Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4 ANALYSIS OF THE KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 HEARING avorn ram SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS on nun COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY.SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ‘TESTIMONY OF DR. STEVAN 7, POSSONY SUNT 36, 1061 Peinted for the uso of the Comaalttee on the Judielery & Bs, GoWMNMENT DRIVEN OFPIEH mae WasnINaToM : 1961 Approved For Release 20037 fi04 “CIA RDPS7 BanE@BRQOUSOOZODOSEta™Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : i A-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY {TAUES 0, EASTLAND, Mlantetyy, Chatman {ETN KUPAUVER, Ten eee ALICCANDER WILEY, W Guux'b. JorssTow Seth Cerone RVBERTT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Tne Sony f, MeCLRDLAN, sekansee ROWAN Le IRUSKS, Nebrassa ‘ae. ERVIN, Jy Mone) Carlfon DNNETD, KEATING, Now York JOM 3, CARNOLE, Col:eaao NOMEIS COTTON, New Hsgsbire UOMAS I. DODD, Cone etleot PuUde s, ALT Mclean ROWARD ¥. LONG, Msroue Sonconsnrren Te Luvesvtoate rin, ADMENESTRATION ov 118 INTERNAL. ‘Souusree Act amp Orta IRHras At Secuasyy Laws {LAMBS 0, BASTLAND, Mtactol, Ohetrtem ‘THOMAS J. DODD, Connectcst, Vee Oheirmon LAND. JOMNSTON, oth Cerda ROMAN b. TURUSIA, Nebrarkn SOUS 1, MCCLELLAN, Jbanexs [VERICE MeKIVIAY DIXSEN, Mints Banta HIeVIN, de, Nor Croton [RENNUGI B, KEATING, New York [NORRIS COTTON, New Tampatire 4. 6, Soonmane, Couneet, ssrvsanta Masa Director of Becearoh Approved For Release 2003/11/04 /A-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4Approved For Release 2003/1 1/0: Approved For Release 2003/1 1/0: IA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4 ANALYSIS OF THE KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1061 US. Sexarn, Suncom To Ixvasniaaca rua Amaxisraarion ov tum Lvrmvst, Secummrr Act anp Oxsitx Iyterxat Srourmx Laws, ortus Comanirren ox tim Jupiotany, Washington, D.O. he eubeomsnitter moby pursuant tg call at 10:48 am, i room 2228, New Senato Oifee Building, Senator Kenneth 2, Keating presiding. ‘Also Present: J G. Sourwing, chit eounsel; Benjamin Mandel, research dizectors Frank Schroeder, chicf investigator. Sonator Kuaruxo. ‘The subcommittee will come to order. ,, Our witness this moming is Dr, Stotan T. Possony, professor of international politics in the Graduate School of Georgetown Univer: sity, and also associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Uni= versity of Pennsylvania, Dr Poesony, will you rise and raise your right hand Do you solemnly Swear the evidence you give in this proceeding ill be the tuth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you Go Mr. Possowr. I do. ‘TESTIMONY OF DR. STEFAN 1. POSSONY Senator Kxarnea, Dr, Possony, have you made a study of Premier Rhrushchoy’s speach of lat Jamiany with regard to certain features ‘which this committee desired you to investigate ‘Mr. Possoxr. Yes. Senator Krarxe, Cnn you tall us somet background? Me, Powowr. I am profesor of tntemationa polities, Graduate School of Georgetown University. have heen a student of strategy, military affairs, and communisn for some 20 years or more, and 1 follow Communist strategy with a gront deal of attention. T have, published » book on Communist stratougy and’ tacties and. tho techniques of what T call conflict management, going back to Marx. and through the whole history of communism up to the Tato 10400 and early 1950's. This hook isquiteold by now. Sinco thon I have always tried to keep up to date with changes in Communist strategy. Recantly T connthoted a boake suggesting 2 “Porward Séralegy for America.” 