39. Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Association vs.

Insular Life
Assurance Co. G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association (Unions) entered into separate
collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (Companies). From the time when there was an impasse between both parties in
negotiations, to the strike up until its end, the following incidents occurred:
· 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors by the company without an increase to their
salary.
· While on strike, each of the strikers received a letter from the companies, stating that while
they recognize the unions’ right to strike, incentives will be given to those who would voluntarily
return to work, such as meals within the office, free movies and free coffee.
· Some management men broke through the picket lines, thus a fight ensued resulting in
injuries.
· Letters were again sent, threatening unionists to be replaced unless they return to work.
· The most active strikers were refused readmission back to the company
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations
be cited in contempt for not quoting the Supreme Court’s decision properly.
RULING:
No, it is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81.
Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled..."
whereas it reads, “For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second
and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears
not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the
immediately succeeding paragraph. The apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an
indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge. We are inclined to believe that the
misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the
respondent Judge’s decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular
ruling in this Court’s decision.
MAIN POINT:
In citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to
reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. It is
because ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and
rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts,
lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.

40. Comelec vs. Noynay, G.R. No. 132365, July 9, 1995

*Code of Professional Responsibility Rule 10.02
Facts:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of
Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a
public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for
having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional
Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.
Respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, ordered the records of the
cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the
appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the
maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.
According to COMELEC the case is within their exclusive jurisdiction since it is an election
offense; that RA 7691 has been misinterpreted by RTC.
Atty Balbuena, in his petition, (motion for reconsideration) says that RTC judge erred in saying
that it is MTC who has jurisdiction. He quoted a court’s ruling in the case of Alberto vs Judge
Lavilles;. Insisted that such case is similar and that Regional Trial Court should have jurisdiction,
not Municipal Trial Court.
Issue:
Did Regional Trial Court Judge Noynay made a mistake in remanding the case to Municipal
Trial Court?
Rulings:
Yes, Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, RTCs have exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except
those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. The violation presented in this
case is a violation of the code. This provided, RTC has jurisdiction, regardless if the penalty is
less than six years. Thus, Judge is reminded to make himself aware of the principles of law and
the competence needed.
The petition was granted.
In addition: Atty Balbuena is wrong in misquoting or misrepresenting a decision of court.
Although he argued that jurisdiction is lodged with RTC, his citation is false. *Violated Rule
10.02, mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the
court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
*Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate that judges should be studious in the
principles of law and office administration in due regard of legal system integrity, respectively.
As well, Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates them to be faithful to the
law and to maintain professional competence. The above actions of Hon. Noynay contradicts
these provisions.
41. Adez Realty vs. CA G.R. No. 100643, October 30, 1992
FACTS:
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay was directed to show cause as to why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court with the apparent purpose
of misleading to court to obtain a favorable judgement. The inserted phase was "without notice
to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty,". In his explanation, his secretary
committed the mistake, and that they handle a lot of cases which lead them to commit such
mistake.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay should be disbarred for intercalating a material fact in
judicial decision.
RULING:
Yes
The instant case originate from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section
13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases one of his
causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons
in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a
petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phase "without notice to the actual occupants of
the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it
highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary a
that. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear
that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject
property –– when in fact it did not make such a finding –– is a clear indication not merely of
carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue
advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this
Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. The distortion of facts committed by counsel,
with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly,
not only because it may set a dangerous precedent by, rather, because it is a clear and serious
violation of one's oath as member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility directs that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved".
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of
the lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws.
.
42. MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF
OF MANILA,
G.R. No. L-22320. July 29, 1968
FACTS:
The spouses Perez were involved in a civil case where a simple money judgment was rendered
against them. To execute the judgment, the court levied upon shares of stock of the spouses.
With the help of the spouses’ counsels Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinas, they resorted to a series of
actions and petitions for the sole purpose of delaying the execution of the simple money
judgment which has long been final and executory. More than eight years after the finality of the
judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied. The above exposition of the
circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that
in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted
with deliberate afore-thought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407.
In the court’s final judgment, the writ of execution against the spouses Perez was upheld, and in
addition, the Supreme Court assessed treble costs against petitioners, to be paid by their counsel,
Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinas, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek
reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct"
and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinas should pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinas should pay the treble costs adjudged against their
clients.

The Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of
"remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally
obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt,
such that even before one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case
reached this Court for the second time. The movants further contend that if there was delay, it
was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive. A counsel's assertiveness in
espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible (Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of Code of Professional Responsibility). A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

43. G.R. No. 14576, September 6, 1918

IN RE VICENTE SOTTO.
Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
Attorney-General Paredes for the Government.
The respondent, Vicente Sotto, an attorney practicing before this bar, with unprofessional
conduct, referred to the Attorney-General for investigation.
Atty. Vicente Sotto published an opinion criticizing the members of the Supreme Court for their
decision on the case of Angel Parazo. He was imprisoned for 30 days for refusing to divulge his
source on news published in his newspaper.
Atty. Sotto also said that he will propose to Congress the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. The respondent was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of court.
Issue
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to punish contempt of court.

Ruling
Yes. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of the superior statute. It is a
doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the court of last resort in the United
States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are
patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence.

44. GUERRERO VS. JUDGE VILLAMOR [G.R. NO. 82238-42

NOVEMBER 13, 1989]
FACTS: Petitioner George D. Carlos, thru his lawyer and herein co-petitioner Antonio T.
Guerrero filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City an action for damages against
respondent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgement in the aforesaid consolidated
criminal cases. The complaint and summons were served on respondent judge. On the following
day, the respondent judge issued an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against herein petitioners,
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to
imprisonment of five (5) days and a fine of P500.00 for degrading the respect and dignity of the
court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court.
To stop the coercive force of the Order of Contempt issued by respondent judge, petitioners filed
the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or restraining order. The Supreme
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining respondent Judge Adriano
R. Villamor from enforcing his order of Direct Contempt of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged derogatory language employed in the Civil Case complaint
constitutes direct contempt.
HELD: NO. Petition was granted. Order of Direct Contempt declared NULL and VOID. The
Temporary Restraining Order is made permanent.

45. Sandstrom vs. State [309 SO 2D 17]

Facts:
Sandstrom, while representing his clients in court was wearing a coat but with no necktie.
The judge Tyson ordered sandstrom to put on a necktie and put the court in recess to allow him
to put on his necktie. But after recess when the court resumed, sandstrom still did not put on his
necktie and judge Tyson warned him if he will not put on a tie he will be held in contempt. Still
Sandstrom did not listen so judge Tyson found sandstrom guilty of direct criminal contempt for
disobeying his order.

Issue:
Whether the judge had the power to impose dress requirements upon lawyers appearing before
him in judicial proceedings.

Held:
We hold that he does have such power.
To begin with, it is clear that the judicial branch of government has the inherent power to
regulate the professional conduct of all lawyers. In our judgment the court's order requiring
appellant to wear a tie in court was a simple requirement bearing a reasonable relationship to
the proper administration of justice in that court. Appellant's dogged refusal to comply
demonstrated a total lack of cooperation by counsel and was hardly befitting a member of the
bar.
 46. PP vs. Rainey, 36 Cal Rptr 291
47. Peck vs. Stone, 304 N.Y.S. 2D 881
Facts:
Ms. Peck, a young lawyer, appeared in the City Court of Syracuse, New York, to represent an
indigent defendant. Ms. Peck was attired in a miniskirt, the hemline of which was approximately
5 inches above the knee and substantially higher when she was seated. Having previously
admonished her about wearing a miniskirt in the courtroom, the city judge directed Ms. Peck not
to appear in court before him again "until her dress is suitable, conventional and appropriate in
keeping with her position as an officer of the Court." Being dissatisfied with the foregoing order,
Ms. Peck filed a petition in the Supreme Court, Special Term, to vacate it.
Issue:
whether respondent's order was arbitrarily made and whether he exceeded his authority in
prohibiting petitioner from reappearing in his court in similar attire.
Held:
Upon dismissal of said petition, she appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, which
reversed the order of dismissal and held that the judge of the city court had abused his
discretion

