HSE Risk Analysis Standard UKCS-TS-015

Contents

Authorisation for Issue

Amendment Record
Amendment Summary
Distribution List
Preface
List of Abbreviations

Paragraph Page
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1 Introduction 1
1.1 Implementation of BP Group Policy 1
1.2 HSE Risk Management 1

2 Application, Purpose and Content of this Standard 1

2.1 Application 1
2.2 Purpose 2
2.3 Content 2

3 BP HSE Expectations 2
3.1 Main Objectives 2
3.2 Assessment, Assurance and Improvement 3

4 Risk Analysis Methodologies 3

4.1 Analysis of Operational Activities 4
4.2 ‘Technical’ Risk Assessment 4
4.3 Major Hazard Analysis 5
4.4 Risk Acceptance Criteria 6

5 Implementing Risk Reducing Methods 7

5.1 Types of Risk Reducing Measures 7
5.2 Emergency Response Considerations 7

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Contents (cont’d)

Paragraph Page

6 Application to Phases of Activity 7

6.1 Seismic 7
6.2 Drilling 7
6.3 Concept Selection 8
6.4 Concept Development 8
6.5 Design 8

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6.6 Fabrication and Installation 9
6.7 Operation 9
6.8 Abandonment 9

7 Updating of Risk Analysis 9

Addendum 1 References

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Authorisation for Issue

Issue Authority
Name: Jon Turnbull

Signature: ________________________________________________

Date: ________________________________________________

Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

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Technical Authority
Name: David Aberdeen

Signature: ________________________________________________

Date: ________________________________________________

Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG

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Amendment Record

For Audit Use

Amendment Incorporated By
Checked
Number
Name Signature Date Signature Date
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AMOSAF.171

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Amendment Summary

Issue No Date Description

Issue 1 November 2001 First issue.
Issue 1/AM01 March 2002 TBA
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Distribution List

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

Virtual Copyholders

Copy Copyholder
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01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

02 Document Technical Authority (David Aberdeen)
03 EoS Document Controller (Dave Taylor)
04 EoS Operations Excellence HSE Consultant (David Egan)
05 OIM, Magnus
06 OIM, North West Hutton
07 OIM, Thistle
08 NWH/Thistle HSE Adviser
09 BSG SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Malcolm)
10 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Faulkner)
11 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Thompson)
12 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Carl Thomessen)
13 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Justin Haigh)
14 CNS SMS Co-ordinator (Jim Blacklaws)
15 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (David Robertson)
16 NBU EPU SMS Co-ordinator (David Egan)
17 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (John Beaumont)
18 NSI SMS Co-ordinator (Ann Rosbrook)
19 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Malcolm Watson)
20 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Simon Robinson)
21 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Bruce Morrison)

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Preface

Purpose
This document gives guidelines on the risk analysis procedures that should be applied to new
and existing facilities; the occasions when they are carried out and the methodologies which
can be used, and includes the role of acceptance criteria in assessing the acceptability of the
risks identified.

Document Status
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This document is quite old and needs significant revision but the basic principles remain valid.
This document outlines the role of various hazard identification and risk assessment processes
used throughout the life of a facility.
The main areas requiring revision include:
• Techniques currently used by the wells/drilling community
• Including better coverage of environmental risks
• Cross-referencing with Capital Value Process (CVP)

Review and Update

This document will be subject to 12-monthly review and update, when document holders will
have the opportunity to express opinions and suggest improvements.
However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document.
As such, any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an
Amendment Proposal proforma which is available electronically on the UK Upstream SMS
website, from the Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor or from the Technical Authority.
All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.

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Responsibility of Copyholders
It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to
maintain the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly
incorporated and acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant
Technical Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (UKCS-DCM-001).

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List of Abbreviations

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

COSHH Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
CVP Capital Value Process
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard and Operability
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
PHSER Project HSE Review
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QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

SIL Safety Integrity Level
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf

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1 Introduction
1.1 Implementation of BP Group Policy
The introduction to GHSER (Addendum 1 Ref 1) states that our goal is that ‘BP will be
distinctive worldwide in our pursuit of and attainment of HSE performance’.
It also states that a key process in achieving this goal is ‘through regular risk
assessments and risk management programmes’.
This is further emphasised within the 13 elements of GHSER (Addendum 1 Ref 2) and in
the BP Group HSE Standard on Process Safety/Integrity Management (Addendum 1
Ref 3), as detailed in Paragraph 3.