1 CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4 : 2 KHRUSHCHEY SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 Senator Knirtxa. In connection with this study of the January 6, 4061, speech, somo of the items which this committee asked you to Snvestigate wore crosen to give us a cloar idea of how Premier Khrushchev used lenguage connoting one thing to people of the freo ‘countries snd another to people in countries to whom he was speak- ings Tanguage vometimes known, I believe, as the Aesopian iangusge. fo would like ta know what his real attitude is toward the. ques- tion of disurmameat; whether he really believes in the possibility of peaceful coexist ance, and. why he raises this issue; what types of rat does Mx. Khrushchev believe to bo necessary, does he believe Jn the pomibilty, of using ‘parliamentary institutions for revolu- tionary purposes; “ias he relinquished the iso of uprisings for Jutionary purposes; what is tho key to Mr. Khrushehev’s strates in undosdeveloped areas, and what is Mr. Khrushchev’s timetable for world conquest, We shall look for answers in the presentation you ‘have prepared forts. Mr. Possony. Yes, sir. Senator Krcrmxc. And perhaps others. ‘Mr. Possony. I} avea prepared statement. Senator Kxarry3, Would y ‘ment at this time? ‘ ‘Mir. Sounwine. Mr. Chairman, might I ask just one question? Senator Krarmnc. Yes. | fir. Sounwne. I notice you have titled this presentation, “Khruchchev’s Men Kampf.” " Why? Mr, Possowy, Well, I want to say, Mr. Sourwine, that T did not chooco this title as.a cheap trick to dramatize this analysis. I want to express my ‘hrm ’convietion that the parallels between Kirushehoy fand Titler are beeoming very clear indeed. ‘Tn the specific cuse of this January 6 specch, T would like to point out that Khrushchev made a programmatic snouncement on Com- munist strategy. "This strategy, in my estimation, will remain in foros for the next is ot longer. Ilitler wrote down Mein Kampf ‘and laid down for the rest of the world to read what he was: intendin; to do once he hal come to power. Both the January speech an ‘Mein Kampf are public announcements of strategie Satentions, However, the petallel is really more significant. “T think there are, jn addition to this programmatic comparison, other similarities which must be romemberece First, Titler wos a man who thought that destiny had chosen him ‘asa charismatic Kader and that he was going to be the greatest man who ever lived in history. For example, he mado statement, “Providence predistined me to be the grontest liberator of mankind.” Think you wil find many parallels in Khrushchev's spooch. ‘May I call your attention to one passage where Khrushchev says that, “Heretofore history has worked, for socialisms henceforth s0- cinlism, ig going to. work for history,” which is just about as much ‘of a hybris, as the Grecks called it, as Hitler's ravings, “Another idea is that predestination plays a great role. ‘Tho Com- manists believe in the predetermination of the course of history. There is no quect‘on in Queir minds fhat communism is going to, win Approved For Release 2003 4/02: OM RORST BUSA ssROOSOUZONISE UFnsing sbout ‘communism, i your prepared state-Approved For Release 2003/1 1/4.;,GIARDRESZR04A6 RAADEA0200056-4 3 Equally, Witler had no doubt that nazism was going to win snd dunt he wes to bo the instrument of vietory. ‘For example, he laid down this sentence am walking, with the assurance ofa slecpwalker, the roed whieh providence za asd te 1 Bo. Now, Hitler was porhaps more honest by calling his paetionlar “proridoncs” the assurance of a sleepwalker, while Khirushehey do- rived his assurance from Mars, Engels, and Lenin, and the Com- nist: doctrine. ‘Ty bath instances, these mon had the same arrogances both 05. gumed they knew what “history” is planning—and that it 3s planning tosatisfy thei hopes and desites, | z Me, Sounwasn Both regarded themselves, and Khrushchev now regards himself, as a judye of history. ir, Possowy, ‘These men arrogate to themselves the power of creator. As to tho next point, both have the same notion as to who for what pushes history. In Khrushchev’s specch, while he makes fll Kinds Of qualifications on the so-called “cul€ of violence,” nevertho- {ess ho says very clearly, and saye this ropoatedly, that if the Western ‘world dovg not surrender, he is going to force their surrender. “In ‘other words, he is upholding the idex that force and violence are the decisive elements in history, subject to a few qualifications. “Exactly ihe samo theory was presented by Hitler, who asserted that violence is the “motor of history.” ‘The Mitlerian “motor of history” is just another expression for Lenin's “locomotive of history.” “Dho parallel hors is not just o superficial one, ATL aggressors in history were worshippers of force, Me Sounwrse, 1s there also, Professor, a parallel in the fact that Hitler's “Mein Kamp?” was not given proper recognition; it was not understood for what it was that is, an actual blueprint of what he jntended? Is there somo of this also with regard to Khrushchev's spose a tessa eidoney on the par of peopl a te fap work not to give it suificient credence; not to understand the seriousness of it and what ho intends Mi. Possonr. That is very true, Howover, it was easior to read “Mein Kampf," one single book which, together with a few subsequent books, explained nazism. In the ease of the Communists, thero is an avalanche of information, Practically every, week Communists re- ‘teto their goals and policies and, of course it is very hurd to keep up : ‘with all the litele nnamoes ‘In fact, many people accuse me of being ierational because T an sponding, moct Gf may time reading this Communist material. T must ‘tnt it is entirely irrational—and boring, Tt is move rational {9 do something els: go fing or swimming, oF road satisfying literature. ‘Tho fundamental dificulty is that you have to rend Communist pro- nouncemonts and writings very earsfully. Tt ig not good, enough to pores them suparciallys Uf you da you will rmisinterprot and draw Iso conclusions--usually in’ the dizection of overestimating U.S. seourity and underestimating Communist singleness of purpos9. Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4Approved For Release 2003/11/04: ClA-RDP7B00446R000500200056-4 : ‘KERUEHCHEV SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 ‘May I, in this omnnection, refer to one incident that happened only yesteiday evening. I was driving home, and over the madio—I forget tho station—there camo a reannotmeement of the speech Khrushchev ' mado yesterday. ‘The interpretation was that the speech, by and lange, : was conciliatory sind moderate. ‘This speech was essentially inter: prgted asa peaceft] contribution, nie moc of cours, wo rnd i sighy diferenty and ary ined to intorpret the speech as an implied ultimatum, Whatever 1 new speech ray mean, our initial Ameriean reaction to Com- i suns eatements tends to bo optimists, We have an almost com- ' pulbsive beliof that the Krerolin desires peace and will, sooner or later, 1 teconsidor itsayowed intont to “bury” us. : Tet mae draw ore other parallel with Hitlor and Kbrushchoy, if I may., Tito snid thot his task consisted in exploiting the weakness of other people. 1 thinks this samo notion characterizes Khruslichev's Strategy Cody. Tis alleged or gumuine confidence that be can bring about the surrendar of the tres" world by using peweeful coexistence tactics or disarmament decoys, ploys, together with frightening proplothe oldest ick of payghoiogical warfare “ane at nothing nt the exploitation of the weaknesses of men, especially cowardice and self-deception. j ‘Mr, Sounwise, Tam sorry I interrupted yon so long, but I thinle thigis very valuable. Gosh with yar prosentation si syan the spaeh vie s. Possory, Bly purpose today is to analyze the speech which N.S. Khrushelor, on January 6, 1961, delivered fo a meeting of the pny organizations in the Highor Panty Schoo, the Acadamy of So, tial Scienoes, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee, Comm ist Party of the Soviet Union. Me. Krusheher’s speech was one of the most outspoken and sig- nificant statements by-a leading Teussian Communist in recent times, ‘Tho choice of the anidience—the party organizations entrusted with ideology, and per anps with overall strategie planning—attests to Khrushcher’s intent to make a programmatie sunouteement of great Importance. ‘Tho specch was 'vory carefully written nnd. widely discominated all oyor tho world. "The speesh Was not delivered in imi prompt Zashion yut mast havo bean ‘writen soveral weeks, before ‘delivery. Otherw oe it could not have been printed in the January iseue of World Mavaist Reviow. making this presentation, T beg your indulgence if 