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07. TORRES v. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 76872

July 23, 1987 | FELICIANO, J. | Powers and Functions of the President: Executive Clemency

PETITIONER: Wilfredo Torres y Sumulong

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman, Board of Pardons and Parole, and the Director, Bureau of
Prisons

SUMMARY:
Torres was convicted for the crime of estafa and was sentenced to imprisonment. Maximum sentence would expire on
November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. On March 22,
1982 and June 24, 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa pending trial before RTC of QC. Torres
was also convicted by the RTC of QC for the crime of sedition pending appeal before the appellate court.

He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty
(20) counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition. The issue in this case is whether the conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. The Court held in the
affirmative that under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President may opt to proceed with this that
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment
of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

DOCTRINE:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts
which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions
of his pardon, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.

PROVISION/S OF LAW CITED, VERBATIM:

Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution – Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code – the President is empowered "to authorize the arrest and
reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his
pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." The arrest and confinement of the appellee were ordered by the President
upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole.

Facts:
1. Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced
to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight
(38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. The maximum sentence would
expire on 2 November 2000.
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on
condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." 2 Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner.
4. The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition: this conviction was then pending appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
5. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
twenty (20) counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.

Issue/s:
Whether the conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original
sentence – yes.

Dispositive Portion:
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WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Ruling:
Yes, the Court held that under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President may opt to proceed with this
that no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally
pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.