company, for example Risk
Acceptability Criteria and XEU Statement of Policy.
1.5 Safety Engineering Guidelines

The input forms address, at a fairly detailed level, the data, models etc used in QRA.
In some areas a guideline has been produced on the overall approach. These are listed in
Addendum 3.

1-2 November 2001 Issue 1
Section 2
Areas for Comparison
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November 2001 Issue 1 2-i/ii
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Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (Input Forms) Comments/Aspects to be Included

Hazard Identification Hazard ID Describe all tools used. Include HAZOP, HAZID, checklists, safety reviews,
full generic hazard list if used accident/incident analysis etc
Best Practice QRA
Consequence and Frequency

Modelling, Initial Event
November 2001 Issue 1

Containment Failure (Process Source Term Blowout Outflow rate Exploration, appraisal, development,
Hydrocarbons) Modelling workover, shallow gas, HP/HT
Outflow location/orientation
Frequency
Risers Hole size/outflow rate Solid, flexible
Location/orientation
Frequency
Pipelines Hole size/outflow rate Solid, flexible, depth, protection
Frequency
Process Sectionalisation into inventories Handling of control and non-return valves
Handling of elevation effects
Hole size/outflow rate Pre-ESD
(all hydrocarbon fluids; oil, gas,
condensate, LPGs, two-phase flow
steady and time varying)
Post-ESD
ESD initiation/reliability/vulnerability
Blowdown initiation/reliability/vulnerability
Flare header failure?
Boil-off, heat input, evaporation
Figure 2.1 QRA ‘Best Practice’ – Areas for Comparison

Frequency Equipment count
Database
UKCSTS014_001.ai
UKCS-TS-014
2-1
2-2
Containment Failure,(Process Gas Dispersion Open Field Initial dilution
Hydrocarbons) (cont d) Modelling
Jet dispersion
UKCS-TS-014
Heavy gas dispersion

Passive gas dispersion
Module Initial dilution

Ventilation rate estimation HVAC, natural ventilation
Mixing model Balloon/stirred tank/plug
Gas cloud size/empirical modelling
CFD analysis
Wind tunnel
Gas ingress into non-hazardous
areas
Liquid Drainage Pool size and location Overflow to other areas or to the sea: impact
Modelling of deluge
Toxic Gas Dispersion Open Field Toxic gas dispersion/effects

Module Toxic gas dispersion/effects
Ignition Modelling Open Field Ignition probability
Fire/explosion split
Module Ignition probability
Fire/explosion split
Fire Modelling Open Field Flash fire
Jet fire Flame length/shape/extension/burn rate and
radiation
Structural response, PFP effect

Equipment response, PFP effect
Feedback into hole size selection?
Deluge/foam effect
Pool fire Flame length/shape/burn rate and radiation
Figure 2.1 QRA ‘Best Practice’ – Areas for Comparison (cont’d)

Equipment response, PFP effect
Liquid spray fire Deluge/foam effect
UKCSTS014.002
Best Practice QRA

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,
Containment Failure,(Process Fire Modelling
, Open Field (cont d) Sea pool fire Flame length/shape/burn rate and radiation
Hydrocarbons) (cont d) (cont d)

Module Flash fire
Jet fire Flame length/shape/burn rate and radiation
Best Practice QRA
Structural Response, PFP effect

Equipment Response, PFP effect

Deluge/foam effect
Pool fire Flame length/shape/burn rate and radiation
Structural Response, PFP effect
Equipment Response, PFP effect
Deluge/foam effect
Liquid spray fire
Smoke Modelling Source Term Quantities of toxic components Difference between external and internal etc
Definition
Dispersion
Ingress into non-hazardous areas Control Room, TR, etc
Explosion Modelling Maximum overpressure
Overpressure distribution How is ignition location, ignition delay,
concentration, cloud size, etc taken into
account?
Structural damage
Equipment damage
External explosion
Explosion mitigation measures
Containment Failure (Others) Utilities Fuel gas
Diesel fuel
Aviation fuel

Methanol
Glycol
Water injection
Compressed air
UKCSTS014_003.ai
UKCS-TS-014
2-3
2-4
Containment Failure (Others) Other Hazardous Chemicals
Materials
Radioactive substances
Explosives
UKCS-TS-014
Other Hazards Impacts Helicopter and aircraft

Dropped objects On/off Installation, Installation/drilling cranes
Ship collisions

Missiles
Natural Occurrences Earthquake
Subsidence
Scour
Severe storm
Structural Failure Structural failure Corrosion/fatigue,
vent/flare/derrick/crane/jacket
SIMOPS Approach All associated risks

Miscellaneous Accommodation fires
Non-ignition of flare
Flare carryover
Scaffold collapse
Escalation Escalation Modelling How is escalation handled To cover all aspects of escalation
How are events grouped into
escalation categories
Time effects
Structural collapse modelling
Additional inventory involvement BLEVE
Effect of Installation safety systems ESD, blowdown, firewater etc
Impairment Modelling Temporary Refuge Definitions Structural
Smoke
Decomposition
Systems
Smoke and gas ingress modelling

Structural damage/collapse
Approach
Calculation of TR impairment Avoid double counting
UKCSTS014_004.ai
Best Practice QRA

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Best Practice QRA

Impairment Estimation EER Definitions Radiation/flame
Structural

Smoke
Approach Benefit of breathing set, water curtains etc
Availability of alternatives, helicopters,
lifeboats, tertiary means
How combined with TR impairment

Emergency Systems Definition for each system
Approach
Fatalities Local fatalities Initial event, all types Percentage of fatalities, personnel distribution
Effect of F&G detection/alarm systems
Escalation fatalities Fatalities during escape to TR
TR impairment fatalities Smoke/fumes/collapse etc
Evacuation fatalities
Escape to sea fatalities
Rescue fatalities
Effect of mitigation measures Fire protection. BA sets, sealed TR
Other Travel risks
Occupational risk Whether and how worker groups
are differentiated
Summations Calculation of PLL

Calculation of overall IRPA
F-N results
Asset Damage Modelling Asset protection Calculation of asset damage

Lost revenue
UKCSTS014_005.ai
UKCS-TS-014
2-5/6
Section 3
Index System for QRA
Technical Alignment Information
Note: First draft of BP input is included as Section 5 for those items which are underlined.
1.0 Hazard Identification
1.1 Tools used
1.2 Generic hazard checklist
2.0 Process Hydrocarbon Containment Failure
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2.1 Source term modelling

2.1.1 Blowout
2.1.1.1 Outflow rate
2.1.1.2 Location/orientation
2.1.1.3 Frequency
2.1.2 Risers
2.1.2.1 Hole size/outflow rate
2.1.2.3 Frequency
2.1.3 Pipelines offshore
2.1.3.3 Frequency
2.1.4 Process
2.1.4.1 Sectionalisation into inventories
2.1.4.4 Frequency
2.2 Gas dispersion modelling
2.2.1 Open field
2.2.1.1 Jet dispersion
2.2.1.2 Heavy gas dispersion
2.2.1.3 Passive gas dispersion
Index System for QRA Technical Alignment Information

2.2.2 Module
2.2.2.1 Ventilation rate estimation
2.2.2.2 Mixing model
2.2.2.3 Gas ingress into non-hazardous areas
2.3 Liquid drainage modelling
2.3.1 Pool size and location
2.4 Toxic gas dispersion
2.4.1 Open field
2.4.1.1 Toxic gas dispersion and effect modelling
2.4.2 Module
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2.4.2.1 Toxic gas dispersion and effect modelling
2.5 Ignition modelling
2.5.1 Open field
2.5.1.1 Ignition probability
2.5.1.2 Fire/explosion split
2.5.2 Module
2.5.2.1 Ignition probability
2.5.2.2 Fire/explosion split
2.6 Fire modelling
2.6.1 Open field
2.6.1.1 Flash fire
2.6.1.2 Jet fire
2.6.1.3 Pool fire
2.6.1.4 Liquid spray fire
2.6.1.5 Sea pool fire
2.6.2 Module
2.6.2.1 Flash fire
2.6.2.2 Jet fire
2.6.2.3 Pool fire
2.6.2.4 Liquid spray fire

2.7 Smoke modelling

2.7.1 Source definition term
2.7.1.1 Quantities of toxic components
2.7.1.2 Dispersion
2.7.1.3 Ingress into sensitive areas
2.8 Explosion modelling
2.8.1 Maximum overpressure
2.8.2 Overpressure distribution
2.8.3 Structural damage
2.8.4 Equipment damage
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2.8.5 External explosion

2.8.6 Explosion mitigation measures
3.0 Non-hydrocarbon Containment Failures
3.1 Utilities
3.1.1 Fuel gas
3.1.2 Diesel fuel
3.1.3 Aviation fuel
3.1.4 Methanol
3.1.5 Glycol
3.1.6 Water injection
3.1.7 Compressed air
3.2 Other Hazardous Materials
3.2.1 Chemicals
3.2.2 Radioactive substances
3.2.3 Explosives
4.0 Other Hazards
4.1 Impacts
4.1.1 Helicopter and aircraft
4.1.2 Dropped objects
4.1.3 Ship collisions
4.1.4 Missiles

4.2 Natural occurrences

4.2.1 Earthquake
4.2.2 Subsidence
4.2.3 Scour
4.2.4 Severe storm
4.3 Structural failure
4.3.1 Structural failure
4.4 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
4.4.1 Approach
4.5 Miscellaneous
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4.5.1 Accommodation fires
4.5.2 Non-ignition of flare
4.5.3 Flare carryover
4.5.4 Scaffold collapse
4.5.5 Turbine fires
5.0 Escalation
5.1 Escalation modelling
5.1.1 How is escalation handled?
5.1.2 How are events grouped into escalation categories?
5.1.3 Time effects
5.1.4 Structural collapse modelling
5.1.5 Additional inventory involvement
5.1.6 Effect of Installation safety systems
6.0 Impairment Modelling
6.1 Temporary refuge
6.1.1 Definitions
6.1.2 Smoke and gas ingress modelling
6.1.3 Structural damage/collapse
6.2 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER)
6.2.1 Definitions
6.2.2 Approach

6.3 Emergency systems

6.3.1 Definition for each system
6.3.2 Approach
6.4 Fatalities
6.4.1 Local fatalities
6.4.1.1 Initial events – all types
6.4.2 Escalation fatalities
6.4.2.1 Fatalities during escape to Temporary Refuge (TR)
6.4.2.2 TR impairment fatalities
6.4.2.3 Evacuation fatalities
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6.4.2.4 Escape to sea fatalities

6.4.2.5 Rescue fatalities
6.4.2.6 Effect of mitigation measures
6.4.3 Other
6.4.3.1 Travel risks
6.4.3.2 Occupational risks
6.4.4 Summations
6.4.4.1 Calculation of Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
6.4.4.2 Calculation of overall Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA)
6.4.4.3 F-N results
7.0 Business Exposure Modelling

November 2001 Issue 1 3-5/6
Section 4
BP Contacts/Custodians
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Text to be supplied.
BP Contacts/Custodians
Section 5
Information Input Forms
Paragraph Page
1 Guidance on the QRA Best Practice Information

Input Form 1
Figure
5.1 Hazard Identification Input Form 3
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5.2 Blowout Outflow Rate Input Form 4