48. MANUEL DE GRACIA vs. THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL

G.R. No. L-42032 | January 9, 1976
Facts: Petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that in
spite of his service of sentence for a conviction of serious physical injuries, his release from
confinement was ordered held by respondent judge who relied upon respondent fiscal’s reason
that, the victim of the crime having died, an amended information will be filed. It is undisputed
that while the information against petitioner charged him with the commission of frustrated
homicide to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to one of serious physical injuries.
It is to such lesser offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea of guilty. On the very
same day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of four months
and one day of arrests mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That period
of confinement he had duly served by November 10, 1975. On December 8, 1975, this Court
issued the following resolution: "The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this
Court on Friday, December 12, 1975 and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ
not later than the aforesaid date. As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for
hearing by respondent wardens, a resolution of the following tenor was adopted by this Court (a)
to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. to file a return of the writ for the
respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a.m. of Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to reset
the hearing of this case on the aforesaid date and time On the morning December 17, 1975,
respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens
appeared. Neither petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present.
Issue:
1. WON there was lapse in judicial propriety by petitioner’s counsel Salvador N. Beltran
Held/Ruling:
Yes. there was a lapse in judicial propriety by petitioner’s counsel who did not even take the
trouble of appearing of the Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse
explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before
this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future
actuations as a member of the bar.
 49. Fernandez vs Bello - 107 Phil 1140
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for his client Florentino Perreyras. However, Florentino
died without paying Fernandez. Atty. Fernandez then assisted the eldest child of Perreyras in a
guardianship proceeding so that the eldest may properly dispose of their property in order to pay
their father’s indebtedness. Eventually, Florentino’s nipa land was sold for P1,000.00.
Thereafter, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Fernandez for his legal services both for Florentino and his
heirs. Judge Eloy Bello found out about said payment and so directed Atty. Fernandez to explain
(because under the guardianship, proceeds of any sale must first be accounted for and no
payment to creditors shall be made without prior authorization from the court).
In the course of the proceeding however, Judge Bello stated that Fernandez does not deserve the
P200.00 attorney’s fees because Fernandez is a “below average standard of a lawyer.” Fernandez
then responded with strong language (which were not specified).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strong language used by Fernandez against the judge is proper.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court stated that the strong language used by Atty. Fernandez must have been
impelled by the same language used by Judge Bello in characterizing the act of Atty. Fernandez
as “anomalous and unbecoming” and in charging him of obtaining his fee “through maneuvers of
documents from the guardian-petitioner.” If anyone is to blame for the language used by
Fernandez, it is Bello himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have
provoked Fernandez. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate
language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.

50. Sangalang v. IAC - G.R. No. 71169 (August 30, 1989)

Facts :
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco,
counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang.
The Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On
March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
Issue :
Whether or not Atty. Sangco’s (a former judge) remarks are a breach of legal ethics.
Ruling :
Yes. In the "show-cause" Resolution, the court sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt,
specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.
Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 -A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or
malpractice.
The court orders : Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable
from receipt hereof.
Additional Notes :
Legal Ethics; attorneys; counsel is entitled to his own opinion in the presentation of his cause but
not licensed to insult the court with derogatory statements.
A lawyer held for contempt and malpractice for resorting to insulting language amounting to
disrespect toward the court; penalty.

51. Penticostes vs. Hidalgo, Adm. Matter Nos. RTJ-89331, September 28,
1990
FACTS:
Complainant Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges against Judge
Rafael B. Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tarlac, Tarlac. In the resolution dated
June 20, 1989 dismissing RTJ-89-294, the Court admonished the complainant "to exercise more
care and decorum in filing unfounded and unsubstantiated charges against officers of the court in
order to maintain and uphold the dignity of the same of which he is a part" (also dismissed was
RTJ-88-213 in a Resolution dated July 18, 1989.) Complainant did not heed this admonition.
In his Comment in RTJ-89-361, and his Compliance by way of comment in RTJ-89-355, the
respondent judge asked that the other administrative cases by the same complainant be
consolidated. Complainant, in his Reply in RTJ-89-355, made a similar request.
The Court directed the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to gather all charges filed by the
complainant against the respondent judge and thereafter consolidated six (6) administrative
complaints: RTJ-89-331 (which recites ten [10] causes of action), RTJ-89-355, RTJ-89-361,
RTJ-89-362, RTJ-89-439, and RTJ-89-438.
Subsequent to the June 20, 1989 admonition, complainant continued to file charges against
respondent. He also threatened to bring more cases, as evidenced by the following: (1) a
Manifestation dated March 1, 1990 (submitted to respondent judge in relation to two civil cases),
which reads:
Counsel will make it appear on record that if the motion and joint motion will not be acted
(upon) on March 21, 1990 as scheduled he will be forced much to his regret to file the following
administrative and criminal complaints against the presiding judge, namely:
ISSUES:
Did the respondent violate his oath?
Did the respondent commit falsification under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code?
Did the respondent knowingly rendered an unlawful order?
Did the respondent maliciously delayed the administration of justice?
Did the respondent commit grave misconduct?
RESOLUTION:
(1) DISMISS outright the following complaints: RTJ-89-331; RTJ-89-362; RTJ-89-438; and
RTJ-89-355; RTJ-89-361 and RTJ-89-439 are likewise dismissed, except as to charges for which
comment has been required; and
(2) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) payable within ten
(10) day from receipt of this Resolution, or IMPRISONMENT of ten (10) days in the local jail in
case of failure to pay the fine within the time appointed; and
(3) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for one (1) year for his willful disregard
and disobedience of the admonition made by the Court in RTJ-89-294, and his violation of
Canons 10, 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. The suspension shall take effect from the
date of receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of this
country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Penticostes.

52. LILY MOCLES v. JUDGE MABINI M. MARAVILLA

Facts:
Lily Mocles charged Judge Maravilla with ignorance of the law and bribery. Ignorance of the
law was filed as it was claimed that the Judge Maravilla issued a writ of execution with respect
to the restoration of possession even though the case was already appealed with branch 36 of the
RTC of General Santos. Bribery for rumour of having received 20,000.00 for the execution of
the said writ.
The complainant claimed that the admission of Judge Maravilla of the issuance of the writ is not
only a clear ignorance of the law but a deliberate and wanton misapplication of the law.
Held:
In the case of bribery against Judge Maravilla, the court found that the complaint utterly lacks
merit as the same was admitted being based on rumours.
In the case of having wrongfully issued the writ of execution, the court ruled that, although the
writ did not cause damage to the defendant as the writ of execution as an injunction and
restraining order was issued, the judge could not be totally absolved from any administrative
liability.
It was found that there was grave abuse of authority if not ignorance of the rule of execution in
the ejection of case. The Judge Maravilla was advised not to repeat the act, and a fine of 1000
was provided including a warning that a subsequent commission of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.

Topic:
Canon 11

53. WICKER v. ARCANGEL. GR NO. 112869 JANUARY 29, 1996

FACTS:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering
Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and
others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the
defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to co-defendant Jose Poe.

The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over
by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Wicker's counsel, Atty.. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent judge
from the consideration of the case. Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and
contemptuous," respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on
November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court. In a
pleading, Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his
views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just
lawyering," for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by
the Court" had advised him to have the case re-ra ffled, when the opposing counsel Atty.
Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was
an indication that Atty. Santos knew who "the judge may be and when he would appear".
Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge held them guilty of direct
contempt.
ISSUES:
Whether or Atty. Rayos violted Canon 11 of the CPR. RULING
HELD:
Yes. In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been
bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a “mouthpiece.” He was just “lawyering” and
“he cannot be gagged,” even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared
and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot
evade responsibility for the allegations in question.
Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much
responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. The
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to “observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others” and “not [to] attribute
to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case.”

54. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda VS Hon. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez & Atty. Napoleon
A. Abiera
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, request for a petition of certiorari of the case filed against him by Atty Napoleon A.
Abiera. Petitioner seeks the review of the following orders from the Office of the Ombudsman:
(1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court
filed by the petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.

Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman alleged that
petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying “that all
civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of
90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,” when in truth and in
fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the said case despite this
Court’s ruling in Orap v. Sandinganbayan, since the offense charge arose from the judge’s
performance of his duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme
Court’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to handle the case of the petitioner.

