Compilation of Research Work by Parth Gupta

CHHATRAPAT SINGH DUGAR V.
KHARAG SINGH
LACHMIRAM
SUBMITTED ON 1-09-23.
Citation: AIR 1916 P.C. 64
Date: 10 March, 1936
FACTS:
Chhatrapat Singh Dugar filed for insolvency under the Provincial

Insolvency Act but was initially denied. He appealed to the Privy
Council, which allowed his appeal, declared him insolvent, and
ordered costs against various respondents, including Raja Bijoy Singh
Dudhoria. A receiver was appointed for Chhatrapat Singh Dugar's
assets, but he passed away in 1918. In 1921, the Privy Council order
was sent to the Murshidabad Court. In 1922, the receiver resigned,
and no replacement was appointed. The applicant, Surpat Singh
Dugar, received the benefit of the Privy Council's cost order through
an arbitration award. In 1926, Surpat Singh Dugar applied for the
execution of the Privy Council's order against Ramsarup Suryaprosad,
described as the proprietor of property at No. 7 Kalakar Street,
Calcutta.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the clerical error in the Privy Council order, which

referred to Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhoria as "Raja Benoy Singh
Dudhoria," invalidated the execution proceedings?
2. Whether the transfer of the execution to the High Court was
valid under Section 39, Civil P. C., and if so, whether it allowed for
execution against parties other than Ramsarup Suryaprosad?
3. Whether Surpat Singh Dugar had the legal standing to execute

the decree against the heirs of Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhoria?
HOLDING:
1. Clerical Error in the Privy Council Order: The court did not
make a definitive ruling on the impact of the clerical error in the Privy
Council order. The judgment sympathized with the applicant
regarding the error but did not declare it invalid. Therefore, this issue
was not conclusively resolved by the court.
2. Limitation of Execution under Section 39, Civil P. C.: The court

held that under Section 39, Civil P. C., when the condition for transfer
was as set out in Sub-section 1(b), the execution should be limited to
the judgment-debtor who satisfies that condition. Thus, the execution
could proceed only against Ramsarup Suryaprosad and possibly other
judgment-debtors who met the conditions of Section 39(1)(b).
3. Standing of the Applicant: The court expressed doubts about the

legal basis for the applicant, Surpat Singh Dugar's standing to execute
the order. It noted that there was no formal order terminating the
insolvency proceedings or releasing assets to the heirs. The court was
inclined to hold that Surpat Singh Dugar lacked the legal standing to
execute the order against the heirs of Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhoria
DICTA:
The court expressed sympathy for the applicant's situation regarding

the clerical error but did not make a definitive ruling on its impact.
The court highlighted the need for clear legal grounds for the
applicant's standing to execute the order, which appeared to be
lacking in this case.
HYPOTHETICAL DISSENT:
A dissenting opinion might argue:
That the clerical error in the Privy Council order should not invalidate
the execution proceedings, as it was clear who the intended party was.
Section 39, Civil P. C., did not expressly limit the mode of execution
or the number of judgment debtors when a transfer occurred. Surpat
Singh Dugar had standing to execute the order as he was acting as an
agent with court-sanctioned proceedings. The court should prioritize
equitable outcomes over technicalities in this case.
ARGUMENTS:
The respondents argued that the clerical error invalidated the

execution proceedings. The applicant contended that Section 39 did
not limit the mode of execution or the number of judgment debtors
and that the transfer allowed for execution against all judgment
debtors. Regarding the applicant's standing, it was argued that the
benefit of the order was transferred to him through the arbitration
award, and he was acting as an agent sanctioned by the court under
Section 59(e) of the Provincial Insolvency Act.
JUDGMENT:
The court issued the following judgment:
The clerical error in the Privy Council order did not necessarily
invalidate the execution proceedings, and it was not necessary to
decide this point. However, the court sympathized with the applicant
on this issue. The court held that under Section 39, Civil P. C. when
the condition for transfer was as set out in Sub-section 1(b), the
execution should be limited to the judgment-debtor who satisfies that
condition. Thus, the court determined that the execution could only
proceed against Ramsarup Suryaprosad and possibly other judgment
debtors who met the conditions of Section 39(1)(b). The court
expressed doubts about the legal basis for Surpat Singh Dugar's
standing to execute the order, as there was no formal order
terminating the insolvency proceedings or releasing assets to the
heirs. The court was inclined to hold that Surpat Singh Dugar lacked
the legal standing to execute the order against the heirs of Raja Bijoy
Singh Dudhoria.
CHAMAN LAL VS SUDHIR CHANDRA AND ORS.
SUBMITTED ON 2-09-23
Date- 23 SEPTEMBER 1971
Citation- AIR 1972 All. 229

FACTS:
This case involves two appeals arising from insolvency proceedings,

both filed by the petitioning creditor. Some transferees of the debtor
sought to be included as parties in the insolvency proceedings before
an adjudication order was issued. The Insolvency Judge initially
rejected their application, stating that transferees can only become
parties in proceedings under Section 53 of the Insolvency Act, not
during earlier stages. However, the transferees appealed this decision
and won, with the District Judge ruling that Order 1, Rule 10 of the
Civil Procedure Code (CPC) applies, allowing the transferees to be
impleaded as parties. The case was then brought to a larger Bench for
reconsideration due to a Single Judge decision that contradicted the
District Judge's ruling.
ISSUE:
The primary issue is whether transferees of the debtor have the right
to be impleaded as parties in insolvency proceedings before an
adjudication order is issued.
HOLDING:
The larger Bench held that transferees have the right to be impleaded
as parties in insolvency proceedings before an adjudication order
under certain circumstances.
DICTA:
Section 5(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act grants the court
handling insolvency proceedings the same powers and procedures as
those exercised in civil matters. Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC applies
to insolvency proceedings, allowing the court to implead necessary as
well as proper parties. Transferees who believe they are necessary or
proper parties can approach the Insolvency Judge for impleadment.
The court should consider whether transferees have a legitimate

interest in defending the insolvency petition, especially when the
debtor may not adequately defend it. Transferees who wish to contest
the validity of the transfer that is the subject of the insolvency petition
can be considered proper parties. The case of AIR 1968 Mad 287,
Mahadeo Rice and Oil Mills v. Chennimalal Gounder stated that the
court can only add a party if it is necessary to do so. However, the
jurisdiction under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC extends to proper
parties as well.
ARGUMENTS:
The petitioning creditor argued that the court had no jurisdiction to

add transferees as parties unless it was necessary, relying on the case
of Mahadeo Rice and Oil Mills v. Chennimalal Gounder.
The respondents (transferees) argued that they wanted to participate in

the proceedings to defend the transfers in their favor and contest the
insolvency petition, making them proper parties.
JUDGMENT:
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that transferees
of the debtor can be impleaded as parties in insolvency proceedings
before an adjudication order if they have a legitimate interest in
defending the insolvency petition, especially when the debtor may not
adequately defend it. The respondents were rightly considered proper
parties to the proceedings as they wanted to contest the validity of the
transfer in their favor, which was a ground affecting the insolvency
petition.
KALA CHAND BANERJEE VS JAGANNATH MARWARI,
Equivalent citations: (1927) 29 BOMLR 882
Bench: V Dunedin, Salvesen, J Wallis
Date- 3 March 1927
FACTS:
This appeal arises from a High Court decision that overturned a

Subordinate Judge's judgment. The case involves Amulya Krishna
Bose's insolvent estate, with the appellant serving as the receiver.
Tara Prasanna Bose, in February 1913, executed a mortgage for Rs.
40,000 in favor of the defendants. When he failed to pay the mortgage
interest, a foreclosure suit was initiated on January 11, 1913. A
solenamah (compromise deed) was later agreed upon, extending the
mortgage repayment period in exchange for regular interest payments.
However, Tara Prasanna Bose passed away before any order was
made regarding this compromise. The properties subject to the
mortgage or equity of redemption then devolved by inheritance to the
insolvent Amulya Krishna Bose.
ISSUES:
Whether the mortgagees were justified in pursuing a foreclosure suit

against Amulya Krishna Bose after his father's death, given that his
equity of redemption had vested in the court-appointed receiver due to
insolvency.
Whether the plea of res judicata applied based on the receiver's earlier
intervention in the foreclosure suit.
HOLDINGS:
The mortgagees were not justified in pursuing the foreclosure suit

against Amulya Krishna Bose after his father's death because, under
Act III of 1907, the equity of redemption had vested in the court-
appointed receiver upon Tara Prasanna Bose's insolvency. Any
transaction or agreement with Amulya Krishna Bose in this context
was considered void.
The plea of res judicata did not apply because the receiver was not a
party to the foreclosure suit. Therefore, the res judicata rule in Section
11 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply. The receiver's previous
attempt to join the suit had failed, and he was entitled to proceed
independently to protect the equity of redemption.
DICTA:
The court emphasized that any transaction with an insolvent in such

circumstances is void and that the equity of redemption must be dealt
with by the court-appointed receiver as per the law.
It was clarified that the rights of a secured creditor over a property are
not affected by the insolvency of the mortgagor, but this does not
imply that the creditor can proceed with legal actions without
involving the person to whom the equity of redemption has been
assigned by law.
PARTY’S ARGUMENTS:
The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to continue the

foreclosure suit against Amulya Krishna Bose based on Section 16,
Sub-section 5, of Act III of 1907, which they interpreted as allowing
them to deal with the security as if there had been no vesting in the
court or receiver.
The respondents attempted to support their case by invoking a plea of

res judicata based on the receiver's previous intervention in the
foreclosure suit.
JUDGMENT:
The court ruled in favor of the appellant (the receiver). They held that
the mortgagees were not justified in pursuing the foreclosure suit
against Amulya Krishna Bose, as his equity of redemption had vested
in the receiver due to insolvency. The plea of res judicata was rejected
because the receiver had not been a party to the earlier suit. The court
allowed the appeal, reversed the High Court's decision, and restored
that of the Subordinate Judge, with costs awarded to the appellant in
both the Indian courts and this appeal. The receiver was entitled to
protect the equity of redemption independently.
JARNAIL SINGH & OTHERS V. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA

