ukcsts011_iss1am01

Guidance on Fire and Gas Detection UKCS-TS-011
Contents
Authorisation for Issue

Amendment Record
Amendment Summary
Distribution List
Preface
List of Abbreviations
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Section 1 General Requirements
Section 2 Setting Performance Requirements

Section 3 Audit and Inspection
Section 4 Detector Specification
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 i/ii

Authorisation for Issue
Issue Authority
Name: Jon Turnbull
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

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Technical Authority
Name: David Aberdeen
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG
November 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

Amendment Record
For Audit Use

Amendment Incorporated By
Checked
Number
Name Signature Date Signature Date
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AMOSAF.171
November 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Amendment Summary
Issue No Date Description

Issue 1 November 2001 First issue.
Issue 1/AM01 March 2002 Amendment to preface and list of abbreviations.
Addition of Section 4 Detector Specification.
Distribution list updated.
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March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 vii/viii

Distribution List
Holders of Controlled Hard Copy
Copy Copyholder Location
01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen
Virtual Copyholders
Copy Copyholder
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01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

02 Document Technical Authority (David Aberdeen)
03 EoS Document Controller (David Taylor)
04 EoS Operations Excellence HSE Consultant (David Egan)
05 OIM, Magnus
06 OIM, North West Hutton
07 OIM, Thistle
08 NWH/Thistle HSE Adviser
09 BSG SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Malcolm)
10 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Faulkner)
11 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Thompson)
12 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Carl Thomessen)
13 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Justin Haigh)
14 CNS SMS Co-ordinator (Jim Blacklaws)
15 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (David Robertson)
16 NBU EPU SMS Co-ordinator (David Egan)
17 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (John Beaumont)
18 NSI SMS Co-ordinator (Ann Rosbrook)
19 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Malcolm Watson)
20 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Simon Robinson)
21 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Bruce Morrison)
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 ix/x

Preface
Purpose
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of this guidance document cover general requirements, setting
performance requirements, and audit and inspection respectively.
A new BP Group document (GP 30-85 Guidance on Practice for Fire and Gas Detection) is being
prepared covering these areas.
Section 4 of this guidance document covers detection specification. A new BP Group document
(GIS 30-85 Guidance on Industry Standards for Fire and Gas Detection) is also being prepared
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covering this area.

Once these documents are available, this guidance document will be withdrawn or updated to
provide UKCS specific guidance.
The principles and core of this document are valid. However, there are a number of issues
which need to be updated which include:
• The role that gas detectors can fulfil (if imperfectly) in early leak detection hence initiating
action which may reduce the size of gas accumulations
• Consideration of recent alternative technology (eg sonic leak detection)
• Better coverage of the potential causes of spurious trips and means of prevention
• Allowance for non-availability in the design and spacing of detectors
• Practically achievable performance standards for Emergency Shutdown (ESD) times
and reliability
• Guidance on the use of voting on beam detectors
• Review of the validity of using 10m spacing of gas detectors given the consequent large
increase in potentially undetected gas accumulations (nominally up to 1000m3)
• Opportunity to use the high sensitivity of modern detectors to reduce alarm and trip settings
on detectors to either improve speed of response or increasing detector spacing without
loss of performance
• Review of the practical/performance issues regarding vertical spacing of detectors
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 xi

UKCS-TS-011 Guidance on Fire and Gas Detection
Review and Update

This document will be subject to 12-monthly review and update, when document holders will
have the opportunity to express opinions and suggest improvements.
However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document. As
such, any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an
Amendment Proposal proforma which is available electronically on the UKCS SMS website,
from the Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor or from the Technical Authority.
All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.
Responsibility of Copyholders
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It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to
maintain the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly
incorporated and acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant
Technical Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (UKCS-DCM-001).
xii March 2002 Issue 1/AM01

List of Abbreviations
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

BASEEFA British Approvals Service for Electrical Equipment in Flammable Atmospheres
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CENELEC Comite European de Normalisation Electrotechnique
COSHH Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (Regulations)
ESD Emergency Shutdown
F&G Fire and Gas
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FDA Flame Detector Assessor

FOC Fire Officers Committee
IEC International Electrotechnical Authority
IP Institute of Petroleum
IR Infrared
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
NDT Non-destructive Testing
NFPA National Fire Protection Organisation
PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (Regulations)
PR Performance Requirement
QRA Quantified Risk Assessment
RHO Radiant Heat Output
TOR Term of Reference
TR Temporary Refuge
TRIF Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
UV Ultraviolet
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 xiii/xiv

Section 1
General Requirements
Paragraph Page
1 Foreword 1-1
1.1 Introduction 1-1
1.2 Changes from Previous Issues 1-1
1.3 Aims 1-1
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2 BP Expectations for Fire and Gas Detection 1-2
3 External Requirements 1-3

3.1 UKCS Legislation 1-3
3.2 Other External Documents Applicable in the UK 1-11
4 Summary of Requirements 1-11

4.1 Overview of Good Practice Requirements 1-11
4.2 Overview of Legislative Requirements 1-12
4.3 Overview of Other Requirements 1-12
Figure
1.1 The Influence of Safety Case Claims on Safety Performance 1-5
1.2 Standards of Performance 1-8
1.3 Equipment and Procedural Items in a Typical ESD Function 1-9
November 2001 Issue 1 1-i/ii
1 Foreword
1.1 Introduction
BP has had a ‘goal setting’ approach to fire and gas detection since 1985. Since then,
advances have been made on several fronts:
• The method has been further developed and improved with experience
• Detector performance in real hazard situations has been further researched
• There have been major changes in detector technologies
• Goal setting legislation, United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA)
guides and other documents have been issued in the UK
This is an appropriate time to capture the best practices currently available into
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one document.
The Safety Case and accompanying regulations have come into force. They emphasise
the need to link safety equipment performance to the risk reduction it is expected to
provide. By setting performance targets and then demonstrating that the systems meet
them, we can justify claims for risk reduction in the Safety Case. This same risk-based
approach can be used for other types of risk such as Asset protection or lost production.
1.2 Changes from Previous Issues

The basic rule sets of the method have not changed. There is better explanation of
some, links to the new legislation have been clarified and topics such as auditing have
been added. Broadly, this document now covers:
• Section 2: Setting Performance Requirements, covering risk identification and setting
the required performance of Fire and Gas (F&G) detection
• Section 3: Audit and Inspection, covering the full range of verification, audit and
testing requirements from the design stage, at commissioning and in service
This section covers the expectations of BP and their employees, UK legislation and other
external bodies.
1.3 Aims
BP will expect fire and gas detection systems to reduce safety and other risks. The main
aim of this document is to link fire and gas system performance to all risks. To be more
precise, it aims to make the link between:
• The actual field performance of the detection systems
and
• The role we expect detection to play in reducing risks from fire and explosion
November 2001 Issue 1 1-1
Detection on its own can do nothing to reduce risk. It has to be followed by appropriate
and effective actions (automatic or manual), such as:
• Abandonment of the site
• Escape from the immediate area
• Plant shutdown
• Mobilising a Response Team
Fire and gas detection is therefore only a link in a sometimes complex chain of events
which all have to function correctly to meet our aims.
To define the role of detection, we must first understand what actions are required,
what links are involved and finally, how automatic detection can help. Without this
perspective, fire and gas system design will be based on what we could detect rather
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than what we need to detect.
Another aim of this document then is to ensure we maintain a good perspective of the
role and benefits of detection in the overall scheme of risk reduction. This will help to
ensure our resources (fiscal and manpower) are directed to where they can be most
effective in reducing risk.
Yet another aim for the document is to help maintain a risk balance for the system.
All the benefits of detection need to be balanced against the risk increases they bring.
For example, the Maintenance Technician(s) for the system may have a high individual
risk exposure since they may spend long periods in the plant areas, working at high
levels. Systems requiring a lot of field support can lead to a net increase in risk. Even the
financial benefits of such systems can be outweighed by a poor approach to design,
maintenance or modification.
The issue of performance remains important throughout the life of the system or, more
correctly, throughout the time the system is expected to reduce risks. In operation,
modification and maintenance, the system must continue to meet our requirements so
this document provides tools to assist in planning these activities and changes.
2 BP Expectations for Fire and Gas Detection

There are several reasons why fire and gas detection is installed on BP offshore
Installations. One of the most important is the reduction of risk to people, the
environment, investment and productivity. Detection by itself does nothing to reduce
risk; it can only react to a fire or gas hazard that already exists. Detection must be
followed by effective actions (manual or automatic) which reduce loss and the risks
from escalation.
In a robust site design, the fire and release risks will be minimised and there will be
several ways to trigger the actions in time to prevent loss. There should therefore be
very few examples where we have to rely heavily on F&G detection to reduce major
safety risks. One example might be to prevent smoke or gas ingress to temporary
refuges. F&G detection for such roles often has to be more reliable than can be easily
achieved by a conventional approach.
1-2 November 2001 Issue 1
Whatever low levels of risk are achieved by risk minimisation (refer to Note below), most
sites will be provided with manual or automatic actions to be taken in the event of a fire
or gas hazard arising. Safety Cases may claim significant risk reduction for actions like
emergency shutdown. F&G detection will be provided as one of several triggers for
these important risk-reducing actions. If the design of the site and the action is robust
then we can readily design (and operate and maintain) the F&G system to achieve the
required level of performance. If, however, the design of the site or the overall Function
is poor then it may be very difficult (and expensive) to meet the required performance.
Note: In terms of major risks, other, less visible systems have a much greater
influence. For example, good bund drains will have a big effect on risk reduction
because they prevent a major fire occurring beneath a vessel.
For smaller risks, fire and gas detection is useful but the benefits can be hard to identify.
However, we know that all the historical incident and loss frequency data contain the
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influence of fire and gas detection because all sites are provided with these detection
systems. As we do not know how big this influence is, we could not eliminate these
systems from a site without exposing personnel and the Company to an unknown
increase in risk. One reason to install fire and gas detection is therefore to comply with
this good practice, ie to ensure that we gain all the small advantages the system may
bring, which are believed would be significant if they could be summed.
Another reason to provide fire and gas detection is to meet workforce expectation. It is
widely believed that these systems are beneficial to safety, even if it is difficult to
pinpoint exactly how the majority of the system reduces risks. This belief is a strong
influence on the requirement for the system and also on its performance and quality.
The importance of the roles for F&G detection across a site will therefore range from
safety critical to unknown. Whatever the importance, we expect the system
performance to match the requirements and we expect resources to be focused on the
more important ones.
The questions of how well the system must perform and what level of quality is
appropriate are answered by our operational expectations and our Safety Case claims.
The other parts of this document help to translate these expectations and claims into a
satisfactory, cost-effective, functioning safety system.
3 External Requirements
3.1 UKCS Legislation
These paragraphs are intended to provide an overview of the legislation applied to the
UK Continental Shelf, as it applies to F&G detection systems. A similar style of
regulation is being adopted in other regions of the world where the benefits of the
Safety Case regime are being recognised. We believe that, with intelligent interpretation,
the UK regulations are an excellent basis for a methodical, risk-based approach to safety
systems, and so may be used as a basis for sound design and operation of such
systems anywhere.
For a complete understanding of the requirements, the reader is strongly encouraged to

read the regulations, the associated approved codes of practice and the guidance
produced by the Health and Safety Executive and UKOOA.
In brief, the principal regulations and the parts that directly affect fire and gas detection
systems are:
• The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, SI 1992/No 2885
• Offshore Installations Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
(PFEER) Regulations, SI 1995/No 743, and Approved Code of Practice and Guidance
• Offshore Installations (Design and Construction) Regulations
3.1.1 Safety Case Regulations

These require us to identify and understand our major safety hazards and quantify the
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major ones. We also have to demonstrate that we manage these hazards well enough to
maintain acceptable levels of safety. F&G detection may have a role in the reduction of
major risks. It will certainly have a place in demonstrating that risk levels are As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The Safety Case Regulations go beyond major hazards, they also require us to
demonstrate that risk levels are ALARP. Opinions differ on the meaning of this term but
it can be interpreted in this context as meaning two things:
• ‘The whole cost of a risk reducing measure is not disproportionate to the benefit.’
This of course only relates to quantifiable risks
• ‘Ensuring that all the small (unquantifiable) risks do not add up to become significant.’
This is about designing and operating to good industry practice. The major part of our
Safety Cases describes how we use good practice in the design and operation of our
sites to reduce risks
The Safety Case will claim that an acceptable level of risk is achieved on a site through
many systems (Safety Management System, Competence Assurance System etc).
Some of the claimed reductions will be attributed to the presence of the F&G detection
system. It is important to understand that the performance claims which have been
made or inferred must be met. These claims, both for significant risk reduction and for
good practice should be translated into a required performance for each Function
(defined later) which the system is expected to perform. This performance then
becomes the acceptable minimum required by legislation, and will be used as the basis
for examinations of the system.
All other performance requirements, intended to meet environmental, financial or other
losses are voluntary, in the sense that they are not required or covered by the
regulations. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship of the Safety Case claims and other
requirements to the eventual performance requirements of a safety system such as
F&G detection.
SAFETY CASE
Non-safety
GOOD PRACTICE QRA
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Criticality Studies
F&E Analysis
Performance claims for Roles for major

Record Expectations
major risk reduction non-safety risks
Specify required Specify required Specify required

performance performance performance
‘Voluntary‘ performance
MANDATORY PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
requirements
CRITERIA FOR DESIGN, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AUDIT ETC
Note: This is not necessarily the order in which these activities are carried out, especially
on a green-site project. The diagram shows the influence of factors and activities on the final
criteria of examination, design, operation and maintenance.
UKCSTS011_001.ai
Figure 1.1 The Influence of Safety Case Claims on Safety Performance
Safety Case Claims

Built into a Safety Case are many claims for many safety systems. We are expected to
understand these claims so that we can design, operate and maintain the safety
systems to a standard appropriate to the claims. There are two types of claim – directly
stated and inferred.
Direct Claims
The directly stated claims will be included in the Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) (or
the supporting Fire and Explosion Analysis) and may be supported by text in the
Safety Case. They will identify specific Functions and relate these to a measure of risk
reduction. By doing so, they claim something about the role and effectiveness of the
Function. Several instrumented safety systems will attract such claims, including High
Integrity Protection System (HIPS), the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system and perhaps
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well control systems.
F&G detection will not normally be mentioned specifically with regard to major risk
reduction, even though F&G may be an input of such Functions. Unless specific claims
are made, it is generally assumed that the F&G system will perform to industry good
practice levels. There may be exceptions, where a Safety Case will claim that we rely on
a particular F&G role to give significant risk reduction (eg in the Function to prevent
smoke or gas ingress to a temporary refuge). We have to ensure that the performance
requirements associated with any such claim can be met (or alter the claim).
Indirect Claims
A Safety Case will make many inferred claims in the assumptions behind the QRA and
its supporting documents. The whole of a QRA is based on historical frequencies of
hazards, therefore, it is based on the assumption that these frequencies are no worse on
the site in question than they are for the average site, ie on the assumption that the site
is designed, operated and maintained to good industry practice. The greater part of a
Safety Case is devoted to demonstrating that this is the case.
This includes all the roles for the F&G detection system (except the direct claims). In
effect, all Safety Cases claim that the F&G system is at least as good as good
practice requires.
3.1.2 PFEER Regulations

A prime purpose of the PFEER Regulations is to test whether the safety systems we
have in place are as good in reality as we claimed in the Safety Case.
The regulations require:
• That each site has a fire and gas detection system (Regulation 10)
• That its required performance is determined from the risk reduction we expect
(Regulation 5)
• That we design, maintain and operate the equipment to achieve that performance,
and that we periodically examine the system, its design, maintenance and operation
(Regulation 19)
The PFEER SI gives particular meaning to some words and phrases. The BP PFEER
Working Group adopted a set of definitions to clarify the meanings.
Standards of Performance
This is a generic term for a hierarchical group of documents which state the important
safety criteria for a site. They cover all levels, from policy statements down to equipment
specifications (refer to Figure 1.2). BP identified the need for four different levels of
statement, each one being fully supported (justified) by the level below.
Goals
High level goals (sometimes referred to as high level performance standards) set targets
like the maximum individual risk for any person on a site or the availability of a temporary
refuge. The way to demonstrate that these goals have been met is to break each down
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to more specific statements, the scenario requirements.
Scenario Requirements
These are sometimes referred to as scenario level Performance Standards and detail the
functions that reduce the risks from the major hazards on the site. The statements will
define the arrangements in place to reduce risk and what roles they perform.
Scenario requirements are supported by PFEER Performance Standards and by
good practice.
PFEER Performance Standards

These are also referred to as system level Performance Standards.
If an element (an item of equipment or a procedure) requires some special quality to
ensure the function meets its required performance then that quality should be reflected
in a PFEER Performance Standard. This will ensure that the people responsible (for
design, operation, maintenance, modification, examination etc) are aware of that quality.
Good Practice
Good practice is defined by several things:
• Industry practices (normally quoted in the Safety Case or supporting documents)
• Industry reliability data, which will give the performance which might normally be
expected from particular equipment for the duty and environment in which it is
being used
• Workforce expectations for the equipment
• The acceptance criteria used in the Written Scheme of Examination (refer to
Figure 1.2)
The entire pyramid of Standards of Performance is supported by the Written Scheme of
Examination which documents the acceptance criteria for each element associated with
safety Functions (discussed further below).
HIGH LEVEL GOALS

(High Level Performance
Standards)
SCENARIO REQUIREMENTS
(Scenario Level Performance SITE GOOD
Standards) PRACTICES
PFEER PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS
(System Level Performance
Standards)
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PERFORMANCE MEASURES
WSE Acceptance Criteria
UKCSTS011_002.ai
Figure 1.2 Standards of Performance
Other Definitions
The words Function, Element and System also have particular meanings under PFEER
(and in this document). Figure 1.3 illustrates the definitions for an ESD Function.
A Function is simply the whole means by which a risk is reduced, ie all the hardware,
software, utilities and procedures which work in series or in parallel to perform the
required action to reduce a particular risk. A major risk will often be reduced by several
Functions. In several places (eg in the Design and Construction Regulations (DCR)) the
word System is used in a similar but broader way, eg Systems in place to reduce risks.
Scenario requirements set the performance criteria for Functions.
A Function will comprise a number of Elements, each an identifiable procedure or piece
of equipment. The arrangement of the Elements and their individual integrity will
determine the integrity of the overall Function.
The word System is commonly used in two ways. In legislation and related documents,
a System is a measure put in place to reduce risk (eg the Safety Management System).
This should not be confused with the common use of system to describe a cabinet
containing similar elements (eg the ESD system or the F&G system). Such cabinets are
merely a way to marshal similar elements into one location for operational convenience.
Confusion arises when reliability is discussed, as the reliability of a cabinet system is not
a useful parameter to use when discussing the required failure on demand rate of a
function since it ignores all the upstream, downstream and supporting Elements which
are also required to perform the Function.
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Field HV
Field PB SOV BDV
SOV XXV
November 2001 Issue 1

Fire S/D Relay
Part of F&G SOV XXV

System
Gas Part of ESD System

SOV XXV
Guidance on Fire and Gas Detection
SOV XXV
Instrumentation
Part of Process
Instrumentation
Local PB
Phone
CCR Manual
Radio
Control
Figure 1.3 Equipment and Procedural Items in a Typical ESD Function

Standby Vessel
UKCSTS011_003.ai
1-9
UKCS-TS-011
Notes: (1) The Function is the overall, risk reducing task. In this case, to isolate and
blow down a section of hydrocarbon plant threatened by fire before
escalation can occur.
(2) The functional probability (as used in the QRA) is the probability that the
Function will be successful, regardless of what initiated the action and
how the actions were performed. A failure may be due to random
equipment failure, a failure to initiate the Function at all, a failure of design
or even failure of the Function to occur in time to prevent the escalation.
(3) Elements are those items or parts of systems which together help
perform the Function. The size of an element should be such that a failure
on demand rate can be attributed to it. (This failure on demand rate should
include utilities such as power supplies where failure might result in
non-operation of the Function.)
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Maintenance and Examination
As far as maintenance and examination are concerned, PFEER Regulation 19 covers
systems in place (Functions) to deal with major hazards and those required by good
practice. The regulation requires the installed equipment to be ‘suitable and maintained
in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair’. We are also required
to have an appropriate Written Scheme of initial and periodic examination and testing for
some equipment by an independent person.
3.1.3 Design and Construction (DCR) Regulations

