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INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENT
TECHNOLOGY PARK MALAYSIA

HIPO60033-COA
CONFLICT ANALYSIS

APT3F2103IR

NAME : JESICA DWI NOVIA PUTRI

STUDENT ID : TP052614
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Introduction

In the decade after the Cold War, the globe has seen significant change. A new one
has replaced the old system. However, whether the new system is better or worse than the
previous one isn't obvious. It's too early to tell whether new patterns are forming, but old ones
have broken loose. With the passing away of bipolarity, the rise of democracy, an expanding
global economy, more frequent attempts at international security policy coordination, an
uptick in violent manifestations of allegation to rights based on cultural identity, and the
reassertion of supremacy that places new demands on states, the potential for historic shifts is
well known.
Even the structure of organized violence appears to be evolving, as governments and
others strive to place limitations on it as these developments take hold. Another sign of a shift
is the decline in international conflicts' frequency and the death toll in the 1990s. Even
though there have been fewer high-intensity wars since the Cold War, subnational ethnic and
religious strife has increased to such an extent that the first decade after its end was the
deadliest since nuclear weapons were first used.
Conflict in South Sudan

An increase in assaults and violence between communities in South Sudan, a possible

breakdown of the peace process, and grave humanitarian situations in many parts of the
country have made it more urgent than ever before to improve security and satisfy the
fundamental protection requirements of the country's people. Even though President Salva
Kiir and former opposition leader Riek Machar created a unity government more than a year
ago, On executing the country's major peace agreement, which was reached in 2018 and
ended a civil war in 2013, little progress has been achieved.
After Kiir and Machar's political spat, President's Guard troops from the two major
ethnic groups in that year engaged in violent clashes, which broke out in December. The
Dinka sided with Kiir during the crisis, while the Nuer sided with Machar's forces. Within
minutes after Kiir's announcement, violence had erupted in states including Jonglei, Upper
Nile, and Unity. There has been an ethnic cleansing of citizens and the destruction of property
by armed groups from the beginning of the war and the recruitment of minors into their ranks
(Omwenga, 2018).
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A peace deal between Kiir and Machar was concluded in August 2015 after numerous
rounds of discussions backed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
and the threat of new sanctions. Machar came to Juba in April 2016 and was inaugurated as
vice president for the first time in more than two years as the first move in bringing an end to
the civil conflict. As soon as he returned, fighting erupted between government troops and
rebel groups, once again displacing large numbers of civilians. Machar left the nation and
was apprehended in South Africa after crossing the border. There were several peace
negotiations between the two parties and other groups in 2017 and 2018, which were later
broken.
At the end of June 2018, after almost five years of civil conflict, Kiir and Machar met
for talks mediated by Uganda and Sudan. Kiir and Machar signed an accord on a
power-sharing arrangement to stop hostilities in Khartoum at the end of the month. After a
series of violations (Kipyegon, 2018), Kiir and Machar negotiated a final ceasefire and
power-sharing agreement in August 2018. After that, Machar's opposing party and other rebel
groups signed a peace deal, stopping the civil war. Machar was re-elected vice president, and
a newfound power framework was put in place with the Revitalized Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.
Machar returned to South Sudan in late October 2018 to commemorate the end of the
civil conflict with a national peace celebration. Even while reports of assaults and breaches
continue, there are still fears that the fragile ceasefire may not last. Even though it's
impossible to verify official casualty figures, an April 2018 research indicated that
approximately 400,000 people died during the five years of conflict. A further almost four
million people were either made homeless or escaped.
An additional 7,600 UN troops were already stationed in the country when the UN
Security Council approved a fast deployment of around 6,000 security personnel to assist
nation-building activities. In an unusual step, the UN Security Council authorized the use of
force by UN forces in May 2014, shifting the Mission's mandate from nation-building to
civilian protection. With security deteriorating and its relationship with the government of the
Republic of South Sudan becoming more complicated since the UN Mission in South Sudan
switched its focus to protection, it's been very difficult for the Mission there. Although their
arrival was delayed until August 2017, the UN approved the deployment of an additional
4,000 troops as part of a regional security force in 2016.
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There are food shortages around the country because farmers have been unable to
cultivate or harvest their crops due to violence. South Sudan's food crisis was deemed the
"worst in the world" by the UN Security Council in July 2014. Nearly five million people in
South Sudan are in danger of starvation due to the famine that was proclaimed in the early
months of 2017. According to United Nations authorities, more than eight million people are
expected to need humanitarian aid in 2021.

