Sara Khatoon

Sureswar Datta law college (University of Calcutta)

4th year student
Parties Name SONIK INDUSTRIES, RAJKOT vs
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF RAJKOT

Facts of the Case:

● The case involves a municipality in Rajkot, presumably in India.

● There were certain rules at the center of the dispute. These rules were likely related
to municipal taxation.
● The Trial Court initially decreed that these rules were invalid.
● An appeal against the Trial Court's decision was dismissed by the Extra Assistant
Judge in Rajkot.
● The Municipality then filed a Second Appeal, which was referred to a larger Bench of
the High Court.
● The larger Bench of the High Court, consisting of learned Judges, held that the
conditions of Section 77 (apparently a legal provision) had been complied with.
Issue of the case
The specific legal issue at hand in this case appears to be related to the validity of the rules,
especially in the context of compliance with Section 77, which is crucial to the case.

Judgment:
The passage does not provide the full details of the judgment, but it mentions that the
learned Single Judge allowed the Second Appeal based on the opinion of the larger Bench
of the High Court. Therefore, it can be inferred that the judgment likely upheld the validity of
the rules in question, concluding that they had been properly enacted in accordance with
Section 77. As a result, the appeal (presumably by the party challenging the rules) was
dismissed by the Court.
Reason for the judgement
The judgment in this case upheld the validity of the rules primarily because it was found that
they had complied with the essential requirements outlined in Section 77. This compliance
demonstrated that the rules had undergone the proper legal procedures, including adequate
publication, inviting public objections, and final approval by the State Government. The
judgment also emphasized the critical importance of transparent publication, ensuring that
the municipality's residents were fully informed about the levy's provisions and their
implications. Consequently, the rules were deemed valid and legally enforceable.
Parties name
Prithi versus budh sing 1981

Facts

The appellant Pirthi has been adjudged insolvent. The respondent Budh Singh applied to
the Court for adjudging Pirthi an insolvent on the ground that Pirthi has taken a loan on
pronote dated 10-1-1971 for Rs. 16,000/- bearing interest at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum. The amount due, according to Budh Singh, was Rs 20,025/-. It was asserted that
the appellant had sold a major portion of his Bhumi-dhari property on 20-2-1973 in favour of
Rura and Tilka sons of Mohan Lal and Inder Singh son of Daryao with an intent to delay and
defeat the creditor. It was asserted that this sale deed had been effected by Pirthi after the
filing of the Suit No. 65 of 1973 by the creditor in the Court of the Civil Judge, Muzaffar
Nagar on 16-2-1973 for the recovery of the amount of the loan.

The appellant contested the petition. He denied taking of loan of Rs. 16,000/- as alleged by
the creditor. He also asserted that the sale deed had been effected in pursuance of an
agreement of sale executed by him prior to the institution of the suit by the petitioner against
him in the Court of the Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar. The appellant further asserted that he
possessed agricultural property worth about Rs. 20.000/- and that he also had a Gher worth
about Rs. 15,000/-, He denied having committed any act of insolvency.
The Insolvency Judge found that the appellant had taken a loan on a pronote as asserted by
the creditor. The Insolvency Judge further found that though the agreement to sell had been
entered into between the debtor and the vendees on 15-2-1973, nevertheless such an
agreement did not create an interest or charge in the properly and the sale was calculated to
delay and defeat Ihe creditor. It further found that the land possessed by the appellant-
debtor was un-irrigated land; whereas the land sold by him was irrigated land. The value of
the land possessed by the appellant was held to be not more that Rs. 100/- per Bigha. It
further took note of the fact that the creditor had filed the lease deed, Ex, 7, executed by the
appellant which showed that one Bigha 19 Biswas of land was sold for Rs. 500/- and the
land sold was of the same quality as the land still possessed by the debtor-appellant. As
regards the Notha, it found that it was practically of no value. It recorded a finding that the
appellant's assets were less than the amount of the debt The Insolvency Judge also found
that the fact that the value of the appellant's assets might exceed his debt, was of no
consequence if the debtor did not have liquid assets to pay of the debt For arriving at this
conclusion the Insolvency Judge relied upon two decisions, namely a decision of Nagpur
High Court in the case of Gadi Bhi-kaji v. Govindrao Bapuji (AIR 1937 Nag 127) and a
decision of Lahore High Court in the case of Bhagvan Dass v. Mahammad Nawaz Shah,
(AIR 1939 Lah 349). The Insolvency Judge took note of the fact that in the suit filed by the
creditor, respondent, the debtor-appellant had applied to the Court to pay the decretal
amount in instalments. In the circumstances, the Insolvency Judge allowed the petition and
adjudged Pirthi an insolvent.

Issue of the case

Aggrieved, Pirthi has come in appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has not
challenged the finding that the appellant was indebted to the respondent and, therefore, we
w.ould proceed on the basis that the appellant is, in fact, indebted to the respondent to the
extent determined by the Insolvency Judge

Holding

The learned Judge relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Pratap
Mall Rameshwar v. Chunilal Johuri (AIR 1933 Cal 417 : 60 Cal 345) wherein Rankin, C. J.,
had remarked that a person cannot be declared insolvent if he cannot meet his debts in the
ordinary way by making legal tender and discharging his debts. The other decision relied
upon by the Insolvency Judge is the decision of Rangoon High Cou
Now coming to the question as to whether a debtor can be declared an insolvent if be does
not have in hand sufficient liquid assets to pay his debts, no absolute proposition can be laid
down that in all circumstances where the debtor whik possessing assets, had not enough
liquid assets in hand, he must be adjudged an insolvent. It all depends on the circumstance
of each individual case. If the assets in a normal case can be liquidated within a reasonable
time and the creditor paid, the debtor cannot be declared an insolvent. If, however, the
assets are not presently saleable or are encumbered then the debtor may be declared an
insolvent.

Judgement

Since the amount due to Budh Singh was Rs. 20,025, the value of Pirthi's assets exceeded
this liability. He could, thus, not be declared an insolvent on the ground that his assets were
less than his liabilities.
Parties name :-

K. Venkataramanasetty And Sons v.

Malali Venkataramanaiya Setty And

Facts:-

The petitioners, who are creditors, filed a petition to adjudicate the debtors as insolvents.
The petitioners claimed that the debtors, who formed a joint family firm, had alienated their
properties in favor of certain creditors to defraud or delay payment to other creditors,
including the petitioners. The debtors denied these claims. The second petitioner testified
that they had advanced loans to Malali Venkataramana Setty and Sons under promissory
notes.

PW 2 BL Ranganna, the Shanubhogue at Kadur, confirmed the establishment of the firm

Malali Venkataramana Shetty and Sons under the Partnership Act in 1961. The debtors
disputed any change in the management of the shop and stated their inability to pay even
after a decree was issued against them.Whether the debtors should be adjudged as
insolvents based on the allegations of preferential alienation of propertiesand intention to
defraud or delay the creditors.

Issues:-

Whether the debtor should be adjudged as insolvents based on the allegation of preferential
alienation of properties and intention to defraud or delay the creditors.

Judgement:-

The court admitted additional evidence regarding a subsequent cell of the mill, which
occurred after the trial court judgement in 1973. The sale was made in favour of the
creditor's bank for Rs.1,05,000/-. The lower court's judgement which assumed at the mill
and its accessories were sufficient to satisfy all the debts, was found to be in error .The court
also criticised the lower court judge for exhibitions and inherent prejudice against the
Marwaries. Cautioning judge to exercise judicial self-restraint and independence considering
the transfer of unencumbered properties by the debtors, including the residential house, car,
and lorry, with the intention to delay or defraud the creditors, the court concluded that the
debtors committed an act of insolvency . Therefore, the appeal was allowed, setting aside
the lower court's judgement, and the original respondents 1(a) to 1(d) were adjudged as
insolvents.
Case Name: Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs Sultan Khan Kabuli And Ors.

Parties:

Appellant: Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.

Respondent: Sultan Khan Kabuli And Ors.

Factual Background:

This case involves two separate appeals that emerged from objections filed in two
insolvency cases. The appellants, Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., were the objectors in both
appeals. In both insolvency cases, individuals (the respondents) were adjudged as insolvent
by the court.

After these adjudications, interim orders of attachment were issued by the insolvency court,
which included the retiring gratuity belonging to the insolvent individuals. The central factual
dispute revolved around the legal status of this retiring gratuity and the timing of when it
should be considered as part of the insolvent's property.

The key contention was whether the retiring gratuity should be deemed the property of the
insolvent immediately upon determination or if it only acquired this legal status after it was
actually disbursed to the insolvent by the employer company. This question hinged on the
interpretation of the Retiring Gratuity Rules of 1937 of the Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., which
provided for retiring gratuities for its employees.

Procedural History:

The insolvency cases involved individuals who were declared insolvent by the court.
Interim orders of attachment were issued by the insolvency court, encompassing the retiring
gratuity owned by the insolvent individuals.
The objectors (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.) contested this attachment, arguing that the retiring
gratuity did not become the property of the insolvent until it was actually paid by the
employer company.
The court below initially ruled in favor of the attachment, holding that the retiring gratuity was
attachable.
The objectors (appellants) then appealed this decision to a higher court.

