ukcsem003_iss1am01

Recovery and Rescue Provision for Offshore Installations UKCS-EM-003
Contents
Authorisation for Issue

Amendment Record
Amendment Summary
Distribution List
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Paragraph Page
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1 Introduction 1
2 Scope 1
3 Responsibilities 1
3.1 Business Units 1
3.2 Rescue and Recovery Provider 2
4 Definition of Terms 2
5 Policy 3
6 Performance Standards 3
6.1 Man Overboard 3
6.2 Helicopter Ditching/Crash 4
6.3 Installation Escape 5
6.4 Recovery 6
7 Selection of Arrangements 6
Addendum 1 References
Addendum 2 Survival Time Guidance
Addendum 3 Guidance on a Selection of Arrangements
Addendum 4 Recovery Time Trials Verification
July 2001 Issue 1 i/ii

Authorisation for Issue
Issue Authority
Name: Brian Turnbull
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: Senior Marine Consultant

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Technical Authority
Name: Peter Hewes
Signature: ________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________
Position: SNS(N) Safety Leader
July 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

Amendment Record
For Audit Use

Amendment Incorporated By
Checked
Number
Name Signature Date Signature Date
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AMOSAF.171
July 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Amendment Summary
Issue No Date Description

Issue 1 July 2001 First issue.
Issue 1/AM01 March 2002 Text in Addendum 2 Paragraph 3 amended.
Distribution List updated.
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March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 vii/viii

Distribution List
Holders of Controlled Hard Copy
Copy Copyholder Location
01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

02 Manager, Regional Emergency Response Centre Dyce
Virtual Copyholders
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Copy Copyholder
01 Document Issue Authority (Brian Turnbull)

02 Document Technical Authority (Peter Hewes)
03 EoS Document Controller (Dave Taylor)
04 EoS Operations Excellence HSE Consultant (David Egan)
05 SEA, Magnus
06 SEA, North West Hutton
07 SEA, Thistle
08 HSE/Compliance Manager, EoS
09 BSG SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Malcolm)
10 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Faulkner)
11 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Peter Thompson)
12 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Carl Thomessen)
13 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Justin Haigh)
14 CNS SMS Co-ordinator (Jim Blacklaws)
15 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (David Robertson)
16 NBU EPU SMS Co-ordinator (David Egan)
17 NBU SMS Co-ordinator (John Beaumont)
18 NSI SMS Co-ordinator (Ann Rosbrook)
19 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Malcolm Watson)
20 SBU SMS Co-ordinator (Simon Robinson)
21 MNS SMS Co-ordinator (Bruce Morrison)
March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 ix/x

Preface
Review and Update

This document will be subject to 12-monthly review and update, when document holders will
have the opportunity to express opinions and suggest improvements.
However, the document control system allows for continuous update of this document. As
such, any user may at any time identify an error or suggest an improvement using an
Amendment Proposal proforma which is available electronically on the UKCS SMS website,
from the Data Control Centre (DCC) Supervisor or from the Technical Authority.
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All holders of this document are registered so that they can be sent updates and be kept
informed of changes or reviews.
Responsibility of Copyholders
It is the responsibility of the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions to
maintain the accuracy of the document by ensuring that all updates are promptly
incorporated and acknowledged.
Furthermore, the registered copyholder of controlled hard copy versions must at all times
maintain custody of this document unless prior approval is given by the relevant
Technical Authority.
The roles and responsibilities of copyholders and ‘virtual’ copyholders are detailed in Section 1
of the Document Control Procedure (UKCS-DCM-001).
July 2001 Issue 1 xi/xii

List of Abbreviations
ACoP Approved Code of Practice

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
BF Beaufort Wind Force
BU Business Unit
CNS Central North Sea
DC Daughter Craft
EDC Enhanced Daughter Craft
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EER Evacuation, Escape and Rescue

EERA Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis
ER Emergency Response
FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Offloading
FRC Fast Rescue Craft
GPOR Good Prospect of Recovery
MAU Mobile Accommodation Unit
MHSWR Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MOU Mobile Offshore Unit
NNS Northern North Sea
OPITO Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation
OSC On-scene Commander
PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response
PIW Persons in Water
PLB Personnel Locator Beacon
POS Place of Safety
QRA Qualitative Risk Assessment
SAR Search and Rescue
SBV Standby Vessel
SMS Safety Management System
SNS Southern North Sea
SWH Significant Wave Height
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor-propelled Survival Craft
TIG Thermal Insulated Garment
TR Temporary Refuge
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
July 2001 Issue 1 xiii/xiv

1 Introduction
The purpose of this document is to define the process of selecting the arrangements
required on or near offshore Installations:
• For the recovery and rescue of persons following their evacuation or escape from the
Installation
• The rescue of persons near the Installation
• For the taking of such persons to a place of safety
The arrangements must meet defined Performance Standards, and as a minimum must
meet those defined in this document.
Arrangements that satisfy the Performance Standards are regarded as being effective as
required by Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER)
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Regulation 17. The link to the Safety Case and the Evacuation, Escape and Rescue (EER)
analysis ensures that all location-specific details concerning the response to fire and
explosion and other major accident hazards are taken into account.
2 Scope
This document applies to all offshore Installations operated by BP in the United Kingdom
Continental Shelf (UKCS). It shall also apply to Installations contracted to BP including
Mobile Offshore Units (MOUs), Mobile Accommodation Units (MAUs), Mobile Offshore
Drilling Units (MODUs) and oil storage and loading facilities.
3 Responsibilities
3.1 Business Units
• To ensure that effective arrangements are in place for the recovery and/or rescue of
persons following their evacuation or escape from the Installation; the rescue of
persons near the Installation; and for the taking of such persons to a place of safety,
all satisfying the defined Performance Standards
• To undertake and maintain the rescue and recovery assessment
• To ensure the assessment is included as a part of the Installation’s EER analysis
• To ensure that there is sufficient equipment on the Installation, maintained in good
working order, for the safe evacuation of all personnel
• To ensure that there is sufficient equipment on the Installation, maintained in good
working order, for personnel to escape should the evacuation arrangements fail
to function
• To ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, there is sufficient personal survival
equipment on the Installation, maintained in good working order, for all personnel
during evacuation and escape, over-the-side working and helicopter transfers
July 2001 Issue 1 1

UKCS-EM-003 Recovery and Rescue Provision for Offshore Installations
• To ensure that Installation personnel are sufficiently trained and drilled in the actions
they should take in the event of any emergency where they could end up in need of
rescue and recovery
3.2 Rescue and Recovery Provider

• To ensure that he is fully aware of the Installation’s Emergency Response Plan
• To ensure that he understands the operational limitations that apply to the rescue and
recovery arrangements at his disposal
• To ensure that he maintains his crew’s competence in the operation of rescue and
recovery equipment
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4 Definition of Terms
Abandonment The act of all personnel leaving an Installation in an emergency.
Escape, A general term used to describe the range of possible actions, including muster,
Evacuation temporary refuge, evacuation, recovery, escape to the sea and rescue, that
describes the movement from a place of work/danger to a safe location.
Evacuation The leaving of an Installation and its vicinity in an emergency, in an orderly and
systematic manner in accordance with the Emergency Response Plan, and without
directly entering the sea (ie means of evacuation may include helicopters, bridge
links, liferafts, and Totally Enclosed Motor-propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC)).
Escape The leaving of an Installation in an emergency when the planned evacuation system
has failed. It may involve entering the sea directly and is considered the last resort.
Recovery The process by which those who have entered TEMPSC and liferafts are retrieved
and taken to a place of safety.
Rescue The process by which persons in the sea are retrieved and taken to a place of
safety.
Place of Safety An onshore or offshore location where medical treatment and other facilities for the
stabilisation of survivors are available.
Rescue Boat A generic term given to any type of vessel capable of picking up survivors
(ie standby vessel, fast rescue craft and daughter craft).
Over-the-side Any work where an increased likelihood of a fall from a height into the water exists
Working which may require the deployment of marine rescue facilities, in addition to any
protective measures required simply for prevention of a fall from a height.
Survivor A person who remains alive after going through a reasonably foreseeable event.
Severe Storm For all areas other than SNS, typically 9m significant wave height and above.
Conditions and For SNS, typically 5m significant wave height and above.
Seastates
2 July 2001 Issue 1

