New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200

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New Ideas in Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsych

Exploring the nature of cognitive flexibility

Thea Ionescu*
Developmental Psychology Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Romania

a b s t r a c t

Keywords: Cognitive flexibility is an important characteristic that helps humans pursue complex
Cognitive flexibility tasks, such as multitasking and finding novel, adaptable solutions to changing demands.
Flexible behaviors Yet it is still a poorly understood construct. After briefly reviewing several investigations of
Cognitive property
this construct in cognitive science, I propose a unified account that considers cognitive
flexibility a property of the cognitive system, rather than a cognitive skill. The emergence
of cognitive flexibility is dependent on two kinds of interactions: the interaction of several
cognitive mechanisms, and the interaction of sensorimotor mechanisms, cognition, and
context in developmental time. The quest for a comprehensive and unified account of
cognitive flexibility is highly justified given its potential usefulness in fostering efficient
problem solving and creativity.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction To advance our knowledge of cognitive flexibility, we need

Flexibility is considered a hallmark of human cognition
and intelligent behavior (Boroditsky, Neville, Karns,
Markman, & Spivey, 2010; Deak, 2003; Jordan & Morton,
2008; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) and was acknowledged in
early models of intelligence and creativity (Guilford, 1962).
Nevertheless, we still lack a comprehensive account of the
phenomenon. There are several behaviors that are consid-
ered flexible (e.g., multitasking, novelty generation, flexible
problem solving), and it is difficult to single out any one as
prototypically flexible. Also, at the level of cognitive
explanations, we have witnessed fragmentation in the
study of flexibility. For example, there have been, among
others, studies investigating set-shifting, representational
flexibility, flexible categorization, and flexible language use
(see the following sections), each with a different definition
of cognitive flexibility. This fragmentation can lead to
narrow conceptualizations that point to different
constructs in the end. Thus, instead of finding a common
definition or understanding of cognitive flexibility, we
could end up with several constructs under the same name.
* 37 Republicii St., 400015 Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
E-mail address: theaionescu@psychology.ro.
to uncover the common underpinnings of flexibility in the
various contexts in which it appears.
The present work is motivated by this lack of a common
conceptualization, and as such, it is essentially theoretical.
One of the most obvious problems that becomes evident
after searching the literature is that cognitive flexibility can
be understood in multiple ways. Some see it as a specific
cognitive ability or skill (most often set-shifting: Colzato,
Huizinga, & Hommel, 2009; Cragg & Chevalier, in press),
while others view it as a property of various cognitive
processes (Blaye & Bonthoux, 2001; Plunkett, 2006) or of the
cognitive system (Deak, 2003). As a consequence, the guiding
question of this paper is the following: In seeking to under-
stand flexibility, how do we bridge the definition of cognitive
flexibility as shifting (i.e., the ability to “shift back and forth
between multiple tasks”, Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen,
2006; p. 2019) with the definition of the flexible solver (i.e.,
“one who a) has knowledge of multiple solution procedures,
and b) has the capacity to invent or innovate to create new
procedures”, Star & Seifert, 2006, p. 282)?
My aim is to present a unifying account of cognitive
flexibility that considers it a general characteristic or prop-
erty of cognition (or of its subsystems, such as attention,
categorization, language, etc.) and not a static entity, such as

0732-118X/$ – see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.11.001
 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200 191

a cognitive mechanism or ability. To be manifest as a prop- Table 1

erty of cognition, cognitive flexibility requires the interac- Sample of tasks that measure flexibility.
tion of several mechanisms (e.g., attention shifting, conflict Task Description
monitoring, and perception; see Section 4 for details) that
Flexible The participant has to put one object
respond to certain environmental demands (such as rule object sorting in two distinct appropriate categories;
changes) in order to achieve flexible behavior (such as (for children) in one trial there are seven objects
solving a problem in a new way). To better understand both on the table: the target (e.g., a green
cup), two objects from one category
the mechanisms and the flexibility they influence, one has
(two other cups), two objects from the
to look across the domains where flexibility is studied, other category (two green toys), and
rather than focusing on individual or narrow domains. two distracters.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present Appearance–reality Having an object that looks like
various instances of flexibility with the aim of highlighting distinction something else, the participant has to
(for children) tell what the object looks like
the multitude of definitions that exist for cognitive flexi-
(appearance question) and what it
bility. In Section 3, I give a short overview of two main really is (reality question), e.g.,
conceptualizations of cognitive flexibility that can be a sponge that looks like a rock.
derived from the literature today. Section 4 introduces the Induction task The participant has to make an
idea that cognitive flexibility is, in fact, a property of (for adults inference, based on a target, about the
and children) existence of a property in one of two
cognition; in this section I will also suggest several ways to items related to the target (based on,
investigate it in this new light. Finally, I conclude by out- e.g., taxonomical or ecological
lining some of the implications of this new approach. relations).
Throughout this paper, empirical evidence from research Wisconsin Card The participant has to sort cards
Sorting Test according to color, shape, or quantity
involving children and adults will be interspersed.