Judgment:
The court, in its judgment, sided with the appellants (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.). It held that
the retiring gratuity should not be considered the property of the insolvent immediately upon
determination but only after it was physically paid to the insolvent by the employer company.

The court's interpretation of the law was grounded in the fact that the Retiring Gratuity Rules
of 1937 conferred significant discretion upon the employer company regarding the granting
of retiring gratuities. Until the gratuity was actually sanctioned and paid to the employee, it
was considered to be within the absolute discretion of the employer. Consequently, the court
determined that it did not become the property of the employee until it was disbursed.

Therefore, the court concluded that the retiring gratuity should not be regarded as part of the
insolvent's property that vests in the insolvency court upon the declaration of insolvency.
The previous order of the lower court, which favored attachment, was set aside. As a result,
the appeals lodged by the objectors (appellants) were allowed to succeed. However, the
court ordered that each party should bear their own costs related to the proceedings in this
case.
The primary issue in the case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs. Sultan Khan Kabuli And Ors.

Issues:-

Dispute Over the Legal Status of Retiring Gratuity: The central dispute revolves around
whether the retiring gratuity, as governed by the Retiring Gratuity Rules of 1937 of the Tata
Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., should be considered the property of the insolvent employees
immediately upon determination or if it only becomes their property after it is physically paid
to them by the employer company. The disagreement stems from the attachment of this
gratuity as part of the insolvency proceedings, with the objectors (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.)
arguing that it should not be considered part of the insolvent's property subject to
attachment until payment, while the court below initially ruled in favor of the attachment.

Holding :-

Rule of Law Applied: The court applied the rule of law as it pertains to the legal status of
retiring gratuity in the context of insolvency proceedings. Specifically, it interpreted Section
28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, which governs the vesting of an insolvent's
property in the insolvency court or receiver upon adjudication.

Holding: The court held that the retiring gratuity should not be considered as the property of
the insolvent immediately upon determination but only after it is physically paid to the
insolvent by the employer company. The court based this interpretation on the fact that the
Retiring Gratuity Rules of 1937 granted the employer company significant discretion over the
gratuity until it was actually sanctioned and paid to the employee. Until that moment, the
gratuity remained within the absolute discretion of the employer, and the employee did not
have a legal claim to it as a matter of right. Therefore, the court concluded that the retiring
gratuity should not be regarded as part of the insolvent's property that vests in the
insolvency court upon the declaration of insolvency.

In summary, the court's holding was that the retiring gratuity does not become the property
of the insolvent until it is paid out by the employer company, and therefore, it is not subject
to attachment as part of the insolvency proceedings until that time.
Parties Nam

Joseph Shine v/s Union Of India

Facts
Joseph Shine, the hotelier challenged the constitutionality of the section 497 of Indian Penal
Code. The core reason behind this petition was to shield Indian men from being punished for
extra marital relationships by vengeful women or their husbands. Petitioner's close friend in
Kerala committed suicide after a women co-worker made malicious rape charge on him.
Further section 497 is an egregious occurrence of sexuality unfairness, authoritative
imperialism and male patriotism. The traditional framework in which section 497 was drafted,
is no longer applicable in modern society.

Issues

Whether section 497 of Indian Penal Code is unconstitutional?

The petitioner wanted certain problems with section 497 to be addressed:
Adultery law provides that man to be punished in case of adultery but no action is suggested
for the women. Hence, it made the gender neutral.

As per section 497, there is no legal provision that a woman can file a complaint of adultery
against her husband.

According to section 497, if the husband gives his consent for such an act then such act is
no more considered as a crime. Therefore, women are treated as an object under adultery
law.

Judgment

The judgment given by CJI, Deepak Mishra started with the statements proving that wives
are not the property of the husbands and husbands are not their masters.

Section 497 disposes off the women from her autonomy, dignity and privacy. To live is to
live with dignity. The draftsmen of the Constitution defined their vision of the society in which
constitutional values would be attained by emphasizing, among other freedoms, liberty and
dignity. So fundamental is dignity that it permeates the core of the rights guaranteed to the
individual by Part III and Privacy of the individual is an essential aspect of dignity.

Section 497 is considered as the wife's encroachment on her right to life and personal liberty
by accepting the notion of marriage which overthrows the true equality.

Equality is overthrown by adopting the sanctions of penal code to a gender-based approach

to the relationship of man and woman. Sexual autonomy falls within the area of personal
liberty under Article 21 of Constitution of India. Trust and respect are two essentials of a
marriage. When both the spouses respect each other with equality and dignity then only the
respect for sexual autonomy is established.

This section denies the substantive equality as it provides that women are not able to give
her free consent for the sexual acts in a legal order which considers them as a sexual
property of their spouse. Therefore, section 497 is violative of Article 14 of the Indian
Constitution and it also violates the non-discrimination clause of Article 15 of the Constitution
of India. This section also lays strong emphasis on the consent of the husband which leads
to the subordination of women. Hence, it clearly violates Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.

Adultery is no longer be a criminal offence- A crime is committed against the society as a

whole whereas adultery is a personal issue. Adultery does not fit into the ambit of crime as it
would otherwise invade the extreme privacy sphere of marriage. However, adultery can be
considered as a civil wrong and is a valid ground for divorce.

Husband is not the master of his wife- The judgment focuses on the fact that women should
not be considered as the property of their husband or father anymore. They have equal
status in the society and should be given every opportunity to put their stance forward.
Parties Name
Swaminathan v. Koonavalli, AIR 1982 Mad. 276

Facts of the case

In the case of "Swaminathan And Ors. vs Koonavalli And Ors.," the dispute stemmed from a
property matter. The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit seeking the division and exclusive
possession of their 1/4th share in a specific property. They argued that this property
originally constituted part of their joint family assets and that their father had been allotted a
1/4th share in the property through a family arrangement documented on September 19,
1953.

The defendants in the case included defendants 1 to 4, who were lessees of the property,
and defendants 5 and 6, who contested the lawsuit. Defendants 5 and 6 contended that the
property had been divided in 1933 through a registered instrument between their father and
the plaintiffs' father. Additionally, they challenged the validity of the 1953 family
arrangement, asserting that it was unregistered and, therefore, could not confer any rights
on the plaintiffs.

Issues
The central legal issue in the case was the validity and admissibility of the 1953 family
arrangement document, referred to as Ex. A. 1. This was a crucial point of contention
because the plaintiffs' father did not possess a pre-existing title or claim to the property. The
primary issues included:

Whether the 1953 family arrangement (Ex. A. 1) was a valid family arrangement.
Whether Ex. A. 1 required registration to be admissible in evidence.
Whether Ex. A. 1 created an immediate interest in the property for the plaintiffs' father or
merely recorded an earlier division.

Procedure
The case went through the following legal procedure:
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in a lower court seeking partition and possession of their 1/4th
share in the property.
The trial court conducted proceedings, heard arguments, and examined evidence presented
by both sides.
The trial court rendered a judgment, ruling that Ex. A. 1 was inadmissible as it appeared to
create an immediate interest in the property for the plaintiffs' father, who lacked a pre-
existing claim.
The plaintiffs filed an appeal to a lower appellate court challenging the trial court's decision.
The lower appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, maintaining that Ex. A. 1 seemed
to establish an interest in the property requiring registration.
The plaintiffs then filed a second appeal to the Madras High Court to seek a review of the
case.

Judgement
The Madras High Court, in its judgment dated June 26, 1981, allowed the second appeal
and ruled as follows:

The court clarified that family arrangements could be valid without requiring registration and
that the need for registration depended on whether the document immediately established a
family arrangement or simply recorded an earlier division.
Ex. A. 1, the 1953 family arrangement document, was found to be admissible in evidence
because it recorded an earlier division agreed upon by the Panchayatdars and did not
create an immediate interest in the property.
The case was remitted to the lower appellate court for further consideration of other issues
and aspects of the dispute.

Reasons
The court's reasoning behind its judgment was based on legal precedents, including
Supreme Court decisions such as Ramcharan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi and Tek Bahadur
Bhujil v. Debi Singh. It emphasized that family arrangements could be valid even without
registration, as long as the document recorded an earlier division and did not immediately
create an interest in the property. In this case, the court found that Ex. A. 1 was a record of
an earlier transaction and, therefore, was admissible in evidence without registration.
Case Name :-SHAKTI VAHINI VS UNION OF INDIA
Citation:-(2018) 7 SCC

Judgement:-27-03-2018

Jurisdiction SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Case No CIVIL WRIT PETITION 231 of 2010

Petitioner:-SHAKTI VAHINI

Respondent:- UNION OF INDIA & ORS

Bench MR.JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA, MR.JUSTICE A.M. KHAMUILKAR, MR.JUSTICE D.Y
CHANDRACHUD

Acts and section involved THE INDIAN CONSTITIONS, 1949:-

Article 19
Article 21
Article 32
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 Section 300 Section 302.

