(Rethinking Asia and International Relations) Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, Hasan H. Karrar - China, Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative_ the Experience of an Early Adopter State-Routledge (2024)

“An indispensable volume for analyzing not only the infrastructural politics
of development in Pakistan – but also for developing a grounded understand-

ing of the geopolitics and geopolitical economy of China’s ascent in the world
system.”
Majed Akhter, King’s College London, UK
“This volume draws together case studies on CPEC that focus on the macro and
the micro, and thus enriches our understanding of the whole. The case studies in
this volume are invaluable for understanding the bigger picture.”
Katharine Adeney, University of Nottingham, UK
China, Pakistan and the Belt
and Road Initiative
Pakistan occupies an elevated role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
hosts its ‘flagship’ project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It has
attracted the largest volume of investments under the BRI and opened itself com-
prehensively to its transformative potential. This book provides a comprehensive
analysis of CPEC’s impact on Pakistan’s economy, politics, and society, covering
its developmental benefits as well as resulting controversies.
Interdisciplinary and international experts capture the complexity of CPEC, pre-
senting new empirical data in the form of interviews, archival materials, and docu-
mentary evidence. Covering topics ranging from agriculture to the environment,
gender to security, they focus on local outcomes challenging prevalent narratives
about the BRI as a strategic, China-driven vehicle to transform other countries
in its image. They argue that examples like CPEC should be understood as in-
teractive processes between China and its international partners, which produce
interdependent relations between them. Beyond the case of CPEC, these findings
contribute to the burgeoning field of ‘Global China’, through a comprehensive yet
granular assessment of the first ten years of the BRI’s flagship project.
This book will be of interest to scholars of area studies, regionalization, interna-
tional relations and development studies, as well as China studies and South Asia
studies focused on the most important and far-reaching national-level implementa-
tion of the BRI to date.
Pascal Abb is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, focus-
ing on how a rising China is interacting with global conflict environments. His
research on this issue has been published in the Journal of Contemporary China,
Third World Quarterly, Pacific Affairs, and others.
Filippo Boni is a senior lecturer at The Open University in the UK. He is the author of
Sino-Pakistani Relations. Politics, Military and Regional Dynamics (Routledge, 2019)
and his research has been published in The British Journal of Politics and International
Studies, Asian Survey, Regional and Federal Studies and Asia Policy, among others.
Hasan H. Karrar is an Associate Professor at Lahore University of Management

Sciences. His research on Chinese international engagement appeared as The New
Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Central Asian Foreign Policy since the Cold War
(UBC Press, 2010) and more recently in Antipode, Comparative Studies in Asia,
Africa and the Middle East, and Modern Asian Studies, and other scholarly outlets.
Rethinking Asia and International Relations
Series Editor – Emilian Kavalski, Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in
China-Eurasia Relations and International Studies, University of
Nottingham, Ningbo, China
This series seeks to provide thoughtful consideration both of the growing promi-
nence of Asian actors on the global stage and the changes in the study and practice
of world affairs that they provoke. It intends to offer a comprehensive parallel as-
sessment of the full spectrum of Asian states, organisations, and regions and their
impact on the dynamics of global politics.
The series seeks to encourage conversation on:
• what rules, norms, and strategic cultures are likely to dominate international life
in the ‘Asian Century’;
• how will global problems be reframed and addressed by a ‘rising Asia’;
• which institutions, actors, and states are likely to provide leadership during such
‘shifts to the East’;
• whether there is something distinctly ‘Asian’ about the emerging patterns of
global politics.
Such comprehensive engagement not only aims to offer a critical assessment

of the actual and prospective roles of Asian actors, but also seeks to rethink the
concepts, practices, and frameworks of analysis of world politics.
This series invites proposals for interdisciplinary research monographs undertak-
ing comparative studies of Asian actors and their impact on the current patterns and
likely future trajectories of international relations. Furthermore, it offers a platform
for pioneering explorations of the ongoing transformations in global politics as a
result of Asia’s increasing centrality to the patterns and practices of world affairs.
The Arctic in China’s National Strategy

Science, Security, and Governance
Martin Kossa
China, Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative

The Experience of an Early Adopter State
Edited by Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni and Hasan H. Karrar
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Rethinking-Asia-and-

International-Relations/book-series/ASHSER1384
China, Pakistan and the Belt
and Road Initiative
The Experience of an Early Adopter State
Edited by Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni

and Hasan H. Karrar
First published 2024
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© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni and
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Names: Abb, Pascal, editor. | Boni, Filippo, (Asian studies specialist),
editor. | Karrar, Hasan H. (Hasan Haider), 1973- editor.
Title: China, Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative : the experience of
an early adopter state / edited by Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, Hasan H. Karrar.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2024. | Series:
Rethinking Asia and international relations | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2024001709 (print) | LCCN 2024001710 (ebook) | ISBN
9781032640174 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032633398 (paperback) | ISBN
9781032633411 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. | Yi dai yi lu
(Initiative : China) | China--Foreign economic relations--Pakistan. |
Pakistan--Foreign economic relations--China.
Classification: LCC HF1590.5.Z4 C6312 2024 (print) | LCC HF1590.5.Z4
(ebook) | DDC 337.5105491--dc23/eng/20240221
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024001709
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024001710
ISBN: 9781032640174 (hbk)

ISBN: 9781032633398 (pbk)
ISBN: 9781032633411 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411
Typeset in Times New Roman

by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.
Contents
List of Contributors ix
Foreword xii
1 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Ten: Taking Stock

of the Belt and Road’s “Flagship” Project 1
PASCAL ABB, FILIPPO BONI, AND HASAN H. KARRAR
2 Pakistan’s Political Settlement and the Prospect of Industrial

Development under CPEC 14
MUHAMMAD TAYYAB SAFDAR
3 Agriculture and Chinese Agribusiness Investments in the

Context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 33
MICHAEL SPIES
4 CPEC and De-Democratization in Pakistan 52

GUL-I-HINA VAN DER ZWAN
5 The Securitization of CPEC 74

ZAHID SHAHAB AHMED
6 BRI and Ethno-Regional Conflicts: A Case Study of CPEC

in Balochistan 93
RAFIULLAH KAKAR
7 China-Pakistan Relations, Gender and the China Pakistan

Economic Corridor 115
ERAM ASHRAF
viii Contents
8 People-to-People Contact under CPEC: Fact or Fiction? 138

SABA SHAHID
Index158
List of Contributors
Pascal Abb is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF),
focusing on how a rising China is interacting with global conflict environ-
ments. He is currently conducting research projects on the impact of the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) on conflict states and how Chinese actors are dealing
with challenges encountered in these environments. His latest publications on
these issues are ‘All geopolitics is local: the China–Pakistan Economic Cor-
ridor amidst overlapping centre–periphery relations’, Third World Quarterly
44(1); and ‘Road to peace or bone of contention? The impact of the Belt and
Road initiative on conflict states’ (with Robert Swaine and Ilya Jones), PRIF
Report 1/2021.
Dr Zahid Shahab Ahmed is Associate Professor of Security and Strategic Studies
at the UAE’s National Defence College, Abu Dhabi. Before that he was a Senior
Research Fellow at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization,
Deakin University, Australia. He is also a Non-Resident Research Fellow at
the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. During
2017–19, Dr Ahmed was a Non-Resident Research Fellow with the Univer-
sity of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy. During 2013–16, he
was an Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Peace and Stability,
National University of Sciences and Technology in Pakistan. He specializes in
peace and conflict studies, and his research focuses on peace and security in
South Asia and the Middle East. He has published extensively in leading jour-
nals, such as Politics and Religion, Democratization, Asian Studies Review, and
Territory, Politics, Governance. He is the author of Regionalism and Regional
Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC (2013) and the lead author of Iran’s
Soft Power in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2023).
Dr Eram Ashraf has a PhD in International Relations from Swansea University in
Wales, UK. Currently, she is working on China-Pakistan relations and the China
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Some of her recent works include ‘Behind
China’s Friendly Advice for Pakistan’ The Diplomat (May 2023), ‘China’s
Role and Interests in Regional Peace and Connectivity: Post U.S. withdrawal
in Afghanistan’ Development Advocate Pakistan United Nations Development
Programme Pakistan, 8(4) 2021, and ‘Economic Visions and the Making of
x List of Contributors
an Islamabad-Beijing-Riyadh Triangle: Assessing Saudi Arabia’s Role in the

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ Dirasat (58) 2020.
Filippo Boni is a senior lecturer in politics and international studies at The Open
University in the UK. He is interested in the politics of Chinese investments
in South Asia and Europe, as well as in the international relations of South
Asia, particularly in bilateral ties between Pakistan and China and the Belt and
Road Initiative. He is the author of Sino-Pakistani Relations: Politics, Military
and Regional Dynamics (2019), and his research has been published in The
British Journal of Politics and International Studies, Asian Survey, Regional
and Federal Studies, and Asia Policy, among others.
Rafiullah Kakar is an accomplished public policy and development expert with
specialization in public sector governance and institutional reforms, social de-
velopment, and the political economy of development. His research interests
encompass ethnic conflicts, federalism, CPEC, education delivery, and politi-
cal economy analysis. With over 12 years of distinguished professional experi-
ence in public and international development organizations in Pakistan and the
UK, Mr. Kakar has demonstrated expertise in contributing to academic litera-
ture through numerous published academic articles, book chapters, reports, and
policy papers. Mr. Kakar holds two master’s degrees from the University of
Oxford, where he earned the prestigious Rhodes scholarship.
Hasan H. Karrar is an Associate Professor at the Department of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan. He re-
searches and publishes on transnational connections and geopolitical alignments
between China, Central Asia, and north Pakistan. He is interested in develop-
ment, governance and securitization on state peripheries, and in the deploy-
ment and representation of Chinese economic and strategic power, including
how Chinese authority responds to—and is contoured by—ground realities in
countries where China is pursuing partnership. His earlier work on Sino-Central
Asian relations appeared as The New Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Central
Asian Foreign Policy since the Cold War (2010).
Muhammad Tayyab Safdar is an Assistant Professor (Global Studies) at the Uni-
versity of Virginia. His research explores the implications of increasing Chinese
investment in developing countries that are a part of the Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI), like Pakistan. Using evidence through in-depth fieldwork from the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Tayyab is especially interested in under-
standing the rules and incentives that inform the interaction between Chinese
stakeholders and elite actors in Pakistan. Tayyab has previously held positions
at the University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics.
Saba Shahid is a specialist in policy advocacy on sustainable development and
local-led development solutions in the think tank sector. She has performance
history in policy analysis and research, designing and delivering training
modules, academic/report writing, and stakeholder management and building
List of Contributors xi
partnerships for shared goals. Saba has worked with local development or-
ganizations, including various authorities and departments of the Punjab Gov-
ernment, NGOs, academic institutions and international organizations such as
UNDP, OPM, and WWF. She has a keen interest in the intersection of entrepre-
neurship and economic development, specifically the role of social entrepre-
neurship in narrowing income and opportunity divides across Pakistan. Saba
completed her MSc in Local Economic Development from the London School
of Economics and Political Science and holds a BA in Economics from Bilkent
University, Turkey.
Michael Spies is a human geographer and principal investigator of the junior re-
search group ‘TRANSECT—Agrarian Transformations and Social-Ecological
Complexities. Local Bioeconomy Scenarios in Central and South Asia’
(2019–2024) at Eberswalde University for Sustainable Development, Germany.
He obtained his PhD from Freie Universität Berlin in 2018, focusing on agrar-
ian change in Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan region. His current research interests
revolve around various aspects of agrarian change in Pakistan and Central Asia,
among others related to social-ecological implications of agricultural mod-
ernization and transboundary dimensions of farming systems. Additionally, his
work explores transdisciplinary perspectives on natural resource management,
with a specific focus on participatory research and action.
Gul-i-Hina van der Zwan, neé Shahzad, is a Lecturer at the Institute of Political
Science, Leiden University in the Netherlands. She is also a Research Fellow at
the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands.
She holds a PhD in Political Studies from the University of Milan, Italy. Gul-
i-Hina’s research is aimed at analysing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and its domestic political implications in the BRI partner countries, focusing on
two specific aspects, namely its impact on the processes of democratization and
regime change in the countries involved.
Foreword
Katharine Adeney
CPEC has been lauded as a game changer by many in Pakistan but has raised con-
sternation internationally about the extent of Chinese influence in Pakistan, as well
as Chinese access to the Indian Ocean through the port of Gwadar. US diplomat
Alice Wells famously criticized the ‘predatory loans’ involved in the BRI, and the
2023 G20 ended with agreement to form an India-Middle East-Europe economic
corridor to challenge the BRI. Others have worried whether Chinese financial in-
fluence on Pakistan will be to the detriment of its democratic development, as the
chapter by Gul-i-Hina Shahzad in this volume discusses.
But what is CPEC—the ‘flagship project’ of the BRI? It is a moving target, tak-
ing on many different forms, and having many different motivations attributed to
it. Its focus has changed rapidly in the eight years it has been in existence: from
energy projects and road building, its focus has now shifted to Special Economic
Zones, Agriculture and Digital Silk Roads.
So, how can we evaluate its development? Some may say it is too soon to reach
a definitive conclusion. However, since its establishment, several things have be-
come clear.
The first is that it is difficult to critically analyze the progress of CPEC as a
macro project. For a long time it was heresy to criticize CPEC within Pakistan,
and academics, journalists, and NGOs who have sought to analyse CPEC have
been routinely criticized for being naysayers or foreign agents. A lot is written on
CPEC but much of it lacks critical analysis—simply repeating official briefings. As
the chapter by Michael Spies details, many of the projects are shrouded in secrecy,
because of Chinese concerns (e.g. because ‘the patented technology gets ‘stolen’
by other, unapproved seed producers’), but the securitization of the CPEC project,
especially in the port city of Gwadar, has precluded independent investigation of
many of the projects.
Relatedly, evidence of progress at the macro and the micro level on CPEC and
its associated projects is scant. The CPEC website includes a plethora of informa-
tion, but a comparison of the progress of the listed projects over a period of years
reveals that many of the completion dates were aspirational rather than realistic.
Much of the literature written on CPEC is not evidence based. Many of the projects
discussed are not CPEC projects at all but are funded by the PSDP (as Rafiullah
Kakar discusses in his chapter on the progress of CPEC in Balochistan). Others
Foreword xiii
were projects that were in progress before CPEC but have subsequently been re-
branded as CPEC (Lahore’s Orange Metro being an example). It is to be welcomed
that data about the number of jobs created are now provided on the CPEC website
but many of the numbers lack credibility, and lacking in key details, e.g. as Eram
Ashraf analyses, it is not possible to analyse the extent to which women have been
able to be employed on CPEC projects. Her chapter on the masculinity of the pro-
ject ‘iron brother’ and ‘iron Pakistan’ reveals the importance of collecting data on
the progress of CPEC over time, which, while it is painstakingly slow, will pay
dividends in the future analysis of the progression of the project(s).
Third, CPEC is a (inter)national project, but to understand where completion
targets have been met, where they have not, and how projects are operating re-
quires on the ground fieldwork and an examination of individual projects. This
inevitably means that a lot of the research on CPEC will be disjointed, but these
case studies, some of which we see in this volume, are invaluable for understand-
ing the bigger picture. Individual projects may well not be representative of the
whole situation in Pakistan (there are huge differences in the operation of CPEC
across provinces, across sectors, and even within provinces), but their importance
should not be under-estimated. Without this empirical data, as the chapter by Rafi-
ullah Kakar lays out, it is not possible ‘to substantiate the claims regarding uneven
distribution of costs and benefits’. The chapters focusing on sectors of CPEC,
such as the Special Economic Zones and the status of agriculture, are therefore
particularly timely.
This volume of papers draws together a collection that focuses on the macro
and the micro and thus enriches our understanding of the whole. More research is
needed (and this author is sure it will be forthcoming) as the projects develop. As
these papers make clear, there are many opportunities that Pakistan can avail from
CPEC, but it is important to maintain a critical academic distance in order that the
potential from these projects can be achieved.
1 The China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor at Ten
Taking Stock of the Belt and Road’s
“Flagship” Project
Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, and Hasan H. Karrar
Pakistan occupies an elevated role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
hosts what is frequently described as its “flagship” project, the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC). It has attracted both the largest volume of invest-
ments under the BRI (over 30 billion invested at the time of writing in 2023, with
a far greater amount pledged) and opened itself the most comprehensively to its
transformative potential. There is no field of Pakistan’s internal or external poli-
cies that has remained untouched by CPEC: economically, it has already brought
about a rapid improvement in the nation’s energy supply (albeit by relying mostly
on coal power plants), and its next steps are scheduled to develop light industry
and agriculture while linking them to the Chinese market. The project has further
strengthened Pakistan’s international alignment with China, while causing signifi-
cant domestic tensions over the allocation of projects, decision-making authority,
information transparency, and resulting corruption. Socially, CPEC has intensified
people-to-people contacts not just in business but also in education and tourism,
putting increasing demands on effective and efficient cross-cultural communica-
tion. All of this has taken place in a very challenging environment within Pakistan,
as seen in vocal and sometimes violent resistance against projects, many of which
can only proceed under military protection. It has also thrown problems with Paki-
stan’s domestic governance in stark relief and polarized opinions over how CPEC
is managed. For all these reasons, Pakistan is arguably the most valuable case to
study for those seeking to understand the implementation of the BRI in host coun-
tries. While studies on the BRI have tended to be framed within global and regional
geopolitics—BRI was coterminous with China becoming the largest exporter of
Foreign Direct Investment, and with the People’s Republic of China becoming
more assertive on the global stage—the chapters in this volume offer a focused
examination of what is happening on the ground in Pakistan, the country that has
been most receptive to engagement with China under the new investment regime.
This volume is motivated by the need to understand how much of what is hap-
pening on the ground can be attributed to CPEC and to take stock of the first ten
years of China-Pakistan development cooperation under the BRI. The answer to
this question is difficult to disentangle. Projects that come under CPEC are not pri-
marily seen as contributing toward a vision of a connected global future emanating
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-1
2 Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, and Hasan H. Karrar
from Beijing; rather, CPEC projects are frequently considered addressing chronic
infrastructure deficiency that has prevented Pakistan from realizing its full eco-
nomic and strategic potential. Consequently, when BRI’s vision of a prosperous
global future touches down in Pakistan, it is immediately put to work to redress
all that successive Pakistani regimes, civilian and military have been unable to ad-
equately provide: employment and electricity, roads, and ports. In doing so, CPEC
projects find themselves embedded in national and local political economies as
well as contestations over rent and control.
To ask “what has been happening on the ground since CPEC began?” is to raise
three interlinked questions. The first question is to what extent does CPEC appear
as something outside what is already happening in different parts of the country?
Put differently, how does CPEC appear similar—or different—from both earlier
and current investments, some of which were already funded by China? The second
question we must ask is the extent to which this global vision is being contoured
in the host country? Between the institutional mechanisms where CPEC projects
are identified and their implementation on the ground are a range of influential
stakeholders: in Pakistan, these may be provincial elite and commercial lobbies,
local strongmen, and members of the community, all of whom are individuals who
can wield considerable influence. Third, what do the local people have to say about
CPEC? Do they have a favorable opinion about CPEC and more broadly about
China, and if not—why?
The chapters included in this volume address these three sets of questions, by
presenting new empirical data in the form of interviews, archival materials, and
documentary evidence, thereby helping fill a number of gaps in the literature on
CPEC, as they focus on so far underexplored areas (for example, agriculture, gen-
der, people-to-people exchanges) that are key to understanding both the past and
future trajectories of CPEC. In doing so, the analyses presented here suggest that
the BRI is best understood as an interactive process between China and its in-
ternational partners, which is producing interdependent relations between them.
Contrary to prevalent narratives about the BRI and CPEC specifically, there is little
evidence of a rising China simply reshaping the world to its liking and imposing
its strategic designs on subservient countries. Rather, they are the product of com-
plex negotiations, a source of unexpected setbacks and frustrations, and exercise a
significant adaptive pressure back on China itself. A global China is one connected
to and interdependent with the world, and the BRI is not just a one-way street. Be-
yond the case of CPEC, these findings seek to contribute to the burgeoning field of
“Global China,” through a comprehensive yet granular assessment of the first ten
years of the BRI’s “flagship project” and how it played out in one of the defining
locales for China’s global infrastructure push.
CPEC’s Significance for Global Chinese Agency

As the BRI’s designated “flagship,” the significance and potential impact of CPEC
reaches far beyond Pakistan’s borders. It has not only attracted the largest funding
volume out of any national-level manifestation of the BRI but has also assumed
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Ten 3
the most comprehensive form: CPEC is not just a massive infrastructure project
but has led to the establishment of many additional ties in fields like education,
policy research, and media that are supposed to act as its guardrails. Scholarships to
Chinese universities and locally provided Mandarin classes have become popular
across Pakistan (Safdar 2021); Chinese and Pakistani policy elites are conducting
joint pro-CPEC advocacy and coordinating their views in dialogue formats (Abb
2022); and content-sharing agreements are bringing Chinese media products to Pa-
kistani news watchers (Afzal 2020). In times when many nations are reacting war-
ily to real or imagined Chinese influence, Pakistan has welcomed it. This makes it a
crucial testing ground for China’s expanding policy toolkit and shows the potential
as well as the limits of the Chinese global agency in the era of the BRI.
As this volume shows, CPEC is emblematic of both the advantages and disad-
vantages of China’s developmental approach. Its advocates in Pakistan frequently
highlight the speed and decisiveness with which its projects are being implemented
and speak admiringly of the Chinese way of doing (infrastructure) business. They
stress the long history of strategic alignment between both countries, drawing a
contrast to Pakistan’s more ambivalent relationship with the US, and the transient
nature of western aid that was drawn down together with the “war on terror.” Chi-
na’s diplomatic stance of noninterference in the domestic politics of its partners,
and thus the absence of political reform conditions attached to infrastructure fund-
ing, is another factor that distinguishes its approach from other international pro-
viders. These constitute comparative advantages that explain the BRI’s popularity
not just in Pakistan but also in other parts of the developing world.
However, if the BRI is indeed intended to export China’s own developmental
model globally, the CPEC experience also offers a very cautionary tale about its ac-
ceptance elsewhere. Seven years after its formal launch, disillusionment is evident
on both sides, and disagreements over the economic and security governance of
CPEC have come out in the open. On the Pakistani side, the initial hype of CPEC
as a “game changer” has given way to disappointment over uneven access to its
supposed benefits in connectivity and electricity generation, few job opportunities
for locals, constant struggles between the provincial and national governments over
project allocation, land-grabbing practices, and environmental damages (Boni and
Adeney 2020; Markey 2020; Small 2020; also see the contributions by Rafiullah Ka-
kar and Michael Spies in this volume). On the Chinese side, investors are complain-
ing about an overly restrictive bureaucratic environment and prolonged approval
procedures, which compare especially unfavorably to the speed of infrastructure
construction in China. An ongoing tussle over unpaid dues for Chinese power pro-
viders has weighed heavily on bilateral relations and disrupted energy provision
in the summer of 2022. Even more concerningly, Chinese citizens in certain parts
of Pakistan are in danger of terror attacks by insurgent groups, and work on CPEC
projects in these areas can only progress under constant military protection (see
the chapter by Zahid Ahmed in this volume). Chinese nationals not in the country
on CPEC-related business are not covered by state security protocols and conse-
quently are more vulnerable: on April 26, 2016 an attack claimed the lives of three
language teachers at the Karachi Confucius Institute. Multiple attacks on Chinese
citizens have led to diplomatic complaints over the ineffectiveness of Pakistani se-
curity measures and reportedly even pressure to allow for the deployment of armed
Chinese security contractors in Pakistan, something currently forbidden by Paki-
stani law, and which remains a contentious proposition (Nouwens 2019).
The challenges Chinese actors encountered in Pakistan are emblematic of a
global slowing in BRI’s pace of advancement, and a tighter scrutiny of proposed
overseas projects within China. BRI-related investments have dropped since 2018,
a trend shift predating but worsened by the Covid-related interruptions (Scissors
2019), and to which mounting concerns over risk exposure and capital misallo-
cation likely contributed (Malik et al. 2021). For example, the coal plants built
in CPEC’s early stage would no longer be possible under new Chinese pledges
to build a “Green BRI.” Security concerns, which had been raised by multiple
Chinese experts early into CPEC’s planning but apparently ignored, are an acute
problem due to BRI’s high exposure to fragile and conflict-affected countries (Abb
et al. 2021) and have received greater attention from Chinese risk rating agencies
(for example Sinosure 2020). Dreams of pacifying the Chinese periphery through
economic means have undergone a harsh reality check, and the exposure to local
conflict risks is drawing China more and more into Pakistan’s complicated po-
litical landscape. The steady expansion of Chinese interests in highly dangerous
environments is the main reason why Beijing is taking on a more active role as an
international security provider (Ghiselli 2021), and CPEC’s combination of acute
threats and volume of assets at risk makes it the most prominent case to study the
evolution of Chinese foreign and security policy.
However, despite all these challenges, both CPEC and BRI are clearly here
to stay: considering the enormous amount of financial, political, and ideological
capital invested in it, a retreat from Xi Jinping’s prestige project is not an option
for Beijing. Instead, the long-term significance of CPEC will lie in how the les-
sons learned in Pakistan are applied to BRI as a whole. From the management
of security threats to interactions with local public opinion, CPEC has led to the
development of new tools and methods, some of which constitute a departure from
long-held Chinese beliefs. Accordingly, Pakistan is not just a fascinating case study
for how BRI—and the Chinese influence that comes with it—is transforming re-
cipient states, but potentially also an example of how increased exposure to these
environments is changing China itself.
CPEC and Pakistan’s Domestic Politics

Pakistan’s domestic politics have been an important example of the transformative
potential hinted at above. The domestic political environment in Pakistan not only
represents an important test for Beijing’s ability to navigate and adapt to the com-
plexities of domestic political realities in BRI partner countries, but it also demon-
strates how CPEC has become internalized in Pakistan’s governance structure and
wider political dynamics.
The internalization of CPEC within Pakistan’s political economy has led to a
number of transformations mostly visible across three dimensions: the establishment
of new bureaucracies to cope with the multi-billion-dollar investments; the cen-

tralization of decision-making processes; and power shifts in Pakistan’s domes-
tic politics. Here we provide an overview of each of these three transformative
developments: new bureaucratic mechanisms, centralization of decision-making,
and transformation of the domestic political landscape, including civil-military
relations.
First, the creation of new bureaucratic mechanisms to coordinate and implement
CPEC is one of the most prominent examples of the transformative effect of BRI
projects on state structures and institutions. Indeed, CPEC is a particularly impor-
tant case, as China and Pakistan have set up one of the most institutionalized, ad
hoc decision-making structures among all BRI countries.
At the apex is the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). As the CPEC’s top
decision-making body, the JCC is the primary venue for the negotiations be-
tween Pakistan and China. The committee is co-chaired by the Pakistani min-
ister of planning, development, and special initiatives and the vice chairman of
China’s National Development and Reform Commission. Several joint working
groups (for example on Gwadar, energy, and transport infrastructure) convene
in between the JCC meetings and make recommendations to the full committee.
Between 2013 and 2023, 12 meetings have been held. Some of the most impor-
tant decisions on CPEC, ranging from the allocations of projects to the focus on
energy generation in the first phase, were the result of interactions and negotia-
tions occurring within the JCC. As such, this new bureaucratic body was created
exclusively to deal with CPEC projects and it epitomizes in many ways the need
for new institutional structures supporting the design and implementation of BRI
projects.
Another important institutional body, although one that was dismissed within
less than three years was the CPEC Authority, discussed by Gul-i-Hina van der
Zwan in her chapter. The CPEC Authority was established in October 2019 through
a Presidential ordinance. Both in the run up to and after the CPEC Authority was
created, a number of concerns were raised, primarily around the fact that Planning
Commission’s functions would overlap with those of the CPEC Authority, includ-
ing inter-provincial and inter-ministerial coordination as well as sectoral research
for informed decision-making and long-term planning. Following the ouster of
Imran Khan in April 2022, the CPEC Authority is now dormant.
In addition to the JCC and the erstwhile CPEC Authority, other bodies were
also established to deal with CPEC, including: (1) Parliamentary Committees on
CPEC (both in the Senate and in the National Assembly) aimed at providing par-
liamentary oversight to CPEC; (2) dedicated “China cells” in the prime minister’s
office alongside Cabinet Committees on CPEC tasked with facilitating approval
processes and streamlining decision-making; and (3) dedicated China cells at pro-
vincial government level. Despite being established to streamline decision-making
and to ensure a timely implementation of the various projects, the mushrooming of
new bureaucratic structures ended up having the opposite effect, namely a cumber-
some bureaucratic environment. This is one of the concerns that has been repeat-
edly raised at bilateral meetings, which is considered to be one of the primary
causes behind the slowdown of the second phase of CPEC since 2017 (Adeney and
Boni 2021).
The second area in which CPEC was most prominently internalized in Paki-
stan’s domestic structures is the centralization of the decision-making process
(Boni and Adeney 2020). Such a trend was the result of two overlapping dynamics.
On the one hand, Beijing had a preference for a dynamic yet centralized decision-
making mechanism. In fact, the establishment of the JCC and CPEC Authority was
the result of China’s modus operandi and of its request to deal with a single, reli-
able interlocutor that would take most decisions related to the CPEC projects. In
other words, having institutional structures that would offer a one-stop-shop for all
things CPEC seemed to be the best solution to navigate through the various levels of
government and interests characterizing Pakistan’s domestic politics. On the other
hand, the then Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government (2013–2018)
was unwilling to devolve power because it did not want to risk diluting its control
over the project and the potential political benefits deriving from it. CPEC was
seen by the then government as a way to re-election in 2018 and to tilt the balance
in civil-military relations in favor of the elected leaders. None of these objectives
materialized.
The third and final observable area pertains to Pakistan’s domestic political
landscape, including but not limited to civil-military relations. One of the main
rationales on China’s side to invest in CPEC was the hope that economic devel-
opment would have a significant positive spillover not only to boost Pakistan’s
economy but also to stabilize its often turbulent politics and security landscape. In
fact, CPEC did not bring the expected benefits in terms of political stability and
control over the projects became an additional bone of contention in Pakistan’s
civil-military relations, with the previously discussed CPEC Authority as a promi-
nent example of such dynamics.
Grounding the Belt and Road

The BRI has its origins in landmark speeches that Chinese President Xi Jinping
made in 2013 in Indonesia and Kazakhstan. In these speeches, Xi had laid out
a vision of shared prosperity along so-called Silk Route Economic Belts and
Maritime Silk Roads. This vision of connectivity across global spaces ended
up as the foundation for the six economic corridors under the BRI, of which
CPEC is one. In projecting a shared future of connectivity and joint prosper-
ity, BRI also offers visual representations of this global association. Primar-
ily, connectivity under BRI has been depicted through maps, in which the six
economic corridors will be shown effortlessly traversing vast distances, disre-
garding borders and terrain, and building on ahistorical but widely legible Silk
Road tropes these maps are meant to illustrate a communal global space, albeit
one that is continuously being forged (Alff 2020; Sidaway and Woon 2017).
Depictions of connectivity are also represented through cultural iconography
inspired by the so-called Silk Road, appearing as ahistorical, decontextual-
ized images of camels plodding across sand dunes. Finally, images of physical
infrastructure—containers and ports, rail lines, and highways—are used as a

way of signaling toward a future of shared prosperity that BRI purportedly
engenders. Where the new infrastructure goes, so it would seem, prosperity
will follow.
Each of these are imaginaries that are generated from outside the particular lo-
cales that will be or, in some cases, are being transformed by BRI. The power of
these visuals in representing the global initiative is in their ability to effortlessly
travel between different parts of the world. A decade since Xi began unfolding his
vision for the BRI, it is fruitful to scale-down—as indeed, each of the contributions
in this volume does—and ask how much has been realized, on the ground, in the
places that were meant to be transformed by BRI? In the case of Pakistan, two sec-
tors have already been deeply affected by it, energy generation and connectivity.
In the former, CPEC resulted in the construction of nine new power plants with a
combined capacity of over 5,000 MW between 2015 and 2020. This made up the
previous nationwide energy shortfall and, at least initially, solved the problem of
frequent “load-shedding”; the practice of temporarily disconnecting parts of the
electricity grid to bring demand in line with supply. However, this gap was closed
by relying mainly on coal power, which brought its own set of problems. Pakistan
is not only deeply at risk from climate change but also does not have many domes-
tic supplies of coal and has to instead rely on imports. In 2022, the combination of
rising commodity prices and a decline in the value of the Pakistani rupee resulted
in a situation where many plants could no longer be economically run, leading to
supply cutbacks and a return of load-shedding (Ghumman 2022). In addition, long-
running underinvestment in local grids means that the new power supply cannot be
delivered equally throughout the country, exacerbating the rural-urban and center-
periphery divides in energy access (Abb 2022).
In connectivity, CPEC became the subject of a bitter political debate over which
“route” it would take through Pakistan, and whether investments would be chan-
neled in and through the populous eastern provinces, or the traditionally neglected
western ones (Bengali 2015; Boni and Adeney 2020). As the name says, CPEC
is supposed to serve as a corridor linking Pakistan directly to China through the
Karakoram, and with its other terminus in the new harbor of Gwadar on the Indian
Ocean. Accordingly, the increased economic activity and access to the Chinese
market it is supposed to deliver will accrue where connectivity is available and
commercially viable. While a political compromise to build three north-south “ar-
teries” supposedly covering all of the country was eventually found, actual follow-
up has been much slower in the western periphery: Chinese actors have proven
reluctant to fund and build new roads in what they consider to be a dangerous
hinterland, and even agreed-upon projects have not advanced according to sched-
ule (see Rafiullah Kakar’s chapter in this volume). Meanwhile, good progress on
motorways in Pakistan’s east has reduced travel time between these comparatively
well-off locales (McCartney 2022). This infrastructure gap is likely to have fur-
ther repercussions, as the better-connected provinces have also seen progress in
CPEC’s new special economic zones, while investor interest in the more remote
areas has been slow to materialize (Abb 2022).
In Pakistan development assumes the provision or promise of public goods and

services and the construction or maintenance of public infrastructure; promising
and delivering on these promises is one of the primary ways in which the countries’
elite derive legitimacy. Affect also has a role to play, which can result in both posi-
tive views of China, or generate wariness. Let us briefly look at two examples from
the periphery, one from the Karakoram Mountains in north Pakistan and the other
from the western Baluchistan province. Before CPEC was formulated, there was a
favorable view of China in Pakistan’s mountainous north where the two countries
have a land border. The Karakoram Highway, which connects Pakistan’s Gilgit-
Baltistan administrative region (formerly known as the Northern Areas) to China’s
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), is the best known symbol of fra-
ternal cooperation. Built over a decade, from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s,
the construction of this high-altitude road through hazardous mountain landscapes
is popularly seen to cement close ties between the two countries. At the time of
its construction, official narratives that surround the construction of the road were
scripted in a Bandung lexicon of South-South cooperation. The oft-quoted affirma-
tion of bilateral affinity—that the friendship between Pakistan and China is higher
than the Himalayas and deeper than the sea—has its origins in a speech that then
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto made to Chinese road builders (Karrar 2021).
The people of Gilgit-Baltistan continue to favor engagement with China, al-
though in recent years there have been concerns that land-grabbing could intensify
after CPEC; there is also frustration at growing securitization, evidenced both in
new check posts and military infrastructure along transport arteries. The fact that
the mountainous north is depicted as the gateway for Chinese capital amplifies
state anxiety, leading to non-normative security measures which affect community
and everyday mobilities at exactly the same time that bilateral engagement intensi-
fied (Karrar 2022).
The next example is Baluchistan, where unease with enhanced engagement
with China is growing. Consider the village of Saindak, located in the western
Chaghi district. Since the turn of the century, a Chinese state-owned enterprise
(SOE), China Metallurgical Group Corporation, or MCC has been extracting cop-
per and gold from the region surrounding the village. The region is heavily secu-
ritized, with Saindak being ringed by a dense security perimeter; one journalist
counted ten check posts in the final 30 km leading up to the village (Notezai
2018). Gwadar too, where since 2013 the Chinese Shipping and Port Handling
Company manages the port, is similarly securitized. The issue of securitization
recently came to the forefront when in December 2021, a Haq Do Tehreek or
“demand rights movement” emerged in Gwadar. Among the demands of the
protestors, who would carry out periodic protests over the next 12 months, and
whose ranks included large numbers of women and children, was an abolishment
of check posts in Gwadar which have chortled mobility, as well as provision of
public goods and service provision. Describing the ground realities in Gwadar,
the leader of the protest movement noted how “the army is always deployed [in
Gwadar] to keep a hold on it, there are checkposts at every step, we are asked for
identification in our hometown.” He then added: “we don’t have water, power or
education … we don’t want such a CPEC” (Rizwan 2022). Similar to Saindak,

from where unprocessed ore is shipped out, in Gwadar too there is a feeling of
deprivation just as the region becomes more closely integrated into regional econ-
omies. Certainly, securitization in Balochistan long predates CPEC, and check
posts are a ubiquitous feature even in those parts of the province where there is no
Chinese presence (Akhtar 2022). But here too CPEC becomes embedded within
a localized political economy that in this case pivots around peripheralization and
resource extraction.
Finally, there is the question of whether the new infrastructure benefits people
who live in the locales where CPEC projects are being implemented. Consider
again, the MCC operating in Saindak MCC. The MCC was handed control of the
electricity station, a water plant, buildings, and warehouses and tasked with the
construction of an airstrip. Over time, an export processing zone was also estab-
lished, all the while the locals remained in want of education and health facilities,
and potable water. Roads, where they do exist, connect excavation and processing
sites, and not the locales where people live (Notezai 2018). Again, there is a longer
pattern of rentier political economies extracting capital with little benefit to local
residents; the best example of which in Pakistan is probably Sui in Balochistan
which while providing natural gas to the rest of the country has remained deprived
itself (Gazdar 2007). Small traders in a border market along the border with China
describe how after CPEC there is more cross-border movement of heavy cargo, and
less border trade (Karrar 2019). Simply put, CPEC was never envisioned as provid-
ing benefits and uplift for wayside locales, although that is how it is spun with the
endless “game-changer” narratives.
Conclusions and Outline of the Volume

Despite the many delays, setbacks, controversies, and frustrations that CPEC has
experienced in its short lifespan, the project is here to stay. Its scope has stead-
ily expanded from the original plan, which is flexible enough to accommodate
new initiatives in areas like agriculture, tourism, digital connectivity, media, and
education. Governing elites from all major parties have endorsed the project, and
within Islamabad, a robust consensus exists in favor. While attempts are underway
to rebalance Pakistan’s international ties through a revival of cooperation with the
US, CPEC has made China a major presence in Pakistan and to an extent locked
this relationship in place.
Much less consensus exists within Pakistan over how to build CPEC, with sev-
eral ongoing controversies over its exploitation of marginalized regions; grievances
over its environmental and social impact on local communities; the involvement
of the military in security provision and project management (Karrar 2022; Ahmed
in this volume). Contrary to widespread perceptions of BRI and its financing, loan
conditions are not among the biggest concerns in Pakistan. However, CPEC is a
cautionary tale for Chinese ambitions to become a global provider of development
solutions, as its top-down implementation has failed to generate grassroots support
or the robust social ties that are supposed to act as guardrails for the BRI.
CPEC has been significantly shaped by local agency and is not a case of Chi-
nese designs being imposed on another country. This flexibility in adapting to the
needs of local elites (not so much other stakeholders), and in constantly adjusting
the CPEC plan accordingly, speaks to a major strength of China’s BRI. At the same
time, the lack of conditionality in Chinese financing has enabled projects that have
highly adverse environmental effects, are seen as perpetuating domestic marginali-
zation and repression (e.g. Gwadar in Balochistan, see Kakar in this volume), are
economically dubious (see Safdar in this volume), or exacerbate social injustice
through land-grabbing (Spies in this volume).
CPEC is a complex project that has touched every aspect of Pakistani society:
livelihoods and living standards, the provision of basic utilities, the structure of its
predominantly agrarian economy, political center-periphery and civil-military rela-
tions, everyday interactions with Chinese foreigners, and many more. This shows
how large the repertoire of “Chinese solutions” to global problems has become,
and how vast the resources that can be mobilized to tackle them. It has also made
Pakistan a field for experimenting with the new tools of the Chinese global agency,
and the lessons learned from its setbacks and controversies will inform BRI im-
plementations elsewhere. This will likely have an impact on Chinese practices of
how such projects are approved and implemented in the future, and increasingly
also the need for interventions to keep them afloat. If CPEC is any indication, this
will pull China out of its familiar comfort zone of “noninterference” in the politics
of other countries.
This volume is designed to capture the scope and complexity of CPEC by featur-
ing contributions from an interdisciplinary and international array of experts. It is
focused on empirical assessments of CPEC’s reality and its consequences—which
are sometimes at odds with the promises of the early years but also reflect a sig-
nificant evolution in the original design. The aim here is to provide a well-rounded
overview of the current state of CPEC, which means taking a critical approach that
submits neither to the exuberant rhetoric of a “game changer” for Pakistan nor to
the kind of reflexive criticism of the BRI has that characterized its perception in
western countries. In order to provide a rich empirical description of Pakistan’s
CPEC experience, the volume primarily draws on a qualitative methodology. It
reflects diverse voices from on the ground, which have been captured in interviews
with academic experts, local community members, civil society activists, govern-
ment officials and politicians, journalists, and Chinese citizens in Pakistan. Where
suitable, this material is complemented by statistical information. Our focus on
empirics and interdisciplinarity also means that we do not attempt to capture CPEC
through the prism of any unified theoretical framework. Rather, authors were en-
couraged to develop their takes through empirical innovation and to highlight de-
tails that have gotten lost in bird’s-eye-analyses of the BRI.
The contributors to this volume present their takes on CPEC across seven chap-
ters, each focusing on a different aspect:
Muhammed Tayyab Safdar explores why, outside the commercial sector,
commercial cooperation under CPEC remains limited. At its outset, CPEC
had been projected to transform Pakistan’s economy through the large-scale
industrialization for domestic and export markets. Safdar explains this through
Pakistan’s underlying political settlement, which breeds a short-term time hori-
zon for ruling coalitions and an incentive structure that privileges unproductive
rent-seeking.
Michael Spies illustrates how, despite multiple announcements of cooperation
in the agricultural sector, uncertainty remains regarding actual investments and
activities. As Spies notes, multinationals and large Pakistani agribusinesses already
have large stakes in the farming sector, and the ongoing neoliberalization of agri-
culture will probably further intensify as new Chinese enterprises enter the scene.
Given the lack of political stability and the fragmented nature of farming in Paki-
stan, it seems rather unlikely that Chinese investors will be a prominent feature in
Pakistani agriculture anytime soon.
Gul-i-Hina van der Zwan assesses the relationship between Chinese invest-
ments and democracy in Pakistan, a key concern of the academic literature looking
at the burgeoning field of “Global China.” Focusing on CPEC, this chapter presents
the novel framework of “Chinese linkage” to understand the impact that ties with
China have had on democracy in Pakistan. Combining quantitative and qualitative
data, the analysis assesses Chinese linkage over five dimensions (economic, cul-
tural, social, educational, and intergovernmental).
Zahid Ahmed covers the security threats to CPEC posed by local insurgent
groups, and the way in which the entirety of the project has become secu-
ritized as a result. This has several important consequences: CPEC’s tight se-
curity regime is seen as intrusive and alienating in peripheral areas, ongoing
security problems have weighed on the international relationship between Bei-
jing and Islamabad, and the increasing involvement of the army in domestic
CPEC governance has exacerbated the tension between economic and strategic
imperatives.
Rafiullah Kakar provides an in-depth case study of CPEC’s progress in Balo-
chistan, a province that has suffered from chronic underdevelopment and often
been marginalized in Pakistani politics. Here, initial hopes that CPEC would ame-
liorate this situation have given way to discontent, widespread protests, and even
attacks on projects. He argues that CPEC’s rejection by locals is due to its central-
ized, extractive, and conflict-insensitive design, which is unsuited to local needs
and political aspirations.
Eram Ashraf addresses CPEC through a gender lens for the first time in the aca-
demic literature on CPEC. In doing so, the analysis traces the evolution of the nar-
rative “iron brotherhood” since its inception in the 1970s and it draws on a wealth
of new data on the China-Pakistan friendship awards to document the exclusion of
women from the CPEC framework.
Saba Shahid describes how, despite frequent extolling of bilateral affinity by
Chinese and Pakistani leaders, contact between the citizens of both countries re-
mains extremely limited. Based on interviews with Chinese living and working in
Pakistan, this chapter explores the extent to which Chinese and Pakistanis interact
outside of the professional sphere and what the reasons for limited engagement
are.
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2 Pakistan’s Political Settlement
and the Prospect of Industrial
Development under CPEC
Muhammad Tayyab Safdar
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2015, has often

been seen as the flagship or pilot project of the larger Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) (Safdar, 2021). Since its launch, the Chinese have invested substantial
resources in building infrastructure in the power and transport sectors. In the
power sector, estimates suggest that Chinese firms, mainly state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and their joint venture (JV) partners, have invested US$19 billion
in constructing power plants and transmission lines. Despite this progress, there
are increasing signs that CPEC has not delivered as a game changer for Pakistan.
This is especially true in the economic realm. CPEC was supposed to transform
Pakistan’s economy through the large-scale relocation of labour-intensive indus-
tries from China to Pakistan that would produce for the export market, helping al-
leviate Pakistan’s perennial balance of payments crises. However, this relocation
has not occurred, and the economy continues to struggle. Cooperation beyond the
power sector, especially in manufacturing, remains limited. What explains this
lack of progress in industrial cooperation despite CPEC’s privileged position in
the BRI?
The chapter uses the political settlement framework to answer the question. It
shows that Pakistan’s underlying political settlement, the incentives it generates,
and the nature of rents created are central to understanding the lack of progress.
The prevailing political settlement means policymakers have a short-term time ho-
rizon, increasing the tendency to capture unproductive rents as ruling coalitions
remain vulnerable to challenges from excluded groups. The chapter argues that
an incentive structure predicated on high short-term returns from speculative in-
vestments further limits investment in manufacturing. The political settlement also
means that the country’s ability to develop and implement an industrial policy is
highly circumscribed. Without an active industrial policy, it is doubtful that CPEC
will have a transformative impact on the economy. It also shows the effect of po-
litical changes on CPEC. Changes in the ruling coalition negatively affected Chi-
nese interests in Pakistan while also impacting the host state’s credibility to meet
its obligations. This is a disincentive for potential investors. Lastly, the chapter
highlights the role of organisational interests in driving decisions which leads to
suboptimal outcomes.
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-2
Pakistan’s Political Settlement and the Prospect of Industrial Development 15
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The first ‘Political Settlements
and Structural Change’ section provides a brief overview of the political set-
tlement framework. The second ‘Pakistan’s Economy: Boom-Bust Cycles and
Manufacturing’ section introduces Pakistan’s economy and discusses the struc-
tural problems affecting growth. The third ‘Industrial Cooperation under CPEC’
section looks at the role of industrial cooperation in CPEC and shows how the
political settlement negatively affects industrial cooperation. The conclusion fol-
lows this.
Political Settlements and Structural Change

