Impact of

Infrastructure
Projects on Urban
Poor in Chennai
Report of a Field Research and Study
July-September 2008

Authors:
Rajan P, Vinay Baindur, Dr. Lalitha Kamath

Report Commissioned by Action Aid International

Regional Office, Chennai.

1
Acknowledgements
All the resettled people, groups and the whole set of interviewees at Semancheri and
Kannaginagar. All the officials and staff at the Go TN offices whom we met and
interviewed for their inputs and information shared.

The authors would like to acknowledge the advice and support received from a number of
people including especially, Jyoti Awasthi as well as Indu Prakash, to prepare and
undertake this study. We also thank Esther Mariaselvam, Programme Manager for her
support with information and ideas to take the study forward. Antony Raj, for his
extensive assistance in the interviews, field work and documentation. Thanks to all the
programme and office staff and personnel at Action Aid, Chennai for their assistance in
logistics and field work for this study. Dr. V. Suresh and his research staff at the Chennai
Centre for Law, Policy and Human Rights Studies. Dr. Lalitha Kamath for her time and
ideas as an excellent resource person during the entire study. Bhuvaneshwari Raman
who drew from her experiences of studying Chennai to guide us for this research.

We also thank all the other researchers in Chennai with whom we discussed about this
study and whose support was completely invaluable to conceptualise and launch this
study. Prof. Shanmugavelayudham, Loyola College, Chennai.

2
Impact of Urban Infrastructure Projects on Poor in Chennai
Report for Action Aid International, Chennai.

Chapter outline:

I: Introduction to the Research Study, Background and Resettlement Strategy of

TN Govt in Chennai

II: Impact on Resettled People

 Reduced access to basic services esp water

 Reduced economic and employment opportunities
 Psycho-socio impact

III. Overall critique and recommendations

3
Chapter I:

Introduction & Background of Resettlement Strategy of Go TN in Chennai

Background of the study

The issues which affect slum and pavement dwellers in many big cities are manifold in
nature. A large majority of the urban poor in a city are forced to live in such conditions where
adequate basic facilities are not provided to them and they are deprived of access to adequate
sanitation, water supply, food and health facilities. The environmental conditions in these areas
are not conducive to support a good quality of life. These families are unable to generate enough
income and their livelihood opportunities are extremely limited. Yet, after living in a certain
location in the core and commercial business areas they create various possibilities for work, like
street vending, small shops, street side restaurants and cycle, scooter and vehicle repair
workshops, etc. But at the same time with huge in-migration from rural areas and a growing
population of urban poor in the big metro cities we can clearly observe a growing “urbanisation
of poverty”. This data also illustrates the skewed and iniquitous development model in which
one class of people who are resource poor are forced to migrate in search of livelihood and
income and then when they settle down in the city are forced to sacrifice once again for the
growth of infrastructure, transport, recreation and tourism sectors.

In Chennai city which is also an important international port, the problems of the urban
poor are closely linked with the urbanisation intensive development model adopted by the GoTN
authorities. The policies and the measures taken to implement them affect the livelihood and
living conditions of this section of society the most. While Chennai even as a colonial port city
had given priority to overseas trade and manufacturing, more recently this focus has been
changing. It is now fast becoming an international outsourcing destination and private sector
investments in land and commercial real estate development have been growing at a fast rate.
This has in turn created a huge demand to turn Chennai into a city of world class facilities and

4
high-quality infrastructure. Incidentally the World Bank Group also has a huge establishment in
Chennai which is a back office handling its worldwide accounting operations.

The Go TN is also investing vast funds by the implementation of two infrastructure

action plans. Similar to many other large cities, in Chennai also road construction, road
infrastructure and transportation projects are receiving increasing investments from the
authorities, due to which pressure is being generated for clearing existing slum pockets. This is
also to grab this land as such areas have high economic value in the central parts of a city. Yet it
is masked as an attempt to better the environmental and social conditions and provide basic
facilities in better locations for the slum dwellers. Through these measures various departments’
of the state push for forcible slum clearance through ongoing harassment tactics and then take
possession of such lands where slums dwellers have lived for decades. They are viewed as
encroachers and are not granted access to many legal entitlements.

When the lands are suddenly rendered vacant for almost no cost, they are sold to
developers and the private sector for a very high land value. Since stamp value for land
registration are being forced down due to Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
(JNNURM) conditions, to ensure revenue growth and buoyancy, Go TN could having a policy
which allows more transactions by easier forms of land sale and transfers. Through JNNURM,
GoI with the help of World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the realtor / developer groups, is
trying to create ‘efficient real estate market with minimum barriers on transfer of property’.
Simultaneously there is a push for greater use of e-governance techniques such as unique
property identification numbers, uniform land titling and GIS maps to identify land parcels. The
beneficiaries of such actions are the real estate sector whose business prospects and their
turnover as well as govt revenues increase steadily.

Slum dwellers, lower middle classes and most of the urban poor lose out due to such
policies and implementation process. Since the urban poor look for vacant lands to occupy and to
settle their hutments and many times these lands belong to the government/ institutions/ railways
etc, there is now a pressure to vacate such lands to realise their higher economic value. We could
hypothesise that they are forced to sacrifice small parcels of land to higher capital accumulation
5
forces. On the other hand as described below they are pushed to the cities peripheries as
unskilled labour in the high IT growth corridors in South Chennai.

The study identified the impact of critical policies and projects taken up by Go TN in the
city of Chennai. This study was to examine and research the impact of the resettlement of the
urban poor from all over Chennai in two rehabilitation sites in the south of the City. It was a
field based research conducted through subject interviews and group interviews with the
residents of Semancheri and Kannaginagar close to the IT corridor on Rajiv Gandhi Salai (Old
Mahabalipuram Road).

The study has examined these impacts through numerous field visits in the selected areas
near IT corridor and industrial parks. The policies and model proposed were also examined.
Field work also involved interviews with affected persons and field and higher level officials.
Appointments and field work were conducted with the support of local field staff and senior staff
of Action Aid International, Chennai.

Objectives:

1. To analyse the urban development process in Chennai and its impact on livelihoods and
services to slums and urban poor.
2. To examine the impact of mega infrastructure project development in Chennai.

Introduction

Noting that urbanisation in the State was likely to accelerate further in the coming
decade, the Tamil Nadu State Planning commission in its report on urban development (July
2008) for the 11th Plan period visualizes that over 50 per cent of the total population would be
living in urban areas by 2011. Clearly the urban transition is expected to occur in TN much
ahead of most other states in the country. TN does display characteristics of diffused

6
urbanisation processes with many prominent towns and cities spread across the state. This also
means that employment opportunities should be more widely available.

The seeds of such widespread urbanisation have been sown by the GoTN to decrease the
impact of in-migration to the city of Chennai. As per census data the process of this migration
has shown a decreasing trend in the past few years. With such a policy under implementation and
in view of the increasing land prices a need arose to deal with the population of urban poor and
low –income workers in the informal sector to prepare the city to meet international standards of
infrastructure. Policies have been put in place after the Madras Urban Development Project-I
(1973-79) and II (1982-88) allowing for greater role of the private sector in the housing and
shelter market which is reflected in the new Master Plan. As explained in the next sections it is
quite clear that the World Bank through its numerous loans to Corporation of Madras / Chennai
has been consistently guiding the city’s development trajectory.

Growing Chennai – towards becoming an international city

It was in 1995 that the process of drafting a new Master Plan for Chennai first began. The
time horizon was 25 years. It took nearly 4-5 years to finalise a draft since there were cases filed
in the High Court demanding more rigorous people’s participation processes. The draft of the
Master Plan was issued only in 2006 for a public comment period of nearly 140 days. Two years
later the Chennai Master Plan 2026 of CMDA was approved by Go TN in Sept 2008. There was
a headline in the Times of India around the same time “Multi-crore infrastructure plan”. The
news item went on to state “The landscape of Chennai is all set for a metamorphosis. When the
Rs 32,700 crore plan for the metro is completed as scheduled in 10 years, the city's skyline will
be dotted with elevated highways, rapid transit ways for buses, truck terminals, mono-rail, a
dozen more flyovers and several rail over / under bridges and multi-level car parks to
accommodate the needs of an ever-growing populace.”