& OTHERS
Year- [2018]
CITATION- 10 SCR 663
FACTS-
In 2006, the M. Nagraj and Others vs. Union of India and Others case
challenged the Nagraj Judgment, which had made it difficult to grant
reservations in job promotions for government jobs and public
services. Article 16 of the Indian Constitution originally did not
include provisions for reservations until the Indra Sawhney case in
1992. In this case, Article 16(4) was introduced, allowing the state to
make provisions for reservation of backward classes in appointments
but not in promotions.
To address this, Clause 4A was added to allow reservations in

promotions as well. Later, through the 81st Amendment, Articles
16(4A) and 16(4B) were included. The constitutional validity of these
provisions was challenged in the Nagraj Case. The Nagraj verdict,
delivered by a five-judge bench, stated that if the State wanted to
provide reservation in promotions for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, it had to gather "quantifiable data" demonstrating
the backwardness of the class and their inadequate representation in
public employment. The reservation provision should not breach the
50 percent ceiling limit or exclude the creamy layer.
The requirement to collect quantifiable data and apply the creamy

layer concept to Scheduled Castes and Tribes was seen as
contradictory to the Indira Sawhney case and was considered
unconstitutional. Questions about equality were raised regarding the
application of the creamy layer to promotions. As a result, a petition
was filed to review the Nagraj verdict, indicating the contentious
nature of the reservation issue in India's public employment sector.
ISSUES-
1. Whether the Nagraj Judgement needed reconsideration by a seven-

judge bench.
2. The second issue questioned whether the States had to collect

quantifiable data to prove the backwardness and inadequacy of the
class while being promoted.
3. The third issue was whether the creamy layer among the scheduled
castes and the scheduled tribes should be barred from obtaining
promotions through the reservation.
ARGUMENTS-
In the case of Jarnail Singh, the Supreme Court declined to refer the
Nagraj judgment to a seven-judge bench and instead reviewed it with
a five-judge bench. The Nagraj verdict had required the collection of
quantifiable data to justify reservations in job promotions for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, raising questions about their
backwardness and representation in public services.
Arguments against collecting quantifiable data included the assertion

that the Constitution already classified Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes as socially and economically backward, making
further testing unnecessary. Supporters of data collection argued that
it was a prudent check to ensure the genuine backwardness of
individuals seeking promotion through reservations and did not harm
anyone's integrity. They saw it as the government's responsibility and
a way to prevent abuse. The concept of the creamy layer was
considered essential for ensuring true equality. Arguments in favor of
excluding the creamy layer included the need to prevent economically
advanced individuals from benefiting excessively from reservations,
ensuring that the truly backward within the class had access to
opportunities. Excluding the creamy layer was also seen as essential
to avoid treating equals differently and unequals the same way.
Justice Nariman emphasized that reservations were meant to uplift the
backward classes and that including the creamy layer would hinder
this objective. Excluding the creamy layer ensured that those not part
of the truly backward classes were not unfairly benefiting from
reservations.
Opponents of applying the creamy layer principle to Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes argued that this was a risky move, given the
differences between these groups and the Other Backward Classes.
They stressed the importance of safeguarding the fundamental right to
equality. Supporters of including the creamy layer contended that it
would still allow the truly backward to benefit from promotions,
especially as they tended to fall within the same economic bracket at
higher employment levels. Excluding the creamy layer was seen as
primarily benefiting the general classes. It was argued that this
approach could help Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes prove
their merit in the face of historical workplace discrimination. Overall,
the case highlighted the complex and contentious issues surrounding
reservations and the creamy layer concept in India's public
employment sector, with different perspectives on how to achieve
equality and upliftment for disadvantaged groups.
JUDGMENT-
The court concluded that the judgment in the Nagraj case does not
need to be referred to a seven-Judge bench. Along with this, the
provision that the State has to collect quantifiable data showing
backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is
contrary to the nine-Judge Bench in Indra Sawhney case making this
provision invalid. It was also seen in the Indra Sawhney Case that any
discussion on the ‘creamy layer’ has no relevance in the context of
Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes. Further, the Supreme Court
confirmed the Application of creamy layer to promotions for
Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes as held in the Nagraj
Judgement. It had resulted in thousands of employees being denied
their due promotions. The court viewed the principle of the creamy
layer as a principle of identification and not of equality.
CONCLUSION-
India had a disturbing history of caste and class-based discrimination.

The backward classes, the Scheduled castes, and Scheduled tribes, the
untouchables all were ill-treated and were denied opportunities in
every field of whether it was work or education. They required
reservations not as a welfare measure but as a right of representation,
a right that had been denied to them for many years. The
circumstances did not change by giving them reservation in
government jobs and posts as they still face discrimination and could
never achieve a high rank no matter what their merit was. A
reservation in promotion was a major step taken by the judiciary as
not everyone was in favour of this reservation. It is commendable that
our government safeguards the interests of the less privileged classes
and that our Judiciary is strong enough to make the right decisions
after facing a lot of criticism. Even the Judiciary is not perfect but as
seen through this case, it kept reviewing cases and amending laws so
that the people of our country can get what they each deserve.
RAGHUNATH V. KEDAR NATH
CITATION- AIR1969 SC 1316, (1969) 1 SCC 497
FACTS-
The plaintiff alleged that Dwarka Prasad took a loan of Rs. 1700 from
Madho Ram, father of the defendants. Dwarka Prasad and his
maternal grandmother executed a possessory mortgage deed for the
disputed house in favor of Madho Ram, specifying terms of the
mortgage. When Dwarka Prasad couldn't pay the monthly amount, he
handed over possession of the house to Madho Ram, who rented it
out. Dwarka Prasad and his grandmother passed away, leaving Radha
Bai as Dwarka Prasad's heir. Radha Bai sold the house to the plaintiff
in 1953. The plaintiff sought to redeem the mortgage and asked the
defendants for an account of the amounts due.
ISSUES:
1. Was the deed dated 27th July, 1922, a mortgage deed or an

outright sale?
2. If the deed was a mortgage, were the defendants entitled to the

claimed interest and costs of repairs?
3. Did the defendants acquire ownership of the property through

adverse possession?
ARGUMENTS:
Plaintiff's argument: The deed dated 27th July, 1922, was a mortgage
deed, and the plaintiff had the right to redeem it by paying the
principal amount.
Defendant's argument: The deed was an outright sale disguised as a

mortgage to avoid certain payments. They also claimed interest and
costs of repairs.
Regarding the second issue, the plaintiff argued that the defendants
failed to prove their entitlement to interest and repair costs. Regarding
adverse possession, the defendants claimed they had acquired
ownership through it.
JUDGMENT:
The trial court held that the deed was a mortgage and allowed the
plaintiff to redeem it on payment of Rs. 1709/14/-. The district court,
on appeal, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The High Court remanded the
case to the lower appellate court to decide if the defendants acquired
ownership through adverse possession. The lower appellate court
upheld the mortgage status of the deed and ruled against adverse
possession. The High Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside
the lower appellate court's judgment, and remanded for the defendants
to render accounts.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the deed
was a mortgage, not an outright sale. They clarified the applicability
of registration requirements to documents under the Transfer of
Property Act and affirmed the High Court's decision to set aside the
lower appellate court's judgment, except for the remand on
accounting. The judgment allowed the plaintiff's appeal and
confirmed the trial court's decree for redemption, with some
modifications, and dismissed the defendants' appeals.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR VS THAKUR

BHARAT SINGH
DATE- 23 January 1967
Equivalent citations- 1967 AIR 1170, 1967 SCR (2) 454
Bench: Rao, K. Subba (Cj), Shah, J.C., Shelat, J.M., Bhargava,