1.2 HSE Risk Management

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A fundamental component of HSE Risk Management is that all activities should be

subjected to an appropriate level of risk analysis to enable potential loss exposures to be
identified, and value judgements (both quantitative and qualitative) to be made on the
acceptability or otherwise of those exposures. The level at which such analyses are
carried out and the rigour applied to them is entirely dependent on the nature of the
perceived risk, but must be undertaken to enable BP’s general management to
be confident that BP’s operation takes place in an atmosphere of ‘knowledge’ rather
than ‘ignorance’.
Professional HSE support is available within UTG and other parts of BP to help advise
line management responsible for making judgements on these issues.

2 Application, Purpose and Content of this Standard

2.1 Application
In BP Exploration, risk analysis should be applied to all phases in the development,
operation and abandonment of an offshore oil and gas field. The approach adopted will
depend on the nature of these phases which have, for convenience, been divided into
the following sequence:
• Seismic
• Drilling
• Concept selection
• Concept development
• Design
• Fabrication and installation
• Operation
• Abandonment

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2.2 Purpose
Risk analysis should be used to help make timely and informed decisions about the
acceptability of any of BP’s activities which may have implications for the health and
safety of individuals, the environment, BP’s facilities and business success. It will be
applied not just to day-to-day activities on an ongoing basis, but will be used as a
fundamental guide in all development work to help ensure that decisions on the way
forward are made at a time when any necessary changes can most easily be introduced.

2.3 Content
Paragraph 3 describes the BP overall loss control objectives. The application of risk
analysis techniques is an essential element in the achievement of these objectives.
Paragraph 4 describes the range of risk analysis techniques which may be used during

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each of the phases referred to above. The approach will vary markedly from one phase
to another but will consist essentially of:
• Hazard identification
• Consequence analysis (qualitative and quantitative)
• Risk analysis (qualitative and quantitative)
• Risk assessment (comparison with risk acceptance criteria)
• Identification of risk reducing measures
• Assessment of risk reducing measures and ALARP demonstration
Paragraph 5 outlines the approach that will be adopted when assessing the risk reducing
measures identified.
The detailed approach to each of the phases of activity which should be applied is further
described in Paragraph 6.
Paragraph 7 refers to the approach to the updating of risk analyses.

3 BP HSE Expectations
3.1 Main Objectives
Summaries of the main HSE Expectations relevant to risk assessment are set out below.
Details are contained in Addendum 1 Ref 2.
• Element 2 Risk Assessment and Management
We will regularly identify the hazards and assess the risks associated with our
activities. We will take appropriate action to manage the risks.
• Element 5 Facilities Design and Construction
Potential hazards are identified and HSE risks assessed, using appropriate risk
assessment tools at specific stages of a project from concept through to startup,
and risks are mitigated through risk management techniques.

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• Element 6 Operations and Maintenance

Risks introduced by simultaneous operations are assessed and managed.
• Element 7 Management of Change
All temporary and permanent changes will be evaluated and managed to ensure that
HSE risks remain at an acceptable level.
These expectations are reinforced by the BP Group HSE Standard Process Safety and
Integrity, in particular Elements 1 and 2.
• Hazard Evaluation
All facilities must systematically identify hazards within its boundary arising from
normal and abnormal operations and shall eliminate/control/mitigate the hazards such
that residual risks are as low as is reasonably practicable. Hazards are to be formally
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analysed for likelihood and severity and communicated to and understood by

the workforce. Risk Assessments using techniques appropriate to the process
complexity shall be carried out as necessary to understand the risks and ensure that
they are managed.
• Management of Change
All facilities shall maintain a Management of Change system for temporary and
permanent process, equipment, operating and organisational changes to ensure
continued safe operation.

3.2 Assessment, Assurance and Improvement

Element 13 of GHSER states that we assess compliance with GHSER expectations by
internal and external assessments.