FACTS OF THE CASE:-

Petitioner Shakti Vahini Organization files writ petition under article 32 of Indian constitution
in Supreme Court. The organization authorised by National commission for women to do
research on “HONOUR KILLING” in Haryana; western Uttar Pradesh, order passed on
22.12.2008. by the research Haryana; western Uttar Pradesh; Punjab trend on increase on
honour killing, which makes fear amongst people who intend to get marry but don’t out of
fear. The violation of Human rights and destruction of Fundamental right take place in tha
name of class honour, group right or by caste system. The action of woman or man in
choosing life partner according to her/his own choice beyond community norm consider as
dishonour.

Petitioned that action found LinkedIn with honour based crimes,

Loss of virginity outside marriage
Pre-marital pregnancy
Infidelity
having unapproved relationships;
Refusing an arranged marriage;
Asking for divorce;
Demanding custody of children after divorce;
Leaving the family or marital home without permission;
Causing scandal or gossip in the community, and
Falling victim to rape.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:-

To seek direction to respondents; state government, central government to take prevention

steps to curb honour crimes and to submit national plan of action and State plan of action for
honour killing
To seeks and direct state government to constitute special cells in each district seperately
for the safety and welfare of couples.
Seeking to issue, a writ of mandamus to State government for launching prosecutions in
honour killing and appropriate measures for such crimes.
Whether the activities of khap panchayats are legal? Does panchayats have right to punish
people?

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:-

The appellant Shakti Vahini Organization contented that the parallel enforcement agency,
where leading member of group have same caste or Lineage have power to punish for
crimes and their direct social boycott or killing by mob where called panchayat,
nomenclature of khap panchayats.
Panchayat acts are not taken cognizable by police and their functions not questioned by any
authority administration in our country. In Indian constitution article 21 provides protection of
life and liberty and guards basic Human rights and equality of status, which violated by
action of panchayat who subscribe Honour Killing.

Contention Of The Respondents:-

The Union of India, Ministry of Home affairs and Ministry of Women and child development
filed counter affidavit and contended Honour Killing treated as murder under 300 of Indian
Penal code and punishable under 302 of Indian penal code.
On 9th September 2013, Union of India States interalia, to tackle tha issues of Honour
Killing, The bill titled “The Prohibition of Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial
Alliance bill” has recommended by law commission of India on 242nd Law commission
report.
On 16 January 2014; 15 states/ Union territory gave responses and waited for remaining
states response. Accordingly all other states gave their responses and consult all stake
holders regarding bill in discussion
The state of Punjab stating inter alia, department of Human affairs and justice lay down and
bringing revised guidelines and policy into force to protect newly married couples for atleast
6 weeks after marriage.
The state of Haryana filed action plan prepared and crime against women cells are
functioning at every district headquarters in the state and make publicity to the citizens to
aware of the cells.
The state of Jharkhand filed stating measures taken against person in such crime even
though Honour Killing not common in their state
The NCT of Delhi states Delhi police doesn’t maintain seperate records under honour killing.
The department of women and child development made arrangements fro rehabilitation of
female victims facing threats due to honour killings.
The state of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal pradesh has
issued circulars to the police to keep check on the activities of the panchayats and abide to
any guidelines issued by courts to curb the evil of Honour Killing.

ORDER OF THE COURT:-

The Supreme Court passed verdict by examining cases,

In Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2006) 5 SCC 477, The court held there is no bar for
Intercaste marriage under Hindu marriage act or any other law, no one can abide any
person from marrying on their own choices.
In Bhagwan Dass vs. State (NCT of Delhi), the court held that any person can’t take laws
into his own hands by committing violence or giving threat of violence.
In vikas yadav vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 9 SCC, the court held women and her
individual choice is her self respect, to impose brotherly or fatherly or class honours by
eliminating her choice is crime of extreme.
In Asha Ranja vs. State of Bihar (2017) 4 SCC 397, the court held that the choice of women
in choosing her partner in life is a legitimate constitution rights under Article 19 of Indian
Constitution.
The union of India imposed and given certain suggestions and guidelines to be taken until
legislation made, to meet the challenge of effect of crime.
Case Name: ADM Jabalpur v Shivkant Shukla (ADM Jabalpur case)

Citation: AIR 1976 SC 1207.

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Judges: Ray, A.N. (CJI), Khanna, Hans Raj, Beg, M. Hameedullah, Chandrachud, Y.V.,
Bhagwati, P.N.

Date of judgment: 28 April, 1976

Dissenting judge: Hans Raj Khanna

Fact of the case:-

The very next day the day on which the emergency was imposed, Article 359(1) was also
involved it and the citizen’s right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution to enforce their fundamental rights were taken away, including enforcement of
Articles 14 (right to equality), Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and Article 22
(protection against preventive detention).

Once these fundamental rights were not available to citizens, the people who were
considered political opponents or critics of Smt. Indira Gandhi was arrested in the name of
preventive detention including eminent political leaders like A.B. Vajpayee, Jay Prakash
Narayan and even Morarji Desai under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA).

These leaders approached their respective High Courts and some even got favourable
orders. But the State found the need to stop giving effect to these judgments that were in
favour of the detainees and thus, all these High Court favourable orders were collectively
challenged in the Supreme Court by the State under ADM Jabalpur vs Shivkant Shukla.

Issues of the case:-

Maintainability of any writ petition under Article 226 for the issuance of a writ of Habeas
Corpus, to ensure personal liberty, on the ground that the order of detention is not valid
according to the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (also known as
MISA) read with the orders issued by the President under Article 359(1).
If yes, then what is the extent of judicial scrutiny with respect to the aforesaid mentioned
Presidential orders?
Arguments of the State:-

In ADM Jabalpur v Shivkant Shukla, The State argued that in a situation of an emergency, it
is the State’s interest that takes supremacy over all else and that is the reason why during
this time the State Executive is given powers by the Constitution to take over the
implementation of laws, that the emergency powers were drafted by the Constituent
Assembly with the view to put utmost supremacy to the State’s Military and Economic
Security over all else.

The State further argued that it is the Constitution itself, under Article 359(1), which has
curtailed the fundamental right of individuals to approach the Court for enforcement of
fundamental rights during an emergency and thus it is not the scenario of the absence of law
and order or justice, but it is the supreme body of law which has itself curtailed it.

Arguments of the Respondents

The respondents in ADM Jabalpur v Shivkant Shukla contended that although Article 359(1)
of the Constitution curtails approaching the Apex Court for the enforcement of fundamental
rights but it does not curtail the enforcement of common law, natural law or statutory rights
of personal liberty in High Court under Article 226.

The respondents in the ADM Jabalpur case also argued that the powers of the executive do
not increase during an emergency as the extent of its powers is already clearly, and
explicitly laid down in the Constitution.

The most important argument of the respondents, according to me, is that although Article
21 gives the right to life it is not the only Article that gives it and that the executive taking
over the powers of the legislature is against the basic structure of the constitution and if such
a thing is allowed then the motive of the framers of the Constitution would be defeated.

Judgment of the case:-

It was 5 judges on Constitutional Bench who heard this case. The majority view was passed
by 4 of the judges while the powerful dissenting view was passed by Justice Khanna.

The majority was of the view that when there is a presidential order of emergency, no
person has locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before the High Court for
Hebeas Corpus or any other writ, order or direction to challenge the legality of the order of
detention on the ground that such detention order is not in tune with the provisions of the Act
or was passed with mala fide intentions.

The Court also upheld the validity of Section 16A(9) of MISA.

Justice Khanna dissentingly stated that invoking Article 359(1) does not deprive an
individual of the right to approach the Court for enforcing statutory rights.

He held that the respondent’s view was correct and that Article 21 is undoubtedly not the
sole repository of the Right to Life and personal liberty. He mentioned that during an
emergency, although Article 21 loses procedural power but the substantive power does not
go away and that there is no way a State can deprive a person of his life and liberty except
with authority by law.
Parties Name:-
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942]

Facts:-
Four directors each put in £500.
Mr Gulliver, Regal’s chairman, got outside subscribers to put in £500 and the board asked
the company solicitor, Mr Garten, to put in the last £500. The directors sold the business and
made a profit of nearly £3 per share.
Shortly after, the buyers brought an action against the directors, saying that this profit was in
breach of their fiduciary duty to the company. The directors had not gained fully informed
consent from the shareholders.
Issues
Had the directors breached their fiduciary duties to Regal?
Held
The House of Lords held that the directors had made their profits “by reason of the fact that
they were directors of Regal and in the course of the execution of that office”.
The House of Lords held that the directors therefore had to account for their profits to the
company.

Rational Reason of the decision

Preservation of Fiduciary Duty: The case underscores the paramount importance of fiduciary
duty in corporate law. Directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to the company and its
shareholders to act in the best interests of the company. The rational reason for holding
directors accountable for profits made in connection with their fiduciary position is to ensure
that this duty is upheld and not undermined by personal gain.

Preventing Exploitation: By requiring directors to account for any profits they make through
their fiduciary position, the judgment prevents directors from exploiting their roles for
personal financial gain at the expense of the company or its shareholders. This rational
reason is rooted in fairness and equity.

