Proceedings of the ASME 2012 31st International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering

OMAE2012
July 1-6, 2012, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

OMAE2012-83302

Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024

STATE OF ART IN LIFE EXTENSION OF EXISTING OFFSHORE STRUCTURES

Abe Nezamian Robert J Nicolson

Principal Structural Engineer, WorleyParsons Manager, Structural Engineering Discipline,
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia WorleyParsons
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

Dorel Iosif
Vice President, Hydrocarbons,
WorleyParsons
Perth, Western Australia,
Australia

ABSTRACT This paper also provides an overall view in the structural

A large number of the old oil and gas facilities have
reached or exceeded their initial design life. With a continued
requirement to produce oil or gas, either from the original fields
or as a base for neighbouring subsea completions, many of
these respective offshore installations are likely to remain
operational for a period of time in the foreseeable future. The
ageing offshore infrastructure presents a constant and growing
challenge. Ageing is characterised by deterioration, change in
operational conditions or accidental damages which, in the
severe operational environment offshore, can be significant with
serious consequences for installation integrity if not managed
adequately and efficiently.
In order to ensure technical and operational integrity of
these ageing facilities, the fitness for service of these offshore
structures should be maintained. The maintenance of structural
integrity is a significant consideration in the safety management
and life extension of offshore installations. Detailed integrity
assessments are needed to demonstrate that there is sufficient
technical, operational and organisational integrity to continue
safe operation throughout a life extension. Information on
history, characteristic data, condition data and inspection results
are required to assess the current state and to predict the future
state of the facility and the possible life extension.
This paper presents state of art practices in life extension of
existing offshore structures and an overview of various aspects
of ageing related to offshore facilities, represented risk to the
integrity of a facility and the required procedures and re
assessment criteria for deciding on life extension.
requirements, justifications and calibrations of the original
design for the life extension to maintain the safety level by
means of a maintenance and inspection programs balancing the
ageing mechanisms and improving the reliability of assessment
results.
INTRODUCTION
The first steel template-type structures were installed over
50 years ago, and many of the structures have been in operation
far beyond their intended lives of 20-25 years [1]. In addition to
the decisions related to continued use of clearly aging
structures, there are similar issues involved in the certification
of somewhat newer structures for relocation and reuse in lieu of
new structures.
Offshore installations are subjected to severe loading from
the continued wave actions and severe storms. Thus, offshore
structures are designed to resist structural failure from extreme
loading and fatigue as well as other failure mechanisms, e.g.,
corrosion. There are various types of damage inflicted on
offshore structures. These include bent members, dents, tears,
cracks, holes and corroded members, which are not fully
accounted for in the original design calculations. Therefore,
assessment of the load capacity of aging structures is one of the
many challenges facing the offshore oil industry [2]. Ageing can
affect many parts of an installation. Topside plant can be
maintained, replaced or updated as required. However the
structure and marine systems of the installation is difficult and
very costly to replace, particularly the subsea parts, and hence

1 Copyright © 2012 by ASME

life extension of the structure and marine systems needs to be
addressed and managed. Loss of structural integrity can have
serious consequences, depending on the redundancy, component
strength, system strength and fatigue life. It is clear that ageing
processes can affect the structural integrity of the installation
and the probability of failure increases with time and therefore
has to be properly managed. Thus, there is a need to give
appropriate consideration to the implications of life extension
on the management of structural integrity and to demonstrate
continued safe performance beyond the original design life.
The structural integrity management of an ageing
installation requires accurate knowledge of:
• the design;
• fabrication;
• installation including any deviations from
procedures;
• operational history;
• environmental conditions and any variations
against the design assumptions;
• effects of fatigue and;
• effects of corrosion.
Appropriate inspection techniques and structural analysis
methods are required to both evaluate the condition and
incorporate the effects of any degradation into assessments.
The regulation of offshore safety requires the introduction
of a structural integrity management plan, entailing the
implementation of suitable arrangements for maintaining the
integrity of the installation by the duty holder. This is achieved
through periodic assessments and carrying out any remedial
work in the event of damage or deterioration, to ensure that
adequate safety margins are maintained [3]. Structural Integrity
Management (SIM) is an ongoing life-cycle process for
ensuring the continued fitness for purpose of offshore
structures. The regulations are underpinned by good practice in
codes, standards and guidance for structural integrity
assessment.