4 Risk Analysis Methodologies

Risk analysis methodologies are numerous and varied and must be selected to suit the
subject matter. In all cases the subject matter will need to be broken down into small
parts to systematically identify the hazards and assess the risks.
A fundamental feature of all analyses is that they shall be conducted by personnel who
are appropriately qualified for the methodology selected and have the necessary support,
information and resources they require.

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4.1 Analysis of Operational Activities

A rigorous and structured approach will be applied to all operational/worksite activities
and will include:
• Permit to Work
In the case of all operations the Permit to Work System will be applied (Addendum 1
Ref 5). This will oblige experienced personnel to identify potential hazards, consider
their potential likelihood and severity, and to stipulate – in writing – the various control
measures which need to be implemented. This control helps establish levels of risk
which, based on knowledge, experience, and Company requirements, are intuitively
judged to be ‘acceptable’.
• Task Risk Assessments
Routine tasks will be reviewed by experienced personnel and those deemed as

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critical, based on a qualitative assessment, will be subject to a more formal review,
such as task risk assessment (Addendum 1 Ref 6). In this manner, effective controls
appropriate to all sources of loss identified with specific tasks will be implemented.
When ‘one-off’ tasks arise, these will be subject to a similar review and, if deemed
necessary, a full task risk assessment, so that a work plan can be devised which
reduces any risk to an acceptable level and as low as is reasonably practicable.
Tasks which involve operations on a hazardous process plant should include a HAZOP
to ensure identification of hazards.
Work on electrical equipment should be covered by an Electrical Task Criticality
Assessment.
• Other Analyses
In the UK it is a legal requirement that all risks are assessed. These assessments
should be documented unless they are so self-evident and repeatable that
the assessment can be readily reproduced by non-specialists. Specific required risk
assessments include COSHH, Noise, Manual Handling and Environmental Impact
assessments.

4.2 ‘Technical’ Risk Assessment

GHSER expectations also require effective assessment of engineering-related hazards to
allow appropriate safety engineering controls to be incorporated into BP facilities.
A variety of risk identification and analysis tools are used by different engineering
disciplines as part of these engineering controls to help to identify and eliminate or
mitigate hazards. Amongst the most common are the use of design codes, checklists,
reliability analysis, electrical area classification, SIL assessments, corrosion risk
assessments etc.

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4.2.1 Modifications
All process and facility modifications should be subject to the Facilities Change Process
(Addendum 1 Ref 4) in which qualified personnel review all such proposals and assess
the impact on the levels of risk, utilising the results from other studies they may
commission, eg HAZOP. Changes to mode of operation and procedures will also be
subject to a similar level of review.

4.2.2 HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPs) will be applied to engineering drawings
(P&IDs) pre-sanction and at a detailed design stage. This is a team-based approach
intended to identify all the conceivable hazards and problems that could prevent safe and
efficient operation of a plant (Addendum 1 Ref 8).
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4.2.3 Project HSE Reviews/Peer Reviews

The size and complexity of a project or modification determines the nature of the
assessment carried out. In the case of major projects, a number of reviews will be
applied in accordance with the CVP procedures and current PHSER Guidelines
(Addendum 1 Ref 7), ie at pre-project, design proposal, detailed design, construction,
pre-commissioning, post-commissioning stages. This will ensure that there is confidence
that appropriate engineering solutions or operational procedures will be developed to
control the identified hazards.

4.3 Major Hazard Analysis

4.3.1 Major Hazard Identification

As an initial step in an analysis of the risks presented by major hazards, systematic
HAZID reviews should be made of all facilities at various stages in the design process
and the life of a facility by a suitably qualified team to identify all types of event which
could lead to significant loss of life, damage to the environment or the facility
(Addendum 1 Ref 10).
These reveiws initiate the process of cataloging and risk ranking hazards and
documenting the means by which they will be minimised.

4.3.2 Quantified Risk Assessment

For most types of risk assessment, a simple risk ranking based on a subjective
assessment of the likely consequences and associated probability is adequate.
However, in the case of identified major hazards, when it is possible to identify the
remote chance of large accidents occurring, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) will
provide numerical consideration of both the likelihood and consequences of accidental
events. The results of this will help resource allocation decisions by allowing the cost
effectiveness of alternative risk reducing options to be assessed (Addendum 1 Ref 11).