Avoiding Evasion of Responsibility: The judgment ensures that directors cannot evade
responsibility by raising various defenses or justifications. It provides a clear and
unequivocal standard for determining liability, which promotes predictability and consistency
in legal outcomes.

Maintaining Trust in Corporate Governance: Upholding fiduciary duty and accountability

helps maintain trust in corporate governance. Shareholders and stakeholders rely on
directors to act in the best interests of the company, and this judgment reinforces that
expectation.

Promoting Transparency: Requiring directors to account for profits made in their fiduciary
capacity promotes transparency in corporate decision-making. It discourages hidden
agendas or self-serving actions that could harm the company.

In summary, the rational reason for the judgment is to ensure that directors fulfill their
fiduciary duties with integrity and transparency, thereby safeguarding the interests of the
company and its shareholders. This rational approach is essential for maintaining the
integrity of corporate governance and the equitable treatment of all stakeholders.
Parties Name:-Jarnail Singh and Ors. vs. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others.
Facts of the case

An excursion seat of Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel and Justice Ashok Bhushan was hearing
an SLP favored by the Center against the August-2017 judgment of the Delhi High Court
subduing the DoPT Office Memorandum (OM) dated August 13, 1997, which
accommodated the continuation of reservation in advancements inconclusively.

The high court had passed the decision in the light of the summit court constitution seat
judgment in M Nagaraj (2006).

l On May 17, a seat of Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice Mohan M Shantanagoudar,
hearing an SLP against the 2011 judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court subduing
a comparable OM incompatibility of M Nagaraj, had coordinated “that the pendency of this
Special Leave Petition will not disrupt the general flow of Union of India making strides with
the end goal of advancement from ‘held to saved’ and ‘open to open’ and in the matter of
advancement on merits.”

The Constitution seat of the Supreme Court, on 26 September 2018 conveyed a judgment
created by Justice Rohinton Nariman, that booking in advancements doesn’t require the
state to gather quantifiable information on the backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes, yet makes the “smooth layer” in either bunch ineligible for the
advantages

Issues of the case

Regardless of whether M. Nagaraj v. Association of India (Nagaraj) required reexamination?

Nagaraj decision had held that before the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
competitors can be advanced, the states needed to demonstrate by “quantifiable
information” that they were to be sure “in reverse”

Regardless of whether the ‘rich layer’ among SC/STs ought to be banned from acquiring
advancements through reservations?

Judgement of the case

The court put aside the necessity to gather quantifiable information that was specified by its
2006 decision in M. Nagaraj v. Association of India as it overlooked the thinking of a nine-
judge seat in Indra Sawhney (1992) that any conversation on velvety layer “has no
pertinence” with regards to SC/STs.

The court has taken over 10 years to address an oddity in the Nagaraj case which acquired
a rich layer channel for advancements for SC/ST workers. This brought about a large
number of representatives being denied their due advancements.
Parties Name:- East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax, West Bengal.

Facts of the case

The appellant in this case was East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd., a
private company. The company had purchased land in Calcutta and constructed shops and
stalls on it to create a market. For the assessment year 1953-54, the company received
income from tenants who rented these shops and stalls.
Issues of the case

The primary issue at hand was how to classify and tax the income generated from renting
out these properties. The question was whether this income should be treated as "profits or
gains of business" (section 10) or categorized as "income from property" (section 9) under
the Income-tax Act.
Holding of the case
The Supreme Court, in its judgment, determined that the income earned by the company
from the rented shops and stalls should be classified as "income from property" and not as
"profits or gains of business." The court's decision was based on the understanding that the
source of income was the property itself, regardless of the company's objective to promote
markets. This ruling affirmed that the specific classification of income under the Income-tax
Act should align with the source of that income. Consequently, the company's appeal was
dismissed, upholding the tax treatment of the income derived from property rentals under
section 9 of the Income-tax Act.

Reason for holding

The Supreme Court held that the income from property rentals should be classified as
"income from property" and not as "profits or gains of business" because the source of
income was the property itself, as per the Income-tax Act's classifications. The company's
broader objective did not alter this fundamental source-based classification, ensuring
consistency in tax treatment.
Research Topic:- Can winding up proceedings go on when company itself is inactive for
filing purposes.

To know about the question, we need to understand what does winding up mean.

The winding up of a company is the process of terminating its business operations and
liquidating its assets. The process can be initiated voluntarily by the company or by an
external entity, such as a creditor, and can also be done through a tribunal. This paper
presents a critical study of the laws related to the winding up of a company under the
Companies Act, 2013, with a focus on the role of tribunals in this process.
The Companies Act, 2013, provides for two types of winding up:
• Voluntary
• Compulsory
Voluntary winding up occurs when the company’s directors or shareholders decide to wind
up the company due to various reasons, including loss of profitability or inability to pay
debts.
Compulsory winding up, on the other hand, is initiated by an external entity, such as a
creditor, and is usually done through a tribunal. The paper analyzes the role of tribunals in
the winding up process and the various provisions under the Companies Act, 2013, that
govern the process. The study also examines the challenges faced by tribunals in the
winding up process, including delays in the process and the need for adequate resources to
manage the liquidation process efficiently.

Now the question is that whether the winding up proceedings go on when company itself is
inactive for filing purposes.
Under the Companies Act 2013, winding up proceedings can be initiated when a company
has become inactive for filing purposes. This typically occurs when a company fails to file its
annual financial statements and returns for a consecutive period of two years or more. In
such cases, creditors, members, or the Registrar of Companies can petition for the winding
up of the company. Winding up is a legal process aimed at liquidating the company's assets
and distributing them among its creditors and shareholders. It is a way to dissolve a non-
compliant or inactive company, ensuring that its affairs are appropriately concluded and
debts settled.
Under the Companies Act 2013 in India, a company is required to fulfill various compliance
requirements, including filing annual financial statements and annual returns with the
Registrar of Companies (RoC). When a company fails to do so for a continuous period of
two years or more, it is considered inactive for filing purposes.

At this point, various stakeholders, such as creditors, members, or even the RoC itself, can
take legal action to initiate winding up proceedings against the company. Winding up is a
legal process that leads to the dissolution of the company. Its primary goal is to liquidate the
company's assets and distribute the proceeds to its creditors and shareholders.

Winding up can be voluntary or by order of the court. In cases of inactive companies, it's
often a court-ordered winding up. This process ensures that the company's affairs are
properly concluded, its debts are settled, and its assets are distributed fairly among those
with legitimate claims.

Winding up serves as a mechanism to deal with companies that have ceased operations,
abandoned their compliance obligations, and left creditors or shareholders in a precarious
position. It's a legal remedy that brings closure to non-compliant or inactive companies while
adhering to the principles of fairness and financial responsibility.

Is postal receiving compulsory alongwith winding up notice u/s 434 of Companies Act, 1956
for filing winding up petition.

Yes postal receipts/receiving compulsory along-with winding up notice u/s 434 of

Companies Act, 1956 for filing winding up petition as a general rule court must check validity
of such notice for as general rule postal receipts provides an prima facie evidence as to date
of service of notice and communication there of if there is no postal receipts or any type of
receiving along with winding up notice under section 434 of companies act then adverse
party make claim non communication of such notice then in such condition it is necessary to
file postal receipts or receiving along with winding up notice under section 434 of Companies
Act 2013 in action Ispat Ltd v. Shyam Metalics Limited Supreme Court illustrated need of
such receiving for winding up petition.
Whether petition under article 226 is maintainable against order of district judge passed in
the capacity of being a MCD tribunal in place of Lieutenant governor.

Petition under article 226 is maintainable against order of district judge passed in the
capacity of being a MCD tribunal in place of Lieutenant governor as article 226 has a wide
ambit it not only covers 5 writs but also includes or for other purposes fundamental rights
and for other purpose.

The word “for other purpose” in the above context means the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Court is not only limited to protecting fundamental rights but also any other legal rights.
If by such order if a person's fundamental right or legal right is affected then he can
challange such order under article 226.
Parties Name:-
THE MANAGEMENT OF HOTEL IMPERIAL, NEW DELHI & OTHERS

Vs.

HOTEL WORKERS' UNION

Facts:

The case involves three appellants, the managements of Imperial Hotel, New Delhi,
Maiden's Hotel, Delhi, and Swiss Hotel, Delhi.
Disputes had been ongoing between these hotels and their respective workmen regarding
labor conditions.
A strike of all workmen in these three hotels occurred on October 5, 1955.
Prior to the general strike, there had been issues at Imperial Hotel in August 1955, leading
to the suspension of 22 workmen by the hotel management.
The management of Imperial Hotel decided to dismiss these 22 workmen in October 1955,
subject to obtaining permission under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(referred to as "the Act").
The decision to dismiss these workmen led to the general strike in all three hotels on
October 5, 1955.
The three hotel managements issued notices to the workmen to rejoin their duties within
three hours, and when they did not, fresh notices were issued, and the workmen were
informed that they were under suspension.
Subsequently, the managements issued notices to the workmen informing them of their
dismissal, pending the obtaining of permission under Section 33 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether wages should be paid to suspended workmen while awaiting permission under
Section 33 of the Act.
Whether the Industrial Tribunal had the power to grant interim relief.
Whether the interim order by the Industrial Tribunal required publication as an award under
Section 17 of the Act.