In Chennai we can observe a different trend than other cities in that CMDA is an agency
which has largely given up planned layout (sites and services) development and thereby allowed
the entry of such big and small developers to enter the market with varied upper middle class and
7
commercial sites and services. The question is why? The reason is to create space for a bigger
role of real estate developers and speculators.

In October 1979, in an Aide Memoir of the Madras Urban Development Project- II the
World Bank “had stipulated as precondition for negotiation that community development
personnel should be added to Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board’s and Tamil Nadu Housing
Board’s engineering divisions implementing the slum improvement and Sites and Services
respectively …..under the authority of Superintending Engineer. The World Bank observed that
since MMDA is a planning body it need not burden itself with implementing programmes.” This
is how a Community Development office headed by a Chief Community Development officer
started functioning in the TNSCB. Similarly an office also began in the TNHB.

This MUDP –II (1982-88) was for India's fourth largest city (population then 5 million) to
“develop /expand low-cost solutions to urban problems” begun under MUDP-I. It supported the
prioritisation of shelter and infrastructure investments in the Madras Metropolitan Area, ‘to make
them more responsive to the needs of the urban poor’. It was meant to strengthen the institutions
such as those responsible for shelter (TNSCB & TNHB), infrastructure (Chennai Corpn), and
transport (PTC, later MTC) by encouraging greater emphasis on cost recovery.

MUDP-II was to support: (a) the development of about 15,000 residential and about 200
industrial plots on two sites totaling about 180 ha, provision of community services; (b)
provision of basic infrastructure and land tenure to about 50,000 slum households and provision
of home improvement loans and grants to about 80,000 slum households; (c) purchase of about
550 buses and depot improvements for PTC and construction and improvement of two roads
linking sites and services areas to employment centers; (d) civil works and equipment to improve
solid waste collection and infrastructure maintenance in the MMC;

The objectives of the TNSCB are stated as follows:

 To clear all slums in Chennai & other towns in Tamil Nadu by providing self contained
hygienic tenements
 To prevent growth of slums & encroachments
8
  To prevent eviction of slum dwellers by private owners and to provide slum families
security of tenure

 To provide basic amenities like water supply, street lights, storm water drains, sewer line,
etc to slum areas

One of the reasons for starting the Community Development wing in TNSCB would have
been to ensure that continuous relocation of the slum dwellers and restructuring of the city
should not come in for opposition /criticism. Any backlash should be prevented. Therefore the
office was housed in TNSCB in 1980 to generate “people’s participation” in the World Bank
loan viz., MUDP –II. This would actually be practiced in the form of liaisoning and building
rapport with the slum dwellers to get them to extend support for the project objectives. Some of
these participation activities came to include the cleaning of roads, garbage collection, delivery
of water, sewerage blockage cleaning, toilet cleaning etc.

Over the years, Chennai has witnessed a change in development concepts such as
the new mega land projects which are coming up with the entry of private sector real estate
companies setting up integrated townships. A study report was released in 2002-03 (during the
period of drafting the Master Plan) by Trammell Crow Megharaj Property Consultants which
was prepared for Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI),
recommended that with spatial expansion of the city there was a need for integrated
developments offering quality of life in neighbourhoods with workplaces and shopping etc in the
same locations.

This is likely to have an impact on the city with development becoming more oriented
towards private sector led growth, especially towards trading, manufacturing, and IT/ ITES
sectors with many other sectors such as construction, hospitality / hotels and commercial office
space, roads, development, transport etc backing up this growth in the city’s priority economy
sectors. The relatively newer IT/ ITES/ BPO and services sector is also slowly displacing
manufacturing industry for the top spot in terms of exports turnover.

9
 In the preceding 4-5 years the demand for land has pushed up prices exponentially around
the small scale and industrial pockets in South Chennai towards the growing “IT corridor” area
and east coast road. Land values on the Rajiv Gandhi Salai (Old Mahabalipuram Road) rose 40
per cent in just one year 2003-04. At Shollinganallur, further down the same road, rates were
calculated in many crores /ha1. It is clear that these increases have resulted from the state
government's IT policy which also allowed IT companies to be established inside existing
industrial estates, in order to make up for shortage of available land. Since 2003 the price for
land within the industrial estates in Guindy and Ambattur has escalated by approx 50 per cent.
Chennai is not only the fourth largest metropolitan city in India and capital of Tamil
Nadu but it is also one of the important trading ports in South India. It started its nucleus with a
fort, and then the city grew by amalgamating nearby fisher settlements and villages. These older
sections of the city, which now form the mainly residential zones, are now fully built-up and
overstretched. Localities like George Town have changed their basic character from residential
to commercial.

Many poor migrants, labourers and construction workers settled in these areas putting up
their small hutments and slums began to come up. They started living in areas which could give
regular work in the informal sector such as by becoming coolies for loading / unloading of goods
as well as domestic work for women. These slum areas were to be found on govt lands and some
were adjoining the rivers such as Adyar and Cooum (Coombe) which ran through from North to
South Chennai. They were also on pavements roadsides and near railway lines. Similarly a
fairly high percentage was also settled on private lands.

1
According to various news items in the Hindu, and web-based information.
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 Slum Population in Chennai -- 2001 census (TNSCB website)

From the data based on the surveys of the TNSCB in 1971 and 1986 the population of
slum dwellers has doubled in about 30 years from 7.37 lakhs to 14.3 lakhs in 2001. This means
that a huge population of urban poor has been added to the city over this period which needs to
be provided all the basic services and facilities for a decent quality of life.

With a population growth rate of more than nine per cent in the last decade, the spatial
expansion in Chennai city has continued to occur. With the influence of the World Bank projects
the Tamil Nadu government has also taken up various economic reforms with a view to achieve
8 to 10 per cent state GDP growth per year. The State Planning Commission wants GoTN to tap
private sector resources to take up urban infrastructure development projects, particularly in
water supply, sanitation and solid waste management; sectors which have been prepared for
public private partnerships.

11
 In its document on the 11th Plan, the Commission said funding under the Jawaharlal
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and other schemes of the Union
government might improve the situation of fund availability but only marginally, that too in
respect of cities such as Chennai, Madurai and Coimbatore. “There is an urgent need for a
massive infusion of investment to make Tamil Nadu’s urban centres liveable and make them
achieve world standards,” the document said, adding that the investment could come through
public private partnerships.

GoTN’s strategy for resettlement of slum communities

The TNSCB is the main agency involved with the resettlement and rehabilitation of the
slum dwellers in Chennai. “The main aim of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board is to clear
the slums especially those located in flood prone and other vulnerable areas and to resettle them
in self contained hygienic houses with basic amenities near the urban limits and to provide basic
amenities like drinking water supply, roads, storm water drain, P.C. units, sewage disposal, street
lights, etc. to all the slums.” (Policy Note 2002-03)

Before the formation of the TNSCB during the period of 1950 to 1971 the Madras
Corporation had already taken up relocation and construction of tenements for many slum
dweller households. There is also a long association of the Madras Corporation with the World
Bank loan project through MUDP-I and II from 1977 – 1988 as explained earlier. Many “good,
leading and best practices” were tested during this time especially for dealing with slum dwellers
and households.

Post 1991 Chennai ranked third in terms of population in slums and first in terms of
slums per sq km among big cities in the country. After the census revealed such a huge increase
in the population of slum dwellers in 2001 it is also apparent that the political parties have had a
strong relationship with the urban poor in terms of where the projects to house them are located.
Due to this the TNSCB tenements scheme which was on the one hand to introduce cost recovery
were constructed in constituencies of the ruling parties in power whether DMK or ADMK. The

12
electoral victories of the political parties seemed to be closely linked to the sital locations of
construction of these tenements as well.

The TN Govt was working with a strategy to resettle slum dwellers and also to evict
many slums and low income areas for a long period. T N S C B also developed four
Rehabilitation Schemes at Velachery, Kodungayur, Pallikaranai, and Okium Thoraipakkum to
resettle urban poor households. To identify the number of households to be resettled the
TNSCB sponsored a survey of slums which was conducted by Tata Consultancy Group from
2002-03 onwards.