The political settlement framework shows that power distribution across economic
and political organisations influences development outcomes (Khan, 2018, p. 636)
and provides a powerful way to understand the institutional structure that creates
benefits for different elite groups based on their relative power (Khan, 2010). The
prevalent institutions1 and constraints have a bearing on the policies that a rul-
ing coalition can implement2 (Dawani & Sayeed, 2020). Institutions and policies
describe rules that determine resource allocation. Competing organisations can
support, resist, or distort these institutions and policies based on their interests
and capabilities, impacting development outcomes (Whitfield et al., 2015; Teye &
Nikoi, 2022).
A political settlement emerges when the allocation of benefits that institutions
support is in line with societal power distribution and is sustainable (Khan, 2010).
Khan (ibid.) distinguishes between two types of political settlements. Capitalist po
litical settlements characterise developed countries where the formal sector domi
nates the economy. They are different from developing countries where clientelistic-
political settlements dominate. A common characteristic in clientelistic political
settlements is that power regarding resource allocation is not formally institution
alised. In such cases, informal institutions like patron-client-based resource alloca-
tions and adaptation of formal institutions ensure that benefit distribution is in line-
with power distribution.
Clientelistic political settlements vary along two characteristics affecting de-
velopment outcomes (ibid.). They differ in the organisation of the ruling coalition.
Ruling coalition’s face distributions of power against it both horizontally and verti-
cally. Horizontal distribution refers to the ability of excluded groups relative to the
ruling coalition. If excluded groups are weak, the ruling coalition is likely to act
with a longer time horizon and vice versa if the excluded groups are strong (Be-
huria et al., 2017). The time horizon affects the type of economic strategies that a
ruling coalition will support (Khan, 2010). Vertical distribution illustrates the rela-
tive power of higher versus lower factions within the ruling coalition. The coalition
has better enforcement capabilities if the relative power of higher level factions to
enforce institutional rules is greater than that of lower ones. The second dimension
they vary in is the technological capabilities of productive classes in society and
their relationship with the ruling coalition. Khan (ibid.) identifies four ideal types
16 Muhammad Tayyab Safdar
of patron-client factions and ruling coalitions. These are potential development

coalitions (vulnerable), authoritarian coalitions (weak), dominant coalitions, and
competitive clientelism.
In developing countries, competing interests affect the process of structural
transformation and industrial development (Mondliwa & Roberts, 2021). Struc-
tural transformation refers to changes in the economic structure where resources
shift from low productivity to higher areas (UNCTAD, 2016). Industrial develop-
ment can be successful if a ruling coalition supports the design and implementation
of policies that ensure that firms invest resources and effort in learning and tech-
nology upgrading by creating rents (ibid.; Khan, 2000). The political settlement
framework helps understand how societal power distribution influences the state’s
ability to manage these rents and ensure that investments contribute to growth
(Gray, 2018).
Even if states implement similar policies, differences in the underlying po-
litical settlement and the relative power of different social groups can lead to
different outcomes (Khan, 2018). In the 1960s, both South Korea and Pakistan
implemented similar industrial policies and supported export-oriented firms under
military rule. While these policies were successful in the Korean case, they were
less successful in Pakistan. The difference in performance can be explained by
the different political settlements in both countries and the relative difference in
the power of excluded groups. In Pakistan, excluded groups had social power and
the ability to organise politically, while they were much weaker in South Korea
(Khan, 2000). The difference in class structure and the absence of intermediate
classes in South Korea meant that the patron, the state, could centralise rent dis-
tribution and discipline capitalist clients, while patrons were weaker in Pakistan,
where the clients were powerfully organised into different factions. Rather than
allocating resources based on economic rationale, patrons allocated resources
based on political connections (Khan, 2010). Excluded intermediate-class elites
in Pakistan during the 1960s had significant holding power,3 which explains the
ability to contest the distribution of resources (Behuria et al., 2017) through the
historically informed ability to organise politically (Khan, 2010; Khan, 2018).
Pakistan’s Economy: Boom-Bust Cycles and Manufacturing

Pakistan’s recent economic performance has been marked by boom-bust cycles.
Economic growth has been sluggish and highly uneven. These cycles coincide with
the country’s recurring problem of persistently high current account deficits, which
have contributed to balance of payments issues (Dawani & Sayeed, 2020). Struc-
tural factors can explain Pakistan’s dismal economic performance. The economy’s
structure has changed over the last two decades, with services being the primary
growth driver. The performance of industry and agriculture has been muted. For
Pakistan, a service-led growth model is problematic as low-productivity traditional
services dominate, unlike India, where there are high-productivity services like
banking and software (Choudhary & Pasha, 2015). Furthermore, while the role of
services is increasing in developing countries, service-led development is unlikely
Figure 2.1 Manufacturing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP

Source: Author’s own based on World Bank data
to contribute to rapid growth, and job creation in the same way manufacturing did
in the past (Rodrik, 2014).
Growth in Pakistan’s manufacturing sector has been particularly sluggish (ibid.;
Dawani & Sayeed, 2020). Figure 2.1 shows the manufacturing value added (MVA)
as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). It shows that manufacturing
in Pakistan is exhibiting signs of secular stagnation which has raised fears of pre-
mature de-industrialisation (Nazeer & Rasiah, 2016).
There are various explanations for manufacturing’s dismal performance. One
focuses on the negative impact of liberalisation and deregulation during the 1990s,
which increased the cost of inputs and borrowing costs (Zaidi, 2015). The pri-
vatised financial sector invested in government securities and reduced lending to
manufacturing (Naqvi, 2018). Roy (2013, p. 313 italics added) argues that liber-
alisation ‘led to the deliberate abandonment of capability development strategies.’
Manufacturers had to compete with increasing imports due to deregulation with
the implementation of poorly designed free trade agreements, like the one with
China, adding to their woes (Pasha, 2018). However, deeper structural issues af-
fected manufacturing. There has been limited structural change in manufacturing
and value added remains concentrated in low-technology areas like textiles and
food processing (Hamid & Khan, 2015). Some of this concentration results from
investment in sectors that generated high returns due to state policy in the name
of import substitution industrialisation (ISI). Industries like sugar received signifi-
cant state patronage, even during periods of liberalisation (Safdar, 2015). Others,
like cement and automobile, remain technology laggards, and firms have limited
prospects of achieving global competitiveness (Dawani & Sayeed, 2020). Pakistan
failed to enter technology-intensive sectors, unlike the more dynamic East Asian
economies (Lall & Weiss, 2003).
The problem of low productivity has also affected manufacturing (Amjad &
Awais, 2016). Low-productivity growth has contributed to a decline in export com-
petitiveness and hindered local firms from competing in export markets (World
Bank, 2021). This can be evidenced by the decline in the share of exports in GDP
from 12 per cent (2000) to 10 per cent (2021). The falling share of exports has
implications for the country’s balance of payments (ibid.). Pakistan also has the
worst investment as a percentage of GDP in South Asia. Low private investment in
manufacturing has been a critical constraint on Pakistan’s economic growth (Lall
& Weiss, 2003). There are various reasons for the low investment, including terror-
ism, the energy crisis, infrastructure deficits, and low ease of doing business indica-
tors (Pasha, 2018). Many other developing countries with higher investment levels
faced similar constraints; however, investment levels in Pakistan did not increase
even after the removal of these constraints (Dawani & Sayeed, 2020).
Industrial Cooperation under CPEC

Given the dismal performance of manufacturing and Pakistan’s balance of pay-
ments problems, industrial cooperation between the Pakistan and China emerged
as a critical pillar of CPEC. CPEC’s long-term plan (LTP) discusses the country’s
wish to harness its ‘demographic and natural endowments’ by enhancing its indus-
trial capacity (MPDR, 2017a). Through CPEC, Pakistan aims to enhance manu-
facturing by upgrading the textile sector and promoting value addition in other
industries by progressively upgrading technical capabilities according to CPEC’s
LTP (ibid.). The LTP is silent on how to achieve these objectives.
After CPEC’s launch, there was hope that dealing with the supply-side bottle-
necks by improving the country’s transport and energy infrastructure would boost
cooperation in manufacturing and help generate local employment while reducing
regional inequalities (MPDR, 2017a). In 2016, both sides formed a Joint Work-
ing Group (JWG) to spur industrial cooperation. During CPEC’s initial period,
the JWG mechanism successfully pushed the agenda for early harvest projects in
the energy sector and transport infrastructure and consisted of officials from both
countries. Both sides hoped the JWG ‘will provide a driving force for industrial
cooperation between China and Pakistan’ (MPDR, 2016).
Industrial cooperation between the two countries revolves around nine priori-
tised special economic zones (p-SEZs). Given the stated policy goal of reducing
regional inequalities, the p-SEZs are in all provinces. The SEZs would be home to
industrial clusters that take advantage of the resource endowments of these areas.
Infrastructure improvements would catalyse growth and economic development
by promoting the relocation of labour-intensive industries from China (Politician1,
2018; Bureaucrat, 2018). Proponents believe that CPEC would help Pakistan be-
come an industrial economy (Politician1, 2018) and deal with the chronic balance
of payments crises (Technocrat1, 2018; Thinktank, 2019). Furthermore, JVs in the
SEZs could help improve local firms’ access to technology, a significant impedi-
ment affecting their growth (Businessman1, 2019). Given Pakistan’s geographical
location, close relations between the two countries, the large domestic market size,
and the abundant, low-cost labour available, they hoped that the floodgates of Chi-
nese investment in manufacturing would open (Technocrat2, 2019). The possibility
that a number of industries producing for the export market would invest in Paki-
stan was a common theme that emerged (ibid; Technocrat1, 2018; Businessman2,
2019). The senior manager of a local thinktank shows this optimism while observ-
ing ‘The relocation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) due to rising costs can
be a catalyst for local development’ (Thinktank, 2019). In the growth vision, each
SEZ would be home to anchor firms (Technocrat3, 2019). The presence of these
anchor firms will lead to the agglomeration of suppliers and facilitate the formation
of clusters, thereby increasing regional economic growth (Kuchiki & Gokan, 2011)
while reducing the cost of production of firms (Technocrat2, 2018).
Chinese state and SOE representatives also highlight the significance of indus-
trialisation in contributing to Pakistan’s economic growth and development. They
stress the importance of Pakistani policymakers learning from the Chinese experi-
ence of industrial development, especially the pivotal role played by SEZs in Chi-
na’s development (Chinese Diplomat, 2019). For Chinese firms, functional SEZs
are necessary to allow industrial capital to invest in Pakistan. Chinese firms want to
establish assembly operations and transfer industrial expertise to the country (Chi-
nese SOE1, 2019). Furthermore, infrastructure improvement during CPEC’s first
phase is unlikely to contribute to growth without enhancing exports and the share
of manufacturing (Chinese Diplomat, 2019; Chinese SOE3, 2019).
Industrial Relocation
Despite the dreams of industrial relocation and the stated importance of coopera-
tion in manufacturing, progress remains limited. To put things into perspective,
in 2018, a significant percentage of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to
Vietnam (61 per cent) flowed into manufacturing and processing (Ha, 2019). In
comparison, most Chinese FDI to Pakistan has gone towards the energy sector,
primarily power generation, with minimal investment in manufacturing (Habib,
2017). None of the p-SEZs is operational, with multiple constraints affecting pro-
gress, including delays in land acquisition, finalising zone developers, putting to-
gether the zone development incentive package, and providing utilities. After the
18th amendment, industries are a provincial matter. The lack of progress on SEZs
is a function of the importance individual provincial governments give to industri-
alisation (Businessman1, 2019). While other SEZs are operational in the country,
Chinese investment in them has not been forthcoming (Technocrat2, 2018), and
industrial relocation remains a pipedream seven years after CPEC’s official launch.
In textiles, which accounts for most of the MVA, there is only one known instance
of a Chinese firm investing. In the mainstream view, the lack of Chinese investment
in the industry is a technical one which can be overcome by ‘facilitating’ investors
(Politician2, 2019).
In formal negotiations with Pakistan, Chinese negotiators have been clear
that the decision to invest in the p-SEZs would be based on the ‘willingness’ of
firms; however, the Chinese state will ‘encourage’ firms to set up shop in Pakistan
(MPDR, 2017b). The Chinese position seems to have hardened further by the end
of 2017. In formal negotiations, the references to encouraging Chinese firms to in-
vest in priority sectors were gone, with cooperation based solely on ‘the (decision
of) companies of the two sides’ (MPDR, 2017b). One of the tools through which
the Chinese national and provincial governments incentivise firms to invest abroad,
especially in developing countries, is access to subsidised capital (Brautigam &
Tang, 2011). In Pakistan’s case, the issue of subsidised capital seems to have been
put on the back burner after initial discussions in 2016. It lends credence to the
view that under CPEC, the Chinese government might push some firms to relocate
to Pakistan, but their numbers are likely to be smaller than in Southeast Asia (Mul-
tilateral1, 2018). Security challenges and the uptick in attacks on Chinese interests
in the country also act as a further disincentive to investment in manufacturing
(Chinese Diplomat, 2019).
McCartney (2021) argues that most of the literature on the impact of industrial
cooperation between China and Pakistan is aspirational and is not rooted in eco-
nomic theory or evidence. For McCartney (ibid.), a significant issue is that the
relationship between the industrial eco-system the Chinese are building in Xin-
jiang, CPEC’s Northern terminus, and Pakistan’s industrial sector is competitive
rather than complementary. This is because the industrial development priorities of
the Chinese state in Xinjiang focus on industries like textiles, which are critically
important in Pakistan’s manufacturing sector. Cheap imports through the CPEC
route could threaten Pakistan’s industry and lead to further de-industrialisation, a
view echoed by large textile exporters in Pakistan (Businessman5, 2022). Despite
the challenges identified by McCartney (ibid.), local planners believe that CPEC
presents an ideal chance to reverse de-industrialisation by incentivising Chinese
firms to relocate to Pakistan in areas with high local demand as a form of ISI (Tech-
nocrat1, 2018; Technocrat2, 2018).
McCartney (2021) also raises questions about the prospects of success in the p-
SEZs. A pertinent question is why Chinese firms would invest in Pakistan instead
of SEZs in other countries. While policymakers list a host of variables which make
Pakistan ideal for relocating labour-intensive industries, there is a shortage of ro-
bust, in-depth studies/evidence to support their assertions. They blame the private
sector for not taking advantage of the opportunities offered by CPEC and forming
JVs with Chinese firms (Technocrat4, 2022). From this perspective, the primary
constraint to industrial relocation is the lack of demand-side activity from Paki-
stan’s private sector rather than questions over the supply of Chinese capital. There
is little discussion regarding other constraints within Pakistan’s political settlement
that negatively affect the prospects of Chinese manufacturing capital relocating.
The Political Settlement and Nature of Rents
The nature of Pakistan’s political settlement, the rents it generates, and the incen-
tive structure are critical to understanding the lack of progress in industrial co-
operation under CPEC. Pakistan’s political settlement evolved from competitive
clientelism from 2008 to 2017 to a vulnerable authoritarian coalition from 2018 to
present (Dawani & Sayeed, 2020). The problem with vulnerable authoritarianism
is the shorter time horizon of the coalition and a greater proclivity towards captur-
ing unproductive rents (Andreoni, 2017).
The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government came to power in 2018; how-
ever, the military establishment played a role in bringing the coalition to power
(Rahman & Shurong, 2021). As a hybrid regime (Paracha, 2020), the ruling coali-
tion, which included the military, political parties, the judiciary, and some sections
of the media, used the accountability process to exclude mainstream political par-
ties. To deal with the vulnerability, the regime blocked dissent by clamping down
on opposition parties, some media organisations, and others considered close to the
previous government by levelling corruption allegations. The main tools for sup-
pressing dissent were the anti-corruption watchdog, the National Accountability
Bureau (NAB), and the accountability courts. The regime’s hold over lower fac-
tions within the ruling coalition was also tenuous despite the military’s backing.
These lower factions included the federal and provincial bureaucracies, especially
in Punjab, as senior members of the bureaucracy viewed as close to the previous
regime also faced corruption charges. In response to the accountability drive, there
was a marked slowdown in the public sector (Jorgic, 2019).
There remained a disjuncture between the interests of the ruling alliance and
long-term development (Khan, 2010). Within Pakistan’s prevalent political settle-
ment, short-termism has contributed to rents accruing to non-productive sectors of
the economy (Mian, 2022). Excluded groups have had holding power and ruling
coalitions are susceptible to external challenges and have operated with short time
horizons. The problem with this short-termism is that rent captured by patrons is
used for consumption rather than investment. This has a knock-on effect on the
investors’ incentives to invest in ventures with long-term returns (Muhula, 2019).
It can also result in the exodus of capital from productive areas of the economy
(Khan, 2009).
The availability of geopolitical rents over the last four decades has also dis-
torted the incentive structure (Dawani & Sayeed, 2020). These centralised secu-
rity rents have had profound implications for the state’s capacity to implement
growth-enhancing policies and institutions (Roy, 2013). The mode of unproductive
rent capture worked even during periods of direct military rule. During Mushar-
raf’s ten-year government, high external inflows and trade liberalisation increased
demand for consumer durables and luxury goods (Pasha, 2018). For the elite, real
estate, finance, and energy emerged as critical spaces of speculation and capital ac-
cumulation (Naseemullah, 2017). Rents from speculative activities and consump-
tion crowded out those generated from manufacturing (ibid.; Dawani & Sayeed,
2020).
Within manufacturing, there are a few politically connected areas where rents
remain high. Based on an analysis of the return on equity (ROE) for firms listed on
the stock exchange, Pasha (2018, p. 158) shows that the ROE is the highest in ISI
sectors like automobiles and food. Despite the importance of textiles in Pakistan’s
exports, the ROE of firms engaged in textile spinning and weaving and textile gar-
ments is the lowest among listed companies (ibid.). Higher returns in sectors like
automobile assembly and power can help explain the current pattern of Chinese
investment. In the automobile sector, Chinese firms have established their presence
in Pakistan through licencing agreements or, in rare cases, through JVs with local
firms in response to incentives offered under the Automobile Development Policy
(2016–2021) (Engineering Development Board, 2016). There are reports that some
Chinese manufacturers view Pakistan as a platform to export right-hand drive ve-
hicles to other markets; however, they are currently assembling imported complete
knockdown (CKD) kits, with most investments made by local conglomerates than
Chinese firms. Pakistan’s experience with Japanese manufacturers suggests that
the latest policy is unlikely to help achieve the goal of increasing localisation and
exports.
Lower returns in manufacturing, especially textiles in Punjab, have meant that
even local industrial capital has diversified and shifted to other rent-thick areas
(Naseemullah, 2017), like real estate. It is true not only for industrialists but also
for political actors and other elite groups who have invested in real estate specula-
tion. The domestic political settlement explains the favoured position enjoyed by
urban real estate, as formal taxation institutions have evolved to increase returns
to urban developers (Pasha, 2018). Furthermore, the informal expansion of cities
in the absence of zoning laws and the selective application of rules also provides
windfall returns.
The presence of organisational interests in the real estate sector with links to the
country’s most important political and economic actor also explains land specula-
tion’s privileged position. The construction of elite societies in metropolitan cities
began as a mode of organisational patronage for retired officers in 1980 (Jaferii
& Maher, 2021). In the past decade, these societies have greatly expanded and
have been constructed by taking over agricultural land with little regard for the
economic and social consequences. The growth of these urban spaces and low(er)
barriers to entry for political actors and local power brokers have made real estate a
preferred area for rent generation. Elite clients, in turn, provide patrons with access
to vital resources, helping maintain their hold on power.
Real estate speculation also partly explains the failure of Pakistan’s numerous
experiments with industrial and export processing zones (Businessman3, 2019;
Businessman7, 2022). Given the state’s limited and diminishing enforcement ca-
pabilities (Roy, 2013), these industrial estates4 also became areas of speculation
and rent generation (Jamali et al., 2021). The 2012 SEZ Act (BOI, 2016) ensures
that this type of land speculation does not occur in upcoming zones. Here too,
however, the inability of the state to enforce laws raises questions about the future
of the SEZs as spaces for unproductive rent extraction. In the Sundar Industrial
Estate near Lahore, despite moves to control speculation, despite similar provisions
a vibrant land market has emerged (Businessman4, 2022).
Despite changes in the geopolitical environment which have reduced access
to rents, the incentive structure and the nature of unproductive rents that have be-
come entrenched, getting Chinese investment in manufacturing, do not seem to
be a policy priority, despite statements to the contrary. Instead, the focus, espe-
cially in the post-2018 period, appears to be on rent capture by reorienting Chinese
spending towards traditional areas of aid targeting the social sector. Rather than
operationalising the industrial zones and finalising the terms of cooperation, the
PTI government made social sector cooperation and poverty alleviation a central
plank of collaboration with the Chinese.
Industrial Policies and the Political Settlement

The other effect of the short-term incentive system is the lack of industrial poli-
cies. Pakistan last had a planned industrial policy in the 1980s (Sayeed, 1995).
The lack of industrial policies does not mean that the state has not established
new bureaucratic organisations to support industrial development. However, even
as the state has developed new organisations to support industrialisation, enforce-
ment capabilities that are vital for the success of industrial policies have hollowed
out (Roy, 2013). Given Pakistan’s political settlement, the propensity to invest in
rent-thick areas reduces the incentive to implement policies focusing on industrial
upgrading (Naseemullah, 2017). This propensity reduces investment in sectors that
are productive and could have the potential to be globally competitive, like textiles,
garments, and pharmaceuticals (Naseemullah, 2019).
In their interaction with Pakistani policymakers, Chinese experts highlighted
the importance of basing decisions on industrial cooperation on a detailed analysis
of Pakistan’s industrial sector (MPDR, 2017b). While the documents fall short of
advocating an industrial policy, there are numerous empirical examples of how
countries like South Korea and Taiwan used industrial policies to promote manu-
facturing (see Amsden, 1992; Greene, 2008). Without formulating an industrial
policy regarding CPEC, it is unlikely that it will be a game changer. In the absence
of a selective industrial policy, the fate of the SEZs is unlikely to differ from that of
the countries many industrial estates and zones (Technocrat1, 2018). Rather than
devising an all-encompassing industrial policy, there is a need to develop appropri-
ate institutions that can contribute to capacity building and industrial upgrading
in particular sectors (Multilateral2, 2019). There is some understanding in official
circles regarding the importance of having an industrial policy. A former senior
bureaucrat at the Ministry of Commerce closely associated with industrial coopera-
tion during CPEC’s initial period lamented the state’s lack of ability to develop and
implement an industrial policy (Bureaucrat, 2018). The prevailing political settle-
ment makes designing and implementing an industrial policy challenging (Techno-
crat5, 2022). Even if the government implements selective policies, organisational
interests that are a part of the ruling coalition or powerful excluded groups are
likely to use them for unproductive rent-seeking and to strengthen their patronage
networks (ibid.).
In the absence of an industrial policy, there is a perception among local busi-
nesses that Pakistan lacks preparation for safeguarding the interests of domes-
tic industry in the emerging economic relationship with China (Businessman1,
2019), a view shared by representatives of multilateral agencies (Multilateral2,
2019). Subsequent governments have highlighted the need to ensure JVs be-
tween local and Chinese firms to ensure technology transfer and upgrading
of local technical capabilities. Despite these aims, Pakistan continues to have

one of the most liberal investment policies in the world, with foreign inves-
tors allowed to hold 100 per cent equity in all sectors. Without any policy re-
quirement, Chinese firms have little incentive to engage in JVs (Businessman5,
2022). Local manufacturers also decry the lack of coordination and participa-
tion in project design and interventions during CPEC’s first phase (Business-
man1, 2019).
To complicate matters, the relationship between the state and industry remains
antagonistic. From the state’s perspective, the local industry, especially manu-
facturing, is parasitic. The continued dependence on state sanctioned rents is a
disincentive for the private sector to enhance linkages with Chinese firms. Manu-
facturers are keen to protect their access to state patronage rather than focusing on
value addition (Military, 2019).
Political Changes
Changes in the political settlement also contributed to significantly cooling rela-

tions between China and Pakistan. In opposition, senior leaders of PTI were criti-
cal of CPEC’s first phase. This critique continued after the party came to power.
Leading figures in the PTI raised questions about the benefits CPEC brought to Pa-
kistan, even as they continued projects that provided them political mileage, such
as CPEC’s reorientation towards the social sector after the 2018 elections. They
expressed reservations about the incentives given to Chinese investors, which gave
them undue advantages compared with local firms, a view echoed by local busi-
nesses (Businessman2, 2019; Businessman5, 2022). The view that there is not a
level playing field vis-à-vis Chinese investors continues to be highlighted by manu-
facturers (Businessman7, 2022; Businessman8, 2022). From a political settlement
perspective, the ruling coalition post-2018 represented groups that were excluded
or had a perception that they were excluded from capturing rents generated during
CPEC’s first phase (Safdar, 2022).
The PTI government also took other steps that fed into the narrative of massive
corruption by the PML-N during its tenure and lent credence to the view that CPEC
had fallen foul of powerful interests in the ruling coalition. In 2018, the govern-
ment publicly announced the cancellation of CPEC-related electricity generation
projects without taking the Chinese into confidence. The government also set up a
committee to audit the power sector and explore solutions to the country’s chronic
circular debt issue in 2019. The Committee’s report came out in 2020. In the case
of CPEC, the Committee estimated that two large Chinese SOEs that built the first
two early harvest power plants5 had misrepresented construction costs. The report
estimated that one of the power plants, a wholly owned subsidiary of Huaneng
Power, one of the largest Chinese power firms, would get Rs 291 billion in ex-
cess payments over the project’s 30-year life (Committee for Power Sector Audit,
2020). Even though the government took no further action, the fact that the two
Chinese SOE projects were included in the Committee’s purview highlights the
tensions surrounding CPEC.
The Chinese routinely expressed their displeasure at the public way the rul-
ing coalition discredited Chinese SOEs. They were also critical of the slowdown
and the lack of policy clarity from the PTI government about CPEC in general
and industrial cooperation (Chinese Diplomat, 2019). During a visit to the Lahore
Chamber of Commerce & Industry (LCCI), the Chinese ambassador expressed
frustration at the slow progress on p-SEZs despite the government’s claims. The
lack of focus on operationalising SEZs negatively affected investment by Chinese
firms looking to relocate production (Businessman1, 2019). Politicians from differ-
ent national and regional opposition parties also highlighted the lack of progress on
the SEZs and the negative impact on industrial relocation (Politician3&4, 2019).
Given the fractious political atmosphere, local manufacturers believe that Chinese
firms were unlikely to set up operations in Pakistan (Businessman6, 2018; Busi-
nessman9, 2022).
Lack of Credibility
The Pakistani state faces substantial credibility issues in the capacity to deliver
on its promises and meet its obligations. In line with Chinese demands, the gov-
ernment established a CPEC Authority in 2020. The CPEC Authority, which has
since been disbanded, was designed to remove bottlenecks facing Chinese pro-
jects. Despite assurances by the federal and provincial governments to remove
hurdles and implement one-window services for Chinese investors through the
Authority, there has been no progress in implementing such systems (Jamali et al.,
2021). Potential Chinese investors bemoan bureaucratic red tape and delays in
getting approvals.
The senior manager of a large Chinese-owned textile exporter with operations in
Lahore was highly critical of the delay in land acquisition for a vertically integrated
textile export park they planned to establish in Punjab. The company’s case is rare
as there is one other example of a Chinese firm establishing an SEZ in the private
sector. For Chinese investors, who are used to the state facilitating investments,
Pakistan’s property rights regime and land acquisition rules seem cumbersome and
inefficient. As a significant exporter of textiles from Pakistan, the firm’s owners ex-
pected the provincial and national Boards of Investment to support them (Chinese
Business, 2021); however, dealing with the local revenue bureaucracy and land-
owners remained challenging. Given the significance of Punjab’s rural areas and
the potential for political mobilisation by rival political factions, the role of local
power brokers, especially land revenue bureaucracy, is vital. Without their support
and the high transaction costs, it is unlikely that the Chinese firm’s attempts at land
acquisition will be successful. The failure of land markets can constrain the growth
of manufacturing in developing countries (Khan, 2009). Khan (ibid.) raises another
pertinent point highlighting poverty’s impact on transaction costs in the property
market. The low opportunity cost of holding out means that peasants have a long-
time horizon and are willing to wait for slightly higher land prices.
Credibility issues and the vulnerability of Chinese investors are also visible in
other areas. Chinese SOEs have invested resources in Pakistan’s power sector – a
rent-thick area since liberalisation and reforms in the 1990s. The investment is
predicated on contracts backed by sovereign guarantees provided by the Govern-
ment of Pakistan and an ROE indexed to the dollar of 17 per cent over 30 years
(Safdar, 2021). At face value, the deals represent a win-win for the Chinese SOEs
as they provide significantly higher returns on capital invested. Here too, however,
Chinese investors face significant hurdles. An essential condition under which the
Chinese SOEs agreed to invest in Pakistan is that the Government of Pakistan
decided to establish an escrow account with a revolving fund of Rs 22 billion to
shield Chinese investors from the impact of circular debt, which crippled Paki-
stan’s energy sector.
Despite interventions from the Chinese National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), the Pakistani state has been unable to operationalise the
revolving fund. The Chinese-financed power plants now face more than Rs
300 billion in receivables with no revolving fund and have threatened to shut
down operations (Rana, 2022). Part of the explanation for the lack of progress
on the revolving fund is the limited fiscal space that the federal government
has. A more careful analysis of Pakistan’s political settlement shows the lack of
progress due to opposition from other organisational interests like non-CPEC
independent power producers (IPPs) whose rents would be negatively affected
by the revolving fund. Given the circular debt situation, further diversion of
funds solely towards Chinese-funded power plants would reduce the free cash
flow available to pay other IPPs and further increase their receivables. From
the perspective of Chinese investors, the lack of enforcement capabilities of the
Pakistani state and the limited success in dealing with organisational opposi-
tion raise questions about the security of the rents that they can generate and
the associated risks.
These risks are also evident in other areas that are marginally more knowl-
edge-intensive. In 2020, the Government of Pakistan announced an incentive
package for the local assembly of cell phones as a form of ISI (Hassan, 2022).
The initial investment in assembly plants came primarily from local investors
who imported kits under licence; however, a few large Chinese firms, like Vivo
and Oppo, also established assembly plants. The policy was hailed as a suc-
cess as Pakistani assemblers began to export cell phones in small batches to
markets in the Middle East. Political instability led to a change in government
in 2022 and changes in policy. These policy changes meant that mobile phone
assemblers faced formidable challenges importing CKD and semi-knockdown
(SKD) kits. The incoming government placed conditions on their import be-
cause of a persistently high current account deficit (ibid.). Even though the
2020 policy promised high rents and protection, the structural constraints faced
by the state coupled with political changes meant that its ability to sustain them
remains questionable. This is not to say that the incentive regime targeting
mobile phone assembly was right or wrong; it just raises questions about the
Pakistani state’s credibility to ensure that the property rights they create gener-
ate stable rents.
Organisational Interests
Multiple organisational interests are wary of the impact of Chinese investment

in the manufacturing sector on their survival and continued access to rents. In
transport infrastructure, Safdar (2022) argues that the lack of access to rents to or-
ganisational interests like the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) in constructing
large-Chinese-funded transport infrastructure projects6 like roads reduced the es-
tablishment’s support for other Chinese-financed infrastructure projects. The disa-
greement over rent capture by the military-operated firm shows that the distribution
of benefits under CPEC was inconsistent with Pakistan’s power distribution (Khan,
2010). These differences can also partly explain the problems between the military
and the PML-N government over CPEC.
Organisational interests within the ruling coalition also played a role in the lo-
cation of the p-SEZs. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the Chinese suggested
establishing an SEZ in Hattar, in the province’s Haripur region, based on a survey
of locations. The town is also home to the Hattar Industrial Estate, which was es-
tablished in 1984 and is one of the more successful industrial estates. Despite the
advantages of Hattar and the suggestion of the Chinese expert group, the provincial
government insisted on establishing the p-SEZ in Rashakai, which made limited
economic sense for some. Rashakai is close to the constituency of the previous
provincial Chief Minister, who remained a senior Federal Minister in the outgoing
PTI government. Ensuring that the p-SEZ was in the constituency highlights the
patron’s political clout. Given the link with CPEC, the politician can also dispense
patronage by helping clients acquire land below market cost. For political entre-
preneurs, participating in electoral democracy Rashakai provided an opportunity to
highlight their strength by attracting state investment in the SEZ. Short-term elec-
toral success here takes precedence over long-run economic efficiency. Clients can
make substantial returns through the allied infrastructure, which is planned along
with the SEZ, which is in sync with the political settlement and the rent-seeking
model. For example, linked with the SEZ are plans by the KPK government in
partnership with the FWO to build housing facilities and allied services for pro-
spective investors. Other organisational interests have also taken advantage of the
opportunity with the Airforce acquiring land to ‘develop’ housing, commercial, and
educational facilities near the zone (Ozgen, 2021). Rashakai has opened the doors
for established organisational interests to engage in speculative real estate activi-
ties, even before the SEZ’s operationalisation.
Conclusion
The chapter sought to answer the following question: What explains the lack of pro-
gress in industrial cooperation, despite CPEC’s privileged position in the BRI? To an-
swer the question, the chapter used the political settlement framework. Despite rapid
initial progress in the energy and infrastructure projects, CPEC’s second phase, which
calls for industrial cooperation, remains far more limited. The chapter has shown that
Pakistan’s underlying political settlement breeds a short-term time horizon for ruling
coalitions and an incentive structure that privileges unproductive rent-seeking. Both
these factors have negatively affected the country’s long-run development. The short-
termism coupled with the lack of industrial policies means that CPEC is unlikely to
be a game changer. The Chinese firms have and are likely to invest in future in rent-
thick areas within manufacturing, such as automobile and mobile phone assembly,
contributing to an increase in trade deficits in the short to medium term.
Given Pakistan’s political settlement, the prospects of Chinese investment in
more productive sectors with linkages with the local economy remain bleak. This
raises a strategic problem for Beijing in Pakistan and other developing countries,
where neo-liberal reforms decimated an already weak manufacturing sector and
promoted a service-led growth model with limited potential for long-run develop-
ment. Chinese interests need to understand the local political settlement to make
the BRI more economically sustainable.
Notes
1 Institutions in the political settlement literature not only refer to rules that govern
decision-making but also define the distribution of benefits.
2 Ruling coalition here refers to the factions that control political power and state power
in societies (Khan, 2010, p. 8).
3 Khan (2010, p. 6) defines holding power as the ability of an individual or group to en-
gage and survive in conflicts.
4 These include both industrial estates and export processing zones (EPZs).
5 These two power plants are the 1320 MW Shandong Ruyi Coal Power Plant in Sahiwal,
Punjab and the 1320 MW Power China Power-Al Mirqab Coal Plant at Port Qasim in
Karachi, Sindh.
6 It is important to distinguish between Chinese-funded transport infrastructure projects
like the Multan-Sukkur Motorway with projects on the Western route like the Hakla-D.I.
Khan Motorway which is financed through Pakistan’s Public Sector Development Pro-
gramme (PSDP). In the earlier case, the requirements of Chinese financing meant that
local firms were excluded, unlike in the construction of the Hakla-D.I. Khan Motorway.
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Appendix 2.1: List of Interviewees
Title Date
Politician1 November 2018

Politician2 February 2019
Politician3 and 4 April 2019
Technocrat1 November 2018
Technocrat2 November 2018
Technocrat3 March 2019
Technocrat4 and 5 May 2022
Businessman1 February 2019
Businessman2 March 2019
Businessman3 March 2019
Businessman4 June 2022
Businessman5 May 2022
Businessman6 November 2018
Businessman7 August 2022
Multilateral1 February 2019
Multilateral2 February 2019
Chinese Business June 2021
Chinese SOE1 January 2019
Chinese SOE2 April 2019
Chinese SOE3 May 2019
Thinktank February 2019
Chinese Diplomat August 2019
Bureaucrat November 2018
Military April 2019
3 Agriculture and Chinese Agribusiness
Investments in the Context of the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Michael Spies
In July 2017, an early draft of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

long-term plan leaked to the Pakistani newspaper Dawn revealed for the first time
a focus on the field of agriculture (Husain, 2017; Khawar, 2017). Since then, many
public announcements have been made by high-level decision makers to put the
agricultural sector center stage in the mid- and long-term phases of the megaproject
in Pakistan (The Nation, 2021; The News, 2021). The political promise is that co-
operation with China, funded or facilitated by CPEC, will boost modernization and
growth in a sector that currently faces multiple challenges such as stagnating yields
and profitability, increasing environmental stresses, and inefficient production and
processing practices (see, for instance, Government of Pakistan, 2018). These chal-
lenges shall be addressed, among others, through intensified cooperation in agricul-
tural research, as well as Chinese investments in various segments of agricultural
value chains. Moreover, through productivity increases and improved access to
markets in China, the agricultural sector of Pakistan shall benefit from new export
prospects (Ahmed, 2021; Suleri and Ramay, 2020). Thus, major investments shall
be made in a sector that plays a very important role for Pakistan, both in economic
and symbolic terms: agriculture is commonly framed as the economic “backbone”
of the country and constitutes an important symbol for self-reliance and national
pride, as symbolized, for instance, in the state emblem of Pakistan (Government of
Pakistan, 2018; Mughal, 2019).
The envisioned goals and measures appear to fit well into existing agricultural
policies in Pakistan, which emphasize modernization, productivity increase, and
economic growth of the sector as key goals (Spies, 2020). The National Food Secu-
rity Policy, formulated in 2018 with the mission to “ensure a modern and efficient
production and distribution system”, already refers to the CPEC in its policy imper-
atives: it envisions, among others, the development of “[m]odern production and
market infrastructure” and “business models to promote value added agriculture”
in cooperation with Chinese partners in the frame of the CPEC (Government of Pa-
kistan, 2018: 1, 15). While there seems to be much congruence of envisioned goals
with existing policy directions, there is a need to look beyond the official narrative
and raise a number of critical questions. Given the diverse interests of involved
actors and stakeholders from China and Pakistan, what are the likely outcomes of
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-3
34 Michael Spies
the envisioned intensified cooperation in the agricultural sector for Pakistan? Will
existing trends be continued or are there more radical changes in the trajectories
of the agrarian sector to be expected? And what are the likely outcomes for local
farmers?
These are rather broad but important questions that require to look beyond the
policy level and to scrutinize what is happening and what can be expected to hap-
pen “on the ground”. Despite many public announcements, only few agriculture-
related activities have been implemented that can directly be attributed to CPEC.
Manifold projects with CPEC funding appear to be in the making, but details are
still vague (see, for instance, Daily Times, 2021). Thus, discussing the potential
impact of measures that have not materialized yet is very speculative. Still, what is
clear from the policy debates and announcements is that in one way or another, ac-
tivities will promote Chinese agribusiness investments in Pakistan. Some interest-
ing trends can be observed already: while not necessarily attributable to the CPEC,
Chinese companies in various ways do play an increasing role in the agribusiness
sector of Pakistan, building on a process of neoliberalization of agriculture that has
already been underway for many years. Taking a closer look at these developments
can reveal important insights into what is about to come and will therefore be the
focus of this chapter.
Overseas investments by Chinese agribusinesses have seen an increase in re-
cent years, targeting not only neighboring regions such as Southeast and Northeast
Asia (Green, 2022; Lu, 2021; Ryzhova and Ivanov, 2022) but also more distant
countries in South America and Africa (Brautigam, 2015; Gooch and Gale, 2018;
Mora, 2022; Wesz Junior et al., 2021). As part of an agricultural “going out” strat-
egy, state-owned and other agribusinesses are strongly supported and incentivized
to invest abroad, with a focus on partner countries of the Belt and Road Initiative
since 2013 (Tortajada and Zhang, 2021). Central drivers of this development are
the goal to ensure a stable food and biomass supply for China’s growing demand
and to gain greater control of global agricultural value chains through China-based
transnational enterprises (McMichael, 2020; Zhang, 2019). Moreover, commercial
objectives and the mitigation of domestic overcapacities certainly play a role as
well, particularly in China’s seed production sector that has seen rapid growth in
recent decades (Xu, 2019). While political-economic drivers in China form the
backdrop of its growing agribusiness investments abroad, local realities are more
complicated and shaped not only by the diverse business interests of Chinese com-
panies but also by the agency of local business partners, complex political nego-
tiations, and the diverse legal-institutional settings in the “receiving” countries.
Central Asia offers a case in point: as the largest agricultural player in the region
and key strategic partner in China’s Belt and Road initiative, Kazakhstan has seen
very little agricultural investment from China, as local opposition and Sinopho-
bic sentiments have led to a ban of foreign land investments (Alff et al., 2023).
The only Central Asian state that has seen substantial Chinese investments in agri-
cultural production is Tajikistan, where Sino-Tajik joint ventures cultivate several
thousand hectares of land. Notably, Tajikistan is the smallest state in Central Asia
with little strategic potential to contribute to China’s food security, but Chinese
Agriculture and Chinese Agribusiness Investments 35
companies, primarily driven by commercial motives, have found a more favorable

local investment environment facilitated by a strictly authoritarian regime (Hof-
man, 2016). Thus, investigating how Chinese investments unfold requires taking
the domestic context in the partner countries seriously.
This chapter is structured into four sections. First, I will give a brief introduc-
tion to the agricultural sector of Pakistan and provide an overview of related CPEC
activities and plans. I will then take a closer look at the role of Chinese companies
in the farming sector of Pakistan. Two main fields of engagement can be identified,
each of which deserves an individual section: the sale of agricultural inputs, in par-
ticular pesticides and seeds; and increasingly also crop production, particularly in
the form of contract farming. In conclusion, I will discuss these trends and develop-
ments and what they mean for the agricultural sector of Pakistan.
The empirical material on which I draw for this chapter mainly stems from
two different sources: (a) news articles published in Pakistani press and various
online news outlets and (b) interviews with various actors and stakeholders in au-
tumn 2019 and 2021 in various parts of Pakistan (Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Multan,
Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad). During a total of four months of field research,
I conducted interviews and focus group discussions with a wide range of actors
and stakeholders, including representatives of (Pakistani, multinational, and Chi-
nese) agribusinesses, policy makers, and policy advisors related to agriculture and
CPEC, agricultural trade associations, and experts from government institutions
and academia.
Pakistan’s Agriculture and the Promises of the CPEC

