Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Contents

Authorisation for Issue

Amendment Record
Amendment Summary
Distribution List
Preface
List of Abbreviations

Paragraph Page
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1 Introduction 1

2 Ensuring a Good Prospect of Recovery 2

2.1 Definition of Terms 2
2.2 Reasonably Foreseeable Events 3
2.3 Survival Times 3
2.4 Performance Standards 4
2.5 Standby Vessels 4

3 Adverse Weather and Risk Assessments 4

3.1 Objective 4
3.2 Definition of Adverse Weather 5

4 NUI Manning 6

5 BP Guidance Documents Relating to Adverse Weather 6

Addendum 1 References
Addendum 2 Weather Trigger Tables
Addendum 3 Guidance on Conducting Work in
Adverse Weather Conditions

March 2002 Issue 2 i/ii

 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Authorisation for Issue

Issue Authority
Name: John Watson

Signature: ________________________________________________

Date: ________________________________________________

Position: Lead Operations Excellence Manager

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Technical Authority
Name: Bruce Morrison

Signature: ________________________________________________

Date: ________________________________________________

Position: BU Representative MNS MAL Co-ordinator

March 2002 Issue 2 i/ii

 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Amendment Record

For Audit Use

Amendment Incorporated By
Checked
Number
Name Signature Date Signature Date
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AMOSAF.171

March 2002 Issue 2 v/vi

 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Amendment Summary

Issue No Date Description

Issue 1 December 2001 First issue.
Issue 2 March 2002 New issue.
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March 2002 Issue 2 vii/viii

 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Distribution List

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Document Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

Virtual Copyholders

Copy Copyholder
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01 Document Issue Authority (John Watson)

02 Document Technical Authority (Bruce Morrison)

March 2002 Issue 2 ix/x

 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Preface

Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide information and guidance, ensuring that the safety
of BP operations is not compromised by adverse weather.

Review and Update

This document will be subject to 12-monthly review and update, when document holders will
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have the opportunity to express opinions and suggest improvements.

However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document. As
such, any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an
Amendment Proposal proforma which is available electronically on the UKCS SMS website,
from the Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor or from the Technical Authority.
All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.

Responsibility of Copyholders
It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to
maintain the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly
incorporated and acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant
Technical Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (UKCS-DCM-001).

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 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

List of Abbreviations

ACoP Approved Code of Practice

DSV Diving Support Vessel
FRC Fast Rescue Craft
GPOR Good Prospect of Recovery
HLO Helicopter Landing Officer
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
MOB Man Overboard
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NUI Normally Unattended Installation

OIM Offshore Installation Manager
PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
POS Place of Safety
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SBV Standby Vessel
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor-Propelled Survival Craft
TIG Thermal Insulation Garment

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 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

1 Introduction
This document provides information and guidance related to ensuring that the safety of
BP operations is not compromised by adverse weather. In this context adverse weather
can be defined as environmental conditions that may affect people, equipment or
facilities to such an extent that particular precautionary measures must be taken to
safeguard the facilities and maintain a safe system of work.
This includes:
• Ensuring that there is a Good Prospect Of Recovery (GPOR) for any personnel who
might enter the water as a result of a reasonably foreseeable event, as is required by
the Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER)
Regulation 17 (Addendum 1 Ref 1).
• Overside Working
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• Working in Adverse Weather

• Platform Supply Vessel Operations
• Helicopter Operations
• Diving and Subsea Operations
Adverse weather includes:
• Heavy rain
• Lightning
• High winds
• Snow
• Ice
• Hail
• Extreme high or low temperatures
• Fog or other poor visibility
• Low cloud base
• Severe sea states
• Strong currents
For certain tasks, low or no wind could be considered adverse weather because of the
reduced dispersion of flammable gas were a loss of containment incident to occur.
Therefore, these guidelines also apply to areas where ventilation is poor or where there
are significant dead spaces (locations with little or no apparent ventilation). However, the
specific case of entry to vessels or confined spaces is excluded from this guidance.
Refer to Gas Testing Procedures (UKCS-SSW-004) (Addendum 1 Ref 2).