For many years, the American Petroleum Institute
document API RP 2A [4], the HSE guidance [5] and the
classification society rules were relied on. In the last decade, the
international oil and gas community has made a co-ordinated
effort to develop an international standard for the assessment of
offshore installations. The ISO 19902 [6] gives more detailed
information as the basis for managing structural integrity. The
NORSOK standard on design of steel structures [7] includes
recommendations to demonstrate ‘fitness for purpose’ when
conditions similar to those specified in the ISO standard exist.
Requirements for the structural integrity management of
structures operated in the North Sea are specified in UK and
Norwegian national regulations and in national and
international standards which have been developing over recent
years [8, 9]. The extent to which ageing is explicitly addressed
in standards and regulations vary, but all implicitly require it to
be considered. The suites of Norwegian regulations are the most
explicit with respect to ageing and contain a formal requirement
2 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
to seek regulatory approval for life extension. The development
of codes and standards dealing with the assessment of existing
structures [6, 10 and 11], is also providing useful guidance for
duty holders now having to address explicitly the topic of life
extension.
This paper presents an integrated approach and basis of
assessment for structural integrity evaluation, remedial actions
and verification of fitness-for-service of the deteriorating
offshore structures.
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
The traditional component-based approach to fixed
platform design has seen gradual historical development [12]
since the installation of the first platform in shallow water off
the coast of Louisiana more than fifty years ago. The design
evolution process is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Evolution of Platform Design
The approach has served the industry well; indeed,
experience from in-service performance suggests that well-
maintained platforms are more robust and damage tolerant than
a component-based design approach would indicate. As a result
of this inherent ‘reserve-strength’, large numbers of the fixed
platforms are seeing safe service beyond their intended design
lives. The growth of the fixed platform fleet around the world is
shown in Figure 2.
The worldwide fleet exceeded 9,000 platforms in 2001,
infrastructures integral to the energy supply of nations large and
small around the world [13].
By their very nature design codes are conservative and
produce structures with reserves of strength. The codes contain
explicit safety factors and additional implicit margins between
code check equations and mean values from test data. Over the
last twenty or so years offshore engineers have needed an
alternative to the traditional component-based design checks in
order to warrant the continued safe operation of the aging
platform fleet. This need led to the development of assessment
guidelines, allowing engineers to better exploit the full capacity
of offshore structures not accounted for in traditional design
using codified component-based methods.
Figure 2: Growth of Worldwide Platform Fleet
Assessment guidelines adopted a pseudo risked-based
approach by consideration of platform safety and operational
‘failure consequences’ in the establishment of their acceptance
criteria. Catalytic to the creation of assessment guidelines was
the industry-wide effort to develop technologies necessary to
gain the required confident in the reliability of the assessment
practice. This led to better explain observed in-service
performance. Parallel advances in computing capabilities
provided the means for engineers to economically implement
these improved technologies.
In the early 1980s Amoco pioneered assessment
engineering for their Southern North Sea (SNS) Platform fleet
and their Central North Sea (CNS) platform Montrose Alpha.
Many of the key methodologies and early assessment practices
were derived from other industries including Nuclear (reactors
and chemical plants, Ship (tanker), Aircraft and Bridges [14,
15]. These industries were faced with the similar challenges for
the assessment of fitness for service of aging infrastructure.
Bridge assessment became well established through technology
research and testing, resulting in technical guidance notes to
assist engineers in their departure from design standards [16].
In the SNS, a noteworthy development was metocean hind-
cast technology, which provided the means to back-predict
maximum wave height from measured environmental and
climate data. This led to a reversal of the upward trend in wave
loading for SNS platforms, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Similarly, during the mid-1980s in the U.S., the
Assessment, Inspection and Maintenance (AIM) Joint Industry
Projects (JIP) were conducted for a variety of operators as well
as the MMS [1]. These projects established a framework for
assessing and maintaining older platforms. In the late 1980’s it
became evident that an API process was required for assessing
the structural integrity of existing jacket platforms. The
approach would be different from the design of new platforms
and such required a new section of API RP2a. The offshore
community then established an API working group that
developed the assessment approach and released it in the mid-
3 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
1990s as “API RP 2A, Section 17-Assessment of Existing
Platforms” [4].
