Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1957 > June 1957 Decisions > G.R. No.

L-
10134 June 29, 1957 - SABINA EXCONDE v. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL

101 Phil 843:

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-10134. June 29, 1957.]

SABINA EXCONDE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE

CAPUNO, Defendants-Appellees.

Magno T. Bueser for Appellant.

Alvero Law Offices & Edon B. Brion and Vencedor A. Alimario for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR MINOR

CHILDREN; RELIEF FROM LIABILITY. — The civil liability which the law imposes upon
the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can
relieve themselves of such liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

2. ID.; LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR DIRECTOR; INSTITUTIONS AFFECTED. — The

civil liability imposed by Article 1903 of the old Civil Code on teachers or directors of arts and
trades for damages caused by pupils or apprentices under their custody, only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.

DECISION
 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of
Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No.
15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved her right to bring
a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime
charged and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old
when he committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control,
supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it only
convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in
honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school’s supervisor. From the school Dante, with
other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the
driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado
Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was
not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only
came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his
teacher.

The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act
of minor Dante Capuno.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.

x x x

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody." cralaw virtua1aw library

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his
son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he
was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of
the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law,
1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr.
Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school’s supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante
boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear
that neither the head of that school, nor the city school’s supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of
Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154
and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno
shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. I can see no
sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones.
What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over
their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that
his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise
authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only
"heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y
artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not
the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that
the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of
the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

In the case before us, there is no question that the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed by the City School
Supervisor to attend the Rizal parade. His father could not properly refuse to allow the child to attend, in defiance
of the school authorities. The father had every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with
other children, the school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. If a teacher or scout master
was present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the minor to drive the jeep without being qualified
to do so. On the other hand, if no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the pupils, the school authorities
are the ones answerable for that negligence, and not the father.

At any rate, I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and
which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child
to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the
presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of
the parent in order to render him liable.

Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.

Abad Santos and Pablo for petitioner.

Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and
P50 for medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of petitioner, Augusto Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had originated in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, which dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his
father against petitioner, father of the above-mentioned Mercado. The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing,
while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto
Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. A "pitogo", which figures prominently
in this case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto
Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right
cheek with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo"
belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato
was not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to
get a basket ball with which they could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to
Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from
Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo".
However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After
Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's
anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past, testified for plaintiffs-appellants, he did not
declare as to the amount of fees he collected from plaintiff-appellants for the treatment of Manuel, Jr. the child was not
even hospitalized for the wound. We believe that the sum of P50.00 is a fair approximation of the medical expenses
incurred by plaintiffs-appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come under
the class of moral damages. The evidence of record shows that the child suffered moral damages by reason of the wound
inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of damages cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe
that the sum of P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child.

As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering the moral damages they allegedly suffered
due to their son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The facts of record do not warrant the
granting of moral damages to plaintiffs-appellants Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In law mental anguish is
restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering
of which arises from a contemplation of wrong committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband
or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor can a parent
recover for mental distress and anxiety on account of physical injury sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his
child placed in peril by the negligence of another." (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to attorney's
fees, it not appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded their claim for damages.

In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound
on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or
head of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter. This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde
vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista:

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable
for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to
an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p.
841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)

The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was
studying should be made liable, is as follows:

ART. 2180. . . .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances
the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so
would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to
school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last
paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be
held to be without merit.

We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to
respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed
the medical expenses incurred in treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound did not even require
hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a
deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues
that if death call for P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the incised wound could cause mental pain and suffering to the tune of P2,000.

In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the child Quisumbing suffered moral damages "by reason of the
wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages included physical suffering, which must have been caused to the
wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only
possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has
been committed.

It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years
old and it does not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.

It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing
physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of
a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which
motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado
to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is, according to the decision appealed from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and
pushed Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to
Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another
boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)

After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified.

For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the petitioner is declared exempt or free from
the payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical expenses, however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and
trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.
QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.

Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. .

Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al. .

Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .

TEEHANKEE, J.:

An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. .

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the
Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages arising from the
death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said
Institute. .

Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise
to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president
1

thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on
August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."

The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and
the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes
were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at
them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly
Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the
stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered
to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. The
foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident."

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a
classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor
of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the
deceased. .

With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death:
shock due to traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage
and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased were caused
"probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. It held that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured
3

his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code."
4
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:

... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 2180. ... .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.

In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates
the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the
conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause "so
long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code
contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In those circumstances
the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the
responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco
L. Mercado, Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al.,
respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960). 5

There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials
of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.

Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:

1. Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc
(a) P6,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power, considering that the deceased was
only between sixteen and seventeen years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's
fee, plus the costs of this action. .

2. Absolving the other defendants. .

3. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.

Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review,
the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors,
with defendant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in the main, to be
meritorious. .

1. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which
expressly hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody," are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence that
the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows] lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the
6

school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."

The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem
7

that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein
petitioner father's contention that his minor son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was not a party to
the case] should be held responsible, rather than him as father, for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the
physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of
medical expenses to treat and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside by the Court on
the ground that none of the specific cases provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been established,
petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his
classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno, where the only issue
8

involved as expressly stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be civilly liable for damages resulting
from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which issue was resolved
adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers
or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but
this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited
and quoted in Mercado. .

2. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads
of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school
premises. Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time
of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical Institute
9

being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .

The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants
Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere
member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded
as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single
proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus
incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-
defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a corporation and is not owned by any
individual person." 10

3. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the
11

Civil Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
12

substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .

4. As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the
exercise of their authority" and "where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not
13

the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction." The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same
cited article. 14

5. The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under
Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .

6. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally
liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased
Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had
said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds
them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of
the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. .

7. Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to
P12,000.00 as set by the Court in People vs. Pantoja, and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. The
15

Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its "considered opinion that
the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The Court
thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206,
Civil Code, from the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .

8. Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal
interest on the total damages awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the
discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the
trial court. Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
16

granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been
shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: .

1. Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severallyto pay plaintiffs
as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and
compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for
attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. .

Dizon, J., took no part. .

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .

I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect
that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age
of majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. .

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company. .

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company. .

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. .

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. .

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article
2176 shall be applicable. .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.

Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article
expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to
similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so
stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age.
Further, it is not without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not grouped with parents and
guardians but ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom no reason is discernible to
imply that they should answer only for minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting
the split among commentators on the point it issue, observes with considerable cogency that —

272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se funds en argumentos merecedores de seria
ponderacion, no es facil tomar un partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos
acercamos a la de los que no estiman necesaria la menor edad del discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el
aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no es siempre argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible
cuanto se refiere a una misma disposicion relative a varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya
establecido important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon, puede dudarse de la oportunidad de
semajante diferencia; porque la voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure condito a cualquier otra
consideracion. Por otra parte, si bien se considera, no puede parecer extrano o absurdo el suponer que un
discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su preceptor
mientras dura la educacion. Ni parece dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los preceptores deben, al
par de los padres, responder civilmente de los daños comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten
faltos de discernimiento.

Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635 (Spanish version), say that —

635. Personas de quien responde. — Si bien la responsibilidad del maestro es originalmente una estension de
la de los padres (1), el art. 1384 no especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser menores de edad, por
lo que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun cuando sean mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser
ejercida en iguales terminos. Aun respecto a los menores variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que
ternese en ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo o no. .

I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by
law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter.
A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary
authority of the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under such
authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only affect the
decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or
not the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article
2180. .

Barredo, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:

I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court
of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was
construed as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the
size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and
often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts
committed by them. When even the school authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose
the traditional disciplinary measures formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion of the
offending students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the fact of enrollment and class
attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter liable unless
they can prove that they have exercised "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if applied
as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and
school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Present conditions being what they are, I believe the
restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision enunciated in Mercado should be maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, the
parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident."
This statement is of course in accordance with Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also in the opinion of the majority, "the
rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used
in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer
minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age
category. I find no justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the real parent
would be free from liability. .

Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:

I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court
of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was
construed as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the
size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and
often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts
committed by them. When even the school authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose
the traditional disciplinary measures formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion of the
offending students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the fact of enrollment and class
attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter liable unless
they can prove that they have exercised "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if applied
as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and
school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Present conditions being what they are, I believe the
restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision enunciated in Mercado should be maintained. .

With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, the
parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident."
This statement is of course in accordance with Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also in the opinion of the majority, "the
rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used
in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer
minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age
category. I find no justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the real parent
would be free from liability. .

Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Per allegations of the complaint and as indicated in the title of the case. Brillantes was made defendant as
"registered owner/head under Act No. 3883" of the Manila Technical Institute. .

2 Notes in parentheses supplied from other portions of autopsy report..

3 "ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.(1902a)."

4 Per the decision also, defendant Daffon had been charged for homicide for the death in Criminal Case No.
82419 and was "acquitted on reasonable doubt."

5 Reported in 108 Phil. 414. .

6 Note in brackets supplied. .

7 108 PhiI. 414 (May 1960). .

8 101 Phil. 843 (June 29, 1957), a six-to-three decision. .

9 The writer concurs with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Exconde [concurred in by Justices Padilla and A. Reyes] that "(I) can see no sound reason for limiting Art.
1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference
is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils. It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit
a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision
over the pupil." However, since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another case wherein it may
properly be raised. .

10 Rollo Page, 47. .

11 Art. 350, Civil Code. .

12 Art. 349, Civil Code enumerates: "(2) Teachers and professors" and "(4) directors of trade establishments,
with regard to apprentices" among those who "shall exercise substitute parental authority." Art. 352, Civil Code
provides that "The relation between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution. ..."

13 Tolentino expresses a similar opinion: "Teachers: — In order to be within this provision, a teacher must not
only be charged with teaching but also vigilance over their students or pupils. They include teachers in
educational institutions of all kinds, whether for the intellect, the spirit, or the body; teachers who give instruction
in classes or by individuals, even in their own homes; teachers in institutions for deficient or abandoned
children, and those in correctional institutions."

14 "ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. ...

"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. .

"... ."

15 25 SCRA, 468, (Oct. 11, 1968). .

16 See Arts. 2231, 2211 and 2208, Civil Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.

Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.

Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the
plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their
hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At
that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed
the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related
the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July
20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the
sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another under
the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which
read:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.

ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the
father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph
of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is
the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a
minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no
meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by
the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage,
or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had
the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all
obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of
good conscience.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., dissenting:

I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute fault
within the contemplation of our law or torts. She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had
found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was likely that something would happen to
her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.

As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to
behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon
plaintiff child.

# Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., dissenting:

I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute fault
within the contemplation of our law or torts. She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had
found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was likely that something would happen to
her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.

As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to
behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon
plaintiff child.