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The Site Manager has responsibility for the overall implementation of the adverse
weather guidelines, including GPOR. The Area Authority is responsible for ensuring
weather is considered in all work planning and approval. Weather trigger guidance tables
are provided in Appendix A.
Decisions taken when implementing the adverse weather policy should be logged
on site.

2 Ensuring a Good Prospect of Recovery

2.1 Definition of Terms
PFEER Regulation 17 states the following:

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‘The duty holder shall ensure that effective arrangements are made, which include such
arrangements with suitable persons beyond the Installation, for:
recovery of persons following their evacuation or escape from the Installation
rescue of persons near the Installation
taking such persons to a place of safety
and for the purpose of these regulation arrangements shall be regarded as being
effective if they secure a good prospect of those persons being recovered, rescued and
taken to a place of safety.’
Definitions of key terms such as ‘recovery and rescue’, ‘good prospect of recovery’ and
‘place of safety’ are given in the PFEER Approved Code Of Practice (ACOP). A Place of
Safety (POS) is either one of the Standby Vessels (SBVs) or one of the normally manned
Installations (unless affected by an incident). Definition of a POS is contained in the
UKOOA Emergency Response Guidelines (Addendum 1 Ref 3) and as such allows for a
greater range of locations to be defined as a POS.
The ACOP also states that recovery and rescue arrangements should be appropriate to
cover all ‘reasonably foreseeable’ events likely to lead to the need for evacuation, escape
or rescue. The term ‘reasonably foreseeable’ is defined in the ACOP.
This paragraph 2.1, is structured to first define those events that are reasonably
foreseeable in the context of BP, and then to provide guidance on the arrangements
needed for a GPOR in each case. This includes data on the expected survival times of
personnel in the water in various dress and meteorological conditions.
The data and discussions in this paragraph 2.1, are based on the process defined by the
BP PFEER Regulation 17 Working Group and contained in the Recovery and Rescue
Provision for Offshore Installations (UKCS-EM-003) (Addendum 1 Ref 4).

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2.2 Reasonably Foreseeable Events

The PFEER Regulations ACOP, Paragraph 166, states that reasonably foreseeable events
would include:
‘a catastrophic failure, a ship collision, a helicopter ditching near the Installation, and a
person falling from the Installation during overside working’.
The BP PFEER Regulation 17 Work Group has further refined the above definition to
include the following three specific scenarios:
• Scenario 1 - Man Overboard
A person overboard, without a survival suit but wearing a lifejacket, as might occur in
a fall during overside working. A maximum of three people requiring rescue is
considered to be reasonably foreseeable for the case of scaffolding collapse. There is
no planned overside working (in the hours of darkness) or in poor visibility where
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personnel in overside activities cannot be clearly viewed from the vessel on close
standby.
• Scenario 2 - Major Emergency
One or more persons escaping to sea in a major Installation emergency with both
survival suit Thermal Insulation Garments (TIG) and lifejackets which are provided in
locations adjacent to recognised points of entry to the sea. The primary means of
evacuation are helicopter and lifeboat, so entry to the sea is very much a last resort.
A maximum of 10 persons requiring rescue from the sea is considered to be
reasonably foreseeable. Refer to Section 5 of the relevant Installation Hazard Control
Register.
• Scenario 3 - Helicopter Ditching
Helicopter passengers/crew who end up in the sea after the helicopter ditches near
the Installation (defined as within the field boundary or 1 mile from the Installation for
the purposes of demonstrating GPOR). They would be wearing survival suits, TIGs
and lifejackets. The maximum total number of people at risk can be up to 21.

2.3 Survival Times

A detailed assessment of survival times, for personnel in various dress states for a
variety of weather conditions, can be found in the Recovery and Rescue Provision for
Offshore Installations (UKCS-EM-003).

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2.4 Performance Standards

The goal of the arrangements is to provide a GPOR for survivors following reasonably
foreseeable events. However, recognising that there are some circumstances that may
prevent this being achieved, the high level performance standard is defined as:
‘To provide a good prospect in all but the most extreme weather conditions and
seastates, of recovering, rescuing and taking to a place of safety, persons who have to
evacuate or escape from an Installation, or who require rescue near the Installation.’
Performance Standards are defined by how they were established and, where
applicable, provide guidance on how to deal with variations on a BU-specific basis
Recovery and Rescue Provision For Offshore Installations (UKCS-EM-003).