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
Figure 3: Reversal of the upward trend for design wave
loading for SNS
Since then, Section 17 has become the worldwide
recognised process for assessing existing platforms. The
process has been used many times particularly in the Gulf of
Mexico by platform owners to assess their platforms where the
reduced metocean criteria are applicable. In August 2003,
Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service
(MMS) released a Notice to Lease (NTL) requiring Gulf of
Mexico platforms owners to assess their platforms to Section 17
Requirements [17]. Further detailed description of the historical
background of Section 17 can be found in Wisch, et. al. (2004)
[18].
API Sub Committee 2 established a Task Group to develop
a stand-alone Recommended Practice (RP) for the Integrity
management of fixed offshore platforms. The work is being
executed as a Joint Industry Project (JIP) with sponsorship from
API, BP, Bureau Vertias, ChevronTexaco, Devon Energy,
ExxonMobil, MMS and Shell [19]. API is currently developing
a recommended practice for the Structural Integrity
Management for fixed offshore platforms (API RP 2SIM). This
recommended practice is based on the sections 14 and 17 of the
current version of API RP 2A. It defines the approach for the
ongoing management of offshore structures. This approach is
applicable for extending the life of existing offshore structures.
The draft copy has been released in 2007 [11]. The draft
contains a number of elements relevant to a risk-based strategy
for the SIM of offshore structures.
LIFE EXTENSION OF OFFSHORE STRUCTURES
Ageing structures are those which show evidence or
likelihood of significant deterioration and damage taking place
since new, or for which there is insufficient information and
knowledge available to understand the extent to which this
possibility exists. They are not necessarily characterized by
physical age. Life extension refers to the continued operation of
an installation beyond the design life assumed at the time of
design or revised following a reassessment.
The ageing process is depicted simply and effectively by
the ‘bathtub curve’ in Figure 4. This shows the following
characteristics:
• possible initial failures associated mainly with
fabrication defects;
• the occurrence of failures associated with inevitable
operational wear and tear;
• Accelerated failure and a loss of integrity associated
with the onset of ageing.
Figure 4: The bathtub curve
A suitable asset integrity management programme should
ensure that loss of integrity due to ageing does not occur during
the intended operational life of the component or structure [20].
Figure 5: Integrity performance during life extension
phase
Figure 5 illustrates possible variations of deterioration of
integrity with time. The principal concern for ageing
installations is the increased uncertainty associated with their
performance in the later stages, characterised by the life
extension phase.
Offshore structures are designed for an assumed operating
or design life. This design life is used in the selection of the
4 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
minimum target fatigue lives for structural members and joints
and the specification of the cathodic protection system. The
design codes that are used for these components apply safety
factors to ensure there is sufficient margin of safety for
individual components over this period. In addition there is
inherent conservatism in design approaches used due to the
uncertainties inherent in the theories used to develop the design
approaches. The historical performance of offshore structures
in regard to fatigue has been significantly better than predicted
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
by the various fatigue analysis approaches except in cases of
poor detailing. Ageing processes can be considered as
systematic changes that alter the risk profile of an installation.
The integrity management of ageing installations and the
successful implementation of an asset integrity management
plan for life extension require consideration of:
• accumulating or accelerating damage / deterioration;
• modifications;
• obsolescence;
• changes of process & / or well conditions;
• advances in knowledge and technology;
• organisational changes / loss of corporate knowledge;
and depend on:
• understanding the degradation processes;
• accurate knowledge of the condition of a structure /
component;
• knowledge of the response of the structure in the aged
condition;
• an implementation strategy (including a gap analysis
identifying the differences between current practice
and good practice);
• re-evaluation of the risk to ensure that any increased
likelihood of deterioration can be predicted, detected
and assessed.
The key issue in determining whether life extension is
applicable to an existing offshore platform is the condition of
the platform. Factors such as existing structural damage
including dents, bent members and fatigue cracks, scour and
corrosion will influence the capacity of the structure. Changes
in environmental criteria due to improved hindcasting from
measured data, increased topsides loading and facilities
modifications also changes in key design assumptions such as
water depth, soil conditions (e.g. Scours) and marine growth
impose higher loading on the structure. Finally the materials
used in the original fabrication, the quality of that fabrication,
and the robustness of the structural configuration will also
influence the ability of the platform to remain fit for purpose for
an extended life.
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
Many important technology developments have been
instigated that have led to an improved understanding of the
strength of components and importantly the reserve strength
provided by the redundancy and robustness of typical space
frame jacket structures.