(for adults and of shapes; rules change without notice,
school-aged but feedback about each answer
2. Various instances of flexibility children) is given.
Dimensional The participant has to sort cards one
Looking at the literature of the past 100 years, it seems Change Card at a time, first by following one rule
Sort (for children) (e.g., sort by shape) and then by
that the concept of flexibility has not been easy to define. following another rule (e.g., sort
While the concept seems intuitive, cognitive flexibility by color).
shows itself in a broad spectrum of behaviors and lacks Stroop test The participant has to name the ink
a unified definition. Let us consider some flexible behaviors (for adults and color in which a word is written and
school-aged not the color that the word denotes
and some definitions of cognitive flexibility to illustrate this.
children) (e.g., when the word "red" is written
First, there are several behaviors that are considered in green ink).
flexible (e.g., Crone, Bunge, van der Molen, & Ridderinkhof, Day–night The participant has to say “night”
2006; Gibson, 1994; Goldstone & Landy, 2010; Leber, Turk- Stroop-like when seeing a picture of the sun,
Browne, & Chun, 2008; Monsell, 2003): switching from one Test (for children) and “day” when seeing a picture
of the moon.
task to another, or multitasking; changing behavior in light Flexible Item The participant has to choose among
of a new rule; finding a new solution to a problem; creating Selection three objects the ones that “go
new knowledge or tools. Table 1 displays descriptions of Task (for children) together in one way” (the objects
some of the experimental tasks in which participants are match on two dimensions, e.g., color
and shape) and then the ones that
expected to show flexible behaviors. For example, in the
“go together in another way”.
Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, Pattern completion The participant has to choose the
1995), participants have to sort cards based on two rules, task (for children) correct piece to complete a pattern
following one rule (e.g., sort by shape) in early trials and in a series of six pieces.
then switching to a new rule (e.g., sort by color) in subse- A-not-B task After repeatedly being hidden at
(for infants) Location A, an object is hidden at
quent trials. Similarly, in insight problems subjects must Location B, and the participant has
solve a problem by using a familiar object in a new way, for to retrieve it from B.
example, by using a box not as a container, but as a step to Optional shift task After learning a discrimination rule
reach a high shelf (German & Defeyter, 2000). (for children (based on color and shape) and after
and adults) an optional shift (reinforcement
Researchers often contrast these behaviors with those that
of the opposite pattern), the
are thought to express the opposite construct: inflexibility. On participant is administered a test
the one hand, there is rigidity or perseveration, denoting series in which a choice must be
more generally “the tendency of an individual not to change” made according to one pattern
(Schultz & Searleman, 2002; p. 166, italics in original), or, in (reversal) or the other
(extradimensional).
particular, “any continuation or recurrence of experience or
Alternative uses The participant has to generate
activity without the appropriate stimulus” (Sandson & Albert, task (for children as many alternative uses for an
1984; p. 715). In this case, the opposite of flexibility is most and adults) object as possible (e.g., for an
often a pathological behavior (or a developmentally appro- automobile tire).
Insight problems The participant has to solve
priate one until flexibility emerges). On the other hand,
(for children a problem by using a familiar
behavioral flexibility can be contrasted with stability, which and adults) object in a new way (e.g., a box
“emerges from the incorporation of the past into the present” as a step).
(Smith, 2009; p. 67). Here, lack of flexibility may be desired,
192 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200

because it leads to coherence of behavior across time. In Table 2

conclusion, many behaviors are flexible; consequently, it can Selected definitions/views of cognitive flexibility.

be difficult to find the common underlying mechanisms. Cognitive flexibility Author(s)

Second, researchers are interested in what is going on at (1) “One component of executive Geurts et al., 2009, p. 74
the mental level1 when one is displaying a flexible function is cognitive flexibility,
behavior, that is, in cognitive flexibility. In other words, which refers to the ability to shift
to different thoughts or actions
what are the cognitive aspects that underlie flexible
depending on situational demands”.
behaviors? There have been studies that investigated (2) “.the “shifting” between Colzato et al., 2009, p. 226
cognitive flexibility from the point of view of executive tasks and mental sets (also
function or cognitive control (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & called “flexibility”)”.
Chen, 2008; Diamond, 2006; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, (3) “.the ability to flexibly Cragg & Chevalier,
switch between different in press, p. 2
Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & tasks, commonly termed
Marcovitch, 2003). Other studies have mentioned the set-shifting or cognitive flexibility”.