5 Policy
Business Units (BUs) will undertake the following four key elements in complying with
this document:
• To derive Installation standards for the recovery and rescue of survivors to a place of
safety, based on, but as a minimum, achieving the Performance Standards laid down
in this document
• To establish those reasonably foreseeable events that lead to the need for recovery
and rescue
• To assess the arrangements provided for recovery and rescue as an integral element
of the Installation’s EER analysis
• To select arrangements for recovery and rescue that satisfies the Performance
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Standards
6 Performance Standards
The goal of the arrangements is to provide a good prospect of recovery for survivors
following reasonably foreseeable events. However, recognising that there are some
circumstances that may prevent this being achieved, the high level performance
standard is defined as:
‘To provide a good prospect in all but the most extreme weather conditions and
seastates, of recovering, rescuing and taking to a place of safety, persons who have
to evacuate or escape from an Installation, or who require rescue near the Installation.’
The following paragraphs define the Performance Standards, give an explanation of how
they were established and, where applicable, provide guidance on how to deal with
variations on a BU-specific basis.
6.1 Man Overboard
6.1.1 Assumptions/Basis
The Man Overboard Performance Standard is based on over-the-side work. The survivor
is assumed to be dressed in normal working clothes and wearing an automatic lifejacket,
but no immersion suit.
6.1.2 Performance Standard

A rescue boat shall be in position to remove the first survivor from the water
within 4 minutes of that person entering the water, and will have recovered the
last survivor within 10 minutes and taken them to a place of safety within
20 minutes.
July 2001 Issue 1 3

6.1.3 Explanation
The 4 minutes criterion for the first survivor is based on fast but realistic response times
for an arrangement in which a Standby Vessel (SBV)/Fast Rescue Craft (FRC)
combination is being used to provide close standby cover. The 20 minute time limit is
based on a predicted minimum survival time for an average person in normal working
clothing (refer to Addendum 2) in winter sea temperature conditions and around
Beaufort Wind Force 4 to 5. It includes a safety factor, in that it specifies a standard for
taking the survivors to a place of safety (normally the standby vessel itself). All persons
who would require rescue should be out of the water in 10 minutes.
Where an Enhanced Daughter Craft (EDC) is used, the 20-minute limit for recovery to a
place of safety may be extended. Each case would require a separate justification.
For other reasonably foreseeable events where a fast response cannot be ensured,
additional personal survival equipment is a requirement. In the case of over-the-side
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working, wearing unsuitable personal survival equipment can add to the difficulty of
carrying out the job safely (eg immersion suits and bulky lifejackets are not practical and
likely to add to the risk of falling overboard), so a rapid response standard is specified.
Those working over-the-side shall be wearing a compact automatic lifejacket to help
minimise the consequences of the cold shock gasp reflex, and so reduce the likelihood
of drowning.
6.1.4 Guidance
A number of persons could fall into the sea during over-the-side work. To deal with this
event, the Performance Standard defines a last survivor recovery time. Each BU should
define the maximum number of personnel that their arrangements can recover within
the Performance Standard. As guidance, the number should not exceed three unless
justified as part of a Stage 2 risk assessment (this may, for example, consider warmer
water, higher standard of clothing/insulation etc).
Random man overboard (ie not associated with over-the-side working) is not considered
a reasonably foreseeable occurrence (refer to Addendum 3).
6.2 Helicopter Ditching/Crash
6.2.1 Assumption/Basis
Helicopter ditching/crashing is considered to be a reasonably foreseeable event.
Survivors are assumed to be dressed in the recommended clothing for flying, wearing a
lifejacket, a Thermal Insulated Garment (TIG), a Multifabs 459 immersion suit and a
Personnel Locator Beacon (PLB). ‘Nearby the Installation’ is defined as being within
1 nautical mile of the Installation.

The survivors of a helicopter ditching/crash shall be rescued and taken to a place
of safety within 2 hours.
4 July 2001 Issue 1

6.2.3 Explanation
The 2 hours criterion is based on the timescale within which the most vulnerable man is
likely to succumb to drowning in winter conditions (water temperature 5°C) and weather
conditions of Beaufort Wind Force 5, as defined in the survival timetable shown in
Addendum 2.
This Performance Standard is derived from the documented winter weather conditions.
It is also based on the wearing of a lifejacket, TIG and Multifabs 459 immersion suit.
The BP clothing policy applies (refer to Addendum 2).
All passengers are presumed to be survivors in circumstances where the maximum
number of persons allowed on the aircraft is less than 20. This may be taken into
account in the selection of arrangements.
The use of a PLB will allow the rapid location of persons in difficult conditions.
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The use of a rebreather assists in the evacuation of the survivor from an upturned
helicopter after ditching.
6.3 Installation Escape
In some cases, which will be BU specific (eg entrapment away from Temporary Refuge
(TR) and TEMPSC, or failed evacuation by TEMPSC), it is reasonably foreseeable that
persons will escape directly to sea.

The survivors of an Installation escape shall be rescued within 2 hours of their
entry into the water.
6.3.3 Explanation
The 2 hours criterion is based on the timescale within which the most vulnerable man is
likely to succumb to drowning. Survivors are assumed to be dressed in the
recommended clothing for escape, equipped with an approved lifejacket, work clothing
or TIG, and a Multifabs 459 immersion suit or equivalent.
Lifejackets shall have a spray hood and crotch strap. Immersion suits shall provide a
minimum Clo factor of 0.65 which may include a TIG and normal working clothes. Water
trials shall be carried out to ensure that the lifejacket/immersion suit combinations used
are compatible. Dexterity trials of immersion suits should also be considered.
Provision of survival clothing other than these will give other survival times, which
should be justified by the BU concerned.
There is no requirement to provide PLBs for these events as it is expected that persons
will not enter the sea directly for 30 minutes after the event, thus allowing any rescue
craft to move close to the Installation. Each Installation should confirm that this
assumption is valid, and if not, further protective measures should be considered.
July 2001 Issue 1 5

6.4 Recovery
Adequate provision must be made for the care of persons who have been recovered or
rescued. Regulation requires that such persons be taken to a place of safety.
Recovery is defined as ‘the process by which those who have entered TEMPSC and
liferafts are retrieved to a place of safety’. The emphasis of this document is on the
rescue of casualties from the sea and immediate life-threatening situations. There is
more time available to recover persons in a TEMPSC or liferaft to a place of safety. In
some circumstances, such as severe weather, it may be the safest option (but not the
most comfortable option) to leave people in the TEMPSC/liferaft rather than to attempt
to transfer them immediately to a place of safety. For this reason a time limit has not
been incorporated into the Performance Standard.
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To identify a place(s) of safety and provide for the recovery of persons from
TEMPSC, liferafts, or other means of evacuation or escape, and their transfer to
this location(s).
Arrangements need to be in place to recover personnel, taking into account the weather
conditions and the expected condition of the personnel. Recovery from TEMPSC/liferafts
is best performed by transfer to an FRC. Recovery outside of the weather conditions in
which FRC can operate safely should not be considered unless life is threatened. The
place of safety would normally be the SBV or other craft if adequately equipped.
7 Selection of Arrangements
The following process should be applied to each Installation or group of Installations:
(1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable events that could lead to the evacuation or
escape from the Installation.
(2) Evaluate the overall survival times for all personnel involved in such events.
(3) Evaluate the overall response time for the recovery or rescue of all personnel
involved in such events.
(4) Select the means for recovery and rescue that will satisfy the Performance
Standards.
(5) Where necessary, define supporting operational and flying restrictions.
(6) Integrate the recovery and rescue arrangements within the Installation Evacuation,
Escape and Rescue Analysis (EERA), and summarise in the Safety Case.
(7) Implement, monitor and record performance as appropriate.
Guidance on the selection of arrangements is given in Addendum 3.
6 July 2001 Issue 1