1 follow a soomingly clumsy drocedure. I have broken down Mr. Khrushehey’s . spoesh into moro than two dozen topieal portions. Tt is my purpose ! make a few comments on cach of these chapters and then place ths pertinent quotes behind each of my comments. I have chosen this ‘method because 1. sieve that, though it lacks stylistic grace, it may facilitate orientatizn and comprehension of Mr. Khrusicher's state- meni. Senator Kearns, Dr, Possony, one of tho great, problems which sro face hore, as ycu probably know, is the matter of time. ‘The set- ‘ng chairman, just eame froth one commnittes, has promised £0 0 Lo another at 11:80. a hare fo ution T wold i to ot aso Ne tery Approved For Release 2003/1104 "CiA-ROBE7BODMZBROOUSUD LIN IBE ove done forApproved For Release 2003/1 1/94 : ClA:RDPATROO4A6RQO0R00209955-4 5 this pretation, T willbe coraflly studied by this coramittee, and will be the subject of report af a Inter time, ‘T would ask that, if it is satisfactory to you, the entire statement too printed at this point in the record as though’ you had rood it, and thet then you answer a few questions which I would Tike to put to you. ‘Ts that satisfactory to yout Mr. Possony. Yes, Senator Kxavwxa, That will be tho order, then, of the chairman. (The full prepared statement of Mr. Posony appears at the end of his oral testimony.) ‘Senator Kearse, I want to turn, if T may, from this January 6, B81 gece which you have analyzed for us in considerable detail to 4 Mr. Khrushchev's speoch of yesterday. T realize that you probably have not had an opportunity to study it ! jn the detail with which you studiod the other one, and also you don't i hhave tho full text as yet, ¥ presume, i ‘Mr. Possoxy, This iseorreet, : Sonator Keavino. But you have had an opportunity, T assume, to exnmine at least the press necounts of this speech, “Mr. Possosy. Yes, si. Senator KrariNo, From thoso aceounts would you say that yester- day's speech logically follows the remarks delivered by Mr. Khru- shchev before the higher party school ‘Mm Possowy. Yes, sit. ctnally, there is completo consistency among the most recent pronoancements by the Communists, dating Ick to the meting of the Communit Parties in November 1960, hich look placo in Moscow, throngh Khrushchev's speech of January Which ig cetontially an interpretation of the declaration of 81 Com- munist Parties issued at the November mecting. ‘The various state- iments that have come out since that time are essentially identieal in Selon and content and merely ‘amaplify the ino formulated in fovomber. ‘Phere is one point, though, which sets this speech of yesterday, T thinks, © littlo apart from the January speech. Any time the Com- maunigte go into a negotiation or, let us sey attend & quasi-summit necting sith the West, they must explain to their own party organ, ation, foils, what dhe mane. ‘ere is the dangor that many of {ho wrlaing party mentors muy Chink Chat porhare negotiation 38 fn attempt by the Soviets to accommodate themselves with us, | Fur- thermore, there is, Tam sure, a great deal of opposition ineide the Soviet Union against “negotiations,” and more generally against the ‘arions tactics which Khrushehoy 3 employing, ; ‘VIence any time a-ctmmit conference takes place, he is compelled to at th aor sraght and notify the Cornet world movement: ‘that Communist objectives are unchanged and that the “negotiation” is merely a method to advance communisn. You may remember the fist Genova summit conference with Presi- dent Kismhower.. There was a great deal of Gxtmosphere” that the Svorld probleazs had boon solved or would be solved by mutual “good qrill” "AS soon as Khrushchev came home, he started to pour arms Into Bgypt. ‘That was a clear-cat warning to the world that nothing Approved For Reteasd GSH MA RDBRYBUORSRDUGebbddass.sF x x }7 B00446R000500200056-4 ATO Ra ee Tet nonver; that the Gremlin was going to expleit the opportunity and t that Khrashchey thought he had grined in Genova nough security that ho was able 10 warm up the Middle East. Tn the Paris coaference that followed the U-2 incident, there was no need to warm up the cold war; it was