RULING:

The Ombudsman should have forwarded the complaint to the Court for investigation and
filing of case, since the petitioner is a personnel of the Supreme Court, a Judge at that.

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

We agree with the petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him
by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

According to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has
administrative supervision over all the courts and court personnel from Presiding Judge of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest Municipal trial court clerk.
The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of the service to this
court for determination whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load,
as the court has the necessary records to make such determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel the Court to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss
the complaint filed by public respondent Atty Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer to the same to this
Court for appropriate action.

ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. (1987 Philippine Constitution)

55. Economic Insurance Co., v. Uy Realty Company and Hon. Judge

Gaudencio Cloribel
FACTS: Respondent Uy Realty Company for a writ of execution againstpetitioner for the
amount represented by its supersedes bond "coveringrentals rightfully due", economic insurance
being the plaintiff in theEjectment case.Side of Petitioners: Economic Insurance Co., Inc. would
impute a gravejurisdictional defect to an order of the then respondent JudgeGaudencio Cloribel
granting a motion of the other respondent Uy RealtyCompany's writ of execution.1. they seek the
dismissal of such a suit as well as a counterclaimfor reimbursement in the amount of P15,000.00
for alleged improvementsmade on the leased premises and for damages in the amount of
P5,000.00for alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor.2 The decision of the City Court of
Manila of October 20, 1966 orderedthe defendant and those claiming under him to vacate the
premises aswell as to pay the sum of P4,100.00 representing rents in arrears plusthe sum of
P1,500.00 a month beginning September, 1966 for the use andoccupation of such premises.3.
That defendant having vacated the leased premises and possessionthereof having been
surrendered to the plaintiff, the legal issuessubject of this appeal has therefore become moot and
the continuationof the trial set for August 2, 1967 will not serve any purpose.4. That on
November 23, 1966, defendant filed Supersedeas Bond No. 567for P8,800.00 thru the Economic
Insurance Company, Inc. to enter theaction into this Honorable Court, said bond having for its
purpose toguarantee the payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals up tothe time of judgment
in the City Court of Manila, including damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Cloribel erred in granting the inclusion of the writ of execution.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, through haste or inadvertance, Judge Cloribel ignored that portion of
the prayer for execution and merely ordered that theappealed case be dismissed. Within the
period, however, before suchorder attained the stage of finality, a modification thereof
wassecured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of Uy Realty Co.to execute on the bond
filed by petitioner. Under the circumstances,what respondent Judge did was clearly within his
authority, and thechallenged order can stand the test of the most exciting scrutiny.Hence, this
petition should fail.it is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner tomake full use of
every conceivable legal defense the law allows it. Inthe appraisal, however, of such attempts to
evade liability to which aparty like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mindthat
procedural rules are intended as an iad to justice, not as ameans for its frustration.

56. LI KIM THO vs. CONRADO S. SANCHEZ, Judge of First Instance

of Manila, Branch VII, and GO SIU KAO,
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review an order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
to stay the execution of a judgment of the same court which had already become final, the
petition alleging that the said court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the said order.
The petitioner Li Kim Tho, lessee of a building administered by Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.,
sublet the ground floor of said building to the respondent Go Siu Kao, who, during the Japanese
occupation, had been deprived of his own house by the military. Needing the entire building for
himself after Liberation, the petitioner required the said respondent to vacate the portion sublet to
him, and the demand having been refused, he brought suit in the Municipal Court of Manila to
have him ejected from the premises.
Judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner; but respondent appealed to the Court of First
Instance and, having again lost in that court, took an appeal to the Court of Appeals. After an
adverse judgment in that court, he took the case to the Supreme Court, but met with failure when
his petition for certiorari was dismissed.
To complete the narration of facts, it should be stated that while the detainer case was in the
Court of Appeals, the respondent Go Siu Kao filed a motion for new trial on the ground that he
had already entered into a contract with Fernandez Hermanos, making him the lessee of the
ground floor of the building in question. Passing upon said motion, the Court of Appeals, in the
very decision which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, declared the motion to
be without merit, holding that, as long as the lease to the petitioner subsisted, he was the one that
had control over the sublease to the respondent, so that any action or attitude taken by Fernandez
Hermanos, Inc., on the continuation of the sublease had no bearing on the result of the case.
ISSUE:
W/N the CFI/respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Order.
HELD:
CERTIORARI; LITIGATIONS MUST END AND TERMINATE; DUTIES OF COURTS. —
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an
end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
It is, of course, settled that the stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever
it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as, for instance, where there has been a change in
the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable.
But we are persuaded that such is not the case here. The filing by respondent Go Siu Kao of a
new action to litigate again his right to continue in the possession of the premises in controversy
as an alleged basis for suspending the execution of a final judgment which denies him such right,
savours of a mere scheme to delay or frustrate the execution of the judgment in question.
Obvious is the fact that the issue raised in the new case is something that has already been passed
upon by the Court of Appeals in connection with the denial of respondent's motion for new trial
based on an alleged contract of lease between him and Fernandez Hermanos. And it is significant
that, while respondent claims that such a lease in his favor has been entered into, nowhere does it
appear that Fernandez Hermanos has given notice to the petitioner Li Kim Tho of its decision to
terminate the lease in favor of the latter or made any demand for him to vacate the premises. As
the lease to Li Kim Tho is from month to month and the lessee has not given up the lease, tacit
renewal thereof must be presumed until the lessor gives proper notice to terminate it.
It is, therefore, our opinion that the respondent Judge was not justified in issuing the writ of
mandatory injunction which, if carried out, would set at naught a final verdict rendered by our
courts, from the lowest to the highest, and make a mockery of the administration of justice. The
issuing of said writ constitutes that abuse of discretion which is correctable by certiorari.
Wherefore, the order complained of is revoked and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued
by this Court to restrain the enforcement of said order is made permanent, with costs against the
respondent Go Siu Kao.

57. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo

GR No. L-30362, Nov 26, 1970
(Espinosa)
FACTS:
On January 14, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a
writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958, it rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiffs, now appellees, requiring one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to
reconvey one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees, and to pay the
latter the amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955.
There was an appeal. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It
was further set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its execution was granted.
Hence the writ of execution. On February 13 of the same year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an
urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ of execution based primarily on the
allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of
such appeal. There was an opposition to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention to
Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a
pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and alleging that there was a failure on the
part of the counsel to comply with the above provision.
The prayer was for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring
counsel for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the residences of the heirs or
the legal representatives of the deceased in order that they could be substituted in his stead so as
not to render nugatory a decision, final and executory in character.
On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno gave counsel of
record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit the name and residence of the executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The
aforesaid counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as
of May 31, 1956, and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid
order. Considering the turn of events, plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in their favor be not
rendered nugatory by the above technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of
April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio,
Anastasia, Simplicio and Domingo, all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate
children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter, substituted as defendants. On October 5,
1965, the lower court, this time presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the aforesaid
motion and substituted defendants in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court was mistaken in granting the motion and substituting the
defendants in place of the deceased.

HELD:
NO. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely for
embodying in the order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court. Thus: "Whenever a
party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the
name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative. “Had
the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was appointed, then upon his
death there could be compliance with the above provision. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such
neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. It is equally vital to remember that
the judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. Defendants cannot be heard
to allege that it is much too late now to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the
principle consistently adhered to by this Court.
The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to
pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation.
RULING:
The order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed. This decision is immediately executory. Treble costs
against defendants.