Addendum 1
References
(1) Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response)
Regulations, 1995, Second Edition 1997, ISBN 0 7176 1386 0.
(2) Standby Vessel Performance Standards, Issue 1, UKOOA, January 1999.
(3) The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, The Hon Lord Cullen, November 1990.
(4) Private communication from Dr Iain Light, DnV, ‘Thermal Protection Offered by the
Multifabs Type 459 Survival Suit and Thermal Insulated Garment (TIG)’, 15 April 1997.
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(5) Review of Probable Survival Times for Immersion in the North Sea, DH Robertson and
ME Simpson, Offshore Technology Report for the HSE OTO 95 038 (January 1996).
(6) Review of BP Amoco’s Survival Time Standards, Dr MJ Tipton and Dr FStC Golden,
6th July 1999.
(7) Human Thermal Responses During Leg-only Exercise in Cold Water, Golden and
Tipton 1986.
(8) Effect of Water Content and Compression on Clothing Insulation, Hall, Johannes and
Polte 1951.
(9) Prediction of Body Cooling, Institut De Medicine Environnmentale, 1997.
(10) The Initial Responses to Cold Water Immersion in Man, MJ Tipton Clinical Science 1989.
(11) Immersion Fatalities, Hazardous Responses and Dangerous Discrepancies,
MJ Tipton 1995.
(12) Effect of Weather on Performance and Response Times in Offshore Rescue, HSE
Offshore Technology Report – OTO 1999 006.
References
July 2001 Issue 1 Add 1-1/2
Addendum 2
Survival Time Guidance
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 1
2.1 Scenarios to be Addressed 4
2.2 Guidance 4
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3 BP Clothing Policy 5
Table
1 Timescale Within Which Standard Man
is Likely to Succumb to Drowning 3

July 2001 Issue 1 Add 2-i/ii
1 Introduction
This guidance is to be used by all BP UKCS offshore Installations in the assessment of
‘good prospect of rescue and recovery’ required by Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response (PFEER) Regulation 17.
The guidance is based on a review carried out in April to July 1999 following the merger
between BP and Amoco. The review was undertaken by a team comprising of members
of both the former companies’ PFEER Regulation 17 Working Groups. The group
considered the rescue and recovery standards previously operated by both
BP Exploration and Amoex, and takes into account research initiated by both companies.
2 Background
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In 1997 BP sponsored an independent review (Addendum 1 Ref 4) of research into

survival in the sea, with the most recent Health and Safety Executive published research
(Addendum 1 Ref 5) as its basis. This research takes into account a range of different
water temperatures and weather conditions in relation to the degree of protection of the
immersed individuals. It is considered to be the definitive published work (albeit one with
an inbuilt degree of ‘reasonable pessimism’ in its survival time estimates).
Also in 1997, Amoco had conducted a detailed review of the issues surrounding rescue
and recovery provision at their Installations, resulting in the publication of their own
standards, with backup documentation, including several test reports relating to
transit-suit performance.
Various factors were taken into account in the post-merger survivability review, of which
the objective was to justify a more realistic approach that was specific to survival
clothing provided by BP. It recognised, however, that a degree of conservatism is
appropriate when assessing whether a ‘good prospect’ is provided under particular
circumstances. A further independent review of the proposals for the revised Practice 23
was carried out (Addendum 1 Ref 6) and the results used in finalising the document.
It should be noted that BP considers that the basing of survival times on figures for an
averagely fit thin man, as is done in this document (and in Addendum 1 Ref 5), provides
a significant degree of that required conservatism.
The primary focus of the review was helicopter ditching, where the potential for a slower
response is arguably greater than for the two other situations addressed. As a result of
the earlier reviews, both BP and Amoco had made similar improvements to the standard
of helicopter transit suits, ie both companies use thermal liners in winter. The resultant
standard Multifabs 459 suit/thermal liner combination provides excellent leak resistance
properties, together with a high level of thermal insulation; effectively ‘state of the art’
and justifiably treatable as the ‘insulated suit’ considered in Addendum 1 Ref 5.
In Addendum 1 Ref 4, conservative estimates of the effect of sweating and urination
into the suit as well as leakage were taken into account in determining the effect on
survival times.

July 2001 Issue 1 Add 2-1
It is now well recognised that the principal threat to an immersed person’s survival is
from drowning, with hypothermia second. This risk is increased by the weather
conditions. In most cases, the wearing of a lifejacket (with a deployed spray visor) is
critical to an individual’s survival prospects. Hence, considerable effort has been, and will
continue to be, dedicated to raising and maintaining awareness of this issue, and also in
ensuring that offshore personnel are well briefed on how to react if they find themselves
in the sea for any reason. This high level of knowledge on how to maximise survival
prospects can be considered as another factor rendering BP’s survival time estimates
conservative.
Although much data is available on wave heights in both summer and winter, the height
of the waves is not directly connected to the likelihood of survival for a man in the water.
Wave-front steepness and whether or not the wave is breaking and spume is being
blown off the crest are the key factors. Unfortunately, probability data for these sea
conditions is not available, so in Addendum 1 Ref 5, the researchers have used Beaufort
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Wind Force (BF) to try and characterise the conditions for different survival prospects,
with BF 5 representing the start of ‘difficult’ survival conditions.
Note: BF 5 is the low end of the ‘difficult’ survival conditions range and is considered to
be an extremely conservative ‘weather limit’. Hence, in conjunction with BP’s
Mariners and Search and Rescue (SAR) providers, the Company has interpreted
how these conditions can be described to provide more practical guidance for
use offshore. This interpretation is given below, which recognises that the
specific conditions referred to are purely illustrative, and that the actual ‘good
prospect’ decision-making at the time will be based on the recovery Vessel
Master’s knowledge of the capabilities of his equipment and crew in relation to
the prevailing conditions. This guidance does not apply to SNS operations, details
of which can be found in TIAP 06:01.
• Routine overside working can proceed up to about a 3m Significant Wave Height
(SWH), where the wave period is less than 7 seconds, and up to about 4m SWH if the
wave period is more than 7 seconds
• Where rescue and recovery relies on a Fast Rescue Craft (FRC), daughter craft or
enhanced daughter craft, helicopter operations, other than rescue operations, can
proceed up to about a 4m SWH where the wave period is less than 7 seconds, and
up to about 5.5m SWH where it is more than 7 seconds
• Where a Dacon Scoop (or similar) is fitted to a Standby Vessel (SBV), helicopter
operations can proceed to about 5.5m SWH where the wave period is less than
7 seconds, and up to about 7.5m SWH where the wave period is more than
7 seconds
• Where rescue and recovery is provided by dedicated SAR capability, helicopter
operations can proceed up to 7.5m SWH

Add 2-2 July 2001 Issue 1
The results of the research reviewed in Addendum 1 Ref 5 are summarised in the form
of a table which indicates the timescale within which the ‘standard man’ is most likely to
succumb to drowning. This is the basis for this guidance. BP’s interpretation of this
information is given in Table 1.
Note: The ‘standard man’ is assumed to be of average fitness, but in the thinnest 2%
of the population, ie one of the most vulnerable to the effects of cold water.
Clothing (Worn Beaufort Wind Survival Time

With Lifejacket) Force
Winter Conditions Summer
(Water Temp 5°C) Conditions (Water
Temp 13°C)
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Working clothes (no 0 to 2 < 45 minutes < 75 minutes

immersion suit)
3 to 4 < 30 minutes < 30 minutes
5 and above (Note) > 10 minutes < 30 minutes
Membrane suit 0 to 2 < 90 minutes < 3 hours
worn over working
3 to 4 < 60 minutes < 2 hours
clothes, with
reasonable leakage 5 and above (Note) < 30 minutes < 1 hour
into suit (ca 500mls)
Multifabs 459 suit 0 to 2 > 3 hours > 3 hours
worn over TIG and
3 to 4 > 3 hours > 3 hours
working clothes,
with reasonable 5 and above (Note) > 2 hours > 3 hours
leakage into suit
(500mls)
Note: Refer to Paragraph 2.2 for the sea/weather conditions that this is likely to mean
in practice.
Table 1 Timescale Within Which Standard Man is Likely to Succumb to Drowning
This interpretation has been kept deliberately on the conservative side in relation to
survival times in weather conditions of BF 5+, as further research is anticipated on the
effects of wave motion on cold-water survival, and this may bring about a change in
predicted survival times. In the case of helicopter passengers (effectively the third
group), the quoted times apply to the upper end of the range within which helicopter
flying would still be permissible (refer to the above).

