Truth and Doxa in Parmenides

by Tomas Calvo (Madrid)

It has been widely held, both by ancient and by modern commentators on
Parmenides, that the distinction between Truth (αλήθεια) and Opinion (δόξα)
which dominates the structure of his poem, can be properly interpreted s an
Opposition between two forms of cognition: pure thought or conceptual know-
ledge, on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other, where the latter is
understood s including images s well s perceptions. Now there is no doubt
that such an epistemic Opposition is formulated later by Plato and Aristotle in
terms of the contrast between the intellect (vous) and the faculty of sense-percep-
tion (αΐσΦησις)1. Furthermore, it is clear that the related Platonic distinction
between knowledge (έτπστήμη) and Opinion (δόξα) exercised an influence on the
later Interpretation of Parmenides, in Aristotle and above all in Simplicius. This
Platonic and post-Platonic distinction has also been accepted by modern scholars
in their Interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy2.
In the first part of this paper Ι Λνίΐΐ try to show that this traditional Inter-
pretation of Parmenides fundamentally misrepresents the language and inten-
tion of his poem. In the second section I will propose an alternative interpreta-
1
This distinction is clearly formulated by Plato in Rep, 510 ff. In spite of the fact
that geometricians make use of sensible, particular images, Socrates points out
that these images are not the object of their speculation but rather "those objects
which can be contemplated only by mains of thought".
2
For example. Zeller: "Parmenides ermahnt uns daher aufs dringendste, nicht
den Sinnen, sondern allein der Vernunft zu vertrauen, und er gibt dadurch ge-
meinschaftlich mit Heraklit die Anregung zu einer Unterscheidung, welche in
der Folge sowohl f r die Erkenntnistheorie als f r Metaphysik h chst wichtig
geworden ist." (E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen
Entwicklung, Vol. I. Leipzig, 1892, p. 565). Burnet also accepts the Opposition:
"It is true that if we resolve to allow nothing but what we understand, we come
into direct conflict with our senses, which present us with a world of change and
decay. So much the worse for the senses, says Parmenides" (Early Greek Philo-
sophy. London, 1930, p. 180). In more recent scholarship, an emphatic affirmation
of this Opposition can be found in W. K. C. Guthrie: "What she (sc. the goddess)
is in fact cnjoining on him ... is not to trust the senses, but instead to judge by
reason. Here for the first time sense and reason are contrasted, and we are told
that the senses deceive and tKat reason alone is to be trusted. It is a decisive
moment in the history of European philosophy, which can never be the same
again .. . The essential point is therefore that Parmenides was the first to draw
the distinction between aistheton and noeton — between the data of eyes and ears
on the one hand and of logos on the other — and to say that the latter was real
and true and the former unreal" (A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol.I. Cambridge,
1965, pp. 25-26).
17 Aicfa. Gesch. Philosophie Bd. 59

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 246 Tomas Calvo

tion bascd upon an Opposition not between two epistemlc states or faculties
(intellcctual knowledge versus sense-perception) but between two contrasting
forms of language, s representcd in the poem by the constrast between Xoyos
and 2πο$ (or Ιπεα). Finally, I will Sketch some lines in the post-Farmenidean
evolution of the two conceptual Systems tliat oppose Aletheia to Doxa and Logos
to Epos.

The traditional Interpretation of the Aletheia/Doxa contrast in

terms of the Opposition between intellectual and sensory cognition
relies upon three pieces of evidence: (1) the meaning of voos and
νοεΐν, (2) the use of Aoyos by Parmenides in fr.' '7, 5 ( s opposed
to seeing and hearing), and finally, (3) a somehow platonizing
Interpretation of δόξα and δοκεΐν. I will discuss these three points
and show why I do not think that any of them can be taken s
evidence for the above-mentioned distinction in Parmenides
1. The meaning of the words voos and νοεΐν ranges from very
wide and generic meanings to more specific ones. Obvi usly, the
most common and usual System in which the term voos is to be
found, from Homer on, is that which opposes it to 6νμό$. In Opposi-
tion to θυμός (the seat or organ of emotional life), voos designates
the power or organ of cognition — and even cognition itself. This
wide meaning of voos s principle of cognition in general3 (not s
any particular kind of cognition) can be found among the Pre-
socratics in Epicharmus 12: voos όρήι καΐ voos ακούει τδλλα κωφά
και τυφλά4 and in Critias 25, 18: νόωι τ* άκούων και βλέπων. In
both texts sight and hearing are attributed to voos, which implies
that it is not considered either a special faculty or a special kind of
cognition5. On the other hand, there are cases in which voos is
not opposed (either implicitly or explicitly) to Ονμός but rather
to σώμα or δέμα$, that is, to some word which designates the body,
the physical aspect of man. Such is the case, for example, in Xeno-
3
I prefer to speak here of the "principle" of cognition in order to avoid imposing
upon Parmenides the distinction between a psychic faculty and its bodily organ,
l since tliis distinction was drawn only at a later stage.
4
! I am not sure whether or not either this or the following fragment 26 of Epichar-
mus is authentic. In any case, the fact that they may be spurious does not
make any diffcrence for my purpose of showing that voos sometimes means
"principle of cognition in general".
6
Empedocles' fr. 3, 9—13 is to be taken into account s evidence for this
generic meaning of νοεΐν s "to know" or "to cognize". In the edition by
Diels-Kranz, it is translated in this case s "erkennen", although in the texts
of Parmenides Diels-Kranz always translates it s "denken".