This slum survey seems to have been disguised as an attempt to locate those areas which
would fit the definition of a slum (Sec: 3 (i) (a) Chapter II of TN Slum Areas (Improvement &
Clearance) Act 1971). But rather, it was a process of identifying all those sites which were
found on objectionable and unobjectionable areas. Objectionable slums were those which
encroached a variety of lands such as govt lands, river banks, roadsides / pavements, corner plots
of land etc. Once these were identified there was a pressure formed under various projects to
evict such people and resettle them in a rehabilitation site far away from the original location.
This had been supported mainly by the TNSCB as the agency with the major responsibility. As
the culmination of the above mentioned survey various depts such as City Corporation of
Chennai, TNSCB, Indian Railways and CMDA jointly prepared a list of nearly 74, 000
households who would need to be evicted, since they were located in such objectionable and
unobjectionable locations which the survey had identified. This list of households now also
features in the recently approved Chennai Second Master Plan 2026.

There is also an initiative of the Chennai authorities in keeping with the National Housing
and Habitat Policy 2007 to allow the delivery of low income group (LIG) and economically
weaker section (EWS) housing through public -private partnership. According to the second
Master Plan they now allow additional Floor Space Index (FSI) of 0.25 to private promoters for
building LIG / EWS housing and also by providing for reservation of 10% of the land where the
site exceeds one hectare, for development of LIG/EWS housing with flat size not exceeding 45

13
sq. m each, either within the site or in a separate site in a 2 km radius. It seems like this is also in
conformity with JNNURM conditions.

The TNSCB had already identified a few sites in North and South Chennai as mentioned
earlier for the rehabilitation of slum families and was already moving people to some places such
as Okium Thoraipakkum from 1998 itself. TNSCB had availed of the special problem grant of
Rs.54.00 crs from the 10th Finance Commission, GoI for the improvement of slums in Chennai
city. With this grant construction of 6500 houses at Okium Thoraipakkum was taken up. By
2002-03 4265 houses were allotted to slum families who were living on the alignment of MRTS
and in other “objectionable places”.

The rehabilitation sites identified were close to existing small and big industrial estates.
After the Tsunami in the Bay of Bengal in Dec 2004 it was decided to relocate families of many
of the fishermen and non-fisherfolk who lived close to the coastline, by bringing them to either
Okium Thoraipakkum or Semancheri. This was an attempt to clean up these areas to create
spaces for tourism, recreation, hotels and hospitality to allow for more lucrative business
opportunities. These rehabilitation sites are located more than 20 kms from the centre of
Chennai. They were located close to swampy and marshy lands in which there was regular
dumping of sewerage, solid waste etc from nearby villages and from Chennai city. This had led
to contamination of ground water table rendering the water non-potable.

Resettlement of tsunami affected people has taken place post Dec 2004 and these people
have also been relocated to the above areas. GoTN is also threatening those who live in coastal
areas (along the beaches) with resettlement arguing that 1) they might be vulnerable to future
disasters and 2) they are ‘eyesores ’2 and need to be removed for beautification of the city. So two
main groups of people being resettled are slums (kuppams) from core areas and unauthorized
slums from coastal areas although many more slums from core areas are being resettled (35
slums from core areas and 3 from coastal areas in Kannaginagar; 12 from core areas and 3 from
coastal areas in Semancheri).

2
As mentioned in the Second Chennai Master Plan 2026
14
 With an idea of ‘Singara Chennai’ a project for beautification of the Marina Beach front
(Kamarajar Salai) at a cost of Rs 100 crs and an Adyar Eco-Park (Adyar Poonga) has been
launched. This has been done after the slum dwellers residing there had been evicted. This park
was given clearance in June 2004. Chennai City Corporation built most of the boundary wall for
the park for about Rs 1.5 crs in 2006, though remaining portion could not be constructed due to
slum dwellers continuing to live there. Later on, the Corporation decided to move those staying
at Rajah Gramani Thottam and allotted TNSCB houses in Semancheri to them in July 2007.
Immediately after this was done, in August 2007 the foundation stone of Adyar Poonga was laid
by the Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi. The 145 ha park is located in the Adyar river
embankments area. It is supposed to be one of the first eco-tourism ventures by the Govt in
Chennai.

TNSCB then took up a programme to resettle all the remaining slum families living in
“objectionable and unobjectionable locations” in Chennai, Madurai & Coimbatore in self
contained tenements with required basic services. It is proposed to make these mega cities in
Tamil Nadu namely Chennai, Madurai & Coimbatore slum-free by 2013. This housing
construction programme under the Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP) mission of JNNURM
is funded by GoI and Go TN. Already so far, about 25000 households have been evicted and it
is likely there are plans to resettle a further 75000 households (Master Plan 2008).

The slum dwellers so relocated will also be forced to pay for the housing in the form of a
hire-purchase system which is in use for tenements in Chennai for a few decades. While lease
cum sale agreements are signed between the women of the household and TNSCB, it is not
considered a patta or a legal land title. So while they are paying cost of construction and other
charges on a monthly basis they are not guaranteed of secure land tenure. This also seeks to bring
them into a formal system of economy, including the payment of user charges / service tariffs for
water supply, electricity, solid waste management and for the provision of other facilities.

In the earlier locations they had already invested large amounts of hard earned money in
their local economy/ livelihoods for the hutment/ shanty, where they stayed. Like others they
already paid various forms of indirect taxes and maybe bribes if required, to get access to
15
resources and use the resources they needed to survive. Similarly the facilities for their children
like schooling, vocations and training etc were available close by.

Despite the urban poor being resettled in sites far away from their original place of
livelihood and work it seems that they still traverse long distances at extra cost to reach such
places where they are assured of a regular income. Especially older men and women who
worked as security guards or domestic help and young school children who go to school near
their place of original residence are put to great hardships. This is because in the new sites
sources of steady employment are not yet consistently available.

Densifying the urban fabric

As explained earlier, GoTN has implemented a policy to cut down the in-migration of
some categories of workers to the city. At the same time there is clearly a marked preference in
attracting highly skilled workers here. The new Master Plan makes a statement of intent that
there would be a greater densification of the population in Chennai. The gross density is
expected to rise on projected population demand from 247/ ha to 330 / ha by 2026. So it is highly
questionable why is it that only the poor are being moved out from core areas of the city. This
seems to indicate that it is only the need for attaining and maintaining a higher economic growth
and GDP targets which are driving the policy formulation process. And clearly this is due to the
proposed land use changes in the new Master Plan. While there is a marginal increase in land
area in hectares in Chennai city from existing land use in 2006 to 2026, the area covered by
roads shows an enormous jump of 10 % (about 1600 ha). At the same time there is also a big
increase proposed under open space and recreational use. (4 ½ % increase -644 ha).

Development Control Rules of the first master plan had been reviewed taking into
account the suggestions of various stakeholders such as real estate developers and builders and
general public, and redrafted to suit the present and future requirements and were included in the
new master plan 2026.

16
 For the urban poor it seems almost all the avenues of participating on an equal footing in
the informal sector economy are getting closed off and they are now being forced to fend for
themselves, since many years after the relocation of the original settlers in 1998-99,
Kannaginagar still faces an uphill task in terms of provision of basic facilities like water supply,
electricity, transportation and employment / livelihood opportunities. Similarly there is not
adequate thought given to need for appropriate income compensation packages. The same
applies for Semancheri as well. On the other hand the TNSCB has been able to establish a strong
position in terms of user charges, lease cum sale agreements and a number of other so called
entitlements while in no way guaranteeing security of tenure for the occupants.

References

1. Policy Note on TNSCB 2002-03 http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/archives/policy2002-

03/tnscb-2003.htm

2. TNSCB and Slum (http://www.gotn-tnscb.org.in/aboutslum.htm)

3. Newspaper articles

4. Chennai Second Master Plan 2026 (Sept 2008)

5. Web based sources of data and information from TN Govt, CMDA, and City Corporation
of Chennai.

17
Chapter 2: Impact on Resettled People

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of resettlement projects on the urban
poor. As mentioned in the last chapter, residents of squatter settlements in locations identified as
“objectionable” at the core area and coastal areas of the city were shifted to five sites outside the
city.