Canon 12~

58. GARCIA Vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO

ADM 3923
FACTS:
The complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits
before different courts to prevent Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these
proceedings were decided against Lee. The tangle of recourses employed by the respondent
caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself
against his every move.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent abuses his right to recourse to the courts?
Ruling:
The respondent grossly abuses his right to recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a
cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or
malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself
unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than
to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of
judicial processes.
Wherefore, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

59. A.C. No. 4058 March 12, 1998

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. complainant,
Vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES, respondent.
Ponente:
PANGANIBAN, Justice

Facts:
- This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet
Electric Cooperative, Inc. seeking his removal or suspension from the bar for forum
shopping, which amounted to "grave misconduct, unduly delaying the administration
of justice, and violating with impunity his oath of office and applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
- In NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84, respondent instituted a suit with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City, seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk
of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the said writ of
execution, which was eventually dismissed. Respondent claims that Branch 7
dismissed the case on lack of jurisdiction and that no appeal was perfected.
 - Later that year, Respondent filed once more to the RTC for separate complaints
for Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, and thus Exempt from Levy
and Execution the subject properties with Damages which are essentially similar
actions to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-
1-0313-84.
Issue/s:
- Whether the respondent violated the canons under the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Ruling/Held:
- YES. The SC rules that the respondent violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility to do no falsehood and to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and for violating his oath as a lawyer. The falsehood of the
absence of a perfected appeal was apparent in his reasoning, and it was made worse
as the statements were made to exculpate himself, though vain, from the charge of
Forum shopping. As such, he is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, and is
warned that a repetition of a similar conduct would be dealt with more severely.
Doctrine/Basis:
- Canon 10 and 12

60. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. UY TENG PIAO

G.R. No. 35252 October 21, 1932
Justice James Cator Vickers
FACTS:
In September 1924 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the
Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7
per cent per annum, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney’s fees and costs.
The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three
months from the date of the judgment, or else the mortgaged properties described in transfer
certificates of the two parcels of land should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law.
Piao failed to comply with the order and so the two parcels of land sold at public auction to the
Philippine National Bank in October 1924.
In February 1925, the PNB secured from Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property
described in Transfer Certificate, and on the same date the bank sold said property. Evidently the
other parcel, was subsequently resold by the bank. In other words, the bank credited the
defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.
The defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land in
consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect
from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the
defendant from the complaint.
Paio denied that he did not remember talking to Pecson. Then one of the attorneys for the PNB
testified that the Paio renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land, because a friend of
the defendant was interested in buying it. (Allegedly as Pecson)
ISSUES:
Whether or not the appearance of the PNB lawyer as witness is recognized.
HELD:
No. Unless the PNB lawyer withdraws from handling this case, his stand is not recognized.
RULLING:
With respect to the testimony of the bank’s attorney, we should like to observe that although the
law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they
should withdraw from the active management of the case.
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.):
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to
other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying
in court in behalf of his client."

61. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. Vs. SANCHEZ

GR No. 75209 – September 30, 1987
SUBJECT: Canon 13 – Influencing or Giving appearance of Influencing Court
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS
CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency
of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
FACTS:
The Union of Filipro Employees, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets
which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987 outside Padre Faura gate of the SC
building. Since June 17, 1981
On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to
withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to
appear before the Court and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in
contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further
required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the
Court with an assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an
unregistered loosed alliance of about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the
UFE or KILU.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively dealt
with.
HELD:
 Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate
petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrator of justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.
The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to
an abuse thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being
non-lawyers, the duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the
shoulders of their counsel of record, Atty. Espinas.
It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.
The contempt charges were dismissed.

62. Lantoria vs. Bunyi, Adm. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Lantoria against Bunyi, a member of the Philippine Bar, on the
ground that Bunyi committed acts of graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the IBP, and corruption of the judge and bribery.
This is in relation to Bunyi’s handling of a civil case wherein Bunyi was counsel of Mrs. Mascarinas. The
latter was the owner of the farm and Lantoria is the supervisor and manager of the said farm. The 3 civil
cases presided by Judge Galicia involved an ejectment suit of squatters in the said farm. The defendants
in the said cases were declared in default.  Correspondences between Lantoria and Bunyi showed that
Bunyi initially enclosed a letter in an envelope addressed to Judge Galicia in a confidential and private
manner. Judge Galicia thru the mediation of Lantoria informed Bunyi that he is willing to let Bunyi write
the decisions for th 3 civil cases. Lantoria informed the same to Bunyi which later delivered the 3
decisions thru Lantoria.
Three years later, Lantoria file the present case against Bunyi alleging that they won the said cases
because Bunyi wrote the decisions in those cases.  Bunyi contends that Lantoria had knowledge of the
request of Judge Galicia to Bunyi as the said judge had two salas before him. Also, Bunyi contends that
the drafting of the decision was not an idea spawned by him. Furthermore, he contends that his
participation is merely on revision.  The solicitor general investigated the matters and found that Bunyi
prepared the draft of the decisions and that he had previous communications with the judge regarding
drafting the same. Moreover, Bunyi admitted that he prepared the said decisions and that the subject
letters do exist.
The Solicitor General found Bunyi guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to
perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to
refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
Lantoria did not attend hearing of the case and later filed his withdrawal of the same. Bunyi gave an
apology but he denied the allegations of offering a gift to judge Galicia.

Issue:
WoN Bunyi violated the code of professional responsibility for lawyers?

Held:
YES. The determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding withdrawal of
complaint due to the Bunyi having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked
for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters had on his duty as a lawyer.  Clearly,
respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on attempts to exert personal
influence on the court - A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the
merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a
judge special personal consideration or favor.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01. CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court. Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.  Court finds Bunyi guilty of unethical practice in
attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case. Suspended for 1 year
 63. Cruz vs. Salva, 105 Phil 1151
Fact:
On the case handled in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, the respondent Francisco G. H.
Salva was filed a case of certiorari and prohibition with a preliminary injunction by the petitioner
Timoteo V. Cruz for the investigation he was conducting in September 1957.
In this case, a criminal investigation was conducted by the Fiscal towards the killing of Manuel
Monroy in 1953 committed by Oscar Catelo and his co-defendants. As Fiscal Salva conferred
with the Office of the Solicitor General, a Conference was held publicly with the Secretary of
Justice wherein reporters were invited at the session hall of municipal court and Timote Cruz
was subpoenaed by Fiscal Salva represented by Atty. Baizas.
Issue:
Whether or not the conduct of investigation was in violation of Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Held:
The SC found and held that respondent Salva was warranted in holding and
sensationalizing the investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is
concerned, publicity was unnecessary if there is only just to acquaint the evidence and
questioning towards those who were accused.
The court was disturbed due to Publications, narrations, and comments as a concomitant
result of the public investigation as already intervened by the press, a violation of Canon 3 Rule
3.04 of CPR as giving value to mass media in which result regarded as a grievous error and poor
judgment.
Thus, the court issued censure and reprehension to Francisco G.H. Salva for contempt of court
and violation of publicity and sensationalism.

64. In Re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970

In the matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY
FACTS:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil
case but he filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but
he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied.
He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with
regard to the motion for reconsideration, He filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which out rightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution. Atty. Almacen who called such
minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as
he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court
are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged
that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons
why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also
stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
 The Supreme Court did not immediately act on his petition as the Court wanted to wait for Atty.
Almacen to actually surrender his certificate. He did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though
as he now argues that he chose not to and asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . .in an open and public hearing.”
He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge.”
ISSUE:
WhEther or not Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be subjected to disciplinary action.
RULING:
Yes. The Court finds that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be suspended from the practice of law
until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. The Supreme Court first clarified
that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write
full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide
“only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
MAIN POINT:
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

65. Maglasang vs. People G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990

Facts:
A petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines,
Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by
registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-
88 of the Court, specifically the non-payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-
attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and
orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the
petition.
Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing the petition. This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court
was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R.
No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration did not
contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, the motion for
reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY."
The Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint filed with the Office of the
President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty.
Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with
"biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution."
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned,
as Respondents (sic). Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court
in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this
particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such
order."
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Castellano should be punished for contempt of court.
Ruling:
Yes, it is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to
smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and
again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his
client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to
resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo."
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." In this
regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or
behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or
have materiality to the case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and

IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail
of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt
with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
66. Maturan vs. Gonzales, A.C. No. 2597, March 12, 1998

FACTS:
Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales was the lawyer of the Glorito V. Maturan who represented them in an
ejectment case against Celestino Yokingco, et al., The judgment was rendered in favor of them
and later filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
During the pendency of the said motion, respondent, without withdrawing as counsel for
petitioner, filed an action to annul the judgment rendered in the previous case on behalf of
Celestino Yokingco. Respondent contends that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution
was the last and final act in lawyer-client relationship and that his formal withdrawal would only
sever the lawyer-client relationship between them. Petitioner Glorito V. Maturan filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales for immoral, unethical and anomalous
act. The investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent committed malicious, unethical, immoral or anomalous acts against
his client.
RULING:
Yes.
This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party
against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that
of his present or former client. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and
with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of
his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
This Court finds respondent’s actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provide in part:
“It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.”
Moreover, respondent’s justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary
obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by
the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will
prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same
to the prejudice of his client.