Vishishtha, Mitter, G.K.
The case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh, decided

by the Supreme Court of India, in 1967, is a landmark judgment that
explores the delicate balance between individual rights and the
authority of the state during times of emergency. The case revolves
around the legality of an executive order issued under the Madhya
Pradesh Public Security Act, 1959, and its implications for
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. The
case raises significant legal and constitutional issues related to the
balance between individual rights and state authority, especially
during times of emergency. To understand the context and
implications of this case, we must examine the fundamental principles
of Indian constitutional law, the specific provisions of the Madhya
Pradesh Public Security Act, and the arguments presented by both
sides.
FACTS:
On April 24, 1963, the State of Madhya Pradesh issued an order under
the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act, 1959, directing Thakur
Bharat Singh (the respondent) to comply with three main directives:
1. Not to be present in any area of the Raipur district.
2. To reside within the municipal limits of Jhabua town, in the

Jhabua district of Madhya Pradesh, and to proceed there immediately
upon receiving the order.
3. To notify his movements and personally report to the Police

Station Officer in Jhabua every day at 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.
The respondent challenged this order by filing a petition in the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh, invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the
Indian Constitution. He contended that the order violated his
fundamental rights, specifically those protected under Article 19(1)(d)
and (e), and that it was discriminatory, illegal, and violated principles
of natural justice.
ISSUES:
The primary issue at the heart of this case was the constitutionality of
Section 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act, 1959.
This provision empowered the state government to order an individual
to reside or remain in a specific place or area within Madhya Pradesh.
The key legal questions included:
1. Whether Section 3(1)(b) of the Act was valid and in compliance

with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the
Constitution.
2. If Section 3(1)(b) was found to be unconstitutional, whether the

order issued to the respondent was valid and enforceable.
3. The impact of the state of emergency declared under Article 352

of the Constitution on the legality of the executive order.
HOLDING:
The High Court initially held that Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, which
allowed for restrictions on a person's movements within specified
areas, was valid. However, it found Section 3(1)(b) invalid, as it could
require an individual to leave their ordinary place of residence, which
might be unreasonable. The High Court also declared the specific
directions given in the order to the respondent as invalid.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, confirming that
Section 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act was
indeed unconstitutional, as it could impose unreasonable restrictions
on a person's freedom of movement. The Court ruled that the entire
clause was void. Furthermore, it clarified that Article 358, which
suspends the provisions of Article 19 during a state of emergency,
operates prospectively and does not validate legislative provisions
that were unconstitutional before the emergency proclamation.
DICTA:
The Court emphasized the importance of the rule of law and the need
for executive actions to have legislative authority to operate to the
prejudice of any person. The Court rejected the argument that
executive orders could infringe citizens' rights merely because the
State Legislature had the power to legislate on the subject in question.
ARGUMENTS:
The appellant, representing the State of Madhya Pradesh, argued

several points. The executive order was valid and necessary,
especially during the state of emergency declared by the President
under Article 352 of the Constitution. Article 358 protected executive
actions taken after the emergency proclamation, even if they appeared
to infringe fundamental freedoms under Article 19. The Madhya
Pradesh Public Security Act provided the necessary legislative
authority for the executive order.
JUDGMENT:
The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the

High Court's decision that Section 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh
Public Security Act was unconstitutional. In its judgment delivered by
Justice Shah, upheld the decision of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh. It ruled that Section 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Public
Security Act was indeed unconstitutional. Consequently, the entire
clause was declared void. The Court further clarified that Article 358,
which suspends the operation of Article 19 during a state of
emergency, operates prospectively and does not validate legislative
provisions that were unconstitutional before the emergency
proclamation.
The Court's key findings and reasoning can be summarized as

follows:
1. Unconstitutionality of Section 3(1)(b): The Court agreed with

the High Court's view that Section 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh
Public Security Act authorized the imposition of unreasonable
restrictions. This section allowed the State to order an individual to
reside or remain in a specific place or area within Madhya Pradesh.
The Court found that this provision could require a person to leave
their ordinary place of residence, potentially leading to significant
hardships. It held that the clause, in its entirety, was unreasonable and,
therefore, unconstitutional.
2. Article 358 and Emergency Powers: The Court rejected the

argument put forth by the State that Article 358 protected executive
actions taken during a state of emergency, even if they infringed
fundamental freedoms under Article 19. It clarified that Article 358,
while suspending Article 19 during an emergency, operated
prospectively. This meant that it did not validate a legislative
provision that was already unconstitutional before the emergency was
proclaimed. In this case, since Section 3(1)(b) was found to be void
before the emergency, the emergency proclamation did not revive its
validity.
3. Rule of Law and Legislative Authority: The Court emphasized

the importance of the rule of law and the need for executive actions to
have legislative authority to operate to the prejudice of any person. It
rejected the argument that executive orders could infringe citizens'
rights merely because the State Legislature had the power to legislate
on the subject in question. The Court upheld the principle that all acts
done by the Government or its officers must be supported by some
legislative authority.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:
India's Constitution, adopted in 1950, is one of the world's most

extensive and detailed constitutions. It establishes a democratic and
federal structure with a clear separation of powers among the
legislature, executive, and judiciary. The Constitution also includes a
comprehensive Bill of Rights, which guarantees various fundamental
freedoms to Indian citizens. Article 19 of the Constitution protects the
right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble
peacefully, the right to form associations or unions, the right to move
freely throughout the territory of India, and the right to reside and
settle in any part of the country. These rights are not absolute but
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the state on certain
grounds, such as public order, security, and morality.
Article 352 of the Constitution allows the President of India to declare

a state of emergency if he believes that the security of India or any
part thereof is threatened by war, external aggression, or armed
rebellion. During such an emergency, Article 358 suspends the
operation of Article 19, essentially giving the government greater
leeway to restrict these fundamental rights.
CITY EQUITABLE FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
RE (1925) CH. 407
Key Point
Traditionally, the courts did not require directors to exhibit a greater
degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a person with
their knowledge and experience (a very subjective test), as laid down
in this case. This test allowed inherently poor directors to escape
liability for company losses, even when most reasonable people
would have regarded their decisions as negligent. However, Section
174 Companies Act 2006 has now adopted an objective, non-
fiduciary, duty of care and skill.
Facts
The company lost £1,200,000 in failure of investments and the large

scale fraud of the chairman, Gerard Lee Bevan, ‘a daring and
unprincipled scoundrel’. The liquidator sued the other directors for
negligence. Here we are concerned with the test that Romer J laid
down for negligence of directors.
Issue:
Whether the director is accountable for the loss of company according

to law?
Held (High Court)

Some directors had been negligent but there was a valid exclusion of
liability clause in the articles. So the director is not accountable for
the loss and it is void according to law
Reason:
Directors being a vital part of the company have profound duties of

care and skill towards the company. In this case the collapse of the
company was due to bad investments, bad debts and
misappropriation. He was accordingly convicted for his frauds. It was
alleged that they were guilty of negligence in not detecting the frauds.
But there was an exemption clause in the articles according to which
the directors were liable only for gross negligence. In discharging
these duties, a director must exercise some degree of skill and
diligence. But he does not owe to his company the duty to take all
possible care or to act with best care. Indeed, he need not exhibit in
the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and
experience. It is, therefore, perhaps, another way of stating the same
proposition that directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment.
Romer J
“A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater

degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a person of his
knowledge and experience.” A director of a life insurance company,
for instance, does not guarantee that he has the skill of an actuary or
of a physician.
“A director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of

his company. His duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed
at periodical board meetings, and at meetings of any committee of the
board upon which he happens to be placed. He is not, however, bound
to attend all such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever, in
the circumstances, he is reasonably able to do so.”
“In respect of all duties that, having regard to the exigencies of

business, and the articles of association, may properly be left to some
other official, a director is, in the absence of grounds for suspicion,
justified in trusting that official to perform such duties honestly.”
RESEARCH WORK OF 12-09-23
Q1- Can winding up proceedings go on when company itself is

inactive for filing purposes.
Winding up proceedings can indeed continue even when a company is

inactive for filing purposes. The process of winding up a company is a
legal mechanism by which a company’s assets are liquidated, and its
affairs are brought to a close. This process can be initiated for various
reasons, including insolvency, inability to pay debts, or for the general
dissolution of the company. Here, we’ll explore why winding up
proceedings can proceed even when a company is inactive for filing
purposes.
Legal Basis for Winding Up: The initiation of winding up

proceedings is often based on legal grounds specified in the
applicable company law or regulations. These legal grounds typically
revolve around the company’s financial status, such as its inability to
pay its debts or its overall insolvency. These grounds for winding up
are independent of the company’s filing status.
Creditor’s Rights: One of the primary triggers for winding up

proceedings is when a company owes debts to its creditors that it
cannot repay. Creditors have a legal right to seek the winding up of a
company to recover their dues. Even if a company is inactive for
filing purposes, its creditors can still petition the court to initiate
winding up proceedings.
Protection of Stakeholders: Winding up proceedings are not solely for

the benefit of creditors. They also serve to protect the interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders. Shareholders who believe that
the company’s assets are not being managed properly or that their
investments are at risk can petition for winding up, irrespective of the
company’s filing status.
Resolution of Outstanding Issues: Even an inactive company may

have unresolved legal issues, pending contracts, or outstanding
liabilities. Winding up proceedings provide a legal framework for
addressing these matters and ensuring that all outstanding obligations
are properly settled, assets are distributed, and the company is
formally dissolved.
Corporate Veil: The concept of the corporate veil, which separates a