2.5 Standby Vessels

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Standby Vessels (SBVs) must be able to meet the PFEER Performance Standard as
given in the Hazard Control Registers held at each BP Installation. This includes
compliance with the UKOOA Guidelines for the Safe Management and Operations for
Vessels Standing by Offshore Installations (Addendum 1 Ref 6).

3 Adverse Weather and Risk Assessments

3.1 Objective
The objective of Paragraph 3 is to:
• Prompt personnel to consider the effects of adverse weather conditions
• Indicate where guidance may be found in BP policies/procedures for standard routine
operations in adverse weather conditions. Section 5 provides this information.
Each BP Installation will identify the typical hazards that could arise from the impact of
various forms of adverse weather, and determine the additional controls and actions to
be put in place. The decision on whether a particular operation or task may proceed, or
needs to proceed, is very much a matter of valued judgement of the Site Management
and the Performing and Area Authorities. Their decision will be based on risk
assessment and whatever assistance is available and deemed appropriate for the
specific circumstances.
Additional risk assessments should be carried out to identify the hazards and determine
the controls to be put in place for non-routine or difficult operations which could be
affected by the occurrence of exceptional weather or when weather conditions are
anticipated or experienced.
The business need for a particular task will require evaluation to determine whether the
work could proceed when weather conditions are more favourable and additional
controls may not be required.

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Such assessments must take into account the fact that adverse weather conditions can:
• Increase hazards to personnel
• Increase hazards on the Installation
• Impair the prospects for a safe abandonment of the Installation
For periods of severe weather, define measures to be taken to reduce the likelihood of
an event which requires evacuation/escape and rescue.
There may be an overriding safety requirement which requires a particular task to
proceed under adverse weather conditions.
Guidance on conducting work in adverse weather is detailed in Appendix B.

3.2 Definition of Adverse Weather

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Adverse weather can be defined as environmental conditions which may affect people,
equipment or facilities to such an extent that particular precautionary measures must be
taken to safeguard the facility or to maintain a safe system of work.
Adverse weather includes:
• Heavy rain
• Lightning
• High winds
• Snow
• Ice
• Hail
• Extreme high and low temperatures
• Poor visibility
• Fog
• Low cloud base
• Severe sea states
• Strong currents
For certain tasks, low or no wind should be considered as adverse weather, eg for
breaking hydrocarbon containment and venting.

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UKCS-SOP-015 Weather Working Policy

4 NUI Manning
It is intended that NUIs will not be manned during adverse weather, ie weather defined
as severe enough to either restrict helicopter operations (poor visibility) or where GPOR
could not be demonstrated should the transit helicopter ditch. In deteriorating weather,
personnel on NUIs should be returned to their host Installation before flying is curtailed.
Priority for infield helicopter and SBV usage should be given to this activity. The pre-visit
check procedure should be detailed in the Installation specific Operating Philosophy
manual. Refer to Normally Unattended Platform Guidelines (UKCS-SOP-032)
(Addendum 1 Ref 7).
Overside working on NUIs is handled in the same way as on other BP Installations and
the same weather restrictions and safety precautions apply. Refer to Overside Working
(UKCS-SOP-029) (Addendum 1 Ref 8).

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The requirements for recovery and rescue of personnel after an emergency on an NUI
are the same as for a permanently manned Installation. The possibility of personnel
being on an NUI is taken into account in the positioning of SBVs.
Maintenance or breakdown of a Totally Enclosed Motor-Propelled Survival Craft
(TEMPSC) if applicable, can render this means of evacuation ineffective. In such cases, a
formal risk assessment should be carried out and documented to ensure adequate
means of evacuation and that a GPOR is maintained. Typical measures might include
continued attendance of a SBV at the Installation whilst it is manned until TEMPSC
facilities can be reinstated.

5 BP Guidance Documents Relating to Adverse Weather

The following reference documents should be referred to, as appropriate:
• All Marine Craft including Standby Vessel / Supply Vessel Operations
Marine Operations Manual (UKCS-MAL-001) (Addendum 1 Ref 9).
• Helicopter Operations
Helicopter Operations Manual (UKCS-MAL-003) (Addendum 1 Ref 10).

