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FINAL DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECUSE. (2022_07_29 21_56_33 UTC)
FINAL DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECUSE. (2022_07_29 21_56_33 UTC)
FINAL DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECUSE. (2022_07_29 21_56_33 UTC)
The undersigned defendant (“movant”) respectfully request that the Honorable Susan Gardner Barthle
(“Judge Barthle”) recuse herself from this matter sua sponte pursuant to Canon 3(E)(1) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or, in the alternative, the defendant moves to disqualify and/or recuse Judge Barthle
in accordance with Rule 2.330 of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration and Florida Statute
38.10. As grounds for this motion, Movant states:
13. Movant received information that several county employees & officers of the court were
making false statements(“statements”) of facts and ad-hominems about Movant constituting
“defamation of character”.
14. Said derogatory comments which seem to revolve a certified copy of an 1884 Deed from the
Trustees of the State of Florida.
15. Movant has personally observed said county employees and officers making false and
defamatory (or ad-hominems) statements about Movant.
16. These false statements and ad-hominems attacking Movants character consisted of the
following derogatory terms: A) “white supremacist”,B) “sovereign-citizen”, and C) “squatter”.
17. All three of these “terms/ad-hominems” are extremely offensive and false in regards to Movant.
18. The said false statements and ad-homnems constitute defamation of character, and renders the
offenders liable for damages, and therefore, any further defamation using the above mentioned
terms directed towards Movant shall constitute malice as the offenders now know or should
have known that they are false.
19. This “motion” once filed, serves as constructive notice that Movant is neither a “ sovereign-
citizen”, “white supremacist” nor a “squatter”,
20. The information received by Movant consisted of, among other things, hours of audio/video
recordings taken in public or a public forum of certain county officials and court officers
making, false statements of facts concerning Movant,to third parties in a public or a public
forum, constituting defamation of character.
21. And although Movant had not personally heard Judge Barthle defame Movant with any of the
derogatory terms listed above, that would all change at public hearing that took place June 14th,
2022, causing the basis for a well-founded fear that Movant will not receive a fair and impartial
hearing from Judge Barthle because of the appearance that she is biased and prejudiced against
Movant as discovered on June 14th, 2022.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Section 38.10, Fla. Stat. affords a litigant the substantive right to seek disqualification of a trial judge;
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160 sets forth the procedure that must be followed in the disqualification process.
Rule 2.160(c) provides that the motion to disqualify must be in writing, specifically alleging the facts
and reasons relied upon to show the grounds for disqualification. See Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd.,
561 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1990).
Canon 3(E)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself
in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned....” Based upon the
facts set forth above and the attached affidavit, there is no doubt Judge Barthle's impartiality might
“reasonably be questioned” by Movant. See Miami-Dade Expressway Authority v. Electronic
transaction Counsultants Corp. 212 So. 3D 1059, 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Wolfson v. Wolfson, 159
So.3d 394, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)(finding that disqualification is required where the trial judge's
comments suggested that she had prejudged the case); Wade v. Wade, 123 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla.3dDCA
2013) (holding that the disqualification is required because the judge's statements reflected that she had
prejudged party's credibility); Amato v. Winn Dixie Stores/ Sedgwich James, 810 So.2d 979, 980-83
(Fla. 1st. DCA 2002) (finding that disqualification was required where the trial court had issued an order
on the merits before all of the evidence had been submitted, even thought the trial court subsequently
vacated the order)
Legal sufficiency is governed by a reasonable person standard. The affidavit must recite facts and
circumstances that would lead any normal human being in the position of [the movant] to “fear” that he
would not receive a fair trial , See Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. [577] at 582, 140 So [459] at 462
(1932) ; accord Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240 at 242(Fla 1986); Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083
at 1087 (Fla. 1983). “if the attested facts supporting the suggestion are reasonbly sufficient to create
such a fear, it is not for the trial judge to that it is not there”.