In Pakistan, the livelihoods of about half of the population are linked to agriculture
(Khan et al., 2019). Due to the high geographical diversity of the country, there
are manifold farming systems ranging from high mountain agriculture in the north
to the irrigated Indus plains in the center and south and dryland pastoral systems
in the mountainous southwest. Most of the country’s crop production depends on
the Indus River and its tributaries for irrigation, and the main production areas are
located in the fertile plains of Punjab and Sindh. The main arable crops in the plains
are wheat, cotton, rice, sugarcane, maize, and potatoes. Besides crop production,
animal husbandry (mainly cattle, goats, sheep, and poultry) plays an important
role in sustaining rural livelihoods. Most farmers are smallholders: according to
the last Census of Agriculture, 90 percent of the approximately 8.3 million farms
in Pakistan operate less than 5 ha of land; and 65 percent even less than 2 ha. Ac-
cording to official data, most farmers own the land they cultivate today: 82 percent
of farms in Pakistan are owner-operated; although the share is lowest in Sindh
province (70 percent), where the hari system of sharecroppers cultivating the land
owned by large landlords is still widespread. Access to farmland is unequally dis-
tributed—about 50 percent of the total cropland is cultivated by the largest 10
percent of farms (Government of Pakistan, n.d.). Moreover, rural poverty rates are
high, and challenges such as high input prices, volatile markets, low yields, and
increasing environmental stresses pose major risks to farmers (Khan and Khan,
36 Michael Spies
2018; Naqvi, 2013). Since the Green Revolution of the 1960s–1980s, agricultural
policies to tackle existing problems have been shaped by a narrative of productiv-
ity growth and modernization, more recently with a focus on biotechnology (Niazi,
2012; Rana and Adhikari, 2019). Still, yields of the main crops have not seen major
increases since the 1980s, with the exception of maize after the introduction of
hybrid seeds by multinational corporations in the 2000s (Khaliq et al., 2018; Zaidi,
2015: 67). The productivity gains of irrigation and fertilizer use and available seed
varieties have leveled off, and deteriorating soil and water quality resulting from
unsustainable farming practices further limit productivity (Murgai et al., 2001). As
a result, Pakistan’s food sovereignty has been challenged in recent years and the
country now depends on wheat imports to support its rapidly growing population
(Demaree-Saddler, 2021).
In this context, the CPEC is seen as a welcome opportunity to “promote the
transition from traditional […] to modern agriculture […] to effectively boost the
development of local agricultural economy and help local people get rid of pov-
erty”, as the official CPEC Long Term Plan from 2017 reads (CPEC Secretariat,
2017: 18). While five years have passed since these proclamations, implementa-
tion is slow and most activities appear to be still in the making. Despite numer-
ous media announcements in recent years, there is still little clarity about concrete
projects in the agricultural sector and about the share of the CPEC budget they will
take. Moreover, the expected export boost of higher value agricultural products
to China has not shown any signs of taking off so far (see Spies, 2021 for a criti-
cal discussion of agricultural export constraints for Gilgit-Baltistan). Yet, a clear
interest in the sector by both sides is evident. One of the ten China-Pakistan Joint
Working Groups subordinate to the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), the prin-
cipal decision-making body of the CPEC, is dedicated specifically to agriculture.
The working group meets periodically to discuss and prioritize projects before for-
mal approval is given by the JCC (Ahmad, 2020; CPEC Authority, n.d.c). A second
joint working group, focusing on socio-economic development, is responsible for
agricultural projects as well (see below). Moreover, an agricultural commissioner
has been posted at the Chinese embassy in Islamabad, advising policy makers and
facilitating exchanges between relevant actors in China and Pakistan. The current
agricultural commissioner Gu Wenliang recently proclaimed that a Memorandum
of Understanding that will lead to a comprehensive “Framework Agreement on
Agricultural Cooperation” between the two countries is currently in preparation,
announcing that “we are going to launch full-scale cooperation with Pakistan in
every related area” (Aziz, 2022). As similar framework agreements have been
signed for “early harvest” infrastructural projects and, more recently, for industrial
cooperation, the coming years may bring more clarity about the specific agricul-
tural investments and activities under CPEC, although they will likely remain less
tangible than previous infrastructure projects in the energy and transport sector that
have taken the bulk of the CPEC budget so far.
Up to this time, there is very little official information on existing or planned
CPEC projects and activities in the agricultural sector. The official CPEC website
mentions agriculture-related industries as proposed investment fields for three of
the four Special Economic Zones that are listed as under construction (Rashakai,
Allama Iqbal, and Bostan), including food processing and production of agricul-
tural machinery (CPEC Authority, n.d.b). A first investment related to agriculture
has already been announced in the news: the Chinese agrichemical company
Zhengbang Group plans to invest Rs. 700 million (about $3.5 million) in construct-
ing an agrichemical plant in the Allama Iqbal Special Economic Zone near Faisal-
abad (Profit by Pakistan Today, 2021). Moreover, 5 of the 27 projects listed on the
CPEC website under the Social and Economic Development Scheme are related
to agriculture, all of which are categorized as “under construction” or “in-pipe-
line”: “China-Pakistan Joint Agricultural Technology Laboratory”, “Provision of
Agricultural Equipment and tools”, “China-Pakistan Joint Agricultural demonstra-
tions”, “Bacterial grass (JunCao)1 Technology Training and promotion project”,
and “Pakistan Agricultural Vocational Training” (CPEC Authority, n.d.d). A grant
of $1 billion was promised under the Socio-Economic Development Scheme of
the CPEC by China in 2019 for selected projects that are coordinated by the Joint
Working Group on Socio-Economic Development (Ministry of Planning, Develop-
ment & Special Initiatives, 2020; Profit by Pakistan Today, 2019). News sources
and interviews in 2019 and 2021 reveal some more details about the planned agri-
culture-related projects, presumably financed under this scheme.
At the Pakistan Central Cotton Research Institute in Multan, a new laboratory
or “Centre of Excellence” for cotton research will be established in cooperation
with the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The center aims at develop-
ing higher yielding and pest-resistant varieties of cotton, the main cash crop of
the region. When I visited the institute in late 2021, work had not started but the
new center is planned to be functional by 2025 (government official, Multan, Oct.
2021; Profit by Pakistan Today, 2019). A similar project is underway to develop
the Oil Seed Research Centre in Faisalabad (ibid.). Both projects were proposed
by the Agriculture Department Punjab and have been formally approved by the
Joint Cooperation Committee, the principal decision-making body of the CPEC,
although implementation was still pending at the time of research (government
official, Lahore, Oct. 2021). Other projects proposed by different provincial and
federal state institutions are underway. According to an article published in Daily
Times in 2021, a total of 18 projects worth Rs.83 billion ($400–450 million) have
been “identified” as CPEC-projects in the agricultural sector but reveal few details.
Only the above-mentioned Centre of Excellence for Cotton Research, center for
pest control based in Karachi, and Centre of Excellence “on agriculture, livestock
and fisheries” at the National Agriculture Research Centre (NARC) are mentioned
as being approved by the Chinese side for funding, probably under the previously
mentioned Socio-Economic Development scheme. Thus, strengthening public re-
search institutions in the agricultural sector seems to be a priority of approved pro-
jects so far, but in other “identified” projects mentioned in the article, commercial
actors will probably take a more central role: the establishment of an aquaculture
park and “intelligent” greenhouse farming, the promotion of commercial cherry
and pistachio production, and a proposed foot and mouth disease free zone in Ba-
hawalpur for (probably export-oriented) meat production (Daily Times, 2021).
38 Michael Spies
An article published by Pro Pakistani in 2022 offers further details on apparent

agricultural investment plans by Chinese companies as part of the CPEC. The Chi-
nese state-owned enterprise China Machinery Engineering Cooperation (CMEC),
previously known for implementing energy projects in Pakistan, apparently plans
to invest $50 million to establish an “Agricultural Science and Technology Trans-
ferring Centre” to support agricultural mechanization in Pakistan (Pro Pakistani,
2022). Moreover, the Chinese company Royal Group reportedly plans to invest $50
million in a foot and mouth disease free buffalo farm project (probably the “zone”
mentioned above) and $30 million in a buffalo milk processing plant (Express Trib-
une, 2021a; Pro Pakistani, 2022). These projects are framed as part of new CPEC
investments of $12 billion committed by China in early 2022 “in the fields of In-
dustry, Agriculture and IT sectors of Pakistan over the next 3 years” (Pro Pakistani,
2022). While no financial details about planned CPEC activities in the agricultural
sector are known, it seems likely that in contrast to transport and energy sector in-
vestments, they will primarily be funded by a combination of grants and commer-
cial investments rather than loans, with the latter probably taking the largest share.
The question that arises here is whether investments by Chinese companies will be
attributed to the official CPEC funding of $60 billion or as “regular” foreign direct
investments that are more (for example, through the Special Economic Zones) or
less directly facilitated through CPEC. In any case, maybe this distinction is negli-
gible at this point—but what is important to note is that CPEC-related projects and
activities clearly aim to attract Chinese direct investments in Pakistan’s agriculture.
Indeed, in early 2021, an online forum was launched to connect Pakistani and Chi-
nese agribusinesses—the China Pakistan Agricultural and Industrial Information
Platform (The News International, 2021).2 The website offers a “business match-
ing” tool and publishes agriculture-related news and short project profiles along
with contact information of Chinese companies and research institutions looking
for local partners.
To understand what this envisioned increase in Chinese investments possibly
means for the near future, we need to take a closer look at the already existing
engagement of Chinese agribusinesses in Pakistan.
Chinese Agribusiness Investments: The Pesticide and Seed Sectors

We expect our Chinese friends to come into the agriculture sector in a big
way. They can do investment in agriculture, but mostly, they are […] more
welcome because of technology, both in increasing the yield and the agri-
business. And they can be really exporting, helping out in Pakistan, and get-
ting profits for themselves. So it’s a win-win-situation, which has been a
hallmark of both countries’ relations.
(Secretary Ministry for Planning, video interview by
Xinhua, 28 June 2022 [Xinhua Global Service, 2022])
The above quote exemplifies how Pakistani officials and CPEC publications
frame agribusiness investments facilitated through CPEC as a welcome opportunity
to modernize the “backward” agricultural sector of Pakistan. This is not an entirely

new viewpoint but should be regarded as part of a more general discursive shift of
agricultural policy debates in recent decades toward agribusiness or “corporate”
agriculture as the preferred development pathway.
In the late 1990s, “corporate farming” was introduced as a new model to develop
the agricultural sector, when Benazir Bhutto’s government approved 19 multina-
tional companies for business in Pakistan. Other policy measures followed such as
the Corporate Farming Ordinance in 2001–2002 and a package offer of tax breaks
and long-term lease of land to foreign investors in 2009, primarily aimed at inves-
tors from the Gulf region and triggering some fear about “land grabbing” (Settle,
2012). While not much foreign investment in farmland seems to have materialized
due to political instability and other investment barriers (Business Recorder, 2014;
Looney, 2014), large international and domestic corporations do play an increas-
ingly influential role in Pakistani agriculture. Major international players in the
food production and processing sector include Nestlé and PepsiCo, both working
mainly with local contract farmers. Many other, primarily domestic agribusiness
companies have emerged in the market in recent years, especially in seed pro-
duction and livestock and dairy sectors (Khan, 2016). Thus, in line with a global
trend, the agricultural sector of Pakistan is increasingly being “neoliberalized”,
with private corporations also taking over fields previously dominated by state
institutions (Lawrence and Smith, 2020). One example discussed in more detail by
Muhammad Ahsan Rana is the seed sector: research, development, and distribution
of new seed varieties used to be largely in the hands of public sector institutions.
But changing policies have led to a rapid growth of private seed businesses and the
“leadership of the Pakistani seed industry has quietly shifted to the private sector”
(Rana, 2014: 4). In this regard, it should come as no surprise that Chinese agribusi-
ness ventures have been emerging on the Pakistani market, most notably in the
pesticide and seed business.
Generally, Chinese agribusinesses are much less visible in Pakistan compared
to domestic and other multinational corporations, and information about their ac-
tivities in the country is relatively sparse. However, there is one notable exception:
Syngenta, owned since 2015 by Chinese state-owned enterprise ChemChina, is the
market leader in Pakistan’s pesticide sector with about 13 percent market share, fol-
lowed by American FMC with 11 percent and Bayer Crop Science with 10 percent
(PACRA, 2020). During field research in 2019, I heard rumors about other Chinese
pesticide companies entering the market in Pakistan but was not able to identify
or locate them. Among others to obtain further information about these develop-
ments, I interviewed CEOs and senior staff members of one multinational and three
established domestic pesticide companies in Multan in 2021. Interviews revealed
that the whole sector strongly depends on China: as Pakistan does not have any
facilities producing the active ingredients needed for pesticide formulation, these
chemicals need to be imported. The largest share—90 percent or more—of the
ingredients are actually imported from China (CEOs of pesticide companies I, II,
and III and a government official in Multan, Oct. 2021).3 As one of the CEOs puts
it, “we totally depend on China for our imports” (CEO of pesticide company II,
40 Michael Spies
Oct. 2021). Moreover, China is also by far the largest exporter of finished pes-
ticide products (as well as fertilizers) to Pakistan (ITC Trade Map, n.d.). One of
the CEOs explains that Chinese agrochemical producers have supplied Pakistani
companies with raw materials and finished products for many years, but “now they
realize that they should also distribute here” (CEO of pesticide company I, Oct.
2021). Apparently, there are at least five Chinese pesticide producers, including
the above-mentioned Zhengbang Group, Shandong Weifang Rainbow Chemical,
and Ningbo Generic Chemical, that have opened their offices in Pakistan in recent
years, although their market share in Pakistan is probably still very small (CEO
of pesticide company I, Oct. 2021).4 As one of the CEOs argues, marketing and
selling their product here will be challenging—it requires much work to build an
effective and trusted distribution network, and there are already many competing
players that dominate the pesticide sales market in Pakistan (CEO of pesticide
company II, Oct. 2021). However, what could make a difference are apparent plans
by the Zhengbang Group to invest in manufacturing pesticide ingredients in Pa-
kistan, possibly in collaboration with Fauji Fertilizer Company Ltd., the largest
Pakistani producer of urea fertilizer (Pro Pakistani, 2022; Profit by Pakistan Today,
2021). Producing the agrochemicals needed for pesticide formulation in Pakistan
is a challenging and expensive endeavor, and Pakistani companies therefore prefer
to import them. However, setting up such chemical plants is potentially very prof-
itable, and some of my interview partners suspect a long-term strategy by China
to outsource this “hazardous” or “environmentally polluting” industry abroad to
countries like Pakistan (CEO of pesticide company II and an agricultural scientist
in Multan, Oct. 2021).
Apart from pesticides, the seed business is an emerging investment sector by
Chinese companies in Pakistan. Already in 2008, Biocentury Transgene China, a
company originally specialized in transgenic (Bt) cotton, opened its branch Bio-
century Pakistan in Lahore. On social media, they claim to be the “largest multi-
national seed company” in Pakistan, but according to an interviewed employee,
their market share is much smaller in Pakistan compared to companies like Syn-
genta and Bayer, who not only sell pesticides but are also big players in the seed
business (Biocentury employee, Lahore, Dec. 2019). In fact, most, if not all, ma-
jor pesticide companies in Pakistan (including those I interviewed) increasingly
venture into the seed sector as well. Biocentury Pakistan mainly focuses on hy-
brid rice and vegetable seeds that are imported from China and—at least until
2019—from India, tested on trial plots, and sold to various distributors in Pakistan
(Biocentury employee, Lahore, Dec. 2019). Hybrid (non-Basmati) rice seeds from
China, in particular, have become very popular in Pakistan in recent years due
to their high yields (interviews with several rice exporters, Karachi, Nov. 2021).
Imported since the mid-2000s, their import numbers have considerably increased:
in 2020, about 9500 tons of rice seeds worth over $35 million were imported from
China, probably all of them hybrid seeds. In 2019, before the COVID-19 pan-
demic, these numbers were even higher (see Figure 3.1). In 2019 and 2020, about
3–3.4 million ha of land were under rice cultivation (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics,
n.d.); assuming an average seed rate of 19 kg/ha (CEO of rice exporting company,
Figure 3.1 Rice seed exports from China to Pakistan, 2001–2020
Karachi, Nov. 2021), the imported rice seeds from China were sufficient for about
15–18 per cent of this area.
Hybrid varieties not only achieve higher yields than conventional open-
pollinated varieties, they also have the commercial advantage—from the perspec-
tive of seed producers—that farmers cannot reproduce the seeds and have to buy
them each year anew. The largest share is imported by Pakistani seed companies
from seed producers in China who own the intellectual property rights, but the lat-
ter increasingly also venture directly into Pakistan. Longping Hi-Tech Agriculture,
for instance, sends Chinese experts to promote their hybrid varieties among farmers
and provide technical advice (Li, 2020), probably in collaboration with the Paki-
stani company Guard Rice (Raheem, 2021), but there are also other Chinese com-
panies that collaborate with local seed enterprises in Pakistan in breeding activities
and field trials, among others. In recent years, a new development has occurred: as
one informant reports, his company started 2–3 years ago, in collaboration with a
Chinese seed enterprise, to produce hybrid rice seeds on an experimental basis on
500 acres of land (1 acre = 0.4 ha). Part of the land is leased and cultivated by his
company, but the larger share is cultivated by contract farmers under supervision
by a team of four to five experts from China (CEO of pesticide company II, Oct.
2021). Reportedly, such arrangements with local companies and contract farmers
are practiced by other Chinese seed enterprises as well, particularly in rural Sindh
42 Michael Spies
(CEO of rice exporting company, Karachi, Nov. 2021). This new development may
be understood as the next logical step after years of exporting seeds to Pakistan,
even though it might also involve risks: the patented technology could be “stolen”
by other, unapproved seed producers, which is possibly one of the reasons why
next to nothing about these arrangements is reported in news media. Other reasons
probably include security concerns for Chinese workers and, more generally, the
seemingly sensitive character of Chinese—and other foreign—investments in the
agricultural production sector, as it may raise questions about the control of land.
Investments in Crop Production

After it became clear in 2017 that the agricultural sector would become an im-
portant sector of future CPEC activities and investment, there was also concern
about potential land “grabbing” by Chinese investors (GRAIN, 2021; Husain,
2017; Khawar, 2017). So far, however, no publicly known land acquisitions by
Chinese agribusiness ventures have materialized. However, there is a clear interest
by Chinese investors in leasing agricultural land for cultivation, as an interviewed
government official explains:
[T]his is the one thing they ask. Preferably government land, because farm-
ers are very possessive about land in Pakistan. […] They ask for any land on
which they can irrigate with ground water or canal water.
(government official, Lahore, Oct. 2021)
Apparently, many applications by Chinese investors for leasing agricultural

land have been submitted to the government, but policy makers have been slow
in preparing the modalities for facilitating such investments (agricultural entrepre-
neur, Faisalabad, Dec. 2019 and government official, Lahore, Oct. 2021). Seem-
ingly, decision makers are hesitant to make quick decisions on this matter, as land
is a highly politicized topic in Pakistan. As an entrepreneur who is very active in
facilitating business exchange between China and Pakistan explains:
Land is a very sensitive issue in Pakistan, many fights […] have been fought
over land. Punjabis cannot buy land in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for instance;
communities are very protective about their land. […] Chinese agribusi-
nesses are mainly interested in farming here, in leasing land on a large scale
for agricultural purposes. But this is not really feasible in Pakistan, due to
the land issue.
(CPEC-related entrepreneur, Islamabad, Dec. 2019)
Already in 2008, when companies from Gulf countries announced to acquire

big tracts of farmland in Pakistan for food production serving their own markets,
nothing appeared to have materialized, and subsequent years have seen a major
drop in foreign direct investments from that region (Looney, 2014). In an analysis
of this apparent failure, Robert Looney concludes that one of the main reasons
was the “combustible mix” of “Pakistan’s food insecurity and poverty” and that
investment risks were particularly high in a country “where violent, extremist anti-
government movements have mastered the ability to exploit land-based class di-
visions” (Looney, 2014: 1). There are, of course, legitimate concerns about the
country’s food sovereignty, if foreign companies take over large parts of fertile
land for export-oriented production. Indeed, interview partners, while emphasiz-
ing the opportunities for Chinese investments to modernize agriculture, also raised
concerns about land investments. As the chairman of an agricultural trade associa-
tion, for instance, puts it:
Any investment [from China] in industry and farming is welcome. But one
thing is alarming: ownership. I heard about plans, Chinese want to buy land,
cultivate here, I am concerned about this. But CPEC is the future. Any com-
modity [sector] has to deal with it.
(Focus group discussion with agricultural
trade association, Karachi, Nov. 2021)
Thus, concerns by decision makers about political and social risks are probably
the main reasons why no publicly known land investments by Chinese companies
have materialized yet. Moreover, reservations on the Pakistani side may also have
slowed the progress of CPEC agricultural projects in general, if such investments
are indeed a primary demand by Chinese actors in the bilateral negotiations about
agricultural CPEC projects. Yet, recent developments suggest a possible turning
point: in March 2022 the Punjab government formally approved the lease of up to
5000 acres of state land for “corporate farming under the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor”, with the aim to “create job opportunities and to modernize the agri-
cultural sector for food security” (Dawn, 2022). Moreover, to some extent policy
makers do actively promote land investments by Chinese—or other foreign—com-
panies: a brochure recently published by the CPEC Authority, available in English
and Chinese, mentions available “[v]irgin arable lands” for corporate farming in
South Balochistan, Cholistan (South Punjab), and Gilgit-Baltistan and particularly
highlights the ongoing Kacchi Canal Project that aims to bring 700,000 acres of
barren land in Baluchistan under irrigation (CPEC Authority, n.d.a: 46–48).
Hence, it is not unlikely that the coming years will see some Chinese farm en-
terprises starting production in Pakistan—either in the form of joint ventures with
Pakistani partners or possibly independently. However, given the risks associated
with such investments, this may not become the prime form of engagement of
Chinese actors in agricultural production, as recent developments and political an-
nouncements related to the CPEC suggest.
In 2021, the by-then chairman of the CPEC Authority, Asim Saleem Bajwa,
announced on Twitter that a pilot project of chili farming, initiated by CMEC in co-
operation with the Chinese chili sauce producer Sichuan Litong Food Group, was
successfully implemented and will go into the expansion phase soon (Pakistan To-
day, 2021b). The project was widely covered in the press: 100 acres were reportedly
cultivated with high-yielding chili varieties using advanced growing technologies,
44 Michael Spies
and yields were reportedly three times higher compared to conventional chili pro-
duction in Pakistan (Express Tribune, 2021b; Pakistan Today, 2021a). Reportedly,
the project had conducted field trials in Pakistan with different chili varieties since
2019 before selecting the most suitable variety for local production. What makes
this project particularly interesting is the production arrangement: rather than leas-
ing and cultivating land by themselves, the companies contract individual farmers
to take care of the production. As a staff member of the project explains, they pro-
vide the farmers with seeds at a fixed price, a team of Chinese experts provides free
technical assistance throughout the growing season, and the companies buy the
harvest at a previously agreed price (Oct. 2021). The chilies are dried and exported
to China for processing. While in the first year reportedly only 30–100 acres had
been cultivated with chilies for the project, probably only by one contract farmer
near Lahore, in 2021, CMEC and Sichuang Litong Group were keen to engage new
farmers in different parts of the country to expand this business (CMEC/Sichuang
Litong project staff member, Oct. 2021). According to news reports, the aim for
2021/2022 growing season was up to 5000 acres, although the interviewed staff
member put it more moderately at 1000 acres. When reaching a production area of
10,000 acres, the latter explains, a deep processing facility will be established in
Pakistan (CMEC/Sichuang Litong project staff member, Oct. 2021; Pakistan To-
day, 2021a). According to Pakistan Today, the chairman of Sichuan Litong Group
aims to ultimately expand this contract farming arrangement to 200,000 acres in
Pakistan (Pakistan Today, 2021a).
According to a more recent press report in May 2022, however, only a total
of 300 acres were cultivated by six “model farms” in Punjab and Sindh (Pakistan
Today, 2022). It seems that the recruitment of contract farmers was less successful
than expected. One reason might be operational delays—the companies were ac-
tively searching for producing partners in October and November 2021, just before
the sowing season. Another possible reason is that farmers were skeptical about the
investment risks and benefits. According to the interviewed staff member, the net
profit per acre that farmers can make from this arrangement is Rs. 100,000, given
an expected yield of 2.5 tons/acre. This is a reasonable but not huge profit—and
seeds and other inputs are very expensive, which means that farmers have to make
a considerable investment. An interview partner who was involved in autumn 2021
in negotiations about a contract farming arrangement with probably one of the two
Chinese companies was rather skeptical:
Last week, they came to my office, wanted to do chili farming. We discussed,

but after a while I realized what they really want: They want to sell their
seeds!
(Focus group discussion with agricultural
trade association, Karachi, Nov. 2021)
Apparently, the imported seeds of this highly productive chili variety are very
expensive, and the interview partner suspects that selling the seed to contract farm-
ers is a means of making profit for the companies. Indeed, Chinese seed companies
active in Pakistan also aim to expand into the chili seed market of Pakistan (CEO
of pesticide company II, Oct. 2021). Nevertheless, selling seeds is unlikely to be
the main motivation for the Chinese companies to explore this contract farming ar-
rangement. The interviewed CMEC/Sichuan Litong staff member explains:
The population in China is large, all land has already been planted. Now all
chilies are planted in Xinjiang, but the costs have increased a lot, the price
of production is high. India is the biggest chili produced in the world, and
Pakistan has similar climatic conditions. So, it is a good idea to produce here.
(Lahore, Oct. 2021)
Indeed, there is a huge chili demand in China, with India being the main exporter
of dried, crushed, or ground chilies to the country (ITC Trade Map, n.d.). Thus, it
seems to make much economic sense for a Chinese (state-owned) enterprise to lev-
erage the CPEC to invest in the chili sector of Pakistan: import dependency from
India can be reduced, while at the same time benefitting from low production costs
in Pakistan through such arrangements.
As previously mentioned, Chinese enterprises engaged in other forms of con-
tract farming in Pakistan as well. In collaboration with Pakistani companies, they
contract local farmers to produce hybrid rice seeds under the supervision of Chi-
nese technical advisors. There might be similar arrangements in other fields as
well. Contract farming could indeed become the prime form of engagement by
Chinese enterprises in Pakistani agriculture, since it circumvents the problematic
land question while still offering a profitable business model to produce for both
Pakistani and Chinese markets.
Nevertheless, there are other potential problems. Contract farming has been
practiced in Pakistan by multinational and domestic companies for many years,
with the most well-known probably being PepsiCo that contracts farmers to pro-
duce potatoes according to specific requirements for potato chips. Contract farm-
ing has been celebrated by parts of the international development community as a
promising tool for improving production conditions for smallholder farmers (Viini-
kainen and Bullón Caro, 2018), but this claim has been challenged by researchers
highlighting the risks of exploitative arrangements due to limited bargaining power
of farmers. As Vicol finds in his research on contract farming in India, farmers may
benefit from stable selling prices, but they still bear all the production risks and
typically depend on credit for purchasing inputs, which creates new vulnerabilities
to indebtedness. In addition, contracting firms typically gain monopsony power by
focusing on crop varieties that have no alternative local market, which allows them
to better dictate the contract terms (see also Cohen et al., 2021; Vicol, 2017). What
is more, in Pakistan, contract farming arrangements seem to exclude smallholder
farmers in the first place. Khan et al. find that contract farmers for PepsiCo and a
Pakistani maize processing company operate an average of 140–150 acres (Khan
et al., 2019), which is striking considering the fact that about 90 percent of farmers
in Pakistan operate less than 12.4 acres (5ha; see the previous section). The main
reason for this is probably the fact that from a business perspective, it is typically
46 Michael Spies
easier to work with a few large holder farmers rather than many small-scale pro-
ducers, as transaction costs are lower. There is currently no reason to believe that
Chinese agribusinesses work differently. Indeed, as the interviewed staff member
of the chili contract farming project explains when being asked about working with
smallholder farmers: “We don’t want this. It’s too expensive, we cannot send our
technicians for training and assisting farmers with little land” (Lahore, Oct. 2021).
Moreover, both in relation to land investments and contract farming, one im-
portant question will be whether production is primarily for Chinese or Pakistani
markets, as it will have implications for long-term food security. These questions
need to be further discussed in the final section.
Conclusion
The CPEC and agriculture nexus has received much media attention for some years
now, but projects are still largely in the making, and there is little certainty about
concrete activities and investments in the next years. Still, judging from related
policy discourses in Pakistan on the one hand, and recent investment trends and
aspirations by Chinese companies on the other, one can expect that Chinese agri-
businesses will play an increasing role in future developments of the agricultural
sector of Pakistan. To get more clues about the direction in which their investments
will possibly be heading, I investigated recent trends of Chinese agribusiness’s en-
gagement in two related agricultural fields: input supply and crop production. The
former is currently the field within Pakistan’s agricultural sector in which Chinese
companies are most prominent, but the latter appears to be up and coming and may
even become the main arena of Chinese agribusiness investments in the future.
With the exception of possible land investments, these developments are not
new. Rather than triggering radical change, increasing Chinese engagements in
Pakistani agriculture facilitated through CPEC is more likely to amplify already
existing developments. Multinational and major Pakistani agribusinesses already
have large stakes in the farming sector, and the ongoing neoliberalization of ag-
riculture, in line with existing policy directions, will probably further intensify
as new Chinese enterprises enter the scene. These enterprises may collaborate
(through joint ventures) or compete with other multinational and domestic compa-
nies in Pakistan, but there is no reason to assume that their business strategies on
the ground are entirely different. A case in point is contract farming as a business
model that is already widely practiced in the crop production and dairy sectors
by PepsiCo, Nestlé, and various domestic enterprises including Engro Foods and
Rafhan Maize Products (Chodavarapu et al., 2016; Khan et al., 2019). However,
a large-scale lease of fertile farmland for production by Chinese agribusinesses
would be a novel development, as no evidence of similar investments by foreign
enterprises exists to date. There are some domestic enterprises that control major
areas of farmland, such as JDW Sugar Mills, founded by the former prime minis-
ter’s advisor Jahangir Tareen that manages “corporate farms” of 24,000 acres in
Punjab and Sindh for their own sugar production (JDW Group, n.d.). However,
due to the high sensitivity of land issues and other investment barriers, including
the lack of political stability and the highly fragmented nature of farmland in Paki-
stan, it seems rather unlikely that similar enterprises by Chinese investors will be a
prominent feature in Pakistani agriculture anytime soon. This situation is different
from, for instance, the authoritarian state of Tajikistan, where Chinese companies
have partnered with high-level local elites to lease several thousand hectares of
farmland for cultivation since the 2010s (Hofman, 2016, 2021). Thus, there is not
one blueprint approach to Chinese agricultural investments under the BRI, but
local contexts are an important determining factor for specific business strategies
and their realization. Also in Tajikistan, where I conducted field research in 2022,
recent years have seen a surge in seed imports from China, with about 7000 tons
of hybrid maize seeds—enough to grow maize on about one-third of the country’s
cultivable land—officially imported in 2021 (ITC Trade Map, n.d.). However, in
contrast to Pakistan, Chinese seed companies are not visible in the country and do
not seem to strive for direct engagement in the local seed business so far. Seem-
ingly, Pakistan as a major agricultural player with more than 20 million hectares
of cultivated land (Zaidi, 2015: 63) offers a much more attractive market in this
regard.
By and large, observed and expected developments promoted through the
CPEC may indeed bring some of the promised modernization and economic
growth to the agricultural sector in Pakistan. But there are two main concerns.
First, the majority of producers in Pakistan are smallholder farmers, for whom
the direction of these developments does not seem very promising. They may
benefit from increased competition in the seed and pesticide market if improved
inputs become available at affordable prices, but the shift to hybrid seeds also
creates new dependencies. Moreover, they will unlikely benefit from contract
farming unless decisive policy measures are taken by the state, and emerging
corporate farms may lead to aggravated price competition when it comes to
selling produce. Thus, the investments under the CPEC in the agriculture sec-
tor as currently envisioned would primarily benefit large landholders. Second,
the question is whether production investments—both in contract and corpo-
rate farming—will mainly aim at export to China or at domestic consumption.
If the former is the case, an expansion of these arrangements will also have
implications for Pakistan’s food sovereignty. Recent trends in the seed sector
raise similar concerns: the hybrid rice seed varieties promoted by Chinese seed
companies are not popular for consumption in Pakistan and therefore mainly
produced for export, much of it to China (Focus group discussion with agricul-
tural trade association, Karachi, Nov. 2021; ITC Trade Map, n.d.). In 2018, the
journalist Khurram Husain already made it clear in a commentary published in
Dawn:
Pakistan’s agriculture needs support of the sort that the Chinese are offering—
there is little doubt about that. But our agriculture is the lifeblood of our
economy, and the biggest pillar of our stability is our hard-fought food secu-
rity. There is very little bargaining room with these priorities.
(Husain, 2018)
48 Michael Spies
Notes
1 JunCao is a technology developed in China to grow mushrooms on harvested grass.
2 The platform is hosted by the Chinese state-affiliated news outlet Gwadar Pro, see
https://gwadarpro.pk/investment.
3 These estimates are difficult to validate, as Pakistan imports dozens of different types of
chemicals that may be used for different purposes. Nevertheless, official trade data con-
firms that the largest share of organic and inorganic chemicals is imported to Pakistan
from China (ITC Trade Map, n.d.).
4 Apparently, there are two more, but he could not name them. To date, only Zhengbang
has an official online presence for its branch in Pakistan: https://www.facebook.com/
Zhengbang-Agriculture-PAK-PVT-LTD-260936344853848/
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4 CPEC and De-Democratization
in Pakistan
Gul-i-Hina van der Zwan
Democracy in Pakistan
Pakistan’s democratization story is marred by the fluctuations between democratic
and autocratic regimes throughout its governance history. Since 1947, Pakistan has
been governed by military rule thrice—(i) during 1958–1971 under General Ayub
Khan and Yahya Khan; (ii) from 1977 until 1988 under military General Zia-ul-
Haq; and (iii) from 1999 until 2008 under General Pervez Musharraf. Given this,
the democratic structures and processes could not consolidate in the country. Dur-
ing the civilian regimes of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1971, and later Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (1988–1999), Pakistan witnessed pe-
riods of transition to parliamentary democracy. Although the elected governments
were not able to complete the five-year term in office, the electoral procedures
solidified (Shafqat, 1998).
Since 2008, the country has been governed by democratic regimes. First, under
President Asif Ali Zardari—belonging to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)—from
2008 until 2013.1 This was the first democratically elected government that com-
pleted a five-year term in office (Afzal, 2019). Second, in 2013, the next demo-
cratically elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, belonging to the
political party of Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), assumed office. In the lit-
erature, this has been marked as the first successful and peaceful transfer of power
for a democratic government in Pakistan with relatively free and fair elections
(Afzal, 2019). However, the Sharif government did not complete its five-year term
in office. As a result of the elections in 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan, founder
and leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), rose to power. Table 4.1 provides
an overview of the categorization of Pakistan’s regimes highlighting military and
democratic rules.
Nonetheless, the removal of Prime Minister Sharif in 2017 and the ousting of
Prime Minister Khan in April 2022 with the passing of a no-confidence vote in the
Parliament present us with the dilemma of one democratic government not com-
pleting its term in office once again (Tarar, 2022). This marks the 2008–2013 pe-
riod to be the only time when two democratically elected governments completed
their terms in office and successfully transferred power to the next government in
Pakistan.
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-4
CPEC and De-Democratization in Pakistan 53
Table 4.1 O
verview of Political Regimes
of Pakistan (1947–2023)
Years Regime Type
1947–1958 Democratic rule

1958–1971 Military rule
Source: Author’s own compilation.
Against such a backdrop, the military has continued to play an influential role in
key policy areas even during the periods of civilian rule in Pakistan. It has been a
major stakeholder in foreign policy and strategic decision-making and has been ex-
erting its agency during civilian rule as well (Hussain, 2022). Pakistan has been cat-
egorized as a “defective democracy” considering that foreign policymaking, though
theoretically made by the parliament, is influenced by supra-parliamentary insti-
tutions such as the military (Croissant, 2004; Hussain, 2022: 63). Pakistan can
also be understood as a “hybrid” regime type. There has been a growing body of
work on understanding and examining the prospects of democracy in Pakistan (see
Adeney, 2012; Hussain, 2022; Shafqat, 1998; Shah, 2014; Waseem, 2010). The
transient nature of democracy, issues of corruption, transparency, accountability,
and multiple military takeovers among other things have hindered democratic con-
solidation in Pakistan. This has led to weak democratic processes, structures, and
practices as well as low democratic quality (Van der Zwan, 2022).
Moreover, centralization has been a key feature not only during military rule but
also during civilian regimes in Pakistan (Adeney and Boni, 2022). Throughout its
governance history, the federal system of Pakistan has gone through periods of cen-
tralization and decentralization during both civilian and military rule. Unsurpris-
ingly, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) implementation, trends
of centralization have also been visible, especially during the early years of the
first phase of CPEC. As there are many drivers of de-democratization in Pakistan,
it is noteworthy to mention that this research conducts an “X-oriented” study of
de-democratization, i.e., it does not examine all the causes of de-democratization
in Pakistan but rather if Chinese engagement in Pakistan under CPEC contributes
to the democratic decline in the country.
The democratic era of Pakistan since 2008 depicts a fluctuating trend of de-
democratization. The declining trend of democracy highlights mostly domestically
driven changes contributing to Pakistan’s de-democratization. This democratic
decline in Pakistan has been visibly growing since 2013, and more so after 2015
which also corresponds with the launch and early years of CPEC implementa-
tion. A decade-long engagement of CPEC in Pakistan has taken many shapes and
forms with a variety of projects across several strategic sectors such as energy,
54 Gul-i-Hina van der Zwan
infrastructure, transport, and industrial cooperation. But what political implications

does it have for Pakistan, especially in terms of democracy and governance? Since
Chinese engagement has increased with CPEC projects across Pakistan, does this
also impact the existing patterns of de-democratization? There have been claims
that China hinders democracy and supports autocrats in the recipient countries
through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects; however, these claims have
not been empirically proven (Nathan, 2015). This is not to argue that Chinese en-
gagement causes de-democratization in Pakistan but rather that it has overlapped
with the existing de-democratization tendencies and processes along with more
centralization. However, to what extent does the Chinese engagement under CPEC
affect the decline in democracy levels? How to understand the extent of Chinese
“influence” as opposed to domestically driven changes in democracy in Pakistan?
The next section elaborates and sheds light on the democratic trajectory in Pakistan
using the democracy indices.
I examine the variation in the levels of democracy in Pakistan using the widely
used democracy indices, namely, the Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) data. It allows us to observe overall democracy levels but also changes
along various dimensions and components of democracy such as civil liberties,
freedom of expression, freedom of media, etc. (Coppedge et al., 2023). However,
the decline in democratic features also corresponds to the global decline in democ-
racy (Repucci and Slipowitz, 2021).
Examining data in the post-2008 period, I find that the democracy scores tell
a similar story yet are composed and measured differently. Both indices of Free-
dom House and V-Dem vary in their index construction and measurement criteria.
While the Freedom House measures the status of freedom the country has, the V-
Dem indices allow us to observe variations in the degree and direction of democ-
racy as well as the sub-components of the indicators.
Freedom House Democracy Index
The Freedom House Index comprises two dimensions of political rights and civil
liberties to measure the degree of freedom and assigns a rank as “Free,” “Partly
Free,” or “Not Free” for each country.2 According to the latest Freedom House re-
port of 2022, Pakistan’s ranking is 37 out of 100 and it is regarded as “Partly Free”
with a score of 15 for political rights and a score of 22 for civil liberties (Freedom
House Report, 2022). The scores as compared to the previous years have declined
significantly (Figure 4.1). From 2013 until 2015, Pakistan’s ranking was 42 which
declined to 41 in 2016 but increased to 43 during 2017–2018 (Freedom House,
2022). This has been the highest ranking score over the last decade.
After 2018, the ranking sharply declined to 39 in 2019. Connecting to the do-
mestic changes, this period also coincides with the change in government from the
PML-N to the PTI-led regime in Pakistan. Scholars have regarded the year 2018
as an “inflection point” for the democratic trajectory in Pakistan (Afzal, 2019).
From 2019 onward, the ranking has continued to decline to 38 in 2020, and a fur-
ther decrease to a ranking score of 37 in 2022 (Freedom House, 2022). With the
Figure 4.1 Freedom House democracy scores for Pakistan
COVID-19 pandemic, ousting of the Prime Minister Khan, the new government of
the PML-N, and catastrophic floods in Pakistan—all these aspects demonstrate the
fragile nature of democracy in the country.
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index
Using the V-Dem democracy indices provides a continuous measure of democracy

and can capture gradual and slow-moving changes in the processes of (de)democ-
ratization.3 The V-Dem captures the data for five main principles of democracy,
namely, electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy.
The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) captures the essential electoral component
of democracy—based on Dahl’s “polyarchy,” whereas the Liberal Democracy In-
dex (LDI) captures the liberal aspects such as the protection of civil liberties, the
rule of law, and sufficient constraints on the executive by the judiciary and legisla-
ture (Coppedge et al., 2023).
Examining the post-2008 period, democracy scores have declined for almost all
types of democracy indices. Out of the five indices, the changes in the EDI are sig-
nificant. The EDI increased from 0.41 in 2008 to 0.47 in 2010 depicting the highest
score over the last decade (Figure 4.2). In 2011, however, the score declined to
0.46 and stayed constant until 2014 when it decreased further from 0.44 in 2015 to
0.4 in 2021 (Coppedge et al., 2023). A similar story is seen with the LDI but with
a relatively lower score of 0.27 in 2021 (Figure 4.3). Looking at disaggregated
data of both the EDI and LDI indicates the corresponding decline in scores of civil
liberties, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and alternate sources of
information as well (Coppedge et al., 2023).
These democracy indices are limited in their explanation and fall short of provid-
ing an in-depth analysis when it comes to impact assessment and understanding the
“external” influences, in this case, the Chinese influence. Although the democracy
Figure 4.2 Electoral Democracy Index scores for Pakistan
decline, especially during the post-CPEC period, correlates with the increased Chi-
nese engagement in Pakistan, it does not necessarily infer causation. Even though the
democracy indices are a helpful tool to understand the status, level, and changes in
the direction of democracy, they do not explain the full picture. Since these indices
are a composition of a variety of characteristics, they reflect the degree of changes
pertaining to those factors and, hence, cannot be assumed to be comprehensive. It is
the limitation we need to acknowledge and account for, and it is the contextual factors
Figure 4.3 Liberal Democracy Index scores for Pakistan

and domestic politics that enable us to shed light on the extent of isolating any China
influences. Therefore, in the next section, I elaborate on understanding the multidi-
mensional Chinese engagement under CPEC using the Chinese Linkage theory.
Chinese Linkage in Pakistan