flexibility of the processes being investigated, for example, (4) “Cognitive flexibility, that Diamond, 2006, p. 70
categorization and language (Barsalou, 1993; Blaye & is, the ability to flexibly
switch perspectives,
Bonthoux, 2001; Colunga & Smith, 2008; Deak, 2003;
focus of attention, or
Horst et al., 2009; Hund & Foster, 2008; Ionescu, 2005; response mappings”
Nguyen, 2007; Plunkett, 2006) or problem solving and (5) “.the Shifting Attention Masley et al., 2009, p. 189
creativity (Bilalic, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Deak, 2000; Test and the Stroop Test;
2003; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Rittle-Johnson & Star, both are measures of what
neuropsychologists refer
2009; Runco, 2004; Silver, Hughes, Bornstein, & Beversdorf, to as "cognitive flexibility”
2004). If we turn to more applied domains, cognitive flex- or “executive function”
ibility has been analyzed in studies on autism or depression (6) “Flexibility refers to the Bennett & Müller, 2010,
(Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010; Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, ability to shift between p. 455
responses and mental
2009; Palm & Follette, 2011; Van Eylen et al., 2011) and in
sets, and to generate
studies on mathematics (Star & Seifert, 2006). The defini- alternative strategies”
tions used in these studies seem to point to different (italics in the original)
constructs (see a sample of definitions in Table 2). (7) "Cognitive flexibility, Jacques & Zelazo,
Summarizing the views presented in Table 2, cognitive or the ability to consider 2005, p. 54
simultaneously multiple
flexibility can be conceptualized as (1) A well-delimited conflicting representations
ability of the cognitive system, namely, set-shifting (defi- of a single object or
nitions 1–4); (2) a higher-order ability, such as cognitive event (.)"
control (definitions 5–8); (3) a property of cognition or (8) “Cognitive flexibility, the Garcia–Garcia, Barcelo,
ability to adapt goal-directed Clemente, & Escera, 2010,
mental states (definitions 9, 10); and (4) a measure for
behavior in response p. 754
divergent thinking (definitions 11–13). One cannot help but to changing environmental
ask: If these are all intended to define cognitive flexibility, demands (.)”.
how can we arrive at a common conceptualization? (9) “Flexible cognition entails Deak, 2003, p. 275; p. 276
Moreover, are the elements denoted by each of them the dynamic activation and
modification of cognitive
equivalent? Our understanding of cognitive flexibility processes in response to
today is like a puzzle with scattered pieces. changing task demands”;
To sum up, cognitive flexibility appears in many areas. “.flexibility is a higher-order
Researchers adopt differing approaches to studying the (i.e., derivative) property
of cognition.”
related phenomena, so there is no cohesive framework for
(10) “The rest of this section Kockelman, 2012, p. 5
understanding flexibility. explicates a few stereotypic
properties of mental
3. Two main views of cognitive flexibility states: (.), embedding,
intensionality, flexibility,
and displacement”.
In this section I give a short overview of the research areas (11) “The dependent variables Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, p. 823
in which cognitive flexibility has been systematically explored. of divergent thinking tasks,
My objective is to emphasize that cognitive flexibility has been such as the Alternative Uses
given different meanings, either explicitly or implicitly. Task, are (.), flexibility
(i.e., the number of different
types or categories
3.1. Cognitive flexibility as a specific ability of ideas) (.)”.
(12) “So the AUT assesses a Cretenet & Dru, 2009, p. 204
cognitive flexibility measure
In the area of executive function, an increasing number connected to creative
of studies have focused on shifting (found both as mechanisms involving verbal
fluency and originality”
(italics in the original)
1 (13) “Flexibility is the ability to Takeuchi et al., 2010, p. 12
When I say “mental level” I do not intend to separate the mind and
produce responses from a
the brain, even if most of the following data do not refer much to brain
wide perspective”.
mechanisms.
 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200
setshifting and attention shifting in the literature), treating
it as being synonymous with cognitive flexibility. Executive
function is an umbrella term that encompasses “the goal-
oriented control functions of the PFC” (i.e., prefrontal
cortex; Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009; p. 180). Whether we can
truly speak of separate executive functionsdand if so, how
many of them there are–are subjects of intense debate
beyond the scope of this paper (see Smith & Kosslyn, 2007;
for an example; see also Chan et al., 2008; Miyake,
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000).
Shifting is usually considered one of the executive func-
tions (Best et al., 2009; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008) and it
reflects a person’s ability to rapidly change from one crite-
rion, rule, or task to another when giving a response. Under
this conceptualization, cognitive flexibility has been studied
predominantly with the task-switching paradigm
(Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). The main
measure is the switch cost, which is assumed to result from
the interplay between the time needed to reconfigure
a mental set and the time needed to resolve interference
from a previous set (Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al.,
2010). It is well known that adults show switch costs
immediately after a task switch (Aron, 2008; Best et al., 2009;
Monsell, 2003; Sylvester et al., 2003), and that the devel-
opment of shifting takes several years, with young children
being error prone in shifting tasks (Crone, Bunge, van der
Molen, & Ridderinkhof, 2006; Davidson, Amso, Anderson,
& Diamond, 2006; Kendler & Kendler, 1970; Zelazo, Craik, &
Booth, 2004). Recently, studies have investigated shifting in
relation to bilingualism (Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009),
mathematical skills (Mazzocco & Kover, 2007), physical
exercise (Masley, Roetzheim, & Gualtieri, 2009), and recre-
ational cocaine use (Colzato et al., 2009), and they all equate
shifting with cognitive flexibility. For example, Masley et al.