5.3 Blowout Location/Orientation Input Form 5
5.4 Schematic Presentation of the Blowout Release Points
with Percentage Distributions during Drilling from a Floater 6
with Percentage Distributions during Drilling from a
Fixed Installation 7
with Percentage Distribution during Completions 8
with Percentage Distribution during regular Production 9
with Percentage Distribution during Workover 10
5.9 Blowout Frequency Input Form 11
5.10 Riser Hole Size/Outflow Rate Input Form 12
5.11 Riser Location/Orientation Input Form 13
5.12 Risers – Loss of Containment Frequency Input Form 14
5.13 Pipeline Failure Frequencies – Distribution of Failures
by Leak Size and Location 15
5.14 Hole Size Outflow Rate Input Form 17
5.15 Location/Orientation Input Form 18
5.16 Pipelines (Offshore) – Frequency Input Form 19
5.17 Sectionalisation into Inventories Input Form 20
5.18 Process Hole Size/Outflow Rate Input Form 21
5.19 Process Loss of Containment Location/Orientation Input Form 22

November 2001 Issue 1 5-i
Section 5
Information Input Forms (cont'd)
Figure Page
5.20 Process Loss of Containment Frequency Input Form 23
5.21 Failure Rate Data 24
5.22 Open Field – Jet Dispersion Input Form 25
5.23 Open Field – Heavy Gas Dispersion Input Form 26
5.24 Open Field – Passive Gas Dispersion Input Form 27
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5.25 Gas Dispersion Modelling – Module Input Form 28
5.26 Liquid Drainage Modelling Input Form 30
5.27 Toxic Gas Dispersion Input Form 31
5.28 Open Field – Ignition Modelling Input Form 32
5.29 Module – Ignition Model Input Form 33
5.30 Open Field Flash Fire Input Form 34
5.31 Open Field Jet Fire Input Form 35
5.32 Open Field Pool Fire Modelling Input Form 36
5.33 Open Field Liquid Spray Fire Input Form 37
5.34 Sea Pool Fire Input Form 38
5.35 Module Flash Fire Input Form 39
5.36 Module Jet Fire Input Form 40
5.37 Module Pool Fire Modelling Input Form 42
5.38 Module Liquid Spray Fire Input Form 43
5.39 Smoke Modelling Input Form 44
5.40 Explosion Modelling – Maximum Overpressure Input Form 45
5.41 Explosion Modelling – Overpressure Distribution Input Form 46
5.42 Explosion Damage to Structures Input Form 47
5.43 Explosion Modelling – Equipment Damage Input Form 48
5.44 Explosion Modelling – External Explosions Input Form 49
5.45 Explosion Modelling – Mitigation Measures Input Form 50
5.46 Utilities Input Form 51
5.47 Other Hazardous Materials Input Form 52

5-ii November 2001 Issue 1
Section 5
Information Input Forms (cont'd)
Figure Page
5.48 Impacts – Helicopter and Aircraft Input Form 53
5.49 Impacts – Dropped Objects Input Form 54
5.50 Impacts – Ship Collisions Input Form 55
5.51 Breakdown of Collision Types 56
5.52 Missiles Input Form 57
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5.53 Earthquake Input Form 58

5.54 Subsidence Input Form 59
5.55 Scour Input Form 60
5.56 Severe Storm, Structural Failure Input Form 61
5.57 Structural Failure Input Form 62
5.58 SIMOPS – Approach Input Form 63
5.59 Other Hazards – Miscellaneous Input Form 64
5.60 How is Escalation Handled? 65
5.61 How are Events Grouped into Escalation Categories? 66
5.62 Time Effects Input Form 67
5.63 Structural Collapse Modelling Input Form 68
5.64 Additional Inventory Involvement Input Form 69
5.65 Effect of Installation Safety Systems Input Form 70
5.66 TR Impairment Definitions Input Form 71
5.67 Smoke and Gas Ingress Modelling Input Form 72
5.68 TR Structural Damage/Collapse Input Form 73
5.69 EER Input Form 74
5.70 Emergency Systems Input Form 75
5.71 Local Fatalities Input Form 76
5.72 Escalation Fatalities Input Form 77
5.73 Travel Risks Input Form 78
5.74 Occupational Risk Input Form 79
5.75 Fatalities – Summations Input Form 80
5.76 Business Exposure Input Form 1

November 2001 Issue 1 5-iii/iv
1 Guidance on the QRA Best Practice

Information Input Form
(1) A full description of the area covered by the form, eg hydrocarbon/fire
modelling/open field/pool fire or escalation modelling/time effects, is required. The
number from the filing list should also be used for reference. Where there is more
than one sheet, eg where different rules sets are applied for different stages, the
forms should be numbered in this Section 2 of 3 etc. Where there is more than
one form, the application of each should be clearly stated.
(2) XEU, WS Atkins or DNV Technica.
(3) Date completed.
(4) An outline description covering the key points. This can be continued on an
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attached sheet if necessary.

(5) QRA types are likely to be feasibility design-screening tools, conceptual design
stage, detailed design/operating stage.
(6) Key assumptions should be highlighted – particularly those where there may be
some doubt as to the simplification or validity.
(7) Data sources used and references.
(8) Some data sources require interpretation before they can be applied to the QRA
model. This question is intended to give an indication of whether a group of
analysts are likely to come up with the same or different results when using
the database.
(9) This question is intended to give an early indication of whether BP is likely to
impose its preference in the future.
(10) This question is intended to give an indication of how easy it is to substitute
different consultants models. All implications should be considered and a fuller
description can be attached if necessary, eg some models may require a different
frequency basis, or release modelling if they are to be substituted.
(11) The sensitivity may vary depending on the Installation arrangements and details.
However, there are some areas where the QRA model will always be sensitive, or
insensitive to changes. Additional comments can be attached if it would be useful.
(12) This question is intended to given an indication on whether different analysts
would be likely to apply this rule set in different ways.
(13) This is intended to rank the audit trail for each area.
(14) This question particularly refers to the assumptions made and the software used.
Reference can be made to other documentation but an indication of the level of
validation/verification which has been applied would be useful on this sheet.
(15) This should be a short summary (continued on additional sheets if necessary)
outlining what the consultant sees as the main strengths and weaknesses of the
modelling described. Where there are general weaknesses it may be possible to
highlight areas where XEU should be considering carrying out research.

(16) Where the modelling has recognised weaknesses it would be useful to know if
there are any modifications used in any cases.
(17) Where weaknesses are recognised are there any plans to modify the rule set to
improve it? If so an attached sheet detailing the planned modifications should
be included.
(18) If there is anything else which should be noted please add it here.
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(1) QRA Area (Level 4):

1.0 Hazard Identification
(2) Consultant: (3) Date:

BP January 1995
(4) Summary Description:
HAZOPs, HAZIDs, Safety Reviews and Checklists are all used, as appropriate, to identify the hazards.
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(5) Applicable to QRA Type:
All – the level of detail will depend on the information available.
(6) Key Assumptions:
(7) Data Sources Used:
Critical Safety Review Guidelines (see Section 6.0)

HAZID Guidelines (see Section 6.0)
HAZOP Guidelines (see Section 6.0)
Note: E&P Forum have prepared a HAZID guideline for seismic operations.
(8) Is much interpretation required? Yes
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(9) Does BP impose its preference? Always Never
,
(10) Can a consultant s model be substituted? Easily No
(11) How sensitive are models to this rule set? Very Not at all
(12) How subjective is its application? Very Not at all
(13) How auditable is it? Easily Not at al
(14) How has it been verified/validated (ref)?
Guidelines have been successfully applied on numerous occasions.
(15) What are its strengths/weaknesses?

Relies heavily on the skills and experience of personnel involved.
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes Customised for specific

situations.
(17) Are any modifications planned?
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_006.ai
Figure 5.1 Hazard Identification Input Form


2.1.1.1 Blowout Outflow Rate

BP February 1995
Guidance from well engineering and reservoir specialists for the particular well under consideration
would be sought and used.
For early screening, would assume that an ignited blowout would be catastrophic irrespective of location.
Feasibility studies would use typical information based on appraisal and exploration well results.
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All
Assumptions used by specialists in estimating blowout rates need to be recorded.
(8) Is much interpretation required?
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(9) Does BP impose its preference?
,
Always x Never
(10) Can a consultant s model be substituted? Easily x No
(11) How sensitive are models to this rule set? Very x Not at all
(12) How subjective is its application? Very x Not at all
(13) How auditable is it? Easily x Not at all
Multiphase flow models used by the specialists will have been validated.
Details not available at present.

Possibly dependent on the level of effort and expertise of the specialists involved particulary if they
do not clearly understand how their work is going to be used.
(16) Are any modifications used?
(18) Other:
Phase III of the Joint Industry Project to develop a blowout risk model (refer to Addendum 1 Ref 1) is
looking at defining release area more accurately. Phase II gave some limited historical information on
release size and fluid.
UKCSTS014_007.ai
Figure 5.2 Blowout Outflow Rate Input Form


2.1.1.2 Blowout Location/Orientation

BP February 1995
Blowout location and orientation are given on the attached figures.
Figure 7.4 Drilling from a Floater

Figure 7.5 Drilling from a Fixed Installation
Figure 7.6 Completions
Figure 7.7 Production
Figure 7.8 Workover
Uncontrolled
That the well under consideration is comparable with the wells covered by the blowout risk model.
Phase I and II of a Joint Industry Project to develop a blowout risk model [1].
(8) Is much interpretation required? No
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never
(13) How auditable is it? Easily x Not at al
Review by safety and drilling professionals sponsoring the project. More formal validation may be
undertaken during 1995.

, ,
Still under development but has potential to be best practice .
(17) Are any modifications planned? Blowout risk model development is ongoing.
(18) Other:
This subject is on the agenda of the Health and Safety Executive/UKOOA Joint Working Party on Failure
Rate Data. BP is one of the UKOOA representatives.
UKCSTS014_008.ai
Figure 5.3 Blowout Location/Orientation Input Form

BELL NIPPLE TOP OF DRILLSTRING/TUBING (15.6%)

THROUGH DRILL FLOOR
Uncontrolled
(6.3%) DRILLSTRING/TUBING
DRILL FLOOR
SHAKER AREA (6.3%) BELL NIPPLE

DIVERTER LINE FROM DIVERTER
DIVERTED DIVERTER (3.1%)
(3.1%)
MARINE
PARTED RISER
DIVERTER LINE
(9.4%)
C/K FLEX LINES

BOP (3.1%)
OUTSIDE
WELLHEAD
(25%)
FROM WELLHEAD
CRATER WELLHEAD (25%)
UNDERGROUND
BLOWOUT (3.1%)
UKCSTS014_009.ai
Figure 5.4 Schematic Presentation of the Blowout Release Points with Percentage
Distributions during Drilling from a Floater

Uncontrolled
BELL NIPPLE TOP OF DRILLSTRING/TUBING (8%)

THROUGH DRILL FLOOR
(11%) DRILLSTRING/TUBING FLANGE ON GAS
SEPARATOR (1.6%)
DRILL FLOOR GAS
SEPARATOR
BELL NIPPLE
DIVERTER LINE FROM DIVERTER
DIVERTED DIVERTER (3.2%)
(24%)
C/K FLEX LINES
(1.6%)
PARTED BOP
DIVERTER LINE
(6.4%) FROM WELLHEAD
(19%)
WELLHEAD
RISER
OUTSIDE
CASING
(21%)
CRATER
ANNULUS AT MUD
LINE LEVEL (1.6%)
UNDERGROUND
BLOWOUT (1.6%)
UKCSTS014_010.ai
Distributions during Drilling from a Fixed Installation