I use a novel multidimensional concept of the “Chinese Linkage” based on Levit-
sky and Way’s theoretical framework of “Western” Linkage, to understand the mul-
tifaceted dynamics of the Sino-Pakistani cooperation under CPEC and its impact
on democracy in Pakistan (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Van der Zwan, 2022).4
The concept of “linkage” has been used as a predictor for understanding in-
ternational diffusion effects and regime changes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). The
Chinese Linkage theory allows us to delve deeper into various layers and levels of
Chinese engagement under CPEC and understand its impact on de-democratization
processes in Pakistan if any.5
The case of Pakistan is chosen as it provides the most refined institutional
framework under China’s BRI. The CPEC investment is not only the largest in-
frastructure package for Pakistan but also the biggest Chinese investment in any
BRI country (Shah, 2015). As CPEC has been the “flagship” project of the BRI,
it becomes an essential case to understand the linkages that China creates with
partner countries at the domestic political level. It also serves as a “valuable BRI
case study” highly receptive to the initial Chinese aid and investment with strong
and durable diplomatic ties with China (Rafiq, 2019: 236). As Pakistan and China
have cherished strong bilateral relations historically—be it with civilian leadership
or military government—these ties further strengthened with the BRI as both coun-
tries expanded their cooperation on a variety of energy and infrastructure projects.
The BRI has enabled and strengthened the channels of networks and linkages
between China and many partner countries. The Sino-Pakistani cooperation in the
past has pivoted more toward security and military dimensions with some eco-
nomic aspects. However, the CPEC broadened the portfolio of cooperation not only
through enhanced economic ties but also through more people-to-people linkages,
educational scholarships, cultural exchanges, language learning, media, journalists
visits, military visits, and other high-level and official state visits (Custer et al.,
2021; Safdar, 2021). Therefore, I examine Chinese linkage under CPEC along the
following five dimensions: (i) economic linkage, (ii) social linkage, (iii) cultural
linkage, (iv) communication linkage, and (v) intergovernmental linkage.
On the economic front, with CPEC’s total projected investments amounting to
US$62 billion, China has financed several projects through concessional loans,
grants, public-private partnerships, and joint ventures, with an aim to enhance trade
and industrial cooperation. For social linkages, there has been an influx of mobil-
ity of workers, engineers, and expatriates from China for the CPEC projects in
the country (Subohi, 2018). On the other hand, many travelers from Pakistan are
visiting and residing in China for work, studies, and tourism purposes. Educational
scholarships such as the Chinese Government Scholarship scheme have allowed
many students from Pakistan to take up higher education in China (Dawn, 2017).
Cultural ties have also been increased through a variety of cultural events, mu-
sic and film festivals, theater, and art performances as well as language learning
exchanges between China and Pakistan. With the educational collaboration of the
four Confucius Institutes (CIs) in Pakistan, many students are learning Mandarin,
whereas an increasing number of Chinese students are also learning Urdu in China.
Regarding communication linkages, the media cooperation and partnerships have
enhanced as well as the meetings of journalists between the two countries.
Furthermore, the intergovernmental linkages have increased during the post-
CPEC period in terms of the number of official and high-level visits including
military visits and cooperation. Also, Pakistan has joined China-led institutions
and regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) signifying its partnership and
support. Therefore, I consider these linkages to be one of the major contributing
factors to understanding the high Chinese linkage in Pakistan. I define Chinese
Linkage under CPEC as follows:
the density or deepening of ties in terms of economic, social, cultural, com-

munication, and intergovernmental linkages between Pakistan and China
along with the participation in China-led regional or multilateral institutions
such as AIIB and SCO.
(Van der Zwan, 2022; 2023)
In the next section, I discuss these five dimensions of Chinese Linkage for the
case of Pakistan over the last two decades, before and during CPEC.
Economic Linkage under CPEC
As economic cooperation has grown between China and Pakistan, besides the high
investment figures, I examine the bilateral trade to understand the impact of eco-
nomic linkages under CPEC. As China has been Pakistan’s largest trading partner,
the trade pattern has been skewed in terms of higher imports from China than
exports from Pakistan. Both countries also signed the China-Pakistan Free Trade
Agreement in 2006 (its first phase lasted until 2012) to enhance trade relations
further (Kayani et al., 2013). With the reduction in bilateral tariffs, bilateral trade
enhanced significantly, “growing by 242% between 2007 and 2018 – nearly six
times faster than the growth of Pakistan’s trade with the rest of the world in the
same period” (Afraz and Mukhtar, 2019: 2). Moreover, the total trade with China
also increased to US$16.4 billion in 2018 (Ali, 2020). However, it did not improve
exports of Pakistan to China and the trade deficit remained.
By examining bilateral trade data of China and Pakistan from the UN Comtrade
database which consists of goods traded, including all commodities, I capture the
annual bilateral trade flows (UN Comtrade, 2020). I use the bilateral import share
and export share as a percentage of the total trade of Pakistan. Examining the total
trade volume between the two countries, it has enhanced significantly in the post-
CPEC period from 2013 to 2019 (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 Bilateral trade of China and Pakistan: 2000–2019
However, as imports from China have always been higher than exports to China
from Pakistan, we witnessed the same trend in the post-CPEC period. This is par-
ticularly relevant since Pakistan has been importing a variety of equipment, ma-
chines, and power plant-related commodities from China under the CPEC projects.
Moreover, for a better assessment of economic integration, the reduction of
trade barriers and trade costs plays a vital role in understanding the “interconnect-
edness or interdependence of the trade, labor, and finance” (Griffiths, 2019). The
bilateral trade costs include “all costs involved in trading goods internationally
with another partner (i.e., bilaterally) relative to those involved in trading goods
domestically i.e., intra-nationally” (Duval et al., 2016: 11). Using bilateral trade
costs data for total goods for China-Pakistan, we see an overall reduction from 145
in 2003 to 128 in trade costs in 2018 (ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database,
2021). Would the CPEC enable trade facilitation and a further decline in bilateral
trade costs?
The newly implemented second phase of the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agree-
ment (CPFTA2) spanning from 2019 until 2024 gives further impetus to Pakistan
to improve and diversify its exports to China (Ali, 2020). Although the FTA con-
tributed to increasing Pakistan’s exports to China, the imports from China were
relatively higher consequently increasing Pakistan’s trade deficit with China. For
Pakistan to benefit from the FTA, it needs to utilize the tariff line efficiently and
improve its understanding of the Chinese market (Shah et al., 2020). It also de-
pends on the concessions from China. Despite the export diversification with vari-
ous product lines in the CPFTA2, Pakistan’s exports still lack competitive access
to the Chinese market for products such as rice, durum wheat, paper and paper
board articles, and medicaments of hormones (Afraz and Mukhtar, 2019). Under
CPEC Phase 2 and especially with the establishment of the Special Economic
Zones (SEZs), improved tariff concessions from China and better institutional ca-
pacity and regulatory framework have the potential to increase Pakistan’s exports
to China. The economic linkages under CPEC, thus, amount to a significant dimen-
sion to include in understanding the density of ties between China and Pakistan.
Social Linkage under CPEC
The post-CPEC phase has seen an influx of many Chinese expatriates in Pakistan
mostly due to the increased Chinese labor mobility (Subohi, 2018). Under China’s
BRI, one of the core policy areas has been to enhance people-to-people interac-
tions (Belt and Road Portal, 2019). One of the manifestations of enhanced social
relations has been increased tourism efforts. China has expanded its cooperation
in tourism by signing a variety of cooperation mechanisms such as “the Silk Road
Tourism Promotion Union, Maritime Silk Road Tourism Promotion Alliance, and
Tea Road International Tourism Alliance,” and by adopting mutual visa exemption
agreements with BRI partner countries (Belt and Road Portal, 2019). The number
of Chinese tourists has increased in many BRI countries in Asia. In 2017, 15 mil-
lion Chinese visited Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, whereas
Thailand received the majority of Chinese tourists (Chai, 2018). According to the
official report on China’s tourism, the total outbound tourists from China to the BRI
countries increased from 15.49 million in 2013 to 27.41 million in 2017, amount-
ing to a 77% increase in five years. Moreover, the number of tourists from BRI
countries to China increased from 9.03 million in 2013 to 10.64 million in 2017
(Chen, 2019).
Similarly, the number of Pakistani travelers to China—be it for a visit, business,
study, or residential purposes—has increased as well. According to the Ministry
of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development data, the number of
overseas Pakistanis in China was recorded to be 15,000 as of 2017–18 (OPHRD,
2020). Moreover, according to the China Tourism Statistical Yearbook, the number
of Pakistani arrivals in 2008 was 72,900 people and increased to 106,500 people
in 2013, and a further 127,300 people until 2017 (National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2020).6 This drastic increase in the number of Pakistanis traveling to China
is indeed an indication of the strengthening of social ties between the two countries
in the post-CPEC period.
Furthermore, China’s BRI has brought a tremendous increase in scholarship
opportunities for higher education for students in the BRI countries. Especially,
for Pakistan, the higher education funding by China Scholarship Council has seen
a drastic increase. Looking at the number of students from Pakistan, there were
28,023 students as of 2018 (Ministry of Education of China, 2019). Thus, I exam-
ine the number of students studying in China from Pakistan annually as a share of
the total number of students abroad from 2000 to 2019. The total number of Paki-
stani students in China is taken from AidData’s China’s Public Diplomacy Dataset
Version 2.0 (AidData, 2021), whereas total number of students abroad is taken
from the Education policy indicators from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics
(UIS) dataset (UNESCO, 2021).
With the internationalization of higher education and scholarship opportunities
under CPEC, the percentage of Pakistani students studying in China has drastically
Figure 4.5 Share of Pakistani Students studying in China (%): 2000–2019
increased as shown in Figure 4.5. This increase is more prominent in the post-
CPEC period for Pakistan. Therefore, the educational linkages under CPEC have
a significant impact on the strengthening of social ties between the two countries.
Cultural Linkage under CPEC
Under CPEC, cultural exchanges, activities, and events have increased manifold.
Since “people-to-people interactions” has been one of the core policy areas of the
BRI, they have been emphasized during the Belt and Road Summit in Beijing in
May 2017 and the 19th Plenary session of the Communist Party of China (Niazi,
2019). In Pakistan, there has been a surge in cultural exchange activities such as
art performances, film, drama, and theatre among other things. Many Pakistani
students are also learning Mandarin at various China Study Centers throughout
Pakistan. There has been a new sister-cities agreement with main cities in Pakistan
such as Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad, as well as the opening of new Chinese lan-
guage testing centers for taking exams of Chinese proficiency tests called Hanyu
Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) testing centers (Custer et al., 2021).
The CIs have been a focal platform for organizing educational and language
learning exchanges between Pakistan and China.7 Under CPEC, the number of
CIs, promoting Chinese language learning, culture, and history, has also increased.
As of 2023, there are five CIs in Pakistan in total according to the Hanban Official
website (Hanban, 2023).
The first and oldest CI in Pakistan was founded in 2005 at the National Univer-
sity of Modern Language (NUML) in Islamabad. The other four CIs are located at
the University of Karachi (2013), the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad (2014),
Figure 4.6 Total number of Confucius Institutes in Pakistan (cumulative)
the University of Punjab (2015), and the University of Sargodha (2019). This trend
is quite telling as all four CIs were established after the CPEC launch (Figure 4.6).
Thus, I use the CIs as a measure of strengthening cultural linkages between China
and Pakistan.
Communication Linkage under CPEC
For communication linkages, I analyze the information flow through media part-
nerships and journalistic exchanges between the two countries. Under CPEC, the
media cooperation between China and Pakistan has strengthened. The four CPEC
Media Forums, and the meeting of media leaders, journalists, and the delegation of
the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE) in Beijing to discuss media co-
operation, depict the Sino-Pakistani efforts in enhancing media partnerships (APP,
2018). The major news outlets in Pakistan such as The Dawn, The Tribune, and The
News have increased the coverage of China mostly with regard to BRI and CPEC
highlighting the “brotherhood” and “iron bond” between the two countries (Afzaal
et al., 2019). The formal media partnership began at the Belt and Road Forum
in 2017 when the Chinese major telecommunication company ZTE Corporation
signed an agreement with Pakistan’s oldest and biggest TV channel—Pakistan Tel-
evision Corporation (PTV) to collaborate and enhance digital television technolo-
gies and services, staff training, and content (Yan, 2017).
Furthermore, the journalistic exchanges between the two countries have also
been enhanced. Looking at the number of journalist visits from China’s Public
Diplomacy dataset, the meetings of the press and visits made by journalists have
increased in the post-CPEC period (Figure 4.7).
These visits are hosted in an official capacity by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs or facilitated by Chinese embassies and could be regarded as part of infor-
mational diplomacy (Custer et al., 2019). The increasing number of journalistic
Figure 4.7 Total number of journalist visits between China and Pakistan
exchanges is prominent in the post-CPEC period and, hence, gives us the deepen-
ing of communication linkages between China and Pakistan under CPEC.
Intergovernmental Linkage under CPEC
As both countries enjoy strong diplomatic relations, the number of official state
visits has increased since the CPEC launch. I examine the number of high-level of-
ficial visits of Chinese officials to Pakistan and vice versa each year. It also includes
the visits of high-level provincial or ministerial-level visits or visits in China, Paki-
stan, or at a third location (AidData, 2021). Additionally, the CPEC has enhanced
the military and defense cooperation between China and Pakistan. It involves high-
level military exchanges, joint exercises, training of military personnel, joint ven-
tures for defense production, and trade of military equipment, aircraft, submarines,
and tanks (MOFA, 2020).
Figure 4.8 depicts a fluctuating trend of the number of government visits as well
as the military visits, counted as total elite visits altogether. Both government and
military visits increased in 2013 but they show a decline for the years 2014–2015.
Nevertheless, we see a sharp increase in 2016 after the first phase of CPEC invest-
ments was absorbed. In comparison to the PML-N government, under the PTI gov-
ernment in 2018, the data show the lowest number of visits since 2000.
Furthermore, I record if the country is a member of China-led multilateral and
regional organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As Pakistan is a member of
both AIIB and SCO, I regard it as a high linkage for intergovernmental ties.
All these dimensions of Chinese Linkage individually and collectively indicate
the deepening of ties along all fronts. However, do these dimensions contribute to
Figure 4.8 Total number of government and military visits between China and Pakistan
explaining part of the variation in the democracy decline in Pakistan? Or do they

have a democracy-enhancing effect? How do Chinese engagement and linkages
surrounding economic, social, cultural, communication, and intergovernmental ties
explain their effect on de-democratization in Pakistan?
Based on the Chinese Linkage theory, the CPEC engagement has strengthened
the linkages to China in terms of economic, social, cultural, communication, and
intergovernmental ties. Following the logic of Levitsky and Way’s causal mecha-
nisms, these linkages, in turn, could potentially contribute to reinforcing domes-
tic tendencies toward de-democratization by shaping domestic actors’ incentives,
interests, and distribution of power and resources in Pakistan (see Levitsky and
Way, 2010: 44–50).8 A high Chinese linkage under CPEC could explain part of
the de-democratization story if the above theoretical argument unfolds. Since cen-
tralization has been primarily domestically driven, a high Chinese linkage could
reinforce those domestic tendencies (at least theoretically) with the implementation
of CPEC. I present a three-fold argument according to the Chinese Linkage theory.
First, the CPEC could possibly contribute to shaping incentives of actors in
a passive way such as the political elite opting for more centralized governance
rather than decentralized decision-making for the CPEC funding and resource al-
location. But it could be a leader-specific effect rather than the Chinese influence.
Second, the CPEC can be associated with shaping domestic preferences for de-
democratization, i.e., by increasing the number of domestic actors with a stake in
observing and following non-democratic norms. With extensive economic linkage
under CPEC in the form of flows of trade, investment, and credit from China,
it could entail conformity or adherence to authoritarian practices. Moreover, so-
cial linkages, particularly educational linkages, i.e., Pakistani students in China or
leaders with professional ties with China, are more likely to maintain those ties.
According to this, the economic and political actors with closer ties to China un-
der CPEC will have higher stakes to follow the “China model” for development
and governance. However, it is difficult to tell at this point about the shifting prefer-
ences of those actors in the case of Pakistan.
Third, Chinese engagement in its passive assistance can have some indirect im-
pact on the domestic power play, including the political parties and business elite
of Pakistan. According to Levitsky and Way, linkage can generate “multiple and
often decentralized forms of pressure that may operate below the radar screens of
outside observers” (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 49). As China has a preference for
centralized and efficient implementation related to CPEC, the “pressure” to de-
liver effectively with more centralization can be understood from the Pakistani side
(Boni and Adeney, 2020: 450). However, are centralization and the growing role of
the military domestically driven tendencies or due to Chinese influence?
Given the claims of the BRI as a “threat” to the liberal order and hindering
peace and democracy in partner countries (Spatafora, 2019), the case of Pakistan
shows how domestic contextual factors play an influential role in shaping the tra-
jectory of corridor cooperation. The local context becomes extremely essential to
dissect while looking for impact assessment related to CPEC. Connecting back
to the democracy story of Pakistan, two main factors play a determining role in
understanding its impact, especially related to CPEC. First, civil-military relations
as the military has been one of the key institutional actors in Pakistan’s political
landscape. Second, how federalism plays a role in understanding the dynamics of
the federal and provincial governments when it comes to CPEC implementation.
To understand the democratic decline and de-democratization, an in-depth analysis
of the domestic context is needed to understand the intertwined nature of the power
play, the complex puzzle of civil-military relations, and federal and provincial dy-
namics related to CPEC implementation.
CPEC and Federalism

Despite the passing of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan in 2010,
the governance has been visibly centralized rather than decentralized.9 Despite the
removal of the Concurrent List and greater provincial autonomy, the devolution
of powers to the provinces did not occur sufficiently. Moreover, the delegation
of power and resources from provincial governments to local governments also
remains to be seen. Especially with the mega-scale projects of CPEC, the fissures
of the federal-provincial asymmetric dynamics resurfaced.
The literature on federalism in Pakistan highlights historical issues of ethnic
dominance of Punjab and the underrepresentation of other ethnicities at the na-
tional level, especially in the Army and the bureaucracy (Adeney, 2012). This has
led to severe sentiments of neglect and dissatisfaction among other ethnicities in
Pakistan. However, with the 18th Constitutional Amendment, and the NFC Award,
the federal government catered to some of the provincial grievances allocating
10% more revenue to the provinces and revising the revenue distribution formula
to include other factors than just population (Khalid and Hussain, 2018). The new
horizontal distribution of resources formula included 82% population, 10.3% pov-
erty, 5% revenue collection efforts, and 2.7% inverse population density catering
to a relatively fair distribution (Khalid and Hussain, 2018). However, more de-
centralization and fiscal federalism needed to be transitioned and institutionalized
properly.10
With the CPEC launch in 2013, the PML-N-led Sharif government kept cen-
tralized decision-making during the early years of CPEC. The debates around the
selection of CPEC “routes” have been one prominent example. There were four
initially proposed CPEC road network routes and alignments such as the North-
ern, Western, Central, and Eastern routes.11 However, out of these four routes,
more emphasis has been given to the Eastern route passing through the well-
developed Punjab province which is also the voter base of the PML-N. This
was criticized by other provincial parties and political leaders (Rizvi, 2015). In
contrast, the Western route passing through the underdeveloped Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa and Balochistan provinces was neglected by the government (Rafiq,
2017). This highlighted the center-provinces grievances especially because the
provincial parties and the opposition party led by Imran Khan (who later be-
came the Prime Minister of Pakistan) put demands for routes realignment cater-
ing to other provinces (Hussain, 2019). This CPEC routes controversy indicated
the partisan politics, asymmetric center-provincial relations, and Punjab-centric
development policies of the Sharif government. The Sharif-led government,
however, managed to alleviate some of the provincial concerns by holding dis-
cussions at the All Parties Conference (APC) and generating political consensus
(Haider, 2015).
Another aspect depicting centralization has been a lack of discussion on CPEC
in the Council of Common Interests (CCI)—a platform for inter-provincial poli-
cymaking. As the CPEC projects were related to electricity, railways, oil, gas, and
port development, the CCI should have been given an active role in catering to
disparities among provinces (Yousafzai, 2016). The Sharif government centralized
the CPEC planning and implementation despite the insistence of the provincial
governments. More so, the provincial Chief Ministers were not included in the
early meetings of the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) and were only included
in 2016 onward. This has depicted less regard for equitable provincial representa-
tion for routes selection and funds allocation as well as discussion and consultation
on the provincial concerns during the early years of CPEC under the PML-N.
Centralization is not a new phenomenon but rather has been a distinct feature
of Pakistan’s governance even during periods of formal civilian rule (Adeney and
Boni, 2022). However, the degree and levels of centralization have tended to vary
across different policy areas and politico-institutional dimensions such as “consti-
tutional autonomy, provinces’ institutional autonomy, and the central manipula-
tion of provincial elections” among others (Adeney and Boni, 2022: 4). The trends
of centralization also vary across different ruling political parties and leaders in
power, and their interplay with other key institutional actors such as the military
and the judiciary. With the new PTI-led government of Prime Minister Imran
Khan, the centralization continued with a more prominent role of the military in
CPEC affairs. The next section discusses the civil-military relationship during the
post-CPEC period.
CPEC and Civil-Military Relations

Since the country has been governed by military rule several times throughout
its political history, the democratic structures, institutions, and processes never
consolidated sufficiently. Even during civilian rule, the military assumed its con-
tinuous role in exerting its agency in the decision-making and foreign policy of
Pakistan. Thus, for any analysis of democracy and de-democratization in Pakistan,
it becomes imperative to understand the dynamics of civil-military relations and
their influence and implications for policymaking in Pakistan.
In the study conducted by Adeney and Boni, they present the disaggregated
level of military rule in Pakistan by dissecting it into two different categories—
the periods with direct military rule, and with the military presidents in Pakistan
(Adeney and Boni, 2022). They argued that Pakistan’s federation has been more
centralized under the direct military rule period in all policy areas as opposed to
the military president or civilian government in power (Adeney and Boni, 2022).
Moreover, the military presidents have increased provincial legislative autonomy
to boost the legitimacy of their regimes (Adeney and Boni, 2022). The military
rulers also established local government structures that weakened the autonomy of
the provinces (Aslam, 2019).
As the military has continued to play a pivotal role in key policy areas even
during civilian rule, the political dynamics are somewhat shaped by the outcome
of the convergence (or divergence) of the interests’ alignment between the civilian
leadership and the military. Thus, the civil-military relationship becomes an impor-
tant determinant for understanding the prospects of democratization in Pakistan.
Moreover, how can we understand the role of the military during CPEC?
Examining the two phases of CPEC—Phase 1 (2013–2018) and Phase 2 (2018–
present), we see two distinct trends. The CPEC Phase 1 under the PML-N govern-
ment indicated a less visible role of the military in the CPEC decision-making and
project implementation, whereas the dynamics changed during Phase 2 of CPEC
in 2018 with a new government of PTI under Prime Minister Khan as the military
became the main interlocutor for the Sino-Pakistani relationship (Small, 2020).
Under Khan, the CPEC affairs have allowed tilting the scale toward a more visible
presence and involvement of the military.
During the CPEC Phase 1, under the PML-N leadership, Beijing was happy
to deal with the civilian regime of the Sharif government; therefore, the Chinese
linkage under CPEC during the early years strengthened the civilian rule rather
than destabilizing it. This finding goes against the conventional claims of China
supporting the rule of autocrats in the BRI partner countries. However, with the
PTI-led government, the military returned to be the main interlocutor for the Chi-
nese side and the Sino-Pakistani cooperation shifted back to how it was before the
CPEC.
Khan’s electoral victory has been a positive development for the military, and
he enabled more military presence in the decision-making related to CPEC. First,
a centralized body—the “CPEC Authority” was established by a Presidential Ordi-
nance in 2019 with an initial appointment of a retired Army general as a chairman
(Baabar, 2019). Second, the government formed the National Development Coun-
cil consisting of the Army Chief of Staff and federal and provincial government
members (Khan, 2019). Since this council is tasked with policymaking and provid-
ing guidelines for regional connectivity, it enhanced the space for the military in
CPEC’s decision-making. Additionally, the Pak-China Relations Steering Commit-
tee was created to expedite the coordination of CPEC projects with members from
the government, armed forces, and intelligence agencies (Rana, 2021).
This has implications for understanding the locus of power and key institutional
actors in steering the projects of the corridor cooperation as well as determining the
beneficiaries of such mega-scale infrastructure developments under the CPEC. This
is also dependent on the nature of relations and the alignment of the political leader
in power. Since PM Khan had maintained closer ties with the military as compared
to his predecessor—PM Sharif, the military was able to exert its “agency” more
around the CPEC implementation (Hussain, 2022).
These increased levels of centralization and more visible military involvement
under CPEC may not be indicative of active Chinese influence but rather can be un-
derstood as a passive “influence.” Besides, zooming in on civil-military dynamics,
federal-provincial relations, and the above arguments has allowed us to examine
the complex nature of the politicization of the CPEC implementation in Pakistan.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined China’s engagement under CPEC from a multidi-
mensional theoretical framework of Chinese Linkage to understand and assess
its impact on the levels of democracy in Pakistan. I have discussed the issues of
democratic governance and centralization visible in handling the CPEC projects
vis-à-vis the domestic political developments during the two successive regimes
of the PML-N and PTI over the last decade. Examining the post-CPEC political
dynamics under the Sharif government from 2013 to 2018 indicated more central-
ized decision-making with the civilian-led coordinating bodies. However, during
Khan’s government, the dynamics of the corridor cooperation shifted with a con-
tinuation of the centralization trend along with more institutional space for the
military in the key leadership positions related to CPEC policymaking. With the
deteriorating nature of democracy in Pakistan, along with deepening centralization
related to the CPEC implementation as well as an increasingly prominent military
role in the CPEC decision-making, I argued that the high Chinese Linkage under
CPEC might be able to explain part of the de-democratization shift in Pakistan.
Analyzing the Sino-Pakistani cooperation in the post-CPEC period, all five di-
mensions of Chinese Linkage, i.e., economic, social, cultural, communication, and
intergovernmental ties, have strengthened. Although all linkage dimensions indi-
cated a high degree of linkage to China, they do not point us to sufficient evidence
to explain the declining trend in Pakistan’s democracy. I examined how CPEC has
been enmeshed with the domestic politics and evolving trends of centralization
and argued that the main drivers of the decline in democratization in Pakistan have
not been due to Chinese influence directly but rather intertwined with Pakistan’s
domestic politics and its complex array of factors such as the political parties, the
military, and the dynamics of the federal system in Pakistan. I argued that while
increased Chinese linkage, along multiple dimensions, has positively attributed
to enhancing Sino-Pakistani cooperation under CPEC, they also overlap with and
shape dynamics of centralization and de-democratization in the country.
Being “X-centered research,” the chapter was not set out to discuss all the causes
of de-democratization in Pakistan, but it focused on the Chinese linkages under
CPEC. The chapter did not claim to trace the causal mechanisms or to confirm or
disconfirm the theory but rather to show the existence and deepening of Chinese
linkages in a local context, and their overlap with the domestic de-democratization
patterns. Nevertheless, this chapter could also tease out some possible explanations
based on the theoretical argument of how CPEC could potentially (at least theoreti-
cally) reinforce de-democratization by shaping incentives, interests, and capabili-
ties of domestic actors in Pakistan.
The main finding has been the way Chinese involvement, as an external influ-
ence, has interacted with, intertwined, and impacted the domestic political devel-
opments in the country. This is also to reinforce that the story of Chinese influences
under the linkage is tremendously intricate and complex. Nevertheless, the bold
claims made about the Chinese influences as a deteriorating force for democracy in
the literature do not hold true in my analysis of the case of Pakistan.
Notes
1 Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy with federal governance and a multiparty politi-
cal system. The major political parties are as follows: Pakistan People’s Party (PPP),
Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q), Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Awami National Party, Jamiat Ulema-
e-Islam (F), Muttahida Qaumi Movement, among others.
2 The Freedom House Index consists of 25 questions: 10 for political rights and 15 for
civil liberties. Each country is given a score for each dimension ranging from 0 to 4
where “0” represents the smallest degree of freedom and “4” the greatest degree of
freedom. The overall score of both dimensions is equally weighted and converted into
a scale for determining the status of countries as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.”
This scale ranges from 1 to 7 for each dimension of political rights and civil liberties.
The lower the rank on this scale, the higher the freedom in that country. The countries
are ranked as “Free” with a score from 1 to 2.5, “Partly Free” with a score of 3 to 5, and
“Not Free” with a score of 5.5 to 7.
3 V-Dem democracy index has an interval scale and values range from 0 to 1, where 1
represents a higher score for democracy.
4 See detailed assessment in van der Zwan (2022). Chinese Linkage and Democracy in
Pakistan.
5 I have introduced the theory of Chinese Linkage and Leverage under BRI in earlier
work, see: van der Zwan (2022). Chinese Linkage and Leverage under the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) in Asia. For understanding the conceptual logic and measurement
of my Chinese Linkage measure for diverse cases in Asia, please refer to: van der Zwan
(2022). Chinese Linkage in Asia.
6 The China Tourism Statistical Yearbook consists of all the relevant indicators regarding
tourism, specifically includes the number of inbound and foreign visitors in China from
different countries.
7 The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are educational institutes for the cultural promotion of
China abroad operating under the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of
China and overseen by Hanban, officially serving as the Office of Chinese Language
Council International.
8 Levitsky and Way presented three main mechanisms through which (Western) link-
age contributed to democratization in the post-Cold War period: “(i) it shaped incen-
tives and heightened the international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse; (ii)
it shaped interests and created domestic constituencies for adhering to democratic
norms; ii) it reshaped the domestic distribution of power and resources, strengthen-
ing democratic and opposition forces and weakening and isolating autocrats” (2010:
44–50).
9 Under PPP-led government of Zardari, the 18th Amendment in the Constitution of
Pakistan was passed in 2010 which led to the curtailment of the presidential powers
and more provincial autonomy. Also, the 7th National Financial Commission (NFC)
Award allowed for a more equitable distribution of resources and fiscal autonomy to the
provinces.
10 For further detailed analysis of 18th Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan, see:
Mohammad Waseem, Federalism in Pakistan. 2010; Katharine Adeney, A step towards
inclusive federalism in Pakistan? 2012.
11 The Northern route starts via the Khunjerab pass. The Western route enters Baluchistan
via Dera Ismail Khan to Gwadar. The Central route passes from Dera Ismail Khan to
Gwadar. The Eastern route passes through central Punjab and Sindh provinces. Also see,
Rizvi (2015), The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
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5 The Securitization of CPEC
Zahid Shahab Ahmed
Security has been central to bilateral discussions between Islamabad and Beijing
since the inception of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). While
China saw Pakistan as an ideal partner in terms of investment, it has always been
concerned about the security situation in general and militancy in Balochistan. Pa-
kistan has also responded accordingly in terms of not just providing security to
CPEC projects and Chinese citizens but by shaping a narrative in favour of secur-
ing the corridor. This chapter aims to understand the ways in which Pakistan has
securitized CPEC and why. By doing so this chapter makes a significant contribu-
tion to literature on CPEC because erstwhile research has mainly focused on CPEC
and security threats (Ahmad et al., 2020; Khan, 2019), but not on its securitization,
which played a major role in generating and maintaining a national consensus as
far as key political actors in the country are concerned.
In terms of securitization, the erstwhile literature has focused on how certain
individuals securitize a specific issue, but it has neglected instances of unsuccessful
securitization (Ruzicka, 2019). According to the Copenhagen School of Security
Studies, “security is a social construction of threats that involves securitizing ac-
tors (mostly political elites), who declare certain issues as urgent and endangering
the survival of the referent object, which, once accepted by the audience, justifies
the use of extraordinary measures to neutralize the threat” (Šuloviḉ, 2010: 3). Ac-
cording to Watson, something or a problem is securitized only when the audience
accepts it as such, and securitization is determined not by the one securitizing,
but by the audience (Watson, 2012). According to Buzan and others, a problem
is securitized by agents who attempt extraordinary measures to resolve it when a
referent object faces an existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998). The securitization
of a problem has some observable advantages, such as the more effective manage-
ment of complicated issues, the mobilization of public support for specific policies
by branding them as security relevant, or the allocation of more resources. These
successes might not have been possible if the same issues were simply seen as
political.
A discourse that takes the form of “presenting something as an existential
threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization–this is a secu-
ritizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it
as such” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). Ruzicka (2019) suggests different reasons why
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-5
The Securitization of CPEC 75
securitization can fail. First, a securitizing actor might not know how to speak
of security in a specific context while presenting a securitization move. Second,
the actors might not have sufficient authority over a specific issue vis-à-vis the
audience. Third, the threatening object presented as an existential threat may not
be amenable to securitization. Fourth, the relevant audience may not accept the
securitizing move. Similarly, another study suggests that the process of secu-
ritization in its implementation stage can be “confronted with significant forces
of resistance that can challenge securitization through counter-securitizations”
(Stritzel and Chang, 2015). Scholars have defined securitization theory in the
following manner:
Securitization theory seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the secu-
rity character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments
resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are
fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created.
(Balzacq et al., 2016: 494)
Benefiting from the existing literature on securitization, for instance the role of
securitizing actors (Šuloviḉ, 2010), this research focuses on the military leader-
ship in Pakistan. While scholars have referred to securitization as actors declaring
something “as an existential threat” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25), the case of CPEC is
somewhat different. As will be examined below, various securitizing actors have
not labelled CPEC-related security threats as existential, but a threat to Pakistan’s
economic stability and geo-economic potential. By stressing the need to provide
security for CPEC, and making this paramount concern in project planning, they
have been able to claim greater influence over the project, including civilian as-
pects of governance. Notably, the securitization process has not just focused on
direct threats to project sites, but two other dimensions of security – economic and
geostrategic – that will be examined in detail further below. Moreover, the author
will carry out an examination of how this securitization has been received by local
actors near major CPEC sites, especially in Balochistan.
When it comes to securitizing actors, it is important to focus on the military in
Pakistan, which has played a significant role in Pakistani politics throughout its his-
tory. Pakistan has experienced several military interventions in its history, resulting
in periods of direct military rule. The military has also often influenced political
decision-making, both overtly and covertly, even during civilian-led governments.
The military’s involvement in politics can be attributed to several factors, including
Pakistan’s pronounced security concerns, external rivalry with India, and recur-
ring domestic conflicts. The military has positioned itself as a guardian of national
security and has intervened during times of perceived political instability or when
it deems the civilian government to be ineffective or corrupt. Direct military in-
terventions have resulted in the imposition of martial law and the suspension of
democratic institutions. Pakistan was under military rule for a significant period
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s under General Zia-ul-Haq (Sheikh and
Ahmed, 2020). Similarly, General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a coup in
76 Zahid Shahab Ahmed
1999 and ruled the country until 2008. Even during periods of civilian rule, the
military has maintained influence over important policy matters, particularly those
related to national security and foreign policy (Ahmed and Akbarzadeh, 2023).
This is evident through the ongoing political turmoil since the removal of the Imran
Khan government as Khan has been directly blaming the Pakistani army for bring-
ing down his government (Ahmed, 2023).
Given the scale and strategic significance of CPEC, the Pakistani military plays
a role in ensuring the security and protection of the project. The military’s involve-
ment in CPEC primarily focuses on safeguarding the infrastructure and providing
a secure environment for its implementation but also extends beyond security con-
siderations. In some CPEC projects, military units have been directly involved in
construction and development. For instance, the military’s engineering units have
been employed in building roads and infrastructure in remote and challenging ar-
eas. The military’s role in CPEC reflects its importance in ensuring the smooth im-
plementation of this critical economic initiative. The military’s extensive network
and resources contribute to creating a secure environment and addressing potential
security challenges that could arise during the execution of the project. The mili-
tary’s influence was at its zenith when the supervising CPEC Authority was led by
a former army general, Asim Bajwa, during 2019 and 2021 (Latif, 2021). However,
it is important to note that while the military plays a role in CPEC, the project it-
self is primarily driven by civilian institutions, including the Planning Commission
of Pakistan, the Ministry of Planning, Development, and Special Initiatives, and
subordinate governmental bodies. The military’s involvement in CPEC is primar-
ily focused on security and support rather than direct decision-making or policy
formulation.
The Context
To understand how the state of Pakistan has securitized CPEC, it is important to not
just understand the context in which China had decided to invest in Pakistan but
also the nature of the bilateral relations between China and Pakistan.
The China-Pakistan relationship has grown significantly since 1950, encom-
passing strong economic, cultural, and strategic relations. While Pakistan backs
China’s membership of the South Asian Association for Regional Coopera-
tion (SAARC), it has become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion (SCO) because of China’s consistent support. India has used its veto against
China’s membership in SAARC but itself has become a full member of the SCO
(Ahmed et al., 2019). Besides this, Pakistan has played a key role in promoting
goodwill for China across the Muslim world (Basit, 2019). Mutual support is not
limited to just regional organizations, as China has often used its permanent seat in
the United Nations (UN) Security Council to block anti-Pakistan moves and sup-
port Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute. China has supported Pakistan in
thwarting India’s attempt to have Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed,
declared a terrorist at the UN (Nichols and Das, 2019). In reaction, New Delhi
blamed Pakistan and China for shielding terrorists. In 2010, China stopped the UN
Security Council from imposing sanctions on Jamat-ud-Dawa leader Hafiz Saeed

(Charbonneau, 2008). This and other dynamics have shaped China’s rhetoric that
it has been helping a friend in need – something that has become more prominent
since the start of CPEC. The first time when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China used the slogan “A friend in need is a friend indeed”
was when Pakistan had sent relief items for the victims of the 2008 earthquake in
China (PRC, 2008). This strategic relationship is also the origin of CPEC: General
Pervez Musharraf is often credited for proposing to China the idea of a deep-sea
port in Gwadar that would provide the shortest seaport access to China’s western
regions (Boni, 2020: 82).
In terms of securitization, it is crucial to look at the security situation in Pakistan
when Beijing had first promised Pakistan investment under CPEC. After the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US, Pakistan joined the US in the “War on
Terror.” While Pakistan received billions of dollars in economic and military aid, it
had to pay a heavy price through security operations against terrorists, including Al
Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban (Gunaratna and Nielsen, 2008). Such actions turned
some terrorists’ groups against Pakistan and the country became one of the largest
victims of terrorism and its international image was deeply dented as a terrorist
breeding ground. More than 80,000 Pakistanis died because of terrorism during
2005–2013 (Iqbal, 2015), which also cost the country an estimated US$123.3 bil-
lion in economic output during 2001–2017 (GOP, 2017). Looking at data produced
by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2008–2014 were the worst years in terms of
terrorism in Pakistan. In 2012 alone, there were 2,347 terrorist incidents resulting
in the deaths of over 6,000 people (see Table 5.1). Widespread terrorism turned
Pakistan into an unfavourable destination for foreign investors. FDI as a percent-
age of Pakistan’s GDP peaked in 2007 at 3.7 per cent, subsequently declined to 0.4
per cent in 2012 and then gradually recovered to 0.7 per cent in 2020 (WB, 2022).
CPEC is a major factor in this regard, but Pakistan still finds it challenging to sus-
tain economic growth (Ullah et al., 2022).
Hence when Beijing reached out to Pakistan to initially invest US$46 billion un-
der the BRI, Islamabad wholeheartedly accepted the offer. Then Federal Minister
Ahsan Iqbal said, “At a time when no country was ready to invest in Pakistan due
to security concerns, China has come forward to make an enormous investment
Table 5.1 Terrorism in Pakistan during 2008 and 2014
Year Number of Incidents Number of Casualties
2008 1,149 6,683

2009 1,665 11,317
2010 1,246 7,342
2011 1,573 6,050
2012 2,347 6,188
2013 2,034 5,294
2014 1,569 5,510
Source: SATP (2023)
that has a huge potential to transform Pakistan” (Nadeem, 2015). Even then se-
curity was a main concern for China for which the state of Pakistan, especially its
army, provided assurances to Beijing. In 2016, General Raheel Sharif of Pakistan
stated that CPEC was Pakistan’s national commitment and besides providing as-
surances of providing full security, he also said, “I assure you [China] that we
will not leave any stone unturned to ensure its [CPEC’s] timely completion and
uninterrupted success” (Khan, 2016). As per the agreement with China, Pakistan
is responsible for securing CPEC project sites, and for this purpose the Special Se-
curity Division (SSD) was established in 2016. It comprises 9,000 Pakistan Army
officers and 6,000 paramilitary forces. In total, there are over 32,000 security per-
sonnel from the army, police, and levies providing security for the over 14,000
Chinese CPEC workers in Pakistan (Rehman, 2019). Despite the official claims
that the number of Chinese expatriates in Pakistan will grow up to five million by
2025 (Bhatti, 2021), the ground realities present a different story. As of 2013, there
were 20,000 Chinese citizens in Pakistan and that number increased to 60,000 in
2018 (Subohi, 2018). It is very difficult to provide an exact estimate of the current
number of Chinese citizens in Pakistan, but the latest figure showed that there were
71,000 Chinese in Pakistan in 2017 (The Express Tribune, 2017). The govern-
ment has also invested in upgrading the capacity of the Pakistan Maritime Security
Agency to patrol CPEC’s costal route around Gwadar and had allocated US$150
million for this purpose in 2017 (Hasan, 2017). For maritime security, the Naval
Air Station in Turbat, Balochistan, was also established in 2017. Still, considering
the threats posed by militancy and terrorism, Pakistan is under constant pressure
to provide more security to CPEC projects and Chinese expatriates and has to bear
the associated costs. In the 2017–2018 budget, the government allocated US$17
million for CPEC security but this cost is estimated to be in the billions of dollars
now (Rehman, 2019).
Security Threats to CPEC

Due to the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan and terrorism across Pakistan, CPEC
security has always been a key topic in bilateral exchanges between Beijing and
Islamabad. The intensity and frequency of those discussions have increased due
to the volatile security situation, particularly since the start of CPEC in 2015. Pa-
kistan’s “kinetic” military anti-terrorism campaigns have resulted in a significant
reduction in terrorist attacks in the country, but that achievement is at risk since
the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2022. Since then, Pakistan has
been experiencing the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and
other terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP),
which have also increased their operations in the country (Ahmed, 2022a; Ahmed,
2022b). Compared to 136 terrorist incidents in 2019, 365 were recorded in 2022
(see Table 5.2).
In terms of the securitization of CPEC, we need to also look at how CPEC
projects and Chinese nationals have been targeted by Baloch militants and terrorist
groups in Pakistan. Here the situation has been very concerning – something that
Table 5.2 Terrorism in Pakistan during 2015 and 2022
2015 950 3,685

2016 526 1,797
2017 294 1,269
2018 164 693
2019 136 365
2020 193 506
2021 267 663
2022 365 971
Source: SATP (2023)
has exposed loopholes in Pakistan’s security arrangements. As CPEC gained mo-

mentum in Balochistan and Sindh, the number of direct attacks on CPEC projects
and Chinese nationals in Pakistan increased, especially in 2017 (see Table 5.3).
The data below does not include the 2020 attack by the Baloch Liberation Army
(BLA) on the Karachi Stock Exchange in which five people were killed, or the
2019 attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar, because these are not CPEC
sites (Saifi et al., 2022). However, looking at the data, the BLA has been on the of-
fensive showing its overt opposition to CPEC. For the BLA, its actions are against
“Chinese exploitative plans in Balochistan” (Saifi et al., 2022). Following the Pearl
Continental attack, General Han Weiguo, Commander of China’s People’s Libera-
tion Army, visited Pakistan and held a meeting with General Qamar Bajwa at the
General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In the meeting, General Bajwa provided reas-
surances of Pakistan’s commitment to CPEC’s security (Dawn, 2019).
Table 5.3 Attacks on CPEC Projects and Chinese Nations in Pakistan (2016–2022)
# Year Location Casualties Responsibility
1. 2016 Karachi – Revolutionary Army