2.1 Scenarios to be Addressed

Three particular scenarios need to be taken into account when assessing whether an
Installation has arrangements in place that provide a ‘good prospect of rescue and
recovery’. These are as follows:
(1) Overside work.
(2) Installation abandonment.
(3) Helicopter ditch/crash.
2.2 Guidance
Refer to Table 1.
• Man Overboard During Overside Working
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As can be seen from the table, survival times are short during the winter months,
significantly less than half an hour in weather above BF 4, which still represents
conditions where overside work could be sanctioned.
The use of thermal insulted overside work garments will increase survival time.
• Person Escaping to Sea During a Major Emergency
In this case the timescales presented represent a point between the ‘dry’ and ‘wet’
examples used in the original report. BP uses an allowance for leakage which is
considered more realistic for the type of survival suit in service. More realistic
assumptions are made regarding the actions of the individuals while awaiting rescue
(as justified in Addendum 1 Ref 4).
Note: Provision of high performance abandonment suits adjacent to means of escape
to sea, could be used to justify a longer rescue and recovery Performance
Standard, similar to the figure derived for helicopter ditching victims.
• Helicopter Passenger After Ditching
Again, in this case the timescales presented represent a point between the ‘dry’ and
‘wet’ examples used in the original report, using an allowance for leakage, sweating
and diuresis that is considered to be realistic for the survival suit/thermal liner
combination that BP supplies, and based on defensible assumptions regarding the
actions of the individuals while awaiting rescue (refer to Addendum 1 Ref 4).
The derived rescue and recovery performance standard incorporates an additional
conservatism in allowing 2 hours for recovery to a place of safety.

3 BP Clothing Policy
The following clothing will be worn all year:
• Survival suit
• Thermal liner
• Trousers
• Soft shoes/trainers
The following additional clothing will be worn during the following periods:
• Oct to May: three layers minimum
• June to Sept: one layer minimum
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Three layers represent a T-shirt, shirt and jumper or similar layers of your choice; one
layer represents a T-shirt; trousers include cords and/or jeans, there is no restriction.
Shorts are not allowed.
The more clothing worn, the slower body heat is lost when in the sea. However, there is
a balance between comfort in the helicopter and survival time. The BP Clothing Policy is
designed to ensure that if an individual enters the water, he or she should have a good
prospect of being rescued alive.

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 Add 2-5/6
Addendum 3
Guidance on Selection of Arrangements
Paragraph Page
1 Identify the Reasonably Foreseeable Events that

could Lead to Evacuation or Escape from the Installation 1
2 Evaluate the Overall Survival Times for All

Personnel Involved in Such Events 6
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3 Evaluate the Overall Response Time for the Recovery

or Rescue of All Personnel Involved in Such Events 6
4 Select the Means for Recovery and Rescue that will

Satisfy the Performance Standards 7
5 Where Necessary, Define Supporting

Operational Restrictions 7
6 Integrate the Recovery and Rescue Arrangements within

the Installation EERA and Summarise in the Safety Case 8
7 Implement, Monitor and Record

Performance as Appropriate 8
Table
1 Reasonably Foreseeable Events 2
Figure
1 Overall Recovery Time 9

2 Flying Decision Tree 10
3 Operations Restrictions (Example) 11

1 Identify the Reasonably Foreseeable Events that could

Lead to Evacuation or Escape from the Installation
The Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) Regulation 17
is not subject to the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle, and effective
arrangements are required to respond to all reasonably foreseeable events. There may
be some uncertainty about what is, or is not, considered to be ‘reasonably foreseeable’.
There is a considerable amount of legal precedent surrounding the meaning of the term
‘reasonably foreseeable’, and the test usually applied is whether an event would be so
regarded by the intelligent lay person. In deciding what is ‘reasonably foreseeable’, it is
material to consider both the behaviour of persons and the performance of equipment.
There will be events that, without further protective and preventive measures, could be
considered to be reasonably foreseeable, such that persons could enter the water near
Uncontrolled
an Installation. Random man overboard is such an event. However, if sufficient steps

have been taken to identify the scenarios under which this can happen, and sufficient
preventive measures have been put in place to prevent persons entering the water (for
example), then this event can be discounted as a reasonably foreseeable event.
Guidance has been provided in the PFEER Approved Code of Practice (ACoP) giving
examples of reasonably foreseeable events, and each particular Installation may have
additional events identified from the assessment required by Regulation 5 of PFEER for
major accident hazards, and under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety
at Work Regulations (MHSWR) for non-major accident hazards.
For a particular Installation, review the list of generic, reasonably foreseeable events and
Safety Case assessment for events/scenarios that can lead to the need for evacuation
and/or escape, and hence rescue and recovery.
For each scenario that is reasonably foreseeable, assess how many people are likely to
be involved, and what level of protective clothing and equipment they can justifiably be
assumed to have available to them at the place they will be when they attempt to
escape or evacuate.
The definition of which events, other than those provided in the PFEER guidance, that
may be reasonably foreseeable is a matter of opinion (unless defined by the courts).
There may be considerable debate within BP and with the regulator regarding the
definition of these events. To assist with this debate and to provide a consistent
approach across the Business Units, BP generic guidance is given in Table 1.

Event Reasonably Reasoning/Back-up/ Platform Guidance

Foreseeable Defence Specific
(Yes/No) Element
(Yes/No)
(1a) Helicopter Y* PFEER Guidance Para 163

controlled and ACoP Para 167
landing on water specifically lists such
an event.
Previous yet limited history

of actual events.
Nearby is not defined, Y* Number of people involved

but should not consider in event is platform
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anything > 1 nautical mile specific, based on size and
from Installation. occupancy of helicopter.
Expect all persons to

escape with majority
transferring directly to
liferaft.
(1b) Helicopter crash Y* PFEER Guidance Para 163

into water and ACoP Para 167
specifically lists such
an event.
Previous yet limited history

of actual events.
Does not cover main Y* Number of people involved

part of journey to/from in event is platform
Installation other than specific, based on size and
nearby. Nearby should be occupancy of helicopter.
considered anything within
about 1 mile from
Installation.
(2a) Loss of Y*/N Platform specific, based on Y* Platform specific depends

hydrocarbon risk, inventories, std and on OSC major accident
containment level of protection, QRA analysis.
with subsequent and OSC major accident
fire/explosion event analysis and
Installation design
addressed scenario by
scenario.
Table 1 Reasonably Foreseeable Events


(Yes/No) Element
(Yes/No)
On multijacket or bridge- For guidance refer to

linked Installation, there HSE Practice Section 6
may be means of escape Selection of Arrangements.
to another safe place
(eg other Installation) in
which case an EER event
may not be inevitable.
All single jacket

Installations, mobiles and
Uncontrolled
FPSO facilities should

consider an event
reasonably foreseeable
unless local QRA and OSC
indicates that the credible
worst incident would not
lead to an EER
requirement.
(3) Ship collision Y*/N PFEER Guidance Para 163 Y* Platform specific depends
specifically includes this on design, size and speed
event as reasonably of impact. BU to provide
foreseeable. Installation, technical
information/charts to aid
early assessment of impact
potential by OIM.
However, depending on
size, speed of ship and
Installation design, this
may not always escalate
to EER event.
Good ER plans and

preparedness may also
prevent event leading to
persons moving to EER
situation, ie if time permits,
controlled full or partial
demobilisation using
helicopter/lifeboats may
be possible.
Table 1 Reasonably Foreseeable Events (cont’d)


(Yes/No) Element
(Yes/No)
(4a) Man overboard N Considered not reasonably Impossible to ensure good

(random) foreseeable due to prospect of recovery
guardrails, maintenance, unless event witnessed.
inspection, adverse
weather/exposed
conditions rules.
Addressed by the
Installation Safety
Management System
Uncontrolled
(SMS).
Should not have a plan for

deliberate act.
(4b) Man overboard Y PFEER Guidance Para 163

(overside and ACoP Para 167
working) specifically includes
this event.
Mitigated by overside
working procedure, close
standby cover with SBV,
quick response/pick-up
performance, low numbers
of personnel involved.
(4c) Man overboard N Not considered to be

(from supply within the intent of
vessel) PFEER, but risks covered
by the vessel SMS and
equipment, as offloading
operations are covered by
Installation rules that
should limit risks to crew.
(5) Lifeboat testing N Safety rules in place.
Only carried out in good

weather/sea conditions.
SBV cover/support
available.