company’s legal identity from that of its shareholders, means that
even if a company is inactive or dormant, it remains a separate legal
entity. This distinction allows for the pursuit of winding up
proceedings against the company itself, separate from its
shareholders.
Public Interest: In some cases, winding up may be in the public

interest, especially if a company’s activities are found to be illegal,
fraudulent, or harmful to the public. Regulatory authorities or
government agencies may initiate winding up proceedings for public
protection, even if the company is not actively filing documents.
Asset Distribution: Winding up proceedings are designed to ensure a

fair and equitable distribution of the company’s assets among its
creditors and shareholders. Even if a company is inactive, its assets
need to be properly distributed, and any remaining funds or assets
may revert to the state if not claimed.
Statutory Obligations: A company may be required by law to undergo

winding up proceedings, even if it is not actively pursuing its business
objectives. Compliance with statutory obligations is a legal
requirement, and failure to wind up the company properly can lead to
legal consequences for its directors and officers.
Debt Recovery: Creditors often view winding up proceedings as a
means of recovering their debts more efficiently than pursuing
individual legal actions against an inactive company. It provides a
centralized process for addressing outstanding debts.
It's important to note that winding up proceedings are a legal process

that involves court intervention and oversight. They are conducted to
ensure that the company’s affairs are properly concluded and that its
assets and liabilities are appropriately managed and distributed. The
fact that a company is inactive or no longer filing documents does not
negate the need for this legal process, especially if there are
outstanding financial or legal matters associated with the company.
In summary, winding up proceedings can continue even when a

company is inactive for filing purposes because they are initiated
based on legal grounds related to the company’s financial status and
its obligations to creditors, shareholders, and the public. The purpose
of winding up is to provide a legal framework for the orderly
dissolution of a company, ensuring that its affairs are properly
concluded and its assets and liabilities are appropriately addressed.
Q2- Is postal receipts/receiving compulsory alongwith winding up

notice u/s 434 of Companies Act, 1956 for filing winding up petition.
The requirement for postal receipts or proof of receipt along with a

winding-up notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 is
not explicitly mandated by the Act itself. However, the legal practice
and jurisprudence around winding-up proceedings in India often
involve providing evidence of proper service of the winding-up notice
to the respondent company. Below, I will elaborate on this practice
and the importance of providing proof of receipt when filing a
winding-up petition.
Statutory Provisions: Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, lays

out the jurisdiction for winding-up petitions. It provides guidance on
when and where a winding-up petition can be filed. While the section
doesn’t explicitly state the requirement for postal receipts, it does
emphasize that the winding-up petition should be properly served to
the respondent company. The section states that a winding-up petition
shall not be presented unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court
that the company has committed an act of insolvency, and the
company has been served with a demand in writing for the payment
of the debt or satisfaction of the claim.
Due Process and Fairness: The practice of providing proof of receipt

or service is in line with principles of due process and fairness. It
ensures that the respondent company is made aware of the winding-up
petition and has the opportunity to respond to the allegations or claims
made against it. Serving the notice properly is essential to avoid any
claims of procedural irregularities or unfairness in the legal process.
Evidence of Compliance: Courts generally require evidence that the

winding-up notice has been duly served on the respondent company.
Postal receipts, acknowledgment receipts, or affidavits of service are
commonly used as evidence to demonstrate that the notice was sent to
the correct address and received by the company. This evidence helps
establish that the legal process was followed correctly.
Avoiding Delay and Challenges: Providing proof of receipt can help

prevent delays in the winding-up proceedings. If the respondent
company claims that it did not receive the notice, it could challenge
the service of the notice, leading to additional court proceedings and
potential delays. To avoid such challenges and ensure the proceedings
move forward smoothly, evidence of service is advisable.
Service of Notice on the Registered Office: The Companies Act,

1956, requires companies to maintain a registered office where legal
notices and communications can be served. Providing proof of service
ensures that the notice was sent to the registered office, where it is
legally required to be received.
Adherence to Legal Formalities: While the Act may not explicitly

require postal receipts, courts often emphasize adherence to legal
formalities and procedural requirements. Proving that the notice was
properly served adds to the legitimacy of the winding-up petition.
Protection for the Petitioner: For the petitioner (the party initiating the
winding-up proceedings), providing proof of receipt offers protection.
It establishes that the petitioner has fulfilled their legal obligation to
serve the notice, reducing the risk of the petition being dismissed or
challenged on procedural grounds.
Burden of Proof: In legal proceedings, the burden of proof typically
falls on the party making a claim. If a petitioner claims that they have
served a winding-up notice and the respondent company disputes this
claim, the burden may shift to the petitioner to prove that proper
service occurred. Having documented evidence of service can help
meet this burden.
In conclusion, while the Companies Act, 1956, does not explicitly

require postal receipts or acknowledgment receipts to accompany a
winding-up notice under Section 434, the legal practice in India often
involves providing proof of receipt or service of the notice. This
practice is rooted in principles of due process, fairness, and the need
to demonstrate compliance with legal requirements. It serves to
protect the interests of both parties involved in the winding-up
proceedings and ensures that the legal process is conducted
transparently and in accordance with the law. Therefore, it is
advisable for petitioners to provide evidence of proper service when
filing a winding-up petition to avoid procedural challenges and delays
in the proceedings.
Q3- Whether petition under article 226 is maintainable against order

of district judge passed in the capacity of being a MCD tribunal in
place of Lieutenant governor.
The maintainability of a petition under Article 226 of the Indian

Constitution against an order of a District Judge acting in the capacity
of an MCD (Municipal Corporation of Delhi) tribunal, in place of the
Lieutenant Governor, Is a complex legal issue that depends on various
factors, including the specific facts of the case, the legal provisions
involved, and judicial precedents. Article 226 of the Indian
Constitution grants High Courts the power to issue writs for the
enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.
Here are some key considerations regarding the maintainability of

such a petition:
Jurisdiction of High Courts: Article 226 empowers High Courts to

exercise jurisdiction over the territory within their respective states or
union territories. However, the jurisdiction of High Courts is not
unlimited, and it is subject to the specific provisions of laws and
statutes.
Tribunals and Special Courts: Many laws and statutes establish

specialized tribunals and courts to adjudicate on specific matters,
including those related to municipal and local governance. The
jurisdiction of these tribunals is often defined by the respective laws
that create them.
Exhaustion of Remedies: Before approaching the High Court under

Article 226, it is generally required to exhaust alternative remedies
available under the relevant statutes or laws. This may involve
appealing the decision to higher authorities or tribunals established for
such purposes.
Jurisdictional Issues: The specific nature of the order issued by the
District Judge acting as an MCD tribunal and its alignment with
existing laws and statutes will impact the High Court’s jurisdiction to
entertain a petition under Article 226.
Violation of Fundamental Rights: For a petition under Article 226 to

be maintainable, it often requires the petitioner to demonstrate that
their fundamental rights have been violated or that there is an issue of
substantial public interest involved. The petitioner must show that the
order in question has resulted in a clear infringement of these rights.
Interpretation of Statutes: Courts often interpret statutory provisions

to determine whether they oust the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226. If the law establishing the MCD tribunal expressly
limits the jurisdiction of the High Court or provides a specific
appellate process, the High Court may be less likely to entertain a
petition under Article 226.
Judicial Precedents: Legal precedents and past judgments can play a

significant role in determining the maintainability of such petitions.
Past decisions by High Courts and the Supreme Court of India on
similar issues can provide guidance on whether a particular petition
under Article 226 is maintainable.
In summary, the maintainability of a petition under Article 226

against an order of a District Judge acting in the capacity of an MCD
tribunal depends on several factors, including statutory provisions,
jurisdictional issues, the nature of the order,’and the presence of
violations of fundamental rights or substantial public interest. It is
crucial for individuals or entities considering such a petition to
consult with legal experts who can provide specific guidance based on
the details of the case and applicable laws.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST VS BIMAN

BEHARI SHAW SHEBAIT
Date- 19 march, 1967
Equivalent citations: 1968 68 itr 815 cal
Background and Facts:
Banku Behari Saha executed a will on November 24, 1925, with the
intention of creating a debutter estate. In the will, he dedicated several
properties to two deities, Sri Sri Iswar Benode Behari Jew and Sri Sri
Iswar Benodeswar Mahadev. Two of the dedicated properties relevant
to this case were No. 12, Benode Behari Saha Lane, and No. 122A,
Manicktola Street, both located in Calcutta. No. 12, Benode Behari
Saha Lane, was specifically described as a “Thakurbati and temple” in
the will. The will contained various clauses, including Clause (17),
which restricted the use and occupancy of these properties. Clause
(17) stipulated that only the Brahmin performing deity worship and
servants could reside in the temple premises, and the property should
not be used for public functions or meetings.
Issue:
The primary issue in this case was the assessment of the annual value
of the two dedicated properties, No. 12, Benode Behari Saha Lane,
and 122A, Manicktola Street, for the assessment years 1957-58 and
1958-59.
The central question was whether these properties had a bona fide
annual value that should be subject to taxation, even though they were
used for religious purposes and had certain occupancy restrictions.
Arguments:
The Income-tax Officer had calculated the annual value of the

properties based on their potential rental value in the open market.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed with this

assessment. He argued that since the properties were temples
dedicated to deities and were not let out, no income accrued from
them. Therefore, the Income-tax Officer’s assessment was not
justified.
The Appellate Tribunal agreed with the Appellate Assistant