Of these, Semancheri and Kannaginagar were explored for this study. These two sites
house the largest in terms of number of households relocated. Together they constitute about 80
percent of households resettled. GoTN policy notes (2008-09) suggest that this proportion will
remain the same in the future. Both these sites are located in the fast-growing peripheries of
South Chennai, adjoining the IT Corridor area, and are approximately 20 km from the city
centre.

Approximately 42 individual and small group interviews were conducted in both case
study areas. These included interactions with panchayat and municipal council members,
women’s groups, youth and male SHGs, local associations, local leaders, particularly women
leaders (leaders from political parties, religious groups) and local government officials. Photo
documentation of the two areas was done over several field visits.

This chapter shows that the resettlement has had an adverse impact on people resettled
from slums in both core areas and coastal areas. Adverse impacts can be classified under three
main categories: 1) Reduced access to basic services especially water; 2) Reduced economic and
employment opportunities; and 3) Psycho-socio impact.

There are four sections in this chapter. The first section provides a brief history of each
case study area, followed by an elaboration of the impacts under the three heads described
earlier.

18
Background of the study area

Kannaginagar, spread over an area of 52.9 ha, at present houses 13000 households evicted from
around 40 squatter settlements from the core and the coastal areas of the city. They were
resettled during different times, starting from 1997. Those resettled between 1997 and 2004 were
from different settlements in the core area. After the Tsunami of 2004, squatter settlements along
the coastal area of the city were targeted for this programme.

At the time of this study, 15000 units were available of which 2000 houses are yet to be allotted,
Each house measures 180 sft. A Slum Board engineer has stated that 10000 more houses will be
constructed under JNNURM and other government projects. Kannaginagar comes under Okium
Thoraipakkam Town Panchayat.

The first group of evictees to be moved into this area, around 500 households, were those evicted
from two slums─ one was from near Reserve Bank and another opposite to the Secretariat. The
evictees were resettled in 2-storey buildings. The largest number to be resettled was between
1998 and 2000. In Aug 2000 alone, 7000 households were shifted from different settlements
along Buckingham Canal to Kannaginagar. This eviction was influenced by the State’s strategy
to beautify the city and widen the canal for the Metro Rail project (which they subsequently
didn’t lay). In 2002, Slum Board shifted about 2000 households in order to implement the Metro
Rail project.

From 2005 onwards, residents of squatter settlements along the coastal area were shifted to
Kannaginagar among other sites. The first batch of 1265 households came in February 2005. In
Jan 2008, 375 households were moved from near Besantnagar beach after a brief period of
resistance by occupiers.

The second location - Semancheri was established originally for rehabilitation of people from
core areas. At present there are around 6500 constructed units of which 4500 have been
occupied. In around 2004, approximately 200 households (from 1 slum) were shifted due to the
construction of Adyar Poonga Eco-park. Around 2001-02, of the 8000 households evicted from
various settlements, 1000 moved to Semancheri. Another 2000 household moved into this area in
2005, and subsequently 600 households in 2006 and 700 households in 2007, as part of efforts
towards tsunami rehabilitation. Semancheri comes under Semancheri Gram Panchayat.
19
1. Reduced access to basic services, especially water

Access to Water: Both at Kannaginagar and Semancheri, people reported that they were
getting water daily in their previous settlements in both core areas and coastal areas. After being
resettled, however, residents complained of irregular as well of poor quality water supply. The
table below provides a comparison of water services before and after resettlement in
Kannaginagar and Semancheri. It highlights reduced access to water services after relocation.

Before ─ After Comparison of Water Services

Water facilities in their previous place of residence (Before) Water supply in the resettled area
(After)

Kannaginagar Kannaginagar
Daily water via public taps from Metro Water at Sethupathu, Although there is one public standpost for
Mailai, Sathyavani muthu nagar every 18 households with one public tap or
handpump, water supply is restricted to
From Velachery to Tharamani
once in four days. Supply is limited to 8
Luz- MRTS Railway Station pots per family by Metro Water (a total of
Kotturupuram abt 9 lakh litres/dy). Additional water cost
likely to be incurred by the residents as
Neelangarai to Thoraipakkum Metro water is demanding water charges
Mailai to Ganeshapuram from the Slum Board, currently in charge
of maintaining water supply. Additional
Teynampet to Satyamurthynagar water is bought for Rs 1.50 per 15 l pot.
Kannapur Didul
KKnagar to Dr Ambedkar Nagar
Mandaveli to Rajah Kiromani Thottam
Neelangarai to Buckingham Kalvai
Ayiram Vilakku (Thousand Lights) to Valas Thottam (garden)
Mylapore to Thir nagar (Downing Kuppam)
Metu Kuppam

Semancheri
Daily water via public taps from Metro Water at previous
settlements at Sreenivasapuram to Onapuram
Perambur Baracks road, Adayaru thirantha Veli Poonga (Adyar
River Park)
Mambalam Main (Pradhani) Road Ayyasami Road
Kagren Basinpalam to Kathivakkam Nedunchalai Sandippo
(Kathivakkam Cross)
Semancheri
Every 12 households have a public tap.
Non-potable water is supplied every
alternate day for 1-2 hrs. Drinking water is
bought from private vendors for Rs 20-25
per 25 l can. Metro Water supplies water
and Slum Board maintains.

20
TT Nagar (Thi Vipatthu Pagudi- Fire Danger Road)
Maligai Pu Nagar to North Kesava Perumal Nagar Main Road

Source: Field work and TNSCB- 2008

The settlements of Kannaginagar and Semancheri were formed on marsh land that was
used for dumping garbage until 1995. Sewage and garbage from Chennai city was transported in
tankers and dumped in the marsh area. It is only since 1995 that the dumping of solid and liquid
waste has stopped. As a result of this prolonged dumping of garbage and sewage, the ground
water has been contaminated3. It is therefore not suited for drinking, washing or cooking.

At present, provision of water supply by the State, i.e., Metro water is via standpipes and
tanks. Since 2005, Metro Water has been supplying water in bulk ─ 9 lakh litres of water daily ─
from a borewell located 30-40 kms away from the resettlement site. Water from the borewell is
pumped into three sumps located within the resettlement sites. This bulk water is not treated but
chlorinated in 3 sumps located in Kannaginagar itself. Water is stored in the sumps and released
in a phased manner to different blocks. Distribution from the sump to the handpumps is managed
by a private contractor. Thus, the Slum Board (SB) buys bulk water from Metro Water and then
contracts out distribution to a private contractor. However, residents regularly tap water from the
sumps without waiting for release via public taps. The Slum Board has stopped locking the sump
gates because it is constantly broken. At Semmancheri, water supplied by Metro Water, is
blended with open well water and chlorinated in SB’s 2 sumps before distributing it to residents.

Residents interviewed stated that the present supply of water is inadequate in terms of
quantity and quality. It is useful to note that water is supplied via stand posts once in every four
days and each household is able to get approximately 120 litres of water per day (ref. table).
Each household has between 5-6 members, thus the per capita availability per day, per person is
about 6 l per day, which is far below the recommended per capita consumption. In addition,
residents also argued that this water is not of potable quality and so many households were

3
Ground water tests conducted by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board also indicated the unsuitability of the
ground water for domestic consumption. No borewell is dug in both Semancheri and Kannaginagar. See also the
website of Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/archives/policy2002-03/tnscb-
2003.htm
21
purchasing one canister of water each for drinking (Rs 20 for one 25 l can) from private
suppliers. In addition, in one of the resettlement site, viz., Kannaginagar, although the number of
households have increased over the years, there has not been a corresponding increase in the
quantity of water supplied. It is interesting to note that in another settlement, viz., Semancheri,
with the increase in the number of household, the Metro Water has made provision for an
additional 2 lakhs of water.

Water pots waiting for release from handpumps Private water supplier selling water

Attempts by local residents to tap the ground water have resulted in skin and health
disorders. As a result, the residents are forced to use only water supplied via tankers and other
external sources of water supply, including private suppliers. In both locations Metro Water
supplies untreated bulk water daily through tankers and via stand posts.