(Yes/No) Element
(Yes/No)
(6) Lifeboat N Special rules in place

maintenance in including use of safety
davits pennants and appropriate
overside working
procedures.
(7) Basket transfer Y Special rules in place.

or Frog
Restricted
operations/events
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Limited numbers involved.
SBV close standby cover

should be available for each
transfer.
(8) SBV sinks N PFEER does not apply to

SBV itself.
Self-rescuing with
independent lifeboat
subject to marine transport
requirements.
(9) FRC event Y PFEER does not apply to

SBV but second FRC
should ensure GPOR.
(10) Lifeboat launch N Lifeboats well maintained Y Ensure that this is noted on
failure – 70 PIW to manufacturer’s the platform PFEER Reg 5
requirements. assessment.

2 Evaluate the Overall Survival Times for All Personnel

Involved in Such Events
BP has developed generic guidance which all Business Units (BUs) must use to meet
the requirements of this document. This guidance and full explanatory text is contained
in Addendum 2.
Based on Table 1, use the survival time guidance in Addendum 2 to decide on the likely
minimum survival time to use in assessing survival prospects for the escaping people.
3 Evaluate the Overall Response Time for the Recovery

or Rescue of All Personnel Involved in Such Events
Uncontrolled
The key features of assessing the response time of rescue and recovery arrangements
is the use of realistic estimates of the time necessary to perform all the required tasks,
from raising an alarm to arrival at a place of safety, under the worst weather conditions
in which it is intended to operate these arrangements.
The most onerous rescue and recovery operations will be those intended to respond to
events that lead to individuals directly entering the sea in large numbers, and/or in
adverse weather conditions. The speed and manoeuvrability of seaborne resources
decrease significantly as the weather and seastate worsen. Estimates of response and
recovery time should therefore take account of this impaired performance at the
extreme of the weather window in which such events are considered reasonably
foreseeable.
Events that can result in personnel entering the sea in these poor conditions will be
difficult to manage, both from the point of view of increased response, location and
recovery times, and reduced survival time. There should be a margin between the
recovery and survival time, to give confidence that the effects of uncertainty will not
invalidate the conclusion that a good prospect of recovery is being provided.
The survival time guidance given in Addendum 2, and the requirements of the
Performance Standards given in Paragraph 6 of this document, gives this confidence for
survival time. To give confidence in recovery times, standard BP data (derived from
actual trials) is available via the BP Marine department.
Although the time taken to perform all the tasks in the operation should be considered,
the two main contributors to the response time, particularly in severe weather, will be:
• The time to get the resources to the scene
• The time taken to locate and recover all the personnel involved to a place of safety
To ensure consistency across BUs, an example of factors that should be considered
relevant, and the assumptions made concerning the use of present procedures, training
and hardware are considered in the illustration below. It is considered that the factors
used would be presented in the Installation PFEER Regulation 17 assumptions.

4 Select the Means for Recovery and Rescue that will

Satisfy the Performance Standards
The selection process must consider the relative merits of alternative recovery and
rescue arrangements. Due account must be taken of the risks faced by personnel once
they have entered the sea, and the need to avoid undue risks to those carrying out the
recovery and rescue operation. In some cases it may be appropriate to make
arrangements with third party or public sector organisations to provide recovery and
rescue arrangements, eg Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft.
Arrangements for recovery and rescue must be selected to meet the policy specified in
Paragraph 5 of this document, and satisfy the Performance Standards described in
Paragraph 6. Traditionally a standby vessel has been provided for recovery and rescue
operations, and in some circumstances this may be the only effective arrangement. It is
permissible for a standby vessel to be shared between Installations, providing this does
Uncontrolled
not compromise the objective of a good prospect of recovery and rescue, ie that the
specified Performance Standards for each incident type can be met.
In some cases where a standby vessel is shared between Installations, a more robust
rescue boat that can operate for longer periods remote from the standby vessel is
specified to provide close standby cover for over-the-side working. This is referred to as
‘mother/daughter’ concept.
Standby vessel/Installation maximum separation distances are controlled by the
Performance Standards. Time has to be allowed for the rescue boat to transit to the
rescue site and to locate and rescue each casualty. For helicopter ditch/crash, this time
allowance is dependent on the prevailing environmental conditions, seastate, visibility,
wind in relationship to the capability (speed, manoeuvrability, level of equipment) of the
rescue vessel. For Installation escapes, this time allowance is dependent on the time
between the event that leads to an Installation escape and the actual escape, and the
prevailing environmental conditions, seastate, visibility, wind in relationship to the
capability (speed, manoeuvrability, level of equipment) of the rescue vessel.
5 Where Necessary, Define

Supporting Operational Restrictions
The PFEER ACoP recognises that in severe weather conditions a good prospect of
recovery cannot be assured. Restrictions therefore have to be placed on certain activities
in order to avoid or reduce the likelihood of a reasonably foreseeable event occurring.
This applies to both flying and Installation operations.
BP guidance in respect of adverse weather and its effect on a good prospect of recovery
is as follows:
• Routine overside working can proceed up to about 3m Significant Wave Height (SWH)
where the wave period is less than 7 seconds, and up to about 4m SWH if the wave
period is more than 7 seconds
• Helicopter operations can proceed up to about 4m SWH where the wave period is
less than 7 seconds, and up to about 5.5m SWH where it is more than 7 seconds
(where rescue and recovery relies on an FRC)

Where a mechanical recovery system (or similar) is fitted to the Standby Vessel (SBV),
helicopter operations can proceed up to a SWH of about 5.5m where the wave period is
less than 7 seconds, and up to about 7m SWH where the wave period is more than
7 seconds. This does not apply to BP SNS operations as the maximum SWH
encountered is 5.5m SWH (refer to TIAP 06:01).
The Flying Decision Tree shown in Figure 2 is included as an example flowchart for
helicopter operations. The Operational Restrictions diagram shown in Figure 3 serves a
similar purpose.
However, it has been recognised that significant wave height solely is a crude measure
on which to base flying and operational decisions. Operational decisions such as
helicopter operations, over-the-side work and ultimately Installation operations (where
these may affect risk of an Installation event requiring Installation evacuation and
escape), must be made by the OIM in consultation with the SBV Master, taking into
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account prevailing weather conditions and seastate, and their effect on the vessel’s
capabilities.
For rescue vessel sharing arrangements, there will be a limit on the distance a rescue
vessel may be from an Installation in varying weather conditions and locations
(upwind/downwind for example). If this distance is exceeded, then a good prospect of
recovery cannot be provided. These distances, based on expected rescue vessel
performance, would be noted in the SBV sharing documentation.
6 Integrate the Recovery and Rescue

Arrangements within the Installation
EERA and Summarise in the Safety Case
No additional comments for this paragraph.
7 Implement, Monitor and Record

Performance as Appropriate
Monitoring and recording of performance against the requirements of this document are
essential for BUs to be able to demonstrate compliance. Information regarding
performance of the rescue and recovery arrangements, weather and seastate, and
decision processes should be recorded for rescue and recovery trials and exercises,
actual rescue and recovery incidents, and all restricted operational and flying decisions.
The guidance contained in Addendum 4 should be used as the reference for trial data
recording and application.