Uncontrolled
BELL NIPPLE
TOP OF DRILLSTRING/TUBING (50%)
THROUGH DRILL FLOOR
(50%) DRILLSTRING/TUBING
DRILL FLOOR GAS

SEPARATOR
BELL NIPPLE
BOP
WELLHEAD
RISER
UKCSTS014_011.ai
Distribution during Completions

Uncontrolled
DRILL FLOOR GAS

SEPARATOR
NEEDLE VALVE
ON FLOWLINE (7%)
FROM XMAS TREE

(7%)
FLOWLINE XMAS TREE
FROM WELLHEAD/ XMAS TREE
(36%)
FROM WELLHEAD
(29%)
WELLHEAD
RISER
OUTSIDE CASING
(7%)
CASING VALVE ON
(SUBSEA) XMAS
TREE (7%)
UNDERGROUND
BLOWOUT (7%)
UKCSTS014_012.ai
Distribution during Regular Production

Uncontrolled
THROUGH DRILL FLOOR TOP OF DRILLSTRING/TUBING (38%)
(38%)
DRILLSTRING/TUBING
DRILL FLOOR GAS

SEPARATOR
FROM WORKOVER
UNIT (4.8%)
WORKOVER UNIT
C/K FLEX LINES
(4.8%)
BOP/XMAS TREE
FLOWLINE FROM XMAS TREE
(9.6%)
FROM WELLHEAD
(4.8%)
WELLHEAD
RISER
UKCSTS014_013.ai
Distribution during Workover


2.1.1.3 Blowout Frequency

BP September 1994
BP is a sponsor of a JIP to develop a model for predicting blowout risk. The blowout frequency for the
average well was calculated as exploration well 45 x 10-4 per well drilled and development well
18 x 10-4 per well drilled, completion 9.9 x 10-4 per operation, production 0.53 x 10-4 per well year
markover 1.63 x 10-4 per well year and wireline 0.34 x 10-4 per well year. Average total ignition probability
was 0.017.
HP/HT wells have a significantly higher risk.
Interviews with drilling professionals in all the sponsoring companies identified parameters (nearly 400)
that could influence the likelihood of a blowout. These parameters were then given a weighting to
reflect their criticality in terms of blowout risks. A customised assessment of blowout risks can be made
Uncontrolled
by using a scoring system with default scores being established for a standard well.
Average blowout frequency can be used during concept selection and design. Parameteric model can
be applied during detailed design. BP has worldwide licence. Any consultant can be used on a BP job.
Typically employ Scandpower.
Model for predicting risk of a blowout during offshore operations (Addendum 1 Ref 1).
(8) Is much interpretation required? Yes at a detailed level
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(13) How auditable is it? Easily Not at all
Model has not been well validated to date, still very much a prototype. Hopefully there will be some
further development validation in 1995. Still judged to be the best available.

Good interrogation of blowout databases to come up with average numbers.
Customisation for specific design needs to be treated as being indicative.
(17) Are any modifications planned? Blowout risk model development is ongoing.
(18) Other:
This subject is on the agenda of the Health and Safety Executive/UKOOA Joint Working Party on Failure
Rate Data.
BP is one of the UKOOA representatives.
UKCSTS014_014.ai
Figure 5.9 Blowout Frequency Input Form


2.1.2.1 Riser Hole Size/Outflow Rate

BP September 1994
Hole size – 0 to 20mm; 20 to 80mm; >80mm; rupture. Use representative hole size for each range –
not fixed, depends on objective of the study.
Outflow – simple model – CIRRUS. For gas and non-volatile liquid release probably no need for more
detailed modelling. Detailed model for volatile liquids and multiphase is PLAC, unless the cost turns
out to be prohibitive.
The range of hole sizes in each category (small, medium or large) may be chosen by relating the
flame length with target distances.
Uncontrolled
Use CIRRUS for simple studies. PLAC is only suitable for detailed studies.
The Update of Loss Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines (Addendum 1 Ref 2)
CIRRUS (Addendum 1 Ref 3)
PLAC (Addendum 1 Ref 4)
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Refer to CIRRUS manuals for validation.
PLAC validation?

CIRRUS is not good for volatiles or elevation effects.
PLAC, although now available on PC, may still be cumbersome or expensive.
(18) Other:
PLAC can be run by BP Group Research and Engineering. It may be possible to obtain a PC version and
devise how this could be made available to consultants.
UKCSTS014_015.ai
Figure 5.10 Riser Hole Size/Outflow Rate Input Form


2.1.2.2 Riser Location/Orientation

BP September 1994
For standard steel jacket Installations, three locations considered, above at and below splash zone.
More exact location is not usually critical – worst place is usually assumed.
For small hole assume release is tangential to riser. Use judgement to determine how many
directions should be used in the analysis, usually the percentage of the circle containing target areas.
Assume full bore release is vertically upwards.
For floating and other types of Installation, locations need to be determined on a case by case basis.
Uncontrolled
All.
Identifying worst locations.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never

Relies heavily on judgement.
(18) Other:
In some very detailed analysis the sensitivity of the assumptions that the release is tangential to the
riser has been reviewed to consider probability of release reaching topside ignition points.
UKCSTS014_016.ai
Figure 5.11 Riser Location/Orientation Input Form


2.1.2.3 Risers – Loss of Containment Frequency

BP September 1994
UK industry standard database is given in Addendum 1 Ref 2. This can be interpreted in different ways.
A BP interpretation is given in Addendum 1 Ref 5, and the results are given in Figures 7.13 and 7.14.
Flexible risers are anticipated to be covered in more detail in future revisions of Addendum 1 Ref 2.
Work done by one of the manufacturers Coflexip may also be useful (Addendum 1 Ref 6).
Uncontrolled
All.
Riser under consideration is suitably represented by the population in the AME database.
Update of Loss Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines (Addendum 1 Ref 2)

Review of riser failure frequency data (Addendum 1 Ref 5)
Coflexip analysis of flexible risers (Addendum 1 Ref 6)
(8) Is much interpretation required? Limited.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never
(18) Other:
An additional frequency due to ship collision could be added where it is likely to be significant, also
engineering studies (Addendum 1 Ref 7) can be used to argue a reduction in failure frequency due to
protective inspection etc measures in place.
UKCSTS014_017.ai
Figure 5.12 Risers – Loss of Containment Frequency Input Form

DISTRIBUTION OF FAILURES BY LEAK SIZE AND LOCATION
RISER including Piper 6 LOC incidents in 332 riser

years (Note 1)
Hole Size (mm) 0-20 mm 20-80 mm >80 mm RUPTURE TOTAL

FAILURE FREQUENCY 8.18E-04 Fraction of Failures 0.333 0.167 0.000 0.500
RISER SECTION ABOVE SPLASH ZONE 0.056 1.52E-05 7.58E-06 0.00E-00 2.27E-05 4.55E-05
SPLASH ZONE 0.556 1.52E-04 7.58E-05 0.00E-00 2.27E-04 4.55E-04
Uncontrolled
BELOW SPLASH ZONE 0.389 1.06E-04 5.30E-05 0.00E-00 1.59E-04 3.18E-04
TOTAL 2.73E-04 1.36E-04 0.00E+00 4.09E-04 8.18E-04
RISER excluding Piper 5 LOC incidents in 332 riser

years (Note 2)

RISER SECTION ABOVE SPLASH ZONE 0.067 1.82E-05 9.08E-06 0.00E-00 1.82E-05 4.54E-05
TOTAL 2.73E-04 1.36E-04 0.00E+00 2.73E-04 6.82E-04
SAFETY ZONE 11 LOC incidents in "65"

safety zone years (Note 3)

SAFETY ZONE NEAR <100m 0.600 3.92E-04 1.57E-04 2.35E-04 7.84E-05 8.62E-04
FAR 100-500m 0.400 2.61E-04 1.04E-04 1.57E-04 5.22E-05 5.75E-04
TOTAL 6.53E-04 2.61E-04 3.92E+04 1.31E-04 1.44E-03
MID LINE 11 LOC incidents in 123753

mid line km years (Note 4)

MID LINE Frequency per km/year 1.000 4.85E-05 2.42E-05 0.00E-00 1.62E-05 8.89E-05
TOTAL 4.85E-05 2.42E-05 0.00E+00 1.62E-05 8.89E-05
SUBSEA WELL 3 LOC incidents in 931

subsea well years (Note 5)

SUBSEA WELL Frequency per year 1.000 3.22E-03 0.00E-00 0.00E-00 0.00E-00 3.22E-03
TOTAL 3.22E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.22E-03
UKCSTS014_018.ai
Figure 5.13 Pipeline Failure Frequencies – Distribution of Failures

by Leak Size and Location

DISTRIBUTION OF FAILURES BY LEAK SIZE AND LOCATION
FITTINGS (Platform 15 LOC incidents in 332 riser

Riser) years (Note 1)

PLATFORM 1.000 1.65E-03 3.56E-04 4.45E-05 0.00E-00 2.05E-03
Uncontrolled
TOTAL 1.65E-03 3.56E-04 4.45E-05 0.00E+00 2.05E-03
FITTINGS (Risers) 8 LOC incidents in 332 riser

years (Note 2)

RISER ABOVE SPLASH ZONE 0.400 3.51E-04 7.59E-05 9.49E-06 0.00E-00 4.36E-04
TOTAL 8.78E-04 1.90E-04 2.37E-05 0.00E+00 1.09E-03
FITTINGS (Safety Zone) 8 LOC incidents in "65"

safety zone years (Note 3)

SEAFETY ZONE NEAR <100m 0.667 5.60E-04 1.21E-04 1.51E-05 0.00E-00 6.97E-04
FAR 100-500m 0.333 2.80E-04 6.06E-05 7.57E-06 0.00E-00 3.48E-04
TOTAL 8.40E-04 1.82E-04 2.27E-05 0.00E+00 1.04E-03
FITTINGS (Mid Line) 9 LOC incidents in 123753

mid line km years (Note 4)

MID LINE 1.000 5.85E-05 1.26E-05 1.58E-06 0.00E-00 7.27E-05
TOTAL 5.85E-05 1.26E-04 1.58E-06 0.00E+00 7.27E-05
FITTINGS (Subsea Well) 6 LOC incidents in 931

subsea well years (Note 5)

SUBSEA WELL 1.000 5.18E-03 1.12E-03 1.40E-04 0.00E-00 6.44E-03
TOTAL 5.18E-03 1.12E-03 1.40E-04 0.00E+00 6.44E-03
UKCSTS014_019.ai
Figure 5.13 Pipeline Failure Frequencies – Distribution of Failures

by Leak Size and Location (cont’d)


2.1.3.1 Hole Size/Outflow Rate

BP January 1995
Hole size – same as for risers.
Outflow rate – same as for risers
Note: Water head must be taken into account.

Uncontrolled
Use CIRRUS for simple studies. PLAC only for more detailed studies.
The Update of Loss Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines (Addendum 1 Ref 2).
CIRRUS (Addendum 1 Ref 3).
PLAC (Addendum 1 Ref 4).
(8) Is much interpretation required? Yes.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(10) Can a consultant's model be substituted? Easily No
Refer to CIRRUS manuals for validation.
PLAC validation?