Public Action for Water Access

Inhabitants have staged many protests since 2000, but there has been no improvement in water
quantity or quality. To cope with water shortages, each block has an arrangement with a private
water supplier. Further, many households have taken illegal water connections from the main
pipeline with the help of local leaders and the watermen of the private contractor hired by Tamil
Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB). The residents were paying Rs 200 to the local leader as
connection charges and, in addition, make occasional payments to the watermen to ensure
regular supply of water. TNSCB watermen estimate that 2 lakh liters of water are illegally tapped
everyday, in this manner. They suggest that if illegal tapping stops they can supply water to
Kannaginagar on alternative days instead of once in 4 days, as is happening.
22
 Due to pressure from Kannaginagar residents, Okium Thoraipakkam Town Panchayat is
now planning to dig borewells near the main road on Panchayat land and supply water to the
resettlement site. The Panchayat has identified a land parcel and is in the process of checking the
water quality. Kannaginagar residents stated that this has happened due to their increased voting
power. Interviews with TNSCB officials and Police reveal that they too have pressurized the
Town Panchayat to take responsibility for supplying water arguing that increased crimes and
tension in Kannaginagar are linked to lack of basic services such as adequate provisioning for
water supply and electricity.

In Semancheri water is supplied from nearby private open wells and from Metro Water.
Earlier Semancheri relied solely on 2 lakh litres of daily water supplied through tankers from
nearby private open wells. Due to residents’ complaints of water shortages and the increase in
number of people in 2005 due to the tsunami, the TNSCB started supplying another 2 lakh liters
per day tanker water from Metro Water.

Under JNNURM, which covers both these locations, it is proposed to extend individual
water supply connections to each household, and to recover connection charges in installments.
Initially TNSCB will advance the water connection charges to Metro water, and will recover it
from the residents in monthly installments. Following the provision of individual connections,
public taps will be disbanded by 2011 (JNNURM CDP Chennai). Metro Water is proposing to
increase water supply in 2009-10 by 3 lakh litres to Kannaginagar and 1.5 MLD to Semancheri.
Their aim is to address the backlog in water supply as well as to provide for additional
households, given the proposal for increased housing under JNNURM.

Status of Housing

Those who have been resettled to Kannaginagar and Semancheri came from slums
deemed “objectionable” and as such they did not possess any land title. The situation remains
much the same in Kannaginagar and Semancheri with people, being issued only a temporary
possession certificate in the name of the women head of the family. There is no clarity on the
entitlement of this temporary possession certificate.

23
 Garbage/sewage dumped behind houses in resettled site G+2 housing in resettlement sites

In Kannaginagar, there was G+1 housing earlier and the size of house was 8x12sft. From
2002, G+2 housing has been constructed and the area increased to 12x14 sft. In Semancheri,
there is G+1 housing and the size of house has remained at 12x14sft. In the next phase, G+2
housing will be constructed to accommodate the households to be resettled. There is a proposal
to resettle another 74000 household in the four resettlement sites including Kannaginagar and
Semancheri.

Under JNNURM, house size in both locations will increase to 295 sft and will include
individual power, water and toilet connections. A city JNNURM official stated that 9,000 units
of multi-storied housing in Kannaginagar and 19,000 in Semancheri are being developed under
the Basic Services for the Poor (BSUP) component of JNNURM. Some buildings are G+3 and
some G+6 and G+7. The TNSCB also proposes that residents contribute 10% of the down
payment of house (inclusive of water, power and toilet connections) as per the financing scheme
of BSUP. This 10% will be enabled through a bank via a loan arrangement and monthly EMI.
The house dweller will be asked to pay for monthly tariffs for water and power.

24
Reduced access to power

Prior to being resettled in these two locations, people in slums in core areas and coastal
areas had access to power through illegal connections for which they did not pay anything. After
being resettled, there was no power connection initially in both Kannaginagar and Semancheri.
After local people protested for power connections, a few households were given legal
connections by the TNSB without any deposit. From 2006 onwards, those deemed tsunami-
affected were eligible for free connections but this is yet to be implemented. Those deemed non-
tsunami affected can pay a lumpsum of Rs 1600 as meter and connection charge to the TNSCB
who pays this to TNEB who then gives the connection. Totally, about 2100 households in
Semancheri and nearly 5000 households in Kannaginagar have got legal power connections. The
TNSCB has given TNEB linesmen numbers to Semancheri people so they can complain to them
when needed.

Those who don’t have legal connections pay Rs 500-1000 to local leaders for an illegal
connection. Every time the connection gets cut they pay Rs 150 to local leaders and this amount
is variable. Frequency of disconnection was stated to be approximately once per week when load
is high, particularly in summers.

The police have intervened to ask TNEB to give legal power connections and give
awareness melas about power connections. In October, the TNEB planned to hold a 2 day camp
to build awareness and mobilize new legal connections. The local police say that this might
become a regular feature.

2. Reduced economic and employment opportunities

Employment opportunities have reduced overall after the move to the resettlement site.
There was a reduction in the number of and type of jobs, and income earned (See Annexure 1 for
a brief description of employment opportunities available at their previous place of residence and
after resettlement). There has been a shift in the type of jobs among resettlers. As the table below
reveals, earlier people from slums in Srinivaspuram, Slatepuram and other areas were involved
in activities like construction, domestic work, fishing related activities, vending, and working in

25
services like security, petrol bunks, and driving auto rickshaws. After resettlement, fishing
related jobs and working in petrol bunks and security services have almost completely stopped.
This has meant a job loss of about 20% in both Kannaginagar and Semancheri.

Of the job opportunities still available to people in Kannaginagar and Semancheri,

construction work and domestic work account for the largest employment. . Even in these two
occupations, local people reported that the number of jobs has reduced by 50%.

Selling food in front of her house in resettlement site TV repair shop in resettlement site

Employment Options:

One reason for high rate of unemployment can be attributed to the physical location of
the resettlement site in the city. Although Kannaginagar and Seemencheri is located in a location
adjoining IT corridor, there are indequate employment opportunities. Of importance here is the
availability of multiple options to earn an income, similar to their previous place of residence.
Prior to their move into the resettlement sites, people were engaged in multiple business
activities at different times of the year which served to enhance their incomes. For instance,
fishing related work was seasonal and often supplemented other work4. Earlier women could
combine several hours of domestic work in the day with vending and selling fried fish in the
4
This work involves loading and unloading from boats (men), transporting (men), drying, cooking and
selling/vending fish (women). Older people (mainly women over 45 yrs) are working full day on this. Younger
women do this part time in the evening for 2-3 hours. Selling happens outside the area by young people, older
people are selling within the area in their own specific location on the beach. This work follows the fishing season
(excepting July-Oct) and tourist season (summer)

26
evening. This is not possible in Kannaginagar and Semancheri because of the distance and
expense involved in reaching their workplace (discussed further in the section on mobility).
Those women who still do domestic work leave with their children in the morning, drop them at
school and then go on to work before bringing them back in the evening. They continue to work
as domestic help, they say, mainly so their children can continue going to school. Earlier,
proximity to firewood, vegetable and fishing markets enabled people to do loading and
unloading work, vending and selling food like fried fish. This is no longer possible in
Kannaginagar or Semancheri. Taken together, we see that resettlement has stunted slum
dwellers’ opportunities for economic growth.

The only employment opportunity that has increased at the resettlement site is that of
driving auto rickshaws, which provides a livelihood to approximately a total of 250 families in
both areas. Driving auto rickshaws is an enterprise/occupation that has increased among
resettlers because of poor bus facilities from the city. There are both share autos (which seat
about 10 people) and regular autos. 40 percent of autos and drivers (share and regular) are new to
their jobs. Auto rickshaw drivers (share and regular) make about Rs 5000-6000 per month, if
they own the vehicle and Rs 3000-4000 per month, were they to lease their vehicles. Regular
autos cost less to run than share autos but transport fewer people. People make more money on
share autos but at present, these are not being manufactured. Second hand share autos are very
expensive. Most people have bought their share and regular autos through loans from banks and
private financiers.