While the Prevention of Fire and Explosion (PFE) part of PFEER deals principally with fire
and explosion hazards, the DCR cover all major hazards. The regulations require us to:
• Identify all safety critical items of equipment
• Introduce a Scheme of Verification to ensure that the required performance of each
safety critical item is achieved in practice
There are UKOOA and BP guides to the definition of safety critical and the reader is
recommended to consult these. In essence, the decision is hazard based. If an item of
equipment is provided to prevent a major accident (defined in the Safety Case
Regulations) or its failure may cause a major accident then it is safety critical.
The level of verification which is applied to the item depends on how much reliance we
place in the item to reduce risk. The gas detectors protecting lives by preventing ingress
of gas to the temporary refuge will generally require more stringent verification than a
smoke detector in a utility protecting equipment.
In most cases, the requirements of the PFEER Regulations for F&G equipment and
those of the DCR are broadly equivalent. The DCR require some additional features in
the verification of the design, over the PFEER initial examination. Otherwise, provisions
that meet the PFEER Regulations should meet the requirements of the DCR.
3.2 Other External Documents Applicable in the UK

There is a wide range of international, national and industry documents which purport to
affect fire and gas detection systems including International Electrotechnical Authority
(IEC) standards, British Standards, Institute of Petroleum (IP) Codes, Health and Safety
Executive guides and UKOOA guides. It is important that we understand the role of
these documents.
The PFEER Regulations (19.1.a) state that fire and gas detection equipment ‘is so
constructed or adapted as to be suitable for the purpose for which it is used or provided’.
Since the purpose is defined by the nature of the risks and the required reduction in risk,
we must ensure that any external document we apply is truly appropriate to
that application.
External codes and standards for fire and gas detection are based largely on the needs of
other industries. They address different risks and have very different objectives (refer to
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Note below). Few codes state their limitations clearly so significant effort is required to
ensure that a particular document can be safely used to achieve the required
performance in a particular application.
Note: The codes of practice on smoke and heat detection provide a good example.
Nearly all such codes are based on the assumption that fires of less than 250kW
(a flame area about twice the size of a domestic door) are insignificant. They also
assume that the air change rate for rooms is less than 4. Clearly these codes
cannot be generally applied to offshore sites (we are often concerned about
much smaller fires and the air change rates are not less than 6 in most areas).
Because of these problems, the offshore industry has used experience and targeted
research to develop its own practices which are not yet common across the industry.
However, several external documents have proved their applicability. They have been
carefully researched and shown to be suitable for the applications stated. Their use
should be strictly limited to these applications.
4 Summary of Requirements
4.1 Overview of Good Practice Requirements
This section explains why we must use good practice in all aspects of design and
operation, including the performance of the fire and gas detection system. Good practice
has three parts: relevant experience, workforce expectations and industry guidelines.
• This document is essentially a compilation of our North Sea experiences and will be
constantly refined as that experience base grows
• The process of setting the level of performance should involve the eventual operating
personnel so that workforce and operational needs are incorporated
• For fire and gas detection, there are few external practices which we can confidently
apply to offshore situations. The historical performance of the average offshore
system based on such standards is not particularly good, even if the cost and size of
some of them have been very impressive. This is the main reason for maintaining this
good practice document
It has been shown that the BP practices for fire and gas detection are better than
industry average in terms of safety. For sites which comply with this document we can
therefore easily justify (in terms of this discipline) the use of generic hazard rates in the
Safety Case.
4.2 Overview of Legislative Requirements

This section overviews the current regulations with respect to fire and gas detection.
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Note: For a comprehensive understanding, it is recommended that the regulations, the
approved codes of practice and guidelines be read.
A brief summary follows which is specific to this section.
The Safety Case Regulations require us to identify and understand the major hazards
that threaten personnel. We have to demonstrate that these major hazards are managed
well enough to maintain an acceptable level of safety. We also have to address lesser
hazards and show that the overall risk to personnel is ALARP. Some of the
demonstration tools are defined in the PFEER Regulations.
PFEER Regulation 5 requires us to record standards of performance for specific risk
reducing arrangements (equipment and procedures) which give significant risk
reduction through prevention, control and mitigation methods (refer to Note below).
Essentially, PFEER Performance Standards should include statements of function,
reliability and survivability. Wherever practical, the statements should be quantified and
measurable. PFEER Regulation 5 only covers systems and equipment which are claimed
to give significant risk reduction. We are therefore not obliged to set PFEER standards of
performance on equipment for which we claim no quantified risk reduction or that
installed for any other reason.
Note: BP guidance on Performance Standards is given in ‘Guidance on where to apply
PFEER Regulation Performance Standards’, HSQ 01.05.27 Rev 0.
4.3 Overview of Other Requirements

In the same way that we may need special performance from parts of the system to
help reduce safety risks, we may expect other major risks to be addressed. Significant
environmental, Asset protection, production loss and other risks may be reduced by
actions triggered by automatic fire and gas detection.
It is not yet common practice to quantify such risks in the same way as is required for
major safety risks, but they are often identified in criticality studies or similar reviews.
This document will allow detection performance requirements to be set against
such reviews.
Section 2
Setting Performance Requirements
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 2-1
1.1 Aims 2-1
1.2 Definitions 2-1
1.3 The Role of the Specifier 2-1
1.4 BP Method 2-2
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2 The Definition of Hazards 2-3

2.1 Fire 2-3
2.2 Combustible Gas 2-3
2.3 Toxic Gas 2-4
3 Good Practice Requirements for Fire Detection 2-4

3.1 Outline of the Method 2-4
3.2 Volume Types and Definitions 2-6
3.3 Fire Detection Requirements,
Hydrocarbon Fire Risk Areas 2-7
3.4 Defining Fire Detection in Non-hydrocarbon Areas 2-8
3.5 Application Notes 2-9
3.6 Requirements for Special Areas 2-10
4 Good Practice Requirements for

Combustible Gas Detection 2-12
4.1 The Hazard Review 2-13
4.2 Detector Deployment 2-13
4.3 Special Cases 2-15
4.4 Sensitivity 2-17
5 Good Practice Requirements for Toxic Gas Detection 2-17

5.1 Hydrogen Sulphide 2-17
5.2 Toxic Hazards from Production Gas 2-17

November 2001 Issue 1 2-i
Section 2
Setting Performance Requirements (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
6 Performance Requirements for Major Risks 2-18

6.1 Plant Prone to Causing Hazards 2-18
6.2 Major Fire and Explosion Safety Risks 2-19
6.3 Other Major Fire and Explosion Risks 2-19
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Table
2.1 Comparison of RHO and Typical Apparent Flame Area 2-3
2.2 Default Threshold RHOs for Alarms and Actions 2-7
2.3 Typical Performance Requirements 2-9
2.4 Standard BPX Requirements for Grades T and V 2-11
Figure
2.1 The Method for Setting Good Practice
Fire Detection Requirements 2-5
2.2 Method for Setting Good Practice
Gas Detection Requirements 2-20
Appendix 2A Example Definition of Performance

Requirements

2-ii November 2001 Issue 1
1 Introduction
The practice of setting requirements for the performance of fire and gas detection has
historically been called grading in BP. This method has been revised in line with the
requirements of the Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
(PFEER) Regulations and we now refer to the practice as setting performance
requirements but the basic approach remains the same. The most significant change is
that the method of identifying special requirements has been simplified and
strengthened.
1.1 Aims
This part of the document covers how to set the overall performance requirements for
fire and gas detection systems, accounting for all requirements. (General good practice,
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specific requirements for major safety risks, and specific, voluntary needs to reduce
‘non-safety’ risks. Refer to Section 1 of this document.)
1.2 Definitions
Function
The means by which a risk is reduced, ie all the hardware, software and procedures that
should work in series and in parallel to achieve the required action.
A Function is made up from a network of Elements, the individual procedures, initiators,
final devices and logic blocks.
Reliability
The probability that the Function will operate (or fail) on demand, as determined by the
arrangement of its Elements, their individual reliability and the level of care we give
them. It can also depend on operational issues such as lockouts, housekeeping, utility
failures, design and even such remote issues as the presence of scaffolding or
adverse weather.
A System on the other hand can be a function (as used in the legislation and related
documents) or it may be a collection of similar elements integrated into a unit or cabinet,
such as the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) or Fire and Gas (F&G) system.
1.3 The Role of the Specifier

The person that draws up the performance requirements (the Specifier) must account
for the expectations and assumptions of the several parties, eg the operator, risk
assessors, safety teams, maintenance crews, auditors and the system designer. The
document setting out the performance requirements has to be meaningful to all these.
The Specifier’s role is therefore very much one of co-ordination and communication.

1.4 BP Method
The BP method for setting fire and gas detection performance requirements serves
several purposes:
• Most importantly, it records the Operator’s expectations for the system. For this, the
Specifier needs to be able to discuss hazards in terms of the damage they can cause
(sizes of fire, time to escalation, tolerable levels of damage etc)
• The method captures the claims of risk analyses (eg Safety Case claims) and any
other claims for system performance. These are often discussed in terms of
outcomes and probabilities for successful risk reduction
• The method has to communicate the required system performance and philosophy to
the system designers. This should be done in terms which can be related to the
layout, numbers and types of detector, and to the system controls and outputs
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• The method also has to tell the site Operator how the system should be operated and
maintained to meet the required system performance
• The method should also provide a clear set of criteria against which the design can be
reviewed, and subsequently, the criteria for auditing and testing the physical system,
its operation and maintenance
The method requires the Specifier to ask two questions for each area of a site:
• What is good practice for this area?
• What special requirements are there?
The good practice requirements for BP offshore sites are a straightforward issue and
they are listed later. It is the special requirements than can be a problem to specify
because they will be specific to the risks (to safety, the environment, production,
reputation etc) that arise on that site.
The special requirements question can be split into:
• What are the consequences we are trying to prevent?
• What hazards can lead to those consequences in this area?
• What are we expecting fire or gas detection to do which will give us confidence that
we can prevent these consequences?
The Specifier will need to enlist the help of those familiar with these risks for the site,
eg the Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) assessors, environmental impact assessors
and those familiar with the criticality of plant items for productivity. Much of this work
should already be prepared for other needs, such as regulatory compliance (Safety Case
Regulations (SCR), PFEER and Design and Construction Regulations (DCR)) and ESD
criticality studies.
Given a complete picture of the consequences, and with an idea of the relative
importance of each, the Specifier can then use a fire and explosion hazard assessor to
help define the types of hazard which might cause these unacceptable increases in risk
(unacceptable to the Operator).

Answers to the last question are then relatively easy to reach and justify. The special
performance requirements are defined by the need for detection in the chain of events
which prevent the hazard from causing unacceptable consequences. This approach will
define the minimum size and nature of the special hazard, it will reveal the maximum
timescale in which action is likely to be effective and it will set the availability
requirements for the function as a whole, and the detection in particular.
2 The Definition of Hazards

2.1 Fire
The base area of a fire is not a good measure of the damage a fire can do. A small
premixed propane torch flame, for example, can be much more aggressive than a larger
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diffusion flame. For this reason we define a fire hazard by its Radiant Heat Output (RHO).
RHO gives a good indication of the potential damage and the probability that it will
escalate or cause loss. RHO is also a measure used in many cross-industry documents.
All aspects of fire detection can be related to RHO eg the effective range of flame
detectors, response of smoke and temperature detectors etc. Table 2.1 compares RHO
and flame area for some typical hydrocarbon fires.
Note: This is the apparent area of the flame to a bystander, not its base area.
10kW 50kW 100kW 250kW

Gas jet 0.3m2 1.5m2 3.0m2 7.5m2
Oil jet 0.25m2 1.3m2 2.5m2 6.5m2
Oil pool 0.5m2 1.9m2 4.0m2 8.5m2
Table 2.1 Comparison of RHO and Typical Apparent Flame Area

Notes: (1) 0.3m2 is similar to the frontal area of a filing cabinet drawer.
(2) 1.5m2 is similar to the frontal area of a four-drawer filing cabinet.
(3) 3m2 is similar to the area of an office door.
(4) Premixed fuel and oxygen fires can produce the same heat from much
smaller areas.
2.2 Combustible Gas

Combustible gas threats come mainly from ignition. There can be two significant
outcomes of ignition which are fire or explosion. For fire, we normally rely on fire
detection and protection systems to take actions in time to prevent unacceptable
consequences. Explosions can cause losses more rapidly, and too quickly for the fire
protection or detection systems to be effective.

The consequences of an explosion can either be direct loss and damage through blast,
or escalation through further releases caused by pressure pulses (which can move pipes
or even large vessels), and wind effects which can hurl missiles. None of these
problems can occur in an offshore module if the flame speed is below about 100m/s. In
the same way that a long-jumper needs a run-up to reach his take-off speed, the flame
front of an explosion needs a distance in which to accelerate. For the types of gases we
handle and the geometry of the plants, the minimum acceleration distance is about 4m
(5 to 6m is more common). Gas hazards are therefore best defined by their size
and concentration.
2.3 Toxic Gas

The effects of toxic gas are directly linked to concentration and (for some gases)
exposure time. Toxic gas hazards are therefore defined by concentration. We use the
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Health and Safety Executive published data on such gases to set the appropriate limits
for detection.
3 Good Practice Requirements for Fire Detection

The normal way to set good practice performance requirements is to quote recognised
codes, practices or guidelines. Unfortunately, few such documents exist which address
the fire or gas hazards and risks encountered offshore.
The method described below is based on many years experience gained by several
Operators on many sites. It tailors the detection requirements to the particular types of
hazard and levels of risk on a site and is strongly linked to workforce expectations and
major risk reduction requirements.
3.1 Outline of the Method

The method is charted in Figure 2.1. First, the areas of a site are defined as either:
• Hydrocarbon handling areas
• Non-hydrocarbon handling areas
• Special risk areas
The fire detection requirements in any area are determined by the risk in that area and
defined by the grade of cover required. There are nine grades:
• Grade A: Hydrocarbon handling areas, high sensitivity
• Grade B: Hydrocarbon handling areas, normal sensitivity
• Grade C: Hydrocarbon handling areas, low sensitivity
• Grade D: Non-hydrocarbon areas, for the protection of life
• Grade E: Non-hydrocarbon areas, for the protection of special items of equipment
• Grade F: Non-hydrocarbon areas, general coverage

Set Grade
definitions: A, B,
C, D, E, F, T and V
Next Review each Fire

Risk Area Next area?
No more
END
Yes No
Next part?
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No
Assign Review Is ‘B‘ good Assign
HC risk area?
Grade B all parts enough? Grade A
Yes
Yes
Is ‘B‘ too Assign
good? Grade C
No
Yes No
Next part?
Yes
Non-HC Assign Review Assign
risk area? Grade F all parts High life risk? Grade D
No
Yes
High equipment Assign
risk? Grade E
No
Turbine etc Assign

enclosure? Grade T
Ventilation, Assign
air intake? Grade V
Assign Define requirements

Special?
Grade S for each ‘S‘ area
None? Record why not
UKCSTS011_004.ai
Figure 2.1 The Method for Setting Good Practice Fire Detection Requirements

• Grade S: Special risk areas, where no other grade is appropriate

• Grade T: Special risk areas, for turbine and other engine enclosures
• Grade V: Special risk areas, for ventilation air intakes
A definition for each grade is agreed with the Operator, covering the sensitivity, function
and reliability of the detection (refer to Appendix 2A for examples). With the exception of
Grade S, these definitions apply across the site, eg all Grade B areas will have similar
performance. Grade S areas are special, and each will have its own definition.
3.2 Volume Types and Definitions

The initial step is to classify the areas that will require detection.
3.2.1 Hydrocarbon Fire Risk Volume
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Any item of plant or equipment, and the volume surrounding it, which is intended to
process, convey, consume or store hydrocarbon production fluids, ie production oil, gas
or condensates, including fuel gas. The definition is intended to cover wellheads, their
manifolds and production plant, flare drums, gas plant, oily drain drums, and bunds
intended to retain spilled production fluids. Diesel fuel at greater than 2barg should
be included.
Exceptions are vents and flare pipework (but not vessels) outside the boundary of
production, drilling, utility or quarters areas. Turbine and some other machinery
enclosures are special cases covered separately below.
3.2.2 Non-hydrocarbon Fire Risk Volume

Any other enclosed space on the site which:
• Is normally occupied (accommodation, offices workshops etc)
• Contains machinery or electrical/electronic equipment
• Contains a significant inventory of flammable materials (some stores)
• Is an escape route which could be affected by one of the above (even if it contains no
fire hazard of its own)
3.2.3 Machinery Enclosures

A machinery enclosure (this includes turbine enclosures) will require early fire detection
if either:
• Fires in the enclosure would be difficult or dangerous to control
• The types of fire that could occur may quickly to lead to unacceptable damage or loss,
for example, if the fires could be particularly aggressive (eg high pressure fuel or
lubricating oil fires) or equipment in the enclosure is easily damaged and critical
(eg fire pumps or analyser houses)

3.2.4 Air Intakes

Air intakes will require fire detection if the incoming air needs to be monitored for the
protection of personnel or plant within the area served by the air supply.
3.2.5 Areas Where No Detection is Required

It is important to record why fire detection is not required in an area. Modifications or
changes in the operations of the site (eg storage of flammable materials) may invalidate
decisions in the future.
3.3 Fire Detection Requirements, Hydrocarbon Fire Risk Areas
3.3.1 Definition of Grades

Uncontrolled
Agree with the Operator an appropriate performance for detection in Grade A, B and C
areas. Appendix 2A gives a typical set of definitions. The specification should include:
• Sensitivity: (refer to defaults in Table 2.2)
• Response time: from the condition arising in the field to the correct output being given
• Availability: the required probability that the fire will be detected and the correct
output given. (Accounting for random equipment failure and design limitations such as
incomplete coverage but not for operational failures, such as lockout or maintenance)
Agree also the philosophy for any general procedural or automatic actions which the
system should promote (eg alarms and general plant shutdowns. Specific actions in
particular areas will be covered later). Again, an example is given in Appendix 2A.
Offshore Sites with No Detector Voting

Grade RHO for Alarm and Action
A 10
B 50
C 100
Offshore Sites with Voting of Detectors for Control Action Outputs
Grade RHO for Alarm RHO for Action
A 10 10
B 10 50
C 100 250
Table 2.2 Default Threshold RHOs for Alarms and Actions

Note: Sites may justify changes to these values with risk based assessments.

3.3.2 Applying Grades

The steps to applying grades in hydrocarbon risk volumes are:
• Assign an average grade of detection coverage throughout all hydrocarbon fire risk
volumes (Grade B)
• Identify any parts of Grade B areas where better detection is required and assign
them Grade A coverage
• Review all remaining Grade B areas for parts where cover is excessive and assign a
lower performance (Grade C)
3.3.3 Application Notes

Grade A is used for parts of hydrocarbon risk volumes which are associated with
particularly high risks. (The way to identify such plant is given in Section 3). Such risks
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will normally have well-defined risk reduction measures (control actions), some of which
may be active and need to be triggered by automatic fire detection. Grade A zones
should extend a minimum of 1m from the plant to which it applies, and be segregated
from Grade C volumes by a further 2m of Grade B.
Grade B is the normal level of fire detection in hydrocarbon risk areas. It is used
wherever another grade is not more appropriate. Grade B zones should extend a
minimum of 2m from any plant which is protected by it or to the area boundaries if any
are within 4m of the plant.
Grade C is used where the Grade B level of detection is excessive and so a reduced
performance grade is required. Grade C zones should not be within 2m of Grade A
volumes (ie there must be a Grade B area between A and C) or hydrocarbon plant from
which there is potential source of release, eg flanges or compression fittings (which will
be Grade A or B).
3.4 Defining Fire Detection in Non-hydrocarbon Areas
3.4.1 Definition of Grades

Agree with the Operator an appropriate performance for detection in Grade D, E
and F areas. A typical set of definitions is given in Appendix 2A. The specification should
include:
• Performance: wherever possible, to an industry standard test of performance (refer to
Table 2.3)
• Response time: from the condition arising in the field to the correct output being given
• Availability: the required probability that the condition will be detected and the correct
output given. (Accounting for random equipment failure and design limitations such as
incomplete coverage but not for operational failures such as lockout or maintenance)
Agree the philosophy for any general procedural or automatic actions which the system
should promote eg alarms and local evacuation warnings. Specific actions in particular
areas will be covered later. Again, an example is given in Appendix 2A.