(2009) showed that aerobic exercise enhances perfor-
mance in a shifting-attention test and concluded that
cognitive flexibility is improved. As such, cognitive flexibility
becomes a specific ability in the executive function family,
namely, the ability to shift.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present
a complete account of shifting and its neural underpinnings
(for reviews see Aron, 2008; Garon et al., 2008; Kehagia,
Murray, & Robbins, 2010; Monsell, 2003; Rubinstein,
Meyer, & Evans, 2001; Sakai, 2008). What I want to
emphasize here is that most of these studies used the terms
“shifting” and “cognitive flexibility” synonymously (e.g.,
Cragg & Chevalier, in press). It is indeed easy to consider
cognitive flexibility and shifting as one and the same
because if we decompose any flexible behavior, we will find
shifting to be an important component of it. However, this
raises the question of whether shifting is the same thing as
cognitive flexibility or is just one mechanism involved in
cognitive flexibility.
3.2. Cognitive flexibility as a property of various cognitive
processes
A different approach has been taken by authors who
analyze particular cognitive processes and their flexibility.
For example, researchers have studied flexible categorization,
flexible language use, and flexible responses in induction
193
tasks. In all these studies, the main idea is that flexibility
appears to be a property of the investigated processes.
For instance, in the area of categorization, it is now
widely accepted that adults tailor the categories they form
to the current demands of the task or situation (Barsalou,
1983, 2003, 2008b), and that they can spontaneously
group one object in several ways (Ross & Murphy, 1999).
This ability to cross-categorize (Nguyen & Murphy, 2003)
allows us to think about categorization as a flexible process.
Developmental studies have shown that children are flex-
ible in their categorizations as early as infancy (Ellis & Oakes,
2006; Mareschal & Quinn, 2001) and toddlerhood (Horst
et al., 2009). It has also been shown that instructions
(Deak & Bauer, 1996; Gershkoff-Stowe, 2005; Ionescu,
2006; Waxman & Namy, 1997), stimuli (Blanchet, Dunham,
& Dunham, 2001; Deak & Bauer, 1996; Kemler Nelson,1999),
context (Blaye & Bonthoux, 2001), and training (Deak &
Bauer, 1995; Deak, Ray, & Pick, 2002) are important for the
emergence of preschoolers’ flexibility with categories. Thus
categorization is a flexible process especially when certain
contextual factors afford it, at least in children.
In word learning, children have access to multiple
sources of knowledge to infer the meaning of a novel word
(Diesendruck, Hall, & Graham, 2006) and must choose the
relevant source. Plunkett (2006) analyzed flexibility in the
use of linguistic context to identify the referent for a given
word. At 24 months, children were better able to infer
meaningful labels in fluent speech than at 17 months. The
author concluded that infants become more flexible in their
interpretation of systematically distorted words (in this
study, words with manipulated surrounding context).
Naigles, Hoff, and Vear (2009) also showed that even before
the age of 24 months, children display semantic and
grammatical flexibility in their verb use. Using the words
we have in our vocabulary in a flexible way (e.g., in novel
settings) seems to be a sinequanon for adult language.
Using the appearance–reality distinction paradigm
(Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; see Table 1 for task
description), several studies have shown that children can
perform well even at 3 years of age (e.g., tactile version:
Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1989; low memory load: Rice,
Koinis, Sullivan, Tager-Flusberg, & Winner, 1997;
nonverbal version: Sapp, Lee, & Muir, 2000). Children seem
to be able to have multiple representations about one object,
or in other words, to show representational flexibility. This
is consistent with the dynamic representations account
(Barsalou, 1993; Smith & Kosslyn, 2007), which states that
adults have the ability to construct many different repre-
sentations of a category and use them appropriately for
different tasks. The difference between children and adults
lies in the extent of their experience with different kinds of
representations for a given object or situation, and in their
ability to understand the intended meaning when asked
appearance–reality questions (Deak, 2006; Deak & Enright,
2006). These factors (extent of experience and under-
standing of the intended meaning) are important for the
emergence of representational flexibility.
Individuals also show flexible responses in induction
tasks (Shafto, Coley, &Vitkin, 2007; Sloutsky & Fischer,
2008). People use various kinds of knowledge when they
make categorical inductions, such as general similarity,
194 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200
shared features, and thematic relations (Coley, Baker, &
Vitkin, in press). Reasoning is informed by the knowledge
people have, but it is informed differently based on the
differential accessibility of that knowledge. The use of
different types of information is influenced by expertise
(Shafto & Coley, 2003) and by the tasks we use to measure
inductive reasoning (Baker & Coley, 2005). For instance,
children who live in rural areas use more ecological rela-
tions in their inductions than urban children, suggesting
the importance of direct experience with plants and
animals for the ability to reason flexibly about them (Coley,
Vitkin, Seaton, & Yopchick, 2005).
The problem with this approach is that it does not form
a coherent account of cognitive flexibility because, very
often, researchers have not provided explicit definitions.
They have only stated that the investigated process is
flexible or leads to flexible responses, and they most often
analyze the external conditions that foster the emergence
of flexibility (e.g., stimuli, task parameters, experience, etc.).