CIRRUS is not good for volatiles or elevation effects.
PLAC, although now available on PC, may still be cumbersome and expensive.
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_020.ai
Figure 5.14 Hole Size Outflow Rate Input Form


2.1.3.2 Location/Orientation

BP January 1995
Depends on objective of study. Exact location and orientation is not usually very important for
mid-line failures.
Within the safety zone around an Installation, failure locations every 50 or 100m may be considered.
Uncontrolled
Pipeline equally likely to fail anywhere along its length.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_021.ai
Figure 5.15 Location/Orientation Input Form


2.1.3.3 Pipelines (Offshore) – Frequency

BP January 1995
UK industry standard database is given in Addendum 1 Ref 2. This can be interpreted in different ways.
A BP interpretation is given in Addendum 1 Ref 5.
The results are given in Figures 7.13 and 7.14.
Note that a frequency is given for the safety zone and for mid-line failures.
Uncontrolled
All.
Pipeline under consideration is suitably represented by the population in the AME database.
Update of Loss Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines (Addendum 1 Ref 2)

BP review of riser failure frequency data (Addendum 1 Ref 5).
(8) Is much interpretation required? Limited.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
Site-specific studies may be undertaken to assess the likelihood of trawl damage, dropped objects
damage, anchor damage. Influence of inspection and repair regimes may also be used to modify
failure rates.
UKCSTS014_022.ai
Figure 5.16 Pipelines (Offshore) – Frequency Input Form


2.1.4.1 Sectionalisation into Inventories

BP September 1994
Process sectionalised by ESD valves.

Control valves, NRVs, would be assumed not to separate inventories first pass but if more detail is
required then either a defined leak rate would be input or something based on a reasonable assessment.
Elevations – liquid will not flow out of a gas-size nozzle, inventory for release is limited to the liquid
above the level of release. Take account of blowdown.
Valve reliability as specified or based on historical data. Speed of response 1 to 2mins for initial runs or
based on a detailed calculation if necessary. All valves assumed to operate first pass.
Possibly look at critical valves failing to work. Minimum pipe size considered typically 6in.
Uncontrolled
All – increasing level of complexity can be introduced for more detailed design.
ESD valves are leak tight that can be modified if it proves to be a critical assumption.
Liquid level assumed to be normal operating level.
Normal operating temperature and pressure assumed.
Valve data sheets or test data on leak rates.

,
Valve reliability – OREDA then specification or manufacturer s data.
Note: Additional information on ESD valve reliability will be available shortly in an E&P Forum.
QRA directory (Addendum 1 Ref 8).
HARP (Addendum 1 Ref 9).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never

The first run will be over-conservative if it assumes no segregation effect from control valves and
non-return valves. Assumed leak/passing rates need to be recorded. Considerable judgement required.
Difficult to get the right balance between the appropriate level of detail and subsequent complexity of
overall analysis.
(18) Other:
This task is fundamental to the complexity of the overall analysis. If scenarios are being generated
manually then it is important that a simple conservative approach is taken. A computerised system is
needed for more rigorous handling.
UKCSTS014_023.ai
Figure 5.17 Sectionalisation into Inventories Input Form


2.1.4.2 Process Hole Size/Outflow Rate

BP September 1994
Define a minimum hole size that has the potential to cause a major hazard – typically a couple of
millimetres depending on fluid and pressure. Assume all hole sizes are possible between minimum and
full bore rupture. For pre-ESD release cases use 10mm, 50mm and full bore to conservatively represent
the ranges min to 10mm, 10mm to 50mm and 50mm to full bore. For post-ESD case use hazard analysis
to define threshold hole sizes on a case by case basis – fire damage is a function of both size and
duration. Outflow rate – use simple orifice calculations, CIRRUS or HARP. Pre-ESD assume pressure is
constant. Post-ESD take account of blowdown, liquid head etc.
Uncontrolled
All.
Probability of leak across hole size ranges is uniform.

Note: A good sensitivity analysis to run is to assume the hole size ranges are represented by some sort
of mean value rather than an upper band value.

HARP (Addendum 1 Ref 9).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Difficult to validate. Being able to run sensitivities rapidly and effectively would help a lot.

Large amount of judgement required. Careful review required at all stages to ensure credibility and
reasonableness of analysis.

HARP development.
(18) Other:
Where a particular component dominates the frequency of a certain hole size range, eg small bore
fittings dominate the 10 to 50mm category, it may be possible to argue that based on engineering
judgement the probability of leak size is not uniform but is biased towards a certain hole size.
UKCSTS014_024.ai
Figure 5.18 Process Hole Size/Outflow Rate Input Form


2.1.4.3 Process Loss of Containment Location/Orientation

BP September 1994
For stabilised oil releases, oil pool is assumed to form. Pool is circular around the release point unless
dictated otherwise by bunding (refer to Figure 7.26). Number of release locations selected for each
isolatable system depends on specific circumstances and objective of study.
For gas and multiphase releases, selection of release location/orientation will be driven by escalation
routes, damage criteria and impairment criteria.
Objective is to drive realistic probabilistic values for use in event trees.
Uncontrolled
All.
A large number of assumptions need to be made which may change for each Installation.
Need to be clearly recorded.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never
Very difficult to validate – heavily reliant on judgement.

Key weakness is that whilst some guiding principles can be systematically applied there is plenty of
scope for inconsistency in the detailed application of the method.
(18) Other:
A computerised system may be of benefit.
UKCSTS014_025.ai
Figure 5.19 Process Loss of Containment Location/Orientation Input Form


2.1.4.4 Process Loss of Containment Frequency

BP September 1994
Equipment count is based on as-built drawings, site survey, or average for system type depending on
design state. Numbers of flanges are assumed unless a site survey is carried out.
Leak frequencies are based on E&P Forum Hydrocarbons Leak and Ignitions Database.
A summary is given as an addendum to this form.
Uncontrolled
E&P Forum Hydrocarbon Leak and Ignition Database (Addendum 1 Ref 10).
(8) Is much interpretation required? No.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never
Difficult to validate. Accepted as an industry standard.?
(18) Other:
Anticipate using results from HSE database (Ammendum 1 Ref 11) in the future, also the equipment
counts prepared for that. BP is involved in Phase 2 of the E&P Forum project (Addendum 1 Ref 12)
which should facilitate the development of BP specific data.
UKCSTS014_026.ai
Figure 5.20 Process Loss of Containment Frequency Input Form

Equipment Leak Frequency/ Hole size Cumulative Distribution Frequency/

Year (mm or d/D) Probability Year
Reciprocating Compressor 6.60E-1 10 0.9730 0.97 6.42E-01

50 0.9980 0.03 1.65E-02
1 1.0000 2.0E-3 1.32E-03
Centrifugal Compressor 1.40E-2 10 0.9300 0.93 1.30E-02
50 0.9700 0.04 5.60E-04
1 1.0000 0.03 4.20E-04
Centrifugal Pump 1.50E-3 10 0.8200 0.82 1.23E-03
50 0.9600 0.14 2.10E-04
1 1.0000 0.04 6.00E-05
Reciprocating Pump 3.10E-1 10 0.8300 0.83 2.57E-01
50 0.9999 0.17 5.27E-02
Uncontrolled
1 1.0000 1.0E-4 3.10E-05
Vessel 1.50E-4 25 0.5400 0.54 8.10E-05
50 0.8900 0.35 5.25E-05
150 0.9600 0.07 1.05E-05
1 1.0000 0.04 6.00E-06
Heat Exchanger (HC in shell) 1.50E-4 25 0.5400 0.54 8.10E-05
50 0.8900 0.35 5.25E-05
150 0.9600 0.07 1.05E-05
1 1.0000 0.04 6.00E-06
Heat Exchanger (HC in tube) 1.30E-5 25 0.5400 0.54 7.02E-06
50 0.8900 0.35 4.55E-06
150 0.9600 0.07 9.10E-07
1 1.0000 0.04 5.20E-07
Heat Exchanger (HC in both) 1.63E-4 25 0.5400 0.54 8.80E-05
50 0.8900 0.35 5.71E-05
150 0.9600 0.07 1.14E-05
1 1.0000 0.04 6.52E-06
Piping <3in diameter 7.00E-5 0.05 0.6000 0.60 4.20E-05
(per metre) 0.22 0.8500 0.25 1.75E-05
0.45 0.9500 0.10 7.00E-06
1 1.0000 0.05 3.50E-06
Piping 4in – 11in diameter 3.60E-5 0.05 0.6000 0.60 2.16E-05
(per metre) 0.22 0.8500 0.25 9.00E-06
0.45 0.9500 0.10 3.60E-06
1 1.0000 0.05 1.80E-06
Piping >12in diameter 2.70E-5 0.05 0.6000 0.60 1.62E-05
(per metre) 0.22 0.8500 0.25 6.75E-06
0.45 0.9500 0.10 2.70E-06
1 1.0000 0.05 1.35E-06
Flange 8.80E-5 0.1 0.9600 0.96 8.45E-05
1 1.0000 0.04 3.52E-06
Valve 2.30E-4 0.05 0.6500 0.65 1.50E-04
0.1 0.8800 0.23 5.29E-05
0.2 0.9400 0.06 1.38E-05
1 1.0000 0.06 1.38E-05
Small Bore Fitting 4.70E-4 0.1 0.1300 0.13 6.11E-05
0.2 0.2000 0.07 3.29E-05
1 1.0000 0.80 3.76E-04
UKCSTS014_027.ai
Figure 5.21 Failure Rate Data


2.2.1.1 Open Field – Jet Dispersion

BP January 1995

Uncontrolled
All.

JETDISP (Addendum 1 Ref 13).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes.
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_028.ai
Figure 5.22 Open Field – Jet Dispersion Input Form


2.2.1.2 Open Field - Heavy Gas Dispersion

BP January 1995
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes Customised for specific situations.
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_029.ai
Figure 5.23 Open Field – Heavy Gas Dispersion Input Form


2.2.1.3 Open Field - Passive Gas Dispersion

BP January 1995

Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(15)What are its strengths/weaknesses?
(16)Are any modifications used? Yes Customised for specific situations.
(17)Are any modifications planned?
(18)Other:
UKCSTS014_030.ai
Figure 5.24 Open Field – Passive Gas Dispersion Input Form


2.2.2 Gas Dispersion Modelling - Module

BP September 1994

For a first pass the most appropriate model among 'plug flow', 'stirred tank' or 'bubble' would be applied.
For a more detailed analysis use a composite model MODVENT (Addendum 1 Ref 14) which predicts
the flow field around the boundary of an area, the effect of the boundary (eg louvres) and the flow field
within the area accounting for plant etc. It then superimposes a 3-D release to predict cloud size,
composition etc. The flow field is calculated using FLOWPOR (Addendum 1 Ref 15), CFD or wind tunnel
test results.
Four step empirical model validated against offshore data. Overall accuracy is within 60%. Covers all the
Level 4 QRA areas under this section. Overall size geometry and model layout, wind rose, release
characteristics are required as input.
Uncontrolled
Further information is given on an Attachment Sheet to this form.
All – requires low level of input of data – rough layout is sufficient.
(8) Is much interpretation required? Yes It is hoped to improve this.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never
By Cambridge University against measurements on Offshore Installations (report not yet published).