Grade Required Performance

D (Life protection) Dual systems, both designed to meet the test
requirements defined in BS 6226 Appendix A4.
E (Equipment protection) Designed to meet the test requirements defined in BS
6226 Appendix A4.
F (General) Designed to meet the requirements of BS 5839 Part 1 for
Class P2 systems.
Table 2.3 Typical Performance Requirements
3.4.2 Applying Grades

• Assign Grade F to all non-hydrocarbon risk volumes
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• Review all Grade F areas for life protection risks and reassign these as Grade D
• Review all remaining Grade F areas for special equipment protection requirements
and reassign these as Grade E detection
• Review remaining Grade F areas for parts where detection cover is not required.
Record why fire detection is not required, as future changes may invalidate
the decision
3.5 Application Notes

• Grade D (Life Protection)
Should be used in every room containing a bed (including medical areas) and every
escape route.
The default performance level aims to protect a sleeping person from a fire in the
same cabin or in an adjacent space. The design should therefore consider the size and
nature of the fire threat, the means of waking the person and protection of escape
routes for the person and those in adjacent areas. The detection response time
should be short enough to ensure successful evacuation. Where the ventilation
system can transfer smoke (directly or by induction) into escape routes or sleeping
areas, they should also be covered by Grade D.
Personnel sleeping in spaces with other grades of detection may not be wakened in
time to prevent their succumbing to smoke or heat. Detection to BS 5839, Part 1,
Class L1 will not ensure protection for sleeping personnel, even if supported by
sprinklers to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) or Fire Officers Committee
(FOC) standards. The threshold fire size is too big. This standard of detection is
sufficient only to indicate that an adjacent escape route may be threatened.
• Grade E (Equipment Protection)
Grade E should be applied in every room containing electrical or mechanical safety
equipment or other high value equipment such as ESD cabinets, emergency power
supplies, communication systems or incident control centres.

The detection performance should be set by the maximum level of damage that can
be tolerated in the equipment concerned. This can range from an overheating wire
(default performance requirement given in Table 2.3) to destruction of a whole
equipment cubicle. It is necessary to consider the response time of the means to
control or extinguish the fire to meet the maximum tolerable level of damage.
(For offshore sites, the response is often manual so detection performance may be
set by the size and nature of the fire which the response teams are confident
to tackle.)
• Grade F (General)
Grade F should apply to all other non-hydrocarbon areas which require fire detection.
This should include public areas (common rooms, offices etc), utility spaces (voids
etc) and areas containing non-valuable equipment (store containing flammable
materials etc).
Uncontrolled
The performance of detection should be such that fires in unoccupied areas are
detected in time to contain the damage to the one area. Automatic or manual control
methods may be employed so the detection performance will need to be appropriate.
Detection designed to BS 5839 Part 1, Class P2 (the default performance given in
Table 2.3) will, when applied to rooms adjacent to escape routes, ensure protection of
the escape route. Sprinklers to NFPA standard may be used to limit damage in the
room or to prolong the usefulness of the fire barrier between the room and the
escape route.
3.6 Requirements for Special Areas
3.6.1 Method and Definitions

The basic steps are:
• Identify turbine and similar machinery enclosures where early detection of an internal
fire is required. Assign Grade T and agree the performance requirements for
such areas
• Identify any air intakes requiring fire detection and assign Grade V. Establish the
nature of the hazard and agree with the Operator the role of detection in achieving the
required protection
• Inevitably, there will be parts of the site where the detection requirements do not fall
into one of the eight other grades. In such spaces, Grade S may be applied. Identify
any such areas and assign them Grade S. Agree the special performance
requirements for each Grade S area with the Operator

Grade Function Available Sensitivity

(refer to Note)
T To detect oil mist/vapour from fuel or 85% 1dB/m
lubrication system releases in the enclosure
(refer also to gas detection).
To detect excessive air temperature in the 85% Ambient
enclosure and in the ventilation air outlet. (incl) +20°C
An alarm from either form of detection to
automatically cause (insert details)
V To detect a smoke plume from an oil or gas 90% Refer to
fire at the limit of ‘breathability’ for 1 hour (incl) Section 3
exposure.
To prevent smoke at the stated limit reaching
Uncontrolled
any room of the protected space.
Table 2.4 Standard BPX Requirements for Grades T and V

Note: Availability – the required probability that the stated condition will be detected
and the correct output given. (Accounting for random equipment failure and
design limitations such as incomplete coverage, but not operational reasons for
failure, such as lockout or maintenance).
3.6.2 Application Notes

• Turbine (and Some Other Machinery) Enclosures
These will require early fire detection if either fires in the enclosure would be difficult
or dangerous to control or a fire could rapidly cause unacceptable damage or loss.
For example, if the fires could be particularly aggressive (eg high pressure fuel
or lubricating oil fires) or equipment in the enclosure is easily damaged and critical
(eg fire pumps or analyser houses).
Manual firefighting in these enclosures can be very hazardous and even short duration
fires can lead to escalation risks or cause unacceptable damage (eg excessive
downtime or replacement costs). The system therefore has to detect the earliest sign
that such loss is likely, ideally the presence of flammable material or excessive heat.
Fortunately, the volume is enclosed so these hazards are easier to detect. The roles
will therefore include detection of release of any of the flammable materials supplied
to the enclosure such as fuel gas, fuel oil and lubrication oil. Detection of fire itself is
also a role but is normally achieved by the same devices (eg oil mist detectors).
• Air Intakes
Air intakes will require fire detection if the incoming air needs to be monitored for the
protection of personnel or plant within the area served by the air supply.
The main role for monitoring air intakes to temporary refuges and accommodation
volumes will be to ensure that the supplied air is breathable. It is important that the
type(s) of smoke (eg from major, remote gas or oil fires) is specified.

The required actions should be to raise alarms at the control point (prompting a
procedural response such as investigation) and to initiate automatic isolation of the air
supply in time to prevent significant contamination of the protected volume.
• Sensitivity
Breathable air is different to uncontaminated air. The supplied air is normally used to
pressurise living space volumes and dilute or prevent leaks of higher smoke
concentrations from doors, drains and other penetrations. The air intakes should be
located where they are least likely to be contaminated.
If pressurisation is lost at an early stage of a major incident (eg due to very sensitive
detection) then the resulting leaks can quickly lead to fatality of the occupants.
In such cases, the role of the system is to detect concentrations of smoke which are
at the upper limit of breathability. This limit will depend on how long personnel will be
expected to remain in the volume. This specification should refer to the site smoke
Uncontrolled
and gas ingress analysis.
• Grade S Areas
The definitions for every other grade apply across the site. The performance
requirement for Grade C in one area is exactly the same as that for a different area.
This is not the case for Grade S. To specify the required detection performance for a
Grade S area, it is necessary to state either:
- The nearest applicable grade and the exceptions or changes required
(eg Grade A without automatic actions)
or
- The type of fire and its fuel (the hazard), the risk to be mitigated and the planned
actions, including response time (the role), the required sensitivity (eg RHO), the
required system outputs (the function) and the worst acceptable failure on demand
rate for the detection elements (the availability)
4 Good Practice Requirements

for Combustible Gas Detection
Throughout this section, the adjective combustible (or flammable) is omitted for brevity
but is implied.
A gas release is not normally hazardous unless ignited (refer to Paragraph 5). If the gas is
ignited the result can be a flash fire, a sustained fire or an explosion.
Where fire detection is provided (to the requirements of this document), it is acceptable
to assume that it will address all risks associated with sustained or flash fires.
Gas detection is used to reduce explosion risks. For several reasons it is not yet
common practice to install active systems which prevent explosions or limit their
effects. Instead, most areas are designed to withstand an initial explosion. However,
primary structures and the Temporary Refuge (TR) will normally require protection from
escalation threats (large fires and secondary explosions).

Current technology does not allow gas detection to reliably detect all leaks. The best
that can be reliably achieved (practically) is the detection of any gas cloud whose size
and concentration make it a sufficient threat to require action. Obviously, some leaks will
be detected.
The procedure for setting the required performance for a gas detection system is to
review each area of the site and establish:
• Whether gas detection is required
• Identify the type of hazards that can arise
• Determine an appropriate detector spacing and function
• Define what effective actions can be taken and a required response time
4.1 The Hazard Review

Uncontrolled
The first question is whether gas detection is required in particular areas. It is required if:
• The area is classified as a Zone 1 or Zone 2 Hazardous Area (refer to BP RP 44-6
Area Classification to IP 15)
The only exception is that gas detection would not normally be required where open
areas such as walkways or laydown areas are classified hazardous due to a remote
source (eg overspill through louvres).
Note: Gas detection would not normally be fitted in Zone 0 areas since it is assumed
that gas at hazardous concentrations will normally be present.
• The area is enclosed and gas could feasibly be present, even if there is no local
source of release (eg gas could be transported by air currents from adjacent areas)
• The area is a non-hazardous area into which gas could feasibly be transported, either
by mechanical ventilation systems or by differential pressures. The penetrations
through which gas can be transported will include air supply ducts and single door
access ways from classified hazardous areas. It does not normally include self-closing
extract ducts, air-locked entrances or single emergency doors which are not
normally used
Otherwise, gas detection is not required. It is important to record why gas detection
might not be specified for an area. Future modifications (eg weather walls) or changes in
operations (eg storage or sampling) might invalidate the decision.
4.2 Detector Deployment

The next step is to define where and how detection should be provided. There are two
ways of using detectors:
• In a three-dimensional grid which ensures that a cloud of a given size and
concentration cannot exist without encompassing at least one detector
• In ventilation air supply or extract ducts. In this case the design will ensure that a
representative concentration is detected

The grid approach is used for general area gas detection. BP works from the basis that
we need to set a detector spacing which reflects the size of gas cloud which (if ignited)
could feasibly lead to significant loss or damage (refer to Note below). The required
spacing is set by:
• The size and geometry of the area, mainly the confinement and congestion
• The ventilation of the area
• The nature of potential release(s)
Note: For further information refer to HSE Report OTO 93 002.
Grid coverage can be achieved with a three-dimensional, triangular grid (isometric)
pattern of point detectors, with a maximum separation equal to or less than the defined
grid spacing.
Uncontrolled
There is also the option of using beam type detectors in areas which are not heavily
congested. Not only can they reduce the number of sensors required to achieve the
coverage but the integrating measurement is better suited to detecting plumes than
point sensors.
4.2.1 Small Volumes

Small volumes (<1000m3) can be either naturally ventilated (eg analyser houses) or
force-ventilated (eg turbine hoods).
Naturally ventilated, small volumes require a grid spacing of 4m (maximum). If there is
no obvious ignition source in the space (eg an engine) then the required action will be to
alert personnel to the presence of gas. If there is a probable source of ignition then
additional actions will be required to prevent the gas from reaching the ignition source or
to remove the source of ignition in time for the action to prevent ignition.
Where a small volume is force-ventilated and contains a source of release (eg a turbine
enclosure), gas detection should be provided at the ventilation air outlet. The detectors
should trigger actions to alert personnel and to isolate the source of release.
Where the area is force-ventilated and contains a source of ignition, detection may be
required at the ventilation air intake(s). This should trigger actions which aim to alert
personnel and minimise the risk of ignition, either by preventing gas reaching the source
of ignition or by removing the source(s) of ignition before the gas reaches it.
For very small enclosures (<100m3), the minimum number of detectors is set by any
automatic action requirements and the voting philosophy for the site. (Note also the
requirements for liquid phase releases if any such sources are present.)
4.2.2 Large Volumes

Large volumes are either open, partly-enclosed or fully-enclosed. In each of these, there
will be parts with free and rigorous air flow (which are largely uncongested) and parts
with sluggish air flow (which are often congested).

For large, open volumes, the congested parts need 5m grid spacing and the
well-ventilated parts a 10m spacing. The required actions are to alert personnel and also
to limit the extent and duration of the release to a minimum (normally through process
block and depressure).
Large, fully enclosed volumes which contain a source of release will often carry a
significant explosion risk (damage to structure etc) and may already have explosion
protection in the form of fast response flame detection and inerting systems. Gas
detection may only be a backup to such protection. In this case a 5m grid spacing should
be used.
If the explosion suppression system uses gas detection as its trigger, great care will be
needed to ensure that detection is sufficiently fast and reliable. A 4m grid spacing or less
may be required.
Large fully enclosed volumes which contain a source of release but have no explosion
Uncontrolled
suppression system should use a 4m grid spacing and may require additional detectors
in the ventilation air outlet(s).
Large enclosed volumes with no source of release but which contain a source(s) of
ignition (eg accommodation blocks) will normally require gas detection at the air inlet(s)
to ensure that gas is prevented from entering any part where an ignition source may
be present.
Note: Where these areas are manned, it is not acceptable to rely on an action to
remove all ignition sources before gas arrives. The action must prevent entry of
the gas.
It is important for any action (manual or automatic) that the designer is confident the
action will be taken in good time to ensure that it is effective. It is particularly important
for duct isolation actions. The passage of gas in the ducts should be stopped before it
crosses the boundary of the protected space. Ignition of gas in a duct inside the
boundary would compromise that boundary against the events that might follow. The
total response time of the detector(s), control systems and dampers can be long
compared to the time taken for gas to reach the area boundary after passing the
gas detector.
For large, partly enclosed volumes, a 5m spacing should apply to both the congested and
uncongested areas.
4.3 Special Cases

There are two special hazards to identify which affect the detection requirements in
large volumes. The first is any trapped volume, the second is where the release could
result in a cold dense cloud which would not rise high enough to be detected by the
lower level of the grid of detectors in the area.

4.3.1 Trapped Volumes

Trapped volumes are where local confinement can cause rapid flame acceleration
because the venting path is badly restricted (eg the volume trapped between a large
vessel and module walls). Every large volume which is provided with gas detection
should be reviewed to identify such trapped volumes. As a guide, if:
0.58 x So x V2/3 ÷ A v
is greater than 1 then the volume is trapped
where:
Av = the total area of vents for the volume (m2)
V = the total volume of the space (m3)
So = the fundamental burning velocity of the gas (m/s)
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Suitable values are:
3.5 for hydrogen
0.45 for methane
0.53 for ethane
0.52 for propane
As for small volumes, detector spacing in trapped volumes should be set at 4m, unless
there is an explosion suppression system (triggered by another form of detection), when
the spacing may be 5m.
4.3.2 Slumping Gas and Vapour Clouds

The behaviour of gas clouds is mainly governed by whether they were released as a gas
or a liquid.
Gaseous Releases
A gaseous release will be mixed with the surrounding air by its momentum. The mixture
will normally be mainly air (up to 16 parts air to 1 part gas). The initial temperature and
density of the released gas therefore has little effect on the density of the resulting
cloud as it will be very similar to that of the surrounding air. The cloud is continuously
carried away from the local area by the ventilating air currents.
Liquid Phase Releases

A liquefied gas release can behave very differently. Firstly, less mixing occurs with the
air. Secondly, the heat required to evaporate the gas is often more than is available from
the surroundings so liquids can remain in the released fluids for some time. The local gas
cloud will therefore be relatively dense and cold. This gas or vapour will tend to slump,
especially in low air movement areas.
Throughout the length of the plume, gas at the outer edges will be entrained into, and
carried away by, local air movements. At some point downwind, the whole plume may
have warmed sufficiently to lift off and be entrained in the ambient flowfield.

If an area contains inventories of liquefied gases and these have obvious leak sources
(seals, glands etc) then consideration should be given to setting the maximum height
above the deck for the lowest level of the grid at 0.5m. The judgement to be made is
whether the grid of detectors in the area, with its lower level at 4 or 5m above the floors
is likely to see such releases.
4.4 Sensitivity
The specification should ensure that the sensitivity of the detection is such that a hazard
will never be underestimated. This will require a detailed knowledge of the gas mixtures
which may be released, their limits of flammability and the response characteristics of
the detector technology selected.
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5 Good Practice Requirements for Toxic Gas Detection

5.1 Hydrogen Sulphide
The BP HSE Practice 10, Hydrogen Sulphide states:
5.4 Fixed Detection

‘It is BP policy that the protection of site personnel is primarily achieved by the safe
working practices defined in this document, not by the use of fixed detectors. However,
fixed detection methods may be installed for other reasons. The design, operation and
maintenance of such systems should follow BP guidance.’
In other words, no site should rely on fixed H2S detection to protect lives. A prime
reason for this approach is that the instruments currently available are not sufficiently
reliable to trust lives to them. This is the position for the foreseeable future.
However, there may be an expectation that H2S detection will be installed, for safety
reasons. Even where this is the case, it is essential that safety is assured by the
methods in HSEP 10, and no reliance is placed on fixed H2S detection.
If fixed H2S detection is installed, the performance requirements can be set as for any
other toxic gas, as described below.
5.2 Toxic Hazards from Production Gas

Export gas is not only combustible (or flammable), it is also toxic. The concentration at
which it is toxic is (for the gases we normally encounter) much greater than the
concentration at which it is a fire or explosion threat. Naturally, the alarm and action
levels are set according to the flammable threat.
Production gas normally also contains other toxic gases (carbon dioxide etc) but the
policy is to detect the combustible gas and annunciate the hazard as a potential fire or
explosion risk.

For small quantities of other toxic gases released in production gas, the approach is
similar: combustible gas detection is relied on to indicate the presence of a release.
The only difference is that any alarm should be treated as a potential flammable and
toxic hazard.
Separate detection for the toxic component should only be considered if the
concentration of the toxic gas is sufficiently high for the toxic risk to be as significant as
the fire or explosion risk threat.
Performance requirements for fixed toxic gas detection equipment should first meet any
claims made under the COSHH Regulations for toxic gas detection (such claims would
be unusual but become mandatory requirements).
Given that there should be no significant reliance placed in these systems for the
protection of personnel, the performance requirements should not be excessive.
There is a danger that operations personnel may not appreciate the drawbacks of such
Uncontrolled
systems and may begin to rely on them, for example when developing site-specific
work procedures.
6 Performance Requirements for Major Risks

The good practice measures that have been discussed will ensure that the site will have
all the standard benefits of fire and gas detection but the site may have special
requirements for better than normal performance in some areas. There are two ways
that these needs come about. The first is that imperfections in the design mean that
some plant items are particularly prone to causing hazards. The second is that there may
be particularly sensitive areas where a hazard would cause a much more severe loss
than usual. This latter group is normally split into safety (risk to personnel onsite) and
other consequences.
6.1 Plant Prone to Causing Hazards

A qualitative review of the plant and equipment in each area is required. Its aim should
be to identify any item that is prone to causing releases or fires. In particular, the review
should look at whether a fire or release hazard could escalate rapidly. An example of a
typical problem item is exposed stud bolting on some spool-mounted valves and
couplings or on heat exchangers. Where the studding is long, a fire can weaken its pull
on the flanges and lead to an escalating release.
Ideally, the design should be changed to remove the problem. If this cannot be done
then perhaps the weakness can be protected in some way to reduce the chance of
release or escalation (eg passive insulation of exposed studding). The aim of such
changes should be to reduce the risks from fire or release to a similar level as the rest of
the plant.
Where neither of these solutions is practical then enhanced detection (eg Grade A fire
detection coverage) would be necessary if the actions it can trigger will be effective in
maintaining a low level of risk. This is not the preferred option but is often a reasonably
practical solution.