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 Truth and Doxa in Pannenides 247

phanes 23, in which he asserts about divinity: ούτι δέμας θνητοισιν

όμοίιος ουδέ νήμα ("not at all like unto mortals in body nor even
in mind"). We can recall also fr. 26 of Epicharmus: καβαρόν αν
νουν έχεις, άπαν το σώμα καθαρός εϊ ("if your mind is pure, you
are pure in all your body"). In such circumstances we must suppose
that νόος designates the mind or psychic in gejQeral including both
the νόος and the Θυμός s these were distinguished in the first
System above.
Within cognition in general there is a further degree of restric-
tion when the word νόος is opposed to some particular kind of
apprehension, to sense-perception or more precisely, to sight6
Under these circumstances, νόος and νοεΐν come to mean representa-
tive knowledge, the representation of something which is not
present. But note that in this representation of what is not present
those representations which we call Imagination and memory are
included: it is possible to represent, to visualize (νοεϊν) whatever
we have seen but do not now see, s well s something which we
have never seen but which we can imagine. The distinction between
"image" and "concept" has still not been elaborated in Parmenides'
Urne. Besides the texts of Parmenides himself, one may quote two
passages of Empedocles': fr. 17, 21 and fr. 84. In 17, 21 ff. Empe-
docles offers us a vision of the universe in which from an original
state of unity arise the -four elements s well s Hate and Love.
Immediately after this he adds: την συ νόωι δέρκευ, μηδ' δμμασιν
ήσο τεθηπός (ν. 21). It is not an abstract concept or notion that is
proposed here for noetic contemplation but rather a particular
goddess in a particular moment of the cosmogenesis whose Situa-
tion and constituent elements are to be imagined. In my opinion,
one should similarly interpret the verb νοεϊν in the first verse of
fr. 84. In this passage Empedocles describes the structure and con-
6
To be more precise, one must not say that voo$ is opposed to "Sensation".
The idea of Sensation (not only the term αϊσθησις with this generic meaning)
had not yet bee"n elaborated. It must be noted that the idea of "Sensation"
pressupposes an unitarian conception of the different sensations s belonging
to a single, generic type of cognition and, therefore, s opposed to a different
type. The latter will be named in different ways: for example, γνώμη in
Critias 39 (μήτε α τώι αλλωι σώματι αίσθάνεται μηδέ α τήι γνώμηι γιγνώσκει)
and φρήν in Democritus 125, etc. In Presocratic texts earlier that Democritus
(fr. 11), the enumerations of those forms of cognition which will later be
named "sensations" (αισθήσει$) only include "seeing" and "hearing". Examples
of such incomplete enumerations can be found in Xenophanes 24, Empedocles
2, 7, Melissus 8, 2, etc.
17«

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248 Tomas Calvo

figuration of the human eye by comparing it with the light which

a man puts into a lantera before leaving at night. The first two
verses read s follows: ώ$ δ' δτε τι$ πρόοδον νοέων ώπλίσσατο
λύχνον/χειμερίην δια νύκτα, <etc. Νοεΐν in this context is not simply
"to have the Intention of" but also "to anticipate", "to envisage'1
the Situation in which this man is going to find himself.
These different meanings oi voos and νοεΐν can be graphically putlined by the
following diagram:
σώμα, δέμα$ «->> voos
(body, physical ,. (mind)
aspect of man)
l
Ουμό$ <-> voos
(emotional life, (principle of
seat or organ of cognition, cognition
emotions) in general)
\ l
όμμα, etc. ·*> vops
(cognition (representative cognition
of what is present) of what is not present)
Needless to say, voos and voeiv undergo further and more precise specifications
and, therefore, the diagram could be continued for later philosophy7; but I
think that Parmenides did not go f rther than the described Situation. Besides,
I think that this diagram of meanings is comprehensive enough to allow a proper
7
The diagram represents a synchronic system of contrast available in the epic
language from Homer to Parmenides and Empedocles. In the later philosophic
usage of Plato and Aristotle new contrasts will be added: (i) the Opposition
between theoretical and practical knowledge. Moos and νοεΐν find their places
in the field of the former while the latter ten4s to bec me expressed through
words derived from and related to φρονεΐν. (ii) The Opposition between memory-
imagination and intellectual knowledge; this Opposition is later tan — and
based on — the elaboration of the idea of Sensation, of αίσθηση; once this
idea has been established, inemory and Imagination tend to be related to it
and opposed to intellectual knowledge. (iii) Within intellectual knowledge,
there is the f urther distinction by Plato between δόξα and vous, the latter
tending to coincide with επιστήμη or knowledge rationally grounded. (iv)
Finally, the distinction between intuitive, immediate intellectual knowledge
(voos) and reasoning, the latter often expressed through compound words in
which the preposition δια appears (διανοία, etc.). Two more observations.
(i) As in the case of the above diagram, all these oppositions can bec me
neutralized in some contexts and, therefore, voos and νοεΐν can adquire a more
general meaning. (ii) My Statement that Parmenides did not go further than
the explained stage does not imply the denial of Parmenides' influence on the
later development of the meaning of these words.