 The intent of the assessment procedure is to reflect the
overall philosophy on the assessment of existing fixed steel
offshore installations. The methodologies presented are a
compilation of available techniques which can be used for
assessment purposes. Figure 6 illustrates the assessment
procedure and required steps to verify the fitness for service of
the substructure.
Figure 6: Assessment Procedure
LIFE EXTENSION REQUIREMENTS
Feasibility study of a target service life based on life cycle
cost analysis is necessary to set up life extension or
requalification requirements as first step of the assessment. The
following elements may influence the target service life and
time extension for an existing facility:
5 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
• Degradation history of the facility, its structure,
systems and components;
• Statistics on incidents and accidents;
• Any successful performance(such as absence of cracks
during inspections);
• Availability and assessment of the facility as-is
condition and updated drawings;
• Impact of any previous recorded damage to and
degradation of the facility;
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
• Identification of possible ageing-related failure modes
which may affect the facility;
• Finally, planned changes and modifications to the
facility during the period of extended lifetime.
Challenges related to the ageing of facilities can be
mitigated by taking technical or operational action, or by
making modifications to the facility itself. Mitigations may
include additional inspection and maintenance, operational
procedures such as reduced staffing in cases of severe storms,
operational limitations, removal of equipment, strengthening of
structures and changes to maritime systems.
When the facility is exposed to ageing mechanisms that
threaten the safety of the facility, the indicators chosen for
monitoring the integrity, should warn the owner of any ageing
related threats to the facility. Prepared and planned
compensating measures should then be implemented.
Guidelines on how to perform such an evaluation have
been developed by the Norwegian operators of the Norwegian
Oil Industry Association (OLF). The process is described in the
OLF guideline no. 122 and supplementary standards [21, 22]
RISK ASSESSMENT
A risk-based strategy requires an understanding of the in-
service performance of the structure and the establishment of
performance objectives. Existing codes and standards provide
some guidance on minimum performance standards for
platforms, usually based on the consideration of the
consequences of failure of the platform. API RP2A and ISO
19902 use the concept of platform ‘exposure category’ to
categorise platforms by life-safety or environmental
consequence of failure.
A risk based approach includes the additional parameter of
platform likelihood of failure. Understanding of assessment
engineering and associated technologies are relatively mature
with proven track records, they are outside of existing codified
guidance. Experience indicates that an increased level of
competency is usually necessary to manage a risk-based
strategy and assessment engineering technologies and data.
A useful means for, and the appropriate level of
competence is provided in UKOOA, as reproduced in Figure 7
[23]. Three ‘decision context’ types are identified, A, B and C.
the conventional engineering design approaches to fixed
offshore platforms typically reside in the A-category: the
engineering is not usually new or unusual, risks are understood
and practice well established. The means of ‘calibration’ to the
left of the figure can be thought of as an indication of
competency required. In the case of conventional design this is
essentially handled by compliance with Codes and Standards,
sometimes supported with the independent verification as the
risk of failure increases.
A risked based strategy, however, may have life-cycle
implications and/or require trade-offs in performance and/or
introduce uncertainty associated with deviation from standard
practice: shifting the ‘decision context’ to type B. In this case
the level of competency required increases and need for
specialist expertise and experience also increases.
The life extension assessment process should assist in
preventing, controlling or mitigating risk and ensure that, in
addition to code and regulatory compliance, best practice in
followed to align with the Owners own minimum HSE
requirements.
Figure 7: Risked-Based Decision Support (UKOOA)
Reliability methods are increasingly used to make optimal
decisions regarding safety and life cycle costs of offshore
structures [24, 25] Such methods deal with the uncertainties
associated with design, fabrication and operation of structures,
and may be classified as follows:
• classical structural reliability analysis (SRA), [26]. The
purpose of SRA is to determine the failure probability
considering fundamental variability, and natural and
man-made uncertainties due to lack of knowledge;
• quantitative risk analysis (QRA) which deals with
estimation of likelihood of fatalities, environmental
damage or loss of assets in the broad sense.
Traditionally, failure probabilities of components and
systems calculated by SRA are considered notional values. In
classical reliability analysis, as in QRA, component reliability is
usually determined by failure data of real components. The
corresponding system properties are commonly determined by
systems models. However, SRA is sometimes used to provide
input about probabilities of structural failure into quantitative
6 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
structural risk analysis (QSRA), possibly even QRA. Care
should then be exercised in providing as realistic failure
probabilities as possible. OTO 1999/060 [27] and DNV report
no. 95-3203 [28] give guidelines on target reliability for
offshore structures.