2. 2016 Sukkur – Insurgents
3. 2017 Hoshab 3 BLA
4. 2017 Quetta – Insurgents
5. 2017 Mastung 2 Unknown
6. 2017 Ghotki – Sindhudesh Liberation Army
8. 2017 Tank – Militants
9. 2018 Karachi 1 BLA
10. 2018 Chagai 1 BLA
13. 2021 Karachi – Insurgents
14. 2021 Dasu 13 Unknown
Source: PIPS (2022), Saifi and Westcott (2021), and Saifi et al. (2022)
The security arrangements for CPEC and Chinese nationals have always been
under scrutiny in Pakistan. As discussed above, this has a lot to do with how various
terrorist groups have managed to attack not just CPEC projects but Chinese nation-
als in different parts of the country. As Pakistan is continuously improving security
arrangements, it has also been noticed that groups like the BLA have changed tac-
tics. There are more attacks on soft targets – places where security arrangements
are not as extensive – and suicide attacks. This was particularly evident in the case
of the 2022 suicide attack on the Chinese language centre in Karachi in which three
Chinese nationals were killed (Saifi et al., 2022). Beijing has been extremely con-
cerned about security, and despite its official policy of non-interference, Chinese
envoys have held meetings with Baloch militants. It is unclear what was discussed
in those meetings, but China has not achieved the desired outcome of securing
CPEC projects (Dawn, 2018a). After a series of attacks on Chinese expatriates
in Pakistan, Islamabad carried out an extensive review of security arrangements
and found gaps in the security arrangements for businesses and homes of Chinese
citizens (non-CPEC sites); for example, there were no CCTV cameras at 102 out of
486 locations (Asghar, 2018). Also, the SSD was not fully developed and deployed
until 2019, and officials from Beijing had raised this concern in the eighth meeting
of the Joint Coordination Committee in January 2019 (Kiani, 2019).
Despite being hesitant to fund CPEC security, Beijing has been providing some
support. This is in line with President Xi’s remarks made to the Parliament of Pa-
kistan in 2015: “we should stick together in the face of difficulty and jointly meet
security challenges. China will work with Pakistan to tackle non-traditional se-
curity threats so as to provide a reliable security guarantee for bilateral economic
cooperation and common development” (PRC, 2015). While Pakistan has refused
the idea of China taking direct control of CPEC’s security, it has accepted what-
ever support Beijing has been providing. For example, in 2018, China provided 50
motorcycles and 200 bulletproof jackets to the government of Gilgit-Baltistan, to
be used by personnel involved in patrolling the CPEC route along the Karakoram
Highway that connects Pakistan with China (Mirza, 2018).
Since the start of CPEC, Pakistan has faced an unprecedented level of political
turmoil. This has also contributed to the slow progress of CPEC. Following a sit-in
(dharna) led by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Nawaz Sharif, the
former Prime Minister of Pakistan, was disqualified from holding public office by
the Supreme Court of Pakistan in July 2017. The disqualification was related to
the Panama Papers scandal, which involved leaked documents revealing offshore
investments of numerous politicians and public figures around the world, includ-
ing Nawaz Sharif and his family. The Panama Papers leaks alleged that the Sharif
family-owned offshore companies and properties that were not disclosed in their
wealth statements (Bhatti, 2017). The Supreme Court of Pakistan took up the case
and formed a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to investigate the allegations against
Nawaz Sharif and his family. After a detailed investigation, the Supreme Court de-
clared Nawaz Sharif disqualified from holding public office under Article 62(1)(f)
of the Constitution, which requires elected officials to be “honest” and “truthful.”
The dharna that lasted for several months played a key role in increasing Imran
Khan’s popularity, paving the way for him to become Pakistan’s Prime Minister in
2018. On the campaign trail, he had announced an intent to “review” CPEC agree-
ments, but his PTI government ultimately did not renegotiate any of them. This
period nonetheless experienced a slowdown in Chinese investment in Pakistan
which can be attributed to a confluence of factors. While many blame the Covid-19
pandemic for a significant drop in FDI from China to Pakistan from 2021 to 2022,
FDIs from many other countries actually increased during this period, for instance
from the US, Switzerland, UAE, the Netherlands, Germany, Malaysia, and Kuwait.
In the case of China, however, its FDI to Pakistan dropped from US$699.59 million
during the 2021 financial year to US$355.83 million in the 2022 financial year due
to slow economic growth experienced by China (BR, 2022; Yao and Zhang, 2023).
The Chinese economic growth slowed during the pandemic but it did not experi-
ence negative economic growth like many other countries. Hence the decrease in
FDI could be explained by other factors, including uncertainty around how the PTI
government was going to deal with CPEC.
In April 2022, Imran Khan lost a no-confidence motion in the parliament, trig-
gering another major phase of political turmoil. His government was replaced by
an alliance of 13 political parties under the banner of the “Pakistan Democratic
Movement” (PDM) led by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The new
PDM government wanted to show that it is fully behind CPEC – unlike the erst-
while PTI government – and take all possible actions to ensure its success. Besides
dissolving the CPEC Authority, the new government urged all stakeholders to im-
prove CPEC’s security. In this regard, Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal demanded a
monthly security briefing. It also appeared that the government realized that kinetic
measures alone cannot provide the security that CPEC needs. Minister Iqbal said
that the National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan needed to come up with
other measures to address the socio-economic grievances of people that underlie
security challenges to CPEC (GOP, 2022).
Securitizing CPEC: Economic and Geostrategic Narratives
While domestic security threats to CPEC have been a prominent issue, they were
not by themselves central to the securitization of CPEC by civil and military elites
in Pakistan. Rather, these focused on the project’s importance to Pakistan’s na-
tional economic and geostrategic security, considered to be higher order objectives
around which a robust elite consensus existed in Pakistan, and which served to
delegitimize any criticism of the project. The following two sections recount the
roots of these narratives, and how political and military actors used them to pursue
their securitization objectives.
Economic Security
A popular narrative in Pakistan is that the country needs CPEC for its economic
security. Soon after its inception, this facet of CPEC became controversial, as it
was seen as a project of the PML-N government – a major party in Punjab and led
by Punjabis – and therefore other provinces raised concerns that Punjab would be
benefiting the most from CPEC. For example, the government of Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa (KP), then led by Imran Khan’s PTI, demanded the federal government to
be more transparent in terms of CPEC agreements. A lot of criticism had to do with
the federal-provincial relationship that had undergone a significant change since
the implementation of the 18th constitutional amendment giving more authority
to the provinces. When the federal government kept CPEC under its control, it
faced criticism mainly from KP and Balochistan (Hussain, 2019). CPEC reignited
historical ethno-nationalism in Pakistan, directed against the PML-N and its power
base in Punjab – the largest province of the country in terms of population and
also in terms of its share in the national assembly. Baloch nationalists have been
criticizing CPEC and some even have labelled it as “China-Punjab Economic Cor-
ridor” (Lashari, 2017).
The PML-N government initially was defensive as it showed no interest in en-
gaging with peripheral stakeholders to address their concerns regarding CPEC. The
Federal Minister for Planning and Development, Ahsan Iqbal, stated that the CPEC
agreement was confidential and therefore could not be made public (Khan, 2016).
The government’s language was also very aggressive, as PM Sharif once said,
“The enemies of CPEC are enemies of Pakistan” (DW, 2016). Subsequently, the
PML-N government switched to a more inclusive approach and began discussions
on CPEC by also simultaneously promoting the narrative that CPEC is crucial
for Pakistan in terms of the economic development of underdeveloped regions in
Pakistan. Beijing demonstrated flexibility and extended the scope of CPEC by pro-
viding equal opportunities, such as special economic zones in four major provinces
of Pakistan (Ahmed, 2019).
While at the national level, political actors reached a consensus over the re-
vised CPEC plan, there remained local concerns regarding the role of the mili-
tary. As discussed earlier, the military has been at the centre-stage of CPEC by
not just providing security but also planning key aspects of CPEC. The role of
the military in CPEC and specifically in the development of the Gwadar port in
Balochistan has faced criticism from locals. Balochistan has experienced a long-
standing insurgency movement, and the military’s involvement in the province has
been accompanied by allegations of human rights abuses, including enforced dis-
appearances and extrajudicial killings. Critics argue that the militarized approach
to security in the region has exacerbated tensions and undermined trust among
the local population (Ismail and Camba, 2022; also see Kakar’s chapter in this
volume). Besides the heavy deployment of troops in the province and upscaling of
military operations against Baloch insurgents, there are other CPEC-related griev-
ances that will surely harm Pakistan’s nation-building efforts or counter insurgency
in Balochistan. There are concerns that the development of CPEC projects, includ-
ing the Gwadar port, has resulted in the displacement of local communities and
the violation of their rights. Critics argue that the local population has not been
adequately consulted or compensated for the land acquired for the projects, lead-
ing to grievances and resentment (Zahra-Malik, 2017). Balochistan, the province
where Gwadar port is located, has long felt marginalized in terms of development
Table 5.4 Terrorism in Gwadar during 2010 and 2023
2010 3 6
2011 7 21
2012 6 31
2013 12 33
2014 4 4
2015 12 25
2016 5 18
2017 3 13
2018 2 9
2019 2 23
2020 1 14
2021 5 10
2022 6 15
Source: SATP (2023)
and resource allocation (Akhtar et al., 2021). As the Gwadar port is labelled as the
lynchpin of CPEC, there have been various mega projects in the city, including the
construction of Pakistan’s largest international airport. In the context of the Baloch
insurgency, Gwadar has also increasingly been exposed to attacks. Some of these
already occurred before CPEC, but such attacks have continued despite heavy se-
curity arrangements made by the state of Pakistan (see Table 5.4).
Despite the significance of Gwadar in CPEC and security arrangements there,
the proposed Gwadar Safe City Project faced delays. It was first approved around
2016 to enhance security measures in the port city of Gwadar, particularly with
regard to countering terrorism and criminal activities. The project involves the
installation of advanced surveillance systems, including CCTV cameras, facial
recognition technology, and other monitoring equipment, throughout the city. The
Gwadar Safe City project has been implemented by the Government of Pakistan,
in collaboration with relevant law enforcement agencies and security organiza-
tions, and the Chinese enterprise Huawei. It is part of a broader effort to strengthen
security infrastructure and combat terrorism and criminal activities in the country.
After a delay of roughly six years, this project finally started in 2023. According
to an estimate, this will cost the government PKR 4,966.9 million – an increase of
more than 68 per cent than the original costing done at the time of the first approval
in 2016 (Yousafzai, 2023).
Since the start of CPEC, successive Pakistani governments have promoted the
narrative that CPEC is crucial for Pakistan. Even the most sceptical PTI later pro-
moted this narrative. Realizing that CPEC is basically a trade corridor that depends
on connectivity and trade with other countries, the Pakistani leadership has also
been claiming benefits for all of South Asia. In a speech in 2016, then-Pakistani
PM Nawaz Sharif claimed that some three billion of the region would benefit from
CPEC (DW, 2016). Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal was also heard repeatedly label-
ling CPEC a “fate changer” in connection to its economic benefits for Pakistan.
He clarified that CPEC is not aid, but an investment (Nadeem, 2015). Iqbal is
known for producing many policy documents in Pakistan and also claimed that
CPEC aligns with the Vision 2025 of Pakistan in which regional connectivity is
seen as a key component of the country’s economic growth (Nadeem, 2015). Simi-
larly, then the Minister for Ports and Shipping, Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo, who has
been a prominent Baloch nationalist, spoke in favour of CPEC in 2017:
CPEC has the potential to change the regional canvas and the world. The
importance of the project for Pakistan’s strategic strength and economic
prosperity needs no elaboration. Every effort is being made to secure the
important trade lifeline both on land and at sea.
(Hasan, 2017)
In terms of domestic politics, PTI was a key political actor that was critical of
CPEC and demanded more transparency from the PML-N government in 2015.
However, when in government from 2018 to 2022, it wanted to review CPEC
agreements by involving China. This approach, as Amir Rana argues, “damaged
not only CPEC but also the overall economy of the country” (Rana, 2019). As
discussed earlier, this is partly responsible for a decline in China’s investment in
Pakistan during 2021 and 2022. The PTI government soon realized CPEC’s signifi-
cance in relation to Pakistan’s economic development, swung fully behind CPEC,
and in fact took several measures to streamline CPEC projects and provided suf-
ficient security to seek more investment from China. Following the 2021 attack
in Dasu, KP, Federal Minister Asad Umar said, “Need and importance of security
is increasing as Chinese investment is rising in Pakistan” (Dawn, 2021). Further-
more, considering the significance of civil-military coordination in CPEC matters,
the government established the CPEC Authority in 2019 and appointed Lieutenant
General (retired) Asim Saleem Bajwa as its first chairperson. However, follow-
ing its return to power in 2022, the PML-N-led government felt that the CPEC
Authority was an obstruction to the smooth implementation of CPEC and has now
dissolved it (Rana, 2022).
Pakistani officials have been promoting a special narrative that links major
CPEC sites and special security arrangements for them with the entire country’s
fate. The first head of SSD, Major General Ahsan Gulrez, visited the Sindh Engro
Coal Mining Company and spoke at length regarding providing “foolproof secu-
rity” to sites like Thar coalfield. He said the people of Thar were “enthusiastic to re-
alise their slogan ‘Thar will change Pakistan’ and he also mentioned how the Thar
coalfield will serve the locals and the energy sector in Pakistan” (Dawn, 2018b). In
Balochistan, military officials have also sought to build local support in favour of
the state’s actions and projects. General Bajwa visited Balochistan in 2017 and said
that CPEC would be successful “when it lifts Balochistan to its rightful place …
Balochistan’s progress is Pakistan’s progress” (Dawn, 2017). However, the main
priority is again security, which in Gwadar was further enhanced by erecting a
fence around it despite strong local opposition (Rana, 2020). This suggests the
primary audience for such measures is Beijing, trying to prove that the Pakistani
side is doing all it can to keep its citizens and projects secure, and aiming to receive
more investment.
The military has been promoting and/or backing the developmental narrative
advanced by the civilian government of Pakistan, while also protecting its own
role in it. In 2017, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) collaborated with
the Federal Chambers of Commerce of Industry in jointly organizing a seminar on
“Interplay of economy and security” in Karachi. CPEC was the key focus of this
seminar as many speakers highlighted how security and economy must go hand
in hand. Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed said, “National security today is a wide-
ranging subject. Leaders across the world understand clearly that security is the
product of an interplay of factors that encompass the political, economic, military,
social, human and environmental facets” (ISPR, 2017). While reporting a meeting
between Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and General Syed Asim Munir, the
current Chief of Army Staff in Pakistan, a press release from the ISPR stated,
Foreign Minister Qin Gang underscored the importance of the longstand-

ing strategic relationship between the brotherly nations and expressed his
satisfaction over the progress made on CPEC while reiterating China’s com-
mitment to its timely completion. He also appreciated Pakistan’s efforts in
maintaining regional peace and stability, especially the support of Pakistan
Armed Forces for provision of security to Chinese Nationals and projects in
Pakistan.
(ISPR, 2023)
In many ways, CPEC is criticized for its actual economic potential. Besides
concerns over it becoming a debt trap, the fruits of CPEC are still out of reach for
Pakistan. Hence, it is often viewed purely as China’s geopolitical project and not
an economic project because Beijing has been tolerating not only the slow pro-
gress in Pakistan but also security challenges. In his book on CPEC and related
narratives, Jeremy Garlick argues, “the progress of CPEC during 2015 and 2020
does not match the image conjured in the public mind by much of the prevailing
media and scholarly coverage – an image which persists as received wisdom due
to constant repetition” (2021: 3). Similar is the case of many claims being made
in relation to the geoeconomic and geostrategic significance of CPEC as will be
examined below.
Geostrategic Security
Since its establishment in 1947, Pakistan faces a security threat stemming from its
rivalry with India. For most periods of its history, Pakistan relied on the West to
meet its security and economic needs but more recently has aligned closely with
China. Mainly because Pakistan was locked into security alliances with the West,
especially the US, China refrained from providing any direct support during Paki-
stan’s two major wars with India in 1965 and 1971 (Basit, 2019). Despite that the
relations in various spheres have grown ever since, especially through cooperation
in security matters, it is important to take that into account to examine CPEC within
the larger geopolitical context.
The two countries have been strategic partners and have collaborated on
security-related matters, including defence, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing,
and military-to-military exchanges. China is a major supplier of defence equip-
ment to Pakistan. The two countries have engaged in defence trade, including the
sale and transfer of military hardware, such as aircraft, submarines, and missile
systems. China is Pakistan’s leading supplier of arms, and this has played a key
role in placing Pakistan among the top ten weapon-importing countries, according
to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2023). China and
Pakistan regularly conduct joint military exercises and training programs. These
exercises aim to enhance interoperability between their armed forces, improve tac-
tical capabilities, and strengthen bilateral military cooperation. Both China and
Pakistan face common challenges related to terrorism and extremism (Basit, 2019).
They have cooperated closely in sharing intelligence, conducting joint operations,
and coordinating efforts to counter terrorist organizations that pose threats to their
respective national security (Boon and Ong, 2021). China and Pakistan have estab-
lished mechanisms for intelligence sharing, particularly in areas related to coun-
terterrorism and regional security. This collaboration aims to enhance situational
awareness, identify emerging threats, and facilitate coordinated responses to secu-
rity challenges. With the development of the Gwadar port as part of CPEC, China
and Pakistan have increased their cooperation in maritime security (Panneersel-
vam, 2017). They have conducted joint naval exercises and coordinated efforts to
safeguard maritime interests and ensure the security of sea routes in the region. As
a result, military relations have come to dominate other aspects of the relationship
and enshrined a prominent role of Pakistan’s military in it (Boon and Ong, 2021).
While many policymakers in China and Pakistan continue to claim that CPEC
is purely an economic project, there is no denying of the fact that it has enhanced
security cooperation between China and Pakistan, and that it has strategic ben-
efits for both (Garlick, 2021). President Xi first talked about this in 2015 that the
two countries “need to align security concerns more closely to strengthen secu-
rity co-operation” (BBC, 2015). Similarly, then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif said during Xi’s visit to Pakistan that “Our cooperation in the security and
economic fields reinforce each other, and they must be advanced simultaneously”
(Houreld, 2015). He further assured Xi that “Pakistan considers China’s security as
important as its own security” (Houreld, 2015). Hence, security in general and se-
curity cooperation between China and Pakistan have been central to their bilateral
exchanges. In a meeting with security officials from China, Federal Minister Ahsan
Iqbal talked about security cooperation: “Pakistan and China will work together
to foil the conspiracies against CPEC” (Qarar, 2017). The two sides have also in-
creasingly been on the same page about security issues abroad such as Afghanistan,
where Pakistan was concerned about India’s increasing influence up until the Tali-
ban’s takeover.
CPEC’s geostrategic significance is also mainly a result of the military’s in-
volvement. Pakistan’s military views CPEC as a strategic game-changer in the
country’s conflict with India – something that has further deteriorated ever since
the rise of Hindu nationalism under the Modi government in 2014. In 2016, then
the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Raheel Sharif, said, “Let me empha-
sise that CPEC is a strategic game-changer not just for Pakistan but for the entire
region. It is destined to bring significant improvement in the lives of millions of
people, besides further promoting mutual interdependence among regional states”
(Khan, 2016). Besides China, Pakistan civil and security officials have also invited
India to join CPEC (Rana, 2017), but India has declined due to the CPEC route go-
ing through the disputed Jammu and Kashmir territory. This does not help Pakistan
in terms of its security dilemma and continued concerns that India is supporting the
insurgency in Balochistan.
Despite its differences with the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan views the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan as a friendly regime. This is also because Pakistan’s
relationships with erstwhile governments were conflictual as they leaned to-
wards India and blamed Pakistan for cross-border terrorism (Constable, 2018).
Pakistan was among the first actors that demanded the US to consider a political
settlement with the Afghan Taliban. Hence, it was fully supportive of any peace
process that involved the Taliban and in fact also hosted Afghan delegations
involving Taliban leaders. Here again, Islamabad saw in Beijing an important
regional partner to gain support for its position on Afghanistan and has sup-
ported Afghan peace dialogues hosted by China. Now that the Taliban are back
in power, China and Pakistan have coordinated their approach, for example by
providing humanitarian aid. The two sides have a shared interest to see a sta-
ble and secure Afghanistan because it is seen as crucial for CPEC’s success
in connecting with the energy-rich Central Asian Republics. Rana argues that
“regional peace with a stable Afghanistan is a prerequisite for [CPEC’s] suc-
cess” (Rana, 2017). This has led to a shift in discourse in Islamabad where now
geoeconomic interests continue to gain prominence, e.g. in Pakistan’s National
Security Policy produced under the PTI government in January 2022 (Leeza,
2022).
As of now, the situation in Afghanistan is dire. While the Taliban have reverted
to their old style of governance, for instance by prohibiting girls’ education and
women’s employment in several fields, the international community faces a di-
lemma. There is still no consensus over recognizing the current Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, and hence no Taliban representation in a UN meeting on Afghanistan
held in Doha in April 2023 (Nichols, 2023). The heavy presence of international
terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, IS-KP, and TTP in Afghanistan has affected Paki-
stan’s security (Ahmed, 2022a). All of this poses a serious challenge for CPEC’s
suggested extension into Afghanistan and the fulfilment of Pakistan and China’s
ultimate dream of connecting the Gwadar Port with energy-rich Central Asia.
Conclusion
When China approached Pakistan to invest under CPEC, it had concerns over
widespread terrorism in the country. Hence, security has been central to bilateral
exchanges ever since. This was also a time when Pakistan was increasingly facing
international and regional isolation due to allegations of state-sponsored terrorism.
Those dynamics played a key role in declining FDIs to Pakistan. Badly in search
of economic partners or investment, Pakistan wholeheartedly accepted CPEC and
provided assurances of securing CPEC project sites and Chinese citizens in the
country. As examined in this chapter, securing the CPEC route and Chinese citi-
zens in Pakistan has not been easy as militant and terrorist groups have been on
the offensive. The BLA has been responsible for major attacks in Balochistan and
Karachi. Now since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, the security situation in
Pakistan is again deteriorating due to major attacks being carried out by TTP and
IS-KP and the government – under pressure from Beijing – aims to further enhance
security.
As Pakistan is responsible for CPEC’s security, there is a requirement of all
provinces having some responsibility. Besides “kinetic” measures, it is impor-
tant to understand how key securitizing actors – in this case both political and
military elites – have securitized CPEC. While not labelling security threats as
existential threats, the securitization has focused on CPEC as a key economic
and geostrategic opportunity for Pakistan. According to this narrative, missing
it would be a disaster for Pakistan’s economic development and geoeconomic
potential. Hence, the PML-N government aggressively acted against any criti-
cism of CPEC, and its leadership even went on to label the critics of CPEC as
the country’s enemies. For its part, the Pakistani military has leveraged its cru-
cial role as a security provider for CPEC into greater influence over the project,
as well as diplomatic influence in Pakistan-China relations. This securitization
has led to significant policy changes and even institutionalization, for instance
through the CPEC Authority, increasing the military’s role in CPEC and enshrin-
ing the dominance of security objectives over other considerations. The securiti-
zation of CPEC has also played an important role in generating domestic support
for CPEC from all major political parties. While the PTI was originally sceptical
of CPEC in opposition, it eventually swung fully behind Chinese investments in
Pakistan. There are some differences in terms of how civil and military institu-
tions have securitized CPEC: While the army has promoted CPEC as a vehicle
for geostrategic security, for example through greater interdependence in South
Asia, the civilian leadership has instead focused on CPEC being crucial to Paki-
stan’s economic security through FDI inflows.
While CPEC’s securitization has galvanized political and military elites in Is-
lamabad and ensured that the project has survived two government turnovers and
significant political instability, the limitations of this approach are visible when
looking towards Pakistan’s periphery. In Balochistan, local grievances against the
state have been aggravated by CPEC projects, most visibly in the case of Gwadar
where China has invested in megaprojects like the Gwadar Port and an interna-
tional airport. As of now, there is little evidence for claims that CPEC is benefiting
marginalized regions of Pakistan, and the security-focused rhetoric used to sell
it has little purchase in a province that has borne the brunt of previous military
efforts.
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6 BRI and Ethno-Regional Conflicts
A Case Study of CPEC in Balochistan
Rafiullah Kakar
Introduction
The multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the
six major land corridors envisaged under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of the
People’s Republic of China. Although bilateral negotiations and correspondence
began in 2013, the formal foundation of CPEC was laid during the visit of the Chi-
nese President to Pakistan in 2015. Aimed at connecting China’s restive Xinjiang
province with the Arabian Sea and Pakistan’s deep sea-port town of Gwadar via
an ambitious network of roads, rail, fiber optics, and special economic zones, the
$46 billion initiative was hailed as a “game changer”(Rehman, 2015) that would
usher in a new era of socio-economic development and prosperity for the region.
Furthermore, it was also hoped that CPEC would uplift Balochistan and develop
Gwadar port into a hub of regional trade.
When the mega economic development initiative was launched, Balochistan
was seen as its most important pillar owing to the province’s strategic location and
natural resource endowments. The province was home to the deep-sea port of Gwa-
dar and offered the shortest physical route for connecting land-locked Central Asia
and the western part of China with the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the province
had a nearly 750 km-long virgin coastline and possessed large reserves of natural
gas, chromite, coal, copper, gold, marble, and other minerals.
The Long-Term Plan (LTP) of CPEC and the Monographic Study on Trans-
port Planning (2014–30), indeed, entailed an elaborate plan for the development
of Balochistan, including the building of Gwadar port, upgrading of the road net-
work from Gwadar to DI Khan and establishment of rail links between Gwadar,
Khuzdar, and Quetta (Transport Planning & Research Institute China et al., 2015).
The Monographic Study, which was conducted jointly by the Governments of Pa-
kistan and China and approved by the apex decision-making body of CPEC, i.e.
the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) in its fifth meeting held in 2015, provided
the road map and list of projects to be completed under the umbrella of CPEC
in the early harvest phase (2014–18), short-term phase (2018–20), medium-term
phase (2021–25), and long-term phase (2026–30). Moreover, CPEC LTP envisaged
investments in trade, coastal tourism, and energy in southern and mineral explora-
tion and ecological conservation in central and northern Balochistan (Ministry of
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-6
94 Rafiullah Kakar
Planning Development & Reforms and National Development & Reform Commis-
sion, 2017).
While CPEC had the potential to promote peace and economic integration
by opening up and connecting the conflict-ridden and underdeveloped districts
of Balochistan with national and international markets (Fazl-e-Haider, 2015),
nearly a decade after the mega economic development initiative was launched,
the potential of CPEC is far from being realized (Ebrahim, 2021; Aamir et al.,
2022; Baloch and Notezai, 2022). Instead, CPEC seems to have exacerbated pre-
existing local discontent and a sense of deprivation. Manifestations of the rising
discontent can be observed in the surge in intensity and frequency of political
protests in Gwadar. The port town witnessed an eruption of massive, unprec-
edented protests in November–December 2021 as tens of thousands of people,
including women and children, marched on the streets for their social and eco-
nomic rights (Nihad, 2021). Dubbed “the Baloch Spring” by Baloch commenta-
tors, the “Gwadar-ko-haq-do” movement demanded the availability of drinking
water and electricity, eviction of big fishing trawlers from the Makran coast,
abolition of unnecessary check posts, and opening of the border with Iran from
Panjgur to Gwadar (Notezai, 2022). In addition to protests, militant attacks on
Chinese personnel as well as Pakistani security apparatus have also risen sharply
in recent years (Baloch, 2022b).
This chapter undertakes an empirical review of the spatial distribution of CPEC
investments and analyzes the systemic factors responsible for the rise in local griev-
ances and discontent against CPEC. The chapter is divided into four main sections.
The first section provides a critical review of the existing literature on domestic
political and security implications of BRI. The second section examines empirical
data on the spatial distribution of CPEC investments in the energy sector, physical
infrastructure, industrial cooperation, and development of Gwadar port. The third
section delves into the systemic reasons behind the growing disenchantment with
CPEC in Balochistan, including the security situation and militarized approach to
development, majoritarian federal model, centralized management of CPEC, and
extractive approach to development. The final section summarizes the key findings
with recommendations for policymakers.
Literature Review
In recent years, the BRI has garnered considerable attention in academic, political,
and media circles. The debate surrounding BRI has largely focused on its geopoliti-
cal, geostrategic, and geo-economic implications (Blanchard and Flint, 2017; Yu,
2017; Rolland, 2017a; Rolland, 2017b). There has been a lack of academic atten-
tion devoted to the ramifications of BRI investments for local political and security
dynamics in recipient countries (Ruwanpura et al., 2020; Abb et al., 2021a). In par-
ticular, since BRI investments are concentrated largely in fragile, conflict-prone,
and multi-ethnic countries (American Enterprise Institute, 2022), it is crucial to
comprehend their potential impact on local political dynamics, especially center-
periphery relations and ethno-regional tensions.
BRI and Ethno-Regional Conflicts 95
Nonetheless, as more BRI projects have been completed, studies have emerged
to assess their local political and economic implications (Laruelle, 2018; Brona,
2020; Lam, 2020; Safdar, 2021) and vice versa (De LT Oliveira et al., 2020; Safdar,
2022). The literature on the consequences of Chinese investments under the BRI
for center-periphery relations and ethno-regional tensions is still emerging and
evolving (Abb et al., 2021 Campbell et al., 2012; Mardon, 2022). Some scholars
argue that the BRI has the potential to promote regional integration and decrease
inequality (Rahman, 2021), while others see it as a new form of colonialism that
perpetuates existing power imbalances (Mazumdar, 2018). Abb et al. (2021) exam-
ined the impact of BRI on conflict settings in four countries and found that while
BRI projects have yielded encouraging results such as improvements in connectiv-
ity, power generation, and industrialization, the uneven distribution of their costs
and benefits has contributed to the exacerbation of existing grievances and ten-
sions. Similarly, studies focusing on BRI investments in Central Asian Republics
have highlighted a deepening of local tensions (International Crisis Group, 2018)
and the emergence of environmental concerns regarding BRI projects (Laruelle,
2018; Yellinek, 2020).
In the case of Pakistan, several studies have investigated how and why the
CPEC has intensified center-province tensions and spatial cleavages (Ahmed,
2018; Hameed, 2018; Boni and Adeney, 2020; Akhter et al., 2022; Abb, 2023).
These studies have rightly alluded to the role of top-down, centralized, and opaque
decision-making processes, securitization, and uneven distribution of benefits in
exacerbating pre-existing tensions and fault lines. However, most of the afore-
mentioned studies lack empirical data from the ground to substantiate the claims
regarding uneven distribution of costs and benefits. This chapter builds on the
center-periphery approach adopted by these studies and aims to examine and an-
alyze it empirically through an in-depth case study of CPEC in the restive and
conflict-affected province of Balochistan. Furthermore, this chapter also explicitly
links the lop-sided distribution of the benefits under CPEC with the design (majori-
tarian) and practice (centralized) of federalism in Pakistan. Lastly, this chapter also
attempts to shed light on the implications of China’s commercially driven approach
for spatial politics in multi-ethnic countries.
An Empirical Review of CPEC in Balochistan

Almost a decade after the announcement of CPEC, the level of investment in Ba-
lochistan remains relatively small, and progress on projects has been sluggish. Ac-
cording to data from June 2022, the total amount invested in Pakistan under the
auspices of CPEC exceeds USD 25 billion (The Express Tribune, 2020; Recorder,
2022), with the energy sector accounting for over 70 percent of this amount. This
investment has already resulted in a national power generation capacity increase
of approximately 6,370 MW (CPEC Authority, October 2022). However, since the
power generated is transmitted and distributed through the national grid, irrespec-
tive of the project location, Balochistan has not benefited from the enhanced energy
generation under CPEC. The national transmission and distribution network has
96 Rafiullah Kakar
limited coverage in Balochistan, which impedes the transfer of increased power

generation to the non-connected areas, including the entire Mekran division in the
south. Furthermore, even the regions of Balochistan that are connected to the na-
tional grid are unlikely to benefit significantly from the enhanced power generation
capacity due to outdated and insufficient transmission and storage capacity.
The investment pattern in the power sector under CPEC, which prioritized power
generation, has led to an amplification of the pre-existing inequality in electricity
access between Balochistan and Pakistan. In 2018–19, the proportion of population
with access to electricity in Balochistan was 75 percent compared to the national
average of 91 percent (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2020). In 2022, Balochistan
generated nearly 10 percent of the total electricity produced in Pakistan (Pakistan
Bureau of Statistics, 2022) but consumed only 4 percent of it (National Electric
Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), 2022). Furthermore, this consumption was
heavily skewed toward agriculture, which accounted for almost 73 percent of the
total consumption in the province (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority
(NEPRA), 2022). If the agriculture sector is excluded, Balochistan only accounts
for 1.16 percent of national electricity consumption.1 The disparity in electricity
consumption between Balochistan and Pakistan has worsened since the implemen-
tation of CPEC, with national per capita consumption (excluding agriculture) being
nearly five times that of Balochistan in 2022, up from four times in 2010–11.2
Aside from energy, the remaining 30 percent of the USD 25 billion invested
under CPEC in Pakistan has been spent on digital and physical infrastructure, with
investments in road and transport sectors making up the bulk of the investment.
Of these, a total of three projects worth USD 183 million had been completed in
Gwadar as of June 2022 (Planning and Development Department, 2022d; Plan-
ning and Development Department, 2022e; Planning and Development Depart-
ment, 2022g). Furthermore, three ongoing projects worth PKR 82.39 billion, out
of which nearly PKR 67.28 billion (USD 523.53 million) is Chinese financing, are
under implementation in Gwadar (Planning and Development Department, 2022f;
Planning and Development Department, 2022h; Planning and Development De-
partment, 2022c). Upon completion of the three ongoing projects, the total Chinese
investment in Gwadar is likely to stand at USD 706 million, which represents only
3 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of the USD 25 billion already-spent and USD
62 billion planned-to-be-spent in Pakistan under the CPEC (for details, please see
Table 6.1). Outside Gwadar, there has been nearly zero Chinese investment in the
road and transport sector in Balochistan.
A review of the official minutes of meetings of the Joint Cooperation Committee
(JCC) and Joint Working Groups indicates that priority was given to upgradation
of existing national transportation arteries passing through the relatively developed
provinces of Pakistan. Furthermore, it also reveals that the idea of constructing
three alignments (eastern, western, and central) was coined for political reasons
to deflect and diffuse pressures from ethno-regional elites. There is no mention of
eastern, western, and central routes in official minutes of JCCs. As far Balochistan
is concerned, three road projects were officially approved in-principle for Chinese
financing at various JCCs, only one of which (Zhob—DI Khan Road, 210 km) was
Table 6.1 Status of CPEC Projects in Balochistan
No Project Names Total Cost Financing

(Chinese Mode
Component)
(USD
Million)
Completed projects (Power Sector)

1. 1,320 MW Coal-Fired Power Plant, Huba 1,912 FDI
Completed projects (Gwadar)
2. Gwadar East Bay Expressway (19 km) 166 Loan
3. Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan 4.08 Grant
4. Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute Gwadar 12.66
182.74
Projects under implementation
5. Development of Gwadar Port and Free Zone 250 FDI
6. New Gwadar International Airport 243 Grant
7. Pak China Friendship Hospital Gwadar 30.53 Grant
523.53
Pipeline projects
8. 300 MW Coal Power Plant Gwadar FDI
9. Solar-Powered Lightening Equipment for Balochistan Grant
10. 1.5 MGD Desalination Power Plant in Gwadar Grant
11. Bostan Special Economic Zone FDI
12. Upgradation of D.I.Khan (Yarik)—Zhob, N-50 (210 km) Loan
13. Nokundi-Mashkel-Panjgur Road (290 km) TBD
14. Construction of Breakwaters TBD
15. Dredging of berthing areas and channels TBD
16. Gwadar Smart Environmental and Sanitation System TBD
and Landfill (CPEC)
17. Gwadar Fish Harbour and Boat-making Industry on TBD
West Bay
18. Fruit and Vegetable Base, Command Area of Mirani Dam TBD
19. Quetta Mass Transit Project TBD
20. 20-bed Burn Unit in Hub TBD
21. Medical Emergency Center in Balochistan TBD
22. Chinese scholarships for students TBD
Source: Planning and Development Department (2022b)
Note
a
The electricity generated under this project is added to and transmitted through the national grid.
part of the so-called western alignment passing through Balochistan. However,

despite the formal approval of these projects by JCC, neither the western route sec-
tion nor the remaining two road projects received the committed Chinese financ-
ing (Syed, 2017; Kakar, 2018). Two of the agreed projects (Besima-Khuzdar road,
110 km; Nokundi-Mashkel road) and remaining sections of the western alignment
(Zhob-Kuchlak section and Kuchlak-Khuzdar section) were eventually taken up
98 Rafiullah Kakar
through the federal Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) in 2019, 2021,
and 2022, respectively (Planning Commission, 2022). As of June 2022, physical
progress on these PSDP-funded projects was very slow. Out of the three sections of
western route, physical work had begun only on the Zhob-Kuchlak section.
The industrial cooperation framework of CPEC too doesn’t offer much hope
for Balochistan, either. Although there are opportunities for private and foreign
investments in the sectors of mining, petrochemicals, fisheries, livestock, corpo-
rate agriculture, and coastal tourism, harnessing these opportunities requires a
competitive business environment and investment-friendly climate. Poor security,
underdeveloped infrastructure, inadequate availability of electricity, weak human
resource base, and fragmented governance framework for investment pose serious
challenges to investment in the province. Of the nine priority special economic
zones (PSEZs) agreed upon under CPEC, one is located in Balochistan, i.e. Bostan.
The basic infrastructure of phase-I has been completed and SEZ status has been as-
signed but the provision of gas, power, and water was incomplete as of June 2022
(Planning and Development Department, 2022a). Resultantly, the Bostan SEZ was
not functional by end of June 2022 with almost negligible prospects of relocation
of Chinese industry in near future.
Although Gwadar-based projects have seen decent progress under CPEC com-
pared to the rest of Balochistan, the so-called crown jewel of CPEC is a long way
from the trade hub vision envisaged for it. The pace of infrastructure development
in the port city remains slow. Business is scarce, making it an “idle port” (Ebrahim,
2021). Incentives such as competitive handling charges, improved security and
safety of cargo at the port, speedy customs clearance, and free storage have failed
to incentivize traders. Although lofty official claims have been made about the in
terest and registration of investors in the Gwadar Free Zone, the actual relocation
of industry in GFZ from within and without Pakistan remains a desire (Ministry
of Planning Development & Special Initiatives, 2021; Planning and Development
Department, 2021a).
The revenue-sharing arrangements of Gwadar port exclude Balochistan. Under
the Concession Agreement signed with the China Overseas Port Holding Company
Limited (COPHCL), the port operating company would retain 91 percent of the
port revenues, whereas the remaining 9 percent of revenues would be transferred
to the federal government (Gwadar Port Authority, 2007). The Concession Agree-
ment also provides for exemption to the port operator from all federal as well as
provincial taxes for 20 years. The Government of Balochistan, however, has been
reluctant to provide the said exemptions to the port company despite pressure from
the federal government and has instead demanded a share in revenues from Gwa-
dar port. The physical connectivity of Gwadar with the hinterland and markets up
north remains limited. Although the western route up north has seen some progress
lately, the Gwadar-hinterland connectivity remains unconducive for major cargo
traffic. Projects about rail connectivity of Gwadar have seen no progress whatso-
ever (Planning and Development Department, 2022c).
The basic social needs of the residents of Gwadar, notably access to electricity
and drinking water, remain unaddressed. The port city remains disconnected from
the national grid. Against a total power demand of nearly 90 MW, Gwadar district
receives barely 15–20 MW power supply on average from Iran, and that too is sus-
ceptible to frequent and abrupt fluctuations and shutdowns (Chief Secretary Balo-
chistan, 2022). A project to extend the national transmission network to the Mekran
region was approved in Federal PSDP in 2019 but that too has seen weak progress.
Work on the much-touted 300 MW coal-fired power plant hadn’t started by June
2022 despite the completion of all procedural formalities (Ministry of Planning
Development & Special Initiatives, 2021).
The current water demand of Gwadar district is estimated to be 7.5–8 MGD,
whereas the available water supply is around 3–3.5 MGD, translating into a short-
fall of 4–4.5 MGD on average (Planning and Development Department, 2021b).
Although the federal and provincial governments have mobilized their resources
to provide clean drinking water to the people of Gwadar, progress remained slow
on the project, which included the laying of pipelines from Swadh and Shadi Kaur
dams to Gwadar city and the installation of a 5 MGD desalination plant (Gwa-
dar Development Authority, 2022). Indeed, work on connecting the dams with the
city was completed in 2021, but long electricity shortages and a rusty, outdated,
and limited water transmission network have meant that even the available water
couldn’t make it to people. Similarly, efforts to harness desalination and reverse
osmosis technology to meet drinking water needs also failed badly, thanks to the
poor technical capacity of government agencies and cumbersome regulatory and
procurement processes to engage competent private or international firms (Plan-
ning and Development Department, 2021b).
The afore-mentioned review of CPEC indicates that the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with CPEC are not uniformly distributed across provinces. The investments
made under the CPEC initiative have largely favored the regions of the country that
are already well-developed, resulting in a lop-sided distribution of benefits. This
uneven allocation of investments has contributed to the belief that the geography
and resources of Balochistan are being utilized primarily for the advantage of Is-
lamabad and Beijing.
Making Sense of the CPEC Fiasco in Balochistan

While CPEC was rejected outright by Baloch separatists as an imperialist agenda
intended to transform Balochistan into a “Chinese colony” (Business Standard,
2018), moderate Baloch nationalists viewed it with suspicion, and pro-Islamabad
Baloch politicians expressed cautious optimism (Baloch, 2014; Baloch, 2015; Ka-
kar, 2016a). However, the centralized and opaque decision-making process for
CPEC and the meager share of investments in the restive province alienated both
Baloch nationalist and centrist politicians alike (Shah, 2018a; Kakar, 2021). The
growing discontent has been evident both in increased violent attacks against Chi-
nese personnel in Balochistan and rising protests in and outside Gwadar. Even the
pro-military and pro-center politicians, mostly tribal chieftains, have started voic-
ing concerns over CPEC. In 2018, the Chief Minister of Balochistan Awami Party
(BAP), a party believed to be created by the military, not only publicly expressed
100 Rafiullah Kakar
concerns about Balochistan’s meager share in CPEC (Shahid, 2018) but also boy-
cotted the meeting of the eighth JCC held in Beijing (Dawn, 2018). This section
aims to explain the underlying systemic factors that have contributed to the in-
creasing disillusionment with CPEC in Balochistan and the lop-sided distribution
of costs and benefits associated with it.
Security Situation and Militarized Approach to Development