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 Truth and Doxa in Parmenides 249

understanding of all thepassages of the poem s well s the solution of someprob-

lems of Interpretation which many commentators have brought to light. Let
•us consider now Parmenides' texts.
As f ar s the poem is concerned, I think that it would be better
to translate voos simply s "cognition" and to render the verb
νοεΐν s "to know" in its broadest sense (accordihg to the second
level of the diagram)8. This translation has the advantage of
allowing and including the more specific meanings in those cases
in which the context requires it. On the other hand, there exists
direct evidence that Parmenides himself uses those terms this way,
at least s f ar s the verb νοεΐν is concerned. Consider the f ollowi g
sentence (2, 7): ούτε γαρ αν γνοίη$ το γε μη έόν (ου γαρ άνυστόν)
ούτε φράσαι$. Observe that γιγνώσκειν appears here in an almost
identical construction to that in which νοεΐν is usually found in
other passages: in Company with some verb of "saying" and both
related to Being. This proves that the two verbs can be and are,
in fact, used s equivalent.
The word voos (or νόμηα) appears in the poem five times. I am
inclined to think that in two of these, at least, it is taken in its
broad meaning of cognition or principle of knowledge in general.
Let us begin with fr. 6 where, in criticizing the ignorant and two-
headed mortals, the goddess says: άμηχανίη γαρ εν αυτών / στή-
θεσιν ιθύνει ττλακτόν νόον οι δε φοροννται / κωφοί όμως τυφλοί τε,
τεθηττότες, ακρίτα φυλά (νν. 5ff.). The "wandering" state of voos
is specified though the loss of a series of cognitive functions:
blindness, deafness, bewilderment, lack of capacity to discern.
The inclusion of seeing and hearing brings this text very close to
those quoted above from Epicharmus (12) and Critias (25, 18).
It is the general organ or principle of knowledge that is affected by
the stupidity of mortals. I propose a similar Interpretation for
fr. 16 in which Parmenides emphasizes the influence of physiolo-
gical factors upon knowledge: ως γαρ εκαστο5 έχει κρασί ν μελέων
ττολνττλάγκτων, / τώς voos άνθρώποισι παρίαπταται. Once again
the context seems to indicate that voos means cognition in general,
including any of its species. As indirect evidence we may quote
Theophrastus' well known criticism (De sensu, 3) according to
which Parmenides identified Sensation and intellectual cognition
(το γαρ αίσθάνεσθαι και το φρονεΐν ώ$ τούτο λέγει). This whole
8
This is the translation proposed by C. H. Kahn in his article "The Thesis of
Pannenides", The Review of Metaphysics, XII. 4, (June 1969), p. 703.

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250 Tomas Calvo

passage of Theophrastus throws light upon our problem for two

reasons: first, Theophrastus uses the general word γνώσι$ when
introducing this fragment (TT. μεν γαρ ουδέν άφώρικεν αλλά μόνον,
δτι δυοΐν δντοιν στοιχείοιν 'κατά το υπερβάλλον εστίν ή γνωσι$)
and, therefore, takes this text s evidence for a general Statement
about cognition; secondly, bis Statement seems to be based on
this very passage of the poem alone, which is the only one explicitly
quoted by him. Theophastus, then, clearly took this fragment to
refer to cognition in general, and, therefore, he understood voos
(and probably φρονεΐν and νόημα in the following lines) s including
all species of cognition9.
Let us now turn to fr. 4.1 am not sure exactly what its three and
a half verses mean: λευσσε δ' δμω$ άπέοντα νόωι παρέοντα βε-
βαίως- / ου γαρ άποτμήξει το εόν του Ιόντος εχεσθαι / ούτε σκιδνά-
μενον πάντηι πάντως κατά κόσμρν / οϋτε συνιστάμενον. But if we
are to understand the passage in the way it is usually understood
("contemplate how the absent is firmly present in knpwledge"),
we must consider this passage s a confirmation that the feature
which characterizes voos s opposed to other forms of cognition
is, in fact, the one described above: its capacity to represent what
is not present to the subject and cannot be directly seen or per-
ceived. As for the two remaining texts:. αλλά συ τησδ* αφ' όδοο
διζήσιος εΐργε νόημα (7, 2) and εν τώι σοι παύω πιστόν λόγον ήδέ
νόημα άμφις άληθείης (8,51)> νόημα should perhaps be again under-
stood in this restricted sense for cognition of what is not directly
perceived.
The above proposed diagram can be used, finally, to explain some specific
aspects of Parmenides' thought which have traditionally given rise to controversy.
For example, the materiality or immateriality of Parmenidean Being depends
in some measure on whether it is considered s a concept or s an Image. But in
this case to distinguish between concept and image seems to be an anachronism.
For Parmenidean Being — in-so far s it is a visualized representation of some-
thing not present to perseption — is both concept and image at the same time;
the elaboration of this distinction will be the work of a later period of Greek
9
Unless Theophrastus is misleading us, there cannot have been other passage in
which the distinction he is denying was explicitly drawn. We may note that in
the lines following the quotation Theophrastus refers vagely to another Par-
menidean text: "Nevertheless, he (sc. Parmenides) attributes sense-perccption
also to the opposite itself, which is clear from the passage in which he affirms
that a corpse does not perceive light, heat and sound because it lacks fire, but
does perceive their contraries, cold and silence". Since we do not have the actual
words of Parmenides, this passage of Theophrastus cannot help us here.