A second factor that has constrained the ability to secure jobs among the resettled
population is related to mobility. It includes the lack of transportation facilities to move into the
city. It is useful to note here that resettlers still travel to their previous place of residence for jobs.
For example, Kannaginagar is situated on the peripheries of the city, about 20 km from the centre
of Chennai. Located about 1.5 km from the main road, buses are very limited with only 10 buses
serving a population of more than a lakh. People have to rely on share autos which charge Rs 7
to drop them to the main road. Field interviews also reveal that overall incomes have fallen due
to increased costs of transport and longer time taken to travel to the work place and back.
Mobility constraints have particularly affected women’s ability to engage in the labour market as

27
 compared to men in the two resettlement sites. 75 percent of women who were involved in
occupation like domestic work are now unemployed.

Before- After Comparison of Employment opportunities

Employment opps –previous place of residence (Before) Employment opportunity in the resettled area (After)

Housekeeping, domestic work, construction, fishing Kannaginagar

related, vending, security work at Sethupathu
- Construction (80% men) in Adyar, Parrys, Broadway, New
Mailai Sathyavani muthu nagar- bus std area
From Velachery to Tharamani - housekeeping (400-500 youth) in IT Corridor area
Luz- MRTS Railway Station - domestic work (40% women) wherever they were
working/living earlier
Kotturupuram
- Security (<100 older people) where they used to live
Neelangarai to Thoraipakkum
- Auto driving- about 70 share autos and 80 autos providing
Mailai to Ganeshapuram
livelihood to approx 70 lease-auto families and earnings to
Teynampet to Satyamurthynagar about 80 owner-auto families
Kannapur Didul
KKnagar to Dr Ambedkar Nagar
Mandaveli to Rajah KiromaniThottam
Neelangarai to Buckingham Kalvai
Ayiram Vilakku (Thousand Lights) to Valas Thottam
(garden)
Mylapore to Thir nagar ( Downing Kuppam)
Metu Kuppam

Semancheri
Semancheri
Sreenivasapuram to Onapuram
Construction (80% men) in same core areas they used to work
Perambur Baracks road
- Domestic work (35% women) in same core areas they used
Adayaru thirantha Veli Poonga (Adyar River Park) to work
Mambalam Main (Pradhani) Road - Housekeeping (500 youth) in IT Corridor area
Ayyasami Road - Security (<100 older people) in same core areas they used to
work
Kagren Basinpalam to Kathivakkam Nedunchalai
Sandippo (Kathivakkam Cross) - Auto driving- about 60 share autos and 40 autos providing
livelihood to approx 80 lease-auto families and earnings to
TT Nagar ( Thi Vipatthu Pagudi- Fire Danger Road)
about 20 owner-auto families.
Maligai Pu Nagar to North Kesava Perumal Nagar Main
Road

Source: Field work in Aug-Sept 2008 and TNSCB

28
Another factor that has affected women’s ability to work in Kannaginagar is the lack of safety.
Crime rates, in general, and against women, in particular, are higher in Kannaginagar. Police
officials interviewed speculated that two of the dominant reasons for higher crime rates are
related to the high rate of unemployment, particularly among youth, and high drop-out rates
among children due to inadequate school facilities (see section on Pscyo-socio impacts). The
case of Babu, a petty shop owner in Kannaginagar provides illustration of economic hardships
faced after resettlement.

Babu is a petty shop owner from Orukuppam who shifted three and a half years ago to
Kannaginagar. He has four children and all the four children were working when they lived in
Orukuppam. His daughters were working in textile shops and his sons were working as office
boys. He was doing the same business in Orukuppam and earning a good income because the
people in the area were earning more. He was engaged in multiple business activities: along with
running a petty shop he bought fish, cooked and sold it in the evening and earned more than
Rs.500 per day. His father was a fisherman but he did not continue this work because he was
not interested in it. In Orukuppam they had 24 hours water supply, good bus facilities and also
sufficient space to carry out business activities.

When he moved to Kannaginagar, he asked the TNSCB to provide him with a shop, as
had been promised by the Collector at the time of resettlement to those displaced people who had
owned shops. The TNSCB told him that he would have to pay Rs.15000 as deposit for a shop
and go through a long tendering process. Only the highest bidder would get the shop and this
would be a process that would be repeated every year. So he decided to start his own petty shop
in the space in front of his house in Kannaginagar. For this he invested Rs. 2000 and makes a
profit of Rs.100-120 per month.
Higher crime rates in Kannaginagar have had other adverse impacts on the family’s
earnings: lowered safety has meant that Babu cannot send his daughters to work. Last month his
shop was broken into and Rs.1000 stolen.

29
Psycho-socio impacts

In the earlier section, it was pointed out that the crime rate was relatively high in the
resettlement sites. The move to a new place in itself, has consequence for psycho-socio well
being. The adverse impact on their psycho-social health is further reinforced because of lack of
basic facilities, employment opportunities and crime. For instance, Kannaginagar suffers from a
lack of basic facilities as compared to Semancheri and has a reputation as a “high crime” area.
As a result employers are reluctant to provide jobs to people from that location. In addition,
public transport workers, and other field bureaucrats are reluctant to visit the area to provide
appropriate services. In a way, these residents suffer from a form of exclusion. In the following
section, we elaborate on the multiple factors contributing to the cycle of criminalization in the
resettlement site.

The cycle of criminalisation

A lack of education and high rate of unemployment together with inadequate basic facilities,
contributes to increased drug addiction and, illegal activities. The perception of residents in
resettlement colonies as criminals is further reinforcing their difficulties to join the labour
market, which in turn provides a breeding ground for criminalization.

Lack of social
and physical
Infrastructure
Reinforcement
of constraints in
finding jobs
Constraints in
Cycle of securing
employment
Criminalisation
Engagement in
Criminal
activities

Societal perception of
Increase in
resettlers as criminals
criminal activities

30
 Public action to secure basic services has been interpreted as criminal activity. The
perception of resettlers as criminals is a dominant one among the police and the public. Since
1997 people have been protesting for power and water in Kannaginagar. During 1998, 500
households got power connections and public taps were set up for every 56 households. The
situation was relatively peaceful because there were fewer families who had access to some basic
facilities. After 2002, an additional 9000 households were shifted to this site, without improving
basic facilities. This intensified residents’ protests for basic amenities, especially for water and
power. Protests soon turned violent with several blockades of the main Mahabalipuram road
resulting in the burning of public buses and the damaging of shops. Since then residents say that
police have recorded them as troublemakers and arrests have increased.

Field interviews reveal that from 2004 onwards the police have taken, on average, 10
people per day to the police station for questioning. Moreover, if there is any problem in the
vicinity, they first come and take Kannaginagar people for questioning. They have created a list
of “troublemakers” / criminals, who they arrest first. While these “troublemakers” may number a
few people (about 300-500), all the residents of Kannaginagar have gained a reputation as
criminals. The perception among the State Government policy makers seems to be that incidence
of crime is a law and order problem which needs to be dealt with by the police. Factors pushing
residents to engage in such activities are rarely analysed.

Interviews with Kannaginagar residents as well as the field officials of the police
department, slum clearance board, water board, electricity board and panchayat members,
revealed several reasons for this criminalization.

A TNSB engineer stated that the Okium Thoraipakkam Panchayat is responsible for
providing solid waste management, street lights and street cleaning, and maintenance of drains
but it is not doing anything for this area. The Panchayat however does not extend these services
to Kannaginagar because property tax is not collected from the resettlers and there is no
incentive for the panchayat to provide services. A local councilor stated that the Panchayat hasn’t
even fixed the rate at which properties should be taxed. The TNSCB is only responsible for
maintenance of buildings and water connections/taps yet local people approach TNSCB and not
the Panchayat when they have a problem. There seems to be a mismatch between the

31
government institutions responsible for provision of services and those agencies (like TNSCB)
that people see as being responsible.

Criminalisation is made worse because there is high unemployment, including many

unemployed youth who steal and are part of gangs, poor basic facilities and no proper school
facilities. Latha, a leader in the Adi Pariyar Magiliar Peravai (womens dalit association) from
Kannaginagar describes the situation in more detail.