3.3. Summary
The overview presented above is by no means exhaus-
tive. Its main purpose is to emphasize that cognitive flexi-
bility has multiple meanings in psychological research
today. Each approach gives us important insights about
specific mechanisms (such as shifting) or about the role of
contextual affordances (such as the stimuli used in cate-
gorization). But can we arrive at a common conceptuali-
zation that would allow us to decode what lies behind all
kinds of flexible behavior? More specifically, is language
flexibility different from shifting, or do they rely on similar
mechanisms? Investigating different aspects of cognitive
flexibility in different domains is decidedly beneficial, and
it is not my intention to say that researchers in one area
deny that flexibility exists in other areas, too. But the time
may be ripe to look at the big picture and to gather all these
approaches into a comprehensive account of this important
human quality. For now, let us identify two different
accounts of cognitive flexibility: (1) as a specific ability or
mechanism in the cognitive system; and (2) as a property of
various cognitive processes.
Scientific approaches to a phenomenon should be based
on a common operational definition or at least should
arrive at a common conclusion even if scientists use slightly
different operational definitions or experimental proce-
dures (Goodwin, 2010). It is often the case in psychological
science that concepts are given multiple definitions (see,
for example, the case of executive functiondWiebe,
Andrews Espy, & Charak, 2008; or attentiondCohen,
Aston-Jones, & Gilzenrat, 2004). This lack of a common
conceptualization for any given concept delays the full
understanding of that concept.
4. A unified framework: cognitive flexibility as
a property of the cognitive system
Going back to our guiding question (see Section 2), I
believe we can only arrive at a common conceptualization
of cognitive flexibility if we envisage a unified framework.
A fragmented research agenda has its benefits (e.g., it can
lead to a detailed understanding of a specific component of
some process) but it also has potential costs (e.g., it can
limit our understanding of that process and lead to
different constructs with the same label). Moreover, some
authors have suggested that having nonoverlapping
accounts of cognitive flexibility in clinical and laboratory
settings makes it difficult to understand pathologies (e.g.,
autism) or to evaluate the role of cognitive flexibility in
replacing maladaptive thoughts during therapy (Dennis &
Vander Wal, 2010; Geurts et al., 2009).
Several studies seem to have leaned toward the
synonymy of cognitive flexibility and set-shifting as out-
lined above. This might be due to the wealth of studies that
investigated the rigidity of thought in frontal lobe patients,
or to the preference for the task-switching paradigm as
a relatively pure measure with well-controlled variables
[earlier works used the Optional Shift Task, Kendler, 1964,
or the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Stroop
Test, Aron, 2008; see Table 1 for task descriptions]. I do
agree that we need well-controlled experiments focused
on specific mechanisms and that research should focus on
specific types of flexibility. Nevertheless, such a focus may
come at the expense of a comprehensive understanding of
cognitive flexibility.
I propose a unified framework that conceptualizes
cognitive flexibility as a property of the cognitive system
(for a similar view see Deak, 2003). This property is based
on the interaction of several mechanisms that respond to
specific environmental demands. One could compare flex-
ibility to efficiency or accuracy. On the one hand, there are
the mechanisms and processes of the cognitive system
(e.g., shifting, memory, categorization, etc.); on the other,
there are the cognitive system’s properties (e.g., pro-
spectivity, retrospectivity, etc.; see Gibson, 1994). In my
opinion, flexibility fits better in the second group. Even
linguistically, one can say that the cognitive system “is
flexible” (an adjective denoting a property), but we cannot
say that it “is memory” (memory being a noun denoting
a component of the cognitive system). We do not find
accuracy, for instance, reified as a mechanism of the
cognitive system, so why should we think of flexibility as
a static ability/mechanism?
In this framework, one needs to look at interactions to
understand cognitive flexibility: at the cognitive level is the
interaction of different mechanisms or cognitive compo-
nents (e.g., executive functions, attention, representations,
perception, coordination of task parameters with goals,
conflict monitoring, previous knowledge); at the individ-
ual’s level (in other words, at a more general level) is the
interaction of sensorimotor mechanisms with cognition
and context in developmental time (see Fig. 1 for a sche-
matic representation).
4.1. Interaction of cognitive mechanisms
Whenever we see a flexible response and assume some
underlying cognitive flexibility, we are, in fact, witnessing
an interaction of multiple cognitive mechanisms or
subsystems. For example, different explanations have been
suggested for 3- to 4-year-old children’s failure to switch in
the DCCS task (see Table 1 for task description), such as
 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200
A
The interaction of:
- Executive
functions
- Attentional
mechanisms in
- Representations interaction
- Perception
- Coordination of with
task parameters
with goals
- Conflict
monitoring
- Previous
knowledge
B
Fig. 1. Two kinds of interaction that lead to the emergence of cognitive flexibility: (A) interaction of cognitive mechanisms (the list presented here is not intended
to be exhaustive); (B) interaction of cognition, sensorimotor mechanisms, and context, in developmental time (see text for details).