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QRA associated with major hazard events will be undertaken in two phases of
the development of a major project – a concept safety evaluation at concept
design stage, and a more detailed approach at the final design stage (refer to
Paragraph 6 for more details).
The need for further QRA on existing Installations/operations will be selectively
undertaken when circumstances suggest it is appropriate, eg new knowledge;
in examining significant hardware or operational modifications, changes of use or
extensions to existing plant or where a major accident either within BP or elsewhere in
the industry suggests the possible need to retrofit additional safety equipment.

4.4 Risk Acceptance Criteria

4.4.1 General

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Prior to carrying out a risk analysis, suitable risk acceptance criteria will be defined to
enable decisions to be made on the basis of the analysis. These criteria will clearly
reflect the risk assessment method employed. Consequently they may range from
purely qualitative at one extreme through to fully quantitative at the other. In all cases
risk analysis should not be used in isolation or in a mechanistic way. It provides one input
into the decision-making process.

4.4.2 Quantitative Risk Acceptance Criteria

Quantitative techniques help enable risks to be numerically ranked in order of priority.
In order to make full use of such quantified studies appropriate numerical criteria can be
used to help judge the acceptability of estimated risk levels.
BP’s policy on risk assessment criteria is given in Addendum 1 Ref 12. A three-tier
framework is adopted. Risks in the lower tier are considered sufficiently low that effort
to analyse them and reduce them further is not justifiable. Risks in the intermediate tier
shall be analysed and reduced to ensure they are As Low As Resonably Practicable
(ALARP). Risks in the upper tier shall be given immediate attention and a response
developed which is commensurate with the scale of the threat.

4.4.3 Qualitative Risk Acceptance Criteria

It is not necessary to resort to a purely quantitative assessment or to numerical
acceptance criteria in order to make risk management decisions on the majority of
hazards. In such cases the acceptability or otherwise of an identified risk and any
associated risk reducing measures will be determined on the basis of a collective
judgement using experienced and knowledgeable personnel, and current industrial
standards.

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5 Implementing Risk Reducing Methods

When risk analysis indicates measures are necessary to prevent, control and mitigate
accidental events so that the residual risks are within our acceptance criteria, those
measures should be implemented in a planned, timed and controlled manner.

5.1 Types of Risk Reducing Measures

Risk reducing measures can include technical, operational and organisational techniques
which can reduce both the probability and consequences of a hazardous situation arising
and escalating. Priority will always be given to using measures which prevent or reduce
the probability of such situations. Nevertheless, depending on the phase of the activity,
a degree of reliance may have to be placed on consequence reducing methods.
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Priority should also be given to passive or inherently safe options. Active protection
options which rely on a number of devices to operate and/or human intervention
may fail.

5.2 Emergency Response Considerations

Should probability and other consequence reducing measures prove insufficient,
an emergency response analysis will be carried out to determine if the systems and
facilities available will satisfactorily reduce risk of loss to within levels of acceptability.

6 Application to Phases of Activity

Whether or not risk analysis is based on a quantitative or qualitative approach, emphasis
should be placed on the quality and appropriate timing of such work and the selection of
appropriate acceptance criteria to assist in assessing the results.
The approach adopted in each of the activity phases referred to in Paragraph 2 is
discussed briefly below.

6.1 Seismic
The potential for safety, environmental and financial losses should normally be assessed
using qualitative techniques.

6.2 Drilling
The nature of drilling requires substantial materials handling and interfacing with
operational machinery. The potential for injury and discharge to the environment is high,
as reflected in historical accident statistics. Rigorous task risk assessments should
therefore be carried out to help ensure that drilling operations are carried out with
exposures to loss suitably controlled.

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Drilling also presents major hazards which are divided into those connected with
structural integrity and stability, and those connected with uncontrolled releases of
hydrocarbons. For the latter the emphasis is normally placed on maintaining barriers to
contain the reservoir fluids and the risks associated with barrier failure. These risks
should be systematically analysed using quantified techniques where appropriate to
ensure that all measures to prevent, control and mitigate accidental events are taken to
reduce residual risks below the maximum tolerable levels and further reduce them to as
low as is reasonably practicable.
Other risks include dropped objects and those associated with simultaneous or
combined operations.