DATA REQUIREMENTS
The existence of reliable and up to date platform
information is a pre-requisite to the assessment. In absence of
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
required data, the assumptions can be made in accordance with
the industry standards and common practice for the initial
assessment. A check list of items of information that is required
for performing structural condition assessment is as follows.
The list is not exhaustive, because consideration may need to be
given to the special requirements of a specific platform.
• Design Report / Basis of design
• As-built drawings;
• Deck load plans or weight control report;
• Pile make up and penetration drawings;
• Pile driving records;
• Previous modifications
• Appurtenance arrangement drawings;
• Marine growth thickness and distribution;
• Scour measurements;
• Joint defects;
• Member damage register;
• Anode depletion data;
• Corrosion measurements;
• Previous remedial work
• Updated metocean data
• Soil reports
Controllable parameters such as marine growth, scour or
‘gate values’ should be established from previous assessments
or inspection results. As underwater inspection reports become
available the parameters should be subject to an engineering
review and evaluation before being summarized and used in
analytical assessment. Careful review of inspection data can
help to find any discrepancies in the structural data and
highlight where as-built drawings might be suspect.
Offshore structures are often designed using limited
environmental data. The assumptions made on the basis of
measurements taken over a short period of time may lead to
conservatism in the assumed extreme event scenarios and the
data might be obtained by interpolation from the nearest
monitoring points, which may be many miles away. The
metocean criteria used for the original design or most recent
assessment should be reviewed. The criteria may be re-
evaluated making full use of any site specific metocean
hindcasts or historical measurements recorded in the vicinity of
the structures.
In the assessment a more rigorous estimate of the soil
properties may be used rather than possible conservative values
developed for the design analysis. When original pile driving
records are available, they may be used to provide additional
insight into the characteristics of the piles and upgrade their
load bearing capacities. Advances in soil sampling technique,
laboratory test procedures and engineering development means
that soil design parameters derived at the time when the
platform was designed may be upgraded.
Recording and monitoring damage data is essential for
proper assessment of structural integrity. With proper records,
the new damage and all previous damages are evaluated
together and the results may indicate that the structure is
inadequate, requiring repair or strengthening. Previous studies
looking at Gulf of Mexico and North Sea have examined the
results of over 3,200 underwater inspections [29]. The data
shows that the largest proportion of damage of offshore
structures is mechanical damage resulting from boat impact
and/or dropped objects. Mechanical damage typically accounts
for about 60% of total damage whilst corrosion and weld/joint
defects, in particular, are far less common. The consistency in
the nature and cause of damage to offshore platforms in GOM
and the SNS and CNS is illustrated in Figure 8. Data from
around the world shows that fatigue damage that exists is
largely confined to known susceptible details.
Figure 8: Comparison of Underwater Inspection
Damage/Defects in GOM and SNS
REQUIREMENT FOR STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT
The objectives of an engineering assessment can be broadly
divided into three areas:
(i) Ensure structural adequacy and integrity of the
structure in its present state.
(ii) Identify and optimise extent of any repair or
strengthening work and the associated urgency.
(iii) Optimise specification of inspection programs.
For existing structures, it is possible to accept isolated
component failure (i.e., loads exceeding the component
capacity) provided that reserve against overall system failure
exists. The assessment process involves detailed review,
analysis, testing, or calculation of the aspects of the design that
are non-compliant with the standard. State-of-the-art scientific
and technical knowledge and the best available data may be
7 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
used in this process. Simple conservative techniques may be
exhausted prior to the use of a technically complex analysis.
The essence of the approach is to be realistic both in terms
of loading and strength assessment and take advantage of what
is known.
In obtaining the best estimate of the structural strength of
the platform components and system, irrespective of the nature
of damage, if any, it may be necessary to deploy the full extent
of present day offshore structural engineering technology, to
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
allow rational decisions to be reached regarding the need to
strengthen or repair.
The structure should be analysed based on its present or
intended condition, accounting for any damage, repair, scour,
modifications or other factors affecting its performance or
integrity. It is intended that the analysis is performed in
increasing levels of complexity.