already pretty warm at that Point, i A a Tie siguiteant, therefore that after tho Paris mesting, Kheushchey ‘wont back to Mos:ow via East Berlin and there delivered 0 “c ooling ow maderatespeech, ; 7 a You remember the photographs of the meeting, the postures in ‘the hall where hy pols ‘were very violent and Madieal) almost as fiona the seizure of East Berlin was impending, But then a ‘“peaco- ful” “Khrushchev, probably to the surprise of the East Germans, calmed the situaticn down. Now in the present case, after the Vienna meeting, he apparently feels tho need to :veassure the world Communist movement that the world conquest goes on and that he went to Vienna to advances com- munism, not to seek: neeommodation, : ‘Thore is a secord point. ‘There is a new U.S. administration and he feels compelled, ‘think, to show that he is not going to be intitni- dated and that he is not particularly impressed with what the new President told hin; that, irrespective of Mr, Kennedy's warnings, he 4s going to contimio on his merry way. Furthermore, T believe that he wants to estabiish a sort of moral ascendancy over the present American adminis:ration, He wants to test our regolution, as he has fore in earlior instances, Above all, he wants to intimidate the now ers, 2 old Commo ist tik isto excut Monts of strength at the ining of a nev administration to find out. how dar they ean Onco the limit has been established, once the Kremlin thinks it has gained moral supe jority, onge it has determined what it might get in is situation, it w Il then embark on the operation of getting what it thinks is available, E | Senator Kearzwi, Is this strategy of alternately blowing hot and cold a well-known Communist strategy? Mr. Possowy. Y3s, ‘This hag beon’a standard operating procedure, really, Howover, T think it isn’t alternating; it is simultaneously growing hot and cold. ‘The very esconce of this allegedly newfangled ibtratecy of Khrushchev is that, on the one hand, he is pushing forward (with his military pressure, or concealed military pressure and, on the ‘other side, he is moving On the so-called disarmament front. Inei- ‘dentally, this procedure was formalated by Lenin about 40 years ago ‘but wo still don’t ur derstand it, f Senator Karin, In your analysis of. Mr. Khrushchev's speech ‘before the Higher Party School in January of this year, did it eome to jyou ag any: surprise that he would now issue an ultimatum as he did yesterday on Western rights in Berlin? | Mr. Possonx, No, sir. As a matter of fect, this ultimatum—or pleckmail, or bluff--was foreshadowed in the Januar: speech. Ihave ‘ome comment in ray prepared toxt.on this point, ‘Basieally, Khn- shehey is talking about the current strategic situation and comparing it with the situation preceding the two World Wars He points out Approved For Release’ 20037ff704' C1 ROWS Fet04a8 ROONSA 0200068 a mpsynlistApproved For Release 2003/11/04, ClAsRDES7BMQ4#5ROODED0200056-4 7 Approved For Releas® 20037¥1vod: Hc i@uRDPS7B00446R000: nations wer slitinta stl camps ng ecl other. Tew day. ages offerod many advantages to Communist stratogy, ineludines whet ‘he does not. mention, that Tnpera Germany helped Lenin to power: in, IOUT and that, in 1939, Stalin enablod Hitler 40 go to wat yuarnt Poland, France, and Britain, Now, Khrushchev says, the situation has changed. ‘Tho imperialists aro united, in a fashion, and this is not an advantage in Cammultice strategy. Yel Khrushehey ongues tho unity of the Westom camp ia not a perfoct unity and ean be broken, Obviously, the Commnnie ves Assumed tho task of breaking the free world liitnce aystore ‘The Berlin issue, and Gerinan rearmament ina bronder sense, aro the levers by which the Kremlin wants to unhinge Westen waite, ‘KGhnushehov is not interested in felving the Basin problem perve. He says Berlin is x bone in his thront, but he tses the Derfin issue ti eetooy NATO. Te wants to rain this bono down nid through out ronte. In the eago of Mr, Ulbricht the situation is @ littl different. Ho ‘as a specific problem in Berlin. Tf Bertin comes to him, thon bes shaky rogime is propped up. Tho peint is, though, that ther» will