Conflict Resolution methods used in South Sudan

1. Third-party Mediation

The Intergovernmental Authority took the first step to peace on Development (IGAD)
with the help of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States throughout 2014.
According to the committee, the ultimate deadline for reaching a peace agreement in the
Sudan war was March 5, 2015, which was considered an unrealistic timetable (Krampe et
al.,2020). On the other hand, the deadline passed without the goal being accomplished. The
Security Council imposed penalties on several persons within the same month due to their
participation in the war. However, the two primary protagonists, Kiir and Machar, were not
included on the list of six sanctioned people, which was surprising to many. A fresh draft was
produced in June 2015 due to increased pressure from regional and global stakeholders
calling for a stop to the senseless slaughter. The Security Council threatened further penalties
if the parties involved did not sign the agreement by August 17, 2015. (Foreign Policy 2015).
The first roadblock appeared two months after the signing of the peace accord when
President Kiir made the unilateral decision to form 18 new states on top of the ten that were
already in place at the time. Although this behavior was denounced, the President made a
nice gesture in December 2015 by sharing cabinet posts with other cabinet members. The
Transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) was not formed by the deadline of
January 2016, signaling that progress on implementing the peace agreement had been
sluggish.
Finally, in February 2016, Riek Machar was selected as the country's 1st Vice
President, despite being still in exile at the time. Additional security agreements, including
the demilitarization of the capital city of Juba, were reached as well. In late July 2016, an
assault on an UN-protected civilian camp by claimed government troops threatened to derail
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the peace talks. In the following weeks, pockets of fighting were seen across the nation. On
March 11, 2016, the United Nations Human Rights Commission issued a report claiming
instances of war crimes, including sexual abuse. In April 2016, Machar returned to Juba to
assume the office of 1st Vice-President, despite the fact that it was a precarious arrangement,
to begin with. Fighting erupted, however, between government troops and those loyal to Riek
Machar, forcing him to escape the city once again and bringing the Transitional Government
of National Unity to its ultimate demise.
Both sides were more concerned with how much power they would keep than
implementing the agreement that led to its demise in 2015. The ARCSS was signed by South
Sudanese government officials, international community representatives, and opposition
leaders in 2015 but fell apart due to a lack of political goodwill. Indeed, the focus on the
government and opposition in the unfolding civil war has obscured the true problems of
regular individuals, which might inspire them to pick up weapons and fight for their nation.
Furthermore, the idea that the rebels are illegitimate organizations undermining the country's
sovereignty and the opposition's far-fetched assertion that they reflect real complaints from
residents is further exacerbated by this view. For South Sudan to achieve lasting peace, it may
be necessary to go beyond just distributing governmental positions.
Failure and success of The AGAD mediation