Commissioner, stating that the properties had no letting value due to
the restrictions in the will, particularly Clause (17), which limited
occupancy to the priest performing deity worship and servants and
prohibited other uses like public functions or meetings.
The Commissioner of Income-tax appealed, contending that even with

restrictions, the properties still had a notional letting value, and thus,
they should be subject to taxation as per Section 9(2) of the Income-
tax Act.
Judgment:
The High Court ruled in favor of the revenue (the tax authorities).
They held that the presence of restrictions, such as those mentioned in
Clause (17) of the will, might reduce the letting value of the
properties, but it did not negate the notion that the properties had
some notional annual income. The court cited previous decisions to
support this interpretation.
The court emphasized that Section 9(2) of the Income-tax Act

required assessing properties’ annual value, whether or not they were
actually let or produced income. The law established an artificial rule
for assessing income from immovable property, and the liability to
pay tax did not depend on the owner’s ability to let the property or
receive income from it.
The court clarified that it did not express an opinion on whether a

temple exclusively occupied by a deity would fall under the purview
of Section 9(2) of the Income-tax Act, as that issue was not directly
relevant to this case.
Dicta:
The court observed that Section 9(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922,
required the assessment of the annual value of property, whether or
not it was actually let out or produced income.
The court noted that the law established an artificial rule for assessing
income from immovable property and that the liability to pay tax did
not depend on the owner’s ability to let the property or receive
income from it.
The court emphasized that the existence of restrictions, such as those

in the will, could reduce the letting value of the property but did not
negate the notion that the property had a letting value.
In summary, the case of Banku Behari Saha vs. Commissioner of

Income Tax dealt with the assessment of the annual value of
properties dedicated to deities in a will. The court clarified that even
in the presence of restrictions, properties could have a notional letting
value for tax assessment purposes, as mandated by Section 9(2) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922.
G.K. BHATNAGAR V. ABDUL ALIM (2002)

Citation- 9 SCC 516
Facts:
Late G.K. Bhatnagar, hereinafter referred to as the ‘landlord,’ was the

owner of a shop situated in Delhi. On May 1, 1966, he entered into a
lease agreement with the tenant-respondent, wherein the tenant agreed
to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 50 along with an additional sum of Rs. 6
as electricity charges. The shop was let out under this arrangement.
However, issues arose in 1979 when the landlord initiated eviction

proceedings against the tenant. The landlord’s claim was grounded in
the assertion that the tenant had sublet the shop without obtaining the
written consent of the landlord, which was mandatory under the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958. The landlord contended that the tenant had
parted with the possession of the shop in favor of one Jagdish
Chander, which constituted a violation of the rental agreement.
In response, the tenant vehemently denied any subletting activity. He

put forth the argument that the arrangement with Jagdish Chander was
not subletting but rather a partnership agreement formed to jointly
operate the existing business within the shop. This partnership had
been documented through a written partnership deed executed on
October 13, 1978.
Issue:
At the heart of this legal dispute was the central issue of whether the
partnership between the tenant and Jagdish Chander could be deemed
as a bona fide partnership as per the provisions of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, or if it was merely a disguise for subletting, which would
be a violation of the Act.
Arguments:
The landlord presented a robust argument, claiming that the

partnership was a mere façade, designed to conceal the actual
subletting of the premises to Jagdish Chander. The landlord sought
eviction based on this alleged violation of the rental agreement.
Conversely, the tenant mounted a strong defense. He contended that

the partnership with Jagdish Chander was legitimate and backed this
claim with the existence of a detailed and legally executed partnership
agreement. Moreover, the tenant supported his case with a general
power of attorney, also executed on October 13, 1978, which further
demonstrated the legitimacy of the partnership and its purpose in
running the business.
Court’s Reasoning (Dicta):
The court embarked on a meticulous analysis of the relevant

provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, with particular emphasis on
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14. This statutory provision
clearly stipulated that subletting, assigning, or parting with possession
of the premises without obtaining the landlord’s written consent was a
ground for eviction.
The court, recognizing the pivotal importance of distinguishing

between legitimate partnerships and subletting in its interpretation of
the Act, underscored the need for scrutiny. While the Act allowed for
genuine partnerships to run businesses, it unequivocally disallowed
subletting, which was seen as a way to protect the rights of the
landlord.
Furthermore, the court asserted that if a partnership was formed

primarily as a camouflage for subletting, it would still be categorized
as subletting within the legal framework. This interpretation was
critical in resolving the dispute at hand.
Upon a close examination of the evidence presented, the court made

several key findings:
The partnership agreement, executed on October 13, 1978, was a

meticulously drafted legal document that detailed the terms and
conditions of the partnership. It clearly established the partnership’s
purpose in operating the business within the shop.
The general power of attorney, accompanying the partnership deed,

conferred specific rights to Jagdish Chander relating to the tenancy
premises and the business conducted in partnership with the tenant.
Though not formally tendered as evidence, the court considered it as
it was produced in court and deemed relevant to the case.
The court also took note that, at two separate instances during the
proceedings, the landlord had sought assistance from the court to
produce the tenant’s passport, ostensibly to determine the tenant’s
travel history to Iraq. However, the passport was not produced, and no
adverse inference could be drawn from its non-production, as it was
not established that the passport was deliberately withheld.
Moreover, the court considered the testimony provided by the

landlord himself during the proceedings. The landlord admitted that
he had not conducted any inquiries to ascertain the identity of the
partners involved in the business or the manner in which the business
was being conducted within the shop. He had relied on information
provided by the tenant’s wife regarding the tenant’s travel history,
which, the court observed, did not pertain to the issue of subletting
In summary, the court concluded that there was no concrete evidence

to suggest that the tenant had left the country or handed over
possession of the shop to Jagdish Chander, ostensibly projecting him
as a partner. The partnership deed and the general power of attorney,
when viewed collectively, supported the tenant’s claim of a legitimate
partnership rather than a subletting arrangement disguised as such.
Judgment:
After a comprehensive analysis of the case, the court determined that
the judgment rendered by the High Court was free from any infirmity.
The High Court had correctly reversed the decision of the appellate
authority and reinstated the verdict of the rent controller. In doing so,
the High Court had addressed a substantial question of law, justifying
its intervention through a second appeal.
As a result, the landlord’s appeal was dismissed, and no order was

issued regarding costs. The tenant’s assertion of a genuine
partnership, as supported by the partnership deed and general power
of attorney, had prevailed in the legal proceedings. The court’s
decision reaffirmed the importance of distinguishing between
legitimate partnerships and subletting as per the provisions of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, ultimately upholding the tenant’s rights in
this case.
MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LTD. VS. K. AND J. COOPER
In the case, heard by the Bombay High Court, the central issue
revolved around copyright infringement in a literary work. The case is
notable for its nuanced examination of the boundaries of copyright
protection and the determination of whether the Plaintiff’s work
contained elements that were eligible for copyright.
Facts:
The case began with the Plaintiff, who was the author of a book. This
book was based on Sir North’s translation of Plutarch’s “Life of
Alexander.” However, a publishing house, the Defendant,
subsequently published a book on the same theme. The Plaintiff
believed that the Defendant’s book infringed upon their copyright
and, as a result, filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the
publication of the Defendant’s book and damages for the alleged
infringement.
It Is essential to note the nature of the Plaintiff’s work. The Plaintiff’s

book contained several disjoined passages from Sir North’s work,
which were woven together to create a coherent and continuous
storyline. Additionally, the Plaintiff’s book included notes authored
by the Plaintiff himself, along with other original content.
Issues:
The primary issue before the Court was whether the Plaintiff was
entitled to copyright protection for their work. This question was
pivotal because only if the Plaintiff held a valid copyright could the
Court then consider whether the Defendant had indeed infringed upon
it.
The Court was tasked with determining the originality and
copyrightability of the Plaintiff’s work. Specifically, the Court had to
ascertain whether the Plaintiff’s use of Sir North’s translation, a work
in which copyright could not exist, combined with their original
contributions, constituted a work that was eligible for copyright
protection.
Arguments:
The arguments presented in the case primarily revolved around the

concept of originality in creative works and the scope of copyright
protection. The Plaintiff argued that their work was indeed original.
They contended that while they had utilized Sir North’s translation,
they had also employed their own creativity and intellect to organize
and connect the disjoined passages, thus transforming them into a
coherent narrative. Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserted that the notes
they had authored were entirely their own creation and deserved
copyright protection. In essence, the Plaintiff maintained that their
work was a product of their unique creative input, making it eligible
for copyright protection. On the other hand, the Defendant likely
argued that the Plaintiff’s work lacked originality since a substantial
portion of it was derived from a public domain work (Sir North’s
translation). They may have contended that merely stringing together
uncopyrightable passages from an existing work did not meet the
threshold for copyright protection. Additionally, the Defendant might
have argued that any notes or additional content by the Plaintiff were
insufficient to establish originality or a separate copyrightable
element.
Judgment:
In its judgment, the Bombay High Court undertook a careful