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Addendum 1
References

(1) Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) on Offshore
Installations Regulations, SI 1995 No 743, Approved Code of Practice and
Guidance.
(2) Gas Testing Procedures (UKCS-SSW-004).
(3) UKOOA Emergency Response Guidelines.
(4) Recovery and Rescue Provision for Offshore Installations (UKCS-EM-003).
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(5) UKOOA Guidelines for the Safe Management and Operation of Offshore Support
Vessels.
(6) UKOOA Guidelines for the Safe Management and Operation of Vessels Standing
by Offshore Installations.
(7) Normally Unattended Platform Guidelines (UKCS-SOP-032).
(8) Overside Working (UKCS-SOP-029).
(9) Marine Operations Manual (UKCS-MAL-001).
(10) Helicopter Operations Manual (UKCS-MAL-003).
(11) Subsea Operations Dossier (UKCS-MAL-008).
(12) UKOOA Guidelines for the Management of Offshore Helidecks.
(13) UKOOA Guidelines for Helicopter Operations to Normally Unattended Installations.
(14) Diving and Subsea Operations Practice (UKCS-MAL-002).

References
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 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Addendum 2
Weather Trigger Tables

Paragraph Page

1 Overside Working and Flying Operational Restrictions 1

2 Supply Vessel Operations 1

3 Diving and Subsea Operations 2

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4 Helideck Operations 3

5 Flying Decision Tree 4

Table
1 Supply Vessels Add 2-4

Figure
1 Flying Decision Tree 5

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 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

1 Overside Working and Flying Operational Restrictions

1.1 Significant Wave Height
Forecasters give predictions of ‘significant’ and ‘maximum’ wave heights. It is important
to understand the meaning of these terms and how they relate.
Typically, the sea surface is comprised of an ever changing pattern of bumps and
hollows that never repeats itself. If these waves were recorded for some time, a random
wave pattern would emerge, as shown in the figure below.

Still Water Level

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Significant Wave Height

UKCSSOP015_001

Record of Random Sea

Observers estimating the wave height in this random sea, however, will tend to ignore
the smaller waves and concentrate on the larger ones, since these are the ones that
most concern them. The wave height thus estimated is approximately the same as the
‘significant wave height’.
Observers are therefore concentrating only on these larger waves, which make up
approximately one-third of all waves. The other two-thirds are ignored, these being too
small to worry about or hard to recognise as being individual waves.

1.2 The Meteorological Office Definitions

Significant Wave Height (Hs)
Average height of the highest one-third of the waves over a 20-minute period.

Maximum Wave Height (Hmax)

Height of the highest wave in a 20-minute period.

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UKCS-SOP-015 Weather Working Policy

1.3 Adverse Weather Standards for Emergency Response and

Rescue Vessel, Flying Operations and Overside Working
Details for emergency response and rescue vessel, flying operations and overside
working in adverse weather conditions are illustrated in Figure 1. For details regarding
flying decisions refer to Figure 2.

Offshore Conditions Assessment Indicative Working Criteria

Wind Speed Wind Speed ERRV Operations Flying Operations Overside Operations
(kts) (kts) Sig Wave Ht Max Wave Ht Sig Wave Ht Limits Ref Notes Ref Notes Ref Notes
Beaufort Scale 10m Level 100m Level (m) (m) (m) 1,2,3 and 6 2,4,5 and 6 1,3 and 6

5 (Fresh Breeze) 17-21 22-27 2.0 2.5 No limitations No limitations No limitations

6 (Strong Breeze) 22-27 28-35 3.0 4.0 3.5 Limit for normal No limitations Overside work limit
operation of FRC

7 (Near Gale) 28-33 36-43 4.0 5.5 Emergency operation No limitations

of FRC only

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8 (Gale) 34-40 44-52 5.5 7.5 5.5 Limit for emergency Aircraft not to engage
operation of FRC rotors (45 knots)

9 (Strong Gale) 41-47 53-61 7.0 10.0 7.0 Limit for use of 60kts on helideck, 7m
mechanical recovery sig wave ht. Routine
aids flying suspended