Latha was living in Lighthouse slum where they had all basic facilities, including good
bus facilities, and three-quarters of the women were working. In 2000, they were shifted to
Kannaginagar where there were no basic facilities and people, especially women, found it very
difficult to get jobs. Here, only a quarter of women are able to work. As they stay at home, they
have time to gossip about others and enter into illicit relationships with other men. This has
become a big problem with 10-15 cases being reported to the police, every day. Men who are
unemployed have started illegal activities like selling arrack and ganja because of which police
conduct regular raids and file cases against them. Additionally, because school facilities are
inadequate, there are many children who are drop-outs and they end up as ragpickers and petty
thieves.

Poor basic facilities have also led to much in-fighting among residents. Latha gives the
example of water which is supplied once in four days and causes tension and conflicts. Each
family gets only 8 pots of water, which is insufficient for their needs. Getting rations from the
ration shop is also another reason for conflict because there are only five ration shops for 13000
households. Fights commonly break out when residents crowd around the ration shops
demanding rations. Many of these fights end up in the police station. Another example is the
fights due to illegal power connections. Each street has one leader for giving illegal connections.
Those who do not pay money to the leader are beaten up and threatened. Sometimes there are
fights between leaders. Due to these illegal connections 15-20 local rowdies have been created.
These rowdies have good contacts with slum board, electricity board and police station. In the
past when there have been fights the police would arrest these leaders or rowdies and file cases
against them. Residents call illegal power connections accessed through local leaders as “rented
power”. They say that this constitutes a huge amount of money which TNEB is forfeiting and
this also contributes to Kannaginagar’s ‘criminal’ image.
32
 The criminalisation of Kannaginagar has had several direct impacts on residents. First on
their employability- they find it difficult to get domestic, construction or house keeping work due
to the reputation they have of being criminals. Second, the two schools within Kannaginagar
(one primary and one high school) are full and residents find it difficult to get admission into
private schools surrounding the area because of this reputation. Due to this, 45 percent of
children (both boys and girls) are dropouts. Dropouts are typically between the ages of 10-15.
Many children have become ragpickers. More boys have become addicted to drugs like thinner
and whitener, and alcohol. Third, getting access to credit and opening a bank account is difficult.
Only 1-2% of people in Kannaginagar and Semancheri have individual accounts; SHG accounts
are present in both locations. Fourth, people have stopped openly protesting about basic
facilities, as they are worried about the repercussions. They confine their protest to within
Kannaginagar and so their bargaining power with service providers has reduced. The TP
President (DMK govt) even refused to give them free TV and gas connection promised by DMK
government because he said there is no security for transporting and storing 15000 TVs.

Splitting up of slums during resettlement has reduced peoples’ bargaining power and
increased internal conflicts within the resettlement site

One of the main features of the TN Government’s (especially the DMK Government)
resettlement strategy is the “samathuvapuram” concept. This involved piecemeal eviction of
people from slums in core and coastal areas and resettlement in different streets of Kannaginagar
and Semancheri. This means that even when an entire slum is evicted it is not resettled in one
contiguous location within Kannaginagar or Semancheri. Francis, a pastor cum local leader,
describes how more than 30 slums located on both sides of Buckingham Canal were shifted to
Kannaginagar. The Government shifted them to Kannaginagar to clean and widen the canal and
also lay the metro rail track. Entire slums were not relocated, only people living within a radius
of 50 meters and in some places 100 meters from the canal, were shifted. The government did
not give any notice but one week prior to the shifting the officials came and informed residents
about the resettlement. They did not have any time to protest regarding the shifting.

33
 Piecemeal resettlement has created tensions among communities who have been settled at
different times and have access to different levels of facilities. Latha, from Kannaginagar, says
that different class and caste families are living next to each other, many of whom are strangers
to each other, and so there is no community environment. The tremendous shortage of basic
services in Kannaginagar and Semancheri means that local residents have to struggle among
themselves to gain access to them. Often higher caste residents corner most of the facilities
provided and this only increases internal conflicts.

The resettlement has also disrupted the social fabric, leadership and power structure of
the communities and made it harder for them to mobilize. Shanthi explains what resettlement in
Semancheri has meant for her community. She is from Srinivaspuram - near Santhom coastal
area. Earlier she says they had more power in Srinivaspuram because they knew all the officials
like police station, water board etc. If they had any problem they would approach the concerned
officials and get the work done. But now they do not know any of the officials and also do not
know whom to approach for basic facilities. Additionally, all the leaders have changed. Overall
we see that resettlement has reduced peoples’ bargaining power with local elected and non-
elected officials.

Findings from the field reveal that when people were resettled and the social relations
within their communities were broken, their alliances changed in response to their new situation.
Since in many places the entire slum wasn’t moved, it meant that many local leaders were not
relocated here. So, new leaders started emerging. There are totally about 25 new leaders,
including women leaders, in each location. Two types of new leaders seem to be most prominent.
They are:

1) Power connection and collection leaders: Power connection and collection leaders are
typically those who were earlier leaders in the slums from core areas. Following resettlement,
these leaders lost their connection to political networks and were seeking new political
opportunities and avenues to consolidate as a new political constituency. Dispensing illegal
power connections proved one way to do this. These leaders engage in limited negotiations with
service providers. Despite fulfilling new roles, they continue the same type of patron-client
relations with residents that they used to have.

34
2) Leaders of development associations: Each community that was shifted formed a development
association and selected their own leaders. Development association leaders are new leaders who
typically work through dalit associations and political parties (DPI, Adi Parayar Peravai-APP,
BSP). In Kannaginagar many of the development association leaders are pastors who recently
converted to Christianity. They regularly interact with each other.

The main aims of new leaders are to regain political bargaining powers that have been
lost due to eviction, to build a new constituency, and to pursue individual political ambitions. To
achieve these, they have identified several strategies. One route is via the electoral system. The
pastors organized one candidate for Town Panchayat President elections but he lost. For the next
elections they propose to support three contestants (one President and 2 member positions) from
their development associations. In a bid to establish political networks, local SHGs are being
promoted to align with the women’s wing of a political party, get women to be more actively
involved in political activities, and become a vote bank. Youth groups are also being promoted
by development associations along with State level dalit associations (parayar peravai) to take up
social and development issues.

Since new local leaders have not got much voice in the two main political parties in the
State, they are becoming increasingly interested in affiliating with newer political parties like
Dalit Panthers of India (DPI) and Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP), in particular with dalit parties
and dalit associations. This helps them to retain their alliance with DMK/AIADMK but also
expand their options by becoming affiliated with dalit parties and association. Perhaps one effect
of this strategy is using not only their vote as bargaining tool but also the fact that they will put
up their own candidate for election who could poach into the vote bank of existing elected
leaders. All these are aimed at increasing their bargaining power with the State via the political
parties. By contrast, old leaders remain aligned with DMK and AIADMK.

Besides employing these strategies to regain political bargaining powers, negotiations

with government agencies, in particular with officials, are being done by associations and adi
parayar. Development associations negotiate for better and more services from a range of
agencies (TNSCB, Tsunami special collector, Police, TNEB, water contractor). In the past they
have organized dharnas (2-3000 people in a peaceful rally to sit in front of agency) with dalit
associations and have written numerous letters to officials.
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 Development associations have been in existence for the last five years. Their impact in
terms of securing infrastructure services seems to be limited. They have managed to get limited
access to additional bulk water supply, tarred roads, and marginally increase the number of
public taps, and clearing of garbage. They are active on an ongoing basis. In addition to caste-
based associations, there is an association for those affected by Tsunami. This association deals
directly with the special tsunami project collector for amenities problems. A large part of their
struggles also had to do with fighting for “tsunami affected person” status because they are
eligible for special benefits then. They got this status in 2006. Tsunami associations work with
development associations only when the issue is a common and collective one like roads or
garbage.

Conclusion

This chapter reveals that even after several years of resettlement few services have been
provided to settlers. There is no clear institutional structure and policy in place for designing and
providing basic services to rehabilitated people. This means that there is no single government
agency that is responsible, particularly with respect to O&M and last mile connections. The
primary agency invested with authority for provision of services, the TNSCB, has a fractured
mandate and shortage of funds.