Judgment:

The court first considered the issue of whether wages should be paid to suspended
workmen. It held that the ordinary law of master and servant allows suspension only if there
is an express term in the contract or if the statute governing the contract provides for it. In
the absence of such provisions, wages should be paid even during suspension.
However, Section 33 of the Act introduced a fundamental change in the law of master and
servant, allowing the master to suspend a workman pending permission to dismiss under
Section 33.
The court implied a term in the contract of employment that when the master suspends a
workman after conducting a proper inquiry and decides to dismiss the workman pending
permission under Section 33, he has the power to do so, temporarily suspending the
contract, relieving the master of the obligation to pay wages and the servant of the obligation
to work.
The court also clarified that the power of the Industrial Tribunal to grant interim relief is not
affected by the implied term in the contract. Interim relief can be granted as a matter
incidental to the points of dispute referred to the tribunal.
The judgment also discussed the process of granting interim relief, stating that the tribunal's
order need not be sent to the government for publication under Section 17 of the Act.
The court modified the earlier interim relief orders, ordering the appellants to pay half the
amount adjudged payable by the Industrial Tribunal's order dated December 5, 1955, for the
period from October 1, 1955, to either December 10, 1955, or July 15, 1956 (the date when
most workmen were re-employed).
The judgment did not decide on the effect of re-employment on the question of waiver, as it
was considered a matter to be determined later by the Industrial Tribunal.
In summary, the judgment clarified the power of the master to suspend workmen pending
permission under Section 33 of the Act and affirmed the authority of the Industrial Tribunal to
grant interim relief. It also addressed the publication of such orders and modified the interim
relief orders accordingly.
Parties Name:- PETITIONER:
KAPIL BHARGAVA (MRS.) AND ORS.
V
RESPONDENT:
SUBHASH CHAND AGGARWAL AND ORS.
Facts of the case

The case of JUDGMENT 2001 Supp(2) SCR 12 involves a dispute between a sub-tenant
(ML. Bhargava) and the landlord (Rama Rani and her son Sher Bahadur) regarding the
eviction of the sub-tenant from certain premises. The original tenant of the premises was
Murli Manohar Lal, who was the brother-in-law of the sub-tenant, ML. Bhargava. The sub-
tenant claimed that he had been residing in the premises since June 1945 with the consent
of the landlord. However, the landlord alleged that the tenant had sublet the premises to the
sub-tenant without obtaining written permission, and neither the tenant nor any member of
his family had resided in the premises for more than six months before filing the eviction
petition. The landlord sought eviction of both the tenant and the sub-tenant under Section
14(1)(b), (d), and (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction petition on the grounds that the landlady,
Smt. Rama Rani, had passed away during the pendency of the eviction petition, rendering
the question of bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) irrelevant. Additionally, the Rent
Controller held that the sub-tenant was a lawful sub-tenant under Section 16(1) of the Act,
and therefore, the case did not fall under Section 14(1)(b) either.

The landlord then appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal, which upheld the findings of the
Rent Controller. Subsequently, the landlord appealed to the High Court under Section 39 of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, and the High Court allowed the appeal, but confined the eviction
decree to the tenant under Section 14(1)(d), citing the tenant's failure to reside in the
premises for six months preceding the eviction petition.

Issues of the case

The primary issue in this case revolved around whether a lawful sub-tenant, deemed as
such under Section 16(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, could be evicted under Section
14(1)(d) of the Act when the tenant had not resided in the premises for the required period.

Judgment

The judgment was delivered by Justice Misra. The Court considered the arguments
presented by both parties. The sub-tenant's counsel argued that a lawful sub-tenant could
not be evicted under Section 14(1)(d) because the definition of "tenant" under Section 2(1)
included sub-tenants, and, therefore, a sub-tenant in possession should be considered as
the tenant under the Act.

However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that while a sub-tenant is included within
the definition of "tenant," this inclusion serves specific purposes in the Act, such as
conferring rights and obligations on sub-tenants under various provisions. The Court
emphasized that the Act treats tenants and sub-tenants as separate entities, as evident from
Sections 14(1)(b), 16, 17, and 18 of the Act. It also pointed out that if sub-tenants were
equated with tenants, it would render several provisions of the Act meaningless.

Regarding the sub-tenant's argument that he became a deemed sub-tenant by virtue of

Section 16(1) because the sub-tenancy was created before June 9, 1952, the Court
explained that Section 16 deals with restrictions on sub-letting and classifies sub-letting
cases into three categories. It held that while Section 16(1) confers a statutory right on sub-
tenants, Section 17(2) imposes an obligation on them to serve notice to the landlord. Failure
to serve this notice would prevent sub-tenants from taking advantage of Section 18. The
Court stressed that the notice under Section 17(2) is not a mere procedural formality but a
substantive right conferred on sub-tenants. Thus, a sub-tenant falling under Section 16(1)
must serve the notice to gain the protection offered by Section 18. The Court concluded that
unless notice under Section 17(2) is served by the sub-tenant, the eviction decree passed
against the tenant under Section 14 is executable against the sub-tenant.
Lastly, the sub-tenant argued that the landlord was aware that the sub-tenant was residing
in the premises and accepting rent, making Section 17(2) compliance a formality. The Court
rejected this argument, stating that there was no evidence to support this claim and that
mere rent payments did not necessarily indicate a change in the nature of the occupancy.

In conclusion, the Court found no merit in the sub-tenant's arguments and dismissed the
appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to allow eviction of the tenant under Section
14(1)(d). The Court also ordered costs to be borne by the respective parties.
Reason for the judgement
Distinct Treatment of Tenants and Sub-Tenants: The court emphasized that the Delhi Rent
Control Act treats tenants and sub-tenants as separate entities. While a sub-tenant is
included in the definition of "tenant" under Section 2(1) of the Act, this inclusion serves
specific purposes related to conferring rights and obligations on sub-tenants under various
provisions of the Act. Therefore, the Act does not equate tenants and sub-tenants, and they
are treated differently.

Section 16(1) Confers a Statutory Right on Sub-Tenants: Section 16(1) of the Act confers a
statutory right on sub-tenants. It deems sub-tenancies created before June 9, 1952, as
lawful sub-tenancies, even if the consent of the landlord was not obtained. This means that
sub-tenants falling under Section 16(1) have certain legal protections.

Obligation Under Section 17(2): The court pointed out that Section 17(2) of the Act imposes
an obligation on sub-tenants who fall under Section 16(1). This obligation requires such sub-
tenants to serve notice to the landlord within a specified period. In cases where sub-
tenancies were created before the commencement of the Act, this notice should be given
within six months of the Act's commencement. Failure to serve this notice would result in the
sub-tenant losing certain protections provided by the Act.

Notice Under Section 17(2) Is Not Mere Formality: The court emphasized that the notice
required under Section 17(2) is not a mere procedural formality. Instead, it confers
substantive rights on the sub-tenant. This notice serves as a protective measure in favor of
the sub-tenant. By serving this notice, a sub-tenant gains the right to become a tenant under
Section 18 of the Act.
Parties Name
Amar Nath Sehgal vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 21 February, 2005

Facts of the case

Amarnath Sehgal, a renowned sculptor, was commissioned by the Indian Government to

create a mural for Vigyan Bhavan. The mural took five years to complete and was first
displayed in 1962. Subsequently, the Government decided to remove the murals from the
walls of Vigyan Bhavan due to ongoing renovations. Unfortunately, the Government did not
inform or seek authorization from Amarnath Sehgal regarding this decision. Furthermore, the
mural suffered some damage due to mishandling and negligence during the removal
process.

Amarnath Sehgal filed a lawsuit against the Government, alleging that their actions
constituted a violation of his moral rights as the author of the mural.
Issues:

The primary issue in this case was whether the author, Amarnath Sehgal, retained rights
over the display and treatment of his work even after its sale under the provisions of moral
rights.

Relevant Law:

The case hinged on the interpretation of Section 57 of the Copyrights Act, 1957.

Analysis:

The Court, in its analysis, emphasized the significance of moral rights in protecting the
artistic integrity and reputation of authors. It affirmed that moral rights are intrinsic to the
author's work and cannot be relinquished or taken away, even after a sale of the work.

The Government argued that once the sale of the mural was concluded, and due
consideration had been paid, they possessed the authority to use the work as they saw fit,
including its removal from public display. However, the Court rejected this argument and
underlined that the mutilation and partial destruction of the mural not only violated the
author's moral rights but also tarnished the author's reputation. The Court held that the
author's moral rights persisted regardless of the owner of the work.

Judgment:

The Court ruled in favor of Amarnath Sehgal and awarded him compensation of Rs.
5,00,000/-. Additionally, the Court ordered that the remaining portions of the mural be
delivered to Amarnath Sehgal for the purpose of restoration and potential sale.