10 (Storm) 48-55 62-71 9.0 12.5 No longer good

prospect of rescue
from sea

11 (Violent Storm) 56-63 72-82 11.0 16.0 Safety of emergency

response and rescue
vessel takes
precedence over all
other operations

12 (Hurricane) 64+ 83+ 14.0

Notes: (1) For overside working, consideration should be given to the abilty of the ERRV to observe and monitor personnel engaged in overside work, eg consider effect of fog,
heavy rain, etc.
(2) The decision to suspend flying operations rests with the OIM in consultation with ERRV Master, HLO and Aircraft Commander.
(3) The decision to suspend overside working rests with the OIM in consultation with the ERV Master.
(4) The assessment of conditions should include the use of hand-held anemometers and consideration of present and forecast conditions.
(5) Other limitations pertaining to heave, roll and pitch of mobile Installations/emergency response and rescue vessels are covered by specific procedures of the helicopter
operator concerned.
(6) During periods of adverse weather which may affect operations eg reduced visibility due to fog or heavy rain, icing etc, the decision to continue operations rests with the
OIM in consultation with the Aircraft Commander and/or ERRV Master.

UKCSSOP015_002.ai

Figure 1 Adverse Weather Standards for Emergency Response and Rescue Vessel,
Flying Operations and Overside Working

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Toolbox Decision Chart Circumstances

Flight with 2 to 20 people in

helicopter, either due to take
off for Installation, or en route
CIRCUMSTANCES
to Installation. Decision chart
does not apply to emergency
risk to life flights.

Is the weather adverse

NO IS with regard to a ‘good
GOOD PROSPECT CHART
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WEATHER prospect of recovery’?

GENERIC
ADVERSE? Use the ‘Good Prospect
Chart’ to assess this.

FLY
YES

Ask SBV Master, ‘Can he

SBV CAPABILITIES YES CAN launch in an emergency?’.
BUSINESS UNIT SPECIFIC SBV LAUNCH (Accounts for Business Unit-
FRC/DC? specific SBV specification and
capabilities.)

FLY
NO

CAN Ask SBV Master, ‘Can he

MECHANICAL RESCUE YES SBV USE use scoop in an emergency?’.
DEVICE DACON (Accounts for Business Unit-
BUSINESS UNIT SPECIFIC SCOOP? specific SBV specification and
capabilities).

FLY
NO

DON’T FLY

RECORD INFORMATION!!

UKCSSOP015_003.ai

Figure 2 Flying Decision Tree

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2 Supply Vessel Operations

Trigger Precaution
Wind
20 - 25kts mean wind Secure loose items which may be blown onto vessel. Advise greater caution to
speed prevent injury to personnel and damage to equipment. Consider seastate and
risk assessment requirements in line with marine guidelines.
25 - 30kts mean wind Monitor the movement of cargo transfers to and from the vessel, taking care to
speed ensure all lifts are carried out with the safety of all personnel in mind, particularly
when dealing with wide/broad sided cargo.
30 - 35kts mean wind Crane Operator to take extra care when slewing with the wind, ensuring that
speed the crane braking system can cope with the load and movement of the crane,
due to the increased risk to personnel on the supply vessel. Wide sided cargo
will become more unmanageable. Monitor movement and stability of supply

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vessel. Deck crews may experience difficulty handling equipment if in exposed
locations. Lifting of wide/broad sided loads should not be attempted. Deck
crews may experience difficulty standing if in exposed locations. Consideration
should be given to carrying out urgent lifts only.
Risk assessment in liaison with the vessel Master must be carried out.
35+kts mean wind Operating limits of some cranes may be exceeded. If so, supply vessel should
speed stand off outside the 500m zone.
Seastate
3.0m significant wave Observe movement and station keeping of supply vessel. Liaise with the supply
height vessel Master to ascertain if safe to proceed with cargo handling operations.
Consider risk assessment depending on operation taking into account any
awkward lifts, potential of cargo damage due to heave and potential effects of
sea on hose work.
4.0m significant wave Station keeping may become difficult. Supply vessel Master’s discretion as to
height whether operations can be carried out safely.
Risk assessment by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) in liaison with the
vessel Master must be carried out. Limitations may be imposed, eg heavy lifts.
Visibility
Poor Consider stopping cargo handling operations if the supply vessel deck crew are
unable to clearly see the Crane Operator, due to increased risk of injury to
personnel.
Visibility <250m Unless there is agreement between the OIM and the supply vessel Master that
the supply vessel can safely approach the Installation, the supply vessel is to
remain outside the 500m zone to avoid possible collision with the Installation.
The supply vessel is to maintain a radar watch.