inhibition failure or attentional inertia (Kirkham, Cruess, &
Diamond, 2003); inability to hold in mind more than one
representation for an object (Kloo, Perner, Kershhuber,
Dabernig, & Aichhorn, 2008); graded representations in
working memory (Blackwell, Cepeda, & Munakata, 2009;
Yerys & Munakata, 2006); inability to construct complex
embedded rules (Zelazo et al., 2003); conflict monitoring
difficulties (Jordan & Morton, 2008); inefficient selective
attention (Hanania & Smith, 2009); and difficulties under-
standing discourse (Deak, Ray, & Pick, 2004). It may well be
that some or all of these mechanisms are required for
success in the DCCS task, in other words, for a good shifting
performance. In the same vein, we can assume that flexible
categorization requires executive functions (such as inhi-
bition, shifting, or working memory), or that flexible
language use needs category knowledge, and so on. In
other words, it is implausible to assume that performance
in a task is based on a single mechanism.
Considering several cognitive mechanisms in the study
of cognitive flexibility would help us understand what it is.
Comparing different tasks and the two main views outlined
in Section 3 (i.e., cognitive flexibility as a specific cognitive
ability and cognitive flexibility as a property of different
cognitive processes) would shed light on the mechanisms
and processes needed for the emergence of flexibility in the
cognitive system.
There have been attempts to compare performance in
different tasks that tap cognitive flexibility in the executive
function area. For instance, Jacques and Zelazo (2005)
analyzed several tasks that require children to respond
from different perspectives. They identified tasks that
provide deductive and inductive measures of flexibility and
showed differences in performance in these two kinds of
tasks due to labeling and, possibly, different social experi-
ences (in deductive tasks, such as the DCCS, all the infor-
mation necessary for solving the task is provided in the
195
- Task demands
- Contextual in the course
cues of
COGNITIVE
- Sensorimotor development FLEXIBILITY
aspects
instructions, whereas in inductive tasks, such as the
appearance–reality task, participants are not told how to
find the solution).
There have been far fewer attempts to study flexibility
as conceptualized in Section 3 (e.g., to investigate shifting
and inductive reasoning). In a comparison of preschoolers’
performances in a flexible categorization task (flexible
object sorting; see Table 1) and the DCCS, performance in
the flexible categorization task was found to be better than
in the DCCS (Ionescu, 2009). On the surface, these two tasks
are highly similar: In both tasks the participant has to
attend to one criterion/rule, choose the appropriate object/
dimension, sort, switch to a new criterion/rule, choose
another appropriate object/dimension, and sort in a new
way. Why would there be a difference in performance? The
results could be due to different mechanisms implicating
two different kinds of flexibility, or to different task
demands. These differential demands can refer to number
of exemplars from the same category, attribute/dimension
knowledge, conflict due to target cards, or presence/
absence of distracters. In other words, in the flexible object-
sorting task, there are three different exemplars from
a given category, the task requires attribute knowledge,
there are no target objects that remain throughout the task,
and there are distracters on the table besides the category
exemplars. Recent studies have shown that the number of
exemplars from a given category does not seem to interfere
with performance in the categorization task (Ionescu,
Hanania, & Smith, 2011). These studies also show that
dimension word knowledge correlates with performance
on the DCCS task (Hanania, Ionescu, & Smith, 2010).
This kind of comparative analysis of performance that
tests flexibility in two or more tasks from different research
areas can yield new insight into what accounts for flexibility
(see Schultz & Searleman, 2002, for a similar claim for the
study of rigidity of thought). So far, there have been few
196 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200
such comparisons. Bennett and Müller (2010) compared the
development of flexibility and abstraction abilities in
preschool children and found that the children’s perfor-
mance relied on the same flexibility component. Relating
performances on different tasks to each other could bring
us closer to a comprehensive account of cognitive flexibility.
Another important cognitive element in this interaction
is knowledge. The more knowledge we have in a domain, the
more flexible we are in solving problems in that domain (Star
& Seifert, 2006). For instance, experts are usually able to use
various types of relations when making inductive inferences
(e.g., taxonomic and ecological), whereas novices base their
inferences on one relation alone (e.g., taxonomic; Baker &
Coley, 2005; Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997;
Medin & Atran, 2004). In a study on the development of
reasoning, Bulloch and Opfer (2009) showed that in early
childhood (3- to 5-year-olds), a good predictor of novel
properties in problem solving is sensitivity to relevant
knowledge. They suggested that this sensitivity could be
a key factor in flexible cognition. On the other hand, it has
also been argued that more knowledge could lead to
inflexibility, as one remains fixated in the previous patterns
of solutions (see Bilalic et al., 2008, for a review; see also
Yonge, 1966, for functional fixedness). In a series of elegant
studies, Bilalic et al. (2008) showed that knowledge and
flexibility have a dynamic relationship. Using the Einstellung
effect paradigm (i.e., inducing a mental set for solving similar
problems), they showed that “ordinary” experts in chess
show inflexibility induced by previous knowledge, whereas
“super” experts in chess were not influenced by previous
mental sets and were flexible in finding unfamiliar optimal
solutions to subsequent problems.