67. IMELDA A. NAKPIL vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES

Adm. Case No. 2040. March 4, 1998.
FACTS:
 Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio
City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They
agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy
it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he
used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name. It was
the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died, respondent acted as
the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears
that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate. The respondent
transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the respondent in excluding the property from the inventory is
unethical.
RULING:
Yes. The respondent’s act of excluding the property from the inventory is unethical.
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. It is well-established that the respondent offered to
the complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the ’50s. The complainant reposed her complete trust in respondent who
was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late
Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and refused to sell the property to the complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To
place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later
transferred it to his corporation.

68. DONALD DEE VS C.A.

[G.R. NO. 77439. AUGUST 24, 1989]
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter’s
cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s
brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada,
U.S.A. Private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas,
Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be
better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could
convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from
liability for the account. Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon
Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private
respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a
discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him.
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent several demand
letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however,
ignored said letters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between parties.
HELD:
YES. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of Appeals. Costs against the petitioner.
RATIO:
There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent to
petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee,
with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed
from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For
such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and
this right cannot be concluded by petitioner’s pretension that at the time private respondent
rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant
of Caesar’s Palace.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services
rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good
faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just
fees.

69. COSASIA VS. BULALACAO, ADM. CASE NO. 3745, OCTOBER 2,

195
FACTS: Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered
corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B.
Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution resolved to refer the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, the IBP investigating commissioner,
found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.
A written Agreement respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a
corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc... the lawyer-client relationship between the
respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date after
almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc.
was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of
filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said
employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf."
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees
of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship
RULING: We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office.
Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent
admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of
his attorney's oath". However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to
reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the
following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to
the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was
committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his
family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has
fully... realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he
has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by
inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma,
Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere
to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he
has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not
good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former
client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case.

70. PNB vs. Cedo, Adm. Case No. 3701, March 28, 1995
Facts:
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-
President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank, with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.” Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for
P200, 000. He even “noted” the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of
Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When
a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the RTC of
Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of
the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy. Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of
complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a
civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the
latter were represented by the law firm “Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates” of which respondent is one
of the Senior Partners. In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel
for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged
that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the
Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while
the said law firm is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro
Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Ferrer nor with the
other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained
by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff.
On the other hand, during the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with the cases entitled “Milagros
Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al.” for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for
petitioner Milagros through the said law firm.
The IBP further found that the charges against respondent were fully substantiated. In one of the hearings
of the Almeda spouses’ case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he
did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the
court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case,
respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that
respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer. The IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-
up of the firm to be true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02)
since the client’s secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and
staff members at all times.
The IBP thusrecommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.

ISSUE:
WoN the act of Atty. Cedo as counsel of other party in a case against PNB, his former employer,
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:
YES. The Court finds the occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the
representation of conflicting interests. The alleged set-up of the firm is in itself a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to
litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which
he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests. ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves
to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3)
YEARS, effective immediately.

71. Lopez vs. Aquino, L-28078, April 29, 1971

FACTS:
On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money
claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate. Both parties appealed from the said
judgment to the Court of Appeals and on January 20, 1967, the appellate court found for respondent as
appellant, and affirmed the lower court's judgment with modifications in favor of respondent. According
to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did
not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the
estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo
and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the
appellate court. Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March 9, 1967, with the
appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the
Judgment," stating inter alia, that the former special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had
long resigned as such with the permission of the intestate court, that the other co-special administrator,
Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by
the intestate court's order dated May 21, 1963, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, and that as
a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed judicial administratrix and has since
been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a
motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the clerk of court be directed to
serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special
administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for re-hearing or reconsideration;" and
praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators
and that her counsel be served with copy of the appellate court's decision. The appellate court denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost
five months later when on September 23, 1967, after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion
for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in his favor by the appellate court, it filed the present petition.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs. This
decision shall be noted in the personal record of the counsel for petitioner and of their associate attorney,
Teodoro P. Regino, who signed and verified the petition.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets
with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of
the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation
of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.
 72. Gillego vs. Diaz, G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971

Facts:
Respondents file a complaint for ejectment and illegal detainer of a certain residential property
against petitioner before the MTC. After numerous postponements attributed by respondents to
the efforts of respondent judge to effect an amicable settlement of the case (pet. Wife being the
sister of the res. Diaz) and to postponements secured by the parties, judgments of ejectment was
rendered. Respondents filed a motion for execution of judgment since it was already final and
executory. But petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari with injunction, praying for a
declaration of nullity of the judgment of ejectment on the sole ground that “the said decision of
the respondent municipal judge is null and void ab initio for the reason that the same was
rendered by him after he has lost jurisdiction over the case due to lapse of one year from the date
of filing of the complaint. This was dismissed on the ground that the court did not lose
jurisdiction over the case just for the reason that the decision was rendered more than one year
after the filing of the complaint. Hence, this direct appeal on a question of law from the order of
the CFI dismissing appellants’ petition for certiorari seeking to restrain the execution of a
judgment of ejectment rendered by the MTC of the ground of the latter court’s alleged loss of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case after the lapse of one year from the filing of the complaint.

Issue:
WoN the appeal was frivolous.

Ruling:
Yes, petitioner, in his brief on appeal, would belatedly assail the MTC ejectment judgment
against him on the alleged ground that the said suit should have been considered as one between
the members of the same family under article 222 of the civil code (since he is a brother in law of
res. Diaz) and it had not been shown that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
but failed, as enjoined by said codal provision. Assuming arguendo the applicability of the cited
article, it is much too late now for petitioner to raise this question for the first time in appeal. Not
having raised it in the ejectment sui, which has long become final executory he is barred now by
laches and waiver from invoking the cited provision. Not having raised it either in his petition for
certiorari below, where the sole issue raised by him was the alleged nullity of the municipal
court’s ejectment judgment “for loss of jurisdiction over the case due to the lapse of one year
from the date of filing the complaint” he is doubly barred from raising it for the first time in this
appeal, under the well settled principle that issues of fact of law no properly brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and will not be considered
by reviewing court.

73. IN RE: ATTY MELCHOR E. RUSTE

Adm. Case No. 632, June 27, 1940
CANON NUMBER:Canon 16
Facts:
Atty. MelchorRuste appeared for and represented, ascounsel, the San Juan spouses in a cadastral
case filed with the CFIof Zamboanga. The spouses claimed lot No. 3765; and as a result ofsaid
proceedings, an undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share ofsaid lot was adjudicated to them.
Ruste demanded for his fees but the couple did not haveenough money to pay him so he asked
them to execute in his favora contract of lease and a contract of sale, of their share of Lot
No.3764, intending to apply a portion of the would-be proceeds aspayment for his fees. The
spouses complied, although in fact and intruth, they received neither of the considerations in said
contracts.By virtue of the deeds of sale executed by Atty. Ruste, Ong Chua has
taken possession of said 11/20 share in Lot No. 3764. The PhP370payment of Chua of the lot
through Ruste never reached the hands of the San Juan couple.
Issue:
WON Atty. Ruste committed malpractice.
Held/Ruling:
Yes. There is evidence to show that the respondent has failed to account to the aggrieved spouses
for the various amounts received by him on account of the transactions effected by him
pertaining to the portion of lot No. 3764. For having improperly acquired the property mentioned
above; which property was then the subject matter of a judicial proceeding, in which he was
counsel ,the respondent is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended for a period of
one year, reserving to the complainant and his spouse such action as may be proper for the
recovery of such amount or amounts as may be due from the respondent.