Table 1 Supply Vessels

Notes: (1) Additional information is available in the Marine Operations Manual

(UKCS-MAL-001).
(2) Reference should be made to the UKOOA Guidelines for the Safe
Management and Operation of Offshore Support Vessels, Sections 8.5,
8.6 and 8.7.

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 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

3 Subsea Operations
There are many criteria that must be taken into account when assessing adverse
weather with regard to diving and subsea operations. These include:
• Vessel type – Diving Support Vessel (DSV), Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), etc
• Vessel dynamic positioning class and any restrictions
• Location/activity - open water/500m
• Launch technique - bell/A-frame/moon pool
• Weather criteria limits - specific to vessel and/or job location
• Weather forecast
The vessel Master, Dive Supervisor and the BP Representative must ensure that the risk
of adverse weather has been included in the task risk assessment prior to any work
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commencing. Policy is given to specific diving and subsea operations in Marine

Operations Manual (UKCS-MAL-001). Vessel specific capabilities and where applicable
Subsea Operations Dossier (UKCS-MAL-008) (Addendum 1 Ref 11).

4 Helideck Operations

Trigger Precaution
Wind
45kts mean wind Consider the helideck firefighting capability. In particular, confirm
speed measured at that the monitors will give adequate coverage and consider the
the helideck ability to:
• Handle a charged fire hose
• Lay a foam blanket effectively
• Stretcher casualties off of the helideck
Inform incoming aircrew of wind conditions on helideck. If the
aircrew intend to shut down the helicopter on the helideck, they
may want to make alternative arrangements, as excessive winds
can cause problems with the rotors at start-up.
Raise the safety rails at the top of the helideck stairs to assist
personnel.
Consider baggage handling and restrict the number of bags
carried by passengers.
If refuelling then consider the manual handling of the hose.
45 – 50kts mean Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) to make an inspection to assess
wind speed the safe movement of passengers and confirm checks as for
measured at the 45kts mean wind speed (above). If necessary, additional
helideck personnel should be assigned to helicopter operations. HLO to

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UKCS-SOP-015 Weather Working Policy

Trigger Precaution
report to OIM advising on whether to continue handling
helicopter flights.
Consider the use of safety lines on the helideck.
Aircrew/HLO to advise personnel to take due care in high winds,
specifying areas of concern on helideck and any restrictions on
baggage handling.
Wind
50 - 60kts mean Monitor wind speed regularly to confirm conditions.
wind speed
Consider securing safety lines to helideck landing net anchor
measured at the
points to assist passengers.
helideck

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Consider changing out arriving/departing passengers one-for-one
or two-for-two so that closer supervision of personnel can be
maintained. This must be agreed by the OIM.
Advise incoming flights and helicopter contractor’s log, if
conditions deteriorate.
60+kts mean wind Mandatory closure of helideck by the OIM.
speed measured at
Advise helicopter contractor’s log that the helideck is closed, and
the helideck
regularly advise on status.
Unfavourable wind If gas turbine exhausts are blowing towards the helideck,
direction consider implications of loss of helicopter lift and advise
helicopter crew.
If cold flaring is taking place, advise the helicopter crew and close
the helideck until the flare is lit – pending wind direction.
General
Refuelling Consider the wind conditions before carrying out refuelling. In
particular, consider the manual handling of the hose in high winds
and the firefighting capability.
Snow/ice Consider deicing operations. If appropriate, remove accumulation
accumulation of snow and ice in vicinity of helideck to prevent damage to
equipment, and/or injury to personnel.
Consider the condition of NUIs if they do not have helideck nets.

Note: Additional information is available in the Helicopter Operations Manual

(UKCS-MAL-003).