INCIDENT
TIME TO DETECT
DETECTED
PLATFORM(S) SBV BOTH
COMMUNICATE TIME TO REACT
NOTHING
WHAT DOING? MOVE TO EVENT

Uncontrolled
CLOSE S/B CARGO DUTIES TANKER DUTIES

TRAVEL TIME
DISTANCE TRAVEL TO SURVIVORS

AND LOCATE FIRST
SPEED
WEATHER/TIDE
VISIBILITY PICKUP TIME

FRC SBV
LOCATION AIDS
HOW MANY IN SEA? PICK UP LAST

SURVIVOR
HELICOPTER PLATFORM SBV SCOOP EXTRA TIME
ALL IN A PLACE
EASE OF RECOVERY All on SBV
OF SAFETY
INTO FRC INTO SBV SAR?
ARRANGEMENTS
TO HOSPITAL ETC
PESSIMISTIC
VERIFICATION
VIEW
BP DATA
UKCSEM003_001.ai
Figure 1 Overall Recovery Time

Toolbox Decision Chart Circumstances
Flight with 2 to 20 people in

helicopter, either due to take
off for Installation, or en route
CIRCUMSTANCES
to Installation. Decision chart
does not apply to emergency
risk to life flights.
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Is the weather adverse
NO IS with regard to a ‘good
GOOD PROSPECT CHART
WEATHER prospect of recovery’?
GENERIC
ADVERSE? Use the ‘Good Prospect
Chart’ to assess this.
FLY
YES
Ask SBV Master, ‘Can he

SBV CAPABILITIES YES CAN launch in an emergency?’.
BUSINESS UNIT SPECIFIC SBV LAUNCH (Accounts for Business Unit-
FRC/DC? specific SBV specification and
capabilities.)
FLY
NO
CAN Ask SBV Master, ‘Can he

MECHANICAL RESCUE YES SBV USE use scoop in an emergency?’.
DEVICE DACON (Accounts for Business Unit-
BUSINESS UNIT SPECIFIC SCOOP? specific SBV specification and
capabilities).
FLY
NO
DON’T FLY
RECORD INFORMATION!!
UKCSEM003_002.ai
Figure 2 Flying Decision Tree

Foggy
Flying restricted due to visibility.
Overside work suspended.
FORCE SPEED S WAVE

Uncontrolled
BEAUFORT IN Kts HEIGHT IN m

Calm/no wind.
0 nil nil Restrict work in poorly ventilated process areas.
1 1 to 3 0.1 Flying restricted to CAA criteria.
2 4 to 6 0.2
3 7 to 10 0.6 3.5m SWH.
4 11 to 16 1.0 Limit of overside work due to wave/wind.
When dark – overside work suspended.
5 17 to 21 2.0
6 22 to 27 3.0
7 28 to 33 4.0
8 34 to 40 5.5 Limit of FRC launch capability in an emergency.
9 41 to 47 7.0
10 48 to 55 9.0
11 56 to 63 11.5 Limit of GPOR in winter with scoop (7 to 8m SWH).
Two hours survival time for helicopter passengers
12 64+ 14.0
in winter conditions.
Lifeboats launch may be unsuccessful.

Helideck closes at 60 knots.
Define measures to be taken to reduce
likelihood of an event which requires
evacuation, escape and rescue.
UKCSEM003_003.ai
Figure 3 Operational Restrictions (Example)

Addendum 4
Recovery Time Trials Verification
Paragraph Page
1 General 1
2 Seacroft Extrapolation Model 1

2.1 Introduction 1
2.2 Extrapolation 2
Uncontrolled
2.3 Explanation of Formulae 3

2.4 Sequence of Events using FRC/DC 4
2.5 FRC/DC Model 4
2.6 Mechanical Recovery Model 9
Table
1 Data Ranges 3
2 Sequence of Events using Fast Rescue Craft/Daughter Craft 5
3 Sequence of Events using Mechanical Recovery Systems 9
Figure
1 Seacroft Extrapolation Model 11

1 General
In 1999, concerns were expressed at the ways by which Business Units (BUs)
extrapolated their Standby Vessel (SBV) trials data to justify continued working at higher
seastates.
The Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) Team has
sourced an Excel based model, marketed by Seacroft Marine, which has been derived
from the earlier Shell model. Trial data have been run for West of Shetland BUs which
have provided good validation of their data. Recently one customer of Seacroft ran a
Dacon scoop trial at 6.8m SWH, which was entered into their model and agreed with the
previous extrapolated results.
The model is now available to all BP BUs to use as the means of trial extrapolation.
Uncontrolled
All trials for extrapolation should use the Seacroft proforma that has been supplied to
BU Marine Representatives. Formal trials should be carried out on a regular basis to
ensure that the competency and performance of the crews and equipment are
satisfactory. For guidance it should be pointed out that the SBV crews follow a rigorous
training programme produced and co-ordinated by the Offshore Petroleum Industry
Training Organisation (OPITO). Accordingly, trials at periods of 6 months are not
considered unreasonable, and should be sufficient to satisfy BUs that the SBV can
maintain its Performance Standards.
All requests for extrapolation should be routed through Hamish MacCowan at
Promarine Ltd, Ocean Spirit House, 33 Waterloo Quay, Aberdeen, AB11 5BS, telephone
01224 211176.
For those BUs which have used the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
(UKOOA) SBV guidelines proforma for trials recording, it may be possible to reformat
these for use by Seacroft to extrapolate previous trials. The model can be used to
extrapolate for various numbers of survivors and Performance Standards.
A summary of the basic model is provided in the following paragraphs.
2 Seacroft Extrapolation Model

2.1 Introduction
There are essentially two basic types of extrapolation models. The first extrapolates
input data to attain the boundary rescue times for exercises involving rescue craft, both
Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) and Daughter Craft (DC), at seastates circa 5.5m Significant
Wave Height (SWH).
The second ascertains the relevant data for rescuing personnel from the water using
mechanical recovery systems up to the higher seastate boundary of 7 to 8m SWH.
These two models also incorporate different scenarios. In the case of the mechanical
recovery system, the model has been subdivided in respect to area (refer to Figure 1).

In the case of rescue craft, the model covers a multitude of different possible scenarios,
as denoted overleaf, using either dedicated FRC, DC or a combination of both. However,
the extrapolation methodology is fundamentally similar.
The scenarios and subdivisions are illustrated in Figure 1.
All of the models have a dual benefit. They firstly determine whether SBV/FRC/DC test
results using mannequins at lower seastates can conform to Duty Holders’ Performance
Standards at the boundary seastates of 5.5m and 7 to 8m SWH.
Secondly, the input values of rescue craft speed and distance from the scene of the
incident can be inserted following extrapolation at the upper seastates, which allows
Duty Holders and Owners to ascertain whether realistic recovery and rescue
Performance Standards can be achieved for various field configurations. This benefit is
particularly useful for Duty Holders and Owners providing a recovery and rescue service
at multiplatform fields.
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Additionally, the model lends itself to establishing type and size of SBVs to meet
Performance Standards on specific locations.
This can be achieved in two ways, firstly by extrapolating existing trial data and inserting
various values with regard to Persons In Water (PIW), vessel transit speeds and
distances to establish realistic Performance Standard values at the upper seastates, in
accordance with Duty Holders’ criteria.
Conversely, as conducted by one SBV Operator, the vessel conducts a series of trials
involving both rescue craft and mechanical recovery systems at various distances.
Following the trials the data is extrapolated to the upper seastates, which establishes
the maximum distance the vessel could be located from a potential ‘incident area’, and
still able to demonstrate the vessel’s ability to meet Duty Holders’ Recovery and Rescue
Performance Standards.
The advantage of this method is that in the event of the vessel being considered for
‘charter’ by a Duty Holder or Owner, the SBV Operator can formally verify that all
relevant trials have been co-ordinated and extrapolated through a ‘Third Party’, namely
Seacroft Marine Consultants Ltd. This method would also allow the Third Party to
conduct an audit on the SBV to ascertain that all the recovery and rescue equipment was
installed, such that effective use at the upper seastates was a realistic option.
The extrapolation models are ‘live’ models and will be continually updated with trial data.
Care must be taken to input this data into the relevant extrapolation models, ie
mechanical means is area specific.
It should also be mentioned that the data inserted into the models should be accurately
and consistently recorded otherwise the model is worthless, ie ‘rubbish in, rubbish out’.
2.2 Extrapolation
As mentioned previously, there are two main types of models, namely that for FRC/DC
and mechanical recovery systems. The methodology of both extrapolation models
however works in a similar way to achieve the rescue times at the ‘boundary’ seastates.