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 Truth and Doxa in Parmenides 251

philosophy: namely, that of Plato and Aristotle. The same point can be made
concerning the assertion of the "sphericity" of Being. For those who consider
Parmenides s the pioneer of puie thought and voos s the principle of purely
intellectual representations, such an assertion is embarrasing. Some of them
seek a way out by regarding this description s metaphorical in character10.
However, we must remember that the Statement of spherical shape is derived from
important principles of limit and symmetry which seem'essenti l to Parmenides'
reasoning about Being.

Besides this purely intellectual character which I am rejecting,

infallibil y has been also considered by some scholars s one of the
specific features of voos. It becones by no means easy to bring this
feature into line with fr. 6, 5—6, where the goddess refers to a
ττλακτόν νόον, a "wandering voos". K. von Fritz has emphasized
this paradox calling it insoluble11. H. Fr nkel put forth an explana-
tion by considering the whole expression s ironic, deliberately
paradoxical and contradictory12. K. von Fritz looks for the explana-
tion of the errors of voo$ in the constitution of the members (κρασι$
μελέων) hat fr. 16 alludes to, though he is forced to admit that such
an Interpretation does not solve the logical problem13. But this
problem does not exist if we accept the above Interpretation accord-
ing to which voos in this passage means the principle of cognition
in general and not any particular and supposedly infallible faculty
of knowledge. Furthermore, even in those cases in which this term
means the capacity to visualize what is not present, I cannot
find any strong argument to support this supposed infallibility.
Among the more outstanding features that have traditionally
characterized voos, is what we may call its "heteronomy", that is,
its being subjected to alien forces which direct it in one way or
another and fix it on this or that object14. These forces can be
either exterior agents or psychic states that lie beyond a man's
own control. In the poem itself we find a very significant example
10
This is the way Simplicius interpreted the Parmenidean Being. (cf. DK I, 221, 7).
Many scholars have followed him. Cf. G. E. L. O wen, "Eleatic Questions", Cl.
Q.. 10 (1960), pp. 84ff.
11
K. von Fritz, "voos, νοεΐν and their derivatives in Presocratic Philosophy
(Excluding Anaxagoras)", Cl. Ph., 4 (1945), p. 237.
12
H. Fr nkel, "Parmenidesstudien", in Wege und Formen Fr hgriechischen Den-
kens. M nchen, 1960, p. 171.
13
ibid.
14
Indeed, this dependency of the subject on outside forces is not limited to voos
but rather is to be found in relation to all the psychic functions and emotional
states in archaic poetic thought.

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 252 Torais Calvo

of the latter in 6, 5—6: άμηχανίη γαρ εν αυτών / στήθεσιν Ιθύνει

πλακτόν νόον. It is their incompetence that conducts their voos.
One could object to this that in 7, 2 the goddess says to Parmenides
άλλα συ τησδ* αφ* οδού διζήσιο$ είργε νόημα, implying that it is
Parmenides himself who can direct bis νόημα along this or that
route. But if so, there must be some force determining him to
separate himself from the forbidden road. The following verses
do not leave any doubt s to this question: μηδέ σ* εθο$ πολύπειρον
όδόν κατά τήνδε βιασθώ, / νομαν άσκοπον όμμα καΐ ήχήεσσαν
άκουήν / καΐ γλώσσαν, κρΐναι δε λόγωι (7, 3—5). Ηόο$ appears
to be dragged by two agents that simultaneously p sh it in opposite
directions: habit with the force of routine and Logos with the
discriminating power of reasoiiing. In the Way of Truth it is the
Logos that directs the voos, that is to s y, the comprehension and
representation of Being. And we must take into account that this
representation of Being s a compact, homogeneous and spherical
reality that rests on itself does not appear all at once but rather
develops step by step s the Logos progesses. It is to this (the
Logos) that the validity and exactiiess of representation are due
and not to the supposed infallibility of voos. This takes us to the
final feature of voos postulated by F. Cornfofd15 and K. von Fritz16:
its "discursive" character. According to .K. von Fritz this dis-
cursive character is the most remarkable novelty introduced by
Parmenides s compared .with the use of voos in the previous
literature. For iny part, I do not believe that Parmenides has
introduced any novelty in this particular point. Reasoning belongs
to λόγο$; visualizing is the task of voos.
2. The preceding analysis of voos and νοεΐν has shown that their meanings
cannot be considered s evidence of a radical Opposition between intellectual and
sensory knowledge in Parmenides. In the following step I will deal with other
words and passages of the poem which have sometimes been interpreted s clear
hints of this Opposition. As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, some
commentators have found the Opposition between both kinds of cognition ex-
plicitly formulated in the already quoted passage in which the goddess says:
μηδέ σ* ίίθο$ πολύπειρο v όδόν κατά τήνδε βιασθώ, / νομαν ασκοπον όμμα καΐ
ήχήεσσαν άκουήν / καΐ γλώσσα ν, κρΐναι δε λόγωι (7, 3—5). In spite of its explicit
allusion to eye and ear, I do not think that these verses oppose Logos to sense
knowledge. Along with όμμα and άκουή we find γλώσσα in this passage, and the
tongue is obviously out of place in any enumeration of faculties or organs of
15
F. Cornford, Pnncipium Sapientiae. Cambridge, 1952, p. 117.
16
ibid.