In conclusion, it is possible that cognitive flexibility
emerges from a complex interaction of several mecha-
nisms. This idea is supported by recent models that analyze
the role of the prefrontal cortex in cognitive control. The
activity of the prefrontal cortex is complex and entails
multiple mechanisms that lead to flexible processing
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; O’Reilly, 2006; O’Reilly,
Noelle, Braver, & Cohen, 2002; Rougier et al., 2005). For
example, one computational model has shown that the
prefrontal cortex encodes abstract rule-like representations
of relevant stimulus dimensions and then through active
maintenance and adaptive updating, rapidly updates its
representations as a reflection of changing task conditions
(Rougier et al., 2005). In other computational models of
cognitive control, the prefrontal cortex has been shown to
interact with other areas, such as the basal ganglia or areas
involved in reward and motivation, to achieve control
(O’Reilly, Herd, & Pauli, 2010). Similarly, recent studies on
brain mechanisms support this kind of interaction. In an
elegant review on task set and the prefrontal cortex, Sakai
(2008) concluded that results from neuroscience studies
show that there is parallel processing in different regions of
the prefrontal cortex and other areas (such as the anterior
cingulate cortex, which reflects conflict monitoring) that
leads to efficient preparation and execution of a task. In
other words, no single mechanism (either cognitive or
neural) leads to flexible behavior; the interaction of several
neural circuits that serve different cognitive mechanism
seems to be required.
4.2. Interaction of cognition with sensorimotor processes and
context
A new approach in cognitive science, namely, embodied
cognition,2 provides a way to look beyond pure mental
processing to understand cognitive flexibility and its
emergence. In the classic cognitive paradigm, cognitive
functions are instantiated as static and distinct entities of
the cognitive system (Barsalou, 2008a). The problem is that
this delimitation of distinct entities seems not to corre-
spond to the reality of our cognitive system (see, for
example, Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003, and
Glenberg et al., 2008, for empirical evidence on the
embodiment of cognition).
For example, Barsalou’s (2003, 2008b) proposal that
representation is multimodal and that concepts are reen-
actments of sensorimotor states suggests that we should
include sensorimotor mechanisms in the study of cognitive
flexibility. A similar argument comes from the action
approach to representation, in which the “embodied
infant” is “in transaction with the physical world and socio-
cultural world” and “grows through the action of con-
structing both self and the known world” (Müller &
Overton, 1998; p. 105). It is now well known that over-
coming perseveration in the A-not-B task depends on the
dynamic interaction of many factors, such as shifts in the
infant’s posture, strengths of memories of past reaches, and
decay rates of the activations (Smith, 2009). As such, the A-
not-B error is no longer thought of as the infant’s inability
to represent objects independently of the actions on that
object, but an expression of “multiple causes interacting
over nested timescales” (Smith & Thelen, 2003; p. 345).
Among these, the motor memories that are formed during
the interaction with the task seem to be relevant. We can
speculate that if sensorimotor mechanisms are important
in this task, they may be important in other tasks, even
with adults.
At the same time, task parameters and task context may
also be important in eliciting participants’ performance.
The differences in performance observed in the categori-
zation and DCCS tasks may have also been an effect of task
context. It is possible that the categorization task was more
attractive for preschoolers than the DCCS task because in
the former, children must put together several distinct
exemplars from the same category, whereas in the latter,
the same exemplar is presented repeatedly.
Thinking about cognitive flexibility in the larger
framework of a brain–body–context interaction is also
beneficial for a unified account of cognitive flexibility, one
that would underlie all flexible behaviors. Researchers in
the field of embodiment argue that in embodied cognitive
modeling, the focus should shift from isolated models (e.g.,
on attention or memory) to complete architectures that
develop in time, and also to “integrated theories of
2
The embodied cognition view embraced here is a general one in
which cognition is the result of a mind/brain situated in a body
(embodiment) but also in a certain environment (embeddedness); see
Barsalou (2008a, 2010), Glenberg (2010), Gomila and Calvo (2008), and
Shapiro (2007), for thorough reviews of the embodied nature of
cognition.
 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200
cognition rather than theories of isolated functions”
(Pezzulo et al., 2011; p.12). Considering cognition in this
larger framework might capture the nature of cognitive
flexibility more accurately.
4.3. Implications and challenges for future research
Future research on cognitive flexibility should focus on
the complex interactions presented above. Two possible
routes can be taken to achieve this.
First, one could investigate flexibility in real-life
domains (e.g., mathematics, music, grammar, etc.) to
reveal the similarities and differences among them. If we
study cognitive flexibility only in one particular area, for
example, the area of executive function research with the
task-switching paradigm, we might conclude that cognitive
flexibility is task switching (see Section 3; see also a similar
trend in the study of creativity with the divergent thinking
paradigm; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). On the other hand, if we
look at real-life domains, we would be in a better position
to identify the mechanisms and their interactions that
constitute cognitive flexibility.