6.2 Major Fire and Explosion Safety Risks

Under the Safety Case Regulations, any safety related performance claim in an accepted
Safety Case, whether direct or implied, becomes a mandatory requirement. Under the
PFEER Regulations, any special safety performance requirement needs to be practically
proven and effectively communicated to anyone with responsibility for the system. In
BP, PFEER standards for performance are the way these requirements are achieved
(refer to Section 1).
6.2.1 Existing Sites

Where a site has developed PFEER standards for performance, any special requirements
for fire and gas detection should be identified. These can be easily incorporated into the
system performance requirements because they are written in the same manner (role,
function, reliability etc).
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6.2.2 Projects
In projects where the standards of performance have not yet reached the detail of
specifying Performance Standards (ie have not reached down to Function or Element
levels), it will be necessary to anticipate where special performance may be needed and
build these assurances into the performance requirements for the system.
The Concept Safety Evaluation (or a document based on it) will be in continuous
development during a project. This will highlight the more significant fire and explosion
risks for the site in its current state of development. These in turn will indicate which
Elements of the fire and gas system may need special performance. For example if the
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF) is expected to be a problem, then
special detection arrangements at the air intakes may be worth specifying at an
early stage.
6.3 Other Major Fire and Explosion Risks

It is not yet common practice to quantify other risks as well as is done for safety risks.
However, it is usual for a project or a site to assess such risks in sensitivity studies.
Typical examples are the environmental impact study and the plant criticality study.
While the performance claims and assumptions made in these documents are not legally
binding (in the same way that they are in a Safety Case), they do indicate the Operator’s
intents for the systems. We should review such documents and estimate whether any
claims for the fire and gas detection systems are met by the performance requirements.

Review each
Gas Risk Area
Yes Is gas detection

required?
No
No Yes
END Next area?
Yes Natural
Is volume
Ventilation type Set 4m spacing
<1000m3?
Uncontrolled
No
Forced
XX and Leaks?
Yes Yes
Is volume Is volume
Set 5m spacing
totally open? congested?
No No
Set 10m spacing
Yes Yes
Is volume Explosion
Set 5m spacing
totally enclosed? suppression fitted?
No No Yes Yes
Any trapped Explosion Set 5m spacing
volumes? suppression fitted? in T area
No No
Set 4m spacing
Set 4m spacing
in T area
XX and Leaks?
Yes Yes Set max elevation

Is area partially ‘Heavy‘ gas release
Set 5m spacing for bottom of grid
enclosed? sources?
above deck at 0.5m
No No
Set max elevation for

bottom of grid above
deck at area spacing
Record why no
detection required
UKCSTS011_005.ai
Figure 2.2 Method for Setting Good Practice Gas Detection Requirements

Appendix 2A
Example Definition
of Performance Requirements
Paragraph Page
1 Foreword 1
1.1 Scope 1
1.2 Approach 1
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2 General Considerations 2
3 Example Performance Requirements 4

3.1 Required Information 5
3.2 Specifications for Grades and Spacing 7
3.3 Wellbay Areas 9
3.4 Risers, Manifolds and Riser Isolation Valves 11
3.5 Oil Processing Plant 13
3.6 Gas Processing Plant 15
3.7 Export Plant 17
3.8 Drilling Areas 19
3.9 Utility Areas: Diesel and Gas Fuel
Treatment and Chemical Injection 21
3.10 Utility Areas: Main and Emergency Electrical Generators 23
3.11 Utility Areas: Firewater Pump Enclosures 25
3.12 Utility Areas: HVAC Plant Room, Switchrooms,
Equipment Rooms etc 27
3.13 Utility Areas: Deck Areas, Cranes, Workshops etc 29
3.14 Central Control and Equipment Rooms,
TR, Accommodation etc 31
4 Additional Information 4
Example Definition of Performance Requirements

November 2001 Issue 1 App 2A-i/ii
1 Foreword
1.1 Scope
This document contains example definitions of Fire and Gas (F&G) detection
requirements.
The examples were collated from the Performance Requirements (PRs) for an integrated
deck, production, drilling, utilities and quarters platform in the North Sea. Good practice
levels of performance for such sites have been used in the examples but these may not
be appropriate for other sites, even of similar concept. Sites have different risks so the
F&G detection system requirements for each will be unique.
PRs record the required operational performance for an F&G system. The PRs therefore
affect system design, operation and maintenance and they have several purposes:
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• They are the design specification for system performance

• They are commonly a reference for the site Safety Case, as evidence that any
performance claims of the Safety Case (or other risk assessments) have been met
• They provide evidence that good practices (and perhaps Business Unit specific goals)
have been followed in setting performance requirements for the system
• They are a basis for auditing the acceptability of the design and the operational
performance of the working system
These requirements may form the basis for claims made in the site Safety Case. It is
therefore very important that the required performance is set at practical and achievable
levels, even after the system has been in operation for several years.
1.2 Approach
The remainder of this appendix contains examples of how to record PRs. The levels of
performance given are those commonly used for United Kingdom Continental Shelf
(UKCS) platforms. Some notes have been added to the examples to point out how
requirements and some of the considerations can change.
The required performance of the detection system can be recorded effectively on sheets
similar to those in the examples which follow. The user may find it easiest to use a
sheet for each fire area of the site. The first example sheet is a guide to the type of
information required.
To save repeating the requirements for the level of fire detection performance many
times for similar areas, the method groups similar areas into grades. These can be
defined in general requirements for the entire site and applied as required to each area.
The second example sheet shows what information is required to record grade and
spacing requirements.

November 2001 Issue 1 App 2A-1
2 General Considerations
There are some aspects of plant design which may affect the level of detection required
by increasing or decreasing the risks and consequences of fire. Many of the
considerations are operational (rather than design) and will require the advice of the site
Operator. Examples are given below:
Actions
The required actions and their maximum permissible response time will normally be
defined in a loss control philosophy for the site. Some actions may need specific
detection (eg see the example PR for wellbays).
Drainage
Uncontrolled
If the drain system in the area cannot remove all the firewater and likely product spillage
then it is likely that burning product will spread and escalate the fire. A higher grade
should be considered together with other means to prevent the spread of fire.
Isolated and Blocked-in Plant

Most plants have a block and depressurise shutdown policy, automatically initiated on
various hazardous conditions, including fire. However, some sections of plant may not
be depressurised, such as risers and metering skids. A careful check is required for
sections of plant which are not depressurised and not adequately protected from the
effects of fire by other means, eg passive fire insulation or pressure relief rated for
engulfing fires. Where such items exist, a higher grade shall be considered.
Plant Depressurising Times

The time required for plant depressurising is given in BP RP 37. Where depressurising
times exceed these limits a higher grade shall be considered.
Ignition Risks
In hydrocarbon plant, ignition risks are normally minimised. In certain circumstances,
ignition probabilities can be higher than normal, for example, near fired process heaters
where surface temperatures exceed 250°C (eg exhaust stacks) or where fluids are
processed above their auto ignition temperature. Such areas shall be reviewed and a
higher grade considered.
Some areas may only contain hydrocarbon fluids which, if released, are not likely to be
ignited, such as process fluids with a consistently high water-cut. In such areas a
reduced grade shall be considered.

App 2A-2 November 2001 Issue 1
Release Risks
There may be items of plant where containment is frequently broken, eg filters or
pigging vessels. Such items are often identified as ‘primary’ or ‘continuous’ sources of
release by the BP RP 39 Hazardous Area Classification method. These items shall be
considered and if the currently allocated grade may not result in a sufficiently quick
response to fire, a higher one should be used. As a guide, a greater than normal risk may
be when containment is broken more than 20 times a year or where abnormal
operations are likely during more than 20 days per year.
Conversely, there may be areas where release of hydrocarbon fluids can only occur
under supervision in the control of a procedure (eg some drilling operations or
maintenance of geographically remote items of equipment). The procedure may mean
that the response time to achieve effective control of fire in the area is very short, often
less than a minute. In such cases a lower grade should be considered.
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Limited Releases
It is often possible to design or modify plant to limit the total inventory in an area, or to
limit the feasible rates of release to a point where significant fires are unlikely. Where
this has been done, a lower grade should be considered.
As a guide, this might include areas where the inventory is less than 0.5 tonnes of gas or
1 tonne of liquid and where rates of release are not likely to exceed 0.25 tonnes per hour
(0.08kg/s) of gas or 0.5 tonnes per hour (0.14kg/s) of liquids.
Congested Plant
Certain sections of plant tend to be heavily congested. This causes three problems:
(1) Fire detection becomes more difficult.
(2) There is an increased risk of escalation.
(3) Firefighting may be very difficult and dangerous.
Typically congested areas are lubrication and seal oil skids, metering skids and manifold
areas. Where improved detection can be shown to alleviate the escalation or firefighting
problems, a higher grade should be considered.
Escalation Risks
Some plant equipment designs are more prone to failing in fires than normal. This can
occur where containment relies on thermally weak items such as long-exposed stud
bolts (eg plate heat exchangers and some check valves and instruments) or elastomer
seals. A higher grade shall be considered for these items.
Similarly, some plant items and structural sections have a very low potential to fail under
fire conditions. Examples are where comprehensive passive fire protection is installed or
where small inventory items such as instruments are remote from other plant. A lower
grade should be considered for these areas.

November 2001 Issue 1 App 2A-3
Safety Equipment and Critical Items

Safety equipment and critical items such as public address systems, ESD valves and
structure should have PFEER Performance Standards that will define the requirements
for survivability of that system. It is necessary to demonstrate that any Function of the
F&G detection system implied by such requirements is met.
3 Example Performance Requirements

Refer to the diagrams within Paragraphs 3.1 to 3.14 on the following pages.
4 Additional Information
Uncontrolled
Blank copies of the forms are available from the Custodians. They are also available in
WORD 6 format on the EUU domain server: EUABZS5\FSE\Documents\Guidance\F&G
Guide\Blankforms.doc.

App 2A-4 November 2001 Issue 1
3.1 Required Information
Fire and Gas Detection Performance Requirements (example)
Site: Site Reference Area: Fire Area Reference Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Specified by: Date: Agreed with Loss Date:
Control by:
F&G role: The roles for detection in each area of the site should describe general expectations for the system. This will usually be to meet ‘good practice‘ requirements and to respond to any specific risks which the system is
expected to address. For example, to protect sleeping personnel, to maintain the functionality of electronic equipment, to isolate a ventilation system or to reduce the risk of escalation.
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Notes: Describe the source of the hazard (eg plant) and any peculiarities which may influence the level of detection.
Describe the automatic fire control and release mitigation actions which the F&G system is expected to trigger (eg deluge, HVAC isolation and shutdowns).
Describe the area in terms of hazard to firefighters etc which might affect the allocation of automatic control actions to F&G alarms.
Functions:
Hazard Nature Extent Action Grade (fire) Expectations Survivability

Spacing (gas)
The nature of the hazard that The nature of the hazard The location of the hazard (eg anywhere in Any actions that the system is expected to trigger. The expected performance Additions or exceptions Any particular hazard or
the system is expected to (eg plumes of flashing liquids or the area or within the ventilation air Note that the need for automatic actions will normally, as a ‘Grade‘ of for this area to the site condition that the system
respond to eg accumulations oil spray or pool fires). intake or area surrounding MOL pump normally be identified elsewhere (eg fire protection fire detection or ‘Spacing‘ ‘Grade‘ or ‘Spacing‘ may have to survive before
or plumes of flammable gas, Sufficient information should seals). philosophy). for gas detection. definitions. performing its Function,
jet, spray and pool fires or be given to guide the selection eg chilling by flashing
Hydrogen Sulphide gas. of appropriate detectors. These statements should be supported by Expectations for the actions should clearly refer to condensate, a prior explosion
plan drawings of the area showing where specific risk reduction actions designed into in the or a particularly aggressive
each Grade applies, and the extent of the F&G system (eg firewater pump start) or any other environment.
areas. safety system (eg Yellow Shutdown, structural
protection deluge or HVAC system isolation).
This column should contain a cross-reference
to the Grade plan for the area covered by
the sheet.
These plans will be used together with the

text descriptions to assess whether a
detector layout can achieve the coverage
requirements. (Refer to Section 3 of this
document, Audit and Inspection).
UKCSTS011_006.ai

November 2001 Issue 1 App 2A-5/6
3.2 Specifications for Grades and Spacing
Site: A New Site Specifications for Grades and Spacings Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To provide a ‘good practice‘ level of fire and gas detection.
Notes: The alarm status of every detector shall be indicated in the Central Control Room, as detailed in the (supply reference, eg F&G Control and Alarm Philosophy).
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Fire Detection Requirements
Grade Nature of Hazard Threshold (1) Response Design Overall Notes

Alarm Action Time (2) Availability (3) Availability (4)
A Hydrocarbon fires, high risk 10kW RHO 10kW RHO 10s 95% 85%
B Hydrocarbon fires, site average risk 10kW RHO 50kW RHO 10s 95% 85%
C Hydrocarbon fires, low risk 100kW RHO 250kW RHO 10s 95% 85%
D General fires, life protection Dual systems, both able to meet BS 6266 Appendix A4 10s 95% 85%
E General fires, equipment protection Single system to meet BS 6266 Appendix A4 10s 95% 85%
F General fires, general protection Designed to BS 5839 Part 1 for Class P2 systems 10s 95% 85%
T Fires in engine enclosures 1 dB/m optical obscuration and temperature 20°C above operating maximum 10s 95% 85%
V Smoke ingress to HVAC systems 0.09 dB/m optical obscuration 10s 95% 85%
Fire Detection Requirements
Spacing Nature of Hazard Sensitivity Response Design Overall Notes

Time (2) Availability (3) Availability (4)
4m Hydrocarbon gas: small, ‘trapped‘ or totally enclosed volumes without supression Must not underestimate hazard 10s 95% 85%
5m Hydrocarbon gas: partly enclosed or congested volumes Must not underestimate hazard 10s 95% 85%
10m Hydrocarbon gas: open volumes Must not underestimate hazard 10s 95% 85%
Duct Combustible gas ingress to ventilation system Must not underestimate hazard 10s 95% 85%
Notes:
General
The values given are for example only. While they may be used on several sites, they may not be applicable to all.
The ‘Nature of Hazard‘ statements are summaries of the full definitions given in SPR/G/97/005 Part 2, intended as reminders only.
(1) Detection sensitivity (in units of kW RHO or a specified performance test). Older system designs tend to vote detectors to increase the reliability of control action outputs. For designs where more modern, reliable detectors are used without voting,
one ‘threshold‘ figure can be used.
(2) This is the maximum permissible response time, from the onset of the stated fire condition in the field until the required output is given by the F&G system.
(3) Design Availability should account for random equipment failure in the system and detector location weaknesses (eg incomplete flame detector cover).
(4) Overall Availability should account for Design Availability and operating outages for maintenance, lockout, inhibit, and where individual field devices may be inadvertently inhibited, eg by scaffolding or welding blankets.
UKCSTS011_007.ai

3.3 Wellbay Areas
Site: A New Site Area: Wellbay Area Accepted on behalf Date:

of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To detect fires, with the aim of minimising losses and reducing the risk of escalation by isolation of wells and general YSD.
To reduce the risks of escalation from an explosion in the area.
Notes: Area contains wellheads and associated flowlines. Different wellheads will be used for water injection, oil production (self-pressured) and oil production (gas injected).
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Deluge is provided, giving protection to the risers, wellheads, flowlines, and the primary structure.
Subsurface valves are provided in each well, but these should be used as a last resort, for example if the release is from below the wellhead tree valves (which close on YSD).
The area is enclosed and congested which affects considerations for manual firefighting and gas dispersion.
Functions:
Hazard Nature Extent Action Grade (fire) Variations Survivability

Spacing (gas)
Fire – medium escalation High pressure gas and crude Within 3m of hydrocarbon line flanges and Alarm in CCR B None No special requirements
potential jet or spray fires valve stem seals YSD
Start duty firewater pump
Initiate wellbay deluge
Fire – low consequence Diffusion gas jet or crude Remainder of the area Alarm in CCR C None No special requirements
spray fires YSD
Uncontrolled fire Large diffusion crude or All risers, release from upstream of Alarm in CCR S Detection of 1MW To be immune to unwanted
gas fire wellhead valves Isolate wells at subsurface safety valve fires, otherwise as alarms and smaller fires
Grade C
Gas – partly enclosed area Composition of gas flashed Entire area Alarm in CCR 5m None No special requirements
from wells (add references) YSD
or injection gas (add stream Start duty firewater pump
reference)
Notes:
Wellheads
These are normally very substantial items which are capable of maintaining containment for long periods in large fires. Generally they are graded B. C has been used on several sites where the risk is lower than normal (eg high water cut).
Grade A should be considered where there is an unusual amount of local, small bore pipework and instrumentation around the wellheads, because of the increased escalation risk. Grade A would also be applied if a Grade B fire could cause damage to the
structure or deluge system (eg cupro-nickel) before water was flowing through the nozzles.
It is good practice to minimise the cycling of downhole safety valves, only closing them if the fire or release is very large or if other actions have failed to control the incident. This can be achieved by using Grade S. This should call for Grade A (or B)
fire detection which will trigger all other actions, and Grade C action levels to trigger the DHSV closure. (Fusible or frangible detectors may be used for the insensitive detection).
Manifolds
Manifold areas will normally be Grade B. Expectations would be where there was an increased escalation risk from heavy congestion or an unusually large number of flanges, instruments or sample points.
Impact Decks
The area above the wellheads is normally decked out and open. Grade C should be used, even during BOP or wirelining operations, which are normally constantly supervised.
UKCSTS011_008.ai

3.4 Risers, Manifolds and Riser Isolation Valves
Site: A New Site Area: Risers, Riser Manifolds and Riser Isolation Valves Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To detect fires, with the aim of minimising losses and reducing the risk of escalation by positive, early isolation of pipeline inventories.
To reduce the risks of escalation from an explosion in the area.
Notes: The ESDVs and their actuators have passive protection against 30 minute jet fires. They also have a fusible plug (inside enclosure) to close the valve if directly attacked by fire.
Uncontrolled
Risers and lines are welded, the only flanges being on the ESDVs themselves.
Grating floor prevents large pool fires. The area is open (deck, deckhead and 1 wall) and well ventilated.
General area deluge is provided. Access and facilities for manual firefighting are good.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Fires in general area – Oil spray or gas jet diffusion Riser flanges and valve seals Alarm in CCR B None No special requirements
medium escalation potential fires YSD
Fires in general area – Oil spray or gas jet diffusion Remainder of area Alarm in CCR C None No special requirements
low escalation potential fires YSD
Fires in valve enclosure – Oil spray or gas jet diffusion Valve flanges and seals Alarm in CCR C None No special requirements
medium escalation potential fires YSD
Gas in general area – Export gas Entire area Alarm in CCR 5m None No special requirements
partly enclosed area YSD
Gas in valve enclosure – Export gas Entire enclosure Alarm in CCR 4m None No special requirements
small volume, natural (to prompt investigation)
ventilation
Notes:
Risers
Risers do not increase the grade of an area if they are of entirely welded construction, ie they do not change the grade that would be applied to the area if they were not there.
Where a riser is not fully welded (eg flanged for an ESD valve or instrumentation) then the valve, instruments and flanges should be Grade B. Where fire damage could cause failure of a riser isolation valve to perform its function
then the vunerable parts shall be Grade A. (Failure may be a delay to close or an incomplete isolation).
Pigging Vessels
Where the riser terminates in a pig vessel or any other point where containment is regularly broken then the seals and joints shall be Grade A.
Riser Isolation Valves
Riser isolation valves mounted on the topsides are normally designed to fail to the ‘safe‘ position if affected by fire (eg with a fusible plug), they are normally also protected from fires. Grade B cover is sufficient in these circumstances. Grade A should be considered
where small fires could feasibly cause damage to the valve or its utilities and the resulting failure could lead to escalation.
If the valve and flanges are housed in an enclosure (as opposed to being ‘lagged‘ with fireproofing) then appropriate fire and gas detection will be required.
UKCSTS011_009.ai