Firstly, the fact that the multi-billion-dollar initiative was launched without first
devising a strategy for peaceful management and resolution of ongoing ethnic con-
flicts was an ill-advised move doomed to face major challenges. To elaborate on
this, a brief analytical review of the current insurgency is imperative.
Balochistan has remained a hotbed of ethnic conflict since the creation of Paki-
stan. The province has seen five phases of violence (1948, 1958, 1962–69, 1973–
77, 2006–present) with the latest wave being the most protracted one. The origin
of the current insurgency can be traced back to the early-2000s when the then-
military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, announced the establishment of military
garrisons in the towns of Sui, Kohlu, and Gwadar and the construction of mega-
infrastructure projects across the province, including the development of Gwadar
port and construction of Makran coastal highway and Mirani Dam (Shahid, 2002).
Baloch nationalists, who already harbored strong feelings of resentment over
the centralized control and exploitation of Baloch natural resources by Islamabad,
raised serious reservations over the proposed development projects. The octoge-
narian Baloch tribal and pro-federation political leader, Nawab Bugti, led the Ba-
loch resistance and vowed to resist any move that would deprive the Baloch of
“their motherland and rights” (Dawn, 2003b). Baloch nationalists feared that the
influx of skilled human labor in Gwadar will alter the demographic balance in favor
of non-Baloch groups. Furthermore, they argued that the upgrading of road infra-
structure and establishment of garrisons, respectively, were meant to augment the
extractive and coercive capacity of Islamabad. Both moderate and hardline Baloch
nationalists demanded provincial ownership and control over the management and
revenues of Gwadar port and abandonment of plans to construct new military gar-
risons (Dawn, 2004a). The provincial assembly even adopted a resolution against
the establishment of new cantonments and check posts (Dawn, 2003a).
In absence of genuine participatory and democratic institutions, the political
differences soon escalated into a crackdown, violent clashes, and eventually a
full-blown conflict. Initially, as political pressure built up and protests mounted,
the military regime responded with heavy-handed measures in the form of arrests
of political workers and deployment of military and paramilitary troops. In re-
sponse, the more radical elements within the ranks of Baloch nationalists resorted
to armed attacks to resist what they viewed as mega-projects aimed at colonizing
Balochistan.
To control the escalating crisis and address the Baloch concerns, a special par-
liamentary committee was constituted with the mandate to talk to Baloch leaders,
review the situation in the fractious province, and make recommendations (Dawn,
2004b). The committee consulted Baloch leaders across the political spectrum and
claimed to have held successful negotiations (Dawn, 2005). However, General
Musharraf disregarded the advice of the parliamentary committee (Masood, 2011)
and launched a military operation against Nawab Bugti, which culminated in the
latter’s assassination on August 26, 2006. As if Bugti’s murder was not enough, the
government refused to hand over Bugti’s dead body to his family and did not allow
family members to attend the funeral (BBC, 2006). In the wake of Bugti’s assas-
sination, other Baloch nationalist leadership also faced the wrath of the military re-
gime. In 2007, the leader of the Baloch Liberation Army, Balach Marri, was killed
(Shahid, 2007). Similarly, the former Chief Minister of Balochistan, Sardar Akhtar
Mengal, was incarcerated and charged with treason on frivolous grounds (Cowas-
jee, 2007). Moreover, in the post-Bugti period, the military, baffled by the ensuing
turmoil, allegedly started a systematic campaign of abduction and extra-judicial
killing of Baloch political activists (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009;
Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Musharraf’s interventionist and repressive policies radicalized the Baloch
movement at an unprecedented scale. While Bugti was willing to hold dialogue, the
new, younger, and more educated leaders spurned the idea of coexistence within
a federal framework (Akbar, 2009). The radicalizing impact was not confined to
Baloch hardliners alone, as a grand Jirga of nearly all major Baloch tribes pledged
to take Pakistan to the International Court of Justice over their human rights vio-
lations (Shahid, 2006), and Mengal’s faction of the Balochistan National Party
resigned from provincial and national assemblies and the Senate (Baloch, 2006).
Subsequently, all major Baloch and Pashtun nationalist political parties boycotted
the General Elections held in 2008, hitting a serious blow to the legitimacy of the
democratic dispensation that came into power.
With the restoration of democracy in 2008, the PPP-led government in the
Center made efforts to pacify the conflict in Balochistan through a number of po-
litical and economic measures, including development packages, political amnesty,
and fiscal and political decentralization reforms, and a more equitable horizontal
resource distribution formula (Grare, April 2013). The 18th Constitutional Amend-
ment in particular addressed some of the long-standing concerns of Baloch nation-
alists with regard to provincial autonomy. However, these measures proved too
little too late as both moderate Baloch nationalists and separatists rejected them on
the ground that they failed to address core Baloch concerns with regard to control
over natural resources and civilian oversight and accountability of the military and
other law enforcement agencies (Baloch, 2012; Hassan, 2020). The continuity of
the repressive approach undermined all pacification efforts.
It was against the backdrop of the events described above that the multi-
billion-dollar initiative of CPEC was announced. While the federal govern-
ment was hopeful that CPEC would generate employment opportunities and
benefit the local population, Baloch political parties across the spectrum were
concerned about the project’s political, economic, and strategic arrangements
(Baloch, 2014; The Express Tribune, 2016). Baloch nationalists maintained that
development projects have historically “increased the oppression and isolation
102 Rafiullah Kakar
of the Baloch rather than providing them socio-economic development and in-
tegration” (Baloch, 2016). Furthermore, they saw the expected influx of skilled
human labor as a serious demographic threat (Baloch, 2015; Boone and Baloch,
2016).
Given the long history of Baloch grievance over the centralized exploitation of
their natural wealth and the fact that the development of Gwadar port and other
mega-infrastructure projects through a top-down authoritarian and centralized ap-
proach was the primary driver of the ongoing ethnic insurgency (Kakar, 2020), the
Government of Pakistan ought to have adopted a conflict-sensitive approach to
economic development in Balochistan. However, the approach adopted by Islama-
bad prioritized the achievement of short-term economic gains over the objective of
peacebuilding and inclusive development.
Little meaningful effort was made to either win over the skeptical local popula-
tion and moderate Baloch nationalists or reconcile the hardline Baloch insurgents.
Although an earnest attempt to reconcile Baloch insurgents was initiated in 2013
by the Baloch nationalist Chief Minister Dr. Malik Baloch, these efforts failed for
two reasons. Firstly, the repressive approach to dealing with Baloch discontent
continued and the practice of enforced disappearances went hand in hand with talks
(Dawn, 2014; Kakar, 2019). Secondly, Dr. Malik had little leeway and freedom to
negotiate and make credible commitments or offer substantial concessions (Baloch
DAM, 2022a). Confidence-building measures that could have earned the trust of
the Baloch insurgents and demonstrated the seriousness of the government were
not taken. Despite these limitations, Dr. Malik made some headway as the two ex-
iled pro-independence Baloch leaders, the Khan of Kalat and Brahumdagh Bugti,
indicated a willingness to return to Pakistan (Dawn, 2015; Baloch DAM, 2022a).
However, the talks were abandoned as soon as Dr. Malik was replaced as the Chief
Minister in 2015. The reluctance to take meaningful confidence-building measures
(CBMs) and the abrupt termination of dialogue proved that the military, which had
the real authority, was not keen to pursue dialogue.
Thus, instead of opting for an inclusive, participatory, and conflict-sensitive
approach, the government followed a militarized approach to implement CPEC
projects amidst an ongoing insurgency. A Special Security Division, comprising
nine army battalions and six civil wings, was raised to secure CPEC projects and
Chinese nationals working in these projects across the country (The Express Trib-
une, 2017). Dozens of check posts were established at the entry and exit points
and within Gwadar town, resulting in restrictions on the movement of people,
especially fisherfolk, and a rise in harassment incidents. Surveillance within and
outside Gwadar town has increased (International Crisis Group, 2018). Further-
more, the military assumed a greater role not only in security matters but also in
the overall administration of Gwadar, which created issues of legitimacy and local
ownership. This was evident when the fencing of Gwadar was reportedly started
by the local military leadership without the prior consent of the civilian adminis-
tration and elected representatives (Senior Official of Government of Balochistan,
2021). The plan had to be shelved immediately owing to immense public pressure
(Zulfikar, 2020).
Enhanced militarization not only increased the cost of doing business but also
put off potential investors for whose safety the measures were originally intended.
The stringent security measures also harmed local livelihoods by placing restric-
tions on the movement of fishermen and curtailing centuries-old informal trade
along the border with Iran (Aamir et al., 2022). Informal trade and fisheries have
remained the backbone of the local economy. It was no surprise that the elimination
of check posts, which made “locals feel like outsiders in their own homes,” and the
opening of border trade were among the core demands of the “Gwadar Ko Haq Do”
movement (Notezai, 2022).
In addition to enhanced securitization in Gwadar, the authoritarian approach
to managing politics in the province also continued, which deepened the crisis of
legitimacy of state institutions. The province became a battleground for the civil-
military rivalry in the Center, which intensified after the disqualification of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif in the Panama Papers case. In 2017, the PML-N Chief Min-
ister in Balochistan resigned due to an orchestrated no-confidence motion (Shah,
2018b). Furthermore, in the run-up to the General Elections 2018, the military al-
legedly orchestrated the establishment of the BAP by cobbling together dissidents
of PML-N and various electables (Hashim, 2018) and oversaw the victory of BAP
in the 2018 General elections, which were tainted by allegations of unprecedented
vote-rigging (Aamir, 2018).
While the enhanced securitization and heavy-handedness fed into the concerns
of Baloch insurgents, the increased political engineering alienated the moderate
Baloch nationalists, thus engendering a serious crisis of legitimacy of representa-
tive democracy. The military’s continued dominance and authoritarianism resulted
in the alienation of Baloch stakeholders across the political spectrum and the de-
legitimization of non-violent parliamentary politics. Moderate Baloch national-
ists faced criticism from both within their party cadres and outside for failing to
protect core Baloch interests through participation in what was perceived as inef-
fective parliamentary politics. The narrative of Baloch hardliners, who had long
questioned the utility of participation in parliamentary politics, gained traction,
especially among Baloch youth. As a result, both Baloch insurgents and new lead-
ers emerging through organic social movements became beneficiaries of growing
disillusionment with parliamentary politics and existing political parties. This ulti-
mately led to a resurgence of protests and violent attacks targeting both Pakistani
and Chinese personnel.
Majoritarian Federal Model and the Centralized Management of CPEC
The decision-making processes and mechanisms surrounding CPEC were central-

ized and opaque. To begin with, many CPEC-related issues, including electricity
provision, port- and railway-building, national planning and economic coordina-
tion, and management of public debt, fell under the purview of the Federal Legisla-
tive List II, over which the Council of Common Interests (CCI) had the mandate
to formulate policies. However, the CPEC plan, projects, and agreements were
never presented to the CCI nor were they endorsed or approved by it.3 Instead, a
104 Rafiullah Kakar
centralized governing mechanism was established, consisting of the Joint Coopera-

tion Committee (JCC) as the apex decision-making body, headed by the Federal
Planning Minister, and several attached thematic Joint Working Groups, headed by
concerned federal secretaries, none of which reported to the CCI.
The centralized management of CPEC violated the constitutional scheme of
division of powers and was yet another instance of Islamabad’s disregard for the
rights of smaller provinces. Such disregard has historically been enabled by the ma-
joritarian design of Pakistan’s federal model and the severe under-representation of
the Baloch in the civil and military bureaucracy. With the Punjab alone accounting
for over half of the seats in the National Assembly, Pakistan’s federal structure
makes the Punjab and Balochistan, respectively, the most and least rewarding po-
litical constituencies for political parties aspiring to come into power at the federal
level. The chronic under-representation of the Baloch in the bureaucracy and mili-
tary exacerbates this situation, which extends to the judiciary and media as well.
Consequently, country-wide political parties, civil society, media, and the superior
judiciary have little incentive to address Baloch concerns, and Islamabad overlooks
Balochistan’s interests and preferences without accountability.
The majoritarian federal design and under-representation of the Baloch in power
structures have remained the most enduring institutional enablers of Balochistan’s
marginalized position within Pakistan (Kakar, 2020), enabling re-centralization of
powers and leaving the protection of provincial rights at the discretion of the civil-
ian and bureaucratic elites in Islamabad. In rare cases when the civilian elites in
Islamabad make political concessions to smaller provinces like Balochistan, such
concessions are often resisted and sometimes effectively reversed by the military
or federal bureaucracy. The latter has generated a history of broken and unfulfilled
promises that has eroded Baloch trust in the political system as well as the Consti-
tution of Pakistan as the guarantor of provincial autonomy and civic rights.
Two cases of disputes, one over the ownership of Gwadar port, and one over the
construction of the so-called western alignment of CPEC, are illustrative of how
the majoritarian federal design has enabled pursuit of lop-sided policies vis-à-vis
Balochistan.
Regarding the first, control over the management of Gwadar port has been a
long-standing demand of the Baloch people. This demand has partially been rec-
ognized and conceded by the civilian elites’ multiple times but has never been
implemented. As explained in the background section, in 2004, the then-Prime
Minister of Pakistan constituted a Parliamentary Committee to make recommen-
dations for resolving the Baloch concerns. One of the recommendations of the
Committee was that the Chairman of Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) should be from
Balochistan and that 50 percent representation on the GPA board should be given
to Balochistan (Senate of Pakistan, November 2005). However, this recommenda-
tion was not implemented. In 2007, the operation and management of Gwadar port
were handed over to the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) for 40 years. However,
within a couple of years, the newly elected provincial and federal governments be-
gan to harbor reservations over the performance of the PSA (Dawn, 2010). Govern-
ment officials maintained that the company had not invested in port infrastructure
despite an agreement to invest $525 million over five years (The Express Tribune,
2011). The then-Chief Minister of Balochistan, Nawab Aslam Raisani, approached
the Supreme Court to seek the cancellation of the agreement. “It’s a one-sided
agreement. It’s our land. It’s our port and we should run it” (Recorder, 2010), said
Raisani. In December 2009, as per the commitment made in the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-
e-Balochistan package, the Federal Cabinet approved a bill that would give Balo-
chistan 50 percent representation on the GPA board and make the Chief Minister
of Balochistan its chairman (Dawn, 2009). However, the bill was never presented
in Parliament.
In early 2011, it was revealed that the Pakistani government had requested the
Chinese government to take over operations at Gwadar port. The Chinese side
acceded to the request. Chief Minister of Balochistan, Raisani, was appalled by
the federal government’s decision without his consent and warned that the peo-
ple of Balochistan would not “accept such arbitrary decisions” (The Express Trib-
une, 2011). In February 2013, the concession rights of Gwadar port were formally
transferred to the COPHCL, barely a month after the elected provincial govern-
ment headed by Raisani was dismissed and governor rule had been imposed in the
province (Raza, 2013). Raisani and other provincial lawmakers insisted that he
was victimized for his defiant stance on Gwadar port and another gold and copper
mining project in Reko Diq, and that the governor rule was meant to pave the way
for handing over control of Gwadar port to the Chinese (Dawn 2013; Shah, 2013).
Baloch political parties across the ideological spectrum opposed the award of the
Gwadar port agreement to COPHCL through a non-transparent process and with-
out the approval of CCI and prior consent of the elected government of Balochistan
(Butt, 2013).
Similarly, during the preparation of the 18th Constitutional Amendment Bill, the
Baloch members demanded the handing over of Gwadar port to Balochistan. The
Chair of the Committee gave written assurance that the control of the port would be
transferred to Balochistan through a separate legislation, which led to the signing
of the bill by the Baloch members (Baloch DAM, 2022a). However, the then-ruling
party did not keep this promise once the Amendment Bill was adopted.
When the moderate Baloch nationalists came into power in 2013, they con-
tinued the efforts of their predecessors to gain control over the management of
Gwadar port. Upon assuming power, Dr. Malik formally raised at CCI the demand
for constituting a board of governors for GPA under the Chairmanship of Chief
Minister Balochistan (Kiani, 2014). In the CCI meeting held on May 29, 2014, it
was decided that 50 percent membership on the board of governors of GPA will be
given to the Government of Balochistan and that the GPA chairman will be nomi-
nated by the Chief Minister of Balochistan (Inter Provincial Coordination Division,
2014). Despite the decision of CCI, the GPA Act was never amended. Up to April
2022, there were only two official members from Balochistan on the board of GPA.
The GPA chairman, however, has since been appointed on the recommendation of
the Government of Balochistan.
A second, even more prominent center-periphery dispute arose over the orien-
tation of CPEC’s connectivity design. A review of CPEC investments in physical
106 Rafiullah Kakar
infrastructure indicates that priority was given to upgrading existing national trans-
portation arteries passing through relatively developed regions of Pakistan. As far
Balochistan is concerned, the initial plan was to construct a motorway from Islama-
bad to Karachi and link it with Gwadar port through the Makran Coastal Highway,
which would have bypassed over 95 percent of the province’s population (Ministry
of Planning DR, 2013). The route became a bone of contention in early 2015 when
lawmakers from smaller provinces accused the PML-N of changing the route of the
economic corridor from one through Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to one
in Punjab. Given the opacity of information, the controversy soon transformed into
a deadlock, with the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists accusing the federal govern-
ment of turning CPEC into a “China Punjab Economic Corridor” (Raza, 2015) and
threatening to resist it like “Kalabagh Dam” (Baloch, 2016). Subsequently, both the
KP and Balochistan provincial assemblies passed resolutions against the alleged
change in the route. They emphasized that CPEC must prioritize the development
and uplift of underdeveloped provinces. The Chief Minister of Balochistan openly
admitted his disappointment for not being taken into confidence on decisions re-
lated to CPEC (Shah, 2015). In order to diffuse the mounting political pressure, the
federal government coined the idea of construction of three routes and pledged in
an All Parties Conference held in May 2015 that the western route passing through
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces will be built on a priority basis
(Haider, 2015). However, this promise was never fulfilled in letter and spirit and
thus the controversy persisted (Raza, 2016b).
In 2018, the newly elected provincial government of Balochistan took stock of
progress on CPEC projects and was left “shell-shocked” at the discovery of their
province’s meager share in CPEC and the fact that no progress had been made
on projects outside Gwadar (Husain, 2018). Chief Minister Jam Kamal met the
Chinese envoy (Zafar, 2018b) to stress the need for the implementation of CPEC
projects in the restive province but the meeting didn’t bear fruit, reportedly (Sen-
ior Official of Government of Balochistan, 2021). Consequently, CM Balochistan
boycotted the eighth meeting of the JCC held in China in December 2018 (Dawn,
2018). The Balochistan Assembly also unanimously adopted a resolution demand-
ing that the federal government form a national commission to look into the unfair
distribution of CPEC share for the province (Zafar, 2018a).
The centralized and non-participatory approach to development was admin-
istered even more pronouncedly at the micro-level. Given that displacement of
fishermen and their livelihoods and degradation of the environment were almost
intrinsic to port development and connectivity work, an inclusive resettlement and
social development framework should have been an integral part of the strategy
for developing Gwadar port. However, in reality, the concerns of the fishermen of
Gwadar were not given due consideration at the planning and design stage. Instead,
a reactive and piecemeal approach in response to their concerns was adopted. Ac-
tions were typically taken only to diffuse mounting pressure generated by pro-
tests of fishermen. In the early 2000s, the old fishing neighborhoods located in the
southeast of the city—Mullah Band—were relocated to another location to vacate
space for the port. The new settlement lacked basic amenities and services such
as drinking water, schools, electricity, and healthcare facilities (Notezai, 2017).

Although the fishermen were compensated monetarily for their homes, many poor
fishermen fell prey to the speculative real estate market and sold their plots of land.
When the Chinese took over the port, the initial physical work was undertaken
within its four walls. Under the umbrella of CPEC, the first major infrastructure
project outside the port area was the construction of the Gwadar East Bay Express-
way—a 19-km six-lane expressway that provides a direct link for cargo traffic to
and from Gwadar port and connects it to the Makran Coastal Highway (Planning
and Development Department, 2022d). The road runs along the East Bay coastline
for 4.3 km—an area where most of the fisherfolk population lives and where the
majority of fishing takes place. Construction of the road, thus, effectively meant a
blockade of access to the coastline for fishing boats (Suleman, 2018). Furthermore,
the road was constructed by dewatering the coastline and building a cofferdam,
which resulted in redirecting the water current to Sur Bander fishing village, sub-
jecting it to increased land erosion (Suleman, 2018).
Within a year of the commencement of construction work in 2017, protests
erupted. The fishermen demanded the construction of three 200-ft wide under-
passes to ensure sea access to the three main fishing settlements situated along
the coast, a breakwater to allow for safe berthing of boats, an auction hall to sell
fish, and protection at Sur Bander to avoid more land erosion. The provincial and
federal governments eventually acceded to some of the demands of the fishermen
and altered the design of the East Bay Expressway to include three bridges and a
breakwater (Planning and Development Department, 2022d).
Extractive Approach to Development
In a polity where the federal design is majoritarian and the ethnic composition
of the core bureaucratic organizations is skewed in favor of the dominant ethnic
groups, the centralized management of Gwadar port and CPEC translated into a
development strategy that seeks to extract Balochistan’s natural resources for the
benefit of Islamabad and exploit the province’s strategic location for securing geo-
political rents. This extractive approach has led to the prioritization, and protection,
of the political and economic interests of Islamabad and foreign investors at the
cost of rights, preferences, and concerns of local communities. Furthermore, it has
also led to a lack of transparency and a disregard for considerations about income,
gender, and regional equality, or environmental sustainability.
Given that CPEC investments consisted predominantly of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and loans, Islamabad prioritized the redressal of the country’s severe
power crisis and the upgrading of road and rail infrastructure in the more developed
regions in the hope to reap quick dividends. The stated objective of Islamabad was
to prioritize projects that could trigger positive economic growth. The implications
of CPEC investments for vertical and horizontal equality were not a major concern
of Islamabad (Kakar, 2016b). Consequently, the policy and financial focus was
squarely on large infrastructure (energy and communication) projects in the rela-
tively developed parts of the country. This infrastructure-heavy, efficiency-centric
108 Rafiullah Kakar
approach also aligned greatly with the political interests of the then-ruling party
PML-N, whose support base was concentrated mainly in the relatively developed
regions and industrial centers. The PML-N’s claim to pursue an efficiency-centric
economic approach to CPEC was slightly disingenuous given that they were inter-
ested more in facilitating and appeasing their core constituency.
In the case of CPEC, Islamabad’s extractive and non-transparent approach
converged with Beijing’s infrastructure-heavy, commercial approach to invest-
ments under CPEC. The commercially driven Chinese investment strategy un-
der CPEC inevitably had implications for domestic political economy and spatial
development.
Review of official documents and conversations with government officials
involved in the management of CPEC projects reveal that Beijing has shown a
reluctance to tailor the overarching CPEC strategy to the needs and realities of
regional and local socio-political context. This is evident in the manner in which
the Chinese side has managed the growing discontent with regard to CPEC arising
out of the restive province of Balochistan. For example, in the wake of the political
controversy around the so-called western route of CPEC, the Pakistani side en-
sured the approval of at least two Balochistan-based road projects through the JCC
forum. However, notwithstanding the discontent in smaller provinces, the political
commitment made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the APC, and the fact that
the said projects were already approved by JCC, the Chinese side unilaterally with-
drew financing commitment for these projects in 2017 (Syed, 2017). Similarly, in
2019, when the pro-center politician and Chief Minister of Balochistan, Jam Ka-
mal, met the then-Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan to stress the importance of pri-
oritizing and implementing infrastructure and livelihoods projects in Balochistan,
the Chinese Ambassador reportedly gave a cold response and didn’t offer any hope
(Senior Official of Government of Balochistan, 2021).
Furthermore, a critical review of CPEC decision-making processes over time
reveals that the Chinese have prioritized power and physical infrastructure pro-
jects in the relatively peaceful and developed regions of the country and ignored
infrastructure projects aimed at improving hinterland connectivity of Gwadar. The
key reason for the Chinese lack of interest in financing and building infrastructure
projects in Balochistan is the volatile and poor security situation. Since the award
of contracts to Chinese firms is a near non-negotiable condition of Chinese loans
(Senior Official of Government of Balochistan, 2021), infrastructure projects that
fall in high-risk security zones don’t suit their interests and, therefore, often get
rejected. The lack of Chinese interest in improving the hinterland connectivity of
Gwadar also indicates that, contrary to popular perception, China doesn’t appear
to have any plans for routing some of its external trade and energy imports through
Gwadar in the short and medium term. Instead, Gwadar is more likely to be used as
a port of exit for minerals from Balochistan and Afghanistan and as an entrepot for
wider trade in the greater Indian Ocean zone. Furthermore, the Chinese investment
prioritization practices under CPEC also provide insights into Chinese motivations.
They validate the argument made by a number of scholars that the off-loading
of over-accumulated capital and excess industrial capacity in infrastructure-heavy
sectors is among the primary motivations behind the BRI (Summers, 2016; Nugent
and Lu, 2021).
While the Chinese may have valid reasons for their reluctance to provide finan-
cial loans for physical infrastructure projects in Balochistan, their failure to con-
sider the local socio-political context and the regional equity implications of their
investments has fueled local resentment and skepticism. Based on the preceding
paragraphs, it is reasonable to argue that the Chinese approach to CPEC invest-
ments is “conflict-blind.” This approach lacks the necessary flexibility in fragile
and conflict-affected contexts, where investments in commercially unattractive ser-
vice delivery projects might be necessary to promote a soft image of China among
local communities. At present, China’s soft power strategy merely involves the
provision of limited equipment to local communities and superficial engagement
with representatives of ethno-regional political parties, the business community,
and the media (Senior Official of Government of Balochistan, 2021). China’s re-
luctance to invest in the socio-economic development of local communities and its
heavy reliance on commercial considerations has resulted in missed opportunities
to build soft power. Instead of transitioning to a people-centered soft power strategy
to complement the commercially driven investment approach, China has recently
attempted to reach out directly to Baloch nationalists and separatists, bypassing Pa-
kistani authorities (Baloch, 2014, 2022b; Stacey, 2018). While these efforts haven’t
succeeded much, they indicate both the growing frustration of Chinese and their
willingness to play a more proactive role in the domestic matters of host countries,
which runs counter to their traditional policy of non-interference. China has also
sponsored exposure visits for local politicians and representatives of civil society.
However, these visits alone have rarely translated into the beneficiaries’ becoming
advocates for Chinese interests in Balochistan.
Conclusion
The in-depth case study of CPEC in Balochistan indicates that it has exacerbated
pre-existing horizontal inequalities and ethno-regional tensions, which have since
manifested in a surge in intensity and frequency of protests and violence target-
ing CPEC projects. The primary explanation for the adverse domestic implications
of CPEC is the conflict-insensitive and militarized approach underpinning it and
the uneven distribution of costs and benefits associated with it. CPEC’s milita-
rized security regime has harmed the dignity and livelihoods of local fishermen,
delegitimized the project in the eyes of many Baloch, and discouraged potential
investment for which these measures were originally intended. Similarly, empirical
data reveals that the investments made under CPEC largely favored the already-
developed regions of the country, thus reinforcing the perception that the geogra-
phy and resources of Balochistan are being utilized for the advantage of Islamabad
and Beijing.
The lop-sided distribution of costs and benefits is facilitated largely by the cen-
tralized management of CPEC, Pakistan’s majoritarian federal model, and China’s
commercially driven and extractive approach to investments under CPEC. The
110 Rafiullah Kakar
critical review of disputes over the ownership of Gwadar port, prioritization of

the so-called western alignment, and construction of East Bay Expressway viv-
idly illustrates the dangers posed by Pakistan’s majoritarian federal design and
centralized approach to development. Federal majoritarianism combined with
under-representation of the Baloch in the civil and military bureaucracy has led
to poor compliance with constitutional provisions and weak commitments to the
socio-economic and political rights of smaller provinces. The situation has been
compounded by China’s conflict-insensitive and commercially driven approach to
investments under CPEC. This case study has lessons for China’s overall approach
to the BRI, especially given that an overwhelming number of BRI projects are
concentrated in similarly multi-ethnic countries with a history of ethno-regional
tensions and conflicts. China’s approach in Balochistan not only provides insights
into Chinese motivations but also highlights how and why Chinese companies op-
erating in conflict-affected zones might inadvertently end up exacerbating local
grievances and conflict fault lines.
Notes
1 Author’s calculation based on date of NEPRA’s report (National Electric Power Regula-
tory Authority (NEPRA), 2022).
2 Author’s calculation based on date of NEPRA’s report (National Electric Power Regula-
tory Authority (NEPRA), 2022) and (Bank 2014).
3 Author’s review of minutes of CCI from 2014 to 2018.
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7 China-Pakistan Relations, Gender
and the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor
Eram Ashraf
Introduction
In March 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan launched their 70 years of friendship celebrations (Hussain, 2021). Pa-
kistan’s Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi wrote about them
as that “iron brothers” who had stood together even in the most difficult of times
(2021). It appears China’s friendship, touted by former President of Pakistan, Zulfi-
kar Ali Bhutto, as “higher than the Karakorams and deeper than the oceans,” (Azfar,
1974) is tilted more toward Pakistani men, making invisible Pakistani women in
those relations.
A gender lens, “asking ‘where are the women?’” (Enloe, 2014: 6), is utilized for
the first time in this chapter to study China-Pakistan relations in the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) era (2013–2023). As such, the chapter draws on the au-
thor’s novel dataset of Chinese awards given to 176 Pakistani citizens during this
period. This data reveals that Chinese entities appear to recognize and reward the
work efforts of Pakistani men more than women. Amongst the various Chinese
awards, two are CPEC specific, which this chapter will focus on.1 They are the CPEC
“communication golden anchor” award (The News International, 2018) and the “out-
standing Pakistani employee” of CPEC projects award (National Development and
Reform Commission People’s Republic China, 2022). A total of 99 Pakistanis have
received these two CPEC awards out of whom only four have been Pakistani women,
namely, Numra Asif, Rizwana Ghani, Shakeela Kosar and Saima Nawaz.
These findings stand in contrast to the message China’s President Xi Jinping
had delivered in his United Nations (UN) address, on the 25th anniversary of the
Beijing Declaration on women’s rights. He had said,
We need to remove barriers and create an enabling environment in which

women are motivated, their creativity is unleashed to the full, and they truly
feel satisfied, happy and secure. We need to fully leverage the role of the
government and mobilize all stakeholders to support women and help them
live their lives to the full.
(Embassy of the People’s Republic of China
in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2020)
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-7
116 Eram Ashraf
There are examples suggesting that China does recognize and reward the
work of foreign women, such as Maryam Salim from Tanzania (Mengzhen and
Li, 2019), Galina Kulikova of Russia, United Kingdom’s Dr Juliette Ann Mac-
Donald (Xinran, 2020) and United Arab Emirates’ Dr Nawal Al Kaabi (Zawya,
2022). Yet, in the case of China’s “all-weather strategic cooperative” partner,
as reiterated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 2021), recognition of Pakistani women in CPEC appears
negligible.
This chapter is based on primary and secondary data using open, online sources
in English, as it is the common language used by people from both countries for
communications with each other. The time period chosen for analysis began in
2013, in acknowledgement of Premier Li Keqiang’s first mention of CPEC as part
of their larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan (Dawn, 2013). As CPEC com-
pleted ten years in 2023, the early part of this year was also included. Online me-
dia sources such as newspapers in English, especially from Pakistan and China,
were searched to select those which mentioned Pakistani citizens receiving awards
from Chinese entities. In some cases, names were cross-checked, with other media
sources, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. For example, the 2020 CPEC
award winners detailed in The News International were cross-checked with a video
report of the event by FM 98 Dosti Channel on its YouTube channel. Launched
in 2016, it is a Pakistan-based, joint venture radio station between China Radio
International (CRI) and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) (Jabri, 2016).
Official government websites of both countries were also searched to see if they
could confirm media reports, such as that of Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(2020). Discourse analysis, for the first time, was conducted on official speeches to
understand the origin of the phrase iron brothers.
The chapter begins with a critical engagement of China-Pakistan relations liter-
ature, claiming that it suffers from the same inertia on gender, which feminists had
identified in early international relations (IR) literature (Tickner and True, 2018:
221). The use of the phrase iron brothers, to describe China-Pakistan relations,
is considered next for the first-time discourse analysis on published speeches and
writings of government officials in both countries. With CPEC completing its first
ten years, the chapter proceeds with data on Chinese awards given to Pakistani citi-
zens between 2013 and 2023. These reveal an overwhelming number of Pakistani
male winners compared to Pakistani women. In the absence of gender differentials
in official CPEC employment numbers, this data exposes CPEC’s limited benefit
for working women in Pakistan. Much work is needed in the next phase of CPEC to
support President Xi Jinping’s call for governments to do more for gender equality
in workspaces.
China-Pakistan Relations: A Feminist Perspective

The literature on China-Pakistan relations has historically overlooked gender, ow-
ing perhaps to the fact the writers were male with a focus on foreign policy and
state leaders. In this regard, it reflects the gender bias feminists had found in early
China-Pakistan Relations, Gender and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor 117
IR studies. The discipline, as Valery Spike Peterson (2004: 36) had explained, was
connected to public sphere activities, such as power politics and foreign policy.
These had been defined as androcentric or male as the norm because IR had been
dominated by elite, Anglo-European male practitioners, and their experiences.
Hence, for Cynthia Enloe (2014: 3), to make feminist sense of international politics
meant “to follow diverse women to places that are usually dismissed by conven-
tional foreign affairs experts as merely ‘private,’ ‘domestic,’ ‘local’ or ‘trivial’.”
Feminist research in IR meant unearthing stories of women whom experts reject
because they are not thought important to international affairs.
One of the early writers on China-Pakistan relations, Hafeez Khan (1961: 218)
had written about Pakistan’s desire to reduce tensions with China, after changing
their Cold War policy of nonalignment. He explained how in May 1954, Pakistan
had agreed to take United States’ (US) military aid and by September joined the
US-led military alliance, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), de-
spite China’s vocal concerns that it was an aggressive pact against them. In the
same article, however, he referred to the October 1954 China trip by a Pakistani
women delegation, three weeks after the signing of SEATO, as “cultural inter-
course” (221). He completely trivialized the importance of the China visit, given
it was the first official delegation from Pakistan led by an elected politician Be-
gum Jahanara Shahnawaz (1971: 287) (Dawn 1954: 258). Anwar Syed, who wrote
the first comprehensive book on China-Pakistan relations, wrongly assumed that
the visit took place a year later than it had (1974: 63–64). William Barnds (1975:
468–469) failed to even mention the visit when writing about China-Pakistan re-
lations and SEATO. Recent works on both country’s relations, written mostly by
male writers, are also depleted of gender, perhaps owing to the limited historical
information available.
The launch of China’s transregional economic development programme, the
BRI, and its chosen flagship the CPEC, led to growing interest in China-Pakistan
relations, resulting in new publications. For example, Andrew Small’s The China-
Pakistan Axis (2015) provided an overview of the resilience of this relationship;
initially India focused, but gradually incorporated, other issues such as the Global
War on Terror and CPEC. Ghulam Ali’s China-Pakistan Relations (2017: 4) fore-
grounded their relations in geographical proximity and common national inter-
ests, not entirely India-centric. Similarly, Filippo Boni’s Sino-Pakistani Relations
(2019: 2) considered the evolution of China-Pakistan relations, arguing its ultimate
stability lies with Pakistan’s military. What happens in CPEC, according to him,
will indicate wider regional trends amongst other beneficiaries of China. However,
his analytical framework, while revealing a broad-based political consensus within
Pakistan on good relations with China, did not include gender differentials.
The omission of gender in the story of China-Pakistan relations lends to the
idea that perhaps women were irrelevant as they were not seen in leadership roles
when the truth was anything but. It has led to assumptions, even amongst Paki-
stan’s academia,2 about their existence in those relations, hence questioning their
relevancy. Writing about women’s role in diplomacy, Cynthia Enloe (2014: 178)
explained how governments had relied on the role of wives in their conduct of IR.
118 Eram Ashraf
Over the years, she says, governments may have changed their marriage policies,
such as on women joining the foreign services, but ultimately their role as wives
has been about helping governments achieve their political and economic goals.
The same can be seen in the early years of China-Pakistan relations, as many in the
Pakistan women’s delegation to China were also wives and daughters of prominent
Pakistani leaders in government, as discussed in the next section.
The Role of Women in China-Pakistan Relations
In September 1954, the All-China Women’s Federation had invited the feminist,
provincial legislator from Punjab, Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz and six other promi-
nent women activists from Pakistan, including the daughter of Pakistan’s Governor
General at the time, Begum Husain Malik (1954: 171). They were invited to attend
the World Conference of Women in Beijing and to participate in the country’s fifth
First October Revolution Day celebration (UPP, 1954). According to both ladies’
accounts, once in Beijing, their group had been granted a special audience with
China’s Premier Zhou Enlai (Shahnawaz: 289). For more than 3 hours, important
topics of the time were discussed between Begum Shahnawaz, leader of the delega-
tion, and the Premier. Given in May 1954, Pakistan had agreed to US military aid
and by early September had joined SEATO (UPA, Reuters and AFP, 1954: 8) it is
not difficult to imagine what important topics of the time could have been discussed
between them. This was the same trip which Khan (1961: 221) had referred to in his
article as cultural intercourse while Syed in his book (1974: 63) had timed it wrong,
missing its possible connection to SEATO and China-Pakistan security relations.
This was despite media coverage given to the women’s delegation in Pakistan and
the publication of Begum Shahnawaz’s autobiography three years before Syed’s
own book (Dawn, 1954: 7). It is telling of how protective Pakistan is when it comes
to its relations with China that both women had refrained from providing any detail
of their discussion with the Premier, in their speeches and writing.
Following the trip, China sent their Minister of Health, Madame Li Teh-Chuan
(475–479), to visit Pakistan in 1955. She spoke on women’s rights and how they
were being addressed in the new republic. In January 1956, Pakistan received its first
high official visitor from China, Vice President Madam Soong Ching-ling, the wife
of Dr Sun Yat-Sen. During her visit, she used the medium of radio to deliver a mes-
sage of friendship and goodwill from China to the people of Pakistan (Syed, 1974:
65). It was her belief that despite having two different social and political systems,
friendly and cooperative relations between China and Pakistan was a real possibility.
In September 1959, the Chinese government invited the imminent Pakistani
politician and Ambassador to the US, MAH Ispahani (1960: 2) and his wife, as
guests to the PRC’s tenth-year celebrations. In his memoir, Ispahani had written
(53) how during his trip he was unofficially briefed by the Chinese regarding what
they considered Pakistan’s unfriendly behavior. They were unhappy that despite
having warned Pakistan against any kind of acknowledgement for the in-transit
Taiwanese Hajis while they were in Pakistan, they had been invited to Pakistan’s
foreign office. The couple’s visit helps highlight Enloe’s point about governments
using diplomats’ wives in the conduct of their IR. In inviting Mrs Ispahani, China
was able to get across its message of displeasure at Pakistan’s actions, in a family-
friendly atmosphere, without warranting unwanted international attention. The in-
cident highlights China-Pakistan “lukewarm” relations in the early years, given
China’s good relations with India and Pakistan’s close relations with the US during
the Cold War era (Boni, 2019: 29).
It was only after China’s war with India in 1962 and the 1963 border agreement
with Pakistan that relations between both countries appeared relatively stable (Ali,
2017: 42). As such, the early exchange visits by female politicians such as Begum
Shahnawaz, Madame The-Chuan and Madam Ling deserve recognition. At a time
when politicians of both countries were wary of each other, they helped to improve re-
lations by enabling communication whilst acknowledging both country’s differences.
The tradition of using wives in the conduct of China-Pakistan relations, con-
tinued in the 1970s with Mrs Nusrat Bhutto, wife of Pakistan’s President at the
time Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He changed Pakistan’s foreign policy toward bilateral-
ism and closer ties with China (Burke and Ziring, 1990: 416) and was rewarded
when in August 1972 China used its veto for the first time in the UN in support
of West Pakistan (Ahmad, 1981: 62). China withheld recognition of Bangladesh
until Pakistan recognized it first, giving Pakistan some clout over prisoners of war
and other negotiations with India. In February 1973, Premier Zhou Enlai, during
a special banquet in her honor, told Mrs Bhutto that he was convinced her visit
to China would result in deepening relations between both countries (Arif, 1984:
143). According to Mahmood Shaam (2009: 153), in May 1974, Premier Zhou En-
lai in front of journalists thanked the visiting President Bhutto and his wife for their
important role in establishing diplomatic relations between China and Iran. Hence,
Nusrat Bhutto, in her role as the spouse of Pakistan’s leader, helped her govern-
ment achieve important diplomatic and political goals with China.
In June 1989, when authorities in China had come under intense international
condemnation for their handling of the student protest in Tiananmen Square, ZA
Bhutto and Nusrat Bhutto’s daughter, Pakistan’s first and only female prime minister,
Benazir Bhutto (BB), decided to call the event China’s internal matter (Ali, 2017:
122). With her outright support, she showed her country’s and her political party’s,
the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP), commitment to good relations with China. In
Ali’s opinion, BB’s support was unexpected given her and her party’s democratic
credentials and their struggle for the restoration of democracy against the military
regime of General Zia ul Haq. According to Small (2015: 112), China regarded BB
with suspicion because they considered her views to be pro-American, as compared
to her late father. As such, BB’s position over Tiananmen was greatly appreciated by
China’s officials at a time when they had received global censure for their actions.
Women’s Role in the CPEC Era
Some other Pakistani women, who continue to contribute toward China-Pakistan’s

good relations in the CPEC era, include PPP’s Senator Sherry Rehman (2018). She
is Pakistan’s first female opposition leader, who maintained BB and her party’s
120 Eram Ashraf
position on good relations with China. Despite being a member of an opposition

party, she vociferously defended CPEC and Sino-Pakistan relations in the media
against international criticism that CPEC was a “debt trap” for Pakistan (Rehman,
2019). Former Ambassador to China (2019–2020), Naghmana Hashmi, was pub-
licly commended (Global Times, 2020) for her role in China-Pakistan relations.
Her one-year tenure came during an extremely testing time for Sino-Pakistan rela-
tions, with the Covid-19-pandemic-induced lockdown in Wuhan and the Pakistan
government’s decision not to airlift Pakistani students back to Pakistan (Ashraf,
2020). Chinese media (Xiaopeng, 2020) praised her role in facilitating improved
understanding between the two countries, her support for CPEC projects and espe-
cially her leadership in holding the Pakistan Mango Festival in Beijing, where Pa-
kistan’s fruit export potential was introduced to the Chinese business community.
In November 2018 (Hassan), when terrorists led a 2-hour attack on the Chinese
consulate in Karachi, Assistant Superintendent, Suhai Aziz Talpur, a Pakistani po-
licewoman was found at the forefront of the fight against them. She was the first
to enter the Chinese consulate and provide reassurance to Chinese diplomats stuck
inside during the attack. Her quick thinking was said to have saved many lives that
day and she received praise from the Pakistani government and citizens as well as
netizens from China (The Express Tribune, 2018). Finally, the late Ms. Attia Ayub,
President of the All Pakistan-China Friendship Association (APCFA), passed away
in February 2020 (Dawn). It was under her leadership that the organization led a
delegation to Beijing in October 2019 and held a “Pakistan Youth Cultural Ex-
change Week” as part of the 70th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the
PRC. She also produced a documentary film titled Hum Aik Hain meaning we
are one, which outlined the Sino-Pakistan friendship. These are some of the sto-
ries of Pakistani women who in their individual capacity have helped China and
Pakistan’s friendly relations, yet collectively, their efforts remain invisible when
literature on China-Pakistan is written.
More recently, in recognition of women’s efforts toward improving China-Paki-
stan relations, the Pakistani government gave state honors and medals to three female
leaders from China. In 2019, Ms. Lin Yi, Vice President of the Chinese People’s As-
sociation for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), was awarded Pakistan’s
third-highest civilian award and medal, the Sitara-i-Pakistan for promoting friendly
relations, especially among youths of both countries (The News International). A year
later, in 2020, Dr Zhao Baige, the vice chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the National People’s Congress (NPC), was given Pakistan’s second-highest civil
award and medal, the Hilal-e-Imtiaz. She was considered instrumental in “promoting
friendly relations and high-level exchanges between Pakistan and China” (Yuwei).
Ms. Geng Ying, President of the China Cultural Heritage Foundation, received the
Sitara-i-Pakistan at the same ceremony for her bilingual book of poems, Pak Cheen
Dosti (Pak-China friendship) and a plantation project “Friendship Bamboo” in
Wuhan, which used saplings from Pakistan. However, this state-level appreciation of
women in improving bilateral relations has yet to be reciprocated by China.
While women appear to have played a constructive role in maintaining friendly
relations between both countries, in 2019 (Xin), Pakistani women suddenly
became a contentious topic between them. Media reports on domestic violence

against Pakistani women, by their Chinese husbands, created concern amongst the
Pakistani public (Iftikhar and Hossain, 2020: 394). Stories of mostly Christian Pa-
kistani women, who after marrying Chinese men and moving to China became
their prisoners, garnered global media attention (Khan, 2019; Afzal, 2022). As the
marriages involved Chinese men working on CPEC projects, the matter was ad-
dressed swiftly at the government level from both sides (Faisal, 2019). The issue,
however, exposed gender-related sensitivities between both countries and relations
between them could not be taken for granted.
“Making women visible” (Enloe, 2014: xv), in China-Pakistan relations, reveals
the constructive role they have played over the years. From politicians, diplomats,
and activists to wives and daughters of leaders, women in both countries have
helped grow and nurture friendly relations between them. They enabled the gov-
ernments in both countries, as Enloe had explained, to achieve their political and
diplomatic goals. And yet, officials in both countries continue to describe their
bilateral relations using masculine terms such as iron brothers. As the phrase gives
prominence to men in these relations, Chinese and Pakistani officials’ discourses
are analysed next to trace the emergence of this phrase.
Iron Brother/Ba Tie