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 ', Truth and Doxa in Parmenides 253

cognition. I think that what i s rejected by the goddess here is what can be describ-
ed s "usual (εθο$) souces of Information", that is, what is seen, what is heard,
what is said17. In Empedocles there is a parallel text in which these three sources
of Information appear (fr. 3, 8—13) and Empedocles himself shows clearly in a
different passage (fr. 39) that this rejection of tongue is to be understood s
rejection of those cosmological explanations that are transmitted from mouth
to mouth in so far s they are in disagreement with his own cosmological account.

3. Finally, we are left with the verb δοκεΐν and δόξα. As I pointed
out at the beginning of this analysis, those scholars who have
considered these terms s related to sense knowledge have been
influenced by a Platonizing Interpretation which goes back to the
ancient commentators. Simplicius, for example, introduces the
second part of the poem by saying: μετελθών δε από των νοητών
επί τα αισθητά ό Π. ήτοι από αληθείας, ώ$ αύτό$ φησιν, επί δόξαν
.. .· (DK Ι, 234, 20—21). Besides this Neoplatonic tradition we
must take into account some translations of the only text in which
• the verb δοκεΐν appears in the poem. The passage, s is well known,
l is the last part of the introduction where the goddess advises Par-
;
i menides that he must learn not only the truth but also βροτών
1
δόξας ταΐ$ ουκ ενι πίστις αληθής and she adds: αλλ* εμπης και τούτα
* μαθήσεαι, ως τα δοκουντα / χρήν δοκίμως είναι δια παντός πάντα
Ι περώντα. The words τα δοκουντα have been sometimes translated
s "appearences", s that which appears (to mortals) which, in
turn, has given place to its identification with the universe s it is
perceived and, therefore, with the contents of sense-perception
(τα φαινόμενα). This Interpretation of τα δοκοΰντα depends, first,
upon the fact that δοκεΐν can be used in two grammatical construc-
tions, subjective (οι άνθρωποι δοκοΰσι) and objective (δοκεΐ τοις
άνθρώποισι), and secondly, upon the further assumption that the
objective construction implies passiyity on the part of the subject
to whom something seems or appears.
Far from accepting this Interpretation, I think that, even when
δοκεΐν is construed objectively ( s "it seems to someone"), it is
correct neither to identify its content with that of sense-perception
17
This has been observed by . Gigon, Der Ursprung der Griechischen Philosophie
von Hesiod bis Parmenides. Basel, 1945, p. 259.1 tbink it is a mistake to suppose,
with some commentators, that the mention of the tongue in Parmenides and
Empedocles is a reference to the sense of taste. Im Met. I, 986 b 31, Aristotle
refers to both Ways through the Opposition αίσθηση / λόγο$. Perhaps this has
influenced the Interpretation of this passage s an evidence in favour of the
Opposition between the two kinds of cognition.

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254 Tomas Calvo

nor to inter the passivity of the subject18. Although I cannot

offer now a comprehensivc account of the meaning of δοκείν,
I will make some suggestions, taking s a point of departure the
common of it in relation to future events where its meaning is very
dose to our "to expect". To quote only one example, let us recall
fr. 27 of Heraclitus: ανθρώπους μένει αποθανόντος ασσα ουκ ελπον-
ται ουδέ δοκέουσιν ("what awaits men at death they neither expect
nor imagine"). This use of the verb δοκεϊν is of interest here for at
least three reasons:
(i) In so far s i t deals with future events, there is an implicit Opposition to
knowledge of the present and, hence, of what can be perceived.
(ii) As a consequence of this lack of immediate experience, δοκεϊν connotes
the feature of conjecture or supposition s opposed to fully reliable knowledge.
(in) Finally, the content of this conjecture may be fulfilled or not f lfilled.
In so far s what is supposed or conjectured is not fulfilled, it may be set in
Opposition to reality or what is in fact the case.
These three features — which also characterize those uses in
which δοκεϊν does not deal with future events but with the true
nature of something — are present, at least by implication, in the
famous fr. 34 of Xenophanes: και το μεν o v σαφές O TIS άνήρ ϊδεν
ουδέ TIS εσται / ειδώ$ άμφΐ θεών τε και ασσα λέγω περί πάντων .. .
δόκο$ δ' επί πασι τέτυκται. Gods are not immediately perceived;
doctrines about them are, therefore, only conjectures; these con-
jectures, finally, are in disagreement with the true being of gods.
Heraclitus' fr. 28 shows the same Situation: δοκέοντα γαρ ό δοκιμώ-
τατο$ γιγνώσκει, φυλάσσει* [καΐ μέντοι και] Δίκη κατάλήψεται
ψευδών τέκτονας και μάρτυρας. Asserting that Justice will capture
those who fabricate lies, Heraclitus emphasizes the second of the
proposed features: these δοκέοντα (the same construction s in
Parmenides* text) are opinions or conjectures constmcted by some
individuals (τέκτονα$) who play an active and not merely passive
role in this connection19. It is in this way, in my opinion, that we
should Interpret τα δοκουντα (l, 31), δόξα$ (l, 30 and 8, 31) and
κατά δόξαν (19, 1) in Pannenides' poem. Δόξα does not mean
sensory knowledge. The δόξαι criticized by Parmenides are opinions
or conjectures about the origin and constitution of the universe,
18
Cf., A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides. A study of word, image and
argument in the fvagments. New Haven—London, 1970, p. 196.
19
1 have assumed that even if the words καΐ μέντοι καΐ are an Interpolation of
Clement, s most recent editors have agreed, (following Reinhardt), the two
clauses belong together s far s their content is concerned.