bo no Berlin crisis untess the Soviots desire such 9 conflict, ‘There is no current dificulty ia the Berlin status which requires a “olution.” "Berlin is an opportunity for offensive Communist action, just asin 1998, the Poligh eoredee offered an oppottanity for Noi politieal action, Sonatoe Rrarivo. Sinco ho cetaaly eanel this ultimatum on Ber. lin before tho entize Soviet population in this well prepared television address, do you feel that ho really means it this ting, or fs there a Possibility thathe isearsying on a blu? Me, Possony. I don't know the answer to this, Senator, T don't thinic he menns it to the extreme of a global war at this moment. T don’t think the time tas eome yet for the Boviet to shoot Wout “Honeo wo should not be intimidated, Hf you tako his speech, you will find thero a discussion of the strategic timing problem, He says the prevent eri—this is a period of about 15 to 20 yeurs— will seo the downfall of capitalism gn the vietory of comin, This present nvn into two phases. ‘Whe fist phase is charnetarized by the fact that the “netive' fronts,” as ho calle thane aro in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and not in Europe os Novth America. “The turning point terminating this frst phases will cine ¥hien the Soviet Union achieves oconomic. superiority. other words, when tho Soviet bloc will have obtained the free world, botl, quantitatively and qualitatively, Bhrushehey specifically puls this turing point into the 1965-70 Berio Tho seni paso wonld oo tho edsive etrugete be ween Communism and the free world and, according to Khrushchers ere teipation, free world dofent through sunrender or destruction atwrally, if tho Soviet Union dees not overtake the Unieel States economically —or what is far more important, in wenpong technel. cay socording to the enunciated timotahle, the onset of the second Rigo willbe day. ‘Whasever dis tary point comes ey i Gecurs only on the Crock calendar, the decisive battle with the Unite x sonnelApproved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4 8 eRe Rec ane Cues CLT ‘Now, to make Burcpe into an active front at tis point wil be pre- ture from the pont, of view of the force relationships. Khra- ahehey is very carefcl, in ono passage, warning against disregard of thece relationships, Tle insists that the Communists mast pro ont ease appraisal of fore relationships ‘which means that they Tnuust not fight befor they can win, Conseqtently, I feel that Bertin Fea paychological Ust of strength, rather than ® military test of Strength, even thoug’, some shooting inay occur. However, in order to be psychologically convincing, Khrushchey nse persuade us that he will be going to the entire length of the hid. Speaking puroly in military terms, if Khrushchev wore Ritent to fight at atime when ho is tot ready, i would be to our aflvantage to oblige Lim. HSenater.Knario. Tn the Jight of the speech made in January be- fore the higher patty, son dos have renee fo believe that the ‘alis reeently held between Mr, Khrushchev and President Rennedy ‘Pllaato a consibution to word poteo in any manner Tye, Posto, 1 don’t think, so far as Lean understand our policy that his wes the US. hope. "T don’t believe that the President ha my illnsions on this point and, in fact, he stated repeatedly that he ately wanted to e=plore the problem of Soviet-American relations, This se n perfoctl legitimate procedure. 1 am sure that if T were eden oul ik to know wl. whom. ‘against. whom T arn aaling, T thing the sume desire for personal reconnaissnnce existed on Mr. Khrushchev s part, “he trouble with, these desires is that the Pyesident isa publ ‘are, and so is Mr. Khrushohoy. ‘They eannot mot in private without Giestorld knowing, interpreting, fearing, and hoping. Congequently, AH Kinds of angurnents and reetifntions, propaganda tnd counter Propegun cmpans fireside chats and solemn orations follow such ediigs like paym nts follow purcliees. “And so while this was kas feally an exporatcry meoling, nevertheless, st was interpreted by nany people to he sort of suit mesting after all. Temas hot entirely excluded that come agreement, could have