3.5 Oil Processing Plant
Site: A New Site Area: Oil Processing Plant Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To detect fires, with the aim of minimising losses and reducing the risk of escalation by early block and depressure shutdown (YSD) of the process.
To reduce the risks of escalation from an explosion in the area through early YSD.
Notes: Available systems are deluge (one valve supplying several systems protecting items of plant and structure), all-site block and depressure shutdown (Yellow s/d).
Manual fire control facilities normal, access for firefighting is average.
Uncontrolled
The area is enclosed and congested.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Fire – Gas jet fires, diffusion flame HP fuel gas super heater Alarm in CCR A None No special requirements
high escalation risk YSD
Fire – Crude spray or pool fires All other plant containing process Alarm in CCR B None No special requirements
medium escalation risk Gas jet fires hydrocarbons YSD
Fire – Oil pool fires All other parts of the area (sand settling Alarm in CCR C None No special requirements
low escalation risk tank, etc) Start duty firewater pump
Combustible gas in trapped Releases from all process Volume between floor, south wall and Alarm in CCR 4m None No special requirements
volumes trains in area: (list) V1001 YSD
Volume between floor, V1001 and V1002 Start duty firewater pump
Combustible gas, general. Releases from all process Remainder of area Alarm in CCR 5m None No special requirements
Partly enclosed area trains in area: (list) YSD
Notes:
Drains
Closed, hydrocarbon duty drain vessels and pumps are normally Grade B. These are part of an important safety system which will limit the spread of pool fires, helping to prevent the spread of fire from one area to another.
Inventory Isolation and Blowdown (ESD) Valves
Inventory isolation and blowdown valves are normally designed to fail to the ‘safe‘ position if affected by fire. Grade B cover is sufficient in these circumstances. Grade A should be considered where a small fire could feasibly cause damage to the valve or its
utilities and the resulting failure could lead to escalation.
Motors
The shaft end bearings of electric motors in production areas which are supplied with lubrication oil should be Grade B, due to the pressurised oil spray fire hazard.
Major Process Vessels

Most process vessels are Grade B. These represent the ‘average‘ level of risk in a hydrocarbon area and should therefore have the ‘normal‘ level of cover. There is an exception where there is heavy congestion. This may occur, for example on large separators
where inlet, outlet and instrument nozzles are collected at one end of the vessel. When walkways, cable trays and tie-in pipework are added, the area can become very congested and firefighting made very difficult, particularly at high elevations.
This exception can be overcome if ‘specific target‘ deluge systems are used in congested areas to prevent further failures and escalation.
UKCSTS011_010.ai

3.6 Gas Processing Plant
Site: A New Site Area: Gas Processing Plant Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To detect fires and accumulations or plumes of gas, with the aim of minimising losses and reducing the risk of escalation by early YSD of the process.
To reduce the level of fire damage to gas compression equipment to less than 24hr downtime.
Notes: Area contains diesel driven gas compression (engine in enclosure), gas drying, glycol regeneration and gas blanketed water treatment plant.
Available systems are deluge (one valve supplying several systems), Yellow S/D and H-60 rated engine enclosure. The enclosure has no fixed fire extinguishing system.
Uncontrolled
Manual fire control facilities normal, access to equipment within the area is average (congested equipment skids).
The area is wholly open (floor only) and is well ventilated.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Fire – high escalation risk Gas jet fires, diffusion flame HP fuel gas super heater Alarm in CCR A None No special requirements
Fire – high loss risk Gas compressor and local pipework YSD
Start duty firewater pump and initiate area deluge
Fire – Crude spray or pool fires All other plant containing process Alarm in CCR B None No special requirements
medium escalation risk Gas jet fires hydrocarbons (list plant items) YSD
Start duty firewater pump and initiate area deluge
Fire – Oil pool fires All other parts of the area (sand settling Alarm in CCR C None No special requirements
low escalation risk tank, etc) Start duty firewater pump
Fire or release in diesel Pressurised diesel or Inside enclosure Alarm in CCR T None No special requirements
engine enclosure lubrication oil release, ignited Engine s/d and external fuel isolation
or not Compressor s/d
Combustible gas, congested Releases from all process Compression skid Alarm in CCR 5m None No special requirements
areas in open volume trains in area: (list) Heat exchanger skid YSD
Combustible gas, general Releases from all process Remainder of area Alarm in CCR 10m None No special requirements
coverage of open volume trains in area: (list) YSD
Notes:
Glycol Packages
Gas drying systems based on glycol are normally Grade B since glycol is not easily ignited, even in hot mist form. In addition, surface temperatures are limited and the number of gas connections kept to a minimum. However, Grade A may be appropriate
for parts of the contact or vessel if any factors, such as temperature control or congestion cause doubt.
Heat Exchangers
Heat exchangers (tube type) are normally of ‘average‘ risk and shall be considered Grade B. However, these and any other types which rely on exposed stud bolts for containment (eg plate types) shall be considered Grade A due to the escalation risk
of containment failure.
Knockout Drums
Most drums used for liquid knockout are Grade B as they are not normally associated with high escalation or release risks. The pumps which transfer the condensates may be Grade A, see above. Flare knockout drums are a special case.
The control action should NOT depressure the plant.
Condensate Pumps and Gas Compressors
These are generally Grade A due to the uncertain nature of the fluid (condensate), the presence of seals, high pressure lubrication and/or seal oil, high discharge temperatures (compressors) and the high density of joints, small bore pipework and instrumentation.
UKCSTS011_011.ai

3.7 Export Plant
Site: A New Site Area: Export Plant Accepted on behalf Date:

of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To limit risk of escalation from small fires and releases by initiating automatic inventory control and fire control actions.
Notes: Area contains oil metering and export pumps.

Available systems are deluge (one valve supplying several systems protecting items of plant and structure). All plant block and depressure shutdown (Yellow s/d).
Uncontrolled
Manual fire control facilities normal, access good (open area).

Explosion overpressure risk low.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Fires in high escalation risk Process fluid (gas, condensate Export pumps (add reference) Raise alarms in the CCR A Extend 3m around No special requirements
plant and crude) Metering pumps (add reference) Start duty firewater pump MOL pump seals
Jet and spray fires Initiate all deluge systems in the area
YSD
Fires in medium escalation risk Jet, spray or pool fires from ESDV (add reference) Raise alarms in the CCR B None No special requirements
plant any feasible process release All other hydrocarbon plant including gas Start duty firewater pump
(Gas jets may contain blanketed water treatment vessel Initiate all deluge systems in the area
entrained glycol) (add references) YSD
Fires in low risk areas Crude oil or condensate Remaining spaces Raise alarms in the CCR C None No special requirements
pool fires Start duty firewater pump
Initiate all deluge systems in the area
YSD
Combustible gas clouds or Gas from streams 17, 36, 37 (List congested skids or areas) Raise alarms in the CCR 5m None No special requirements
plumes in congested parts of and 40 Start duty firewater pump
open area YSD
Flashing condensate clouds Flashing condensate from Local to condensate processing plant Raise alarms in the CCR 5m, low level None To withstand -60°C
or plumes stream 41 See plan (add reference) Start duty firewater pump
YSD
Combustible gas clouds or Gas from any stream in Remaining spaces Raise alarms in the CCR 10m None No special requirements
plumes in remaining parts the area Start duty firewater pump
YSD
Notes:
Pumps
Hydrocarbon export and booster pumps are normally considered Grade A because of the presence of high pressure oil (production, seal and lubrication) which may be released as an easily ignited mist.
There is normally also a congestion of pipework, flanges and instruments which could give rise to rapid escalation.
Analyser Houses
Analyser houses are not normally provided with fire detection if sited in an area covered by Grade A, B or C detection. Fires (other than those caused by human activity) are very unlikely within them.
An external fire which threatened the analyser house would be detected by the system in the surrounding area.
Gas detection should be provided, either in the ventilation air extract duct (if force ventilated) or a detector positioned in the house (if naturally ventilated). The detection would have alarm functions only because the release rates are normally restricted
to very low flows.
UKCSTS011_012.ai

3.8 Drilling Areas
Site: A New Site Area: Drilling Areas Accepted on behalf Date:

of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To indicate the presence of fire in areas unmanned during drilling operations and the presence of hidden fires when there are no drilling activities.
To prevent ingress of combustible gas to force-ventilated drilling areas.
Notes: The wireline cabin and mud laboratory may be unoccupied but ‘in use‘ during drilling operations. Fire damage should be limited to 1 week downtime.
The wireline cabin draws ventilation air from local sources (ie not the main site HVAC plant room).
Uncontrolled
Combustible gas released elsewhere may collect in the sack store and mudpit area. This is an enclosed area.
Functions:

Spacing (Gas)
Fires in cabins Class A Wireline cabin Alarm at CCR and Driller‘s cabin F None No special requirements
Mud laboratory
Driller‘s control room
Fire Mud (as diesel fuel) Sack store and mudpit area Alarm in CCR and Driller‘s cabin C No control action No special requirements
Misc drilling chemicals
Combustible gas ingress Any well fluid release HVAC air intake to wireline cabin Alarm at CCR and Driller‘s cabin n/a Response time set No special requirements
to cabins (including reinjection gas) YSD by duct length
Combustible gas clouds, Any process or well fluid Sack store and mudpit area Alarm in CCR and Driller‘s cabin 5m No control action No special requirements
partly enclosed area release
Notes:
Drill Floor
If the drill floor is manned whenever a hazardous situation could arise, and personnel are warned of imminent risk by other systems then F&G detection is not needed.
There is normally no automatic action which detection could take to reduce risks.
Cabins
Cabins which may be powered up but unmanned (eg wireline logging cabins) will require gas detection at the air intake(s) and basic fire detection in the cabin. More sophisticated fire detection would be required to protect any critical equipment within the cabin.
Mud Areas
If oil-based mud may be used, then fire detection will be required to alarm the presence of spray or pool fires in all mud transfer, processing and tank areas. (These fluids burn in a similar way to diesel fuel.)
Where the mud will always be water-based, no grading is required for the storage (pits), mixing and pumps areas. Stores for dry chemicals (eg mud additives) should be Grade C, the chemicals are often flammable.
Drilling Utility Areas

Switchrooms, stores, workshops, generators and equipment rooms etc should be assessed in the same way as any other utility area. Special consideration may be required where loss of a utility could endanger safety (eg loss of control of a well)
or where fire damage could lead to significant delays in drilling.
Degassing and Shale Shaker Equipment
Where these items are constantly supervised whenever there is a significant chance of gas or vapour release, Grade C shall be used since the response time for the area will be very short. Otherwise, Grade B shall be used.
Wirelining and BOP Areas
These are usually Graded C on the basis that when there is a high risk of release, the area is supervised by personnel with access to immediate means to cease operations.
UKCSTS011_013.ai

3.9 Utility Areas: Diesel and Gas Fuel Treatment and Chemical Injection
Site: A New Site Area: Utility Areas, Diesel and Gas Fuel Treatment and Accepted on behalf Date:
Chemical Injection of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To detect the presence of fire in the diesel and gas fuel treatment plant, with the aim of limiting damage.
To detect accumulation of combustible gas in the area.
Notes: Area contains diesel fuel treatment and transfer plant and fuel gas treatment vessels.
Air is drawn from this area by the adjacent emergency generator (A-60 rated enclosure).
Uncontrolled
There is no automatic or manual deluge system, conventional facilities for manual firefighting are available. Manual local and remote shutdown is available.
Access for firefighting is good (the area is floored with grating and so cannot support a pool fire beyond the trays).
There is a credible explosion risk (partly enclosed area) from gas leaked in nearby process areas and from the local gas plant.
Functions:

Spacing (Gas)
Hydrocarbon fires, high Gas process heaters and Local to vessels (list references) Raise alarms in CCR A No special requirements
escalation risk KO drums Isolate sources of gas (by remote skid shutdown)
Hydrocarbon fires, medium Diesel fuel spray or pool fires Local to plant, vessels, tanks and drip trays Raise alarms in CCR, with procedure to investigate B Grade C in No special requirements
escalation risk Fuel gas jet diffusion fires only and control the fire by isolating sources of fuel (by surrounding spaces
Class B fires from chemicals Chemical injection skid remote or local P/Bs) and standard firefighting methods not required
Combustible gas, partly Fuel gas leaked locally or any Whole volume Raise alarms in CCR 5m None No special requirements
enclosed area process gas from adjacent Inhibit automatic start of Emergency Generator
areas and indicate this
Notes:
Diesel Fuel Systems
Diesel fuel storage tanks are normally Grade C if inside modules. Fire detection is not normally required if outside.
Fuel pumps and other pressurised equipment (eg filters and cyclones) should be Grade B due to the oil mist fire hazard.
Helifuel Systems
Helicopter fuelling systems are not normally graded since the operations are supervised. If areas are unsupervised (eg at the transfer pump skid), pressurised equipment should be Grade C.
The helideck areas, including the fuel hose pit, are not normally provided with automatic detection. Risk of fire only arises when the area is manned.
Gas Fuel Systems
Fuel gas heaters and their associated knockout drums should be Grade A due to the increased ignition risks from the elevated temperature. Other sections of fuel gas processing and distribution plant are generally Grade B or C.
Chemical Skids
Chemical injection skids are normally Grade B. Although process chemicals can be very unpleasant if involved in a fire, storage is normally at atmospheric pressure, they are generally not highly flammable and the inventory from the pressurised lines
is normally very small. However, the chemical inventories should be reviewed and, if flammable or strong oxidising agents are used, Grade A should be considered.
UKCSTS011_014.ai

3.10 Utility Areas: Main and Emergency Electrical Generators
Site: A New Site Area: Utility Areas, Main and Emergency Accepted on behalf Date:
Electrical Generators of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To limit fire damage to 1 day downtime.
To prevent combustible gas entering an enclosure.
Notes: Main generators are dual fuel (gas or diesel) turbine driven machines. The turbines are in separate enclosures from the generators.
The enclosures are separately force-ventilated. The turbine enclosures are provided with a manually operated fixed firefighting system.
Uncontrolled
The generators are all provided with winding temperature monitors and alarms.
The emergency generator is diesel fuelled only and is driven by a reciprocating engine. Generator and driver are in the same enclosure along with a 250 litre fuel day tank.
The enclosure is force-ventilated when the engine is running.
Normal manual firefighting facilities are provided although entry will be very difficult under fire conditions. All these enclosures are designed to contain a hydrocarbon jet fire for 30 minutes.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Fire in engine enclosures Diesel spray fire lubricating Throughout the enclosures Alarm in CCR T None No special requirements
oil spray or pool fire Isolate all fuel supplies (outside enclosure)
gas jet fire (turbines only) Shut down engine but maintain lubrication
Fire in generator enclosures Lubrication oil spray fire Throughout the enclosures Alarm in CCR T None No special requirements
(electrical fires covered by Stop engine (normal shutdown)
other systems) Start duty firewater pump
Gas ingested by enclosure Any process release At ventilation air intake Alarm in CCR n/a Response time No special requirements
ventilation systems Isolate air supply in time to prevent combustible determined by duct
gas from entering the enclosure and action times
Shut down engine but maintain lubrication
Gas released in main Fuel gas Ventilation air outlet Alarm in CCR n/a Action to be Must be suitable for
generator turbine enclosure (to cover all enclosure) Isolate both fuel supplies (outside enclosure) completed ≤2 seconds likely high temperature,
Shut down engine high vibration environment
Notes:
Combustion Air Inlets
Combustion air inlets are usually positioned close to ventilation air inlets and so would not require separate detection to prevent ingress.
Fire Detection in Enclosures
Engine enclosures are usually Grade T. These are a special class of hydrocarbon area which normally house high pressure gas or fuel oil and lubrication oil, together with ignition sources (eg high surface temperatures).
When fires do occur, they can be very aggressive and damaging. They can also be very dangerous to fight manually. The role for detection should focus on early actions to isolate all sources of fuel while limiting damage. The grade definition should call for detection
of oil mists (pre-ignition detection) and unusually high temperatures in the enclosure and in ventilation outlet air (if appropriate).
Turbines
Emergency shutdown of turbines may cause an additional ignition source through flame emission from the compressor blow-off valves. Isolation of lubrication oil systems before the rotors have stopped can result in significant damage.
Fuel control systems for turbines are generally not within the engine enclosure and should be considered separately.
Diesel Engines
Studies indicate that ingested gas will not usually harm a diesel engine, since the fuel control system will try to compensate for the increase in ‘fuel‘. If the concentration of gas reaches flammable levels then any damage is likely to come from intermittent firing
of the engine causing explosions in the exhaust system.
UKCSTS011_015.ai

3.11 Utility Areas: Firewater Pump Enclosures
Site: A New Site Area: Utility Areas, Firewater Pump Enclosure Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To protect the diesel firewater pump from internal fires or external gas clouds, by limiting damage to equipment in the enclosure and
reducing the threat to firefighters from enclosed spray fires.
Notes: Enclosure is A-60 rated (to prevent external fire affecting the firepump and to prevent internal fire escalating) and provided with local manual deluge for fire control.
External manual valve provided to isolate main fuel supply to enclosure. The enclosure is provided with a local, manually operated deluge system.
Uncontrolled
Local diesel day tank (500 litre) and lubrication oil tank (15 litre) in enclosure.
Firefighting access: one narrow door.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Internal fires Diesel and lubrication oil Throughout the enclosure Raise alarms in the CCR, with procedure to T None No special requirements
fuelled spray or pool fires investigate and control using local manual deluge
Start other firewater pump
Combustible gas, external to From any feasible process Ventilation air intake. Raise alarms in the CCR Intake duct Response time No special requirements
enclosure release (Note that the combustion air intake is ≤2 seconds
inside the enclosure) Isolate air intake in time to prevent combustible gas
reaching a likely source of ignition (combustion air
intake, exhaust manifold etc)
Inhibit remote start
Start other firewater pump
Notes:
Combustion Air Inlets
Firewater pump engine availability is normally important to safety and productivity. The detection and automatic actions should aim to minimise downtime.
UKCSTS011_016.ai

3.12 Utility Areas: HVAC Plant Room, Switchrooms, Equipment Rooms etc
Site: A New Site Area: Utility Areas, HVAC Plant Room, Switchrooms, Accepted on behalf Date:
Local Equipment Rooms etc of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To prevent the ingress of smoke or combustible gas from external hazards to the Temporary Refuge (TR) (PFEER Performance Standard applies) and other areas.
To limit fire damage to HVAC supply equipment to 1 day repair time.
To detect electrical and electronic equipment malfunctions which might result in a damaging fire, with the aim of limiting equipment repair time to 1 day.
Uncontrolled
Notes: Loss of HVAC and pressurisation may jeopardise TR integrity (refer to PFEER Performance standard No: give reference).
The HVAC plant room supplies air to the TR, other control and accommodation spaces and local equipment rooms. It contains control panels, fan-motor sets and air conditioning equipment.
Normal facilities for manual firefighting are provided but there are no fixed systems or automatic firefighting equipment.
The switchrooms and local equipment rooms are all supplied with air from the HVAC plant rooms, so the quality of supplied air is already assured.
The rooms contain electrical and electronic equipment critical to production and important to safety.
Functions:

Spacing (Gas)
Smoke ingested at External process fire or Air supplies to all served areas Alarm in CCR E Plus smoke opacity Environment similar to
concentrations greater than internal HVAC equipment fire Shut down and isolate air supply ducts to all served monitor set at 6% external
1 hour breathability limit areas in time to prevent the contamination reaching
the served areas (within 5 seconds)
Switch over TR air supply to alternative source
Incipient (very early stages of) Electrical and electronic Switchrooms Alarm in CCR (prompting rapid inspection and E None No special requirements
fires Local equipment rooms corrective action)
Flammable gas ingested at Any process release Air supplies to all served areas Alarm in CCR Duct None Environment similar to
LEL concentration or greater Shut down and isolate air supply ducts to all served external
areas in time to prevent the contamination reaching
the served areas (within 5 seconds)
Switch over TR air supply to alternative source
Notes:
PFEER Performance Standards

It is important that any PFEER Performance Standards which relate to F&G Functions are included and referenced.
Air Intake Detection