Development of acceptance criteria for platform
assessments is subjective and can be argued from either side of
the loading resistance equation. Increasing levels of complexity
are employed in developing the acceptance criteria, with the
simpler techniques being exhausted prior to the more complex.
Starting point: base the assessment on present design
acceptance criteria.
Lower return period: it is possible to justify a lowering of
the 'extreme' event return period.
Code check failures: a code utilization check greater than
unity does not necessarily constitute an actual component
failure or subsequent system failure. A more accurate
representation of the resistance should be used to alleviate
the problem or demonstration that the system has a degree
of in-built redundancy may be sufficient to accept the
component overstress.
System strength: justification for accepting an assessed
structure may be based on an ultimate strength analysis
which considers the system strength rather than the
strength of each component.
TIME DEPENDANT MECHANISMS
Operating experience gained in widely separated parts of
the world consistently shows that provided corrosion protection
systems are adequately maintained structural reliability does not
degrade significantly even for exposure periods well in excess
of originally intended design lives [29]. However in some cases
corrosion defects may influence integrity of the structure,
therefore the corrosion allowance should be calibrated for
extended life in correlation to in service performance data.
With the growth of platform operating experience over
time, it has become clear that the number of occurrences of
fatigue cracks discovered in existing structures is not as high as
would be expected. The reason for the lack of correlation is the
degree of conservatism has served industry well, allowing many
platforms to continue to operate safely well past their initial
design lives.
Recent studies indicate that the structural analysis may be
the principal cause of the conservatism. It has been usual
practice to assume the tubular joints are rigid when performing
fatigue analysis usually due to a lack of knowledge on how to
better represent the true flexibility of joints that is observed in
large-scale component and frame tests. The technology now
exists to address the question of local joint flexibility and reflect
it in the fatigue analysis with a high degree of reliability and in
a cost effective manner. In addition a calibration technique in
correlation with the available joint inspection data may be
considered to produce more realistic assessment of the
probability of failure due to fatigue lives of primary tubular
joints [30].
ANALYSIS METHODS
The assessment analysis is intended to be iterative in
nature, starting with relatively simple and conservative
procedures. If the structure can be demonstrated to be fit for
purpose on this basis, the analysis is complete. If not, more
complex methods may be exhausted to determine the
acceptability prior to any decisions regarding expensive or high
risk mitigation measures.
System strength is not addressed in detail in codes and
guidance documents. It has been demonstrated through large
scale testing and via field observations that, for all frame types,
there is additional system capacity available over and above that
defined by the failure of the first component. In other words, the
whole is stronger than the sum of the parts. The 2D, and later
3D, frames testing JIPs in the 1990s provided important
confirmation of frame behaviour and data for calibration of
analysis tools for offshore platforms [31].
A structural analysis of the complete structural system,
when considered necessary, may be performed on a three
dimensional model that is of sufficient detail to accurately
represent the stiffness of and loading on the platform
substructure and foundation. The stiffness of the deck should
also be accurately represented, especially for non-linear
analyses. Special attention should be given to defensible
representation of the actual stiffness of damaged or corroded
components.
MITIGATION AND RISK REDUCTION
Prevention, mitigation and risk reduction measures should
be considered at all stages of assessment and may be used in
lieu of more complex assessment.
Structures that do not meet the assessment requirements
through design level analysis, or ultimate strength analysis will
need prevention or mitigation actions. In determining the
effectiveness of the prevention or mitigation measures, the
balance of the feasibility (cost, time and difficulty) versus the
benefits and risks, should be considered. In addition,
consideration should be given to the local conditions and
circumstances and the degree of confidence in the data and
techniques used in the assessment.
Prevention measures include structural strengthening and
load reduction to reduce the possibility of a hazardous event
occurring. The selection of a repair or strengthening solution is
8 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
addressed within the broadest possible context. It is arguable
that there are basically four approaches to strengthening,
modification and repair (SMR), which are:
• Remove damage;
• Reduce the loading;
• Undertake a localized strengthening or repair;
• Undertake a global strengthening or repair.
The following list summarises the various strengthening,
modification and repair (SMR) techniques that are presently
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
available and may be used.