Failure

Consequences of a Faulty Methodological Approach on the Fundamental Issues

Arise from the Crisis Situation in South Sudan- South Sudan peace negotiations, mediated by
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), were predicted to fail since the
process was beset with challenges and far from accomplishing its goal, even after multiple
deadlines were set to bring about peace and stability in the country. As a result of the collapse
of the negotiations, the mediators' lack of understanding and deficiencies in their technique
was revealed (Moriasi, 2020). IGAD's peace process is further complicated by a lack of a
precise grasp of the challenges and possibilities that people seeking substantial political
change must overcome.
Need for a new paradigm shift in creating sociopolitical space: inclusive and equitable
methods for meaningful change- During the transitional stage, the IGAD and its allies should
carefully consider not restricting discussions to power-sharing and government form as a
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means of ending the violence. They should, however, devise a comprehensive strategy to
address the underlying causes of the conflict to bring in a government that is open and honest
with its people. This means that any effort to bring about a peace accord that places power in
the hands of ethnic elites and their political allies is certain to fail. To guarantee that South
Sudan's security and law enforcement organizations reflect its many ethnic groups, they must
be separated from the political leadership. There must be a systematic approach to the peace
discussions rather than a flurry of fresh and undesirable suggestions every time a new round
of peace talks occurs. Because the mediators try to patronize and force their will on the
participants by refusing to consider their opinions on the resolution of the issue, this
uncertainty makes the sessions more difficult, complicated, and counterproductive.
The success of mediation by IGAD

According to Nyombe (2019), IGAD responded quickly to the start of violence in

Juba and immediately assumed leadership of the legislative sphere. Refugee flows, for
example, were a direct result of the crisis in South Sudan on IGAD member nations. Because
of IGAD's early and strong involvement, it became clear that the situation in South Sudan
was of concern for the region as a whole and that steps needed to be done to avert an
intensification of bloodshed. Also, there was a clear message that peace in South Sudan, one
of the region's most significant accomplishments in light of the CPA's facilitation by IGAD,
had to be maintained. IGAD Heads of State and Government have held six emergency
sessions and three supplementary meetings to address the crisis in South Sudan.
IGAD relied on its CPA mediation expertise when it became engaged to restore peace
in South Sudan. General Sumbeiywo, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Mesfin, and Sudan's
General El-Dabi, IGAD's Special Envoys for South Sudan Mediation, all participated in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) discussions, which gave them the opportunity an
edge in the mediation process. Having prior personal contacts with the dispute parties was
helpful to the IGAD mediation team since they were well-versed in the context and could
draw on that information.

2. Negotiation

From 1997 forward, four variables came together to persuade both the Government of
Sudan (GoS) and SPLM/A to return to the negotiation table after a long time without
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development. Initially, the stalemate was recognized as a result of the significant offensive
operations of 1995-96, in which the SPLM/A reclaimed several government-held territories.
With the realization that neither side would emerge victoriously, the possibility of a
negotiation re-emerged. After a major personnel shift in Khartoum, there was a knock at that
door. Secondly, there had been a significant shift in people (Samson, 2018).
The first talk was conducted in Juba in September. On October 18, 2019, the
government and al-Hilu (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North) reached an
agreement on the Two Areas track during the second round of discussions (SRF). The third
peace negotiations began in December on east Sudan, and (SPLM-N) tracks. Below is a brief
description of some of the discussions that have taken place.
Juba negotiations-Salva Kiir, the President of South Sudan, met with representatives
of several rebel groups, members of Sudan's Sovereignty Council, and Sudan's prime minister
in September 2019 after the authority was transferred from TMC to that body (Woldemichael,
2020). President Hemetti, a member of the Sovereign Council, arrived in Juba on September
9 and has already begun negotiations. It was expected that the prime minister and three other
cabinet members would arrive in Juba on September 12 for discussions.
Agreements executed in October 2019- On October 18, rebel and Sovereign Council
(head of state) officials met in Juba to discuss the Two Areas and Darfur concerns.
Sovereignty Council and SPLM-N representatives Amar Daldoum and Shams al-Din
Khabbashi met for three hours discussion program conducted by a delegation from South
Sudan. A co-signer on all contracts was Galway, the team's leader. "Al-Hilu and the
Sovereignty Council attempted to prepare a Declaration of Principles to structure the peace
discussions and to spill forth their unified agenda for Sudan."
On October 18, South Sudanese mediators organized a united committee for the first
time independently, between SRF and SRC representatives, to the first Darfur track
conference (Lanz, 2019). Juba's September 11 declaration will be examined by a joint
committee, which hopes to provide suggestions for moving forward with discussions on the
country's most pressing issues. As part of a negotiated solution, Hemetti, put assign with the
SRF, October 21 that included a restored ceasefire, humanitarian supplies to problem zones,
and a pledge to continue discussions. Sudan, South Sudan, and other African states, Tut
Galwak announced following the October 18 meetings, would "stop all sorts of bloodshed"
by the end of 2020 in Africa.
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Failure the negotiations