Due to resettlement in far away locations away from proper transportation, markets and
job opportunities, settlers’ economic opportunities and incomes have reduced. Prior to 2005, the
TNSCB had no program for providing income compensation or training in learning new skills
and upgrading existing ones. Since 2005, the TNSCB is giving income compensation and
training opportunities in Semancheri but these are limited, and are mostly geared towards
privileged beneficiaries like SHGs and fisher folk. No attention is paid to providing placement
opportunities after the completion of training. Also, this is not a standard policy that is
implemented across the board for those who have been resettled. It is mostly targeted towards
those affected by the tsunami.

The shifting of people from different slums has caused a distinct impact on their
collective bargaining powers. Existing capacities to demand improved basic facilities has been
36
restricted due to this. There is no satisfactory rebalancing of this bargaining power. This has
forced them to struggle for newer strategies to come together and mobilize for putting forward
their needs and demands to the authorities.

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Chapter III

Recommendations of the study and report

In the city of Chennai a series of urban reforms have been introduced by the means of attempts to
liberalise the economy in a manner favourable to private sector and especially corporate sector.
These measures include policy support, subsidies like cheap serviced land and access to finance
capital etc. This has happened to create an enabling environment for business growth. Similarly
supporting infrastructure through project construction was also taken up through various
schemes and development of sites and services. Such projects which are launched in the City
core area is leading to the eviction of many of the older commercial business hubs.

The highest impact of such projects is on the urban poor who are forced to move out of the city
to far away locations leaving their thriving local livelihoods behind.

Recommendations

1. Discussion with the project affected people (PAP’s) and evictees of development projects
revealed that there are very few spaces left in the central city areas for the urban poor to live
and work legitimately. Even the second Master Plan recommends resettlement of 74000 slum
households deemed to be living both in “objectionable” and “unobjectionable” sites over the
next few years. Prime central city locations are increasingly zoned and given for commercial
development while the urban poor are being removed from these locations. This is
completely unfair. We call for a portion of this prime centre city land to be dedicated for the
urban poor to live and work, particularly in those areas slated for densification where the
floor area ration (FAR) has been increased. It is important that the urban poor have legal title
to this land.

2. There are no proper policies to give basic facilities to resettlements and rehabilitation sites.
Slum Board needs to be clearly put in charge of developing resettlement sites with proper
facilities like water, electricity, drainage, and transportation. Adequate funding needs to be
allocated to the SB to carry out this task which, ideally, should be done before resettlement
takes place. Until the SB hands the resettlement site over to the concerned local government,
it needs to be in charge of maintaining these basic facilities. State departments in charge of
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 urban development need to ensure that the concerned local government has adequate finances
and capacity to maintain the facilities once the handover has taken place.

3. The practice of “inclusive growth and development “ in cities will be under great scrutiny as
the ruling classes use slogans such as ‘slum- free cities’ to push poor people far away from
business and commercial areas. We recommend that this sort of anti-poor growth and
development should not find any place in the future of cities but in practice the poor should
also have an equal voice in their progress as well as in access to services and a right to the
city.

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Annexure I
List of Slums evicted for project related land development in Chennai and resettled at
Kannaginagar and Semancheri.

In response to an application for a list of slums evicted the Secretary of the TNSCB provided a
list through letter on 2.12.2008. As follows:

List of slums shifted to Kannaginagar

1. Sethupathu } All Slums Shifted

2. Mailai } Due

3. Velachery to Satyavanimindunagar } to MRTS

4. Tharamani to Railway Station } Alignment

5. Luz slums – Kotturupuram

6. Neelangarai to Thoraipakkum

7. Mailai to Ganeshapuram

8. Teynampet to Satyamurthynagar

9. Kannapur Didul

10. KK nagar to Dr Ambedkar Nagar

11. Mandaveli to Rajah Kiromani Thottam

12. Neelangarai to Buckingham Kalvai

13. Ayiram Vilakku (Thousand Lights) to Valas Thottam (garden)

14. Mylapore to Thir nagar ( Downing Kuppam)

15. Metu Kuppam

List of Slums shifted to Semancheri

1. Sreenivasapuram to Onapuram
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2. Perambur Baracks road

3. Adayaru thirantha Veli Poonga (Adyar River Park)

4. Mambalam Main (Pradhani) Road

5. Ayyasami Road

6. Kagren Basinpalam to Kathivakkam Nedunchalai Sandippo (Kathivakkam Cross)

7. TT Nagar ( Thi Vipatthu Pagudi- Fire Danger Road)

8. Maligai Pu Nagar to North Kesava Perumal Nagar Main Road

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Annexure II:Brief description of occupations of slum dwellers prior to and after resettlement
Construction: Rs 3000-4000

Work is available during the year except for 3-4 months during rains. Mainly men. Full day’s work. Most
of the work is unskilled (70%). 5% are masons, 40% painters, few carpenters, electricians and helpers,
and plumbers.

Domestic work: Rs 2000

Mostly done by women who do 3-4 houses per day usually working about 8 hours totally per day. Sunday
is holiday. They are working where they used to. They leave early morning (abt 6am) with their children,
drop them to their old school and go to work. In the evening they pick up the children and reach home by
about 7pm. The journey takes 1 hour if they leave at 6am, 2 hours if they leave later. They have to change
2 buses (Adyar or Broadway). They spend Rs 600-1200 on bus per month.

Fishing related: Rs 1500-5000

This work involves loading and unloading from boats (men), transporting (men), drying, cooking and
selling/vending fish (women). Older people (mainly women over 45 yrs) are working full day on this.
Younger women do this part time in the evening for 2-3 hours. Selling happens outside the area by young
people, older people are selling within the area in their own specific location on the beach. This work
follows the fishing season (excepting July-Oct) and tourist season (summer)

Housekeeping: Rs 2500-3000

Earlier this included work in offices and commercial complexes near where they lived. Now, its work in
companies in the IT corridor area. This type of work includes office boy, cleaning. This is full day work
which is mostly contract work. They find out about this work through contractors and through personal
contacts. They get PF.

Vending: Rs 2500-3000

This is a full time job mainly done by people in Slatepuram which is near 2 markets (vegetable and
firewood). Women mainly vend in one place near the market area. Men are itinerant vendors within a
radius of 2-3 km. They mainly sell vegetables.

In other areas, there are few food hawkers and petty shops (provision and beedi). In Kannaginagar there
are 54 shops (each street has 3 shops) and these vendors buy provisions from PTC. Shops are given on
tender basis to highest bidder. Rent is now Rs 1500 per shop per mth. In Semancheri there are 3 shops per
street. There is a bidding process here too. Many shops are closed because the rent is considered to be too
high, they don’t make enough profit and every year they need to go through the bidding process. But they
need more shops in Semancheri.

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In both Kannaginagar and Semancheri 2-3 people are doing petty business from their house like selling
provisions and food.

Loading/unloading: Rs 2000-3000

Loading and unloading is done for 1) fishing, 2) vegetables and 3) firewood.

Fishing, vegetable and firewood related no longer occurs in Kannaginagar and Semancheri. These don’t
exist as opportunities because the markets have been shifted out of the core to Koyambeedu. Most of
these now do construction work.

Auto drivers and owners: Rs 5-6000 for owner-driver and Rs 3-4000 for drivers

This is an enterprise/occupation that has increased in both areas because of poor bus facilities. 40% of
autos/drivers (share and regular) are new.

Share autos (which seat 10 people) charge Rs 5 per person for transport from settlement to main road
(Old Mahabalipuram road). If they want to go to Tidel Park they pay Rs 10. Share autos do provide
transport from inside settlement to city although main focus is transport within the city and its difficult to
get autos within settlements. 75% of share autos are owned. 25% are leased- they pay Rs 400 per day as
lease. On average, those who run share autos make Rs 700-1000/day. Petrol costs and taxes need to be
minused from this amount. Share autos have to transport minimum 5 people at a time else they are fined
by police. There are about 130 total share autos in both places (Kannaginagar- 70 and Semancheri- 60).

There are about 20 autos owned / rented by people in Kannaginagar and Semancheri – these are used for
hire outside the settlements. They make more than Rs 700 per day (they need to make this much to break
even).

Autos cost less to run than share autos but transport fewer people. People make more money on share
autos but manufacture of these has stopped and second hand share autos are very expensive. Most people
have bought share and regular autos through loans from banks and private financiers.

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Annexure III: Letter received from TNSCB on 2.12.08

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