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 Truth and Doxa in Parmenides 255

and all these cosmogonical and cosmological explanations go far

beyond what is immediately given in sense-perception. Parmenides
himself introduces Love into his cosmogonical account (12, 13),
and I do not think that this divine agent can be apprehended more
easily than, or in a fundamentally different way from, the well-
rounded Being of the first part of the poenu_.It is precisely after
mentioning such a principle of cosmic Love that Empedocles says
in the above quoted fragment (17, 21): την συ νόοοι δέρκευ, μήδ*
δμμασιν ήσσο τεθηπώς.
II
The preceding arguments have attempted to show that there
is no clear Opposition between intellectual cognition and sense-
preception in the poem. If so, we must abandon the traditional
Interpretation of the dichotomy αλήθεια / δόξα in terms of such an
Opposition, and we must look elsewhere for an explanation of the
nature and contents of the two Ways. I will suggest that the main
Opposition put forth by Parmenides is the Opposition between two
kinds of language which — according to his own words — can be
named Logos and Epos, respectively20. This appears textually
formulated in 8, 50—52 s a distinction between the λόγο$ about
the Truth and the κόσμος έττέων through which the opinions of
mortals are expressed and transmitted:
εν τώι σοι τταύω ττιστόν λόγον ήδέ νόημα
άμφις άληθείη$· δόξα$ δ* από τούδε βροτείας
μάνθανε κόσμον εμών έπέων άπατηλόν άκούων.
Both kinds of language act on a pair of contraries, Being-not
Being in Logos and Light-Night in Epos. And in each case the
20
This was already observed by E. Hoffman in 1925 in his monograph Die Sprache
und die archaische Logik. However, his formulation does not seem incisive enough
and E. Hoffman remains with the traditional Interpretation of the poem. Some
incidental comments have been also made by other scholars in this connection.
For example, P. Albertelli (Gli Eleati. Bari, 1939, p. 147) writes: "C'e in Parmenide
un'antitesi netta tra φάσθαι — φράζειν e όνομάζειν. II primo termino indica
l'espresione ehe coincide con il pensiero (verita) e con l'essere; il seconco sta a
significare il linguaggio ehe' gli uomini foggiano per indicare le cose del rnondo
sensibile, oggeto de pensiero". But he only points out that Parmenides does not
use the same verbs in both Ways. We may also recall F. Cornford (Plato and
Parmenides. London, 1964, p. 29) who writes: "The second part accordingly is
not in the form of logical deduction but gives a cosmogony in the traditional
narrative manner". Unfortunately, this perceptive remark is not developed further
by its author.

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256 Tomis Calvo

contrarics are proposed s the two sole members of a dichotomous

classification: fr. 9 shows that Light and Night fill up the universe
entirely (επειδή πάντα <paos καΐ νυξ όνόμασται) and fr. 2,2 estab-
lishes that "it is" and "it is°not" are the only two possible ways
in the field of Logos (οδοί μουναι). Neverthdess, the syntactical
structure of each language is wholly different While the language
of Logos is disjunctive (8, 16: εστίν ή ουκ &rnv, it is or it is not),
the language of Epos is conjtmctive (9: <pccos καΐ νχ/ξ, Light and
Night). The disjunctive procedure of Logos, with the subsequent
elimination of one of the alternatives, is camed out in two conse-
cutive steps.
(i) In the first step, the disj nction opposes "it is" to "it is
not". The two Statements are contradictories. "It is not" means
that there is nothing at all, and this must be rejected s incompa-
tible with the very possibility of knowing and speaking (2, 6—8).
Language is only possible if there is something to talk about. So,
the first step of Logos establishes that there is something, that there
must necessarily be something, although this first decision (κρίσι$)
does not specify at all either what there is or how it is to be char-
acterized. The question about the subject of ?στι seems to me out
of place at this moment of the logos, if the question is to be answered
by determining any characteristic of "what there is". As I pointed
out when discussing voo$, the representation of Being does not
appear all at once.
(ii) In its second step, the disj nction of Logos refers to "it is"
s opposed to "it was — it wiU be" taken together and "it is"
excludes both "it was" (namely, it was but now is not: ει γαρ
εγεντ' ουκ εστί, 8, 20) and "it will be" (namely, it wiU be but is
not yet: ούδ' ει ποτέ μέλλει εσεσθαι, i6.).*This elimination of "it
was" and "it will be" implies that what there is not only something
but everything that can be: ουδέ ποτ* fjv ούδ* εσται, έπεί νυν εστί
όμοΰ παν (8, 5). The word ,παν appears several times in the poem
after this passage to characterize reality. The further articulation
of "what there is" is the logical consequence of this totality of its
existence.
The structure of Epos is totally different. "It was" and "it
will be" are not excluded from it. On the contrary,.past, present
and future constitute a continuous series, by means of which
narrative language, that is, the very possibility of narration is
restored. For narrative is precisely that form of language which
unfolds through the three grammatical forms of past — present —