Factors contributing to negotiation Failures

The government's lack of political commitment and resistance groups' mutual distrust
might be the first element to fall under this category. While several ceasefire agreements
required the GoS to disband the janjaweed, it maintained its assaults on insurgent regions. It
ignored many UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to take control of these militias.
For their part, the insurgent groups concentrated on strengthening their military capabilities to
gain more leverage in negotiations with the government. The government's by attacking IDP
camps and refugee camps in Chad with the help of janjaweed militias. The administration did
not make any compromises that may have bolstered the public's faith in the government.
There was also an imbalance in the bargaining positions that impeded the parties
involved. On the other hand, the government was well-versed in peace discussions thanks to
its efforts with the South, while the resistance organizations were ill-equipped to deal with
them. Because of the fierce competition for power and resources that the agreements in
Darfur's resistance groups had created, they were divided into several factions and vulnerable
to further division. It was also feared by the resistance groups that GoS was forging
agreements with various factions and undermining the resistance movements based on their
experience in the South. Given their failure to destroy the state militarily, the opposition
groups could not seek further power and resource-sharing sacrifices.
A third reason is that the CPA, signed by Sudan's north and south, was given priority
over the Darfur peace initiatives because of the country's long history of disputes and
accords. Power and wealth sharing were two areas in which this was particularly true. To
begin with, mediators and the GoS underlined that this would be handled as part of the
implementation of the CPA and the creation of a New Sudan; hence JEM's need for national
political reform was ignored. They thought that a powerless Senior Assistant in the
Presidency was not representative of Darfur since the CPA had allotted the top executive
positions in the central government. There were only 20 percent seats left for opposition
parties from northern and southern Sudan in the CPA that allotted 52 percent of the seats to
the National Congress Party (NCP) and 28 percent to the South Sudan Liberation Movement.
As a result, significant groups withdrew from the deal because Darfurians' aspirations for
proportional representation in parliament could not be met. The lack of places for Darfurians
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at the national level may have fueled the groups' competitiveness and contributed to greater
division in the conflict. Accordingly, the SPLM rejected the Compensation Fund since there
was no CPA provision to compensate Southerners for their specific losses. In general,
mediators and foreign observers backed the GoS's viewpoints above those of the Darfurians
to preserve the CPA.
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References

Omwenga, A. C. (2018). War, Conflict, and Its Impact in the Greater Horn of Africa:

A Case Study of South Sudan (Doctoral dissertation, United States International

University-Africa).

Kipyegon, K. (2018). Role Of IGAD In Resolving The Conflict In South

Sudan (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

Krampe, F., Van De Goor, L., Barnhoorn, A., Smith, E., & Smith, D. (2020). Water

Security and Governance in the Horn of Africa. Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute.

Moriasi, E. M. (2020). Mediating Conflicts in Africa-Comparing Intergovernmental

Authority on Development (Igad) Mediation Processes in South Sudan and Somalia: Lessons

for Regional Organizations (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).

Nyombe, T. D. M. (2019). African Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict

Resolution: Analyzing the Contribution of Intergovernmental Authority on Development

(IGAD) In the South Sudan Conflict Resolution 2013-2018 (Doctoral dissertation, United

States International University-Africa).

Samson, J. (2018). Strategic Issues which Hinder the Realizations of Peace through

Negotiation in Sudan: Case of Darfur. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF

COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS.

Woldemichael, S. (2020). Sudan's Transition: What are the Chances of Success?.

Lanz, D. (2019). The Responsibility to Protect in Darfur: From Forgotten Conflict to

Global Cause and Back. Routledge.