Cheap, quick to run for parametric study (as most applications are). Provides link between release
frequency and consequence predictions (explosions). Poor user interface (refer to Addendum 1 Ref 18).
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes Development not completed.
(17) Are any modifications planned? Yes Development not completed.
(18) Other:
Complexity of input/output data handling and linkage of the parts requires specialist use – this will be
improved so a Safety Engineer can use the composite model on a PC.
JETDISP is being included.
UKCSTS014_031.ai
Figure 5.25 Gas Dispersion Modelling – Module Input Form


2.2.2 Gas Dispersion Modelling - Module Attachment Sheet
Although MODVENT is still being developed it has been applied to models where explosion risks are
high and the risk levels are sensitive to explosion size and frequency.
MODVENT is a 3-D integral dispersion model which takes obstacles and boundary effects into
account. MODVENT covers the effect of air flows on the release from the release point so initial
dilution effects are included.
The requirements for the explosion consequence modelling vary depending on the model being run.
MODVENT can be used to calculate equivalent gas cloud volumes of still stoichiometric mix or
whatever is required by the explosion model. It can also calculate the flammable envelope where
that is required for consequence modelling.
Uncontrolled
MODVENT will also be able to cover smoke and gas ingress modelling.
For a first pass to see whether explosions are a significant problem on an Installation, the nearest
dispersion model among plug flow, stirred tank, bubble etc would be applied until MODVENT is able
to be applied simply and locally.
Open field dispersion could use CIRRUS or JETDISP as a first pass. These models are currently the
subject of discussion on their accuracy levels and areas of applicability.
Advice should be sought from HSQ on which one to use in any case. The intention is to add the
open field dispersion equations in JETDISP into MODVENT.
The basic flow field on which MODVENT superimposes a leak is calculated by FLOWPOR, CFD or
wind tunnel testing. BP have a CFD methodology and safety factors which they apply but they do not
recommend specific CFD models providing the validated form of equations is used.
Sunbury should be involved when CFD modelling is proposed.
Forced ventilation cannot be incorporated in MODVENT. At present a CFD model is used for forced
ventilation modelling. This should be discussed with Sunbury.
A modification to MODVENT may be added which will calculate the overall ventilation, air change rate
but that is not available at present.
MODVENT does not include heavy gas. HEGADAS (in CIRRUS) or DEGADIS (stand alone) would be
applied for that. They are similar models which have a similar level of validation.
UKCSTS014_032.ai
Figure 5.25 Gas Dispersion Modelling – Module Input Form (cont’d)


2.3.1 Liquid Drainage Modelling

BP September 1994
Bunding/gullies can control pool size and burn rate. If deluge is operating pool covers entire module
or up to intermediate divisions. Drains will be examined for design and preferential drainage of water,
oil or both.
Worst case design for the module may minimise sea pool fire effects.
Without bund and deluge the pool will still fill the floor area and overflow unless the release rate
< drain capacity + burn rate.
Grating can encourage combustion if liquid sprays onto it: 50% combustion on grating, 50% falling
through up to 100m2 grating.
Uncontrolled
Drainage can only really start to be taken into account during detained design. For earlier stages
assume oil pool fills module and then overflows (size of oil pool based on release rate and burn rate
only – ie no allowance for drainage).
Drain design data when necessary and available.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never

The area of fire assumed with no deluge may vary depending on interpretation. With deluge the area
assumed may also vary. Small inventories may not be able to spread over the whole area or the fire
may float beyond the module and overboard if the deluge is operating.
(18) Other:
Need to agree some simple rules to minimise subjectivity.
UKCSTS014_033.ai
Figure 5.26 Liquid Drainage Modelling Input Form


2.4 Toxic Gas Dispersion

BP September 1994
MODVENT (Addendum 1 Ref 14) would be used for dispersion in modules. CIRRUS (Addendum 1
Ref 2) and JETDISP (Addendum 1 Ref 13) could be used for the first pass open field modelling –
refer to details on Sheet 2.2.
Uncontrolled
All.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
Toxic gas dispersion within modules not usually required. Onshore as well has limited inventories of
acutely toxic material.
UKCSTS014_034.ai
Figure 5.27 Toxic Gas Dispersion Input Form


2.5.1 Open Field – Ignition Modelling

BP September 1994
For onshore process plant use same as 2.5.2.

For driffting clouds – limited experience, no standard values.
For offshore releases below deck level or from other areas not like a typical module, tend to
qualitatively argue a reduction from values obtained in 2.5.2 based on dispersion of vapour cloud etc.
Blowout ignition probability also used.
Uncontrolled
All.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Not well validated. Should be treated as a key sensitivity.

This is one of the key weaknesses in offshore QRA modelling.
(18) Other:
Needs standardising and improving.
UKCSTS014_035.ai
Figure 5.28 Open Field – Ignition Modelling Input Form


2.5.2 Module – Ignition Model

BP September 1994
P ignition = exp (0.3921n (m) - 4.333) for oil release } m = release rate in kg/s
P ignition = exp (0.6421n (m) - 4.16) for gas release } logic?
Given ignition P explosion = exp (0.381n (m) - 2.995) , m = gas release rate in kg/s, for liquid streams
consider vapour flash fraction.
Design implications?
Uncontrolled
All.
Classification of Hazardous Areas – Con, Lees Ang IChemE 1992 (Addendum 1 Ref 16).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(9) Does BP impose its preferance? Always Never
,
Not well validated. Should be treated as a key sensitivity.

Not a lot of confidence in the model. Benchmarking against WOAD suggests that overall ignition
probability is reasonable. Concern is that probability of explosions may be underpredicted.
(18) Other:
Key area for R&D, better model required.
UKCSTS014_036.ai
Figure 5.29 Module – Ignition Model Input Form


2.6.1.1 Open Field Flash Fire

BP September 1994
Flash fires are treated as explosions with zero overpressure. LFL boundary is taken to be the
extent of damage.
Uncontrolled
All.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
The effects on individuals should be covered but requires more work to be done.
UKCSTS014_037.ai
Figure 5.30 Open Field Flash Fire Input Form


2.6.1.2 Open Field Jet Fire

BP September 1994
First pass use CIRRUS as BPFLARE is on VAX and therefore not easily accessed. FIREX is similar to
forthcoming BPFLARE PC version. CFD can be used to model the fire though in most situations is
too expensive to be justifiable. Burn rate is taken to be the leak rate. Heat flux 300kW/m2 max,
250 average (methane 200 average). PFP effect is in 01.05.07 where durations for existing specific wall
types are given, new PFP would be based on proven manufacturer's test data.
SCI interim guidance is used for structural and equipment effects. No particular structural collapse
models are recommended. Feedback into hole size selection – based on hole size/release rate
required to do damage. Deluge/foam effects – none.
Uncontrolled
All – the variation will be in the number of events modelled and calculated.
Semi-empirical models used, wind speed restriction of 50m/s, jet deflection model ignores
buoyancy effects.
Input is directly from the hole size/release rate modelling with additional inputs on wind speed
direction etc.
BP FLARE (Addendum 1 Ref 17).
Impairment Criterias HSQ Guidance 01.05.07 (Section 5)
SCI Interim Guidance (Addendum 1 Ref 18).
FIREX P (Addendum 1 Ref 21).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(14) How has it been verified/validated (ref CIRRUS Validation Manual for model F2, 3/93)?
Peer review by Dr R Britter, Dept of Engineering, University of Cambridge. PFP tests proven by
manufacturers. Structural collapse modelling mechanisms are not specified.

Refer to Validation Manual. The means of calculating the consequence of the fire and potential for
escalation may not be adequately detailed. None of the existing models attempt to include the erosive
effect of a jet fire.
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes/No
(17) Are any modifications planned? Yes/No
(18) Other:
Conversion of BP FLARE to a PC base is a possible R&D item. Current SCI Phase II work/experiments
are likely to help. British Gas are doing experiments including obstacles.
CFD can show deluge effect.
UKCSTS014_038.ai
Figure 5.31 Open Field Jet Fire Input Form


2.6.1.3 Open Field Pool Fire Modelling

BP September 1994
Flame height, burn rate, shape, radiation etc - BPPOOL (in CIRRUS and standalone PC model which
includes obstacles). Heat flux 200, 150 ave (cond) 50 less for crude. BPPOOL divides the flame into two
with different emmisivities for the upper and lower sections. PFP effect is in 01.05.07 where
durations for existing specific wall types are given, new PFP would be based on proven manufacturer's
test data. SCI interim guidance is used for structural and equipment effects. No particular structural
collapse models are recommended. Feedback into hole size selection based on hole size/release rate
required to do damage. Deluge – general area, 50% reduction in burn rate (heavy crude) 25% for
condensate: foam – 75% reduction in burn rate of pool area while foam lasts. Fuel flowing into fire,
10% probability of foam extinguishing, 75% probability of extinguishing if no flow into the pool.
Uncontrolled
As noted in the summary.

A semi-empirical solid flame shape model.

BPPOOL (Addendum 1 Ref 19).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Always x Never
(14) How has it been verified/validated (ref CIRRUS Validation Manual for model F2, 3/93)?
BPPOOL validation exercise is in Addendum 1 Ref 19.

The means of calculating the consequence of the fire and potential for escalation may not be
adequately detailed. The models are least accurate near the fire where escalation is most likely to
occur.
Deluge effect not validated and its application is subjective.
(18) Other:
SCI Phase II includes experiments with deluge on pool fires.
UKCSTS014_039.ai
Figure 5.32 Open Field Pool Fire Modelling Input Form


2.6.1.4 Open Field Liquid Spray Fire

BP September 1994
Criteria for a spray fire – > 7bar heavy crude, 4bar light crude, 2bar condensate.
For heavy crude all release would form an oil pool < 2bar and quantities prorated in between.
CIRRUS, BPFLARE, FIREX may underestimate radiation but no alternative other than hand calculations.
General area deluge will not extinguish and will have little effect. Monitors may be able to extinguish.
Heat flux: stab crude, 200kW/m2 max and 150 average: condensate 300 and 250.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(14) How has it been verified/validated?
Nothing at present, by next year will have more information through the JIP on fire and blast.
British Gas experiments appear to support the 7bar pressure.

Expert advice is required. A combination of a gas jet and a liquid pool would be modelled.
Experiments suggest that in this area current modelling techniques may not be conservative.
(18) Other:
,
The Steel Construction Institute s Joint Industry Project on Fire and Blast is still ongoing.
UKCSTS014_040.ai
Figure 5.33 Open Field Liquid Spray Fire Input Form


2.6.1.5 Sea Pool Fire

BP September 1994
No self-sustained sea pool fire if wind speed > 3m/s or wave height > 2.5m probability of suitable
weather for sustained fire < 0.07. Note: The 3m/s (and therefore the 0.07) is now questioned.
Oil slick direction is vector addition of 3% wind velocity + 100% surface current.
Sustained combustion is likely if fuel temperature > 40°C above its flash point. If < 20°C above its
flash point it will self extinguish. Where fuel thickness < 0.8mm combustion is unlikely.
Additional information on ignition probabilities, how oil reaches the sea and pool size are included in
the reference. The constraints on ignition are not well understood at this stage.
Uncontrolled
Note: Source of oil, eg topsides, riser etc is an important consideration.
All.
n/a.
HSQ guidance on Sea Pool Fires (Addendum 1 Ref 20).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
n/a.