Weather Trigger Tables

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 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

Addendum 3
Guidance on Conducting Work in Adverse
Weather Conditions

Paragraph Page

1 Guidance on Conducting Work in Adverse Weather

Conditions 1

2 Guidance for Controlling Activities in Low Ventilation

Areas 3
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3 Guidance for Controlling Activities in High Wind Speed

Conditions 3

Guidance on Conducting Work in Adverse Weather Conditions

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1 Guidance on Conducting Work in Adverse Weather

Conditions
Below are listed extreme weather conditions and typical problems which may arise in
attempting to complete tasks under those conditions:

High Wind
• Personnel unable to stand easily
• Unstable scaffold
• Tarpaulin covers working loose
• Components difficult to control (eg large valve boxes)
• Inability to:
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- Weld correctly
- Apply paint/coatings correctly
- Decant/transfer chemicals solvents safely
- Conduct crane operations

Low Wind
• Poor dispersion if containment is broken/cold flaring
• Poor dispersion of fumes from welding/painting/use of solvents

Heavy Rain
• Impaired visibility
• Buildup of water due to isolated/’dammed’ drains
• Inability to:
- Weld correctly
- Apply paint/coatings correctly
- Decant/transfer chemicals safely

Snow/Hail
• Impaired visibility
• Slip hazard
• Buildup of snow/ice causing difficulties in moving equipment and personnel
movements

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March 2002 Issue 2 Add 3-1
UKCS-SOP-015 Weather Working Policy

• Inability to:
- Weld correctly
- Apply paint/coatings correctly
- Decant/transfer chemicals/solvents safely

Extreme Cold
• Inability to carry out task due to low temperature (particularly if accompanied by wind
chill in exposed locations)
• Use of any liquids likely to freeze
• Slip hazard
• Inability to weld correctly

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• Inability to apply paint/coatings correctly
• Risk of cold burns

Fog/Low Cloud
• Impaired visibility
• Inability to conduct crane operations
Adverse weather, is most likely to affect external work, or work which involves the
movement of personnel, equipment or materials in external areas. Therefore, the affect
of adverse weather must be considered when planning and carrying out these type of
tasks. The weather forecast should be reviewed at the daily permit meeting so that any
precautions which may be necessary are put in place.
Where an activity which is particularly weather dependent is scheduled or necessary, the
planning and control of work must make reference to the prevailing and predicted
weather.
Toolbox talks should include the following topics:
• Weather limiting parameters
• Actions to be taken in the event of deteriorating weather forecasts
• The person nominated to cease/continue work in marginal weather conditions
identified

Guidance on Conducting Work in Adverse Weather Conditions

Add 3-2 March 2002 Issue 2
 Weather Working Policy UKCS-SOP-015

2 Guidance for Controlling Activities in Low Ventilation

Areas
It has been recognised that there are areas on the Installation, that in low wind
conditions, the air movement is so low that there may not be dispersion of gas in a
release situation. Risk assessments should include consideration of the possibility of gas
accumulation in low ventilation conditions (calm weather or dead spaces). The following
points should be considered:
• What would be the escalation potential for an incident should gas buildup occur?
• What risk does the task incur? (Is it routine or are there historical problems,
eg isolating, etc)
• What are conditions like in the area? (Initial tests have shown that a hand-held
Uncontrolled

anemometer provides a figure at one location only. Looking around the module at
stringers, labels, etc will give a better picture of how draughty the conditions are.
Also, does it feel draughty?)
• What procedural steps may help? (Regular radio updates in areas where containment
is broken and fired and soft gas inhibits in place so that the Control Room Technician
can be sure the situation is under control)
• What can be done to improve ventilation, if needed? (Leaving doors open, adjusting
louvers, use of air movers)
• What could cause the conditions to change? (What does the weather forecast
suggest)

3 Guidance for Controlling Activities in High Wind

Speed Conditions
High wind speed conditions, as noted in Paragraph 2.4, can both increase the probability
of an incident, and reduce the likelihood of a successful evacuation should this be
necessary. Risk assessments should include consideration of both factors. Typical
questions are:
• What risk does the task incur? (Is it routine or are there historical problems, eg
isolating, etc)
• Does the weather make isolation more difficult to accomplish or check?
• What evacuation options have been impaired by the weather conditions?
• What is the escalation potential for an incident in the area which is caused or
exacerbated by the work?

Guidance on Conducting Work in Adverse Weather Conditions

March 2002 Issue 2 Add 3-3/4