Reason for Judgment:

The Court's judgment in this case established a significant precedent for the interpretation of
moral rights. It reinforced that moral rights are fundamental to an author's work and cannot
be waived or diminished, even after the sale of the work. The Court's decision also
introduced the concept of special reliefs, such as returning copyrighted works to the author,
which had not been widely recognized prior to this case. This case set a benchmark for
future interpretations of moral rights and the residual rights of authors, emphasizing the
importance of protecting an author's reputation and artistic integrity.
Parties Name
Simmonds v.Cockell, (1920) All ER Rep. 162

Facts of the Case:

The plaintiff, Mr. Simmonds, owned premises that were burglarized, resulting in the theft of
goods valued at Euros 475. Importantly, Mr. Simmonds and his wife were not present on the
premises at the time of the theft. The insurance policy in question contained a specific
clause that stated: "Warranted that the premises are always occupied." Mr. Simmonds
subsequently brought a lawsuit against one of the underwriting members of Lloyd's under a
Lloyd’s policy of insurance, seeking coverage for the loss resulting from the burglary,
housebreaking, and theft.

Issues of the Case:

The central issue in this case revolved around the interpretation and application of the
insurance policy's warranty clause, which required that the insured premises must always be
occupied. Specifically, the question at hand was whether Mr. Simmonds had breached this
warranty by not being present on the premises during the burglary.

Holding:
The judgment in this case was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mr. Simmonds, and the
defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs. The court held that the warranty, which
stipulated that the premises must always be occupied, had not been breached by Mr.
Simmonds.

Rationale for the Judgment:

The court's decision was based on a careful interpretation of the insurance policy's wording.
The crucial point here was that the policy did not explicitly require the continuous physical
presence of someone on the insured premises. Instead, it merely stated that the premises
must always be occupied.

The court reasoned that if the insurer intended to require the continuous presence of a
person on the premises as a condition of coverage, they could have explicitly stated so in
the policy. However, since the policy did not contain such a clear and specific requirement,
the court held that the insurer could not rely on the argument that Mr. Simmonds had
breached the warranty by not being present at the time of the theft.

In essence, the court's decision hinged on the principle of interpreting insurance policies
strictly and in favor of the insured when the policy terms are ambiguous or not clearly
defined. In this case, the lack of a clear requirement for continuous occupation meant that
Mr. Simmonds was entitled to coverage for the loss resulting from the burglary. Therefore,
the judgment favored the plaintiff, Mr. Simmonds.
Parties Name

Navjot Singh Sidhu vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 23 January, 2007

Facts of the case

The case involved Navjot Singh Sidhu and Rupinder Singh Sandhu, who were initially tried
for criminal charges, including Section 302 IPC (related to murder) and Section 323 IPC
(related to causing hurt) with Section 34 IPC (acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention). They were acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Patiala.

Issues:

The main issues in the case appear to be:

Whether the acquittal by the Sessions Judge was justified.
Whether Navjot Singh Sidhu's resignation from his parliamentary position had any legal
implications, particularly regarding his disqualification from public office.

Judgment:

The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Punjab and convicted Navjot Singh
Sidhu under Section 304 Part II IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). Rupinder
Singh Sandhu was also convicted under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC and
Section 323 IPC. Navjot Singh Sidhu was sentenced to 3 years of rigorous imprisonment
(R.I.) and a fine of one lakh rupees, and Rupinder Singh Sandhu received similar sentences.

Reasons for the Judgment:

The reasons for the judgment are not provided in the excerpt you provided. To understand
the reasoning behind the High Court's decision, you would need to refer to the full text of the
judgment, including the legal arguments presented by both sides and the court's analysis of
the evidence and applicable law.

The excerpt does mention that Navjot Singh Sidhu resigned from his parliamentary position
after the High Court's judgment to maintain probity and moral values in public life. However,
it also discusses the disqualification provisions under the Representation of the People Act,
suggesting that Sidhu's resignation was related to his desire to contest elections in the
future without incurring immediate disqualification.
Parties Name

Trideshwar Dayal v. Maheshwar Dayal, (1990) 1 SCC 357.

Facts of the Case:

The case involved a dispute between the appellants and respondent No. 1, who were
members of the same family. The dispute arose from an arbitration award made on 9th
October 1973. The arbitrator filed the award with the civil court for it to be made a rule of the
court. However, the appellants objected to this and, on 18th March 1976, the court rejected
the prayer to make the award a rule of the court. This decision was later confirmed by the
High Court on 3rd July 1981.

In the meantime, respondent No. 1 had applied to the Collector to summon the award and
impose stamp duty and penalty. The Collector granted this request on 15th July 1983. The
appellants challenged this decision before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under
Section 56 of the Indian Stamp Act. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority set aside the
Collector's order, primarily on the grounds of jurisdiction.

Respondent No. 1 then challenged the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority's decision in a
writ case before the High Court, which was allowed on 27th February 1989. The High Court
remanded the case to the Collector for reconsideration and also questioned the authority's
power to entertain the appellants' application under Section 56 of the Act.
Issues:

Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority had the power to set aside the Collector's
order regarding stamp duty and penalty?
Did the Collector have the jurisdiction to impound the award and impose stamp duty and
penalty?
Could the correctness of the property valuation, which was the subject of the award, be
examined by the Collector?
Could respondent No. 1 re-open the issue of making the award a rule of the court in this
proceeding?
Judgment:

The Court disposed of the appeal in the following terms:

The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority had the power to interfere with the Collector's order
if it was found to be erroneous.

The Court found no defect in the Collector's decision to impose stamp duty and penalty on
the award, and the time that had elapsed since the award's execution did not limit the
Collector's authority in this matter.

The Collector did have the power to examine the correctness of the property valuation, as
specific provisions in Uttar Pradesh allowed for it.

The Court did not address the issue of re-opening the question of making the award a rule of
the court in this proceeding. It clarified that the scope of the current proceeding was limited
to stamp duty, and the issue of making the award a rule of the court should be considered
separately if necessary.

Reason for Judgment:

The Court held that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority had the power to review and set
aside the Collector's order if it was found to be erroneous, emphasizing the broad language
of Section 56 of the Indian Stamp Act.

The Court found no defect in the Collector's decision to impose stamp duty and penalty on
the award. It noted that the order to impound the award was originally passed by the civil
court in 1976 and that further steps related to this order were taken later with the Collector's
involvement. The Court rejected the argument that there was a limitation issue based on the
time that had passed since the award's execution.
Brief of the case

Court No. – 4

Bench: [HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM
SRI NARASIMHA and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]

Item No: 22
Diary No.- 33121 - 2022

Case Title: RISHIPAL vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA

Facts:

The case involves the compulsory acquisition of land from landowners by the government.
The landowners were contesting the valuation of their land, arguing that they should receive
compensation based on the highest price paid for similar land in the same locality during a
contemporaneous period.

Issue:
The main issue in the case was the determination of the appropriate compensation to be
paid to the landowners for the acquisition of their land. The landowners argued that they
should be compensated based on the highest price paid for comparable land in the vicinity
during a similar time frame.

Holding:
The court, in its judgment, relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court and held that:

Landowners are entitled to receive compensation based on the highest price paid for
comparable land in the same locality during a contemporaneous period.

The court cited the case of "M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur v. Collector," a judgment of
the Supreme Court, which emphasized that when land is compulsorily taken away from a
person, they have the right to claim the highest value for their land, as demonstrated by the
price of similar land in the vicinity, in a bona fide transaction between a willing buyer and
seller that occurred near the time of the acquisition.

The court stated that the sale deed representing the highest value should be preferred over
others unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different approach.

The court also noted that averaging the values of two different sale deeds should not have
been the method used in this case, implying that the highest value should have been
adopted for compensation purposes.

Brief of the case

Court No. – 4

Bench: [HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM
SRI NARASIMHA and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]

Item No: 23

Diary No.- 1568 - 2023

Case Title: BALWINDER KAUR vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA
Facts

This is plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court dated
21.11.2005 whereby the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 23.7.2005 was set
aside.

2. Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1 lac as damages as an indigent person under
Order 33 CPC on the ground that she is a poor lady holding yellow ration card and has no
source of income. She is residing with her husband and children at Shiv Colony, Ward. No.
6, Near Anganwari School Ghatiwala, Pinjore, Tehsil Kalka, District Panchkula. Her husband
is unemployed and is suffering from various ailments. She had four daughters namely
Mamta, Manju, Sunanda and Asha and had no son. She decided to have no more issue as
such she planned to go for sterilization operation which was conducted by Dr. Vimal Shouri,
Civil Hospital, Kalka on 29.2.1996 which was registered in the sterilization register vide No.
1150 of 1995/96 and a certificate dated 29.2.1996 was issued to her. It is further alleged that
after the operation, she was assured by the doctor (respondent No. 2) that operation was
successful and she will not conceive in future. However, in the year 1999, she again
conceived and gave birth to a female child namely Rajni on 30.11.1999 It is also alleged that
she had gone to defendant No. 2 to ask him as to why she had become pregnant and also
requested him for abortion but was told by him that the abortion at that stage can prove
dangerous to her life, therefore, she had no alternative than to give birth to the child. She
further alleged that she had suffered mental and physical agony on having given birth to an
unwanted female child, which has put an extra financial burden on her and the entire family.
It was submitted that she has no movable or immovable property and she needs money for
the upbringing, education, clothes, food and marriage of the female child who had taken
birth due to the failure and negligence of the tubectomy operation performed by respondent
No. 2 on account of which she had claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 1 lac.
Issues

Whether the suit is not maintainable?

Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD.
Relief.

Both the parties led oral as well documentary evidence. The plaintiff Balwinder Kaur
examined herself as PW1 and in her affidavit Ex PA reiterated her stand taken in the plaint
and tendered documents Ex.P1 ration card of the plaintiff family, Ex.P2 Tu-bectomy
operation certificate of the plaintiff, Ex.P3 birth certificate of Ms. Rajni, daughter of the
plaintiff born after tubectorny operation of the plaintiff, Ex.P4 legal notice issued by the
plaintiff, Ex.P5 postal receipt, Ex.P6 UPC receipt and Ex. P7 acknowledgment. In her cross-
examination, she admitted her signatures on the application form Ex.D1 which was filled up
and signed by her before she was operated upon. On the other hand, defendants examined
DW1 Dr. R.S Chauhan. Who proved the consent form. D1 which bears the signatures of the
plaintiff and that of Dr. Vimal Shouri, who performed the operation. He reiterated the
contents of the form containing warning about the possibility of failure of tubectomy
operation.
Holding
The findings recorded by the first Appellate Court on the basis of appreciation of evidence
as well as the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Shiv
Ram and others (supra) leaves no doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation
as the chances of failure of tubectomy operation are always there and she was also
warned/informed in this regard, moreover, she was totally negligent after the conception as
she went to the doctor/defendant No. 2 at the stage when the operation could not have been
suggested as it was dangerous to her own life. No evidence has been led by her to prove
that after she missed the menstruation she had consulted the doctor and informed him about
the failure of the tubectomy operation otherwise she could have been relieved of the
unwanted child by adopting safer method of MTP.

In view of the findings recorded by the first Appellate Court as well as the law laid down by
the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram and others (supra), I do not find
any merit in the appeal norm any question of law much less substantial arises for
determination by this Court. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, however, without order as to
costs.
Appeal dismissed
Sara Khatoon

Parties Name:- The Secretary, Ministry of Information v. Cricket Association of Bengal &
Anr.

CITATIONS: 1995 AIR 1236, 1995 SCC (2) 161

INTRODUCTION ABOUT THE CASE

The Cricket Association of Bengal (CAB) hosted the sixth international cricket tournament in
November 1993. This historic 1995 decision by India's Supreme Court on air concerns a
dispute between the Department of Information and Broadcasting and the Bengal Cricket
Association over whether or not the Cricket Association had the authority to award a special
television broadcast in the private sector instead of Doordarshan. In response, the court is
examining whether Doordardhan would enjoy his control over the development of global
signals and should regulate their assets by telecommunications or broadcasting.

This disagreement occurred during the early days of economic liberation. This has led to the
influx of independent media into economic freedom that had previously entered the AIR and
Doordarshan state-owned media administration. The issue was also the origin of what area
of society and what body could be a large part of Indian society. Claims made against
Doordarshan, Doordarshan argue that they have too many audiences reached and therefore
a valid claim to do it alone in terms of broadcasting.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The right to liberty is guaranteed by Art 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution Access to information is
part of you and includes the receipt by telephone, Subject to the limits of the airwaves
involved in this regulation of public authority, this limit falls below 19 (2).
Cricket is a source of entertainment, the right to freedom of speech and expression also
comes within the limits of 19 (1). The CAB and BCCI have the right to organize cricket
matches in India with or without foreign teams. Applicants have the right to broadcast the
games online by international organizations, claiming that it is a right under 19 (1) (a) and
that the authorities must issue such a license.
The defendant asserted that the airwaves were the property of the public and could not be
used for personal choice and pleasure. 19 (1) (a) does not include the right of airwaves and
is a public place. Not allowed as requested by the applicant.
Issues of the case

Did the facilitator have the right to play in the air using an outdoor institution?
Do public institutions regulate the production and distribution of landmarks or their rejection?
Do wind waves or waves fall under a public domain or public property?
Can a government agency like DD claim to be the broadcaster in charge of all events,
whether the event is produced or organized by him or anyone else in the country?
Argument of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
Differences in the effect of the rights granted under section 19 (1) (a) to persons who wish
the media to consider their views, including (i) broadcasters and (ii) editors. In connection
with the event (iii) the viewer (IV) demands a television signal and a frequency connection
produced elsewhere in India.
The broadcasters themselves cannot access it without a broadcasting license. There are no
standard claims regarding broadcasting licenses. It should be used as a limited resource to
provide maximum profit.
The right to watch television / radio is subject to certain environmental restrictions, but
Section 19 (2) applies to governmental regulations. The purpose of the license is not to limit
the presentation of ideas, but to control and order the rare resources by placing people who
are not rich enough to control the media to ensure complete enjoyment.
Television dominance alone does not restrict the dominance of ideologies alone, otherwise,
the fact that access to the media is through government officials violates Section 19 (1).
Argument of Cricket Association of Bengal
The right to host a sporting event rests with the legal entity to which it belongs, in which case
the legal entity is its member, including the Board of Control for Cricket in India and the
Cricket Association of Bengal. The right to create an event includes the right to edit the
event the way your company chooses. This includes the right to broadcast and not
broadcast the event.
BCCI and CAB had the right to produce, broadcast, transmit the event, either directly or
through an agent, under Section 19 (1) (a). The content of the rights under Article 19 (1) (a)
is also sufficient to protect the viewer’s information. In this case, the viewer and producer
had the right to broadcast the event. Given these two rights; the telecommunications bureau
was obliged to allow the event to be broadcast.
Licensing under Section 4 of the Act is a regulatory measure and does not authorize the MIB
to deny the Board of Control for Cricket in India/Cricket Association of Bengal a license to
broadcast and broadcast sporting events or impose conditions unrelated to Section 19(2).
The Constitution does not provide for monopoly in section 19(1) (a). Therefore, Doordarshan
cannot make the same claim, and Doordarshan’s claims of commercial interests or
exclusive rights in the generation of signals cannot be grounds for refusal of approval under
section 4 of the Act.
Judgement of the case
Radio waves and waves were to be considered public property. Their use must be
monitored and regulated by government agencies for the benefit of the public and the
prevention of their rights. Because social media involves the use of radio waves, this feature
imposes restrictions on the use of radio waves as it does on other social media.
The Supreme Court has found that the right to communicate and to receive information is a
form of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) of the
Constitution. Citizens have a basic right to access information and to access television
broadcasts for this purpose. Radio waves have contributed to law enforcement and can be
monitored and controlled by government agencies. This restriction was imposed on the state
of state ownership with respect to the use of social media in relation to the limits of freedom
of speech and expression in accordance with Section 19 (2) of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government will immediately take steps to
establish a private and public entity that represents all structures and interests of the public
in order to regulate and regulate the use of radio waves.
The Supreme Court stated that differences in opinion, opinion, and opinion cannot be
guaranteed by a single individual, whether governmental or individual, party, or organization.
“Private broadcasters are more likely to violate citizens' freedom of speech than the state-
owned media, as stipulated in the law. The media should be controlled by the public, not the
government. This mark is mentioned in Article 19 (1) (a)” of the constitution.
Parties Name
K.M.Nanavati v/s State Of Maharashtra, 1961 AIR 112

Facts:
In this case, accused K.M. Nanavati was second in command of an Indian Naval ship. He
married Sylvia in 1949 in the registry office in Portsmouth, England. Since the time of
marriage, the couple was living in different places because of the nature of the job of K.M.
Nanavati. After all, they finally shifted to Bombay.

Where they met Prem Ahuja and his sister through the Agniks the common friend of Ahuja
and Nanavati. As a Naval officer, Nanavati was frequently going away from Bombay on his
ship leaving his wife and children behind. In his absence friendship developed between
Sylvia and Ahuja which later on took the form of an illicit relationship. On 18 April 1959
Nanavati returned from his ship. After returning, he tried to be affectionate with his wife on
several occasions, but she behaved strangely toward him.

On 27th April 1959, Sylvia tells Nanavati about her relationship with Ahuja. Due to this
Nanavati was angered and decided to settle that Matter with Ahuja. After this, he drove his
car to his ship and from there, he took a semi-Automatic revolver and six cartridges and put
them in the brown envelope on the false pretax.

Then he went to Ahuja's Office, but not finding him there Nanavati went to his house and he
entered his bedroom of Ahuja and shut it from inside. Nanavati asked Ahuja if he would
marry Sylvia and care for his children. Ahuja replied, "Am I married to every woman I sleep
with?" Then a fight occurs between Ahuja and Nanavati, in this Nanavati shot Ahuja. After
this, he surrendered himself to the nearby police station. A case was filed against K.M.
Nanavati.
Issues:

Whether it was a grave and sudden provocation or whether it was a premeditated murder by
the accused?
Whether SLP can be entertained without fulfilling the order under Article 142? 3. Whether
the pardoning power of the governor and SLP move together?