• Welding
• Weld Improvement
• Clamp Technology
• Member Grouting
• Joint Grouting
• Bolting
• Member Removal
• Adhesives and Epoxy Grouts
• Cold Forming
• Mechanically Strengthen Joints or Members
• Add Bracing
• Marine Growth Cleaning
RISK BASED INSPECTION PROGRAM
A rational approach for the in-service inspection of fixed
jacket structures may use a risk based SIM as a basis. This
approach allows to maintain an understanding of a structure or
group of similar structures and to monitor their condition while
providing flexibility to optimize the use of inspection resources.
The risk-based strategy for the development of inspection
scopes of work depends upon an understanding of the platforms
susceptibility to damage and the tolerance of the structure to
that damage. The SIM strategy should match a risk-based
inspection interval with a risk-based inspection scope,
deployment method (diver versus ROV) and survey techniques
employed (general visual versus close visual/NDE).
As part of the assessment process for future service life,
consideration should be given to accumulated fatigue
degradation effects. Where the required inspections are made
and any known damage is assessed and/or repaired, no
additional analytical demonstration of future fatigue life is
required. Alternatively, adequate fatigue life may be
demonstrated by means of an analytical procedure compatible
with those specified in API RP2A. In some cases, MPI
inspection of the joint can be used to “reset” accumulated
fatigue degradation if there is no evidence of surface cracking.
Such information can also be used to establish risk-based
inspection intervals.
CONCLUSION
State of art in life extension of fixed offshore structures was
discussed in order to ensure technical and operational integrity
of the ageing facilities and to maintain the fitness for service of
these offshore structures. The maintenance of structural
integrity is a significant consideration in the safety management
and life extension of offshore installations. Detailed integrity
assessments are needed as outlined to demonstrate if there is
sufficient technical, operational and organisational integrity to
continue safe operation throughout a life extension. Information
on history, characteristic data, condition data and inspection
results are required to assess the current state and to predict the
future state of the facility and the possible life extension. The
regulation of offshore safety requires the introduction of a
structural integrity management plan, entailing the
implementation of suitable arrangements for maintaining the
integrity of the installation by the duty holder. This is achieved
through periodic assessments and carrying out any remedial
work in the event of damage or deterioration as outlined, to
ensure that adequate safety margins are maintained. Good
record keeping and high quality data will be beneficial in this
process.
REFERENCES
[1] Bea, R., Puskar, F.J., Smith, C., and Spencer, J., 1988,
“Development of AIM (assessment, Inspection, maintenance)
programs for fixed and mobile platforms” Proc. Offshore
Technology Conference, Houston, TX, Vol. 2, pp. 193-205
[2] Nezamian, A., Nicolson, R.J., 2011, “Integrity
Assessment, Repair and Verification of Fitness for Service of a
Damaged Offshore Platform Radio Tower” Proc. 30th
International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic
Engineering, Rotterdam, the Netherland, OMAE2011-50345.
[3] Stacey, A., and Sharp, J. V., 2007, “Safety factors
requirements for the offshore industry,” Engineering Failure
Analysis Vol. 14 pp. 442-458.
[4] American Petroleum Institute (API), 2000,
“Recommended practice for planning, designing and
constructing fixed offshore platforms”, API RP 2A, Washington
[5] Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 1990, “Offshore
Installation: Guidance on Design, Construction and
certification”, HSMO, London.
[6] International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
2007, “Petroleum and natural gas industries: Fixed steel
offshore structures”, ISO 19902, International Standard
Organization, Geneva.
[7] NORSOK Standard N-004, 2004, “Design of steel
structures”, Norwegian Technology Standards Institution, Oslo,
Norway.
[8] Health & Safety Executive, 2001, “Offshore
Installations (Safety Case) Regulations, SI 2005/3117, HSE
Books, London, 2005
[9] Petroleum Safety Authority, Regulations Relating to
Material and Information in the Petroleum Activities (The
Information Duty Regulations).
[10] NORSOK, N-006, Assessment of structural integrity
for existing offshore load-bearing structures, March 2009.
[11] American Petroleum Institute, 2007, “Recommended
Practice for the Structural Integrity management of Fixed
Offshore Structures”, API RP2 SIM, Draft.
9 Copyright © 2012 by ASME
[12] Health & Safety Executive, 1999, “Assessment of the
Historical Development of Fixed Offshore Structure Design
Codes”, Offshore Technology Report OTO 1999-015.
[13] O’Connor, P. E., Bucknell, J.R., DeFranco, S.J.,
Westlake, H.S., and Puskar, F.J., 2005, “Structural Integrity
Management (SIM) of Offshore Facilities” Proc. Offshore
Technology Conference, Houston, TX, OTC 17545.