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 Truth and Doxa in Pannenides 257

future. Hence the emphasis of fr. 19 with which the Way of Opinion
certainly concluded:
οϋτω τοι κατά δόξα ν 2φυ (past) τάδε καΐ νυν ?ασι (present)
και μετέπειτ* από τούδε τελευτήσουσι (future) τραφέντα.
The narrative character of Epos is also brought out through the word κόσμος
of the syntagm κόσμος έττέων21. In my opinion, the meaning of .this expression in
Parmenides has been wrongly interpreted by some scholars. H. Diller, for exam-
ple, Claims that έπη does not refer to the verses but rather to the words — the
series of words — in so far s they are regulated by the meter and are subject to
poetic use22. Obviously, this explanation (which may apply to occurrences of the
phrase elsewhere) does not fit the case of Parmenides, since the logos (that is,
the speech according to Logos) is also offered in the same meter and in identical
poetic form. G. S. Kirk's Suggestion, although more accurate, also seems in-
sufficient. He Claims that the term κόσμος in this case points to the "semilogical"
nature of the explanation23. The point is not that the epos participates in a lesser
degree of Logos but rather that it constitutes another kind of language. Κόσμος
refers to the ordering of the several elements and episodes which take place
consecutively and constitute the whole of a story. Odysseus praises Demodocus'
narration emphasizing that it was constructed κατά κόσμον (λίην γαρ κατά
κόσμον Αχαιών οιτον άείδεις, Od. 8, 479). (Α little further — ν. 492 — Odysseus
asks Demodocus to sing nrrrou κόσμον, which probably means the tale or story
of the horse and not the fashioning of the horse, s it has often been translated).
This idea of ordering or succession is entirely alien to Logos, s Parmenides points
out in fr. 5: ξυνόν δε μοι εστίν, ότπτόθεν άρξωμαι* τόθι γαρ ττάλιν ΐξομαι αοθις.
Νο matter where one begins, one always ends up at the same point: the incom-
patibility between "it is" and "it is not11 and the necessity of affirming the former.
As a consequence of this heterogeneity of Logos and Epos, there
is no possible connection between the two Ways of the poem. Logos
demonstrates that plurality cannot be reached by starting from
an original unity: ουδέ ποτ' εκ μη εόντο$ έφήσει ττίστιος ισχύ$ /
γίγνεσθαι τι τταρ* αυτό (8, 13), nothing can become besides and
in addition to what there is. Neither can unity be constructed
from plurality: in terms of both kinds of language, the true unity
does not result from the addition or conjunction which essentially
belongs to Epos but from the negation or disjunction of Logos.
The Interpretation of the poem from the point of view of a confrontation be-
tween two kinds of language allows a better understanding not only of the struc-
ture of both Ways but also of the Parmenidean criticism of traditional cosmologi-
21
This phrase, s is well known, appears also in Solon (2, 1), Pindar (07. 11, 13)
and Democritus (fr. 21).
22
H. Diller, „Der vorphilosophische Gebrauch von κόσμος und κοσμεΐν", in
Festschrift Bruno Snell. M nchen, 1956, p. 47ff.
23
G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments. Cambridge, 1954, p. 311.

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258 Torais Calvo

cal explanations, in so far s the lattcr reJy upon extrarational means of persua-
sion dorived from thc very nature of thc language they use. A grcat deal of
Parmenides* vocabulary, which is usually considcred only in its epistemic
connotations, must be considered in its relationship to Speech. By way of
conclusion, I will touch upon one significant item in this vocabulary.
My account of δόξα in the first part of this paper pointed out its epistemic
meaning s a kind of cognition (opinion, conjecture) that cannot be reduced to
sense-perception. This does not exclude other important connotations. Co'nsider,
for cxample, its meaning s "fame", "reputation". This meaning of δόξα, which
is well attested elsewhere, is of interest here because it points to two relevant
connotations. In the first place, there is a clear social reference, since having fame
implies being known ot a Community of individuals. In the second place, there
is an unequivocal reference to speaking: that is to say, the fame of an individual
implies that people talk about him. Indeed, his fame is nothing but what is said
about him. (Something similar is involved in our concept of "p blic opinion".
For although the term "opinion" seems to allude only to the epistemic aspect,
this concept in fact entails the two features just mentioned: there is no public.
opinion except in relation to a given Community and with reference to what is
said in this Community about some person or topic). Now these features also
characterize the δόξαι of the poem. The fact that they belong to a plurality of
individuals — to people in general -«- is expressed by the accompanying adjective
βροτεία$ (βροτεία$ δόξα$, 8, 51) and the dependent genitive βροτών {βροτών
δόξα$, 1, 30). As for the reference to speaking, fr. 8, 51—52 makes clear that
these opinions or beliefs are transmitted and taught by Epos, and cnaracterized
by acts of naming (ονομάζειν at 8, 53; cf. 9, l and-19, 3).

III
If we look ahead at the development of Greek philosophy after
Parmenides, we recognize that a remarkable change has taken
place even in the thought of his follower Melissus. By comparison
with the doctrine of Parmenides, Melissus has produced a notable
simplification in content s well s in vocabulary. In Melissus the
System αλήθεια / δόξα s such disappears and neither of these
words is to be found in the extant fragments. We do find the
adjective αληθινός qualifyihg reality (fr. 6, 5) s well s the verb
δοκεϊν. But this verb is no longer systematically opposed to αλήθεια
(or to any other word expressing the true being of reality) and, in
itself, it seems to lack a negative epistemic connotation. Δοκεϊν
can be both wrong and right, and Melissus is constrained to intro-
duce the idea of rightness (ορθώς, ουκ ορθώς)24. Along with αλήθεια /
24
An example of right δοκεϊν can be found in fr. 8, 2: εΐ δη ταΰτα εστί... είναι
χρή έκαστον τοιούτον, οίον ιτερ το πρώτον §δοξεν ήμΐν. For a wrong δοκεϊν,
cf. fr. 8, 5: ουδέ εκείνα πολλά ορθώς δοκεϊ είναι.