Lack of available data to create firmer quantification. BP are sponsoring further research in this area.
Some of the information in 10.05.20 is no longer correct.
(18) Other:
SINTEF experiments looking at the characteristics of crude fires on the sea will be available this year.
Ease of burning may be considered next year.
UKCSTS014_041.ai
Figure 5.34 Sea Pool Fire Input Form


2.6.2.1 Module Flash Fire

BP September 1994
Module flash fires are treated as explosions with zero overpressure and form part of the
distribution of explosion overpressures.
Uncontrolled
No structural damage assumed to occur.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
The effects on individuals should be covered but requires more work to be done.
UKCSTS014_042.ai
Figure 5.35 Module Flash Fire Input Form


2.6.2.2 Module Jet Fire

BP September 1994
4) Summary Description:
Flame has to be long enough to reach equipment and engulf 1/2 diameter to damage or wall +1m spread.
Burn rate is taken to be the leak rate, rarely ventilation controlled, fuel often runs out before air.
If ventilation controlled unburned gas burns as diffusion gas flame externally outside upper module.
Heat flux = 300kW/m2/250kW/m2average. Structural response and PFP effect is in 01.05.07 where
durations for existing specific wall types are given, new PFP based on proven manufacturer's test data.
SCI interim guidance used for structural and equipment effects. No particular structural models are
recommended. Feedback into hole size selection based on hole size/release rate required to give
specified damage levels. Deluge/foam effects – none. Further information is on an attachment to
Uncontrolled
this form.
Semi-empirical models used, jet deflection model ignores buoyancy effects.
As for 2.6.1.2 Open Field Jet Fire.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(14) How has it been verified/validated?

See validation manual. Once the flame length is greater than some length in relation to the module size
or congestion (as yet unspecified) the amount of flame directionality is unknown.
(18) Other:
Guidance on when to stop using directional model is required. CFD may be used to produce
databases. This area will invariably be critical and an agreed rule set is essential.
UKCSTS014_043.ai
Figure 5.36 Module Jet Fire Input Form


2.6.2.2 BP Module Jet Fire - Attachment Sheet
There will be a cut-off size of jet fire above which the fire effectively fills the module and cannot be
modelled as a directional flame. At that stage all critical structure and equipment within the module
should be considered to be exposed to a heat flux of 300kW/m2.
The cut-off will relate flame length to module size but it has not yet been defined.
Note: Guidance on this is required.
The switch over to ventilation controlled is calculated quite simply depending on the area of the vent.
HARP will be able to calculate whether fires are or are not ventilation controlled.
The effect of the external fire can be calculated using FIREX for a ventilation controlled fire.
Where the internal fire is ventilation controlled it is unclear what software is used. (HARP may be
Uncontrolled
able to be used for this and CFD can be used to build up databases to be used as references.)
Where the fire is not ventilation controlled and is relatively small and unobstructed, open field models
can be used.
UKCSTS014_044.ai
Figure 5.36 Module Jet Fire Input Form (cont’d)


2.6.2.3 Module Pool Fire Modelling

BP September 1994
Flame height, shape, radiation, hot gas layer depth can be calculated using the FIREX model.
SCANDPOWER handbook criteria used to calculate the spread if it reaches the roof.
External flaming is as for jet fires. For ventilation controlled fires the burn rate is set by the air supply.
Heat flux approx 50kW/m2 higher than open field.
Deluge – general area, 50% reduction in burn rate (heavy crude) 25% for condensate.
Foam – 75% probability of extinguishing fire if no flow into pool.
Uncontrolled
All – the variation will be in the number of events modelled.
FIREX (Ammendum 1 Ref 21)

Scandpower Handbook (Amenddum 1 Ref 22).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
Check in manual.
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_045.ai
Figure 5.37 Module Pool Fire Modelling Input Form

1) QRA Area (Level 4):

2.6.2.4 Module Liquid Spray Fire
2) Consultant: 3) Date:
BP September 1994
4) Summary Description:
Criteria for a spray fire – > 7bar heavy crude, 4bar light crude, 2bar condensate. For heavy crude all
pool < 2bar and quantities prorated in between.
Models may underestimate radiation but no alternative other than hand calculations.
General area deluge will not extinguish and will have little effect. Monitors may be able to extinguish.
Liquid jets will lose energy and rise on leaving the module. Flame volume as for equivalent pool fire.
If flame vol < 1/2 module volume then no significant external flaming otherwise external flame = total
volume – 1/2 module volume (if fire is freely ventilated). If ventilation controlled use FIREX
Uncontrolled
(SCANDPOWER Handbook).
5) Applicable to QRA Type:
6) Key Assumptions:
7) Data Sources Used:
FIREX (21)
Scandpower Handbook (Addendum 1 Ref 22).
8) Is much interpretation required?
Comments: 1 2 3 4
9) Does BP impose its preference? Always Never
,
10) Can a consultant s model be substituted? Easily No
11) How sensitive are models to this rule set? Very x Not at all
12) How subjective is its application? Very x Not at all
13) How auditable is it? Easily x Not at all
14) How has it been verified/validated (ref)?
Nothing at present, by next year will have more information through the JIP on fire and blast.
15) What are its strengths/weaknesses?

Generally liquid spray fires are not well understood and in a module they are even less well
understood.
16) Are any modifications used?
17) Are any modifications planned?
18) Other:
The Steel Construction Institute Joint Industry Project on fire and blast is still ongoing.
UKCSTS014_046.ai
Figure 5.38 Module Liquid Spray Fire Input Form


2.7.1 Smoke Modelling

BP September 1994
A composite model will shortly be available covering smoke composition, ventilation, contamination
rate and personnel effects. The model consists of four main components:
1. Quantities of toxic components – see (Addendum 1 Ref 23).
2. Dispersion as gas dispersion – MODVENT etc.
3. Ingress into sensitive areas – see (Addendum 1 Ref 23).
4. Computer software SGICALC – see (Addendum 1 Ref 23).
Uncontrolled
All – may be used at several levels of detail.
FEA, site geometry, TR layout, manning, weather (generic data is available for concept use).
HSQ Guidance on Smoke Modelling (Addendum 1 Ref 23).
MODVENT (Addendum 1 Ref 14).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
By using validated and industry standard methods/references. Calculations were validated by
external consultants against sources.

Cheap, quick to run for parametric studies (most applications). Uses other (external) dispersion
models eg MODVENT, CFD, JETDISP etc depending on required accuracy.
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes Appropriate accuracy required.
(17) Are any modifications planned? Yes User interface improvement.
(18) Other:
n/a.
UKCSTS014_047.ai
Figure 5.39 Smoke Modelling Input Form


2.8.1 Explosion Modelling – Maximum Overpressure

BP September 1994
(Full details on attached sheet or ref).
FLACs code to be used.

Uncontrolled
All. Build up a simple model for screening/concept design and then add detail as available.
FLACS (Addendum 1 Ref 24).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

Obtain details from Sunbury.
(18) Other:
BP has had bad experiences changing explosion models part-way through a development.
The preffered route is for Sunbury to carry out all explosion modelling.
UKCSTS014_048.ai
Figure 5.40 Explosion Modelling – Maximum Overpressure Input Form


2.8.2 Explosion Modelling – Overpressure Distribution

BP September 1994
In principle some form of probabilistic assessment of ignition location, cloud size, cloud
concentration would be carried out.
Preffered approach not yet determined.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
Another important area for R&D. Key step is to finalise approach in modelling gas accumulations.
UKCSTS014_049.ai
Figure 5.41 Explosion Modelling – Overpressure Distribution Input Form


2.8.3 Explosion Damage to Structures

BP October 1994
Walls with steel plates fully welded to the support structure may start to buckle at overpressures of
0.2 – 0.3 barg, and bending of the wall support diagonals and secondary structure may take place at
0.3 – 0.5 barg. Walls with steel cladding may collapse and fall off at pressures of 0.1 – 0.2 barg.
The primary columns and horizontal beams at main truss lines are usually very strong.
Initially simple static hand type calculations would be used. If there was a problem then ABACUS (or
similar) non-linear finite element analysis would be used.
As a final resort sections may be tested. SCI Guidance would be used.
Uncontrolled
All. Detail of modelling required would depend on the level of information available, criticality and
objective of the study.
Large numbers of simplifying assumptions are required – important to involve Structural Engineers.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

Explosion effects on structures are difficult to model with certainty. The effect will be considered
to be instantaneous.
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_050.ai
Figure 5.42 Explosion Damage to Structures Input Form


2.8.4 Explosion Modelling – Equipment Damage

BP January 1995
Process equipment with its piping is expected to shake and possibly deform during the explosion.
This type of influence may lead to possible new leakage of hydrocarbons if the equipment is
subjected to a drag force created by an explosion exceeding 0.3 barg.
The drag forces are strongest near the largest explosion venting areas.
Uncontrolled
Information used in escalation modelling – analysis of drag forces would only be considered in
detail design.
6( ) Key Assumptions:
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(9) Does impose its preference? Always Never
,
(16) Are any modifications used? Yes Customised for specific situations.
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_051.ai
Figure 5.43 Explosion Modelling – Equipment Damage Input Form


2.8.5 Explosion Modelling – External Explosions

BP September 1994
No firm approach.
Historically there has been a difference of opinion between experts on the significance of this
phenomenon.
Could be significant.
Need to develop a firm position.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
9) Does BP impose its preference? Always Never
,
10) Can a consultant s model be substituted? Easily No
11) How sensitive are models to this rule set? Very Not at all
12) How subjective is its application? Very Not at all
13) How auditable is it? Easily Not at all
14) How has it been verified/validated (ref)?
15) What are its strengths/weaknesses?
16) Are any modifications used?
17) Are any modifications planned?
18) Other:
UKCSTS014_052.ai
Figure 5.44 Explosion Modelling – External Explosions Input Form


2.8.6 Explosion Modelling – Mitigation Measures

BP September 1994
Background guidance is given in Christian Michelson Institute Gas Explosion Handbook.

Specific cases would be discussed with Sunbury.
Measures include increased and faster venting, reduced congestion optimum vessel orientation
and layout etc.
Uncontrolled
CMI Gas Explosion Handbook (Addendum 1 Ref 25).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
BP is sponsoring research into active and passive explosion mitigation measures.
UKCSTS014_053.ai
Figure 5.45 Explosion Modelling – Mitigation Measures Input Form


3.1.1 Utilities

BP September 1994
Treat in a similar way to topside process hydrocarbons.

Usually on a relatively coarse analysis is required.
Systematic HAZID, looking particularly at causes of failure, is probably the most important part
of analysis.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_054.ai
Figure 5.46 Utilities Input Form


3.2 Other Hazardous Materials

BP January 1995
Ensure these are all identified and assessed using a systematic HAZID process.
Detailed frequency and consequence analysis work not usually required.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_055.ai
Figure 5.47 Other Hazardous Materials Input Form


4.1.1 Impacts – Helicopter and Aircraft

BP January 1995
Refer to 6.4.3.1 Travel Risks.

An incident that results in a fatality during departure/arrival at an Installation may also cause
escalation due to structural damage. A conditional probability has to be based on the specific
Installation and flight path.
Uncontrolled
All.
North Sea Helicopters Accidents (Ammendum 1 Ref 26)
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_056.ai
Figure 5.48 Impacts – Helicopter and Aircraft Input Form


4.1.2 Impacts – Dropped Objects

BP January 1995
(Full details on attached sheet or ref.)
See Safety Engineering Guidelines.
Uncontrolled
(8) Is much interpretation required? Yes/No
Comments: 1 2 3 4
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_057.ai
Figure 5.49 Impacts – Dropped Objects Input Form


4.1.3 Impacts – Ship Collisions

BP January 1995
A summary of assessment approaches is given on the attached sheet.