6.3 Concept Selection

When selecting an appropriate concept for a new development or an extension of an

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existing development, all of the safety, environment and financial loss exposures should
be reviewed and incorporated in the concept selection process. A ranking of possible
concepts in terms of these issues should be made which, with appropriate weightings,
can be taken into account along with other technical and financial factors.

6.4 Concept Development

Once a concept type has been selected, interactive studies will be used to help to
develop the concept in terms of orientation layout, explosion barriers, fire barriers,
evacuation systems etc. The overall objective is to ensure the concept is basically
sound and unlikely to require significant and expensive changes later in the project
development process.
When the concept development is nearing completion a concept safety evaluation will
be carried out following the standardised approach set out in Addendum 1 Ref 13.
This primarily considers major losses. The results are compared with quantified risk
acceptance criteria to ensure residual risks are justified, tolerable and reduced to as low
as reasonably practicable.

6.5 Design
More specific and deeper studies will be undertaken at the detailed design stage,
eg to define ‘design scenarios’ for active/passive fire protection and explosion design,
and assess reliability of critical systems. For each area of use, pre-defined standards of
acceptability will be used to assist in evaluating the results. The objective will be
to assess if remedial measures are clearly worthwhile, unnecessary or marginal.
In the latter case, a cost benefit analysis may be employed to assist decisions on
high-cost options.
At the end of design the continuing validity of the concept safety evaluation will be
reviewed and if necessary, the study updated.

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6.6 Fabrication and Installation

Quantified risk analysis techniques are typically not applicable to the safety,
environmental and financial loss exposures encountered during fabrication and
installation. A balanced qualitative approach will therefore be adopted reflecting the
degree of operational autonomy of the principal contractors.

6.7 Operation
Occupational hazards associated with the operational phase will be identified, ranked and
evaluated using a formalised review such as task risk assessments.
Any one-off tasks are considered on an individual basis as they arise and will be subject
to review using task risk assessment or HAZOP approaches.
The overall QRA available at the end of design will be regularly reviewed and updated,
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if necessary, to reflect any significant changes such as operating conditions, manning,

data or criteria, or lessons learned from accidents in BP or other Operators.
Major modifications to an Installation are considered in much the same way as described
in Paragraphs 6.3 to 6.5, though clearly the scale is smaller. The overall QRA will finally
be updated to include the modification.

6.8 Abandonment
When decisions on abandonment are made, a review will be made at the time to identify
the appropriate risk analysis methodology.
As with concept selection the HSE and financial loss exposures of each option should be
evaluated prior to selecting the abandonment route.

7 Updating of Risk Analysis

Key considerations leading to the need to review and as appropriate update a risk
analysis including:
• Changes to a concept during detailed design
• Changes in operating conditions and organisational arrangements
• New knowledge and statistical databases becoming available
• Experience gained from accidental events
• Availability of new analytical methods
• Changes in acceptance criteria

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Addendum 1
References

(1) Introduction to GHSER signed by GVP HSE.

(2) BP HSE Management System Framework (GHSER).
(3) BP Group HSE Standard – Process Safety/Integrity Management.
(4) Facilities Change Process (UKCS-CHM-002).
(5) Permit to Work as described in Integrated Safe System of Work Procedures
(UKCS-SSW-002).
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(6) Task Risk Assessment Procedure as described in Integrated Safe System of Work
(UKCS-SSW-002).
(7) Engineering Technical Practice ETP SP 48-1 HSE Review of Projects.
(8) Guidelines for HAZOP Studies (UKCS-TS-001).
(9) Technical Integrity Performance Standards (UKCS-TI-001).
(10) Guidelines for HAZID Studies (UKCS-TS-002).
(11) Use and Value of Quantified Risk Assessment, GN 91/13.
(12) Guidelines on the Application of Risk Acceptability Criteria (UKCS-TS-003).
(13) Methodology for Rapid Concept Risk Assessment (UKCS-TS-010).

References
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