[14] Sharp, J.V., Wintle, J.B., Johnston C. and Stacey, A.,
2011, “Industry Practices for The Management of Ageing
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
Assets Relevant to Offshore Installations” Proc. 30th
International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic
Engineering, Rotterdam, the Netherland, OMAE2011-49263.
[15] Nezamian, A. and Setunge, S., 2007, “A case study of
application of FRP composites in strengthening of the
reinforced concrete headstock of a bridge structure”. Journal of
Composites for Construction, ASCE publication, Volume 11,
Issue 5, pp. 531-544 (September/October 2007)
[16] Nezamian, A., Setunge, S. and Fenwick J. M. (2004)
“Reliability Based Optimal Solution for Rehabilitation of
Existing Bridge Structures”. Proceeding the Clients Driving
Innovation International Conference, 25-28 October 2004,
Surfers Paradise, Queensland, Australia
[17] Notice to Lease No. 2003-G16, 1999, “Assessment of
Existing OCS Platforms”, Effective Date August 15, 2003,
United States Department of the Interior Minerals Management
Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS regions.
[18] Wisch, D.J., Puskar, F.J., Laurendine, T.E.,
O’Connor, P. E., Versowsky, P.E. and Bucknell, J.R., 2004, “An
Update on API RP 2A Section 17 for the assessment of Existing
Platforms” Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston,
TX, OTC-16820.
[19] O’Connor, P. E., Versowsky, P.E., Day, M. Westlake,
H.s., and Bucknell, J.R., 2005, “Platform Assessment: Recent
Section 17 Updates and Future API/Industry Developments”
Proc. Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, TX, OTC-
17699.
[20] Ersdal, G., Hornlund, E., and Splide, H., 2011,
“Experience from Norwegian Programme on Ageing and Life
Extension” Proc. 30th International Conference on Ocean,
Offshore and Arctic Engineering, Rotterdam, the Netherland,
OMAE2011-50046
[21] OLF Guideline No. 122, 2008: Recommended
Guidelines for the assessment and documentation of service life
extension of facilities, Version 1
[22] OLF 2008, “Recommended guidelines for application
for consent for extended lifetime of facilities”.
[23] UK Offshore Operators Associations, UKOOA, 1999,
‘Industry Guidelines on a Framework for Risk Related Decision
Support’.
[24] ISSC, 1988-94., “Report of ISSC Committee IV.1.
Design Philosophy”, Proc. 10th ISSC, (1988), 11th ISSC, Wuxi
(1991) and 12th ISSC, St. John's, Newfoundland (1994).
[25] Moan, T, 1993. “Reliability and Risk Analysis for
Design and Operations Planning of Offshore Structures”, Proc.
6th ICOSSAR Conf., Rotterdam: Balkema, 1994.
 [26] Melchers, R.E., 1987, “Structural Reliability Analysis
and Prediction”. Chichester, U K: Ellis Horwood Ltd.
[27] Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Offshore
Technology Report, OTO 1999/060, 1999, “Target levels for
reliability-based assessment of offshore structures during design
and operation”, Sandsli, Norway.
[28] Det Norske Veritas (DNV), Report No. 95-3203,
1995, “Guideline for Offshore Structural Reliability Analysis:
Application to Jacket Platforms”, Norway.
[29] Bucknell, J., Lalani, M., Gebara J., and Puskar F. J.
2000, “Rationalization and Optimization of Underwater
Inspection Planning Consistent with API RP2A Section 14”
10
Proc. 19th International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and
Arctic Engineering, New Orleans, Louisiana, OMAE00-2073
[30] Barton, A.D. and Milani, N.K., 2000, “Fatigue Life
Calibration of Bass Strait Platforms Based on Inspection
History” Proc. 10th International Offshore and Polar
Engineering Conference, Seattle, USA, Volume 4, pp. 343-349
[31] Bolt, H.M., 2000, “Results from Ultimate Load Tests
on 3D Jacket Type Structures” Proc. Offshore Technology
Conference, Houston, TX, OTC 11491.
Downloaded from http://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/OMAE/proceedings-pdf/OMAE2012/44892/165/2521764/165_1.pdf by Southwest Jiaotong University user on 26 June 2024
Copyright © 2012 by ASME