examination of the provisions of copyright law and the specific
circumstances of the case. The Court acknowledged that the Plaintiff
had utilized Sir North’s work, in which copyright could not subsist, as
a foundational element of their own work. However, the Court
recognized that the Plaintiff had not merely copied Sir North’s work
verbatim. Instead, they had employed their own creative skills and
intellect to connect the disjoined passages and craft a continuous
narrative. This transformative effort, in the Court’s view, constituted
originality. Crucially, the Court also acknowledged that the Plaintiff
had contributed their own notes to the work, which were entirely their
creation. These notes, along with other original content, were
recognized as distinct from Sir North’s translation. As a result, the
Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s work was indeed eligible for
copyright protection. The copying of those parts of the Plaintiff’s
work that stemmed from their own creativity, including the notes, by
the Defendant amounted to infringement. In light of this decision, the
Court amended the order of the Trial Court to specify the parts of the
original work in which copyright subsisted. This clarification was
essential in determining the scope of copyright protection and the
extent to which the Defendant had infringed upon the Plaintiff’s
rights. In summary, the Macmillan And Company Ltd. Vs. K. and J.
Cooper case exemplifies the nuanced evaluation of copyright in
situations where a work incorporates elements from public domain
works but also includes original contributions. The Court’s ruling
underscores the importance of transformative creative effort in
establishing copyright protection and the recognition of separate
copyrightable elements within a larger work.
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. V. M/S ZUARI

INDUSTRIES LTD
Citation- (2009) 9 SCC 70
Facts:
The case began with an appeal against a judgment issued by the

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi,
dated March 26, 2004.
The dispute arose when the complainant, who was the respondent in
this appeal, had taken out insurance policies with the appellant (the
insurance company) in 1998 for their factory located in Goa. These
insurance policies included coverage for fire damage and
consequential losses resulting from fire.
On January 8, 1999, an incident occurred where a short circuit took

place in the main switchboard of the factory. This short circuit
resulted in a flashover, which, in turn, caused overcurrents leading to
the generation of excessive heat.
The heat produced from this event charred the paint on the panel
board, created smoke and soot, and even caused damage to the
adjacent feeder. The smoke and ionized air traveled to the generator
compartment, where another short circuit occurred, causing the
generator power supply to trip.
As a consequence, the entire electric supply to the factory was cut off,
and this led to a situation where high-temperature flue gases
continued to be fed into the waste heat boiler, causing damage to the
boiler itself.
In response to this incident, the complainant filed a claim with the

insurance company, but the claim was rejected by the insurer, leading
to the complainant’s petition before the National Commission.
Issue:
The central issue in the case was whether the damage to the boiler and
equipment resulted from a fire, which was a requirement for coverage
under the insurance policy, or if it was caused solely by the stoppage
of electric supply due to the short circuit.
Arguments:
The insurance company (appellant) argued that the damage to the

boiler and equipment was not a result of fire but rather due to the
interruption of electric supply caused by the short circuit. They
contended that for an insurance claim to be valid, the proximate cause
of the damage needed to be considered, and in this case, it was the
stoppage of electricity.
On the other hand, the complainant (respondent) argued that their

insurance claim should be upheld because there was indeed a fire
event (the flashover) that had caused the damage. They stressed that,
for a fire insurance claim to be valid, the presence of a fire event was
essential.
Dicta (Legal Principles)
The court referred to the legal principle of “proximate cause,” which

is the cause that sets in motion a chain of events leading to the
ultimate result without the intervention of another force. The court
emphasized that proximate cause is not necessarily the cause that is
closest in time or place.
Additionally, the court noted the principle that in cases of ambiguity
in an insurance contract, any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
the claimant and against the insurance company.
Judgment:
The court ultimately ruled in favor of the complainant (the claimant),

stating that the fire event (the flashover) was indeed the proximate
cause of the damage. They disagreed with the surveyors’ conclusion
that the fire was not the cause of the damage.
The court emphasized that had the fire event not occurred, the damage
would not have transpired, and there was no independent source of
damage that intervened.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and there were no costs

awarded.
In summary, this case hinged on the interpretation of the insurance

policy and the determination of whether the fire event (flashover)
qualified as the proximate cause of the damage, ultimately ruling in
favor of the complainant based on the presence of the fire event as the
causative factor.
MADRAS REFINERIES LTD VS CONTROLLING REVENUE

AUTHORITY, BOARD OF REVENUE, MADRAS
Facts:
Madras Refineries Ltd. (the Company) executed a Loan and Note

Purchase Agreement with the First National City Bank and others on
December 20, 1966.
Under this agreement, the Company agreed to authorize the creation

and issuance of secured notes, Series A and B, and these notes were to
be secured by a Deed of Trust and Mortgage between the Company
and the First National City Bank.
The Deed of Trust and Mortgage stated that the Company needed to
borrow money from time to time to finance the construction of a
refinery, and it executed the Deed of Trust and Mortgage as security
for the due payment of principal, interest, and other obligations under
the Notes.
It was also agreed that the Notes would be guaranteed by the

President of India pursuant to the terms of a Guarantee Agreement.
Issues:
Whether the stamp duty should be charged on the Deed of Trust and
Mortgage under Article 40(b) of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act
or on the debentures?
Whether the Guarantee Agreement was exempt from duty under
Section 3 of the Stamp Act and whether the debentures were exempt
under Article 27?
Dicta:
The Court emphasized that the real and true meaning of the
instruments should be ascertained, regardless of the descriptions given
by the parties in the documents.
It noted that the Deed of trust and Mortgage was executed before the
Guarantee Agreement, and it was the primary security for the loan,
even though the loan was also guaranteed by the President through the
Guarantee Agreement.
The Court rejected the argument that the Guarantee Agreement was
the principal security, as it was clear that the Deed of Trust and
Mortgage played that role.
It also highlighted that the parties explicitly defined “Collateral

Agreements” to include the Guarantee Agreement in the Deed of
Trust and Mortgage, confirming that the latter was not a collateral
agreement.
Arguments:
The appellant argued that the Guarantee Agreement was the principal
security and that stamp duty on the Deed of Trust and Mortgage
should be payable under Article 40©.
The appellant also contended that the Guarantee Agreement was

exempt from duty under Section 3 of the Stamp Act, and the
debentures were exempt under Article 27.
Judgment:
The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the High
Court.
It held that the Deed of Trust and Mortgage was the principal or
primary security, chargeable with stamp duty under Article 40(b) of
Schedule I.
It found that the Guarantee Agreement was not an instrument of sale,

mortgage, or settlement, and therefore, it did not fall within the
purview of Section 4(1) of the Act.
The Court also rejected the argument that the debentures were the
principal instruments, confirming that they were issued under and
secured by the Deed of Trust and Mortgage.
In summary, the Court affirmed that the Deed of Trust and Mortgage
was the primary security for the loan, and therefore, it was subject to
stamp duty as per Article 40(b). The Guarantee Agreement did not
qualify as an instrument of sale, mortgage, or settlement under
Section 4(1) of the Act. The debentures were not considered the
principal instruments but were issued under and secured by the Deed
of Trust and Mortgage.
RAJEEV DHAWAN V. GULSHAN KUMAR MAHAJAN,
2014) 41 SCD 785,
Contempt P. (Crl.)2/1994
Facts:
The case originates from events related to the Ayodhya dispute in

India, particularly the destruction of the Babri Masjid on December 6,
1992.
In response to the incidents at Ayodhya, the President of India issued

a Proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution of India,
assuming control of the government of Uttar Pradesh and dissolving
the U.P. Vidhan Sabha.
Subsequently, the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Ordinance,

1993, and the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993,
were enacted.
Special Reference No.1 of 1993 was made to the Supreme Court of
India by the President of India under Article 143(1) of the
Constitution to examine the constitutional validity of the 1993 Act.
During this period, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which was
banned at the time, held a Dharam Sansad, and its leaders made
derogatory statements concerning the Supreme Court, accusing it of
overstepping its limits and losing prestige.
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, a designated Senior Advocate, filed a Contempt

Petition before the Supreme Court against VHP leaders Vishnu Hari
Dalmia and Giriraj Kishore, as well as the Indian Express newspaper,
invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 129 of the
Constitution.
The Contempt Petition alleged that the statements made by Dalmia

and Kishore and published in Indian Express were malicious and
amounted to scandalizing the Court and undermining its authority.
Issues:
Whether the statements made by Vishnu Hari Dalmia and Giriraj