On her very first trip to China, Pakistan’s first female Foreign Secretary, Tehmina
Janjua, in an interview with Chinese media noted that “China and Pakistan are not
only iron brothers as President Xi Jinping has said, but also steel sisters” (Jinxi,
2021).3 As discussed earlier, Sino-Pakistan relations are not limited to men only;
women are equally invested in good relations between both countries. The iron
brother rhetoric, however, is not the only one used, as other terms attached to the
word iron were also found. This was because iron brother is Chinese officials’ in-
terpretation of the unique name Ba Tie, said to be given to Pakistanis in China (Ho,
2018). The Mandarin word Ba Tie巴铁, which translates to Pakistan iron, is sup-
posedly a symbol of the close bond or friendship between both countries (Yichang,
2019). Official rhetoric, according to Julia Strauss (2009: 779), are not “merely
empty words” but perform an important function for the state trying to gain support
from a wide audience. In China, she explained, officials utilized rhetoric to help de-
velop, explain, and legitimize their policies and initiatives both for domestic and in-
ternational audiences. Given Pakistan’s centrality in the BRI, the introduction of the
phrase iron brother by Chinese officials may be seen as their attempt to gain support
from an audience they considered important for the success of their new project.
As mentioned earlier, Chinese officials have not always interpreted Ba Tie as
iron brothers. In April (2013), the outgoing Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Liu
Jian, in a farewell speech became the first to explain how people in China referred
to Pakistanis as their “iron core friends.” He was describing how friendly relations
at the state level had spread down amongst their people and become cemented. A
few weeks later, Premier Li Keqiang (2013a), during his visit to Pakistan, spoke
of how Chinese netizens (Chinese citizens on the internet), referred to Pakistan as
122 Eram Ashraf
“Iron Pak” as a term of endearment. It meant, he said, that Pakistan’s friendship

was as strong and reliable as iron to China, repeating the idea of a time-tested
friendship between the two countries. He stated (2013b), “When it comes to Pa-
kistan, the first words that come to the mind of the Chinese are ‘iron brother’. To
us Chinese, Pakistan is always a trustworthy friend as solid as iron.” His narrative
repeated the idea that the Chinese consider Pakistan a reliable partner and so iron
brother epitomized that notion. That same year, the incoming Chinese ambassador
to Pakistan Sun Weidong (2017) once more repeated how the Chinese netizens
referred to Pakistan as “Iron Pak,” meaning friendly and reliable Pakistan.
Pakistan’s military, Boni had explained (2019), was key to stable relations be-
tween both countries. During the 94th anniversary celebrations of China’s Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA), Pakistan’s then Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar
Javed Bajwa, referred to relations between both armies as that between “brothers
in arms” (Radio Pakistan, 2021). He appeared to follow the tradition of his prede-
cessor General Raheel Sharif (2015). However, Sharif had also described relations
with China as that between “devoted friends” rather than iron brothers. This was
despite the phrase iron brother appearing in use amongst high officials of both
countries. Even China’s high-level PLA officials such as General Fan Changlong
(2015), Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission could be seen describ-
ing relations as “China and Pakistan are the best iron brothers, good friends and
strategic partners….” However, since then Pakistan Army has accepted the title of
iron brothers with pride as seen in General Bajwa’s later speech (2017) “We have
always stood by each other through thick and thin and at every critical juncture of
our history. That is why we are called as ‘Iron Brothers.’” Pakistan’s military, Boni
had explained, key to stable relations between both countries.
Pakistan’s Change in Rhetoric
The use of iron brother by Pakistan’s officials represented a change from past prac-
tice when officials were seen avoiding using the term brother when referring to
China. In the aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when general consensus in
Pakistan credited China’s forthright support, an important factor in India declaring
a ceasefire, Syed (1974: 123–124) found that Pakistani official discourses main-
tained a cautious approach. He attributed this to Pakistan and especially President
Ayub Khan’s foreign policy of dual alignment, whereby they wanted to be seen
balancing relations between China and the US. China’s overt support for Pakistan
had led credence to reports of Sino-Pakistan collusion against India.
In the case of China-Pakistan relations, the first mention of the masculine term
brother can be found in 1956. It was during Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s visit to Pa-
kistan that he was honored as a “sworn brother” by the Nawab of Hoti (Syed, 1974:
68). However, the construction of Sino-Pakistan relations in masculine terms, as
brothers, seemingly first appeared in China’s official narratives when Premier Wen
Jiabao used brotherly terms to describe them (Shahnawaz, 2011: 77).
In his address at the joint session in Pakistan’s parliament, Wen Jiabao (2010)
said, “China and Pakistan are brothers forever…We are good brothers sharing weal
and woe.” Good brothers, perhaps reflective of their good relations, as he explained
how Pakistan had helped the PRC gain international legitimacy in their initial years.
Interestingly, he began his speech in Pakistan’s national language Urdu, address-
ing the parliamentarians as only Bhaiyo or brothers. This was despite Dr Fahmida
Mirza, Speaker of the National Assembly, being a woman. The omission of Behno
or sisters could have been an oversight, for he had also addressed the assembled in
English as ladies and gentlemen. But leaving it out in Urdu, the national language
of Pakistan, clearly suggests he was more concerned about male members of his
audience. It could be because, as later Xi Jinping also reminisced in 2014, Indians
used to describe Sino-India relations as Hindi-Chini Bhai, or India-China brothers
(Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in India). Chinese officials exposed
to the importance of brothers in South Asia, may have chosen a similar rhetoric
for Pakistan. Wen Jiabao’s emphasis on brothers, to describe good relations with
Pakistan, still appears relevant in Chinese official’s narrative as seen in their inter-
pretation of Ba Tie as iron brother (Yi, 2015).
Iron brother rhetoric helps Chinese officials emphasize friendly relations
between both countries, not only at the government level but also at a people-
to-people level. For CPEC to be successful, China needed support from inside
Pakistan, especially from political parties. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
(PMLN), PPP and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) are all national parties that have
been in government at both national and provincial levels. Their support has been
crucial to the implementation and progress of CPEC. The success of Chinese of-
ficials’ rhetoric can be measured in that, regardless of which political party came to
government in Pakistan, they all adopted the iron brother phrase.
The rhetoric perhaps may also have served another purpose, that of convinc-
ing China’s domestic audience. In order for CPEC to be successful, Xi Jinping’s
government also needed the support of Chinese investors and workers, who would
need to work with Pakistanis in Pakistan. Constructing the idea of a reliable Paki-
stan through the rhetoric of Ba Tie would have provided a message of reassurance
from the Chinese government that Chinese investments would be safe in Pakistan.
As Strauss had mentioned in her China-Africa study, official Chinese rhetoric can
be meant for both international and domestic audiences and so may have been the
case with iron brother/Ba Tie.
However, this gender-limited construction of China-Pakistan relations makes
invisible Pakistani women to the extent that Pakistani officials such as Janjua had
to introduce the notion of steel sisters. The next section draws on the author’s
original dataset to look at awards given to Pakistani citizens by Chinese entities, in
particular those related to CPEC. These once more reveal the scarcity of Pakistani
women when compared to Pakistani men in China-Pakistan relations.
Friendship Awards
First established in 1991, China’s “friendship awards” by October 2019 (Xinhua)
were reportedly handed out to around 1700 foreigners. It is difficult to verify these
numbers, as there is no published dataset on recipients, only occasional mentions
124 Eram Ashraf
in media.4 The friendship awards are meant to honor those foreigner, who it was
believed had made great contributions to China’s economic and social progress
(People’s Daily Online, 2009). While central government friendship awards are
given at the national level, other friendship awards are also given by authorities in
China at various provincial, city and municipality levels.
Some Pakistani citizens, mostly men, who have received these awards, were
those engaged in scientific research, such as Professor Atta-ur-Rahman who in
2014 received a friendship award for his services in the field of chemistry (The
News, 2020) and in 2020 the China International Science and Technology Coop-
eration Award by Xi Jinping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Paki-
stan, 2020). The same year, another Pakistani chemist, Professor Muhammad Iqbal
Choudhary, won the 2020 Guangxi “Golden Silk Ball Friendship Award” which in-
cluded a medal and a bonus of around $15,000 (Geo News, 2020). Chinese awards
to Pakistani citizens, including the friendship award, began to be given in earnest
after President Xi Jinping’s 2015 trip to Pakistan to officially launch CPEC. The
next section while considers some of those awards and their male recipients, its
main focus will be on CPEC-specific awards for which some Pakistani females
were selected.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
During Xi Jinping’s trip to Pakistan in April 2015, the Chinese President handed out
China’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Friendship Award” to three Pa-
kistani men and four Pakistani groups (Dawn, 2015). The awards were established
in 2014 (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in India), during celebrations
marking the 60th anniversary of Panchsheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence. In Pakistan, they were given to honor those Pakistanis, believed to have
contributed toward Sino-Pakistan friendship (Ren: 2015). These included Pakistani
Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, Pakistan’s former ambassador to China, Masood
Khan (2008–2012), and Ali Ahmad Jan. Jan was recognized for his 37-year-old
voluntary service guarding the Chinese Martyrs Cemetery, a memorial park honor-
ing those who had died during the construction of the Karakorum Highway. While
these are just some of the awards given to Pakistanis in the CPEC era, the annual
CPEC media forum or “golden anchor” award and the annual “outstanding Paki-
stani employee” of CPEC projects award were created specifically for CPEC and
so studied next in detail.
CPEC Media Forum “Golden Anchor” Awards
The CPEC Golden Anchor Award was launched in September 2018 by China Eco-
nomic Net (CE.n) with judges from both Pakistan and China (Gwadar Pro, 2021)
hence meant for people in both countries. CE.n is the national news website for the
Chinese state-affiliated Economic Daily. They also operate the online news outlet
Gwadar Pro that publishes CPEC-related news in English, Urdu and Chinese. Four
award ceremonies as such have been held so far, apart from 2021, when due to
Covid restrictions in China, they were held in June 2022 (Liu Qiyu).5 The annual
award ceremonies are held during the CPEC joint media forums that are also held
annually between Pakistan and China.
According to Safdar (2021: 11), Chinese efforts to expand relationships between
China’s state-owned Xinhua News and public and private Pakistani media organi-
zations are still in a nascent stage. Leading media houses in Pakistan, he says,
view bilateral relations with Chinese media based on commercial interests. For
example, some have signed up for Xinhua’s subscription services as they cost less
than their counterparts in the US and Europe, such as wire services like Reuters.
With reducing funds available to them from government-derived advertisements,
private media houses that had relied on them, he says, find Xinhua appealing. Apart
from commercial reasons, there are also those, he explains, who view the Xinhua
agreement as helping counter negative reporting on CPEC and reducing Western
influence over Pakistani media.
Ms. Numra Asif, a research assistant at the Centre of Excellence (CoE) CPEC,
a Pakistani think tank, was the first female recipient of the Golden Anchor Award
(CE.n ) when it was launched in 2018 (CPEC News). As such, according to the
author’s original dataset, she also became Pakistan’s first female recipient of
a Chinese award. The Golden Anchor Award was given to her jointly with the
CoE’s director Dr Saleem Janjua for their report “CPEC—A Pilot Model for Eco-
Civilization Concept of China” (Daily Pakistan Observer, 2018). A total of 18
individual Pakistanis have received this award since 2018, including Ms. Asif, who
remains its first and only female recipient as seen in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 C
PEC Golden Anchor Awards Based on Authors
Dataset of Awards, Given to Pakistanis by
Chinese Entities in the CPEC Era (2013–2023)
Year Name Gender
November 2018 Ms. Numra Asif Female

Dr Saleem Janjua Male
Majid Qazi Abdul Male
November 2019 Mian Abrar Hussain Male
Javed Akhtar Male
Saleem Safi Male
Mehtab Haider Male
Yasir Habib Khan Male
December 2020 Muhammad Asghar Male
Naveed Hussain Male
Shafqat Ali Male
Tariq Sumair Male
Amir Ghauri Male
Sultan Hali Male
June 2022 (2021) Hafiz Tahir Khalil Male
Muhammed Asif Noor Male
Syed Kamal Hussain Shah Male
Tahir Ali Male
126 Eram Ashraf
In 2017, Freedom Network, a civil liberties group in Pakistan, reported that

only 5 per cent out of 20,000 journalists in Pakistan were female (Rehmat, 2017).
This was despite a sharp rise in the number of journalists since digital media
opened up in the country in 2007. However, as we can see with the selection of
Ms Asif, the Golden Anchor Awards are not just given to those in media but in-
clude individuals who contribute toward countering negative stories about CPEC
through publications. As such, the selection of just one female for a shared award
with her male supervisor in nearly five years is problematic. Either Pakistani
women are not countering negative reporting on CPEC as they don’t consider
it beneficial or else their efforts are not receiving the same recognition as their
male colleagues from the awarding committees. The next section on the second
CPEC award scheme further expounds Pakistani women’s low visibility in Chi-
nese awards.
CPEC Pakistani Worker Awards/“Outstanding Pakistani Employee”

of CPEC Projects Award
The annual CPEC Pakistani workers award ceremony, also known as the “out-
standing Pakistani employee” of CPEC projects award, began to be held in Pa-
kistan by the Chinese Embassy from 2020 onwards.6 As the name suggests, they
are given to Pakistani workers of CPEC projects, in recognition of their work
efforts (The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) People’s
Republic of China, 2021). In December 2020 (Associated Press of Pakistan), 18
CPEC staff members from various parts of Pakistan were given these awards in
an online ceremony arranged by the Chinese embassy, due to Covid safety con-
cerns. While the selection of award winners was heavily focused on the Sindh
and Punjab provinces in Pakistan, where most CPEC projects are located, they
also included workers from Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK), the Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan provinces. Observation of names on the list
suggests that religious minorities were also selected, such as Girdhari and Nir-
dosh Kumar belonging to the Hindu community (Khan, 2020). However, none of
the winners selected that year for the award was a Pakistani woman. There was
an issue with one name Tasneem, as it can also be used by females; however,
careful examination of the online event’s video on FM 98 Dosti Channel (2020)
clarified that the individual was a male. Whilst the attempt at ethnic and religious
inclusivity is commendable, it made the omission of women from the list even
more pronounced.
In December 2021 (Gwadar Pro), the number of CPEC employee award winners
increased from 18 to 27. Amongst the winners, Ms Rizwana Ghani, an employee of
China Power Hub Generation Company (CPHGC), became its first female recipi-
ent. She was the second Pakistani woman to win a Chinese award after Ms. Asif’s
selection in 2018, according to the author’s original dataset. Ghani worked as a
senior manager for fuel procurement at the 2 × 660 MW CPHGC Coal Power Plant
Project in Balochistan. The importance of this milestone, however, was completely
missed by media from both countries. An in-depth news article which carried her
Table 7.2 R
ecipients of CPEC Outstanding Pakistani Workers Awards Not on CPEC
Projects, Based on Authors Dataset of Awards Given to Pakistanis by
Chinese Entities in the CPEC Era (2013–2023)
Award Year Name Project
2022 Muhammad Adnan (PhD) Pakistan-China Red Chilli Contract

Farming Project
Kaleem Ullah Mohmand Dam Hydropower Project
Khan Zeb Dasu Hydropower Project
Syed Imran Raouf Balakot Hydropower Project
Hamid Khan Tarbela 5th Extension Hydropower Project
Jamshed Ali Haier Pakistan
Tabi Satti Diamer Basha Dam Project
2021 Nadeem Ilyas Diamer Basha Dam Project
Muhammad Ibrahim Saindak Copper and Gold Project
Malik Usama Hamid Challenge Fashion Ltd
interview (Qamar, 2022) also failed to mention that she was the first female given
this award, perhaps as a result of ignorance on the matter.
At the end of December 2022 (The News International), the Chinese embassy
held the third CPEC outstanding Pakistani employee award ceremony in Islama-
bad, which saw the number of Pakistani recipients rise further to 34. What was also
notable was the rise in female recipients from the year previously to two. They
were Shakeela Kosar, an assistant manager working on the Orange Line metro
project in Lahore (Ali, 2022), and Saima Nawaz who worked on the Suki Kinari
Hydropower station project. It is a step in the right direction as it shows perhaps
growing awareness of the lack of Pakistani women in these awards. However, after
nearly ten years of CPEC, four Pakistani female recipients of Chinese awards are
a dismal number.
While these awards are meant for Pakistani workers on CPEC projects, it was
observed some of the projects named were not CPEC, as seen in Table 7.2. For
example, one of the 2021 awardees, (The Express Tribune) Nadeem Ilyas, was
selected despite working on the Diamer Basha Dam which falls under Pakistan’s
Water and Power Development Authority or WAPDA. It appears that while some
of these workers may not be working on CPEC-specific projects, their employ-
ers are Chinese companies working in Pakistan, such as Power China where Ilyas
worked (Pakistan Today, 2022). As such, the pool of prospective candidates for
these awards appears to be bigger than just CPEC projects, and so the selection of
only 3 female workers out of 79 workers are even more concerning.
CPEC and Employment Data

A lack of reliable employment data from CPEC projects, as highlighted by Jacob
Jabin (2017), and Katharine Adeney and Filippo Boni (2021: 16; India Seminar.
Com, 2022), hinders Pakistani women’s visibility in CPEC. The official CPEC
website provides some employment figures for individual projects, but only total
128 Eram Ashraf
and local employment numbers, such as for the CPEC Authority a (CPEC Author-
ity: Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives). Their focus ap-
pears to be on how many locals as compared to Chinese workers were employed on
CPEC-related projects, perhaps reflective of the sensitivity surrounding the issue
(Dawn, 2017). CPEC Authority b, (the Development of Port And Free Zone) the
provided employment numbers don’t even tally. An absence of gender differentials
in CPEC employment data not only makes it difficult to deduce the low number of
female award winners but also the benefit of CPEC for female employment in the
country. Chinese officials, such as Zhao Lijian (Junaid, 2018), in acknowledgement
of the lack of focus on gender in CPEC’s initial phase, promised more jobs for
women with the creation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). This is a welcome
move, but, in the absence of female employment numbers in CPEC projects, it
will be impossible to determine the veracity of his claim, remaining simply media
propaganda.
Pakistan’s official, annual crude labor participation rates from 2013 to 2021,
provided by the Ministry of Planning, Development & Special Initiatives (May
2015: 21; November 2015: 21; 2018: 21; 2019: 23; 2022: 17), unlike CPEC,
does include gender differences. They not only reveal big differences amongst
the sexes but also appear to show them to be in negative correlation as seen in
Table 7.3. While male participation rates show a steady increase, female partici-
pation shows the opposite. Interestingly, the one-time female labor participation
rates show a rise, when comparing the difference between figures for 2018–2019
to 2020–2021, there appears to be a fall in male labor participation rates. If we
take these figures as a rough barometer to measure employment opportunities
provided as a result of CPEC projects, especially for Pakistani females, apart from
the rise in 2018–2019, they do not appear to be a contributor. However, overall
declining female labor participation rates amongst Pakistan’s females, in the pres-
ence of a large development project such as CPEC, does raise questions. Consid-
ered a “game changer” for Pakistan by its leaders, such as former Prime Minister,
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (Digital Associated Press of Pakistan, 2016), what has
Table 7.3 A
uthors Calculations Based on
Pakistan Labor Force Survey,
Participation Percentage Rates
Year Male Female
2013–2014 48.0 15.8

2014–2015 48.1 15.8
Change +0.1 0.0
2017–2018 48.3 14.5
Change +0.2 −1.3
2018–2019 48.1 15.5
Change −0.2 +1
2020–2021 48.4 15.5
Change +0.3 0.0
CPEC achieved for Pakistan’s half of the sky, to use Mao Zedong’s reference (Hu,
2016: 16) for women?
Research carried out on CPEC projects in provinces of Pakistan, such as Punjab
and KPK, provides a complex picture of CPEC’s impact on the working lives of
Pakistani women. A 2017 study (Niazi, He and Ullah, 2019: 160) concluded in
the case of CPEC’s Sahiwal coal power plant in Punjab that no job allocations for
women, and no women employed on the project, led to an increase in the area’s
unemployment and decrease in household incomes. The researchers explained that
prior to the CPEC project, local female employment in the area was mainly in the
farming sector, which was not only lucrative for them but also helped elevate their
social standing. For example, 66 per cent of the local females were engaged in
dairy cattle breeding. However, since the construction of the power plant, which
was built on private farming land, that figure dropped to 16.6 per cent as there was
less land available for them to graze their cattle and keep them. This study, as such
is the first of its kind, which emphatically shows a CPEC project having a detri-
mental effect on Pakistan’s working women. According to the researchers (Niazi
et al., 2019: 163), the plant was built on agricultural lands without assessing the
impact on local people. Unintended consequences of CPEC for Pakistani women,
such as this study has shown, make further gender-related, evidence-based studies
on CPEC imperative.
Researchers in another study (Farooq, Gul and Khan, 2018: 57) found that ap-
athy toward women in CPEC had led to public perception of “Men is CPEC,”
that it is meant for men only. Interviews with Pakistani women in government,
academia and media, in the province of KPK, had left researchers to conclude
that women were being held back from progressing and utilizing the benefits of
CPEC. For example, a senior female officer told them that while the CPEC cell at
the government’s Department of Planning and Development had laid emphasis on
women learning the Chinese language, there was no policy consideration on how
to create female employment opportunities in CPEC. An academic explained that
no policy existed on the utilization of CPEC to reduce gender differential gaps in
employment participation rates. Another survey carried out amongst rural women
in Punjab and KPK provinces of Pakistan (Saad, Ijaz, Asghar and Yamin, 2020: 24)
found their perception of CPEC was that it may be good for people in general, but
it had no direct benefit for them. For a developing country like Pakistan, to have a
major portion of their population believe their work was not valued because of their
gender should be a serious cause for concern.
Perhaps as a result of initiatives led by the CPEC Joint Media Forum men-
tioned earlier, some female employment stories were published in Pakistani and
Chinese media for propaganda. One such case was that of Gulaban (Reuters, 2017),
a 25-year-old housewife from Tharparkar, in Sindh who, first in the country’s his-
tory, drives huge 60-tonne dumper trucks for Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company
(SECMC). According to the media, she overcame her nervousness in driving the
trucks and ended up inspiring other women in her village to join her. Jahan Ara
(Samoon, 2017), a female SECMC official, reportedly steered this programme for
local women. Also published (Misbah S Malik and Liu Tian, 2019) was the story
130 Eram Ashraf
of Ambreen Shah, who was initially hired as head of the CPHGC legal department
but then promoted to vice president of the company’s Legal and Corporate Affairs
due to her hard work.
Despite their innovative hard work, creating opportunities and inspiring other
women to join them, none were selected for a Chinese award. Xi Jinping’s pledge
of support from China toward global women’s development appears to be falling
short for the women of Pakistan in China’s pilot project CPEC.
Gender Equality and Society
According to Khawar Mumtaz (2021: 89), a women’s rights activist in Pakistan,

despite government recognition of the problem of gender inequality in Pakistan,
social norms still discriminate against working women on the basis of gender. The
work of women, she said, was largely ignored in Pakistani society, and not con-
sidered relevant. As a result, their opportunities were restricted not just physically,
due to mobility issues, but also because of a lack of information on opportunities
for them.
This tendency to ignore women is also an issue in China, where several re-
searchers, such as Jude Howell (2006: 609), identified a pattern when studying
gender quota implementations in elections. Xinhui Jiang (2022: 78), for example,
found gender quotas were often ignored by local electoral authorities despite being
required to check for them. She believed lack of women-specific pools from where
election candidates could be chosen and preference for choosing other easily avail-
able candidates, such as those fulfilling occupational quotas, were leading to gen-
der quotas becoming overlooked. As Edmund Downie (2014: 59) also explained,
while precise gender quota requisites had been brought in by the state in 2010, they
had no enforcement provisions. A no rewards or punishment provision in gender
laws, according to Lu Haina (2019: 471), along with inadequate, gender-specific
funding and lack of gender expertise, made it easy for government and public insti-
tutions in China to ignore gender during decision-making processes.
For China, CPEC could be a useful vehicle to deliver President Xi’s message on
gender equality, which could be expanded to other projects in the BRI. Lu Haina,
Liang Xiaohui and Wang Chenping (2018: 44) believe China in fact has a legal
obligation to include gender equality in the BRI, as they are signatories to certain
human rights treaties which include gender equality. They explain that China’s
state-owned enterprises can be held liable as their investments and aid programs
in BRI countries fall under China’s jurisdiction, despite not being located inside
China.
Given that CPEC is now moving toward increasing people-to-people relations,
it is time that gender is given its due place in China-Pakistan relations. In a country
like Pakistan where working women already face societal discrimination, Chinese
official’s tendency to overlook gender may help explain the low numbers of Paki-
stani women in Chinese awards for CPEC. Pakistani women’s employment has not
been considered a priority for both countries in CPEC, despite Xi Jinping’s pledge
to support working women in developing countries.
Conclusion
This chapter used a gender lens to consider relations between China and Pakistan
in the CPEC era, as it was considered a much-neglected area of research. Making
Pakistani women visible in both countries’ relations reveals how they have been
ignored in historical accounts, marginalized in Chinese discourses and awards and
left completely absent in CPEC in its first ten years. Similar to feminists’ critique
of early IR literature put forward by academics such as Enloe and Peterson, this
chapter also found China-Pakistan literature dominated by male academics. Their
writings mostly focused on power relations between both countries and their state
leaders who also happened to be mostly men, hence helping explain the absence of
women in their stories. Pakistan’s first official delegation to China in October 1954,
led by an experienced female politician and women activists, is hardly mentioned in
writings on China-Pakistan relations. When it is, it is either relegated from high poli-
tics to something cultural or even placed at a wrong date hence made insignificant.
Discourse analysis carried out for this chapter for the first time revealed how
during CPEC Chinese had officials constructed the idea of a friendly, reliant
Pakistan using masculine terms such as iron brother and iron Pakistan. Meant
for both Pakistani and Chinese audiences, this chapter argues that their rhetoric
was aimed at gaining broad support for Xi Jinping’s flagship BRI project, the
CPEC. From Pakistani audiences, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and the mili-
tary, to Chinese investors and workers, their support was necessary for CPEC’s
success. Iron Pak, iron brother and similar rhetoric would have given them
reassurance that they and their interests would be secure in a reliable Pakistan.
Pakistani officials’ adoption of the phrase iron brother, when in the past they
had seemingly avoided brotherly language for China, shows how successful
Chinese officials have been in their endeavor. Perhaps, Pakistan is no longer
concerned with balancing relations between China and the US with regard
to India. However, the success of the iron brother rhetoric renders Pakistani
women invisible in those relations, as pointed out to Chinese media by former
Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua when she advanced the counter rhetoric of
steel sisters.
Drawing on the author’s original dataset of awards given to Pakistani citizens,
by Chinese entities, revealed the dismal presence of Pakistani women in the two
CPEC-related awards. Ms. Numra Asif, since 2018, remains the first and only fe-
male award winner of the CPEC Media Forum “golden anchor” award. And, as
opposed to 76 male employees, only three females have been given the CPEC
Pakistani workers awards. The selection of just four women out of 99 Pakistanis
from various professional backgrounds and ethno-religious groups is deeply con-
cerning. While Pakistan recognized and honored the work of three female leaders
from China with state medals, the gesture has yet to be reciprocated by the Chinese
government. Compared to Pakistani men, Pakistan’s half of the sky doesn’t appear
to be a priority for China.
In light of President Xi Jinping’s official narrative on gender equality, pro-
moting government efforts in reducing gender gap discrepancies and pledging
132 Eram Ashraf
support for working women in developing countries, the selection of just four
Pakistani women out of 99 in China’s CPEC awards list shows that something
needs to change. As Haina, Xiaohui, and Chenping had pointed out, China has a
legal obligation to address gender equality in the BRI as they are signatories to
certain human rights treaties which include gender. An emphasis on gender equal-
ity promotion in CPEC, such as through rewarding the work of female employees,
may help dispel the idea that CPEC is for men only. A well-trained labor force is
paramount for the success of CPEC-related projects inside Pakistan. But it is not
enough to train them if their work remains unrecognized and undervalued. CPEC,
in this instance, could help deliver President Xi’s message on gender equality
beyond China’s walls.
Officials from both countries have expressed belief that female employment
in CPEC will increase in its second phase as it involves industrialization projects
in the SEZ providing them more opportunities. However, in the absence of any
female employment data from CPEC projects, it will remain impossible to gauge
the veracity of such claims. The evidence so far lays bare that CPEC cannot be
considered a game changer for Pakistani women, at least in its first decade.
Notes
1 As this chapter focuses on Pakistani award winners, Chinese recipients were not
addressed.
2 Discussions with academics at the Lahore University of Management and Sciences,
Third International Inter-Disciplinary Conference on Gender, Work and Society held
in Lahore, Pakistan (May 20–21, 2022) and Dr Mohammed Waseem and Dr Zoha Wa-
seem, Karachi, September 2022.
3 I am grateful to Dr Maria Bastos for bringing this to my attention.
4 Personal communication with Chinese journalists and experts on China.
5 Correspondence with award winner.
6 In April 2019, a Chinese company CSAIL posted on their company website that two
of its male employees were given a similar award but formal announcements by the
Chinese Embassy in Pakistan for these awards can be seen from 2020 onwards (China
Three Gorges South Asia Investment Ltd).
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8 People-to-People Contact
under CPEC
Fact or Fiction?
Saba Shahid
Increasingly, “cultural influence” is seen as a measure of power or impact of a

nation. It is used to determine a country’s “ability to shape international public
opinion” and therefore building cultural influence is an essential form of building
regional power (Lemahieu and Leng, 2021). People-to-people contact features as
a sub-measure in which people of two nations interact with each other outside
of state-determined activities. The presence of regional diasporas, travel through
tourism, and educational and cultural excursions act as important determinants.
Cultural influence is hence an important tool to foster economic engagement and
facilitate foreign direct investment and bilateral trade. Official documents, Chinese
and Pakistani officials, the media, and even private business consortiums repeat-
edly emphasize people-to-people contact as a significant cultural objective of the
CPEC, indicating aspirations beyond the hard infrastructure and energy invest-
ments that are highlighted with respect to the mega-project.
Modern cultural diplomacy between China and Pakistan has existed since 1950.
There have been systematic state-level efforts to sustain friendly ties and project
government-to-government relations that are primarily built on principles of non-
interference, aid in times of disaster, and trade agreements. Cultural diplomacy
has taken place in the form of business expos, art and culture exhibitions, or per-
forming arts festivals facilitated by the two countries’ foreign services, ministries
of foreign affairs, and electronic and print media. However, cultural diplomacy
is distinct from people-to-people contact. While they may influence each other,
people-to-people contact refers to the grassroots level of cultural engagement that
exists between the people of two countries—organic interactions that emerge from
living, working, and socializing together.
The term, “people-to-people,” is pervasive, apparent in all forms of report-
ing on CPEC. Some government documents campaign “…people-to-people ex-
change and cultural communications as the engine” to the Corridor (Government
of Pakistan, Ministry of Planning Development and Reform, 2018). President Xi
Jinping has repeatedly referred to Chinese and Pakistani people as “brothers,”
“friends,” and “neighbors” in his speeches over the years, indicating bilateral rela-
tions that go beyond diplomatic, state-level relations. His Pakistani counterparts
have echoed the same. While these diplomatic speeches suggest an existing rela-
tionship, they also allude to an insufficiency or absence of the kind of contact the
DOI: 10.4324/9781032633411-8
People-to-People Contact under CPEC 139
two governments hope to build. Why else would policy documents on the CPEC
emanating from both countries explicitly highlight the need to promote “people-
to-people” contact? There is an intentional, purposeful strategy to strengthen
engagement between the countries’ citizens. Fundamental to this process are Chi-
nese and Pakistani individuals engaging with one another outside the range of
state-level, organized activities because of CPEC-induced interaction. With re-
spect to Chinese people traveling to Pakistan, the people-to-people contact taking
place has not fully been understood. How do the two communities interact? What
motivates socialization and what forms of social interaction do they engage in?
How do the Chinese travelers perceive the local culture? The existing literature on
these questions remains limited, with few anecdotal analyses present in the form
of newspaper articles.
Efforts to promote cultural understanding have so far been quite limited to state-
fostered programmatic exchanges, including academic scholarships and events or-
ganized by the countries’ respective governments. This continues to be the case in
the context of several cultural agreements signed between the two.1 The role of the
media has been an important one as well in promoting cultural dialogue. Digital
investments are part of the media plan; cinematic collaborations, radio shows, and
popular Chinese apps like TikTok are positive indicators of a growing influence of
China (Hassan, 2021). Language courses are another sector that indicate cultural
exchange. The Confucius Institutes have a major role to play in terms of teaching
Mandarin Chinese; some schools are also introducing the language into their cur-
ricula (Safdar, 2021). Chinese scholarships are also being promoted and China is
becoming a popular destination for higher education (around 28,000 Pakistanis are
enrolled in higher education institutes in China) (Hassan, 2021). Other methods of
fostering cultural exchange are the “sister city” agreements that are common strate-
gies to promote trade and connectivity between a Pakistani city and a Chinese one
(so far there are 16 in total) (Siddique, 2022).
Concurrently, as the number of Chinese people traveling to and living in Paki-
stan rises, there is need for deeper understanding of people-to-people engagement.
More importantly, there is a need to develop a nuanced evaluation of what that
engagement looks like. An immediate local reaction was a sense of cynicism as-
sociated with their arrival, particularly noticeable in the print media. Political Sci-
entist Alvin Lim describes the Chinese ethnoscape in Pakistan as a potential source
of conflict as people perceive them as a “threat to local identity.” Lim argues that
as with other sources of globalization, migration can become a neutralizing force,
“erasing” local culture and this in turn is perceived as a danger (Lim, 2017). CPEC
is seen as a means to infiltrate Pakistan, and therefore, there is a sense of antago-
nism attached to those associated with it.
This is because of a lack of knowledge about Chinese culture, society, and
language and vice-versa—the Chinese are also unfamiliar with local Pakistani
contexts, social and cultural norms. Pakistanis are more influenced by Western cul-
tures, including that of the US through its prolific film and TV industry. Likewise,
despite decades of conflict and tension, India and Pakistan share several similari-
ties: a colonial legacy, language and cuisine, demographic and ethnic affinities, and
140 Saba Shahid
not to mention the significant influence of Bollywood on Pakistani society (Sid-

dique, 2022: 88).
This chapter describes local experiences of Chinese workers in Pakistan as an
indicator of how the objective of people-to-people contact under the CPEC is real-
ized. The aim is to explore the localized experiences of Chinese migrants in terms
of their social interactions and engagements outside of their professional commit-
ments. Because the Chinese diaspora in Pakistan has developed through distinct
periods of migration, I focus on Chinese people arriving in Pakistan in the last ten
years, coinciding with the launch of the CPEC.
This analysis will contribute to our understanding of both the challenges to
integration and the potential to build on cultural similarities. It draws on litera-
ture on migration and cultural integration, including the few ethnographic studies
conducted on the Chinese diaspora in Pakistan, but its contribution to the subject
is its analysis stemming from semi-structured interviews conducted with Chinese
professionals working and living in Lahore. Interviewees also included academics
studying China-Pakistan relations, particularly CPEC.2 I also refer to conversa-
tions I have had with second-generation Chinese-Pakistanis who form part of an
older community of Chinese migrants and have a distinctive experience of life in
Pakistan.
Policies promoting people-to-people contact must build on these experiences
and be informed by the Chinese community’s local, grassroots experience of life in
Pakistan. Understanding diaspora experiences is important to understand the extent
of conflict or harmony between home and host culture of the migrant community,
which is critical to overarching strategies for cooperation between the respective
governments.
Studies exploring the impact of migration on host countries can be divided into
two groups.
The first are those that look at the impact of migration on culture (host and mi-
grant culture) and, second, those that look at the impact of migration on economic
development of the host country. In the former, several factors impact host culture
and migrant culture. Prinz and Siegel (2019) for instance consider three factors to
cultural integration: first, how different are host country and home country cultures;-
the greater the difference, the lower the likelihood to integrate. Second, the size of
the immigrant population in the host country; the larger the diaspora, the lower the
likelihood to integrate, and third, the kind of policies in place in the host country
that can determine the level of integration. They also describe “distance” between
cultures as a significant determinant (Prinz and Siegel, 2019). The level of existing
diversity in the host country is also a factor on how disruptive migration will be to
the local culture.
The literature that looks at the impact of migration on economic development
of the host country draws a strong relationship between the two. According to
the OECD, migrants play an important role in the economic growth of a country:
they tend to increase the working-age population of the host country, bring skills,
and hence play a role in human capital development and technological progress
(OECD, 2014). Portes (2019) finds similar empirical evidence and makes a case
that if a free trade argument is applied, labor movement is most efficient where
no barriers exist, just like any economically productive input. Migrants therefore
boost economic growth, and there is little evidence of them “taking away” native
jobs as anti-immigrant lobbyists would campaign. Rodriguez Posé and von Ber-
lepsch (2014) find that counties in the US that received migrant workers in the late
19th and early 20th centuries are the most “dynamic,” indicating migrant workers
have had a lasting impact on the economic health of US counties. Yet do these eco-
nomic benefits translate into a natural acceptance and, hence, easy settlement pro-
cess for migrant workers? Or are there barriers to their cultural settlement? Gagne
(2018) found that “cultural distance” can act as a serious impediment to economic
investment, as is the case with Chinese FDI in Africa. The costs to acquire and
interpret new information, deal with possibly different business and management
practices, and understand local traditions or “unspoken rules of the game” can be
high enough to deter FDI.
Understanding the causes of this “cultural distance” is an endeavor most nations
need to embark on if we are to successfully engage with the world’s largest coun-
try and second largest economy. Particularly as Chinese investors tend to be more
open to risky and politically unstable economies relative to Western multinationals,
it can be transformative for countries like Pakistan if it can acquire a more sophis-
ticated understanding of Chinese investors, what motivates them, and what defines
their cultural engagement in their host economies (Gagne, 2018). The subsequent
section explores the historic experiences of Chinese diasporas abroad that might be
of use to build a contextual analysis of their present experience in Pakistan.
Global Chinese Diaspora: Insights from Africa

There are an estimated 46 million Chinese people living outside of China, with
modern migration trends dating back to the 19th century (Academy for Cultural
Diplomacy, 2022). Since the 1840s, China has been a “migrant sending country”
with diasporas across Asia, Australia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas (Terry,
2021). With the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), another wave of
Chinese emigration abroad can be observed with many Chinese people arriving in
partner countries. The experience of the almost two million Chinese in Africa has
served as a useful case study.
Government-to-government economic engagement and trade, an increasing
number of private investors, temporary labor, and state-regulated employment
agencies are driving much of the Chinese migration to Africa, yet historic nar-
ratives labeling the migrants as “predatory,” “neo-colonial,” or “land-grabbing”
have followed (Terry, 2021). Racial prejudice against the Chinese has roots in
anti-immigrant, discriminatory campaigns sometimes seen in Western countries
where migrant workers are seen as a threat to employment and societal life. In the
past, xenophobic laws, such as Chinese Exclusion Act passed in 1882 in the US
and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904 in South Africa, forcibly led to a physi-
cal, economical, and socio-political isolation of Chinese communities abroad.
These policies eventually lead to the spread of stereotypes like Chinese people are
142 Saba Shahid
self-segregating, unfriendly, and unwilling to integrate into their host country (Yan
H, 2020).
Despite the bias and discrimination, these historic epithets have returned,
mostly as political sloganeering against a rising China. In Sri Lanka, with the
99-year lease of the Hambantota Port, China has often been cited in the news as
an imperialist, rent-seeking superpower (Chellaney, 2017). In Pakistan too, fol-
lowing the launch of CPEC, the media, local and international, mirrored these
sentiments, even referring to China as a resurrected East India Company. Alluding
to Pakistan’s colonial past and its legacy of pillage and exploitation—which some
still have a living memory of—is a dangerous, yet effective way to jeopardize
Pakistan-China ties.
Yet, ground realities in countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, and Tan-
zania reveal a complex story where Chinese migrants contribute toward local de-
velopment gains (Terry, 2022). Experiences of Chinese integration in Africa for
example tell a story of push and pull factors where the local political climate, the
employer company’s safety policies, language barriers, or duration of stay all de-
termine the level of cultural assimilation and interaction. Additionally, whether a
Chinese professional is traveling with their family or not, their nature of work and
the level of openness they are welcomed with, or the presence of an existing Chi-
nese community are also important indicators (Hairong 2020). The case of Chinese
entrepreneurs in Burkina Faso lends credibility to the idea that “globalization from
below” can take place, where Chinese migration is taking place in the absence of
state-led or diplomatically encouraged interactions (Khan, 2014). Here, while the
usual dichotomy of competition versus collaboration exists within the sphere of
Chinese entrepreneurial activity in Burkina Faso, there are multiple levels of eco-
nomic engagement that can be witnessed: between the employer and the employed,
between two business collaborators, and third, between Chinese entrepreneurs and
the Burkinabe administration (Khan, 2014). Research suggests that despite the lack
of state-led affirmative action pushing for Chinese interaction within Burkina Faso,
an environment of lenient economic regulation continues to encourage Chinese
entrepreneurs to set up shop and thrive in close cooperation with the Burkinabe
people.
In Nigeria and Lagos, Sino-African relations are strongly correlated with the
professional experience local Africans have within Chinese-owned enterprises.
Where the African worker feels their work is dignified, well-paid, and provides
opportunity for growth, their opinion of Chinese migrants is positive. Conversely,
where professional experiences are tainted by stories of exploitation and unfair
treatment, class-relations dominate the conversations and hence local opinions on
the Chinese in Africa (Lampert and Mohan, 2014). The motivation behind African
interaction with Chinese migrants seems to be opportunities for skills develop-
ment, technical learning, and business networking (Lampert and Mohan, 2014).
These recorded observations are intuitive in nature; where locals feel threatened
and dissatisfied with their expectations of professional growth vis-à-vis Chinese
management, conflict is likely to arise and lead to restraint in perceptions regarding
Chinese migrants.
But what about interaction outside the folds of business and employment?
Particularly from the perspective of the Chinese migrants? The following section
considers Chinese migrations to Pakistan and provides a historical analysis of the
Chinese communities’ settlement in large metropolitan cities, specifically in La-
hore. It offers a perspective on Chinese migrant communities’ social interactions
beyond the economic and professional sphere—something even the widely studied
Sino-African literature has insufficiently addressed.
Migratory Trends and the Chinese Diaspora in Pakistan

Pakistan is a middle-income country with a population of over 230 million people.
Over 65% of these are under the age of 35, indicating a large market of consumers,
relatively cheap labor, and extensive potential for trade. Yet less than 1.5 million peo-
ple in Pakistan, not even 1% of the population, are of a foreign nationality.3 Although
ethnically and linguistically diverse, Pakistan’s economy has yet to benefit from the
internationalization of the local labor force—this is in stark contrast to Pakistan’s
own export of labor. Around 11 million Pakistanis work abroad and partake in eco-
nomic activity of their host countries, top destinations of which include Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain (Government of Pakistan Bureau of Emigration
& Overseas Employment (Hqs), 2020).4 China does not feature as a top destination
for Pakistani labor, which is more likely to migrate to Middle Eastern countries.
Similarly, of the total immigrant population in Pakistan, the Chinese community
makes up a very small segment—less than 1% (Siddique, 2022: 83). There tend to
be three times more Pakistanis traveling to China than the other way around (Sid-
dique, 2022: 84). Estimates of the number of Chinese migrants working and living
in Pakistan vary extensively—from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands,
but a clear number, backed by a credible source, is hard to come by.
The Chinese diaspora in Pakistan can be divided into two distinct groups; the
first is an older generation of Chinese entrepreneurs who traveled to Pakistan to
set up small businesses. The second group are Chinese business owners, entrepre-
neurs, and professionals traveling to Pakistan following CPEC. Both groups are
distinguished by their relatively high income and class status compared to other
migrants, particularly the Afghans, who tend to be informal, daily-wage laborers.
The next section details Chinese migration to Pakistan, which has occurred over
two “waves” of inward movement.
Migratory Waves from China to Pakistan

In the 1950s and 1960s, several Chinese families came to Pakistan by way of es-
caping poverty and an increasingly constricting political climate in China. Others
came from India following the India-China War in 1963. In her research on Chinese-
Pakistani families that belong to this first wave of migration, anthropologist Alice
Lin found that most are from the Hakka ethno-linguistic group and come from the
south of China. These migrant workers remained in metropolitan cities and con-
tributed toward small, family-owned businesses ranging from beauty salons and
144 Saba Shahid
Chinese restaurants to export-oriented leather goods and even dental clinics. Most
families speak a combination of Urdu, English, and Hakka at home—an indication
of cultural retention. Lin observes a distinction between the older generation who
may refer to themselves as Chinese while the younger generation identify as Paki-
stani or Pakistani-Chinese (Lin, 2018). My own interviews in Lahore during 2019
included second-generation Chinese-Pakistanis who identify as Pakistani and have
assimilated with respect to fluency in Urdu and provincial dialects, developing a
palette for local cuisine, and being aware of the non-spoken rules of professional
and social mannerisms. Pakistan to them provides greater political freedom and
creative expression compared to China and allows a sense of individual identity.
However, there is also a sense of “othering” that they experience, and incidents of
racism continue to impact their everyday lives. Over time, many second-generation
Chinese-Pakistani’s have migrated to Western countries—Canada is for instance a
popular destination, a place that gives space to their multi-cultural identity. As a
result, despite a long history of Chinese migration to Pakistan, the community of
Chinese-Pakistanis continues to be limited in number.
A second wave of Chinese migration to Pakistan has occurred following greater
interaction between Chinese and Pakistani government officials in the run up to
the CPEC. These include Chinese professionals, business owners, laborers, and
state-sponsored personnel who have traveled to Pakistan in search of economic op-
portunity during the 2010s. It is these newer groups of Chinese workers to Pakistan
that are most likely traveling as a result of the buzz created around CPEC. These
Chinese expats are different from the Chinese-Pakistani community that migrated
during the mid-to-end century; they are involved in more formal channels of in-
come generation and tend to be associated with large multinational technological
corporations such as Haier, Changhong Ruba, Huawei, and Xiaomi, or with mega-
infrastructure projects involving road, rail, and energy plant construction. A sig-
nificant number of these expats are also engaged in the agricultural sector, running
their own farms for instance with the production of rice crop. The income profile of
these Chinese expats is also higher than the older Chinese-Pakistani communities
in the country, which made a living through small-scale, home-based businesses.
Data from the Pakistan-China Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry located in
Lahore shows around 50 Chinese enterprises associated with the Chamber, mostly
located in Punjab, around the eastern route of the CPEC.
While many travel to Pakistan on short-term and temporary assignments, sev-
eral are required to stay long term, traveling back to China during holidays—par-
ticularly those expats who have set up their own businesses. As a result, Pakistan
hosts Chinese expats who have varying durations of stay, which in turn impacts
their contact with local people and the kind of connections they are able to form.
Duration of Stay: Proximity Makes the Heart Grow Fonder