Any area, manned or not, which is pressurised to prevent ingress of flammable gas or to dilute a contaminated area with gas-free air should be provided with gas detection at the air intakes. The detection and automatic actions must be capable of isolating
the air supply fast enough to prevent flammable mixtures from entering the protected space. Similarly, smoke detection should be provided for systems intended to prevent ingress of smoke or toxic gas detectors if the system protects against toxic gas.
Switch and Plant Rooms
Where rooms for equipment such as air handling plant or switchgear are provided in production areas, they are normally pressurised or otherwise regarded as ‘safe‘. These shall be Grade E or F as appropriate.
UKCSTS011_017.ai

3.13 Utility Areas: Deck Areas, Cranes, Workshops etc
Site: A New Site Area: Utility Areas, Deck Areas, Cranes, Workshops, etc Accepted on behalf Date:
of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: Provide fire detection with the aim of preventing intolerable losses and meeting ‘good practice‘ guidance.
Notes: Tote tank storage area is adjacent to main diesel fuel storage. There is potential for escalation of fire to intolerable loss.
Functions:
Uncontrolled

Spacing (gas)
Hydrocarbon fire Pool Tote tank laydown area Alarm in CCR C None Open deck environment
Class B fires Paint, solvents etc Paint store Alarm in CCR F None No special requirements
Engine bay fire Diesel spray and pool Diesel driven pedestal crane engine bay Alarm in CCR and crane cab F None No special requirements
Crane cab fire Class A and electrical Crane driving cabin Alarm in CCR F None No special requirements
General fire Class A and B (hydrocarbon) Laboratory Alarm in CCR with rapid first aid response if B No control action No special requirements
laboratory in use
General fire Class A Mechanical workshop Alarm in CCR F None No special requirements
Instrument workshop
Laboratory store
General fire Class A and electrical Utilities module (air compression etc) Alarm in CCR F None No special requirements
Notes:
Laboratories
Laboratory rooms for the analysis of hydrocarbon samples normally have very low flammable inventories and little intrinsic value. However, incidents tend to result in personnel injuries.
These areas should be to Grade B standard, but with no automatic control action. The use of sprinklers or other automatic systems should be considered where the response time to aid or rescue personnel is judged to be too long.
Laboratories with little or no hydrocarbon inventory may not need such effective detection, and a more appropriate standard would be F.
UKCSTS011_018.ai

3.14 Central Control and Equipment Rooms, TR, Accommodation etc
Site: A New Site Area: Central Control and Equipment Rooms, Accepted on behalf Date:
Accommodation etc of Operator by:
Control by:
F&G role: To protect high value electronic equipment from cubicle fires, by raising alarms in time for manual intervention to be effective in preventing significant loss.
To protect the lives of sleeping personnel from fire.
To warn of any escape route threatened by fire.
To alarm the presence of any significant fire.
Uncontrolled
Notes: These rooms are part of the site temporary refuge.
Functions:

Spacing (gas)
Electrical fires In cubicles, panels or cable runs Central Control Room, ESD equipment Alarm only, intended to prompt investigation and D None No special requirements
room (etc) and the cabin voids below manual intervention to prevent a flaming fire
Class A fires General All sleeping cabins Alarm in the CCR D None No special requirements
All internal escape routes
Class A fires General All other office and common areas F None No special requirements
within accommodation
Class A and Class B fires General Galley Alarm in the CCR F None No special requirements
Combustible gas risks - - - - - -

(See PR for HVAC air intakes)
Notes:
Control Rooms, Radio Rooms, Electronic Safety System Equipment Rooms etc
Because of the high criticality of these areas, Grade D is often used rather than E. This requires two separate systems, both of which can meet the test requirements (normally BS 6266 A4).
One system should use high sensitivity point detectors and the second should be a VESDA type, monitoring the ventilation air outlet(s).
Sleeping Cabins
Onshore standards of detection do not protect sleeping personnel from fires within their sleeping rooms. Grade D detection should be specified to address this risk.
Escape Routes
All escape routes in accommodation and service areas (offices, workshops etc) require detection to raise alarms if the route is threatened (by smoke).
Galleys
Galleys require two levels of detection. First they need the appropriate grade for the location of the room, assuming there was no special fire hazard within (normally Grade F). In addition, it is good practice to install proprietary systems to
detect and control fires in the extract ducting and hoods above fat fryers. (Manual firefighting equipment should also be specially provided to help control fires at the fryer units).
Stores
Automatic detection is not required in store rooms with little flammable inventory (eg potato stores).
Offices, Recreation Areas, Locker Rooms, Laundry etc

These require detection only if there is no doubt that a fire within the room could be contained within the boundary of the room (normally B-15 standard). Locker rooms, laundries and bonded stores are commonly required to have detection, as
are any rooms in which smoking is permitted. Consideration should be given to the probability of a fire and how it would be discovered and controlled.
UKCSTS011_019.ai

Section 3
Audit and Inspection
Paragraph Page
1 General 3-1
1.1 Introduction 3-1
1.2 Use 3-1
2 Scopes of Work 3-2

Uncontrolled
2.1 Audit Criteria 3-2

2.2 Risks 3-2
2.3 Design and Equipment Reviews 3-3
2.4 Areas 3-3
2.5 Detection Type 3-4
2.6 Equipment, Reliability and Human Factor Topics 3-4
2.7 Audit Frequency 3-4
3 Audit Report 3-5
4 Standard Terms of Reference 3-5

4.1 Setting Performance Requirements 3-5
4.2 Review of System Design or Installed Equipment 3-7
4.3 Review of Availability 3-9
4.4 Review of Competence 3-10

November 2001 Issue 1 3-i/ii
1 General
1.1 Introduction
It is standard practice for BP projects and operating sites to audit their Fire and Gas
(F&G) systems against system Performance Requirements (PRs). The design and overall
system will be audited at least once and periodic checks will test the operating system
against these criteria throughout its life. The scope of the audits can vary from testing
detector coverage to a full review of the design, operation and maintenance of the
system, and the competence of personnel who work with it.
These audits differ from a PFEER examination in three ways:
• They can address all risks, not just safety
• Their terms of reference are variable, depending on client needs
Uncontrolled
• The findings of such audits are not binding in the sense that PFEER examinations
findings will be
The audits may be used as a separate tool to focus on particular areas of concern (eg to
look at Business Unit protection aspects or the coverage of flame detectors) or they may
be combined with the PFEER examination. Audits can also be used to prepare for a
PFEER examination, (in the same way one might ask a garage mechanic to check a car
over before an MOT test) or to provide input to such an examination.
1.2 Use
This document contains example scopes of work in the form of a menu of audit
services. Business Units can use these to tailor audits or reviews to suit their particular
requirements.
A Business Unit can require an audit for many reasons, so it is important that the auditor
clearly understands the intended scope and purpose. The checklist of audit options in
Paragraph 2 should ensure that the client’s overall aims are clearly transmitted.
Paragraph 3 defines the contents of the audit report.
Paragraph 4 records the essential features of the procedures used in auditing
F&G systems.

2 Scopes of Work
Clients should select from the following possible scopes of work.
2.1 Audit Criteria

Any audit will need criteria against which the system will be assessed, normally the F&G
system PRs. Strictly, these should be prepared in advance of an audit and provided for
the auditor’s reference but this is not always convenient. The options are:
Propose Draft PRs

Use this option if the site does not have previous PRs for the equipment to be audited,
set according to BP practice (Section 2 of this document).
Uncontrolled
Review Existing PRs against BP Practices and Operational Expectations
Use this option if there is doubt that the PRs meet current BP practice or expectations.
Review Existing PRs for the Impact of Changes to Risk or Systems

This option will test the validity of the PRs only where significant changes have been
made to the site or the system since the last audit. It will be assumed that in areas
where no change has been made, the requirements remain appropriate for the risks.
Review Recommendations and Findings of Previous Audits

The client should provide the necessary documents to allow the auditor to review the
recommendations or findings from previous reviews or audits together with the client’s
responses and current status of any remedial actions.
No Work: Use Existing PRs as the Agreed Criteria

The audit should assume the existing requirements are fully appropriate for the risks.
Apparent anomalies may be highlighted by the auditor, but a rigorous check will not be
undertaken.
2.2 Risks
It is necessary to focus the terms of the audit on the areas of risk reduction that the
system is intended to meet. The options are:
All Risks
The audit will be based on all risks, ie the ability of the system to meet good practice,
PFEER Performance Standards and any specific Business Unit protection performance
requirements.

Safety Risks Only

The audit will consider only safety risks (fire, flammable and toxic gas), ie whether the
system meets good practice and PFEER Performance Standards. Such an audit could be
used to support a PFEER system of examination.
Other
The client should specify the particular risks against which the performance of the
system should be assessed. For example, the scope could be limited to only fire risks,
flammable gas risks or toxic gas risks.
2.3 Design and Equipment Reviews

Specify whether the audit should cover the system design or the installed equipment,
Uncontrolled
or both.
Design
Audit the suitability, the layout, positioning and orientation of the of the equipment
against the performance criteria. (Normally required in PFEER initial examinations.)
Installed Equipment
Audit the equipment in place against the performance criteria, based on the assumption
that the design is acceptable. (Normally required in periodic and initial PFEER
examinations.)
2.4 Areas
Review Whole Site

The audit will assess whether the system meets the specified performance
requirements in all areas of the site.
Review Modifications Since Previous Audit
Review Specific Areas

The scope of the audit may be limited to specific areas such as accommodation,
hydrocarbon plant areas, turbines, switchrooms or air intakes. The client should specify
which particular areas are within the scope of the audit.

2.5 Detection Type
All Detection
The audit should address all detector types intended to respond to the specified risks.
Specified Detector Types

The audit will be limited to detector types (flame, IR gas etc) specified by the client.
2.6 Equipment, Reliability and Human Factor Topics

Performance requirements cover more than the equipment in place. The client should
specify which requirements should be addressed by the audit.
Uncontrolled
All
To include all the criteria listed below.
Coverage, Output and Response Time

The ability of the system to react with the required response in the required time to the
hazards specified in the requirements.
Availability
The probability that the system will respond as specified given the current condition of
the equipment, together with its available maintenance and operational history.
Survivability
The probability that the system will meet the PRs for survivability.
Competence
The audit will assess the skills, knowledge and experience of the system of those
involved with its operation and maintenance.
2.7 Audit Frequency
One-off Audit
This is intended to be an isolated audit with no foreseeable repetition.
Occasional (On Request)

The client believes that the audit may be repeated in the future when requested.
Periodic at Specific Intervals

The client intends the audit to be repeated at an interval, to be specified.

3 Audit Report
The audit report should include the following sections:
• The scope for the audit as discussed and agreed with the client (refer to Paragraph 2)
• The audit criteria, agreed with the client against which the system(s) will be audited
These are normally the system PRs. Where the criteria exist as a readily accessible
client document, a reference should be given, otherwise the full criteria should be
presented in the report.
• The procedures used for each section of the scope
If these are standard procedures, readily available in a client document, these can be
referenced, otherwise they should be reproduced in full.
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• Results
The report should record all results, including both conformance and
non-conformance with the criteria.
• Findings and Recommendations
The report should compile a list of the non-conforming findings, arranged in order of
apparent significance. Where risk data is available then this should be used, otherwise
the judgement of the auditor should be used. Any opinions of the auditor should be
clearly identified as such. Likewise, the basis of all factual statements should be stated,
such as source of reference material and the results of other work.
4 Standard Terms of Reference

Guidance is given below for setting the Terms of Reference (TOR) against some of the
scopes of work given in Paragraph 2.
4.1 Setting Performance Requirements

The client must provide the audit with site-specific criteria against which the system can
be judged. The criteria are normally the PRs of the system. There may be cases where
these are not available or need to be modified or updated.
The BP method for setting the required performance for fire and/or gas detection
systems is given in Section 2 of this document. While the task of setting PRs is
necessarily a team task, there is much that the informed consultant can do to make that
task easier, eg by preparing a draft set of requirements according to the defaults
recommended by the BP method, and highlighting links to particular safety,
environmental or financial risks identified by the client.

TOR – To prepare draft overall performance requirements for the F&G detection
system
The same basic procedure is used for an operating site with no previously recorded
requirements, or a green-field project. The procedure for a consultant is:
(1) Set detection performance requirements based on the default recommendations in
the BP practices. These will ensure that the system performance meets good
practice.
(2) Change the PRs to reflect any specific PFEER Performance Standards which have
been set for the system.
Note: These performance requirements effectively set the criteria for PFEER
examinations of the system.
(3) Where other specific detection requirements have been set to meet other major
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risks (such as environmental or financial losses), appropriate changes are again
made to the system performance requirements. Any increases in performance
required as a result of such risks will be identified separately so they can be kept
outside the scope of a PFEER examination.
(4) The draft is submitted to the BP client for review and acceptance. These system
performance requirements should be fully accepted by the client before an audit
proceeds.
TOR – To review all PRs against BP practices and Operator expectations
The consultant will review the site, the PFEER Performance Standards and any other risk
reduction requirements specified by the client and assess whether the existing PRs
reflect the expectations of BP guidance, of risk assessments and of operational
personnel.
TOR – To prepare draft amendments to the performance requirements for the F&G
detection system, to cover changes in the site, the risks or client expectations for
the system
Where modifications have been made to a site with pre-existing PRs, the procedure
should be:
(1) Collect details of any plant modifications to the plant since the last audit, any
changes in the fire or explosion risks and any change in client expectations for
system performance.
(2) Review the potential impact of the changes on F&G detection and propose
changes to the F&G detection PRs, based on the BP practices and the detection
requirements prior to the change.
Note: Where specific PFEER Performance Standards are associated with the
modifications, changes to the PRs effectively set new criteria for a PFEER
examination of the system.

(3) Where other specific detection requirements have been set to meet other major
risks from the modifications, appropriate changes are again made to the system
PRs. Any increases in performance required as a result of such risks will be
identified separately so as to ensure they can be kept outside the scope of a
PFEER examination if desired.
(4) The draft is submitted to the BP client for review and acceptance. These system
PRs should be fully accepted by the client before an audit proceeds.
4.2 Review of System Design or Installed Equipment

It is normal practice to test whether the design of the fire and gas detection system is
capable of meeting the PRs. The test should also be applied to modifications of either:
• The fire or gas detection system
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• The fire and explosion risks

• Claims made for the performance of the F&G system
Where PFEER Performance Standards apply, the regulations require a similar initial
examination.
TOR – Audit the design against the performance criteria for selection of
equipment, its suitability, its intended layout, positioning and orientation
The aim of this work is to ensure a design can (if correctly installed, operated and
maintained) meet the performance requirements. The techniques used vary according to
the type of detector and the area to be covered.
Flame Detection
• The effective range of the selected detectors in the anticipated environment, based
on test data
• The layout and orientation of the detectors to ensure that the footprint of achieved
coverage can provide the required alarms and control actions for the stated hazards.
This check should use the assessment software Flame Detection Assessor (FDA)
developed by BP and Micropack Ltd for this purpose
Point Heat and Smoke Detection

• The selection of detector types is appropriate to the hazards and the PRs
• The positioning of detectors is appropriate for the air movements in the area and
the PRs
Other Fire Detection

The checks must be appropriate to the type of fire. Generally, assurance is required that
detection will occur for the type and size of fire quoted, in the time specified, also
meeting the availability and survivability criteria.

Combustible Gas Detection

(1) Ensure the detectors are positioned to reveal a cloud or plume of the size and
concentration specified, wherever that may be in the area.
(2) Ensure the sensitivity of the instruments will not underestimate the hazards arising
from any of the mixtures of gases that may arise in the area.
(3) Establish whether the location and type of instruments is appropriate to the air
flow patterns and plant layout in the area, to ensure accumulations and plumes of
gas will be detected.
Aspirator Systems
Examine any use of aspirators (occasionally used with smoke or gas detectors) to ensure
that the time delay to detection is within expectations and that any failure modes of the
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aspirator will not prevent the availability target being met.
TOR – Audit the equipment in place against the performance criteria, based on the
assumption that the design is acceptable
Where a design has been previously audited then, barring no major modifications or
changes in risk, the design should remain fit for purpose throughout the life of the site.
Despite this, the equipment in place can fail to meet these criteria and so periodic
checks may be required to ensure these criteria continue to be met.
(1) Visually inspect the detection equipment and make a qualitative assessment of
whether detection coverage meets design coverage requirements.
(2) Visually inspect the area of detection and the control area for any features which
might inhibit the required output or delay it beyond the required response time.
(3) Where the auditor has doubts about the performance of the detection system,
tests may be used to establish its acceptability or otherwise. The test vary
according to detector type and the nature of the area in which they are installed,
refer to notes.
Notes: (1) Flame Detection Tests: there are no practical, in situ fire tests
possible for this assessment. The audit tests are therefore
inferential, as are those routinely used during maintenance. The
audit should review the optical condition of the detectors and their
alignment. Where a photographic record exists of the optimum
alignment of the detectors, this should be compared with their
current view. If such a record is not available then photographs
should be taken of the view from every detector and these should
be used to assess the resulting coverage against the performance
requirements using the FDA software package.

(2) Smoke Detection Tests: the performance of smoke detectors

depends to a great extent on their location with respect to the
sources of smoke and the air movements in the area. Should it be
necessary to prove the performance of the system, then a hot wire
test to BS 6266 Appendix A.4 may be conducted in non-hazardous,
electrical areas, or visualisation of the air movements may be used
in other areas.
(3) Heat Detection Tests: it is not usual to test the arrangement of heat
detectors in situ due the problems associated with creating large
volumes of very hot air. The calibration of individual sensors may be
checked by the same tests used in maintenance but the
performance of the devices in situ can only be inferred from their
location with respect to their surroundings.
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(4) Combustible and Toxic Gas Detection Tests: clearly it is

unreasonable to release detectable quantities of toxic or flammable
gas. Once again, inferential test must be used. The system
sensitivity is determined by the layout of detectors and their
calibration. The layout is determined by design and the calibration by
maintenance. The only reasonable tests for audit are therefore to
ensure the detectors are in the locations required by design and that
maintenance ensures the sensitivity required by the design.
4.3 Review of Availability
TOR – To confirm that the F&G detection system is being operated and maintained
in a manner that is compatible with its availability performance targets
Ensure system availability meets performance requirements. This will normally require:
(1) Review details of permit procedures and platform instructions for details covering
the use of detection inhibits and control action lockouts.
(2) Review the history in the F&G system event recorder to check history of use of
inhibits and lockouts (including maintenance).
(3) Review provisions for identifying unavailability that is not revealed by the F&G
system (eg scaffolding masking flame detectors).
(4) Review maintenance and fault logs to check that failures by detectors to meet
their required sensitivity does not compromise the required availability for
detection in that area.