Verdict of Hon'ble High Court

K.M.Nanavati was found guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was
sentenced to life imprisonment by a division of a bench consisting of two High Court judges.
Sylvia's confession, any specific incident in Ahuja's bedroom, or both did not amount to the
grave and sudden provocation.
The jury was not instructed that Nanavati's defense had to be proved, to the extent that
there is no reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable person and the accused was held
liable.
An Appeal was made by the accused under the supreme court of India and here is

Verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court

The Supreme court ruled that the judgment given by the high court is justifiable and the
following are the reasons:
The Hon'ble court noted that the accused had regained self-control as there was enough
time lapse between the confession and the incident and that he was also thinking about his
family's future.

The Hon'ble court concluded that no reasonable man would have reached the same
judgment as the jury based on the facts and evidence. At first, Nanavati dropped his family
in the cinema hall, took the revolver from his ship, went to his house, marched into his
bedroom carrying the revolver and After the incident, he didn't even tell anyone that it was
an accident until his trial. Thus Nanavati had the mentality of someone who had planned and
taken vengeance on his wife's lover.

The Court concurred with the High Court's conclusions about the Judge's allegation of
misdirection. It noted that the question of whether a misdirection tainted the jury's verdict
must be considered in light of the likely impact that the misdirection had on the lay jury. The
Supreme Court went on to say that the purpose of the judge's charge to the jury is to explain
and present the facts and circumstances of the case to them. The Judge's job is to make
sure that the jury understands the law and its ramifications, as well as to present all of the
evidence to them so that they can make the best conclusion possible.

Supreme Court held that the application made to the governor for pardon and the SLP
cannot proceed parallelly. If SLP is filed, then the power of the governor in such case shall
be ceased.
Parties Name:-
THE STATE OF MADRAS
Vs.
GANNON DUNKERLEY & CO.,(MADRAS) LTD.

Facts of the case

Gannon Dunkerley & Co. was a company engaged in the construction of buildings, roads,
and other works. The sales tax authorities in the State of Madras sought to include the value
of materials used in the execution of building contracts within the taxable turnover of the
company. The company challenged the validity of this assessment, contending that the
transactions were not contracts for the sale of goods as defined under the provisions of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which was in force at the time the Constitution of India came into
effect.

Issues of the case

The main issue in the case was whether the transactions involving works contracts, which
included both labor and materials, could be considered as contracts for the sale of goods
and thus subject to sales tax.

Judgment:
The judgment in the State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. case held in favor of the
respondent company, Gannon Dunkerley & Co.
Reason for the judgement
The judgment in the State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. case was primarily driven
by the court's interpretation of the term "sale of goods" as defined under the Sale of Goods
Act, 1930. The central issue at hand was whether transactions involving works contracts,
which encompassed both the supply of materials and the execution of labor and services,
could be categorized as "sale of goods" subject to sales tax. The court recognized that
works contracts were inherently composite in nature, extending beyond the simple transfer
of goods. They involved substantial labor and services, such as skilled workmanship and
project execution. By considering the intent of the legislature and the potential for double
taxation, the court concluded that taxing the entirety of works contracts would not align with
the legislative purpose and could lead to undue financial burdens. As such, the judgment
clarified that works contracts should not be treated as contracts for the sale of goods for the
purposes of sales tax, providing legal clarity and certainty in the taxation of such contracts.
Parties Name:-
Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd. (2003)
Facts of the Case:
The case involved a dispute between Modi Entertainment Network (MEN), an Indian
company, and W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd. (WSG), a Singaporean company. MEN and WSG
had entered into a contract for the broadcasting rights of cricket matches in India. Disputes
arose between the parties, leading to arbitration proceedings in India as per the arbitration
clause in their contract.

While the arbitration proceedings were ongoing in India, WSG initiated legal proceedings in
a London court, seeking to restrain MEN from proceeding with the Indian arbitration. WSG
argued that the Indian arbitration would be in violation of their agreement and sought an
anti-suit injunction from the London court to prevent MEN from pursuing the arbitration in
India.
MEN then approached the Indian Supreme Court, seeking an anti-suit injunction against
WSG, arguing that WSG's actions in the London court were an interference with the Indian
arbitration proceedings.

Issues of the case

Whether the Indian Supreme Court should grant an anti-suit injunction against WSG to
prevent them from pursuing legal proceedings in the London court?
What are the principles governing the granting of an anti-suit injunction by an Indian court?

Judgement and reason for the judgement:-

Firstly, the Supreme Court of India recognized that in order for an Indian court to grant an
anti-suit injunction, the defendant against whom the injunction is sought must fall within the
personal jurisdiction of the Indian court. This meant that W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., being a
party involved in arbitration proceedings in India and having contractual dealings with an
Indian company (MEN), was considered subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian court.

Secondly, the court emphasized the paramount importance of ensuring that the ends of
justice were not defeated. In this context, it was noted that if WSG were allowed to continue
its legal proceedings in the London court simultaneously with the ongoing arbitration
proceedings in India, it could result in conflicting judgments and lead to a miscarriage of
justice. Therefore, to prevent such an outcome and to maintain the integrity of the Indian
arbitration process, the ends of justice favored the granting of an anti-suit injunction.

Lastly, the principle of comity, which involves showing respect for the jurisdiction of other
courts, was taken into consideration. While acknowledging that Indian courts possess the
power to issue anti-suit injunctions, the Supreme Court recognized the need to exercise this
power judiciously and sparingly. However, in this specific case, the court found that it was
justified to interfere with the proceedings in the London court in order to prevent injustice
and protect the efficacy of the Indian arbitration process.

In summary, the judgment in this case reflected a delicate balance between the principles of
personal jurisdiction, the ends of justice, and comity. It ultimately concluded that, given the
circumstances, an anti-suit injunction should be granted to restrain W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd.
from pursuing its case in the London court, ensuring that justice was served and respecting
the authority of the Indian arbitration process.

Parties Name:-COTMAN v BROUGHAM

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Essequibo Rubber and Tobacco Estates Limited was a company registered under the
Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 in the United Kingdom. The Companies Act 1908
required companies to specify their objects, which were outlined in the company’s
memorandum of association. The objects clause was a critical element as it defined the
scope and limits of the company’s activities. The case “Cotman v Brougham” revolved
around the interpretation and validity of the objects clause in this company’s memorandum
of association.
Essequibo Rubber and Tobacco Estates Limited’s memorandum of association contained a
significant number of objects. The objects ranged widely, covering various areas of business
activities that the company could potentially engage in. However, the memorandum also
included a unique provision in its final clause. This clause stipulated that the listed objects
should be read individually and not as subclauses subordinate to main clauses.

The central issue in the case arose when the company was considering underwriting an
issue of shares in another company called the Anglo-Cuban Oil Bitumen and Asphalt
Company Limited. This action involved providing a financial guarantee for the value of the
shares issued by the Anglo-Cuban Company. The question was whether Essequibo Rubber
and Tobacco Estates Limited had the legal capacity to undertake this underwriting activity
under the provisions of its objects clause.

Issues of the case:-

1. The interpretation of the objects clause in the memorandum of association, especially

considering the unique provision that the objects should not be read as subordinate to each
other.

2. Whether the company’s objects clause allowed it to underwrite shares in the Anglo-Cuban
Oil Bitumen and Asphalt Company Limited.
Legal Vidhiya

JUDGMENT:

The case involved Essequibo Rubber and Tobacco Estates Limited, a company registered
under the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908. The company’s memorandum of
association contained an extensive list of objects that it could engage in, with a final clause
specifying that the listed objects should be read individually and not subordinate to one
another. The primary issue was whether the company had the legal capacity to underwrite
shares in another company, Anglo-Cuban Oil Bitumen and Asphalt Company Limited,
according to its objects clause.
Sara Khatoon
Sureswar Datta law college Calcutta University
4 th year student
Parties Name H.R Adyanthaya vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. Case Summary 1994 SC
Facts of the case
The petitioner was a medical representative in the company of the respondent, where the
petitioner filed a complaint in the labor court as his services were terminated. It was held by
the court that the medical representative will be considered as a workman under the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
Then the respondent filed an appeal in the Industrial Tribunal under the Maharashtra Act
where the tribunal held that the medical representative will not be considered as a workman.
Then the case was referred to the five-judge bench in the Supreme Court in front of the five
bench judges.
Issues of the case:-
Whether the medical representative will be considered a workman or not under Section 2 (s)
of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947?
Judgement of this case
was held by the court that the complaint filed by the appellant under the Maharashtra Act is
not maintainable as the medical representatives are not workman under the Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947.
It was further directed by the court that under Article 132 of the Constitution that the State
Government will refer it to the Industrial Tribunal and consider it as Industrial Dispute under
the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
It directed the respondent to pay all the petitioners in the case an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1
lakh within six weeks from the date of the judgement and those who were liable for a bonus
for the previous years will be paid accordingly by the respondent.