As it is not possible to gather trial data at the upper seastates, the methodology behind
the extrapolation models is to accumulate data at the acceptable seastates when trials
can be conducted, then group them into data ranges (eg 1 to 2m SWH). By categorising
the data, it is possible to average the required parameters (eg speeds, pickup times etc),
and identify how the rescue crews perform within this data range. Then by relating their
performance at the separate data ranges, it is possible to extrapolate the times up to
the upper seastates. The data ranges for the two main types of models are shown
in Table 1.
Main Type of Model Significant Wave Height (m)

Lowest Medium Highest
FRC/DC <1 1 to 2 2 to 3.5
Uncontrolled
Mechanical means < 1.99 2 to 3.49 > 3.5
Table 1 Data Ranges
It is clear that the data ranges for the FRC/DC differ from that utilised for the mechanical
means. The reason for the distinction is because the mechanical means can be tested in
higher seastates. The maximum seastate for trials requiring deployment of FRC/DC has
been, historically, circa 3.5m SWH, although some Duty Holders may reduce this figure
to circa 2 to 3m.
The database, as it currently stands, has rescue data up to 5.5m SWH when using the
mechanical means.
2.3 Explanation of Formulae

This paragraph has been inserted to give an overview of the formulae used in the model;
this is to give the Duty Holders a better understanding of the theory behind the
extrapolation models.
Following an ‘alarm’, the model for the FRC/DC follows a different sequence of
events to that of the mechanical recovery systems. However, the equations used to
extrapolate upwards to the boundary seastates are ‘theoretically identical’ between the
two main models.
The differences between the individual scenarios within the two main models are
dependent purely on the input data rather than formulae.
Therefore to explain the formulae, tables have been developed classifying the sequence
of events during the incident, with an explanation of how the formulae calculate the
times at the boundary seastates. This is done on a model-by-model basis, ie the FRC/DC
and mechanical means of rescue and recovery models.

2.4 Sequence of Events using FRC/DC

Table 2 categorises the sequence of events that occur during an incident using FRC/DC,
with written clarification on those events. Additionally, the table denotes an explanation
on how the extrapolation calculation is made, as well as providing some rationalisation
regarding some common misperceptions.
Table 3 categorises the sequence of events that occur during an incident using
mechanical recovery systems of rescue. It will be observed that the extrapolation
instrument is identical in both models, therefore to avoid repetition the explanations
applicable in Table 2 are also used in Table 3.
The events in both Tables 2 and 3 that require a value to be inserted into the model are
shown in blue font, whereas the black font represents an event that is calculated from
the input values.
Uncontrolled
Seacroft Marine Consultants are required to input values where a red ‘input here’ quote
is in the models. All other remaining cells are protected by password.
2.5 FRC/DC Model

Table 2 explains the sequence of events for the FRC/DC model and the extrapolation
instrument up to 5.5m SWH. The events that require a value to be input into the model
are shown in blue font.

Seq Sequence of Sequence Explanation Extrapolation up to 5.5m SWH

No Events Explanation
(1) Test This is the significant wave height in metres This value is required, as it provides one
significant on the day of the trial. of the key data points in the extrapolation
wave height instrument.
(2) Distance This is the distance in nautical miles from No extrapolation required as the distance
FRC/DC is where the FRC/DC originates (which could does not elongate with higher seastates.
from incident be on the SBV itself) to the scene of the However, this is one of the parameters
incident. Accommodation has been made to that can be varied to identify whether a
recognise that the FRC/DCs (up to three) particular trial could comply with Duty
could all be coming from different locations. Holders’ recovery and rescue Performance
Standards at extended distances, and assist
said Duty Holders in defining alternative
Uncontrolled
recovery and rescue services.
(3) Transit speed This is the speed of the SBV in knots that is This equation is typical to the extrapolation
of SBV only relevant for Sequence Nos 13 and 14 of the lower seastate times up to the
below. Speed of SBV is another parameter, boundary times. Therefore this explanation,
which can be varied to identify whether to avoid repetition later, is referred to as
a particular trial could comply with the ‘Explanation 1’.
Performance Standards if the vessels are
Explanation 1: Because there are three
travelling at different speeds. Consequently
data ranges in all the extrapolation models
the model lends itself to establishing type
(FRC/DC or mechanical means) below
and size of SBVs to meet Performance
the boundary seastate, a total of two
Standards on specific locations.
relationships can be ascertained; the
lowest compared with the medium and
the medium compared with the highest.
If speed is the parameter requiring
extrapolation, as in this sequence (No 3),
then the formulae explanation is as follows;
firstly the difference between the speed at
the lowest data range from the medium,
divided by the significant seastate within
those two data ranges. This is then
averaged, with the difference between
the speed at the medium data range from
the highest divided by the significant
seastate within those two data ranges.
This calculates an average drop of speed
per metre seastate rise, based on two
relationships amongst three data ranges.
Table 2 Sequence of Events using Fast Rescue Craft/Daughter Craft


The difference between the boundary

seastate (in SWH) and the test seastate is
calculated, which is then multiplied by the
average drop of speed per metre to get a
total extrapolated speed drop between the
test seastate and the upper seastate, as
stated in the Performance Standards. This
is finally subtracted from the input speed
provided in the trial.
(4) Transit As for Sequence No 3, these are the These speeds are extrapolated in an
speeds of respective mean speeds of the FRC and DC identical fashion to Explanation 1.
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FRC/DC during the trial, in knots.
(5) Time to alarm This is the time in minutes that it takes the This time is extrapolated in an identical way
crew onboard the SBV to mobilise from an to Explanation 1. A warning should be
alarm being raised. raised here and called Explanation 2.
Explanation 2: This is a warning to

illustrate a common misconception that
in an ‘extrapolation model’, speed of
rescue craft should reduce with increased
seastates, and time to pick up casualties
from the water should increase with
increased seastates. This is on the whole
true, however this argument tends to filter
through to all the parameters such as ‘time
to alarm’. This may very well be the case,
but time to alarm is not dependent on
seastate, therefore if the trial results
illustrate a drop in time to react to an alarm
in higher seastates, then the extrapolation
model will show a reduced time at the
boundary seastate than in the trial input
data, even though the seastate could be
far lower. This is not an anomaly in the
extrapolation model, as the parameter is
independent of seastate. This could record
false readings if the drop is extreme, and
result in negative numbers at the boundary
seastate. This has been considered and
counteracted by inputting some logic to
default any negative times to zero.
Table 2 Sequence of Events using Fast Rescue Craft/Daughter Craft (cont’d)


(6) Launch times This is the time it takes to launch the FRC or Again, extrapolated in the same fashion as
DC from the SBV, in minutes. If the craft is Explanation 1. This is another parameter
already in the water, then the launch time is that could be subject to Explanation 2
zero. above.
(7) Transit The transit time of the FRC or DC is simply There is no need to extrapolate this
FRC/DC the distance the craft has to travel divided by value as the contents of the equation
its speed, after it has been deployed from (ie distance/speed) has already been
the SBV. extrapolated earlier in Sequence No 4
(distance is not extrapolated).
(8) FRC/DC on This parameter calculates the total time up to As the relevant values were extrapolated
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location this point in the incident, by adding Sequence earlier (ie Sequence Nos 4, 5 and 6), these
Nos 5, 6 and 7. values are added as for the trial’s input
values.
(9) Time taken The time is calculated by recording the total Again, this is extrapolated upwards using
per survivor time to recover all the mannequins, divided Explanation 1.
by the number of trial mannequins. Therefore
this variable is input as minutes per person.
(10) Number of The Performance Standard will dictate Performance Standards generally equate to
survivors per number of PIW, circa 20/30, rescued within 20 PIW with some Duty Holders at 30 PIW.
rescue craft 2 hours. The user will distribute the 20/30
amongst the rescue craft.
(11) Pick up This is simply the multiplication of Sequence As Sequence No 9 is already extrapolated,
survivors Nos 9 and 10. the calculation remains at Sequence No 9 x
No 10.
(12) Total time to This parameter calculates the total time up to As the relevant values were extrapolated
pick up this point in the incident, by adding Sequence earlier, these values are added as for the
survivors Nos 8 and 11. trial’s input values.
(13) Transit of This is the transit time of the SBV from its As the relevant speed was extrapolated
SBV original start point to the place of incident. earlier (in Sequence No 3), no extrapolation
This value is used in Sequence No 14 below. is required, so a simple distance/speed
equation is used.