been reach on tome ;oints., You may remember tho Preaident sated {Thee bo hoped fhe aos situation would be improved. Tf.so, Vienna Mould go into history as more than an exploratory meeting, Qunctoe Kratien 13 there any evidence the Laos situation was improved? ; . Possony, Na, T would say tho contrary is true, Tf Khrushchey really wanted to issuro peace, then T would expect him to go to a ‘meeting ike in Visnna and make a real broad concession or offer a Tnutual advantage deal. The fact is that he didn’t go to Vierma to Muake concessions, Ife failed to offer us any advantages. To asked eto give bat ho aid not offer to give in return, Tho free world is in- Fited to weaken itsel? to make communiem strong —thet is Khru- Thohov's definition of “peace.” In the Berlin ese, for example, the Corman ham fog of sl-delerination dont even desire to eon sult the will of tle Berlin population, Khrushehev's insistence on Shewsided “deals” really clear-cut evidence that he does not intend to'work for pence, 0 dhe United Sates interprets ‘this much-abused word, Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4Approved For Release 2003/11/94,7,GlA¢RDPEZRQOA4ERONO5QA2Q0055 74 9 Senator Knsrsxe. Well, now, yesterday in his epecch he indicated that he was happy with’ the Meoting with Prostdont Kennedy. in ‘Vienna, and that tt proved worth while, He stated in substance, that ao ono! coud expect an agrecment whon both nations have such livergent views ‘Now as you know, President Kennedy eaid after his meeting with Rhrashohey, that it was very sober. ‘Can you explain in any way why Mr. Kheushebey was able to state that he was Happy with the meeting with Mr. Kennedy and that it proved very worth while, and that hho knew that no concrete agroo- ents could be made by either side, by the two principals on bebalt of their governments? What vas he hay about J ‘Mr. Possony, Well, I don't know that we should ascribe too much, impotiance to this phraseology, because after all, he has to comply tid th rus of indornational ters to some extent, and 80 ho has to mako a statement of thissort, 7 ‘On the other hand, T would say thet he probably found the experi- nce rewarding beentonit allovod him to size mp his opponent. This iscortainly a very significant gain in any strategists book. Senator Knatiyo, As an expert on Soviet strategy and on com- munism, do you feel that if tho United States should, in any way, softon its position on standing firm in Berlin, that this ‘would have a tendency to weaken the position of tho free world in other areas } around the world! Mr. Possowr. Senator, I think any time yon wegken a Western position you make a mistako in tho precent poriod of history, Tf wo ‘weaken any of our positions, we strengthen the positions of com- murism. T think the record is absolutely clear on this point. Te is ‘3 clear on this same point as it was during the Hitlevian period. Tho President himself repoatedly stressed tho futility of appense- ment, History proves that appeasement: does not Tead_ to pete but ‘causes wars—in’ fact, in my judgment, ft makes them inovitable, Tf, by taking strong sfand in Berlin, wo wero forved to weaken cu position, Jt us aay in southeast Asis T would suy thio would be w very clear prof tha our currant miliary srength is inadequat, nsoquenify, if we want fo win tis btile—and expecially if wo ‘want to win the protracted conflict—we have to get more muscle, ‘Senator Knaxixo. T presume you have not studied the proposition sufficiently in ordor to make any comment on the siggostion that West Berlin be made a free city. ; ‘Mr. Possoxy. No,Senator. Tthinkyourefor to Senator Bansfeld’s suggestion, Senator Knariva, Yeo * Mr. Possoxy. I havo not seon tho text, so T don't think T should comment on it. ‘Thisis really not germane to your question, Senator, but as another gorument, I think wo must remémbor that what is e rational solution Jn.o dispute for exemple between Germany and France or betwen the United Siaies and Britain may not be & rational solution within the framework of the omfict betwon the free mond and the Com- nist world, Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4