4.4 Review of Competence

TOR – To confirm that the personnel working with the F&G detection system are
competent to do so
Interview personnel working on the F&G system. Appraise their skill, knowledge and
experience in their area of responsibility, eg:
(1) Ensure Control Room Operators follow the required alarm handling procedures.
(2) Witness maintenance routines being implemented and ensure technicians are
aware of the potential for unrevealed failures and how these are avoided.
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Section 4
Detector Specification
Paragraph Page
1 Foreword 4-1
1.1 Aims 4-1
1.2 Vendor Selection 4-1
2 Fire Hazard Detection 4-1

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2.1 Optical (Flame) Detection 4-1

2.2 Linear Detection 4-4
2.3 Point Detectors 4-8
3 Gas Hazard Detection 4-11

3.1 Volumetric Detectors 4-11
3.2 Linear Gas Detectors 4-11
3.3 Point Gas Detectors 4-12
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 4-i/ii
1 Foreword
1.1 Aims
This section of the document aims to assist in the selection of fixed fire and gas
detection equipment. The advice is generally intended for offshore and other
hydrocarbon processing sites, but may be used more widely. This section advises on the
types and levels of detection that are appropriate to different hazards while Appendix 4A
is a collection of the BP procurement specifications for the types of detector
commonly used.
1.2 Vendor Selection

There is no intent in any part of this document to be vendor selective or specific.
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The specifications and limits stated are, it is believed, achievable goals, based on
operational needs and experience. By stating our requirements rather than repeating
what is commonly achieved, BP is encouraging vendors to develop their products to
meet our requirements. In some cases, we recognise that only one vendor may have
met a particular specification to date.
It is recommended that the specification sheets are used as a basis for bid or
procurement so that the problems many projects have met can be avoided in the future.
2 Fire Hazard Detection

This paragraph discusses the various types of detector available and the hazards they are
best suited to detecting. The advice is intended as a first step in the procedure for
selecting detectors, the second is to gather experience of the proposed devices from
similar sites with similar hazards. Detector type testing also has an important part
to play.
Sensitivities are given in terms of the size of hazard it is normal to detect with such
devices. This is often not a function of the detector’s sensitivity, but more to do with the
environment or conditions surrounding the hazard.
2.1 Optical (Flame) Detection
2.1.1 Infrared
Infrared (IR) detectors have become the standard for all gas and liquid hydrocarbon fires.
Generally, they are tuned to monitor one (or more) specific waveband (a range of
wavelengths) of near or mid-IR radiation. The wavebands are chosen where hydrocarbon
flames emit strongly, and the background is relatively dark.
Infrared detectors require a hydrocarbon flame. Fires of other fuels (such as hydrogen)
may be impossible for the sensors to see. Other fuels, such as methanol, may be seen
but very insensitively.
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 4-1
All infrared flame detectors will respond to reflections of flares in puddles, cladding and
other reflective surfaces. This is partly because infrared radiation is easily reflected.
IR detectors should not be used in any situation where flare radiation can be seen,
either directly or reflected off even one surface.
Several methods have been developed to reject the signals from non-fire sources of IR,
eg sunlight and hot surfaces. The simplest (and first) was a single frequency detector
that only responded to ‘flickering’ sources of about 5 to 15Hz. More sophisticated
designs may have more effective signal processing or more sensors (monitoring
different wavelengths) which attempt to differentiate between a hydrocarbon fire and
any other source of IR.
Whatever the method, all IR flame detectors are affected to some extent by background
‘blackbody’ radiation sources in their field of view (hot plant, people, the sun, etc).
Some detectors suffer reduced sensitivity while others give unwanted alarms,
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especially if the source appears to flicker (eg the detector is vibrating on its mounting,
a tarpaulin is flapping or the sun is reflected off a moving surface).
Sunlight is less of a problem for flame detectors working in the mid IR (3 to 5µm) but
some detectors working in the near IR (1 to 3µm) will false alarm to sunlight.
Multifrequency instruments which monitor both mid and near IR wavelengths may
suffer significant reduction in sensitivity.
There is no easy rule to predict which design is best suited to a particular site.
Not all multiwavelength devices have good false alarm rejection and cheaper detectors
are often good enough. The Fire and Safety Engineering Group (SPR Dyce) can advise
based on wide experience and extensive testing.
Field test sources are now available for IR detectors in the form of torches which can be
used at a range of up to 5 metres. These sources test the functionality of the detector
but do not test its sensitivity unless used at a prescribed range (which is normally
difficult in operating plant).
IR detectors can be used in processing and utility areas to detect flaming fires of 10kW
Radiant Heat Output (RHO) or greater. This limitation is set more by plant congestion
(line of sight) than the devices. Most modern instruments should have an effective range
of greater than 10m to such fires. IR detectors ‘see’ more than the visible area of the
flame and the effective range will have been measured against an unobscured plume.
The main causes of unrevealed failure are:
• Object in line of sight between detector and fire (eg welding blanket)
• Blackbody radiation, causing sensitivity reduction (some multifrequency devices)
• Some electronic faults
The main causes of unwanted alarms are:
• Reflections of ‘acceptable fires’ (eg flares)
• Blackbody radiation (many devices)
4-2 March 2002 Issue 1/AM01
The main causes of revealed faults are:

• Loop circuit faults
2.1.2 Ultraviolet (UV)

Ultraviolet (UV) detectors are generally unsuitable for hydrocarbon fires for the
following reasons:
• The fires can emit very little UV
• The smoke will absorb UV strongly
UV detectors are based on the Geiger-Mueller tube and are very sensitive (some can
count individual photons) but there may be no UV to be seen from a ‘dirty'
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hydrocarbon fire.
Hydrocarbon fires can be seen by UV detectors if they are clean burning, ie gas jet fires.
If this is the only hazard in the area then UV detectors may be used, but they are
best located well below roof level in case smoke is given off from other materials
(eg paint and cables).
False alarm immunity of UV detectors is good because the environment is very dark at the
monitored wavelengths (where sunlight is strongly absorbed by water). However, these
detectors will respond readily to welding, lightning and radioactive sources.
It is not widely appreciated how easily these detectors can be inhibited. Any deposit on
the lens might absorb UV photons – even a fingerprint can significantly reduce sensitivity.
These detectors can be easily tested in the field. UV test sources are marketed in the
form of a torch, suitable for use in hazardous areas. However, these sources are very
strong and it is difficult to prove the sensitivity of the detector.
Given a clean flame, a clean lens and a clean environment, most UV detectors should
have an effective range of 30m to 10kW RHO fires although this will often be limited by
plant. UV detectors have to see the UV emitting area of the fire, normally the blue or
invisible area of flame close to the seat of fire.
• Object in line of sight between detector and fire (eg welding blanket)
• Welding, Non-destructive Testing (NDT) using radioactive sources and occasionally
lightning (photographic flashes are normally too fast to be detected)
• Reflections of ‘acceptable fires’ (eg flares)
• Slight fouling of the lens (most devices have facilities to detect this)
• Loop circuit failures
2.1.3 Combined UV-IR

Combined UV-IR devices operate in two modes: ‘UV and IR’ and ‘UV or IR’.
The ‘UV and IR’ mode requires detection of both wavebands before a (shutdown) output
is given (some devices give a pre-alarm on detection of one or the other waveband).
The aim of the instrument is to reject unwanted alarms since there are few sources
which emit as strongly as (clean) fires in both spectral regions. Such devices may be
beneficial where fires can only be clean burning, they emit IR and UV, and the windows
of the detectors will be kept scrupulously clean.
The ‘UV or IR’ types aim to respond to either waveband, offering higher detection rates,
but the unwanted alarm immunity of these instruments tends to be correspondingly poor.
These devices are not normally recommended for general use. Specific tests would be
required to show their suitability for a specific role and (given their higher cost) their
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advantage over IR or UV detectors.
The causes of faults are the same as for IR and UV types described above.
2.1.4 Closed Circuit Television

There are many applications where IR and UV flame detection will not perform
satisfactorily due to excessive unwanted alarms (eg top deck process areas).
Heat detection can be used but cannot practically meet the performance requirements
of most process areas. In an attempt to reduce the response time, IR enhanced Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) has been used to give the Control Room Operator an
immediate confirmation of a fire should a heat detector raise an alarm. This is not an
ideal solution because the initial alarm is still too insensitive to meet the performance
requirements.
Intelligent CCTV systems have been successfully developed for these situations.
These systems do not rely on heat detection, but continually and automatically process
the video signals, testing for a suspected fire. On detection, the system will
automatically raise an alarm and present a video image of the area in the control room.
When these techniques have been proven in service they should provide a superior and
cheaper form of optical fire detection for most petrochemical applications.
2.2 Linear Detection

There are many technologies of linear detectors, most aimed at monitoring air
temperature and a few which aim to detect radiated heat. This paragraph is limited to
discussing the more commonly available devices.
Linear types can be pneumatic, electrical or optical. Generally, they are used to
supplement other forms of detection in difficult areas (eg in heavily congested plant or
where flare radiation may be visible).
2.2.1 Pneumatic Tube Systems

Pneumatic tube systems are frequently used for directly controlling firewater deluge
valves. Instrument air is supplied through a filter regulator and a small, variable restriction
orifice. The flow of make-up air into the tube is just sufficient to keep the deluge valve
closed and also to maintain a pressure transmitter above its alarm setting. If the fire
detecting tube is ruptured, the pressure should quickly fall, causing the deluge valve to
open and the transmitter to raise an alarm.
These systems can also be used without a deluge valve as a ‘detection only’ system,
where the electrical signal is used to raise alarms and cause trips.
It is difficult to configure these systems to meet operational requirements. Some of the
factors involved are:
• Effective range: the tube needs to be very close to a fire (refer to specification sheet)
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• Response time: typical response times are 2 to 3 minutes from the onset of a
detectable fire to pressure transmitter response, longer for the deluge valve
• Operating pressure: the tube material and the operating pressure must be matched to
ensure a clean ‘burst’ (about 7barg for polypropylene), but the maximum pressure is
often limited by the deluge valve to 4barg or less
• Tube volume: the volume downstream of the restriction orifice must be minimised
• The pressure transmitter should be at the far end of the detector tube from the
supply and test valve
• The test valve should give a test hole similar to the size of the expected
rupture (approximately 1mm)
• The detector tube must be protected from accidental damage (eg in inverted
cable tray)
Variable RO Manifold
PT
Supply and Filter
Regulator Test Valve Detector Tubes Instrument
(one per tube)
2mm
Diameter
Deluge Valve
(optional)
Typical Pneumatic Tube Arrangement

UKCSTS011_020.ai
With these provisions, linear pneumatic tube detectors can be very effective, especially
where detection of larger fires is required to activate specific actions, like subsurface
valve closure.
• Too distant from fire
• Incorrect setup (eg variable orifice set too large or pressure transmitter located
at supply end)
• Mechanical damage or air supply failure
• Incorrect setup (eg variable orifice set too small)
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2.2.2 Electrical Linear Heat Detectors
These come in two varieties, those that respond to an average temperature along their
length and those that respond to the highest temperature at a point along their length.
Both types have a pre-set (in manufacture) response threshold and give an alarm only
output. They require special support electronics which must be made suitable for use in
hazardous areas.
These systems have not generally found favour with offshore sites. They are not easily
tested (in fact some have to be replaced once activated) and not well suited to a plant
environment (EM pick-up, hydrocarbon contamination, vibration and other such
problems).
2.2.3 Optical Linear Heat Detectors

These use a property of a particular type of optical fibre (Ramman scattering) which
changes with temperature. A sophisticated control system can monitor the temperature
at any point along the fibre. Currently available versions shield the fibre for most of its
length, removing the shielding at specific points where a heat collector is coupled to the
fibre. This effectively turns the system into a string of point heat detectors.
These systems offer the advantage of continuous analogue readings from a large
number of points but this has little value in most applications. They tend to be more
costly and complex than the traditional binary point detectors which they compete with
and so have not been widely used. They may have comparable cost and lower
complexity than ‘addressable systems’.
2.2.4 Linear Optical Smoke Detectors

These are essentially obscuration monitors. Anything that reduces the intensity of light
(near IR) in the path of the beam will cause an alarm at a given level.
A particularly rugged and reliable version of the obscuration detector, developed from an
exhaust stack analyser, is used in ventilation ducts to detect when the level of smoke in
the air reaches the limit of breathability for one hour. This is particularly valuable in
temporary refuge application where the survival of personnel depends on maintaining
pressurisation of the refuge.
In-situ testing, calibration and maintenance of the recommended instrument are
straightforward.
There are no known causes of unrevealed failure.
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• Sea fog and diesel engine exhaust from adjacent supply vessels (although the latter is
undoubtedly toxic at the concentrations required to trip the alarm)
Revealed faults are uncommon but may result from:
• Incorrect setup (eg alarm level too sensitive)
• Failure of the source or electronics
2.2.5 Linear Oil Mist Detectors

These are essentially obscuration instruments. A light source is columnated and
transmitted across the area to be monitored. It is usually returned via a retro-reflector
and the intensity of the returned light is monitored. Software signal filtering is required to
prevent unwanted alarms.
The oil mist detector is particularly useful in engine enclosures for indicating the release
of high pressure fuel or lubrication oil which can lead to particularly aggressive and
damaging fires. If the oil mist ignites, the instrument doubles as an optical smoke
detector. It is not (yet) very useful in open areas where beam interruption is more likely
and may cause unwanted alarms.
• Incorrect setup
• Activities that raise dust, like changing air intake filters online
• Accidental interruption of the light beam
• Failures of the light source or electronics
2.3 Point Detectors

While there are a huge variety of technologies available in point devices, they are
generally built to perform to European standards. This limits their upper and lower
bounds of sensitivity against the particular fires used in the tests, designed to check
their suitability for the needs of onshore industries, public buildings, the fire brigade and
so on. This is by far the largest market for these detectors and so dictates everything
about them.
The petrochemical industry is a small market in comparison and so we have to adopt
these detectors. We should not however accept that the needs and values of the wider
market apply to us. We may for example put a much higher value on a life, or piece of
safety equipment and thus need different standards of detection than those used in, say,
a shop. None of the wider standards for design, test and application were written for our
industry, but given these reservations, we can use these detectors to meet some of our
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own requirements.
2.3.1 Ionisation Smoke Detectors

These contain a small radioactive source (Americium 241) which ionises air in a small
chamber. The ions flow to a charged plate giving a measurable current. Particles of
smoke or vapour in the chamber can absorb the radiation and reduce the current.
A low current trips the alarm circuit.
The size and composition of the particles are crucial to successful detection so that
some types of smoke or vapour are detected at very low (invisible) levels, like that from
toast or very hot cooking oil, whereas others like the large sooty particles from plastic
fires are not seen at all. BP has tested many of these devices against common hazards
and the results are given in the summary table at the end of this section.
As a general rule, these devices can be used in accommodation areas to monitor the
escape routes, corridors and public rooms. They are not suited to sleeping areas as they
may not detect a fire in time to save the lives of sleeping personnel in the room.
They may be used to detect fire in some equipment spaces (depending on the
ventilation) but not for highly critical electrical or electronic equipment.
These detectors are sensitive to gas and liquid fuelled hydrocarbon fires, but not robust
enough to be used in plant areas. They are suited to monitoring air intake ducts (if their
slow response time is acceptable), in fact they may be too sensitive for some
applications and may give unwanted alarms to diesel engine exhaust fumes.
In-situ testing is practical (if expensive) using proprietary aerosols and application tools.
Normal practice is to replace any failed or suspect devices, rather than attempt repair.
Because they contain a radioactive source, failed devices must be disposed of properly,
normally via the manufacturer.
• Incorrect siting with respect to airflow patterns
• ‘Smoke’ particles or vapour of wrong characteristics
• Blocking of the very fine filter designed to exclude dust and very small insects (eg Thripp)
• Sources of vapour which cause strong response (eg exhaust fumes)
• Steam from showers
• Loss of charge on the pick-up electrode, and some other electronic faults
2.3.2 Optical Point Detectors

An intense light source is used to back-scatter photons to a detector which is masked
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from the source.

Once again, the size and nature of the particles of smoke are important. Carbon black
particles characteristic of hydrocarbon and plastic fires will not be detected, even if they
make it through the Thripp filter and the labyrinth that separates the source from the
detector. White smoke (eg electrical equipment fires or smoke containing large amounts
of water vapour) should be readily detected.
In general, these are a less sensitive option to ionisation types, but they are specific to
particular types of smoke and therefore used only in certain locations. Detectors are
available which combine an optical smoke sensor with a temperature (rate of rise)
sensor and these have similar sensitivity to ionisation types for detection of most fire
types whilst retaining the improved performance for detection of electrical fires.
Testing and maintenance are the same as for ionisation types.
• ‘Smoke’ particles or vapour of wrong characteristics
• Blocking of the very fine filter designed to exclude dust and very small insects (eg Thripp)
• Sources of vapour which cause strong response (eg exhaust fumes)
• Loss of light source (detected in most models) and some other electronic faults
2.3.3 Point Heat Detectors

Several types are available, based on technologies like bi-metalic strips, IR sensors
and thermistors.
In general the more rugged bi-metalic strip types are used offshore, particularly so for
arduous situations like in turbine enclosures or ventilation ducts. These can be supplied
to respond at a factory set temperature and can incorporate an additional trip on a high
rate of rise in temperature, again pre-set by the manufacturer.
In-situ testing is relatively straightforward (eg using a proprietary chemical hand warmer)
but calibration should be done in the workshop using a heated sand-bath and
thermometer.
The electronic types (thermistors etc) are generally less reliable, more expensive and
more complex and so are not commonly found offshore. They are generally only used
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where aesthetics is a primary consideration.
2.3.4 High Sensitivity Smoke Detection Systems

The protection of people in sleeping areas, critical and high value equipment generally
requires better performance from detectors than is provided by the standard point types
described above. Higher sensitivity is required.
There are two basic types of high sensitivity smoke detectors: addressable point optical
systems and aspirated optical systems (often called VESDA or Very Early Smoke
Detection Apparatus).
The use of addressable point systems is discouraged because they are generally more
difficult to engineer and can be significantly affected by local environment variations.
Their overall cost of installation and ownership is generally higher.
The aspirating type is preferred for its relative simplicity, reliability, lower overall cost and
ease of upkeep. These work in a similar way to point optical detectors, but with a much
stronger light source (a pulsed, solid-state laser is the preferred source) and a much
more sensitive detector. They are not so selective about the type of particle they
respond to.
They are normally used with a multipoint sampling system to monitor extracted air from
sleeping quarters and rooms containing high criticality electrical or electronic equipment.
Their sensitivity is adjustable and at maximum is far higher than our needs require.
They are more than capable (when used with appropriate alarms and procedures) of
protecting sleeping personnel or detecting an overheated component in a multicubicle
equipment room.
The efficiency of the system is dependent on the design of the sampling system and
needs to be checked on commissioning using a standard test. Thereafter, testing,
calibration and maintenance are all performed in-situ.
There are no recorded unrevealed failures.

• Activities which create dust (eg replacing filters in cubicle ventilation systems) could
be a problem
• Aspiration failure (uncommon)
3 Gas Hazard Detection

3.1 Volumetric Detectors
None currently available. Developments in progress, check with Custodians.
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3.2 Linear Gas Detectors
3.2.1 Combustible Linear Detectors

These are complex optical devices which require particularly careful design and
installation. If this is achieved, these instruments are very effective gas hazard monitors.
The main role of such instruments is to monitor the level of gas hazard in an area.
They produce an IR beam which is directed across the area to be monitored.
The received light is analysed at two or more frequencies, some of which is absorbed by
the target gas or gases, the reference frequency is not. Given the initial and final
intensities, the average concentration of gas in the path is calculated and transmitted,
usually as a 4 to 20mA signal.
Some instruments operate with separate transmitter and receiver units, one at each side
of the area to be monitored. The other arrangement combines the two units and
bounces the beam back from a retro-reflector. This first arrangement is generally
preferred since it improves the signal to noise characteristics of the device, hence
improving its immunity to environmental conditions (eg fog, snow, sunlight) and results
in a smaller diameter beam, hence reducing the potential for false gas readings from
partial blockage and allowing easier installation in congested plant.
Different path length options are available, from short-range (about 0.5 metres) versions
for monitoring ventilation ducts, up to instruments capable of traversing 100 metres
or more.
The range of gases which the instrument responds to depends on the IR bands the
manufacturer has selected to analyse. Since different instruments use different
wavelengths their response to the range of hydrocarbon gases will also change.
Maintenance and testing is safe, simple and straightforward, a special plastic film is used
to test the response of the instrument avoiding the use of bottled calibration gas.
There are no recorded causes of unrevealed failure, either from the field or from
evaluation testing. It is possible however to install a detector of the wrong model which
is insensitive to the target gases. This should be revealed at commissioning.