For example, in studies on equation solving (Star &
Seifert, 2006), results would provide us with information
about what it means to be a flexible problem solver. There
have been attempts to pursue a problem-solving approach
in the domain of executive functioning in which executive
function is seen as a macroconstruct that reflects the
interaction of several subsystems involved in each phase of
solving (problem representation, planning, execution,
evaluation; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). This
approach could be applied to real-life problems in order to
identify the different mechanisms that interact in task
performance (i.e., executive mechanisms plus other
cognitive mechanisms; see Fig. 1 for examples of such
mechanisms). Moreover, performance in these kinds of
problems could be then analyzed together with perfor-
mance in laboratory tasks that are thought to evaluate
cognitive flexibility. For example, comparing anagram
solving, which is another measure of flexibility in the
context of problem solving (Silver et al., 2004), with task
switching or flexible categorization of words could tell us
more about common and different mechanisms.
Drawing is another example of a real-life domain in
which children’s performance expresses representational
change and flexibility (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990). When chil-
dren are asked to draw things that do not exist (e.g., a man
that does not exist), they need to change the representa-
tions they already have about those things (namely, about
a typical man by adding, for instance, wings) (Adi-Japha,
Berberich-Artzi, & Libnawi, 2010; Spensley & Taylor,
1999). This flexibility could again be analyzed and
compared to performance in laboratory measures of
cognitive flexibility to uncover the underlying mechanisms.
Second, a developmental approach would also help us
understand the dynamics of cognitive flexibility. Cognitive
flexibility is not an all or nothing abilitydit appears at
different developmental periods for different tasks. The
perseveration–flexibility pattern appears in the A-not-B
task at the end of the first year, in the DCCS task in
preschool years and then again in the WCST task in school-
197
aged children. An open question is what accounts for this
pattern [see the Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC)
theory for an attempt to explain the recurrence of this
pattern in development; Zelazo & Frye, 1998]. As I discussed
in Section 4.2, performance in a specific task is influenced
by factors other than cognition itself, and including these in
the analysis would move us closer to an answer. Dynamic
systems modeling combined with microgenetic experi-
ments would inform us about when change occurs and
further our understanding of the emergence of flexibility.
The ontogenetic analysis reveals how we move dynamically
from one state to another via moments of stability and
novelty generation (Smith, 2009). Moreover, computational
models and epigenetic robotics could also be important
tools for finding the exact constraints that act upon our
system in developmental time and determine performance
in one task or another (see, for example, computational
models of attention, Usher, 2006, or epigenetic robotics on
grounding transfer, Cangelosi & Riga, 2006).
One might ask: what remains of cognitive flexibility
after we take out the mechanisms listed in the first column
of Fig. 1?3 If we agree that cognitive flexibility is a property,
the answer must be: nothing. In other words, there is no
static entity called “cognitive flexibility”; there is only
a property that emerges in the functioning of the cognitive
system or in its subsystems (such as attention, memory,
reasoning, etc.) when certain conditions are met. What we
need in our research programs is to specify all of the
conditions (both internal and external) that lead to the
development and manifestation of cognitive flexibility. Our
guiding question remains to be answered: How do we get
from the definition of shifting to the understanding of the
flexible problem solver? In my opinion, a unified frame-
work based on the principles proposed above could bring
us closer to unraveling the complex phenomenon of
cognitive flexibility.
5. Concluding remarks
There are many unanswered questions about cognitive
flexibility. This work reviewed contemporary views of
cognitive flexibility and presented an integrative frame-
work for studying it. In this framework, flexibility is
considered a property of the cognitive system, not a static
structural entity. The emergence of cognitive flexibility is
dependent on two kinds of interactions: the first involves
the interaction of cognitive mechanisms; the second
involves the interaction of sensorimotor mechanisms,
cognition, and context in developmental time. Thus, flexi-
bility emerges as a dynamic property. This framework is in
need of systematic empirical evidence. Nevertheless, I
believe that taking a step back and looking at the big
picture (namely, at the several mechanisms and constraints
that lead to cognitive flexibility) provides us with a better
understanding of this complex phenomenon.
A common definition of cognitive flexibility has impor-
tant implications for both psychology and education.
3
The author wishes to thank Ulrich Müller for raising this important
point.
198 T. Ionescu / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 190–200
Unraveling the conditions that lead to the emergence of
cognitive flexibility could help us foster creativity and
better understand individuals who seem to lack flexibility
(as in autism) or have “too much” of it (as in giftedness).
Acknowledgments
The preparation of this manuscript was partially sup-
ported by a Fulbright Senior Grant (Grant No. 456/2008).
An earlier version of this work was presented at the
Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and
Psychology, August 25–28, 2010, in Bochum and Essen,
Germany. The author wishes to thank Ulrich Müller and
two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier
versions of the manuscript, and also Linda B. Smith and
Rima Hanania for insightful discussions on topics related to
this work. Special thanks go to Laura Kim, Rima Hanania,
and Anita Todd for editing the manuscript.
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