The judge must review an initial recusal or disqualification motion only for it's legal sufficiency, and
may not pass on the truth of the facts. If the motion to disqualify is legally sufficient, the judge must
immediately grant it and take no further action in the matter. Fl. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f). In general, a
trial judge who enters an order of disqualification or recusal is prohibited from further participation in
the case, and any subsequent orders by that judge are void. Lake v. Lake, 14 So. 3d284(Fla. 3rd DCA
2009)
The trial court must determine only if the motion is legally sufficient; the trial court may not consider
whether the factual assertions of the motion are true. Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2D 440-42(Fla. 1978) The
rule expressly “limits the trial judge to a bare determination of legal sufficiency” in order to prevent
disqualification proceedings from becoming adversarial. Id.
The facts alleged in a motion seeking to disqualify a trial judge must be evaluated as true for the
purposes of determination of legal sufficiency. City of Hollywood v. Witt, 868 So. 2D 1214, 1217 (Fla.
4th DCA 2004)
The trial court cannot insert it's own views regarding the facts of the motivations of the parties but “
must review the motion from the litigant's perspective...”Jimenez v Ratine, 954 So. 2D 706, 608 (Fla 2nd
DCA 2007)
The test for determining the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify is whether the motion shows “a
well-grounded fear that the movant will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. “ McKenzie v.
Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. , 565 So. 2D 1332, 1334 (Fla. 1990). “a determination must be made as
to whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and
impartial trial “ Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2D 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983). Furthermore, “..it is not a
question of law how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind and the
basis for such feeling. “ Id, at 1086 (quoting State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla.
1938)) “..the facts disclosed in the record before this Court establish the legal sufficiency of the State's
motion , and therefore, we grant the petition for a writ of prohibition.”
Where there is any legally sufficient basis, whether factually accurate or not, for a founded fear of
possible prejudice to exist in the mind of a defendant, recusal is mandated. See, e.g., Management
Corporation of America, Inc. v. Grossman, 396 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981).
A motion to disqualify a judge must establish a fear on the part of the movant that he or she will not
receive a fair and impartial hearing. See, Quince v. State, 592 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1992). The instant
motion clearly establishes such a fear. The motion “must be well-founded and contain facts germane to
the judge’s undue bias, prejudice, or sympathy.” Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 480-81 (Fla. 1998).
The instant motion is well founded, based on the record, and respectfully consists of germane facts
showing the bias and prejudice of the Court.
In determining the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify, a court looks to see whether the facts
alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving fair and impartial treatment
from the trial judge. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2000). In the instant case, a
reasonably prudent person, would be in fear that the Court, because of its prejudice or bias deprived
him of fair and impartial treatment.
“A motion to recuse or disqualify a trial judge is legally sufficient when the alleged facts would create
in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Valdes–
Fauli v. Valdes–Fauli, 903 So.2d 214, 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). The allegations contained in the motion
must be taken as true. Masten v. State, 159 So.3d 996, 997(Fla. 3d DCA 2015). Actual bias or prejudice
need not be shown, rather it is the appearance of bias or prejudice which requires disqualification.
Marcotte v. Gloeckner, 679 So.2d 1225, 1226(Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
Based on the foregoing facts, I fear Judge Barthle has prejudged my claims as being without
basis or merit, and is biased against me, and as a result I fear I will not receive a fair trial
because of the prejudice or bias of Judge Barthle.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, I the Movant, respectfully request that Judge Barthle
voluntarily recuse herself from this matter sua sponte, or , In the alternative , Movant moves to
disqaulify Judge Barthle from presiding in this matter.
VERIFICATION OF MOTION
Under penalty of perjury, I swear and affirm that the facts alleged herein , are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge,
JASON STODDARD
by:___________/s/Jason Stoddard____________
Jason Stoddard, Movant.
28936 stormcloud pass
wesley chapel,fl 33543
J.T&K.WRy.Co. Parcel #6
ELECTRONIC MAIL: HDCOOPEROFMIAMI@GMAIL.COM
I HEREBY CERTIFY that, a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to and served
on Judge Barthle by electronic mail on 7/5/2022.
JASON STODDARD
by:____________/s/Jason Stoddard___________
Jason Stoddard, Movant.
J.T&K.WRy.Co. Parcel #6
ELECTRONIC MAIL: HDCOOPEROFMIAMI@GMAIL.COM
crcive1@jud6.org
eservice@mcclainalfonso.com
lclark@mcclainalfonso.com,
answers@dallegal.com,
DALFONSO@pascoclerk.com,
Susan Barthle c/o jawsadmin@jud6.org ,