• ‘Acceptable’ gas releases for operational purposes (eg sampling)
• When some types of sheet plastic are introduced into the beam (eg a helmet visor)
• Combination effects (eg permanent plus transient interruption of the beam, sunlight
plus angular vibration at a multiple of the light source pulse frequency).
These problems can be eliminated by good equipment selection (considering the
actual environment of installation) and appropriate design, installation and
commissioning
• ‘Beam blocked’ indications caused by obstructions, sunlight ‘blinding’ the detector,
or dense obscurants (eg fog, snow). All these can be addressed and eliminated at the
design stage
Uncontrolled
3.2.2 Linear Toxic Gas Detectors
These operate on exactly the same basis as the combustible type, the only difference
being the wavelengths that are analysed (this of course can lead to differences in optical
components, power consumption, size etc).
Otherwise, their relative merits and problems are similar to the combustible type
described above.
3.3 Point Gas Detectors
3.3.1 Point Combustible Gas Detectors

These are used to indicate the presence of gas at a particular location (eg in a congested
area of plant or in small ducts.) IR technology has proved its worth over older methods
and is now the only acceptable one for new jobs. It works in the same way as the IR
linear detectors, by comparing absorbed and a reference frequencies of IR light. The
main difference between these and the linear types is that the path-length is short
(a few centimetres) and is kept within the confines of the instrument.
Calibration can be achieved using plastic filters, or the less safe and older method of
bottled calibration gas. The plastic filter method gives the possibility for the manufacturer
to build the filter into the unit and offer a remote calibration test.
The only known causes of unrevealed failure in most of the available detectors are:
• Some instruments are supplied with a fine filter to exclude dust or moisture. This
filter can block which prevents or delays detection of a hazard. Such failures may not
be revealed. These filters should not be used.. Instruments which rely on these
filters for good performance are not recommended
• It is possible to install a detector of the wrong model which is insensitive to the target
gases. This should be revealed at or before commissioning

• ‘Acceptable’ gas releases for operational purposes (eg sampling)
• A failure of the instrument, its supply or its supporting electronics
3.3.2 Toxic Point Detectors

These are generally unreliable as fixed instruments, especially in plant or outdoor
environments. With few exceptions, the instruments can fail without indication and
would not indicate a hazard if it was present. It is imperative that these instruments
are not relied on to protect lives. Safe procedures must always be used, regardless of
the indications of any fixed toxic gas detectors in the area.
The sensor technologies which are prone to unrevealed failure include semiconductor,
Uncontrolled
electrochemical cells, para-magnetic (for oxygen) and catalytic. These and more were
initially developed for laboratory or workshop applications where they would be
calibrated before each use. They are not well suited to industrial sites where they would
be fixed in a plant environment and expected to work reliably for months on end.
Toxic instruments are beginning to appear based on similar principles to the IR
combustible linear and point instruments. Some work at other wavelengths, eg UV.
It is thought that when these are fully developed and evaluated they will prove as
effective as the combustible gas versions currently available.
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 4-13/14
Appendix 4A
Procurement Specifications
Paragraph Page
1 General Requirements (All Detectors) 1

1.1 Mechanical 1
1.2 Electrical 2
1.3 Environmental (Outside Protected Areas and in Ducts) 2
1.4 Environmental (Inside Protected Areas) 3
Uncontrolled
1.5 Maintenance 3
1.6 Documentation 4
2 Infrared Open Path Gas Detectors

Typical Specification 4
2.1 Open Path Gas Detection (General Area Use) 4
3 Infrared Point Gas Detectors Typical Specification

Specification 7
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 App 4A-i/ii
Several examples of procurement specifications are provided. Since these change

frequently, it was not attempted to put a complete set together. Instead it is suggested
that users contact Ray Hynds or Bob Bonn of SPR to obtain the most recent and relevant
procurement specification for their needs.
The library of procurement specifications include:
• Air sampling units
• Flame detectors
• Heat detectors (rate compensated)
• High performance optical smoke detectors
• Ionisation smoke detectors (duct and free mounted)
• Line-of-sight optical gas detectors (duct and free mounted)
Uncontrolled
• Manual alarm callpoints

• Manual deluge release units
• Oil mist detectors
• Point optical gas detectors (duct and free mounted)
• Visual alarm panels
Alternatively, users may wish to develop their own procurement specifications.
The format of the examples in Paragraphs 2 and 3 has proven to be comprehensive
and effective.
1 General Requirements (All Detectors)

1.1 Mechanical
Materials of Construction
The construction of the enclosure shall be suitable for an offshore environment. Metal
enclosures should be of 316 stainless steel (316L if welded). Plastic enclosures are
acceptable but should be of the reinforced polyester type (for its stability, strength and
fire retardant qualities). Aluminium enclosures will only be considered if the magnesium
content is less than 6%.
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 App 4A-1
Mounting Brackets
Mounting brackets may be required to provide directional adjustment, vibration
resistance and a de-mountable interface to the structural steelwork. Such brackets shall
be of metal construction (principally) and suitable for an offshore environment, preferably
316L stainless steel.
Weight
Vendor shall advise the gross weight of each instrument and all the accessories needed
to meet these specifications.
1.2 Electrical
Hazardous Area Certification
Uncontrolled
Unless otherwise indicated, all detectors shall be suitable for use in Zone 1 areas,
as defined in the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15,
Section 1.5. Certification shall be CENELEC (E)Exd or (E)Exi as defined in BS 5501 Parts
1, 5 and 7. The preferred detector specification is Gas Group IIB, Temperature Class T5.
The minimum acceptable specification is Gas Group IIA, Temperature Class T3.
Power Supply
The power supply to the fire and gas detection system will be a battery-backed
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system of nominally 24V dc (18 minimum, 27
maximum). The supplier shall advise peak and average power consumption at these
voltages.
Installation Power Generation

Electrical power is generated onsite at 60Hz. While this should not be apparent in the
supply to the detector, it does cause mechanical vibration of the structure and may
cause electrical interference through pickup.
Connection Requirements
The supplier shall supply interconnection diagrams sufficient for design, operation and
maintenance functions. The supplier shall also identify any necessary accessories.
1.3 Environmental (Outside Protected Areas and in Ducts)
Conditions
The detector shall be able to function normally in the following typical environmental
conditions:
• Wind 60m/s from any direction
• Temperature -14°C to +30°C
• Humidity 45% to 100% RH
App 4A-2 March 2002 Issue 1/AM01
• Rain 1200mm/yr falling at any angle

• Hail 15 minutes duration, 20 to 30 falls/yr
• Snow Rarely lies
• Ice Rarely forms
• Atmospheric pressure 915 to 1055mbar
• Heat radiation 0 to 1100W/m2
• Dust
3
Less than 200mgm/m
• Waterspray Sea spray and hosedown
• Vibration 1mm displacement, 2 to 60Hz
Ingress protection required to IP 66.
Uncontrolled
Contamination of instruments in plant areas will occur and may be caused by: diesel fuel
oil, crude oil, glycol, fresh water, salt water and steam. The supplier shall advise of any
problems that these contaminants (in any combination) may cause.
Environmental protection accessories shall be available for use with the detector.
Information regarding the use/effect of such accessories (for example, loss of signal
strength or potential blockage) shall be clearly identified by the supplier.
1.4 Environmental (Inside Protected Areas)
Conditions
The detector shall be able to function normally in the following typical
environmental conditions:
• Temperature +5°C to +25°C
• Rain Accidental slashes from any angle
• Atmospheric pressure 915 to 1055mbar
• Dust
3
Less than 200mgm/m
• Vibration 1mm displacement, 2 to 60Hz
1.5 Maintenance
The Operator is anticipating a 6-monthly planned maintenance interval for fire and gas
detection devices, unless otherwise stated. This does not include unplanned activities in
response to ‘fault’ indications. The supplier shall raise any concerns with respect to
this strategy.
1.6 Documentation
The supplier shall provide manuals and other information sufficient for design, operation
and maintenance of the supplied equipment, including any necessary accessories.
The following topics shall be included, together with any information required on the
specification sheet for the device:
• Detector specification and functional description
• Detector performance
• MTBF calculations (including accessories if supplied)
• System design application notes
• Installation and commissioning procedures
• Test and maintenance procedures
Uncontrolled
• Spares and accessory lists
2 Infrared Open Path Gas Detectors

Typical Specification
2.1 Open Path Gas Detection (General Area Use)
Features Requirement Notes

General
Type of detector Infrared line-of-sight for use in plant areas.
Operating principle Dual wavelength infrared. 1
Mechanical
Support Vibration damping may be required. 2
Supplier to advise.
Directional adjustment Horizontal: +/- 45°, vertical: +/- 45°. 3
Accessories Calibration/protection devices.
Operational
Operating distance Up to 40m. Supplier to advise minimum.
Beam geometry Supplier to advise minimum required
clearance for optimum performance over
40m path.
Alignment methods One man alignment. Supplier to advise
procedure.
Measurement range 0 to 5 LEL metres.

Operational (cont’d)
Gas composition Supplier to advise appropriate calibration, etc. 4
Response time T90 (final response) < 10 seconds.
Fault signals Fault and beam blocked signals. 5
Beam block time delay >10 and <60 seconds.
Long-term stability Less than +/- 5% FSD in 6 months
operation.
Solar interference Immune to false alarm. 6
Onsite contaminants Immune to false alarm. 7
Uncontrolled
Response to obstructions Immune to false alarm. 8

Reliability/availability Instrument MTBF calculations to
be supplied.
Electrical
Output signals 4 to 20mA. 9
Maintenance
Test methods No use of test gas. 10
Notes: (1) The detector may be of the transmitter/receiver type complete with a
reflector panel or separate transmitter and receiver modules suitable for
operation up to 40m path length. Where reflector panels are proposed,
sizes required for varying detection distances are to be clearly identified
by the supplier.
(2) The device shall be constructed and mounted such that correct operation
is ensured when the foundation is vibrating. Typical characteristics are
1mm maximum movement at 2 to 60Hz. The supplier shall test the
detector in accordance with BS 5445 Part 5 Annex D. Any potential
problem frequencies must be identified to the purchaser. (The foundation
may be expected to vibrate at the Installation power generation frequency
and its harmonics.)
(3) The bracket shall allow for easy adjustment in both the horizontal and
vertical planes (+/- 45° degrees in both planes). A means of locking the
mounting bracket in the required position shall also be provided.
(4) The designer is required to ensure that the detector calibration will never
underestimate the flammability of a hazard. To assist the designer, the
vendor shall advise the cross-sensitivity (with respect to methane) for
ethane, propane, butane, iso-butane, pentane, iso-pentane, hexane,
heptane, carbon dioxide and water vapour. The vendor should also advise
the wavelengths (including optical filter spread) used for measurement
and reference indications.
Typical gas compositions for the Installation are as follows:
% Methane % Ethane % Propane % Butane C5+

Mix 1 81 10 4 2 4
Mix 2 8 11 34 32 15
Uncontrolled
(5) The detector and supporting electronic equipment shall include functions
to detect and communicate any condition that might prevent a response
to hydrocarbon gas in the optical path. Unrevealed failures in availability (to
respond correctly to hazard) are not acceptable under any circumstances.
(6) Solar interference (sunlight) shall not cause false alarms, nor is it
acceptable for sunlight to cause the detector to be unavailable, even if this
condition is communicated. The supplier must identify any circumstances
or combinations of conditions which, with the addition of sunlight, may
cause unavailability of the detector. The supplier should be able to offer
remedial actions and/or accessories that will limit the probability of such
occurrences.
(7) Fouling of optical surfaces by the common contaminants (refer to
Paragraph 1) shall not cause unwanted alarms. Substantial fouling shall be
communicated as a fault. (Note that the instrument shall be capable of
normal operation until the signal level has dropped to less than 30% of the
commissioned value.)
Sea fog is a special case. The detector should be capable of operating in
fog densities equivalent to a transmittance of 0.1 (90% drop in visibility)
over 40m, measured at a nominal wavelength of 632nm. The supplier
shall incorporate the wavelength dependent effect of varying water
droplet sizes into the required response on contaminants. Offshore
experience suggests that abnormal fog conditions can cause false gas
readings.
(8) The detector shall not produce an alarm indication greater than 0.5 LELm
in response to any combination of obstructions, vibration and/or external
sources of infrared radiation (including solar and hydrocarbon flare
radiation) in the beam. A test method to allow verification of this
performance will be submitted by the supplier for approval.
(9) The required output mode is a 4 to 20mA signal as follows:

• 0mA = common fault
• 2mA = beam blocked
• 4mA = 0 LEL metres
• 20mA = 5 LEL metres (full scale deflection)
Alternative signal arrangements may be offered by the supplier.
(10) It shall be possible to test the function and accuracy of the instrument
without the use of gas (eg using optical filters).
3 Infrared Point Gas Detectors Typical Specification

Uncontrolled

General
Type of detector Infrared point. 1
Detection method Dual wavelength infrared.
Construction Suitable for offshore use. 2
Mounting and test Function test/protection devices. 3, 4
accessories
Operational
Measurement range 0 to 100% LEL.
Gas composition Calibrate for typical gas. 5
Cross-sensitivity C1 to C8 with respect to calibration gas. 6
Response time No greater than 15 seconds @ T90. 7
Long-term stability Better than +/- 5% FSD.
Fault signals Fault and optical contamination. 8
Onsite contaminants Immune to false alarm and underestimation 9, 10
of flammable gas.
Reliability/availability MTBF calculations to be supplied.

Electrical
Hazardous area certification For use in Zone 1 area. 11
Power supply 24V dc nominal.
Installation electrical 60Hz.
frequency
Output signals 4 to 20mA. 12
Connection details Three-wire configuration. 13

Environmental Conditions
Ingress protection IP66 minimum.
Uncontrolled
Typical environmental 14
conditions
Maintenance
Maintenance intervals 6-monthly intervals.
Test methods and Manuals etc 15, 16
documentation
Notes: (1) The detector shall be of the self-contained infrared point type.
(2) The construction of the enclosure shall be suitable for an offshore
environment. Metal enclosures should be constructed of 316 stainless
steel (316L if welded). Plastic enclosures are acceptable but should be of
the reinforced polyester type due to its stability, strength and fire
retardance. Aluminium enclosures will only be considered if the
magnesium content is below 6%. The use of dissimilar metals in contact
will not be acceptable.
Cable entries should be designed to withstand the stresses of supporting
screened and armoured cables under wind loading. If necessary,
additional clamps or brackets should be supplied.
The detector shall be constructed such that correct operation is ensured
when the foundation is vibrating. Typical characteristics are 1mm
maximum movement at 2 to 50Hz. The supplier shall test the detector in
accordance with BS 5445 Part 5 Annex D. Any potential problem
frequencies, particularly below 2Hz, shall be identified by the supplier.
(3) Mounting brackets shall be of metal construction and suitable for an
offshore environment, preferably 316L stainless steel. An insulation kit,
which prevents corrosion between the bracket and user provided
foundation, should be available for special applications.
(4) Function test and environmental protection accessories shall be available

for use with the detector. Information regarding the use/effect of such
accessories (eg effect on response time) shall be clearly identified by the
supplier.
(5) Typical gas composition for the Installation is as follows:
% Methane % Ethane % Propane % Butane C5+

Mix 1 81 10 4 2 4
Mix 2 8 11 34 32 15
The detector shall be calibrated such that the flammability of the gas is
never ‘underestimated’. It should be noted that point infrared gas
Uncontrolled
detectors will also be used to low level detection in areas where

condensate releases are a possibility. The supplier is to advise of any
special criteria when specifying detectors for use in such areas.
(6) The vendor shall supply cross-sensitivity data showing the device’s
response to hydrocarbon gases or vapours C1 to C8 with respect to the
base calibration gas (frequently methane). The vendor should also advise
the precise wavelengths and tolerances of the optical filters used in the
device.
(7) Response times to T90, when fitted with environmental protection
accessories, should be stated by the supplier. This test should typically
have been carried out in an air velocity of 1m/s. Methods used to obtain
the response time shall be clearly described.
(8) Detector fault monitoring shall be provided; this should typically include a
common fault output and an ‘optical contamination’ output. The vendor is
to supply details of fault signal outputs.
(9) The detector shall not be subject to false alarms due to the effects of
contaminants on the device. The contaminants that can be expected to be
found on the Installation are as follows: oil, glycol, fresh and salt water,
diesel and steam. Any problems that these contaminants may cause must
be highlighted by the supplier.
(10) The detector shall not fail in an unrevealed manner under any
circumstances, including underestimation of gas concentration as a result
of optical contamination.
(11) The detector shall be suitable for use in Zone 1 areas, as defined in the
Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15, Section 1.5.
Certification shall be by BASEEFA or CENELEC (E)Exd or (E)Exi as defined
in BS 5501 Parts 1, 5 and 7. The preferred detector specification is Gas
Group IIB, Temperature Class T5. The minimum acceptable specification
is Gas Group IIA, Temperature Class T3.
(12) The required output mode is a 4 to 20mA signal as follows:

• 0mA = common fault
• 2mA = optical contamination
• 4mA = 0% LEL
• 20mA = 100% LEL
Alternative signal arrangements may be offered by the supplier.
(13) The detector shall be connected using either a three-wire or four-wire
configuration. A minimum of two threaded cable entries shall be provided.
The entries shall accept M20 cable glands (preferred) or M25 as an
alternative and be located at the bottom of the detector to minimise the
chance of water ingress.
Uncontrolled
Sufficient terminals shall be supplied within the detector to allow for the
termination of up to four cores of 2.5mm cable per gland entry. Terminals
should be capable of accepting up to two pin or spade connectors per
terminal.
(14) The detector shall be able to function normally in the following typical
environmental conditions:
• Temperature -14°C to +30°C
• Rain 1200mm/yr falling at any angle
• Hail 15 minutes duration, 20 to 30 falls/yr
• Snow Rarely lies
• Ice Rarely forms
• Atmospheric pressure 915 to 1055mbars
• Heat radiation 0 to 1100W/m2
• Dust
3
Less than 200mgm/m
• Waterspray Sea spray and hosedown
• Vibration Refer to Note 2
• Shock Irregular transient shock/stress (accidental)
• Radiation 0.75mREM
(15) It should be possible to carry out routine maintenance, such as function
tests and/or calibration, without the need for temporary access facilities
(eg scaffolding). This may include the use of a gas cell within the optical
sampling cavity. In addition a facility to test the detector without test gas
is required (for example using optical filters to provide apparent gas
concentrations of 30% and 80% LEL of the calibration gas).
(16) The detector shall be supplied complete with all the necessary
manuals etc that shall cover, but not be limited to, the following points:
• Detector specifications and functional description
• Detector performance
• Cross-sensitivity including Alkane gases C1 to C7 and contaminants
listed in Note 9
• System design application notes
• Installation and commissioning procedures, including diagrams
• Test and maintenance procedures, including any British Standard
requirements
• Spares and accessory lists
Uncontrolled
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 App 4A-11/12

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Guidance on Fire and Gas Detection UKCS-TS-011

Authorisation for Issue

Section 1 General Requirements

Section 2 Setting Performance Requirements

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 i/ii

Authorisation for Issue

Position: Technology Unit Leader, UTG

Position: Senior Safety Engineer, UTG

November 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

For Audit Use

November 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Issue No Date Description

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 vii/viii

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

01 Document Issue Authority (Jon Turnbull)

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 ix/x

covering this area.

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 xi

Review and Update

xii March 2002 Issue 1/AM01

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

FDA Flame Detector Assessor

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 xiii/xiv

2 BP Expectations for Fire and Gas Detection 1-2

3 External Requirements 1-3

4 Summary of Requirements 1-11

1.2 Changes from Previous Issues

2 BP Expectations for Fire and Gas Detection

For a complete understanding of the requirements, the reader is strongly encouraged to

3.1.1 Safety Case Regulations

Performance claims for Roles for major

Specify required Specify required Specify required

CRITERIA FOR DESIGN, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AUDIT ETC

Figure 1.1 The Influence of Safety Case Claims on Safety Performance

Safety Case Claims

3.1.2 PFEER Regulations

to more specific statements, the scenario requirements.

PFEER Performance Standards

HIGH LEVEL GOALS

Figure 1.2 Standards of Performance

Field PB SOV BDV

November 2001 Issue 1

Part of F&G SOV XXV

Gas Part of ESD System

Figure 1.3 Equipment and Procedural Items in a Typical ESD Function

3.1.3 Design and Construction (DCR) Regulations

3.2 Other External Documents Applicable in the UK

4.2 Overview of Legislative Requirements

4.3 Overview of Other Requirements

2 The Definition of Hazards 2-3

3 Good Practice Requirements for Fire Detection 2-4

4 Good Practice Requirements for

5 Good Practice Requirements for Toxic Gas Detection 2-17

Setting Performance Requirements

6 Performance Requirements for Major Risks 2-18

Appendix 2A Example Definition of Performance

Setting Performance Requirements

1.3 The Role of the Specifier

Setting Performance Requirements

Setting Performance Requirements

2 The Definition of Hazards

10kW 50kW 100kW 250kW