(14) Time for Once the rescue craft have picked up all the As the relevant values were extrapolated
FRC/DC and casualties, the SBV may still be steaming to earlier (in Sequence Nos 12 and 13), no
SBV to meet the incident, hence there will be more time extrapolation is required.
required for the FRC/DC to meet the SBV.
Calculating the difference, if any, in the
values from Sequence Nos 12 and 13
identifies this time. If there is a positive
figure, this is added to the total time of
rescue and recovery of the incident. If it is
negative, the programme defaults the time
to 0 (as a negative value would reduce the
Uncontrolled
incident time, which is not possible).
(15) Time from This is the total time in minutes per person This parameter needs to be extrapolated,
alongside to taken to recover the FRC/DC and transfer and is done by using Explanation 1.
a POS the casualties into the POS reception area,
divided by the number of casualties onboard
that particular rescue craft.
(16) Recovery This is the total time taken to recover the As the relevant values were extrapolated
times FRC/DC and transfer the casualties into the earlier (in Sequence No 15), no
FRC/DC POS reception area, therefore multiply extrapolation is required.
Sequence Nos 10 by 15.
(17) Time from This is the total time taken for each rescue As the relevant values were extrapolated
alert to craft to rescue and recover their quota of earlier, no extrapolation is required.
persons mannequins from the start of the incident to
onboard the completion, therefore the addition of
Sequence Nos 12, 14 and 16.
(18) Maximum As there could be up to three rescue craft in All extrapolation has been performed by
time the water, this final cell chooses the largest this event and thus no extrapolation is
of the values from Sequence No 17, as this is required.
the total incident time.

2.6 Mechanical Recovery Model

Table 3 explains the sequence of events for the mechanical recovery model and the
extrapolation instrument up to 7 to 8m SWH. The events that require a value to be
inserted into the model are shown in blue font.
Seq Sequence of Sequence Explanation Extrapolation up to 7/8m SWH

(1) Test This is the significant wave height in This value is required, as it provides
significant metres at the time of the trial. one of the key data points in the
wave height extrapolation exercise (refer to
Explanation 1 in Table 2).
(2) Distance SBV This is the distance in nautical miles No extrapolation required as the
Uncontrolled
is from from where the SBV originates to the distance does not elongate with
incident scene of the incident. higher seastates. However, this is one
of the parameters that can be varied to
identify whether a particular trial could
comply with Duty Holders’ recovery
and rescue Performance Standards at
extended distances, and assist said
Duty Holders in defining alternative
recovery and rescue services.
(3) Transit speed This is the speed of the SBV, in knots. Speed of SBV is another parameter
of SBV Comply with the Performance which can be varied to identify whether
Standards if the vessels are travelling a particular trial could comply with the
at different speeds. Consequently the Performance Standards if the vessels
model lends itself to establishing type are travelling at slower speeds.
and size of SBVs to meet Performance Therefore, the model lends itself to
Standards on specific locations. establishing type and size of SBVs
to meet Performance Standards on
specific locations.
This speed is extrapolated in an
identical way to Explanation 1 – refer to
Table 2.
(4) Time to alarm This is the time, in minutes, it takes the This time is extrapolated in an identical
crew onboard the SBV to mobilise from way to Explanation 1 – refer to Table 2.
an alarm being raised. This is a parameter that could be
subject to Explanation 2 – refer to
Table 2.
(5) Transit SBV The transit time of the SBV is the There is no need to extrapolate this
distance the SBV has to travel, divided value as the contents of the equation
by its speed. (ie distance/speed) have already been
extrapolated earlier in Sequence No 3
(distance is not extrapolated).
(6) Transit SBV This parameter calculates the total time As the relevant values were
to area up to this point in the incident, by extrapolated earlier (ie Sequence Nos 3
adding Sequence Nos 4 and 5. and 4), these values are added as for
the trial’s input values.
Table 3 Sequence of Events using Mechanical Recovery Systems

Seq Sequence of Sequence Explanation Extrapolation up to 7/8m SWH

(7) Time to This is the time, in minutes, it takes Again, this is extrapolated upwards
manoeuvre for the SBV to get alongside the first using Explanation 1 – refer to Table 2.
including casualty from the time it arrived on the
search scene.
(8) Time to The time is calculated by recording the Again, this is extrapolated upwards
recover each total time to recover all the mannequins, using Explanation 1 – refer to Table 2.
survivor from the time alongside the first
casualty, divided by the number of trial
mannequins. Therefore this variable is
input as minutes per person.
(9) Time to This parameter calculates the total time As the relevant values were
recover 20 to rescue 20 casualties, ie multiply extrapolated earlier in Sequence No 8,
Uncontrolled
survivors Sequence No 8 by 20. there is no need to extrapolate further.
(10) Time since This is the total time for the incident All extrapolation has been performed by
alarm to from the alarm, ie the addition of this event, and thus no extrapolation is
recovery of Sequence Nos 6, 7 and 9. required.
20 people
Table 3 Sequence of Events using Mechanical Recovery Systems (cont’d)
Recovery trials were conducted during 1997 to provide baseline verification data for BUs
in assessing adequacy of their rescue and recovery arrangements, and as a guide to
completion of BU specific trials that may be required. The full report of these trials is
available from the BP UK Operations Logistics Department. Additional trials have been
carried out in the Southern North Sea and these are referred to in SNS TIAP 061.

Uncontrolled
R&R 3 to 4 MEN, ie CLOSE STANDBY
USE OF UP TO 3 RESCUE CRAFT FROM R&R
FRCD/DC MODEL circa 5.5 SWH 1 to 2 FRC AND 1 DC TO BE DEPLOYED FROM SBV
2 DCs AND 1 FRC TO BE DEPLOYED FROM SBV

2 DCs IN THE WATER AND 1 FRC TO BE DEPLOYED
NORTHERN AND CENTRAL NORTH SEA
MECHANICAL RECOVERY SYSTEM circa 7 to 8m SWH WEST OF SHETLAND
SOUTHERN NORTH SEA
UKCSEM003_004.ai
Figure 1 Seacroft Extrapolation Model


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Recovery and Rescue Provision for Offshore Installations UKCS-EM-003

Authorisation for Issue

July 2001 Issue 1 i/ii

Authorisation for Issue

Position: Senior Marine Consultant

Position: SNS(N) Safety Leader

July 2001 Issue 1 iii/iv

For Audit Use

July 2001 Issue 1 v/vi

Issue No Date Description

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 vii/viii

Holders of Controlled Hard Copy

Copy Copyholder Location

01 Data Control Centre (DCC) ODL, Aberdeen

01 Document Issue Authority (Brian Turnbull)

March 2002 Issue 1/AM01 ix/x

Review and Update

July 2001 Issue 1 xi/xii

ACoP Approved Code of Practice

EER Evacuation, Escape and Rescue

July 2001 Issue 1 xiii/xiv

July 2001 Issue 1 1

3.2 Rescue and Recovery Provider

Abandonment The act of all personnel leaving an Installation in an emergency.

2 July 2001 Issue 1

6.1 Man Overboard

6.1.2 Performance Standard

July 2001 Issue 1 3

6.2 Helicopter Ditching/Crash

6.2.2 Performance Standard

4 July 2001 Issue 1

6.3 Installation Escape

6.3.2 Performance Standard

July 2001 Issue 1 5

6 July 2001 Issue 1

Survival Time Guidance

In 1997 BP sponsored an independent review (Addendum 1 Ref 4) of research into

Survival Time Guidance

Survival Time Guidance

Clothing (Worn Beaufort Wind Survival Time

Working clothes (no 0 to 2 < 45 minutes < 75 minutes

Survival Time Guidance

2.1 Scenarios to be Addressed

Survival Time Guidance

Survival Time Guidance

1 Identify the Reasonably Foreseeable Events that

2 Evaluate the Overall Survival Times for All

3 Evaluate the Overall Response Time for the Recovery

4 Select the Means for Recovery and Rescue that will

5 Where Necessary, Define Supporting

6 Integrate the Recovery and Rescue Arrangements within

7 Implement, Monitor and Record

1 Reasonably Foreseeable Events 2

1 Overall Recovery Time 9

Guidance on Selection of Arrangements

1 Identify the Reasonably Foreseeable Events that could

an Installation. Random man overboard is such an event. However, if sufficient steps

Guidance on Selection of Arrangements

Event Reasonably Reasoning/Back-up/ Platform Guidance

(2a) Loss of Y/N Platform specific, based on Y Platform specific depends