Hand calculations are largely based on JP Kenny Protection of Offshore Installations Against
Impact – Background Report (ref JTI88535).
Tend to use Safetec to analyse.
Uncontrolled
All.
COLLIDE (Addendum 1 Ref 27).

Protection of Offshore Installations Against Impact (Addendum 1 Ref 28).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
Currently the subject is of much concern as high risk levels are predicted in the North Sea.
UKOOA Marine Committee is sponsoring Safetec to update traffic data which is at the heart of the
COLLIDE model.

Believed to be the best available model.
Note: COLLIDE only covers North Sea.
(17) Are any modifications planned? Yes.
(18) Other:
Subject of inter-governmental department debate in the UK.
UKCSTS014_058.ai
Figure 5.50 Impacts – Ship Collisions Input Form

5-56
UKCS-TS-014
Type of Traffic Traffic Category Vessel Category Mode Assessment Approach
External (Passing) Merchant Small Powered/Drifting Frequency assessment using COLLIDE + structural damage
assessment + fatalities assessment
Medium "
Large

"
Very Large "
Naval Traffic Surface Vessels Powered/Drifting Argued to be negligible. Large vigilant, well-trained crew and
high reliability. Also relatively low numbers
Submerged Vessels Assumed negligible. COLLIDE can model but there is no data
on submarine movements
Fishing Vessels Inshore Powered/Drifting Assumed to be too small to cause any significant damage
Deep Sea Powered/Drifting Taken account of as far as these vessels are included in
COLLIDE
Factory Powered/Drifting "
Offshore Traffic Standby Vessels Powered/Drifting Include in the COLLIDE route database for passing vessels
Supply Vessels Powered/Drifting "
Offshore Tankers Powered/Drifting "
DSVs etc Powered/Drifting Include in the COLLIDE route database for passing vessels
Floating Units Storage Vessels Drifting Hand calculation on a case-by-case basis
Flotel Drifting "
MODU Drifting "
Crane/Barge Drifting "
Field-related Offshore Traffic Supply Vessels On Approach Hand calculation based on JP Kenny and RABL reports
(Visiting Vessels) Attendant "
Figure 5.51 Breakdown of Collision Types

Standby Vessels Powered/Drifting "
Offshore Tankers Powered/Drifting "
DSVs etc Powered/Drifting "
Floating Units Storage Vessels Drifting Hand calculation on a case-by-case basis
Flotel Drifting "
MODU Drifting "
Crane Barge Drifting "
UKCSTS014_059.ai
Best Practice QRA

Uncontrolled

4.1.4 Missiles

BP September 1994
Risks should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Reference gives equations for energy levels assuming the missile is the initiating event for
rotating equipment and pressure vessels.
Uncontrolled
Effects of Missiles on the Topsides of Offshore Platforms (Addendum 1 Ref 29).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_060.ai
Figure 5.52 Missiles Input Form


4.2.1 Earthquake

BP September 1994
Risk in North Sea is low therefore use a simplistic conservative method to give an indication of risk.
Reference compares likely earthquake loads with the design storm loading and derives risk levels
of between 5 x 10 -6 to 6.2 x 10-8.
Uncontrolled
Risk of Structural Failure due to Earthquake (30)
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_061.ai
Figure 5.53 Earthquake Input Form


4.2.2 Subsidence

BP October 1994
Subsidence risk is considered to be negligible for conventional jackets. The height of the Installation
at sealevel (LAT) is monitored. Also the relative height of the well conductors and the topside can be
used as a guide.
The subsidence risk for unconventional jackets or Installations may need to be assessed but if a
potential problem was identified it would be controlled by implementing a system for increased
monitoring of the Installation position and as long as the appropriate system was implemented as part
of the Installation operation the risks from subsidence would be considered negligible.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_062.ai
Figure 5.54 Subsidence Input Form


4.2.3 Scour

BP October 1994
Scour is treated in a similar way to subsidence. If a potential problem is identified, as may be the case
in the Southern North Sea, it is monitored and controlled as part of the Safety Management System.
The residual risk is considered to be negligible.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_063.ai
Figure 5.55 Scour Input Form


4.2.4 Severe Storm, Structural Failure

BP September 1994
From Reference 31 – risk of failure of a structural component is 1 x 10-5, with addition of redundancy and
overall structural system failure that reduces to approx 1 x 10-6.
Effect on topside is covered in Reference 32. Conservatively the overall risk that the actual
applied load will exceed the resistance is less than 1 x 10-5.
Uncontrolled
Reference 23 – designed to 100 year storm, DoE Offshore Installations: Guidance on Design and
Construction, June 1990 and API RP2A August 1991.
Risk of Structural Failure due to Extreme Environmental Events (Addendum 1 Ref 31).
Risk of Structural Failure of Topsides due to Extreme Environmental Events (Addendum 1 Ref 32).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_064.ai
Figure 5.56 Severe Storm, Structural Failure Input Form


4.3.1 Structural Failure

BP September 1994
The risk of structural failure of primary components of Installation jackets, sufficient to cause Installation
collapse and affect the TR, due to fatigue is low, of the order of 1 x 10-7, and due to corrosion is
considered negligible.
Uncontrolled
Risk of Structural Failure due to Fatigue or Corrosion (Addendum 1 Ref 33).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_065.ai
Figure 5.57 Structural Failure Input Form


4.4.1 SIMOPS – Approach

BP January 1995
A thorough HAZID is conducted.

Hazards are assessed if necessary using best practice as defined in these input forms.
Uncontrolled
All.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_066.ai
Figure 5.58 SIMOPS – Approach Input Form


4.5 Other Hazards – Miscellaneous

BP January 1995
Ensure all hazards are systematically identified using a HAZID.

Limited more detailed analysis required – addressed by design.
Uncontrolled
All.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_067.ai
Figure 5.59 Other Hazards – Miscellaneous Input Form


5.1.1 How is Escalation Handled?

BP January 1995
Handling of escalation is determined largely by the sophistication of the event tree modelling
approach.
Would normally address wall, floor, ceiling collapse; internal fire escalation within a module;
escalation to risers; escalation to a blowout; BLEVE of condensate/LPG vessels.
Uncontrolled
Escalation is only usually taken into account at concept design and later.
Numerous critical assumptions have to be made.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

Difficult to handle escalations rigorously using classical event tree approach.
(17) Are any modifications planned? Possibly look to developing/buying a

comprehensive risk management package.
(18) Other:
PLATO (Addendum 1 Ref 24) offers a much better approach to the handling of escalation. It has been
reviewed in detail and would need significant upgrading to be best practice in other areas.
UKCSTS014_068.ai
Figure 5.60 How is Escalation Handled?


5.1.2 How are Events Grouped into Escalation Categories?

BP January 1995
TR impairment is usually taken as the final escalation event. Events that could impair the TR are
identified, together with escalation mechanisms by which these events could be realised.
Typically worst case fires and explosions in each 'area' of an Installation are considered together with
fires in multiple adjacent areas.
The mechanism by which smaller explosion and fire events would lead to these 'worst cases'
is also considered.
Uncontrolled
Concept design or more detailed.
Numerous critical assumptions have to be made.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

Heavily reliant on judgement.
(18) Other:
Again PLATO (Addendum 1 Ref 34) handles better.
UKCSTS014_069.ai
Figure 5.61 How are Events Grouped into Escalation Categories?


5.1.3 Time Effects

BP January 1995
In conventional fault tree analysis it is difficult to consider more than three or perhaps four time
stages: time to detection; immediate; personnel mustered in the TR; personnel evacuating by
lifeboat.
Smoke and gas impairment calculations do need to take account of time more rigorously, as impairment
is a combination of concentration and exposure time.
Uncontrolled
Simplification of the time sequence of events.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

Difficult to form a good picture of the development of an incident with time particularly escalating
scenarios.
(18) Other:
Again PLATO (Addendum 1 Ref 34) handles better.
UKCSTS014_070.ai
Figure 5.62 Time Effects Input Form


5.1.4 Structural Collapse Modelling

BP October 1994
Relatively simple calculations may be possible if primary load paths can be identified. For multi-load
paths, cantilevers etc USFOS type modelling would be carried out to model progressive collapse.
Tall structure support and collapse to be included. In a fire most structures will be OK for 5 minutes but
will be impaired after 15 minutes. With blowdown the critical period in a jet fire is within those limits.
For local area collapse, use ABACUS or USFOS but engineering judgement is still a vital part of the
analysis. Steel sheet (approximately 6mm) will not collapse and form holes if subjected to a jet fire
(red hot curtain). Use SCI and JIP guidance.
Uncontrolled
Consider what strength is required as a minimum to avoid escalation.
All.
ABACUS (Addendum 1 Ref 35).

USFOS (Addendum 1 Ref 36).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_071.ai
Figure 5.63 Structural Collapse Modelling Input Form


5.1.5 Additional Inventory Involvement

BP January 1995
Local area: Explosion, jet fires and pool fires are assumed to have the potential to result in
escalation to the 'worst' possible fire in the area (usually an extensive oil fire).
Adjacent areas: Explosion, jet fires and pool fires are assumed to have the potential to result in
escalation to the 'worst' possible fires in adjacent areas.
Uncontrolled
Fairly detailed QRA.
Relatively simple ruler sets have to be established to make the analysis manageable.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_072.ai
Figure 5.64 Additional Inventory Involvement Input Form


5.1.6 Effect of Installation Safety Systems

BP January 1995
ESD and blowdown usually assumed to work with account perhaps taken of local valve failure.
To date vunerability of other safety systems has been considered in order to assist in optimising
their design but has not typically fed back into overall risk assessment.
Uncontrolled

Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
There may be increased focus in this area of escalation with the introduction of the PFEER Regulations
(Addendum 1 Ref 37) in the middle of 1995.
UKCSTS014.073
Figure 5.65 Effect of Installation Safety Systems Input Form


6.1.1 TR Impairment Definitions

BP September 1994
• By smoke when carboxyhaemoglobin exceeds 15%, the exposure to air temperature exceeds an (TBA)
• By flammable gas if it is credible for gas at flammable concentrations to ingress into the TR
• By toxic gas if limits rise above those specified in Table 4 of the reference
• By significant damage to TR walls
• By significant damage to the TR supporting structure
Uncontrolled
All.
Impairment Criteria HSQ Guidance 01.05.07.
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_074.ai
Figure 5.66 TR Impairment Definitions Input Form


6.1.2 Smoke and Gas Ingress Modelling

BP October 1994
MODVENT or a detailed CFD model, is used to calculate the concentration at the points of interest
and then SGICALC calculates the ingress and the time dependent effect.
Determines whether TR is impaired by smoke, flammable gas or toxic gas.
Estimates the frequency of impairment.
Uncontrolled
MODVENT (Addendum 1 Ref 14).

HSQ Guidance on Smoke Modelling (Addendum 1 Ref 23).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_075.ai
Figure 5.67 Smoke and Gas Ingress Modelling Input Form


6.1.3 TR Structural Damage/Collapse

BP October 1994
Similar rule sets apply to those covered in 4.3.1.

Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_076.ai
Figure 5.68 TR Structural Damage/Collapse Input Form


6.2.1 EER

BP January 1995
Basic approach is presented in guidelines of forthwith EER studies for existing Installations.
Will be seeking advice from consultants on current industry best practice.
Uncontrolled
'Forthwith' Study EER Methodology (Addendum 1 Ref 38).
Comments: 1 2 3 4

Out of date.
(18) Other:
There may be increased focus on this area with the introduction of the PFEER Regulations
UKCSTS014_077.ai
Figure 5.69 EER Input Form


6.3 Emergency Systems

BP January 1995
Basic approach is presented in guidelines of forthwith ESR studies for existing Installations.
Will be seeking advice from consultants on current industry best practice.
Uncontrolled
All.
'Forthwith' Study EGR Methodology (Addendum 1 Ref 39).
(8) Is much interpretation required? Yes/No
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,

Out of date.
(18)Other:
There may be increased focus on this area with the introduction of the PFEER Regulations
UKCSTS014_078.ai
Figure 5.70 Emergency Systems Input Form


6.4.1 Local Fatalities

BP January 1995
Limited internal experience – looking for guidance from pre-qualified QRA consultants.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_079.ai
Figure 5.71 Local Fatalities Input Form


6.4.2 Escalation Fatalities

BP January 1995
Limited internal experience – looking for guidance from pre-qualified QRA consultants.
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_080.ai
Figure 5.72 Escalation Fatalities Input Form


6.4.3.1 Travel Risks

BP September 1994
(Full details on attached sheet or Addendum 1 Ref 19).
Ref (Addendum 1 Ref 26) gives Accident Rates/100,000 of 1.35 per flight hour cruise and 0.74 per
flight stage departure/arrival: Conditional probability of injury accident of 0.15 cruise and 0.35 departure/
arrival; and probability of an injury in an injury accident of injury 0.11/fatality 0.82 cruise, and injury 0.2/
fatality 0.48 departure/arrival. The serious injury or fatality rate is the product of the three appropriate
numbers. Lower rates may be justified depending on the aircraft type eg Dauphin but the available data
Uncontrolled
and hence robustness of the results is lower.
North Sea Helicopter Accidents (Addendum 1 Ref 26).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_081.ai
Figure 5.73 Travel Risks Input Form


6.4.3.2 Occupational Risk

BP September 1994
Comparison of industry and BP data gives the following information:

FARs (24-hour basis) are: Drilling + Production 7.5; Construction 14.5; Catering + Admin 0;
Diving 0; All staff 3.4.
Individual Occupational Risk = FAR x Hours exposed per person per year x 10-8.
Average occupational risk-based on 20 weeks offshore per year, 24-hour exposure the FAR of 3.4
equates to 1.1 x 10-4 per year.
Uncontrolled
All.
HSQ Guidance Document on Occupational Risk (Addendum 1 Ref 40).
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
Needs to be amended and brought up to date.
UKCSTS014_082.ai
Figure 5.74 Occupational Risk Input Form


6.4.4 Fatalities – Summations

BP January 1995
Limited internal experience – looking for guidance from pre-qualified consultants.
Potential loss of life (statistical number of average fatalities per year) and the individual risk of various
worker groups have typically been calculated.
FN results have not historically been produced but would be useful in the future.
Uncontrolled

Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_083.ai
Figure 5.75 Fatalities – Summations Input Form


7.0 Business Exposure

BP January 1995
Whilst the focus has in recent years been primarily on personnel risk, there is a growing awareness that
QRA work should be extended to address the broader business risk issues to all safety and
environmental incidents. Some provisional outline guidance is available in (Ammendum 1 Ref 41).
Uncontrolled
Comments: 1 2 3 4
,
(18) Other:
UKCSTS014_084.ai
Figure 5.76 Business Exposure Input Form

Addendum 1
References
(1) Model for Predicting the Risk of a Blowout During Offshore Operations, Scandpower,
Procedure No 21.75.73, February 1994. Phase II Report, December 1994.
(2) PARLOC 92 The Update of Loss Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines, Advanced
Mechanics and Engineering Ltd, 362.1, Feb 1993.
(3) CIRRUS.
(4) PLAC.
Uncontrolled
(5) Review of Riser Failure Frequency Data, HSQ.

(6) Risk Analysis, COFLEXIP, 0502-G-017, Rev 1, July 1994.
(7) Riser Hazard Analysis Guidelines Phase 1, BP Engineering, T89/1012, July 1989.
(8) Exploration and Production (E&P) Forum QRA Data Directory, (current project – please
contact Mike Wendes).
(9) HARP.
(10) E&P Forum Hydrocarbon Leak and Ignition Database, DNV Technica, N658, Jan 1992.
(11) HSE Hydrocarbon Leak Database, (current project – please contact Mike Wendes).
(12) E&P Forum Hydrocarbon Leak Database, (current project – please contact Mike Wendes).
(13) JETDISP.
(14) MODVENT.
(15) FLOWPOR.
(16) Classification of Hazardous Areas, Conilees, Ang; I Chem.E, 1992.
(17) BPFLARE.
(18) Interim Guidance Notes for the Design and Protection of Topside Structures Against
Explosion and Fire, The Steel Construction Institute, SI1691001.FNT, Nov 1991.
(19) BPPOOL.
(20) Guidance on the Assessment of Sea Pool Fires, HSQ 01.05.02 rev 1.
(21) FIREX.
(22) Handbook for Fire Calculations and Fire Risk Assessment in the Process Industry,
Scandpower/SINTEF, 1992.
(23) Method for the Assessment of Smoke and Gas Ingress, HSQ 01.03.01 rev 0.
(24) FLACS.
(25) Gas Explosion Handbook Version 1.2, Christian Michelson Research, CMR-93-A25034,
Sep 1993.
References
November 2001 Issue 1 Add 1-1
(26) North Sea Offshore Helicopter Accidents, PenTech, Nov 1993.

(27) COLLIDE.
(28) Protection of Offshore Installations Against Impact, J P Kenny, OT188535, 1988.
(29) Effect of Missiles on the Topsides of Offshore Platforms, BP Engineering,
21154/ESR.93.ER.069, July 1993.
(30) Risk of Structural Failure Due to Earthquakes, BP Engineering, 221098/ESR.93.065,
July 1993.
(31) Risk of Structural Failure due to Extreme Environmental Events, BP Engineering,
220967/ESR.93.ER.062, June 1993.
(32) Risk of Structural Failure of Topsides due to Extreme Environmental Events,
BP Engineering 221097/ESR.93.ER.067, July 1993.
Uncontrolled
(33) Risk of Structural Failure due to Fatigue or Corrosion, BP Engineering,
221099/ESR.93.ER,066, July 1993.
(34) PLATO.
(35) ABACUS.
(36) USFOS.
(37) Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response)
Regulations 1995.
(38) Forthwith Study; Evaluation, Escape and Rescue Analysis Methodology, Cullen Team.
(39) Forthwith Study; Emergency Systems Review Methodology, Cullen Team.
(40) Occupational Risk, HSQ/SE/93/004 rev 1 , April 1993.
(41) XEU HSE Exposure Management – Position Paper, HSQ.
References
Add 1-2 November 2001 Issue 1
Addendum 2
HSQ Controlled Documents
Date of Issue: Thursday, 1 December 1994

Document No Rev Title
Policies
HSQ 00.01.02 rev 0 HSE Competence Assurance Programme
HSQ 01.01.01 rev 0 Risk Acceptability Criteria; XEU Statement of Policy
Standards
Uncontrolled
HSQ 00.02.02 rev 0 Asset Managers’ HSE Obligations

HSQ 01.02.01 rev 0 HSE Risk Analysis Standard
HSQ 01.02.02 rev 1 Emergency Response Goals
HSQ 01.02.03 rev 0 Offshore Installation Manager Selection and Training
HSQ 01.02.05 rev 0 Standard for Notification and Recording of Fatalities
HSQ 10.02.06 rev 0 HSQ Document Identification System
Guidance
HSQ 01.05.02 rev 1 User Guide for Serious Occurrence Reporting
HSQ 01.05.05 rev 3 Guidance on the Loss Potential Matrix
HSQ 01.05.06 rev 0 HSE Document Catalogue
HSQ 01.05.07 rev 0a Impairment Criteria
HSQ 01.05.08 rev 0 Ship Collision Risk Assessment
HSQ 01.05.10 rev 0 Offshore Safety Cases. Material Change Criteria
HSQ 01.05.11 rev 0 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations; Risk
Assessment Guidelines
HSQ 01.05.13 rev 1 UK Offshore Safety Legislation
HSQ 01.05.18 rev 2 Remedial Action Guidelines
HSQ 01.05.19 rev 0 Display Screen Equipment Regulations, Guidance for
Co-ordinators
HSQ 01.06.01 rev 0 Risk Acceptability Criteria Application in Offshore Safety Cases
Note: Revision numbers are current at date of issue of this index.
HSQ Controlled Documents

November 2001 Issue 1 Add 2-1/2
Addendum 3
Safety Engineering Guidance Documents
(1) Critical Safety Review Guidelines 01.05.16

(2) HAZID Guidelines 01.05.01
(3) Risk Management Model 01.05.12
(4) Emergency System Goals 01.02.04
(5) Emergency Escape and Rescue Goals 01.02.02
(6) Dropped Object Methodology 01.05.15
Uncontrolled
(7) HAZOP Guidelines 01.05.26

(8) Ranking Study Method for Concept Selection (W S Atkins)
(9) HSE Philosophy Guidelines (Offshore) 01.02.08
(10) HSE Plan Guidelines (Offshore)
(11) Offshore Safety Case Guidelines 01.05.04
Safety Engineering Guidance Documents

November 2001 Issue 1 Add 3-1/2

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Best Practice QRA UKCS-TS-014

Authorisation for Issue

Section 1 Methods and Models – BP Best Practice

Section 3 Index System for QRA Technical

Section 5 Information Input Forms

Addendum 2 HSQ Controlled Documents

November 2001 Issue 1 i/ii

Authorisation for Issue

Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG

November 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

For Audit Use

November 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Issue No Date Description

November 2001 Issue 1 vii/viii

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

November 2001 Issue 1 ix/x

• Use of OIR/12 data for predicting release frequencies

Review and Update

November 2001 Issue 1 xi

xii November 2001 Issue 1

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

EER Evacuation, Escape and Rescue

November 2001 Issue 1 xiii/xiv

1.5 Safety Engineering Guidelines 2

Methods and Models – BP Best Practice

comparability of the risk assessment work carried out for BP.

1.1 QRA Technical Alignment – Areas for Comparison

Methods and Models – BP Best Practice

1.3 Internal Contacts and BP/External Consulting Support

1.4 HSQ Controlled Documents

1.5 Safety Engineering Guidelines

Methods and Models – BP Best Practice

Areas for Comparison

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (Input Forms) Comments/Aspects to be Included

Consequence and Frequency

November 2001 Issue 1

Figure 2.1 QRA ‘Best Practice’ – Areas for Comparison

Heavy gas dispersion

Areas for Comparison

Toxic Gas Dispersion Open Field Toxic gas dispersion/effects

Structural response, PFP effect

Figure 2.1 QRA ‘Best Practice’ – Areas for Comparison (cont’d)

November 2001 Issue 1

Structural response, PFP effect

Structural Response, PFP effect

November 2001 Issue 1

Figure 2.1 QRA ‘Best Practice’ – Areas for Comparison (cont’d)

Other Hazards Impacts Helicopter and aircraft

Areas for Comparison

SIMOPS Approach All associated risks

Figure 2.1 QRA ‘Best Practice’ – Areas for Comparison (cont’d)

November 2001 Issue 1

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (Input Forms) Comments/Aspects to be Included

November 2001 Issue 1

How combined with TR impairment