Kishore, as reported in the Indian Express, constituted criminal
contempt of the Supreme Court.
Whether the Court should initiate contempt proceedings against the

individuals involved.
Arguments:
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan argued that the statements made by Dalmia and
Kishore were derogatory, accused the Court of overstepping its
authority, and had the potential to lower the image of the Court in the
eyes of the public.
The Contemners argued that the statements were made in response to

the Ayodhya dispute and should be viewed in that context.
HOLDING:
The Court, on May 6, 1994, directed the initiation of criminal

contempt proceedings against Vishnu Hari Dalmia, Giriraj Kishore,
and Pradeep Thakur (Reporter, Khabardar India), but deferred
proceedings against Dalmia pending the filing of returns by Kishore
and others.
The Court also decided to examine separately whether to initiate

contempt proceedings against the Editor, Printer, Publisher, and
Reporter of Indian Express (respondent Nos. 4, 5, and 6).
RATIONALE:
The Court acknowledged that the statements attributed to Dalmia and

Kishore could amount to criminal contempt if found true.
It deferred proceedings against Dalmia until returns were filed and
considered the matter of initiating contempt proceedings against the
other respondents separately.
The Court took Into account the serious nature of the allegations and
the potential impact on the public perception of the judiciary.
JUDGMENT:
The matters remained dormant for nearly two decades, and the notice
accompanied by charges was not served on Giriraj Kishore. In 2014,
Giriraj Kishore, now 96 years old and in poor health, was brought to
the Court, but the notice was still not served. Given the passage of
time and Giriraj Kishore’s condition, the Court decided not to pursue
the contempt matter further. As a result, the contempt proceedings
against all contemners, including Vishnu Hari Dalmia and Pradeep
Thakur, were closed.
The Court stated that contemner Nos. 4 to 6 had not yet been
proceeded against for contempt, and the matter of initiating
proceedings against them had not been decided.
In summary, the Supreme Court of India decided not to pursue

criminal contempt proceedings against the individuals involved,
considering the passage of time and the health condition of one of the
contemners, Giriraj Kishore. The matter of contempt proceedings
against others remained pending.
SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU V. THE STATE OF
MYSORE
DATE OF JUDGMENT, 1958 AIR 255
COURT: Supreme Court of India
JUDGES: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama, Imam,

Syed Jaffer, Sarkar, A.K., Bose, Vivian
REFERENCE: 1958 AIR 255
Petitioner: Sri Venkataramana Devaru
Respondent: The State of Mysore
SUBJECT: The judgment revolves around the application of equality

in places of worship.
FACTS:
This was an appeal by the trustees of the ancient and renowned

temple of Sri Venkataramana of Moolky Petta, who were managing
the temple on behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins in accordance
with a Scheme framed in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. After the passing of the Madras Temple Entry
Authorisation Act, 1947 which had for its object the removal of the
disability of Harijans from entering into Hindu public temples, the
trustees made a representation to the Government that the temple was
a private one, and, therefore, outside the operation of the Act. But the
Government did not accept that position and held that the Act applied
to the temple.
Challenging the decision of the government the appellants approached

the trial Court stating that they have administrative independence
under Article 26 as they form a separate denomination. However, the
Court rejected their contention and held that, the Act covered all
temples. Later this view was affirmed by the High Court but it also
held that, the appellants has the right to exclude the general public
during certain ceremonies in which the members of the denomination
alone were entitled to participate. However, the appellants approached
the SC for complete exclusion.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS:
The Indian Constitution:
• Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by Part III
• The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for

the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
• The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or

writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III
• Article 26(b): Freedom to manage religious affairs Subject to public

order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any
section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion.
• Article 14: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
• Article 15(1): The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them.
• Article 25(2)(b): Providing for social welfare and reform or the

throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to
all classes and sections of Hindus.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the right to manage religious affairs of a religious

denomination can be
2. Overridden by right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the

Constitution?
JUDGEMENT:
The petitioners contended that, it was an age-old practice of Gowda

Saraswat Brahmins to conduct all the rituals and ceremonies in
relation to the temple. Therefore, the temple and its devotees
constitute a religious denomination and hence has independence in
religious administration which confers upon them the right to decide
who can enter the temple. Therefore the 1947 Act which takes away
this right is unconstitutional to that extent. The respondents contended
that, the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the
Constitution confers the right on every individual to profess, practice
and propagate their religious believes. Further the right under Article
25(2)(b) which specifies "throwing open of all Hindu religious
institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus" protects the validity
of the impugned Act. The Act completely protects the rights of every
individual under Article 15 which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of caste.
Upon hearing the parties to the case the Court affirmed the view of
the HC and held that, a complete exclusion of general public will
amount to violation of Article 25 therefore the temple authorities may
be permitted to exclude general public only in those ceremonies
which are integral in nature which are performed by the members of
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins alone. Further the Court applied the
principle of harmonious construction to resolve the dispute between
Article 25 and 26.
COMMR. OF SALES TAX, M.P. V M.P. ELECTRICITY
BOARD, JABALPUR
AIR 1970 SC 732: (1969) 1 SCC 200 115
Bench: Grover, A.N
Case: This case involves appeals from the Madhya Pradesh High
Court regarding the assessment of sales tax by the Madhya Pradesh
Electricity Board for the assessment years from April 1, 1957, to
March 31, 1958, and April 1, 1964, to March 31, 1965. The case also
deals with the definition of "dealer" and the taxability of electric
energy and steam supplied by the Electricity Board.
FACTS:
The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, referred to as the "Electricity

Board," was established under the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. The
Electricity Board was responsible for generating, supplying, and
distributing electric energy within the state. During the assessment
years in question, the Electricity Board also sold coal-ash, supplied
steam to Nepa Mills, and provided specification and tender forms for
works. The Electricity Board purchased materials like Gitti, Murram,
and sand from unregistered dealers. The assessment orders imposed
sales tax on the turnover of coal-ash, specification and tender forms,
and the supply of steam to Nepa Mills. Additionally, the Electricity
Board was assessed with purchase tax on materials purchased from
unregistered dealers. The Electricity Board and the Commissioner of
Sales Tax both appealed the assessment orders to the Sales Tax
Tribunal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Electricity Board qualifies as a "dealer" for the

purpose of sales tax in its activities related to electric energy.
2. Whether the sale of coal-ash by the Electricity Board is subject to

sales tax.
3. Whether the supply of steam to Nepa Mills by the Electricity Board

is taxable.
4. Whether the specification and tender forms provided by the

Electricity Board are subject to sales tax.
5. Whether the Electricity Board is liable for purchase tax on

materials purchased from unregistered dealers.
ARGUMENTS:
The Commissioner of Sales Tax argued that the Electricity Board

should be considered a "dealer" in its electric energy-related activities
and that the sale of coal-ash should be taxed. The Electricity Board's
counsel argued against the imposition of sales tax on coal-ash and
suggested that electric energy's exemption from sales tax should apply
to coal-ash. The counsel also contended that the supply of steam to
Nepa Mills was not a sale but a works contract and therefore not
taxable. Regarding the purchase tax, the Electricity Board's counsel
did not press for a decision on this matter.
RATIONALE:
The definition of "dealer" in the relevant Acts included those engaged

in buying, selling, supplying, or distributing goods. The term "goods"
was defined broadly and did not specifically exclude electric energy.
Courts in other jurisdictions had previously held that electric energy
qualified as "goods" for the purposes of sales tax. The Electricity
Board primarily engaged in selling, supplying, and distributing
electric energy, which fell within the definition of a "dealer" in the
Acts. The sale of coal-ash was subject to sales tax, as it was regularly
produced and sold by the Electricity Board. The supply of steam to
Nepa Mills was considered a works contract, not a sale, and thus was
not taxable. Specification and tender forms were not considered
marketable goods, and sales tax did not apply. The issue of purchase
tax was not pressed by the Electricity Board and was left undecided.
JUDGMENT:
The court held that the Electricity Board qualified as a "dealer" for the
purposes of sales tax in its activities related to electric energy. The
sale of coal-ash was subject to sales tax. The supply of steam to Nepa
Mills was not taxable as it was considered a works contract.
Specification and tender forms were not subject to sales tax. The issue
of purchase tax was not addressed as it was not pressed by the
Electricity Board. Parties were left to bear their own costs.
In summary, the court's judgment clarified the taxability of certain

activities of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and defined the
scope of "dealer" and "goods" under the relevant Acts.
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR V. UNION OF INDIA THROUGH

SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE,
Citation- (2018) 10 SCC 1
Facts
The primary issue in this case related to the constitutional validity of

Section 377 of the IPC, which dealt with “unnatural offences” and
criminalised “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”, insofar
as it impacted consensual same-sex relationships. In 2009, Section
377 was held to be unconstitutional by the High Court of Delhi in the
Naz Foundation case, which was overruled by the Supreme Court in
Suresh Kumar Koushal. The Petitioner, Navtej Singh Johar filed a
writ petition before a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in
2016 challenging its decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal and the
constitutionality of Section 377. The matter was referred to the five
Judge Bench considering the importance of the issue.
ISSUE
Whether Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 insofar as it

applied to consensual sexual conduct between adults was
unconstitutional and whether the judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal
should be upheld or set aside.
ARGUMENTS
The Petitioners contended that homosexuality, bisexuality and other

sexual orientations were natural and based on lawful consent and
were neither a physical nor a mental illness. The Petitioners further
contended that criminalising sexual orientations violated the concept
of individual dignity and decisional autonomy inherent in the
personality of a person, and the right to privacy under Article 21.
The Petitioners submitted that the rights of the LGBT community,

who form 7-8 percent of the Indian population need to be recognised
and protected. They relied on the Puttaswamy case to argue that
Section 377 was unconstitutional because it discriminated against the
LGBT community on the basis of sexual orientation, which was an
essential attribute of privacy, and that the sexual orientation and
privacy lay at the core of fundamental rights guaranteed under
Articles 14, 19 and 21. The Petitioners sought recognition of the right
to sexuality, the right to sexual autonomy and the right to choice of a
sexual partner as part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21.
The Respondents submitted that insofar the constitutional validity of