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 Truth and Doxa in Parmenides 259

δόξα, the Opposition between Logos and Epos also disappears from
bis speculation. This has a double consequence. On the one hand,
everything which for Parmenides was a matter for Epos is now
included in the One Way characteristic of Melissus' philosophy.
This inclusion is caitied out by identifying the whple contend of
the \Vay of Opinion with not-Being and thus eliminating it. On
the other hand, when the Opposition between two forms of language
disappears, attention is now fociised on the field of knowledge.
Since the testimony of perception is not in agreement with the
logical demands of rational inf erence, the f ormer is put into question
and deprived of cognitive authority: δήλον τοίνυν, δτι ουκ opOcos
έωρώμεν (fr. 8, 5). This displacement of the question is decisive
and opens up a line of thought which leads to Democritus. Demo-
critus has at his disposal a unitary concept of sense knowledge —
s is indicated by his complete list of the five senses in fr. 11. I
think, therefore, that his criticism of bastard cognition must be
understood s referring to all (secondary sense-qualities, although
his text does not give a complete enumeration of them: νόμωι
γλυκύ, και νόμωι τπκρόν, νόμωι θερμόν, νόμωι ψυχρόν, νόμωι χροιή,
έτεήι δε άτομα και κενόν (fr. 9). The Democritean criticism is
specifically directed against the general opinion or belief according
to which those qualities exist in reality. This belief is characterized
s "conventional" (νόμωι) in so far s it is in disagreement with
the true nature of things (έτεήι) which does not include anything
eise in addition to atoms and the void.
The term νόμος brings us back to the idea of conventionality in Parmenides'
thought. This idea {although not the word νόμος itself) is present in his poem,
where it is primarily related to language through terms like όνομα, όνομάζειν,
etc.25. The language of Epos is conventional — according to 8, 53—65 — in the
double sense that mortals decided t o name two forms and that they assigned
certain properties to these forms (σήμοττ* ΙΘεντο), which implies assigning mean-
ing to their names. The topic of conventionality in relation to the way people
speak appears also in Empedocles and Anaxagoras, under the obvious influence
of Parmenides. Following Parmenides, Empedocles criticizes the use of terms
like φύσις, γένεσις and τελευτή26. According to Empedocles, there is only mingling
25
The notion of the conventionality of the Way of Opinion was correctly pointed
out by K. Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie.
Booo, 1916, p. 82.
26
These words had been rejected also by Parmenides. For γένεσις and γίγνεσθαι
see fr. 8 (l, 2, 6, 13, 19, 20, 21, 27). For φύσις compare the exclusion of φυν
in the Way of Truth (8, 10) and its admission in the Doxa (&pu in 19, 1). For
τελευτή compare the similar exclusion in άτέλεστον (8, 4) and admission in
19,2.

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260 Tomas Calvo

and the Separation of what has bcen mingled, in spite of tbe fact that people use
tbe word φύσι$ in this connection. Neithcr is it right to speak of birth and dcath.
The convcntionality of this way of speaking — which entails its disagreement
wilh the truc nature of physical processes: ή 0έμι$ <ού) καλέουσι — is expressed
by the word νόμο$: νόμωι δ* έπίφημι κσΐ oCrros (fr. 9, 3—5). Anaxagoras also
rejects the verbs γίγνεσθαι and οπτόλλυσθαι (for the latter rejection compare
Parmenides 8, 19 and 40), and he substitutes σνμμίγεσθαι and δκχκρίνεσθαι for
them s more accurate and in accordance with reality {op0cos, Γ7) ·

These passages of Empedocles and Anaxagoras show a concep-

tion of the conventionality of cosmological speech which is quite
different from that of Parmenides' poem. The Opposition between
Logos and Epos has disappeared from the System of those philos-
ophers, s their cosmological accounts try to embrace and coordi-
nate both kinds of language in one form of discourse. As a conse-
quence, they both limit the Charge of conventionality to certain
expressions. Their criticism implies the following line of reasoning:
(i) some words are in disagreement with the true nature of the
processes they are supposed to describe. (ii) The use of such words
is a consequence of a wrong cosmological opinion. (iii) Once we
have substituted a true opinion for the false one, we are able to
find the right term or expression. Obviously, this is not Parmenides'
procedure. In the first place, his criticism is not primarily directed
against any particular cosmology or against a particular opinion
or expression. It is the cosmological explanation s such that is to
be replaced by a different kind of discourse. In the second place,
Parmenides does not criticize cosmological terminology s if it
were inaccurate or contrary to the real nature of the things and
processes described by it. The names used by mortals — in the
account offered by the goddess — are all right s they stand, and
fr. 20, 3 emphasizes their appropriateness and significance: τοις
δ* όνομα άνθρωποι κατέθεντ' επίσημον έκάστωι.
The disappearence of the Opposition between Logos and Epos
in Melissus, s in the cosmologists, is clearly related to the displace-
ment of their philosophical concerns from the field of language to
the field of epistemic authority. What emerges, then, is a new view
of δόξα and a new conception of νόμος, both of them opposed to
the true nature of things. These later views thus continue the
Aletheia-Doxa Opposition of Parmenides in a new and quite
different form. But to pursue these later developments would take
us beyond the scope of the present study.

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