Much like the experience of the Chinese diaspora in Africa, the level of comfort
and familiarity Chinese migrants develop with respect to the local culture and
society is related to their duration of stay in Pakistan. Interviewees who had been
in Pakistan for over 5 years exhibited an inherent ease and understanding of the Pa-
kistani lifestyle. “Friendly,” “welcoming,” and “hospitable” were terms frequently
used to describe their experience of interacting with Pakistanis. “I have a lot of
local friends who invite me to their family events, weddings, births and even funer-
als” relays an interviewee who has been living in Pakistan since the past six years.
“People take time to open up and overcome their own biases as well, people felt
I may be different because I have no religion, or would comment about the poor
quality of Chinese products” (Interview with Chinese banking professional, La-
hore, June 2022). She added that these were prejudices, but nothing that could not
be overcome over time.
Many interviewees who have experience of life in Pakistan are also introspec-
tive in their discussion and explain that adaptation and assimilation is an indi-
vidual process and experiences may vary from person to person. They believe
the level of effort a migrant put into understanding their host country is also a
determinant of how smooth their adjustment period will be (Interview with Chi-
nese banking professional, Lahore, June 2022). An interviewee relayed his own
experiences and commented how he felt East Asians including Chinese, Kore-
ans, and Japanese tend to stay in closed groups and socialize among themselves.
His experience of Chinese malls in Los Angeles is an example, where everyone
spoke Mandarin and even the signboards were in Chinese characters (Interview
with Chinese language teacher and Business Consultant (Taiwanese), Zoom Call,
April 2022).
Chinese migrants are also cognizant and appreciative of the “Iron Brothers”
sentiment, a term commonly used to describe China-Pakistan relations. Despite
the challenges they face while adjusting to a new country, most interviewees
referred to an “unbreakable bond” that unites the two countries. It is evident in
their interactions that an alliance, a friendship, exists that motivates a sense of
good intentions and positive opinions for each other. In fact, many Chinese and
Pakistanis believe that despite the cultural differences, it is remarkable that the
friendship has sustained and although people-to-people contact has not been a
central focus in the past, CPEC has speeded up the process of engagement and
understanding.
While difficult to measure, this nonetheless remains a significant driver of
their perception and outlook of life in Pakistan. Likewise, the experiences of
these groups are varied, there are common features that have emerged from
conversations I had with Chinese expats working and living in Lahore. Dur-
ing my interviews I asked open-ended questions about their social life, their
experience of engaging with Pakistanis in social settings, and their lifestyles
after working hours. The next sections detail these observations along with
insights from Pakistani businessmen and an ex-Pakistani ambassador to China,
both with experience working with Chinese entrepreneurs. Additionally, inputs
from local and international academics studying the BRI and CPEC inform my
analysis.
146 Saba Shahid
Dynamics of People-to-People Contact: Differing Business Cultures

Perceptions about the Pakistani business environment and professional practices
are a strong determinant of Chinese expats’ willingness to socialize and interact
with their Pakistani counterparts. It is because of work that they first arrive in
Pakistan and subsequently their professional experiences motivate their personal
engagements and social lives.
In a news report, a manager of a Chinese restaurant in Islamabad explained how
most of his customers were corporate professionals “who are not looking to stay
in Pakistan for more than a couple of years and, hence, are not particularly looking
to assimilate, …The only time you see locals and Chinese mingling will be over
business. Otherwise, they find it difficult to interact with one another because of the
cultural differences” (Khan, 2019a). My own research indicated a pattern whereby
Chinese interviewees seemed more concerned with their work and experience of
work. They were either not very comfortable or were skeptical about sharing infor-
mation beyond their professional experiences. Even direct questions about social
interactions somehow ended up with answers about economic-development or the
business climate. A favorable economic outcome of their stay in Pakistan is what
motivates several of the Chinese migrants and determines their perception of the
country. Yet their professional experiences are marred by frequently changing gov-
ernment policies, differences in working culture, and the country’s long-standing
issue of power shortages.
A common concern of most interviewees is a professional working culture that
is different to that of China. Punctuality and meeting deadlines are a major hurdle
that Chinese professionals feel their Pakistani counterparts do not adhere to. Sev-
eral Chinese investors expressed that in China, efficiency and stable government
policies favored business, while in Pakistan the business climate is adversely im-
pacted by a political system that is volatile, changes taxation and visa policies fre-
quently, and is struggling with developing a working class that is skilled with basic
professional ethics (Interview with Chinese-Pakistani business owner, Lahore,
March 2022; Interview with Chinese agricultural scientist and business owner,
Lahore, May 2022). An interviewee who provides business consultancy services
commented on how it is difficult for him to find trustworthy local partners. In his
business of plastic waste export, he found that contacts gave unusually expensive
price quotations, often more expensive than European countries, and the exagger-
ated prices can be hard to competitively sell in the international market. He also
found that producers have “disappeared” after receiving money (Interview with
Chinese language teacher and Business Consultant (Taiwanese), Zoom Call, April
2022).
Visa extensions for the Chinese labors are a considerable challenge that Chi-
nese business owners face in Pakistan. One business owner explained how he felt
that immigration policies do not support foreign investment. The Board of Invest-
ment helps provide work visas, but the process is very cumbersome. People rely
on business visas and then extend them but the problem with that is slow process-
ing times. Furthermore, there is a penalty of 200–800 USD per person in case of
visa expiration, which can add up to a significant amount when you have a large
number of Chinese employees. Many CPEC projects involve Chinese labor as a
substantial part of the operational, managerial, and technical components of the
project. If their visa extensions impede their employment on the project, it is likely
that the message sent home is one of adverse working conditions with problems of
continuity in project operations. This is not only a disadvantage for an economy
like Pakistan that is looking for FDI and international investments, but also for the
scale of technological learning and knowledge transfer that is the expected to take
place between China and Pakistan vis-à-vis Chinese professionals.
There are also issues with the Federal Bureau of Revenue, which can deduct
money directly from a business account in the case of a fine or penalty, and this
may even happen without proof. “Even if you counter their claims and win a case,
the money isn’t returned, but instead adjusted in your tax payments. This disrupts
the cash-flow cycle which is highly detrimental to running a business” (Interview
with Chinese-Pakistani business owner, Lahore, March 2022). Accordingly, many
Chinese investors have left Pakistan. These incidents can impact the “trust” factor
in Sino-Pak collaborative efforts, which in turn can inform the opinion of Chinese
expats about the local socioeconomic environment.
Yet, the counter argument to that is that within China, evidence of corruption
in state institutions and state-run companies is strong, indicating a degree of inef-
ficiency and ineffectiveness in China as well. However, in China central authorities
function with very tight chains of command, down to the local level. Decisions are
implemented in a smooth top-down manner that leaves little room for error, delay,
or policy confusion. This is not the case in Pakistan, where multiple policy stake-
holders function in incongruous, overlapping mechanisms. Several CPEC projects
have been delayed due to this reason as well, where Pakistani administrative proce-
dures suffer from a duplication of mandates, unstructured departmental roles, and
ineffective federal-provincial-local coordination. Analytical reports such as those
by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) have indicated that CPEC projects
have exposed many of Pakistan’s governance weaknesses, which require extensive
structural reform to take full advantage of Chinese investments (Younus, 2021).
The current political situation, where the country’s top leadership has been in a
stalemate, has further jeopardized progress on CPEC projects, particularly those
earmarked for Phase-II of CPEC. An unstable political climate has had ripple ef-
fects on the entire administrative machinery of the country, impacting Chinese ex-
pats’ ability to effectively make progress with their enterprises. One interviewee
observed that while CPEC has been a pull factor for many Chinese entrepreneurs,
the local business standards here have adversely impacted their decision to stay on
(Interview with Chinese language teacher and Business Consultant (Taiwanese),
Zoom Call, April 2022).
Local business facilitators, such as the Pakistan-China Joint Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry feel that the situation is more nuanced at the local level than
it seems. A senior Pakistani representative from the Chamber explained that Chi-
nese professionals’ expectations could be influenced by the differences between
the two countries’ economies; China is now a developed nation and Pakistan is
148 Saba Shahid
still developing. The level of experience and age of the Chinese professional may
also influence their perception of the local system. According to him, the older
generation is more patient, has seen the economic struggle that led to China’s rise,
and is therefore more willing to engage with Pakistanis as they develop and grow.
Conversely, the new generation of Chinese businesspeople are competitive and
do not have the patience to deal with delays, or bureaucratic processes. They have
witnessed rapid wealth accumulation, part of which can be explained by China’s
one-child policy; many individuals are inheriting assets from both maternal and
paternal grandparents as their elders age and pass away (properties and rent are a
major source of their income) (Interview with Representative from Pakistan-China
Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Lahore, March 2022). Chinese profes-
sionals today are also a product of an education system that rigorously includes
discipline, social work, and community development as part of their curricula.
“We focus a lot on morality and ethics in conducting business, we train our youth
in schools and during jobs about this sentiment—in addition to academics, moral
training is essential” noted an interviewee (Interview with Chinese agricultural sci-
entist and business owner, Lahore, May 2022). He continued to mention that the
Chinese working in Pakistan expect a similar level of professionalism and discipli-
nary training to exist locally but may often find that this is not the case across the
board. In fact, in Pakistan the public education system is riddled with decade-long
issues of poor teacher training, outdated courses, and a culture of rote learning.
Moreover, only 12 percent graduate with tertiary education (compared to 58 per-
cent of Chinese) resulting in a professional cadre that has limited qualifications and
is ill equipped with international professional cultures (World Bank, 2022).
To add to the mismatch in business/economic engagement is a significant lan-
guage barrier that impedes meaningful, more deeper interactions between Chinese
and Pakistani people—both in terms of professional and social dealings. Pakistani
labor is either conversant in Urdu, the national language, or local provincial di-
alects. Middle-income professionals are fluent in both English and Urdu, in ad-
ditional to having a good grasp of local dialects. Despite the rapid increase of
Chinese language centers in Pakistan, English remains the most common spoken
foreign language in the country, not Chinese. Of course, this stems from Pakistan
being a British colony for over 200 years, where English was institutionalized as
the medium of instruction within the education sector and the official language for
public sector institutions.
Likewise, many Chinese struggle with English and Urdu—a competitive disad-
vantage for them in both international and Pakistani markets. As a result, a middle
ground is achieved whereby Chinese migrants interact with locals in limited Eng-
lish or Urdu. There are local translators that can act as intermediaries, but again
this exercise is likely to be limited to the working environment. Whether shopping
at their local grocery stores, frequenting cafes and restaurants, or even going out
to watch plays or movies, Chinese expats are likely to either have to converse in
Urdu or English, which can be a challenge as they perceive Urdu as a “difficult”
language to learn (Interview with Chinese language teacher and Business Consult-
ant (Taiwanese), Zoom, April 2022).
Security Concerns and Private Social “Bubbles”

It has been established that a significant part of the Chinese experience of life in Pa-
kistan is affected by their professional environment and work-related interactions.
There is however another major influence—the security climate of the country.
Security concerns over the safety of Chinese workers impact their ability to move
around the city they live in and socialize with locals. Since the launch of CPEC,
Chinese workers have been targets of terror attacks, often as soft targets, easily
victimized to send strong political messages and create media attention (Baloch,
2022). A common local perspective is that several of these attacks are a result of
proxy conflicts motivated by foreign powers and have little to do with Chinese
nationals themselves. At the same time there is also evidence that these killings are
masterminded by ethnic separatists, particularly in Sindh and Balochistan, who be-
lieve CPEC infrastructure projects are exploitative and disadvantage local commu-
nities and their natural resources to the benefit of Chinese business owners (Baloch,
2022). Balochistan, where several CPEC infrastructure projects are located, has
a long history of complaints against the central government with respect to local
employment and economic opportunities. To the marginalized ethnic communities
there, CPEC infrastructure projects represent yet another lost opportunity, where
foreign powers, in collaboration with the federal government, are using Balochi
resources without involving and empowering the locals.
In April 2022, a suicide bombing at the Karachi University killed three Chinese
language tutors triggering a departure of several Chinese academics, particularly
those working in Confucius Institutes. As a result, employers have responded by
either withdrawing their personnel out of the country or restricting their movement
in Pakistan through heavily guarded commuting routes. One interviewee shared
how “Chinese people move to Pakistan at high personal costs” ensuring their safety
is not only important for the individual but also “falls as a responsibility of the
business” (Interview with Chinese business consultant, Zoom, May 2022). Another
interviewee commented that the CPEC is a government-to-government project,
in which the Chinese government decides which Chinese businesses to send to
Pakistan. These are usually state-owned or partially state-owned and they bring
their own workers who remain on their construction sites and are encouraged to
stay within the government set-up. Private individuals/companies watching them
believe they may have similar opportunities, but the story is different for them; the
institutional support they receive is negligible. Only in extreme circumstances will
the embassy intervene, he explained (Interview with Chinese language teacher and
Business Consultant (Taiwanese), Zoom, April 2022).
Another solution has been to provide the Chinese workers with serviced com-
munal living spaces, equipped with all the necessary amenities needed from gro-
cery stores to banking services all within a confined space—what locals commonly
refer to as “bubbles.” Security-escorted vehicles transport them to and from their
places of work. News articles have similarly reported on the fear the Chinese ex-
perience as a hindrance to their interaction with locals. One such report noted,
“due to the short nature of their stay, most of them do not feel the need to learn
150 Saba Shahid
local languages. Their cultural understanding of Pakistan also remains limited.

Their isolation is heightened by the availability of facilities that cater exclusively
to a Chinese clientele” (Khan, 2019b).
The communal living tradition is something many Chinese people will attest to.
Interviewees have spoken of the “peacefulness” that comes with working and liv-
ing in the same place (Interview with Chinese Banking Professional, Lahore, June
2022). Others have described the efficiency and value of highly closed, “private”
community-based clubs set up mostly in large cities such as Lahore, Islamabad,
and Karachi. One interviewee described in detail the arrangement of these clubs;
they are run in people’s homes and are not open to the public. They serve authentic
Chinese cuisine and even entertainment akin to nightclubs where everything is
available, from alcohol, and allegedly even female escorts. They do not do business
with outside people, and Pakistanis can only enter if someone from the community
brings them in. Individual Pakistanis have even attempted to pay high amounts
such as 2–300,000 PKR for entry but have been refused, he explained (Interview
with Chinese-Pakistani business owner, Lahore, March 2022). Another interviewee
mentioned Chinese guesthouses that provide accommodation and food for Chinese
workers—there are an estimated 40 in Lahore alone (Interview with Chinese lan-
guage teacher and Business Consultant (Taiwanese), Zoom, April 2022).5 A pref-
erence for community-based social clubs also stems from a sense of disconnect
some may feel while socializing in public. An interviewee described his discom-
fort of visiting the Lahore Zoo and feeling like he had “become a zoo animal”
when people stared too much (Interview with Chinese-Pakistani business owner,
Lahore, March 2022). He questioned his choices with respect to socializing in pub-
lic spaces, feeling limited in his ability to do so beyond his community and private
circles. In general, Pakistani cities are not cosmopolitan spaces, and as the country
opens up to new investment opportunities, partly through CPEC, the Chinese may
well be the first significant diaspora to establish themselves.
Religion and Questions of “Morality”

Cultural norms in Pakistan tend to be influenced by religion. The country is vastly
Muslim—around 96% of the population, with a small religious minority of Chris-
tians and Hindus. Islamic values are propounded extensively in school curricula,
through the print and digital media and heavily through political rhetoric and
political campaigning and sloganeering. In fact, over time political parties have
developed a strong political base in their constituencies by focusing on Islamic
sloganeering and giving party tickets to Islamic scholars and religious influencers.
Moreover, the selective politicization of religion, while detrimental to an individ-
ual’s personal ability and freedom to practice by choice, has frequently been used
as a strategic mechanism to influence the masses by political leaders. Therefore,
religion, and the practice of religion, has become a significant part of Pakistan’s
sociocultural environment.
This is an aspect of societal life that the Chinese migrants find different to
their home culture, where religion is not explicitly expressed in public domain.
Conversely, China’s treatment of the Uighur Muslims, a minority ethno-religious

group concentrated in the country’s north-western province of Xinjiang, has raised
eyebrows and international concern by human rights organizations. China has been
consistent in implementing a strict anti-terrorism policy which the state links fre-
quently to the Uighur population present there (Ramachandran, 2018).
According to a former Pakistani Ambassador to China, stark religious differ-
ences are a significant reason why Chinese professionals will not seek long-term
employment or investment in Pakistan (Interview with a Former Pakistani Ambas-
sador to China, Zoom, March 2022). However, there are commonalities such as
high values attached to morality and virtuous personal character in both societies.
In fact, as voiced by an interviewee, honesty, hard work, helpfulness, loyalty, and
patriotism are traits Chinese professionals will seek in their everyday dealings (In-
terview with Chinese agricultural scientist and business owner, Lahore, May 2022).
A family-oriented culture is another trait Chinese migrants find similar to their
own tradition. “Eid is like our Chinese New Year” an interviewee commented, it
revolves around the elders and celebrates the young through traditions such as
Eidi where children receive gifts (Interview with Chinese agricultural scientist and
business owner, Lahore, May 2022). There is also substantial evidence of inter-
cultural marriages taking place between Chinese men working in Pakistan and Pa-
kistani women, even if these are not very frequent. According to anthropologist
Kiran Hassan, marrying a Chinese person outside your faith is surprisingly not met
with religious opposition within these families—the economic benefits supersede
any cultural biases indicating “China and Islam’s peaceful coexistence” (Hassan,
2021). Hardcore religious clerics too focus their criticism on the US or India as tra-
ditional targets and have not chosen to focus on these intermarriages as unorthodox.
Women from Xinjiang have a long history of marrying men from adjacent Gilgit-
Baltistan in northern Pakistan, but the marriages taking place in larger metropolitan
cities like Sialkot, Sargodha, or even Lahore are a more recent phenomenon. Many
of these Pakistani brides are of Christian faith, others are Muslims. There are also
several controversial marriages taking place with news reports of Pakistani women
from low-income families being sold as brides to Chinese businessmen. Al Jazeera
for instance reported that between 2018 and 2019 over 600 girls from poor Chris-
tian families, one of the most vulnerable communities in Pakistan, were trafficked
to China through forced marriages. China in turn has a high demand for “wives”
due to its significant number of missing women—there are around 34 million more
men than women in the country owing to the preference for the male child and the
incidence of female infanticide that took place during the one-child policy era (Al
Jazeera, 2019).
There are happy stories as well, for instance the marriage between a senior
engineer of a Chinese construction company and her Pakistani colleague, the
chief executive officer of the same company, that made local headlines. Both
worked together on CPEC infrastructure projects including on the Islamabad In-
ternational Airport and the Multan-Sukkur Motorway. The Chinese senior engi-
neer had to convert to Islam before marrying into the CEO’s conservative family
from DI Khan while he had to convince her family about her safety in his home
152 Saba Shahid
country (Yousafzai, 2019). These stories, albeit anecdotal in nature, suggest the
possibility of cultural exchange growing between Pakistanis and Chinese to the
point where a sizeable Chinese diaspora exists and participates in local societal
life in the long run.
Gender Dynamics
Stark differences in gender roles are another aspect the Chinese find different to
their home culture. Several male interviewees commented how their wives may
find it difficult to adjust to a largely patriarchal culture in Pakistan. Women are
often restricted to domestic lives, and even at family events are segregated from
the men, one interviewee observed. He added that the Chinese leader Mao Ze-
dong has played in an important role in promoting women to be equal to men and
as equal contributors to the country (Interview with Chinese agricultural scientist
and business owner, Lahore, May 2022). This is a story common to many male
Chinese expats in Pakistan, who often move to the country alone and travel back
to China to visit their families. Security is a concern as described above, but so
are gender dynamics and a culture where women do not move around freely. It is
important to note that many CPEC projects are situated in rural areas which are
yet to even witness the kind of globalization in women’s fashion and clothing that
has occurred in Pakistan’s urban metropolises. For those Chinese professionals
working in rural areas, residing with their families would require considerable
adjustment. There are also the unspoken rules of interaction between men and
women. Assimilating and socializing together is an urban phenomenon, and that
too mostly in private spaces. It would be rare to see men and women mixing
freely in open public spaces such as parks, especially when the two are not rela-
tives. Certain areas or points of meeting are more welcoming to groups of men
and women together such as cafes, cinemas, or universities but this would depend
on the city, and within the city, the township/locality. These aspects of Pakistani
social life can take time to navigate and can be a serious impediment to short-
term temporary Chinese workers, who might be intimidated by the relatively
more defined gender roles.
There are the odd Chinese female expats too, who have traveled to Pakistan
due to work. Although gender disaggregated data on Chinese workers in Pakistan
is hard to find, it is safe to say there are significantly fewer Chinese women than
men who have come to Pakistan in search of economic opportunities. One such
female interviewee who traveled with her daughter to work at a large bank said she
noticed that women do not shake hands with men in Pakistan. She found the Paki-
stani culture to be one that can take time to adjust to, but once you learn the local
traditions and understand the societal dynamics, socializing can be quite enjoyable.
For instance, she felt that she could be more independent in the larger metropolitan
cities, drive by herself, and socialize freely. She even takes short trips to the north-
ern areas with her daughter having gained the confidence to do so (Interview with
Chinese banking professional, Lahore, June 2022). According to her, with time you
realize there are many kinds of cultures within Pakistani society; it is about finding
similarities and adjusting to the differences (Interview with Chinese banking pro-
fessional, Lahore, June 2022).
Conclusion and Recommendations

According to statistics from the PEW Research Centre, Pakistanis view China the
most positively after China itself (Siddique, 2022: 84). Additionally, as the preced-
ing analysis suggests, the two countries share a strong foundation of friendship
and brotherhood that has sustained through generations. With respect to CPEC,
people-to-people interaction has rightly been identified as a priority objective, as
the potential of economic collaboration between the two communities can signifi-
cantly be enhanced where there is better cultural understanding on both sides. In
fact, within Pakistani media and policy circles, the CPEC has predominantly been
presented as a unique opportunity to alleviate several development challenges the
country faces. As economic activity concentrates in and around CPEC projects,
they are likely to pull in more Chinese and Pakistani investors, along with financial
capital, technological knowledge, skills, and machinery that can be adopted by
the local market, thereby creating opportunities for “economic leapfrogging” in
Pakistan.
Yet, for effective agglomeration forces to set in with respect to the CPEC, it is
essential that what I call “positive feedback pipelines” are established. This entails
that the existing community of Chinese migrants working in Pakistan communi-
cate a favorable account of their professional and social experiences. Several of my
interviewees shared concerns with respect to aspects such as political instability,
threat to security, gender-based inequality, and differences in religious practice.
These facets impact the daily lives of Chinese expats, including their social en-
gagements and interactions outside of their work environments.
While people-to-people contact entails organic, bottom-up interactions between
Chinese and Pakistani people, there is room for public sector facilitation to im-
prove and support greater engagement. References to cultural differences or chal-
lenges to cultural assimilation of the Chinese expats working here are seldom made
in official CPEC documents. Aspects such as language, cuisine, work ethics, cul-
tural practices are indicators that can either be learnt and adapted to or be seen as
differences and deter positive people-to-people exchanges. To ensure learning and
adaptation, integrating the experiences of the Chinese expat community in Pakistan
is a necessary endeavor to facilitate their cultural learning curves and hence foster
meaningful people-to-people contact. Similarly, prioritizing engagement with local
Pakistanis and ensuring their participation in CPEC projects will alleviate antago-
nism or feelings of exploitation that have previously threatened Chinese personnel
and their ability to assimilate.
Consequently, recommendations from the interviewees I spoke to can be of sig-
nificant value to those wanting insight on individual-level insight on people-to-
people contact and how it can be improved. Several interviewees have for instance
suggested the sizeable community of Pakistani students in China as an instru-
ment of promoting an understanding of Chinese culture. A consortium of around
154 Saba Shahid
12 Chinese and Pakistani universities exists and there are around 11 Pakistan/
South Asia Study Centers in Chinese universities which can similarly act as contact
points for understanding the Pakistani culture. These collaborations can be scaled
up and expanded (Interview with a Former Pakistani Ambassador to China, Zoom,
March 2022). University linkages and think tank interactions can play an important
role in promoting greater engagement and which fall under the mandate of CPEC’s
cultural engagement policies. Likewise, by building on the experiences of Chinese
professionals working in Pakistan, they can be used to both train other Chinese
migrants about conducting business in Pakistan and to train Pakistani workers em-
ployed in Chinese-owned businesses (Interview with Chinese agricultural scientist
and business owner, Lahore, May 2022).
Promoting Chinese tourism in Pakistan is another area to build people-to-people
contact according to a former Pakistani Ambassador to China. Estimates suggest
that prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, around 130 million Chinese students traveled
internationally as tourists, generating a total of around 100 billion USD in revenue
in the countries that they visited. Pakistan received a negligible proportion of that
indicating a severe lacking tourism infrastructure and suggesting that Pakistan is
not a top travel destination for its Chinese neighbors, despite the geographic prox-
imity and relatively lower costs of travel and accommodation (Interview with a
Former Pakistani Ambassador to China, Zoom, March 2022). Visiting Pakistan and
exploring the local culture and establishing the country as a popular destination for
Chinese tourists can create channels for cultural engagement. Part of efforts to pro-
mote tourism can include complementary museum exhibitions where collections
based on common historic heritage including Buddhist artifacts can play a positive
role in fostering conversations and deeper understandings (Interview with a Former
Pakistani Ambassador to China, Zoom, March 2022).
Bilateral media collaborations, including with media houses and film produc-
tion companies, are another area that was suggested by interviewees as a means
to appreciate each other’s culture. Although media-based interactions fall under
the domain of CPEC collaboration, these have not taken full advantage of the im-
pact audiovisual imagery can have on building cultural appreciation, particularly
through jointly produced movies and drama series. Additionally, by providing au-
dio and subtitle options in Chinese and Urdu, the media and entertainment industry
can considerably help improve the existing language barrier (Interview with a For-
mer Pakistani Ambassador to China, Zoom, March 2022).
Chinese analysts have suggested setting up “joint grievance centers” that spe-
cifically address issues Chinese professionals face in Pakistan (Youkang, 2022).
These centers can for instance focus on common issues such as business regis-
tration, visa extension, taxation policies, and labor employment. More recently, a
CPEC authority has been set up as a one-stop center to facilitate all CPEC-related
activity, yet its role in business facilitation and promoting cultural understanding is
yet to be seen enfolding.
To conclude, this chapter has attempted to evaluate how people-to-people con-
tact is enfolding in Pakistan vis-à-vis the CPEC. It has provided an introductory
analysis on the challenges the Chinese expat community faces with respect to
socializing and interacting with local Pakistanis beyond the work environment.
The chapter acts as preliminary research on the subject, conducted with a relatively
small sample size of interviewees. Gaining insight from a larger group of Chinese
and Pakistani stakeholders involved and impacted by the CPEC would be the next
step to this research. Moreover, exploring in greater detail Pakistani attitudes about
the Chinese culture would provide the other half of perspectives that would further
enrich this study and expose additional barriers to people-to-people contact.
Notes
1 The first agreement of its kind was signed in 1964 and promoted engagement through
policies such as visa facilitation. More recently, the Executive Programme of Cultural
Agreement signed in 2018 has hoped to promote people-to-people contact through cul-
tural events such as the CPEC Cultural Caravan—a traveling expo of art exhibitions,
seminars, talks, and literary events. Similarly, the CPEC Summit and Expo involves
cultural shows and performances.
2 I interviewed five Chinese professionals working in Pakistan, a Pakistani representative
from the Pakistan-China Joint Chamber of Commerce, a former Pakistani Ambassador
to China, and two academics working on CPEC and China’s historic territorial conflicts,
respectively. The names of the interviewees have been kept anonymous.
3 According to the latest population census (2017), around 1.4 million people are counted
as ‘non-Pakistani.’
4 Between 1971 and 2020, the Pakistani Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment
(BE&OE) 11 million were registered as workers abroad.
5 This number has dropped down to ten during the pandemic according to the interviewee.
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Interviews
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Index
Note: Page numbers in italics and bold refer to figures and tables, respectively.
Aghaz-e-Huqooqe-Balochistan package 105 investment (FDI) 107; majoritarian

agribusinesses 11; see also agriculture and federal model and the centralized
Chinese agribusiness investments management of CPEC 103–107;
agricultural policies 36 provinces 126; security situation and
agriculture and Chinese agribusiness militarized approach to development
investments 33–35; CPEC 35–38; 100–103; separatists 99; violence in 100
export prospects 33; farming systems Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) 99
35; investments in crop production Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) 79
42–46; Kazakhstan 34; pesticide and Baloch militants 80; and terrorist 78
seed sectors 38–42; Tajikistan 34 Baloch Spring 94
Ahmed, Zahid Shahab 11, 74 Ba Tie 11, 115–116, 121–123
Al Kaabi, Nawal 116 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 1–2, 6–9,
Allama Iqbal Special Economic Zone 37 14, 34, 54, 93, 116, 141; China’s own
All-China Women’s Federation 118 developmental model 3; connectivity
All Pakistan-China Friendship Association under 6; investment 1, 4; see also
(APCFA) 120 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (CPEC); Pakistan
(AIIB) 58, 63 Belt and Road Summit 61
Asif, Numra 115 Bhutto, Benazir 52, 119
attacks on CPEC Projects and Chinese Bhutto, Nusrat 119
nationals/citizens in Pakistan 79 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 8, 52
authoritarian coalitions 16 Boom-Bust Cycles 15
Automobile Development Policy 22 BRI see Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
automobile sector 22 brotherhood 62; see also Iron
Awami National Party 69n1 Brother/Ba Tie
Ayub, Attia 120 Bugti’s assassination 101
Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) 126 Burkina Faso 142
Azhar, Masood 76
capability development strategies 17
Bajwa, Asim Saleem 43, 76, 84, 122 capitalist political settlements 15
Bajwa, Qamar 79 CCTV cameras 83
Baloch, Malik 102 centralization 53, 64
Balochistan 8, 75, 82; CPEC Fiasco in chili: demand in China 44–45; export 45;
99–109; CPEC in 95–99, 97; discontent farming 43–45
102; economic development initiative China: actors involved in CPEC 4, 7,
93, 102; extractive approach to 33–36, 43, 46, 64; foreign policy
development 107–109; foreign direct towards Pakistan 67, 116–121; global
Index 159
agency 3, 10; motivations behind the clientelistic political settlements 15

BRI/CPEC 45–46, 108–110; see also colonialism 95
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; communication golden anchor award 115
Pakistan communication linkage 57
China International Science and Communist Party of China 61
Technology Cooperation Award 124 community-based social clubs 150
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) competitive clientelism 16
1–2, 93; apex decision-making body 93; Concession Agreement 98
in Balochistan 11, 93–110, 97; Belt and confidence-building measures (CBMs) 102
Road Initiative (BRI) 6–9; centralization Confucius Institutes (CIs) 58, 62, 70n7,
53; China’s developmental approach 139, 149
3; and civil-military relations 67–68; content-sharing agreements 3
communication linkage under 62–63; Council of Common Interests (CCI) 103
controversies 9; corporate farming Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors
43; CPEC Media Forum “Golden (CPNE) 62
Anchor” Awards 124–126; CPEC counterterrorism 86
Pakistani Worker Awards 126–127; COVID-19 pandemic 55, 81, 120; imact of
crown jewel 98; cultural linkage 4, 40
under 61–62; “debt trap” for Pakistan CPEC Authority 5, 25, 37, 76, 88
120; employment data 127–130; and CPEC Media Forum “Golden Anchor”
federalism 65–66; friendship awards Awards 124–126, 125
124–127; funding 34; gender equality crop production 35, 46
and society 130; global Chinese culture/cultural: assimilation 142; distance
agency 2–4; industrial cooperation 141; influence 138; integration 140;
15, 18–27; intergovernmental linkage linkage 57
under 63–65; investments in 6, 14, 57;
launch 14; long-term plan (LTP) 18, dairy sectors 46
33, 36, 93; majoritarian federal model defective democracy 53
and centralized management 103–107; defence 86
military involvement 9; Outstanding degree of freedom 54
Pakistani Employee 126–127; Pakistan’s democracy in Pakistan 52; Chinese
domestic politics 4–6; protest movement linkage 57–65; communication linkage
8–9; related business 3; security threats 4, under CPEC 62–63; CPEC and civil-
11; social linkage under 60–61; strategic military relations 67–68; CPEC and
alignment 3; western alignment 97, 104, federalism 65–66; cultural linkage
110; western route 108; see also Pakistan under CPEC 61–62; democracy 52–57;
China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement economic linkage under CPEC 58–60;
(CPFTA) 58–59 intergovernmental linkage under CPEC
China-Pakistan Joint Agricultural 63–65; social linkage under CPEC 60–61
demonstrations 37 development coalitions 16
China-Pakistan Joint Agricultural digital investments 139
Technology Laboratory 37
China-Pakistan relations 115–116; bilateral economic linkage 57
media collaborations 154; bilateral environmental damages 3
trade 59, 138; CPEC and employment ethno-regional conflicts 93–95; CPEC
data 127–130; feminist perspective Fiasco in Balochistan 99–109; CPEC in
116–121; Friendship Awards 123–127; Balochistan 95–99; extractive approach
gender-limited construction 123; Iron to development 107–109; majoritarian
Brother/Ba Tie 11, 115–116, 121–123; federal model and the centralized
Sino-Pakistan relations 57, 120, 124; management of CPEC 103–107;
see also China-Pakistan Economic security situation and militarized
Corridor; Pakistan approach to development 100–103
China-Punjab Economic Corridor 82, 106 ethno-regional tensions 95
CIs see Confucius Institutes export processing zones (EPZs) 28
160 Index
facial recognition technology 83 relocation 19–20; lack of credibility

family-oriented culture 151 25–26; organisational interests 27;
farming: contract 45; contract farmers 41, political changes 24–25; political
44; corporate 39, 43, 46; Corporate settlement and nature of rents 20–23; see
Farming Ordinance 39 also China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Federal Bureau of Revenue 147 industrial relocation 19–20
Federal Chambers of Commerce of intelligence sharing 86
Industry 85 intergovernmental linkage 57
Federal Minister for Planning and internationalization of higher education 60
Development 82 internationalization of local labor force 143
foreign direct investment (FDI) 1, 19, 38, inter-services public relations (ISPR) 85
42, 77, 81, 88, 97, 107, 138, 141, 147 Iqbal, Ahsan 77, 81–83
foreign land investments 34 Iron Brother/Ba Tie 11, 115–116, 121–123
free trade argument 141 Islamic sloganeering 150
friendship awards 123–124; CPEC Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 78
124–127; CPEC Media Forum “Golden
Anchor” Awards 124–126; CPEC Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan 69n1
Pakistani Worker Awards 126–127; Jamiat Ulemae-Islam (F) 69n1
Outstanding Pakistani Employee Janjua, Saleem 125
126–127 Janjua, Tehmina 121
Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) 27 Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) 5, 36,
64, 93, 96, 104
gender dynamics 152–153 Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 80
gender equality and society 130 Joint Working Group (JWG) 18
geostrategic security 85–87 journalistic exchanges 62, 63
Gilgit-Baltistan 8, 36, 43, 80, 151
Global China 2, 11 Kalabagh Dam 106
Golden Anchor award 124–126 Kamal, Jam 106
Green BRI 4; see also Belt and Road Karachi Stock Exchange attack, 2020 79
Initiative Karachi University 149
Green Revolution 36 Karakoram mountains 7–8
Gwadar: Free Zone 98; Gwadar-ko- Kazakhstan 34
haq-do movement 94; Gwadar Port Khan, Ayub 52, 122
Authority (GPA) 104; harbor of 7–8, Khan, Imran 5, 52, 65–66, 76, 80–82
10, 93; port 104, 107; Pro 48n2, 124, Khan, Masood 124
126; Safe City Project 83 Khan, Yahya 52
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) 82, 106, 126
Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) testing “kinetic” military anti-terrorism campaigns 78
centers 61 Kosar, Shakeela 115
Haq, Zia ul 119 Kulikova, Galina 116
Haq Do Tehreek (demand rights movement) 8
Hilal-e-Imtiaz 120 Labor Force Survey 128
Hindi-Chini Bhai (India-China brothers) 123 labor movement 141
human capital development 140 labour-intensive industries 18
Human Resource Development 60 Lahore Chamber of Commerce & Industry
(LCCI) 25
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) 17 land grabbing 39, 141; by Chinese investors
independent power producers (IPPs) 26 42; practices 3
India-China War, 1963 143 Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) 55, 56
Indus plains 35 Li Keqiang 116, 121
Indus River 35 Lin, Alice 143–144
industrial cooperation under CPEC in Lin Yi 120
Pakistan 18–19; industrial policies and Li Teh-Chuan 118
political settlement 23–25; industrial load-shedding 6
Index 161
Longping Hi-Tech Agriculture 41 economic performance 14, 16–18;

Looney, Robert 42 export 21; “hybrid” regime type
low-productivity growth 17 53; industrial cooperation under
CPEC 18–27; industrial policies
MacDonald, Juliette Ann 116 23–25; investments in 18; “kinetic”
Makran Coastal Highway 106 military anti-terrorism campaigns
Malik, Husain 118 78; low-productivity growth 17;
maritime security 78 manufacturing sector 17; military
Maritime Silk Roads 6 rule 52–53; nature of rents,
Maritime Silk Road Tourism Promotion political settlements and 20–23;
Alliance 60 organisational interests 27; political
Marri, Balach 101 regimes of 53; political settlement
Mekran division 96 15–16, 20–23, 26, 28; power
migrant culture 140 sector 25–26; power shift in 5;
migratory waves from China to Pakistan security measures 4; short-termism
143–144 21; structural change, political
military rules in Pakistan 52 settlements and 15–16; textile
military-to-military exchanges 86 sector 18; women’s delegation 118;
Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis 60 see also China-Pakistan Economic
Mirza, Fahmida 123 Corridor
modern agriculture 36, 39 Pakistan-China Joint Chamber of
modern cultural diplomacy 138 Commerce 144
Modi, Narendra 87 Pakistan-China Joint Chamber of
Mullah Band 106 Commerce and Industry 147
Multan-Sukkur Motorway 28 Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) 81
Munir, Asim 85 Pakistani Students studying in China 61
Musharraf, Pervez 52, 75, 77, 100 Pakistani Worker Awards 126–127
Muttahida Qaumi Movement 69n1 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)
5, 24, 52, 67, 69n1, 81–82, 123
National Accountability Bureau (NAB) 21 Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) 69n1
National Agriculture Research Centre Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 52, 69n1, 119
(NARC) 37 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 21–25, 27,
National Counter Terrorism Authority of 52, 54, 63, 66–68, 69n1, 80–84, 87–88,
Pakistan 81 123, 130
National Development and Reform Panama Papers scandal 80
Commission (NDRC) 26, 126 Parliamentary Committees on CPEC 5
National Food Security Policy 33 patron-client factions 16
National University of Modern Language Pearl Continental attack 79
(NUML) 61 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 122
Nawaz, Saima 115 people-to-people contact 57, 61, 138–141;
neoliberalization of agriculture 34 Africa, insights from 141–143; business
northern areas 8 cultures 146–148; Chinese diaspora in
Pakistan 143; duration of stay 144–145;
outstanding Pakistani employee of CPEC gender dynamics 152–153; global
project award 115, 126–127 Chinese diaspora 141–143; migratory
waves from China to Pakistan 143–144;
Pakistan: agribusinesses 11; agricultural religion and morality 150–152; security
policies in 33; armed Chinese concerns and private social “Bubbles”
security contractors in 4; in Belt 149–150
and Road Initiative (BRI) 1; China, pesticide and seed sectors 34, 38–42
alignment with 1–2; conflict pesticide companies in Multan 39
with India 87; credibility issue political sloganeering 142
25–26; cultural norms 150–152; polyarchy 55
domestic politics and CPEC 4–6; Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) 104
162 Index
priority special economic zones (PSEZs) South Korea 23

18–19, 25, 98 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 37–38,
Provision of Agricultural Equipment and 59, 131
tools 37 Special Security Division (SSD) 78
Public Sector Development Programme Sri Lanka 142
(PSDP) 28, 98 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 14
steel sisters 121
Qin Gang 85 subsidised capital 20
Qureshi, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood 115 suicide attack on Chinese language centre
in Karachi, 2022 80
racial prejudice 141 surveillance systems 83
Rashakai 27 Syed, Mushahid Hussain 85, 124
Rehman, Sherry 119–120
resource allocation 15 Taiwan 23
return on equity (ROE) 21 Tajikistan 34, 47
ruling coalitions 15–16 Talpur, Suhai Aziz 120
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 78
Saeed, Hafiz 77 terrorism in Gwadar 83
Salim, Maryam 116 terrorism in Pakistan: 2008–2014 77, 77;
second-generation Chinese-Pakistanis 139 2015–2022 79
securitization of CPEC 74–76; actors TikTok 139
75; context 76–78; economic and transgenic (Bt) cotton 40
geostrategic narratives 81; economic Transport Planning 93
security 81–87; geostrategic security transregional economic development
85–87; security threats 78–81; theory 75 programme 117
security 74
semi-knockdown (SKD) kits 26 Uighur Muslims 151
Shahnawaz, Jahanara 117–119
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Wang Yi 116
58, 63, 76 Wen Jiabao 122–123
Sharif, Nawaz 52, 66–68, 80–81, 83, 86, western alignment 97, 104, 110
103, 108 women: role in CPEC 119–121; role
Sharif, Raheel 78, 87, 122 in diplomacy 117; see also gender
short-term incentive system 23 dynamics; gender equality and society
Silk Road 6 World Conference of Women in Beijing 118
Silk Route Economic Belts 6
“sister city” agreements 139 Xiaomi 144
Sitara-i-Pakistan 120 Xi Jinping 4, 6–7, 80, 86, 115, 121, 123–
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 19 124, 131, 138
socialization 139 Xinhua News 125
social linkage 57 Xinjiang 151; province 93; Uyghur
Socio-Economic Development 37 Autonomous Region (XUAR) 8
Soong Ching-ling 118
South Asian Association for Regional Zardari, Asif Ali 52, 70n9
Cooperation (SAARC) 76 Zhao Baige 120
Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation Zhou Enlai 118–119, 122
(SEATO) 117–118 Zia-ul-Haq 52, 75

(Rethinking Asia and International Relations) Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, Hasan H. Karrar - China, Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative_ the Experience of an Early Adopter State-Routledge (2024)

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“An indispensable volume for analyzing not only the infrastructural politics

of development in Pakistan – but also for developing a grounded understand-

Hasan H. Karrar is an Associate Professor at Lahore University of Management

Such comprehensive engagement not only aims to offer a critical assessment

The Arctic in China’s National Strategy

China, Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Rethinking-Asia-and-

Edited by Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni

ISBN: 9781032640174 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

1 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Ten: Taking Stock

2 Pakistan’s Political Settlement and the Prospect of Industrial

3 Agriculture and Chinese Agribusiness Investments in the

4 CPEC and De-Democratization in Pakistan 52

5 The Securitization of CPEC 74

6 BRI and Ethno-Regional Conflicts: A Case Study of CPEC

7 China-Pakistan Relations, Gender and the China Pakistan

8 People-to-People Contact under CPEC: Fact or Fiction? 138

an Islamabad-Beijing-Riyadh Triangle: Assessing Saudi Arabia’s Role in the

Pascal Abb, Filippo Boni, and Hasan H. Karrar

CPEC’s Significance for Global Chinese Agency

CPEC and Pakistan’s Domestic Politics

of new bureaucracies to cope with the multi-billion-dollar investments; the cen-

Grounding the Belt and Road

infrastructure—containers and ports, rail lines, and highways—are used as a

In Pakistan development assumes the provision or promise of public goods and

education … we don’t want such a CPEC” (Rizwan 2022). Similar to Saindak,

Conclusions and Outline of the Volume

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2015, has often

Political Settlements and Structural Change

of patron-client factions and ruling coalitions. These are potential development

Pakistan’s Economy: Boom-Bust Cycles and Manufacturing

Figure 2.1 Manufacturing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP

Industrial Cooperation under CPEC

The Political Settlement and Nature of Rents

Industrial Policies and the Political Settlement

of local technical capabilities. Despite these aims, Pakistan continues to have

Changes in the political settlement also contributed to significantly cooling rela-

Multiple organisational interests are wary of the impact of Chinese investment

Roy, P. (2013) The Political Economy of Growth under Clientelism: An Analysis of Gu

Appendix 2.1: List of Interviewees

Politician1 November 2018

In July 2017, an early draft of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

companies, primarily driven by commercial motives, have found a more favorable

Pakistan’s Agriculture and the Promises of the CPEC

An article published by Pro Pakistani in 2022 offers further details on apparent

Chinese Agribusiness Investments: The Pesticide and Seed Sectors

to modernize the “backward” agricultural sector of Pakistan. This is not an entirely

Figure 3.1 Rice seed exports from China to Pakistan, 2001–2020

Investments in Crop Production

Apparently, many applications by Chinese investors for leasing agricultural

Already in 2008, when companies from Gulf countries announced to acquire

Last week, they came to my office, wanted to do chili farming. We discussed,

Years Regime Type

1947–1958 Democratic rule

infrastructure, transport, and industrial cooperation. But what political implications

Freedom House Democracy Index

Figure 4.1 Freedom House democracy scores for Pakistan

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index

Using the V-Dem democracy indices provides a continuous measure of democracy

Figure 4.2 Electoral Democracy Index scores for Pakistan

Figure 4.3 Liberal Democracy Index scores for Pakistan

Chinese Linkage in Pakistan

the density or deepening of ties in terms of economic, social, cultural, com-

4 CPEC and De-Democratization in Pakistan 52

5 The Securitization of CPEC 74

8 People-to-People Contact under CPEC: Fact or Fiction? 138

Table 5.1 Terrorism in Pakistan during 2008 and 2014