74. Ordonio vs Eduarte (Adm. Matter No. 3216, March 16,

1992)
**Canon 10**
FACTS:
Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for
annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate of Felicisimo
Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty. Henedino
Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge. His wife, Atty.
Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. The decision in Civil Case No. 391 was rendered in favor
of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari
and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. Antonia Ulibari
conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared
and notarized by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also
conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for
legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the
deed of conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari. Dominga Velasco-
Ordonio filed the complaint for disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit
executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never conveyed the
subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale
executed in favor of her children were not known to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring
to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420 square meters as
the latter's attorney's fees.
RULING:
It is clear from Antonia Ulibari’s affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the said land
to her lawyer as attorney’s fees, and even if she knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject
property in favor of the respondent and her husband, in causing the execution of the Deed of
Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property, the
respondent has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by
assignment property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession. Respondent has also violated Rule 10 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting."

75 - Licuanan v Melo, A.M. No. 2361 (February 9, 1989)

Facts :
Leonila J. Licuanan filed an affidavit-complaint against Atty. Manuel Melo with the Office of
the Court Administrator for breach of professional ethics. In the complaint, she (Licuanan)
alleged that Melo, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to
remit to her the rentals he collected on different dates over a twelve-month period, and Melo
failed to report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from
actual receipt that Melo turned over the collections to her after she demanded the same.
In Melo’s defense, he admitted having received the payment of rentals from Licuanan’s tentant,
and explained that he kept this matter from Licuanan for the purpose of surprising her with his
success in collecting the rentals.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Issues :
1. Whether or not there was unreasonable delay on the part of Atty. Melo in accounting
for the funds collected by him for Licuanan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Melo should be disciplined for the unreasonable delay on his part
in accounting for the funds.
Rulings :
1. Yes. The SC adopts the OSG’s well-considered findings that during the twelve-month
period that Melo has been collecting rental payments from Pineda, he had every opportunity
to, but did not bother to inform Licuanan about said payments. It is very much discernible
that he did not surrender the amount for over a year because he was using it for his own
benefit.
2. Yes. His actuations in retaining the rental payments for his personal benefit for over a
period of one year deprived his former client, Licuanan, of its use. He knowingly withheld
information on the payments despite her inquiries, and by his misconduct, he breached the
trust reposed in him by his client and shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which
should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law.
The Court finds Atty. Melo guilty of deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. He
displayed lack of honesty and good moral character, and he has violated his oath not to delay any
man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven
himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
The Court resolved to DISBAR respondent. Atty. Manuel L. Melo’s name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Additional Info :
The abovementioned misconducts are glaring breaches of the Lawyer’s Oath, Canons of
Professional Ethics, and Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly:
(Canons of Professional Ethics)
11. Dealing with trust property
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
(Code of Professional Responsibility)
Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his profession.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.

76. Quilban vs Robinol, Adm. Case No. 2144, April 10, 1989
PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989

FACTS:
The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold land to the
Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area
of 2,743 square meters as possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since
1965 or 1966. In 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman
Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the
Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc
suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters
Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader
authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the
'Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin as President. But instead of
working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with
whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land
was ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of P15 per square meter or total consideration of
P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P100 to P120 per square
meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the
property. In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against Rivera, et.
al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case. To prosecute the appeal in the CAl, the Samahan
members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also Co be given by the members a part of the
land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What
was initially a verbal commitment the land sharing was confirmed in writing. On 14 November
1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. To
raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for
ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of
title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of
family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On
18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31
May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of
P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00. After almost
year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty.
Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution
had not yet been issued by the CFI of Quezon City.
However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After
confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers
discovered to have no basis at all. On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first
consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of the Samahan thereafter
approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown
the document containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as
their lawyer. Upon Atty.
Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter informing the latter of their
decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with
him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor was
similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol. On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered
his appearance in a civil case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of
the authority given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers.
Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the
defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the
plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no
objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor. Because Atty. Robinol,
however, still questioned the first consensus, another document labelled “The second consensus"
was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the
effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144:
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court
requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that
the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law.
Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that
Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and
conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge
him as their counsel. Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds
of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed
for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to retum to the plaintiffs, the
sum of
P75.000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not
committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol.
ISSUES
Should Atty. Robinol be suspended?
Should Atty. Montemayor be disbarred?
DECISION:
YES. Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the CA
had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly,
he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land
equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary
value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients'
money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the
circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who
could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of
P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who,
after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of
them. Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he
had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for
his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged
dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly,
even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds
intended for a specific purpose-the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
complainants' evidence on this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total
sum of P75,000.00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered
himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any
man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought
the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the
fulfillment of a lifetime ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.
NO
Reasoning In So far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with of the findings of the
Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in
the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs. There is no
doubt that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, of
Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his
appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer,
Atty. Robinol, for of loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In
so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is
concerned, therefore, the same is absolutely without merit.
Disposition
Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay
no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself
unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby
declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of
P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs. Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R
Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

77. LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT

Facts:
Atty. Ricafort was charged with having misappropriated the sum of 30,000.00 intended for his
client as well having deceived his client into giving 2,000.00 purportedly as bond in the case.
The court sent several resolutions seeking the respondents comments on the complaints
presented. However, the respondents, Atty. Ricafort did not comply. Atty. Ricafort later paid a
total of 60,000.00 plus 2,000.00 which he took as a way of settlement.
Held:
Although the complainant failed to submit original or true copies of the documents needed to
support claims against the respondents, the court ruled that the failure to respond to the different
resolutions lends credence to the allegation of the complainant.
Further, the belated payment of the amount did not relieve him from any liability. When the
respondent converted his clients money as his own without his clients consent, he not only
degraded himself as a lawyer but also has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession.
Atty Ricafort was then suspended for one year in practicing law. A lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the profession.
Notes:
CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01-- A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02-- A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

78. CANTILLER v. POTENCIANO, ADM. CASE NO. 3195,

DECEMBER 18, 1989
Topic: Canon 18
FACTS:
Humberto V. Potenciano is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll
No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross
misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court.
An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller. The court issued a decision against
the latter. A notice to vacate was then issued against Cantiller.
Cantiller then asked the respondent to handle their case. The complainant was made to sign by
respondent what she described as a “[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly
composed petition for annulment of judgment”.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila. Respondent demanded
from the complainant P l,000.00 as attorney’s fee. However the judge of the said court asked the
respondent to withdraw as counsel by reason of their friendship.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter which was allegedly
needed to be paid to another judge who will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano
did not succeed in locating the judge.
Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by virtue of the demand of the latter. The amount
was allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer’s Office of Pasig as purchase price of the
apartment and P 1,000.00 to cover the expenses of the suit needed in order for the complainant to
retain the possession of the property. But later on Cantiller found out that the amounts were not
necessary to be paid. A demand was made against Potenciano but the latter did not answer and
the amounts were not returned.
Contrary to Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he withdrew his
appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as
replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.
HELD:
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client’s
interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge
to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior
knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this
fact.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing
with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a
matter of public interest.

79.Arsenio A. Villafuerte vs Atty. Dante H. Cortez

A.C. No. 3455. April 14, 1998

FACTS:

Arsenio A. Villafuerte, complainant, filed in an instant proceeding, to seek for the disbarment of
Atty Dante H. Cortez, for what he perceives to be a neglect in the handling of his cases by
respondent lawyer, despite the latter’s receipt of P1,750.00 acceptance and retainer fees.

Allegedly, complainant never showed up thereafter until November 1989 when he went to the
office of respondent lawyer but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution. Indeed, said
respondent, he had never entered his appearance in the aforenumbered case.

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
conducted investigation on this matter. In its report, IBP-CBD concluded that the facts
established would just the same indicate sufficiently case of neglect of duty on the part of
respondent.

The Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-66 which – “RESOLVED to CONFIRM
Resolution No XII-96-191of the Board of Governors Meeting dated August 30, 1996
SUSPENDING Atty Dante Cortez from the practice of law for three (3) months with a warning
that repetition of the acts/omission complained of will be dealt with more severely.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the IBP-CBP in its findings and conclusion that respondent lawyer has
somehow been remiss in his responsibilities.
The Court is convinced that there is a lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and
complainant, because of the acceptance of the payment of P1750.00 by the respondent. A
lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of his responsibilities
that should be expected of him (Canon 17). He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect,
within the bounds of the law, the interest of his clients. The Code of Professional Responsibility
cannot be any clearer in its dictum than when it stated that a “lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence,” (Canon 18) and decreeing further that he “shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him” (Canon 18-04).

WHERFORE, Atty Dante H. Cortez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for the
period of one month from notice hereof, with a warning that a repetition of similar acts and
other administrative lapses will be dealt with more severely that presently.
For reference:
Resolution No. XII-96-191 by the IBP Board of Governors:
RESOLVE to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigation Commissioner in the above-entitled case, hereinmade part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex ‘A’ and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable rules laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Dante Cortez is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three months with a warning that a repetition of the acts/omission complained of will be dealt
with more severely

80. REONTOY VS. IBADLIT A.C. CBD No. 190 Feb. 4, 1999 302 SCRA
604
FACTS: An adverse decision was rendered by the trial court against the client of Atty. Ibadlit.
He did not appeal the decision because of his opinion that to appeal would be futile. An
administrative complaint was later filed by Atty. Ibadlit’s client against him for failure to file an
appeal within the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether a lawyer may refuse to file an appeal on behalf of his client when in his
opinion to make an appeal would be futile.
HELD: No. It was highly improper for him to have adopted such opinion since a lawyer is
without authority to waive his client’s right to appeal and his failure to appeal within the
prescribed period constituted negligence and malpractice. Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 0f the
CPR “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.”

81. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs

GAUDENCIO INGCO, Defendant-Appellant.
IN RE ALFREDO R. BARRIOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-32994, October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Respondent Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who was appointed counsel de
oficio for the accused in this case, Gaudencio Ingco, sentenced to death on September 28, 1970
for the crime of rape with homicide, was required in a resolution of this Court on September 9,
1971 to show cause within ten days why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
having filed fifteen days late a motion for the extension of time for submitting the brief for
appellant Ingco.
The explanation came in a manifestation of September 11, 1971. It was therein stated that
respondent "was then busy with take preparation of the brief of one Benjamin Apelo" pending in
the Court of Appeals; that while he had made studies in preparation for the brief in this case,
during such period he had to appear before courts in Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City, Bulacan
and Pampanga; and that likewise he did file, on July 27, 1971, motions for extension in the
aforesaid case of Benjamin Apelo with the Court of Appeals, which motions were duly granted.
He would impress on this Court then that he was misled into assuming that he had also likewise
taken the necessary steps to file a motion for extension of time for the submission of his brief in
this case by the receipt of the resolution from the Court of Appeals granting him such extension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Barrios violated Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. The respondent counsel is woefully negligent considering that the accused is fighting for
his life. The least that could be expected of a counsel de oficio is awareness of the period within
which he was required to file appellant's brief. The counsel has exhibited sheer inattention
tantamount to grave neglect of duty deserving of severe condemnation. It is clearly unworthy of
membership in the Bar which requires dedication and zeal in the defense of his client's rights, a
duty even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio.
WHEREFORE, respondent Alfredo R. Barrios is severely reprimanded, this reprimand to be
entered in his record

82. Legarda v Court of Appeals (G.R No. 94457, June 10, 1992)
(Espinosa)
Facts:
Petitioner was a previous defendant in a complaint for filed by New Cathay House, Inc.,
compelling Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at Quezon City which
the private respondent intended to use in operating a restaurant.
Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel appeared as counsel for Legarda and filed an urgent
motion for an extension of ten (10) days to file an answer. She failed to answer within the
extended period, and the lower court had rendered a decision by default compelling her to sign
the lease contract and to pay the damages.
Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision but he did not appeal
rendering the decision final. On November 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by her attorney-
in-fact, filed in the CA a petition for annulment of the judgment where it was dismissed,
however, Atty. Coronel did not file a motion for reconsideration.
On December 1989, New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through the Coronel Law
Office, a notice to vacate within three days from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not inform
petitioner until sometime in March, 1990.
 On August 1990, the petitioner’s new counsel filed a petition for certiorari contending
that the decisions of the courts are void as petitioner was deprived to be heard and stripped of her
property without due process of law through the negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio
Coronel.
March 18, 1991, Supreme Court declared the previous decisions as null and void and
required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions.
Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days within
which to file his explanation due to the motion pressure of work. A day after the expiration of the
30-day extended period, he filed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty (30)
days as he had been confined at the St. Luke's Hospital, which has been denied.
ISSUE:
Did Atty. Coronel committed a gross negligence which resulted in grave injustice to the
petitioner?
HELD:
Yes. Undoubtedly, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and
attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material prejudice. The facts of the case
clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause; he covenants
that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to
exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on
him by the latter.
Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is
an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects
him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on professional self-
destruction.
RULING:
The second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty.
Antonio P. Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of petitioner
Victoria Legarda and accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition of the acts
constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal record, another copy be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and copies thereof be circulated in all the courts.

Canon 18~
The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence."
He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable." Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travials attending the
disposition of the case against her not to mention the devastating consequence on her property
rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar.
By negligence to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which
resulted in the deprivation of petitioner’s rights over her house and lot.
In this regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of
March 18, 1991: "Petitioner’s counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law
school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the
petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After
agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case failed against her by the private respondent,
said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file
the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default
on the motion of private respondent’s counsel. . .."

83. Mariveles vs. Mallari, Adm. Matter No. 3294, February 17, 1993
Facts:
Mariveles files an administrative complain regarding former counsel for his negligence to file the
appelants brief to the court of appeals, resulting to dismissal of the appeal. Through new counsel,
complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry of Judgment and
Admission of Appellant's Brief, but it was denied by the appellate court. Thus, petitioining this
case for review in the SC
Issue:
Whether or not there is negligence in the part of the respondent?
Ruling:
The respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable
Wherefore, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and
dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal
profession and to immediately cease and desist from the practice of law

84. ROMINA M. SUAREZ, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
LXI, ANGELES CITY,
G.R. No. 91133. March 22, 1993.
Ponente: MELO, Justice
Facts:
- Case at bar is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17488 and to direct respondent trial court
to reopen the joint trial of Criminal Cases several criminal cases mentioned in the 2 nd
fact
- In May, petitioner was charged in Criminal Cases No. 7284-7296, and No. 7302-
7303, violating the Bouncing Check Law. 4 months later, petitioner was again
charged in the same court with the same offence in Criminal Case No. 7650.
 - Several hearings were held, yet the petitioner herself failed to make an
appearance on the account that she had contracted marriage and resided in her
partner’s domicile. During these hearings, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. San Luis
appeared as her representative. It wasn’t long until Atty. San Luis stopped appearing
before the court, and had another counsel, Atty. Buen Zamar, make a special
appearance on the former’s behalf as a counsel for the accused.
- The accused was eventually arrested, and she was held for trial.
Issue/s:
- Whether the petitioner was denied her day in court (due process of law)
Ruling/Held:
- YES. The SC rules that the petitioner was deprived of due process of law on
account of the negligence of her counsel. The appearance of Atty. Buen Zamar is of
no comment as there was no client-attorney relationship between him and petitioner.
As a consequence to the petitioner being deprived of due process of law, the SC
decides that the decisions of the Court of Appeals, and of the trial courts to be SET
ASIDE. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to reopen Criminal Cases No. 7284-
7296, 7302-7303, and 7650
Doctrine/Basis:
- Canon 17 and 22

85. PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 110504 October 27, 1994
Justice Josue Bellocillo
FACTS:
In January 1987, Atlas Fertilizer Corporation shipped 13,000 bags of fertilizer from Toledo City,
to Iloilo City through MV Ana Alexandria owned by private respondent Northern Mindanao
Transport Co., Inc. (NORTHERN). Petitioner Provident Insurance Corp. insured the shipment
against damage or loss.
Upon arrival to Iloilo City, one bag of fertilizer was missing and 188 bags sustained unrecovered
spillage of 887.50 kgs. Additional unrecovered spillage of 1,712.50 kgs. from 118 torn bags was
incurred while being transported from the vessel to the warehouse of ATLAS by broker Benny
Espinosa Trucking Services.
In October 1987, ATLAS made a formal demand from NORTHERN to pay P3,461.25
representing the loss and spillage. NORTHERN refused to pay. In April 1988 ATLAS
nonetheless recovered from PROVIDENT the amount of P7,311.04 for the damage and loss to
its shipment.
A year later, PROVIDENT initiated this collection suit against NORTHERN before the MeTC.
The complaint was dismissed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) because it was
filed beyond 1-year reglementary period. In 1993, PROVIDENT filed before the CA a petition
for review of the RTC decision which was dismissed because it was a pure question of the law.
PROVIDENT moved for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUES:
(a) whether the RTC erred in affirming the dismissal of the MeTC considering the alleged valid
and meritorious claims of plaintiff
(c) Whether the RTC erred in applying the COGSA and holding that the action had prescribed
because more than one year had elapsed from the delivery of the cargo to the consignee on
13 January 1987 to the filing of the complaint in November 1988
HELD:
No.
RULLING:
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, third issue evidently pure questions of law
because their resolution is based on facts not in dispute. With regard to the first question,
PROVIDENT argues that it was necessary to go over the records. But we do not agree.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals of
2 March 1993 and 28 May 1993, the instant petition for review is DENIED
(Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks
another and possibly favorable judgment in another forum other than by appeal or special civil
action for certiorari. There is also forum shopping when a party institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. – Batas Natin)

86) ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA

INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES, INC., vs. ATTY.
ROSENDO MENESES III,
CBD A.C. No. 313 January 30, 1998

SUBJECT: CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT

AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED
IN HIM.

PER CURIAM:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was initiated by a
complaint-affidavit 1 filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, the
Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. Herein
complainant charges respondent Meneses with the following offenses, viz.:
(1) malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender;
(2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his
client's interest;
(3) willful abandonment; and
(4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount of
P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the amicable
settlement of a pending case.
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a group of
companies which includes Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc., through its
Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of respondent
Atty. Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled various cases and
was properly compensated by his client in accordance with their retainer agreement. 3
One of the litigations handled by him was the case of "People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a.
Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaña," pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of
Makati. On December 24, 1993, respondent received the sum of P50,000.00 from
Arthur Bretaña, the accused in said case, to be given to therein offended party, a certain
Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement and with the understanding that
a motion to dismiss the case would be filed by respondent Meneses. However, despite
subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client the receipt
acknowledging that Gleason received said amount.
Upon investigation it turned out that the said motion, respondent Atty. Navarro had no legal
personality to sue him for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc.
because his legal services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant,
Inc.; that Navarro had not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any
case nor had he been authorized by its board of directors to file this disbarment case
against respondent; that the retainer agreement between him and Frankwell
Management and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of December 31, 1993
according to the verbal advice of its Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the
case of Arthur Bretaña was not part of their retainer agreement, and Bretaña was not an
employee of Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him as its
legal counsel; and that the settlement of said case cannot be concluded because the same
was archived and accused Bretaña is presently out of the country.
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, stresses that respondent
Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to account for the
amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him; that respondent's arguments in his motion to
dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission; and that he was fully aware of
the interrelationship of the two corporations and always coordinated his legal work with
Estrellita Valdez. Then after, the Investigating Commissioner resolved to deny said
motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The respondent filed a manifestation that he was
adopting the allegations in his motion to dismiss as his answer.9 Several postponements
and resetting of hearings were later requested and granted by the Commission He
thereafter moved to postpone and reset the hearing of the case several times allegedly
due to problems with his health.
The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from the practice of the
legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to return the P50,000.00 he
received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution. It
further provided that failure on his part to comply with such requirement would result in
his disbarment.
 Respondent Meneses' misconduct constitutes a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer which,
inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. He
blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely holding in trust the
money he received from his client to be used as consideration for the amicable
settlement of a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did not materialize,
he was necessarily under obligation to immediately return the money, as there is no
showing that he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of
fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.

Therefore, Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is DISBARRED.

87. Blanza vs. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, September 5, 1967
FACTS:

Atty. Agustin Arcangel, respondent, volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza and Maria Passion,
complainants, in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands,
both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and
also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then,
respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and refused to surrender the papers
when asked by the complainants six years later.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance.

RULING:

No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary
action against respondent. But the Court cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member
of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely
complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of the law, he is necessarily a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.

88. G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975 COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP
WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
 This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for entertaining an Appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit which
was correctly dismissed by the latter as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was
resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor
practice controversy. Said unfair labor practice case was already passed upon and sustained
by the Supreme Court, hence, cannot be further appealed for being final and executory.
In the petition, it was stated that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of
Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop, followed
by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that
petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow
the sheriffto keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were denied by the Court
en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by
this Court for lack of merit. Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this petition had
the temerity to deny such allegations. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for
respondent Lo Bu, he did specifically maintain that respondent filed a motion to recall the
writ of execution and followed by the motion to return the levied properties.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Bustamante in denying the facts alleged in the
petition to defend the cause of his client is commendable.

Held:
A legal counsel is expected to defend a client’s cause but not at the expense of truth and in
defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws.—For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente
had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his client’s cause with zeal, but
not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to
remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession,
requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and
eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into
serious question his good standing in the bar.

89. Albano vs. Coloma, Adm. Case No. 528, October 11, 1967 ANGEL
ALBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent
FACTS:
This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent
Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. Complainant alleged that during the Japanese
occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for
them as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After
which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized,
respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they
had themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that
respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. Complainant stated that being a
poor man, he could hardly pay for the services of a lawyer to assist him in the disbarment
proceedings. He added the information that respondent Coloma "is a very influential woman in
the province of Ilocos Norte" as she was then a member of the provincial board. The prayer was
for the "kind and generous help regarding this matter in order that Atty. Perpetua Coloma may be
made to stand before the bar of justice and disbarred from the practice of her profession as a
lawyer."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Perpetua Coloma be removed for her failure to comply with her obligations
as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and
capacity.
RULING:
No, a lawyer cannot be removed without just cause. The Solicitor General could thus rightfully
assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent
in said case, tried to back out on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent
attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them said case in
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and
genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, therefore as has been
so clearly shown, was in no wise culpable; there is no occasion for the corrective power of this
Court coming into play, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma was dismissed.
MAIN POINT:
Any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With
his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only
in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed
ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he
himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views
with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of
his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal
profession] is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This
Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk minimized. Where, as in this case, the good
name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the truth, an action
prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called for.

90. Corpuz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980
Facts:
David accepted the case of Corpus though there were no express agreements regarding attorney’s
f fees. Corpus was administratively charged. He employed the services of david and won the
admin case.

Corpus gave a check to David, but was returned by david with the intention of getting paid after.
Then, the case is ruled with finality by the SC and Corpus gets his back salaries and wages.
David continued to fight for corpus’ case and got favorable judgment. Corpus refused to pay
david contending that sice david refused the first check given by him, he gave his services
gratuitously.

Issue:
WoN private respondent’ atty. David is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Held:
YES. Despite not having any written agreement or contract between Corpus and David, it is still
evident that the latter provided his legal services to the former for at least 4 years. It was further
noted that in a letter from Corpus to David, the former wrote that he would pay the latter the
attorney’s fees upon his reinstatement and receipt of back salaries but, upon reaching a favorable
judgment, has since denied the payment of such. The efforts exerted by David in providing his
legal services to allow Corpus to win his case is blatantly obvious. Therefore, attorney’s fees
should be paid to the defendant.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER R. MARINO CORPUS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TOPAY

RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T. DAVID THE SUM OF TWENTY THOUSAND(P20,000.00)
PESOS AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T. DAVID AND JUDGE
JOSE H. TECSON OF THECOURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
V, ARE HEREBYDECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND ARE HEREBY
REPRIMANDED, WITHA WARNING THAT REPETITION OF THE SAME OR SIMILAR
ACTS WILL BEDEALT WITH MORE SEVERELY.COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.SO
ORDERED