Section 377 was concerned with the ‘consensual acts of same sex
adults in private’, they would leave it to the wisdom of the Court.
Some Intervenors argued in favour of retention of Section 377 as it
furthered “a compelling state interest to reinforce morals in public
life”. Arguing that fundamental rights were not absolute, the
Intervenors submitted that Section 377 was not discriminatory as it
“criminalises acts and not people” and applied equally to all unnatural
sexual conduct, irrespective of sexual orientation and criminalised
some forms of carnal intercourse by both heterosexual and
homosexual couples.
DECISION
The Supreme Court, while observing the judgment in Suresh Kumar

Koushal, noted that it relied on the miniscule minority rationale to
deprive the LGBT community of their fundamental rights and did not
differentiate between consensual and non-consensual sexual acts
between adults. The Court noted in this regard that a “distinction has
to be made between consensual relationships of adults in private,
whether they are heterosexual or homosexual in nature.” Moreover,
consensual relationships between adults could not be classified along
with offences of sodomy, bestiality and non-consensual relationships.
Further, the Court analysed the constitutionality of Section 377 on the

bedrock of the principles enunciated in Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21.
The Court relied on the NALSA judgment, which granted equal
protection of laws to transgender persons, to reiterate that sexual
orientation and gender identity was an integral part of a person’s
personality, and the Puttaswamy judgment, which recognised the
interrelationship between privacy and autonomy and that the right to
sexual orientation was an intrinsic part of the right to privacy, to
conclude that “it is imperative to widen the scope of the right to
privacy to incorporate a right to ‘sexual privacy’ to protect the rights
of sexual minorities”. The Court further discussed the Yogyakarta
Principles on Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation and the U.K
Wolfenden Committee Report, 1957, which abolished penal offences
involving same-sex consenting adults amongst many other
international comparative references.
The Court also relied on Its judgment in Shakti Vahini vs. Union of
India & Ors. ((2018) 7 SCC 192), and Shafin Jahan vs. Asokan K.M
(AIR 2018 SC 1933) to reaffirm that the right to choose a life partner
was a feature of individual liberty and dignity protected under Article
19 and 21 and referred to principles stated in Shayara Bano vs. Union
of India and Ors. ((2017) 9 SCC 1) to hold that Section 377 was
irrational, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 as it made consensual
relationships in private spaces a crime and subjected the LGBT
community to discrimination and unequal treatment. Moreover, the
Court used the maxim “et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium”
which translates to “a man’s house is his castle” to hold that Section
377 was disproportionate and unreasonable for restricting LGBT
persons’ right to freedom of expression and choice as the restrictions
did not protect public order, decency or morality.
On the interplay of morality and constitutionality, the Court noted that
a “subjective notion of public or societal morality which discriminates
against LGBT persons, and subjects them to criminal sanction, simply
on the basis of an innate characteristic runs counter to the concept of
Constitutional morality, and cannot form the basis of a legitimate
State interest”. The Court reiterated that “any restriction on the right
to privacy must adhere to the requirements of legality, existence of a
legitimate state interest, and proportionality”. Further, one of the
principles that emerged out of comparative jurisprudence analysis was
that “(i)ntimacy between consenting adults of the same-sex is beyond
the legitimate interests of the state”.
The Court concluded that sexual orientation was natural, innate and
immutable. It held that the “choice of LGBT person to enter into
intimate sexual relations with persons of the same sex is an exercise
of their personal choice, and an expression of their autonomy and self
determination”. Further, although the LGBT community constituted a
sexual minority, they were equally protected under Part III of the
Constitution.
RAI SAHIB RAM JAWAYA KAPUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB,
Citation: AIR 1955 SC 549

Coram: Bijan Kumar Mukherjea – CJI, V Bose, Jagannadhadas, V
Ayyar, Imam
FACTS-
It was alleged by six persons by means of a writ petition under Article

32 of the Constitution who claim to carry on the business of
preparing, printing, publishing and selling textbooks for different
classes in the schools of Punjab under the name “Uttar Chand Kapur
& Sons”. It was purported that the Education department of the
Government of Punjab in performance of their ostensible policy of
nationalisation of textbooks issued a series of notifications since the
1950s with regards to the printing, publication and sale of the same.
It was contested In the petition that the sale of these books placed
unwarrantable restrictions ousting other fellow traders from the
business. Petitioners maintained that their right to carry on trade i.e.
Article 19(1)(g), was infringed without any proper legislation sans
executive order & therefore, the petitioners prayed for the writ of
mandamus directing the Government of Punjab to withdraw the
notifications in violation of their rights.
ISSUES
• What is the scope and extent of executive powers?
• Whether the Government of a State has the power under the

Constitution of India to carry on a trade or business without any
legislative sanction?
• Whether the Government of Punjab, in creating a monopoly in the
business of printing and publishing school textbooks, violated the
Fundamental Rights of the petitioners enshrined under Article 19(1)
(g)?
ARGUMENTS
The executive Government of a State is wholly incompetent without

any legislative sanction to engage in any trade or business activity.
Basing the contentions on Article 71 and Article 162 of the
Constitution of India, it was contended that the legislature must enact
first what the executive will carry out and, therefore, the acts of the
Government of Punjab in carrying out their policy of establishing a
monopoly in the business of printing and publishing textbooks for
school students is whole without jurisdiction and hence illegal.
The State, In doing so, is creating a monopoly in its favour in respect

of a particular trade or business that could be done not by any
executive act but by means of proper legislation, which should
conform to the requirements of Article 19(6) of the Constitution not
infringing the Fundamental Rights of the petitioners.
The Government is doing so and depriving the petitioners of their

interest in any business or undertaking which amounts to property
without authority of law and without payment of compensation as is
required under Article 31.
JUDGEMENTS:
The Judge said that as in our view, the solicitors have no key directly
in the current case which can be said to have been encroached by the
activity of the Government, the request will undoubtedly bomb on
that ground. This being the position, the other two focuses raised by
Mr Pathak don’t need to be thought by any means.
As the candidates have no major right under Article 19(1)(g) of the

Constitution, whether or not the Government could build up an
imposing business model with no regulation under Article 19(6) of
the Constitution is by and largely insignificant. Again, a simple
possibility or prospect of having specific clients can’t be supposed to
be a right to property or any interest in an endeavour inside the
importance of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and no inquiry of
instalment of remuneration can emerge because the candidates have
been denied of something similar.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
While managing the issues of the case, the Court needed to answer the
idea of leader power and the degree of the elements of the chief. To
decide the idea of chief influence, the Court alluded to the two
Australian instances of The Commonwealth and the Central Wool
Committee Vs The Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co.
Ltd., and Attorney-General for Victoria Vs The Commonwealth.
According to the Court, the Australian Constitution explicitly
characterizes chief influence to incorporate just upkeep of the
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth.
P. SEETHARAMAYYA V. G. MAHALAKSHMAMMA, AIR
1958 AP 103
INTRODUCTION
This case is a clear one of damnum sine injuria. In this case the
appellant asked for mandatory injunction to demolish the bunds and
to fill in the trench on the defendants’ land, for permanent injunction
against these defendants against putting up bunds or digging a trench,
and for damages for the loss caused by flow of water.
Case Numbers 1933 and 1934 of 1953
Hon’ble Judges/Coram Mohammed Ahmed Ansari, J.
Decided on 27.09.1957
Equivalent Citation AIR 1958 AP 103, MANU/AP/0130/1957
Cases Referred Nield v. N.W. Rly
BRIEF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties to the appeals are owners of adjacent lands. The fifth
defendant had constructed a bund on her land to preserve part of it
from damage by flow of water through a breach in the embankment of
the vagu. Defendants Nos.1 to 4 dug a trench to ward off water
entering into their plot. These defendants further constructed another
bund to the north of their and as additional safeguard.
The appellants’ case is that the fifth defendant on account of bitter

enmity between her and the other defendants, put up bunds in her
plot, and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 dug the trench as well as put up a
bund to the north and the west of their plots; that thereby rain water
falling on their plot flowed into appellants’ plot, completely washing
variga and groundnut crops raised therein; which the appellants twice
put up bunds along a length of 150 feet to the west of their plot to
prevent the flow of rain water, but each time the bunds were washed
away.
The appellant asked for mandatory injunction to demolish the bunds

and to fill in the trench on the defendants’ land, for permanent
injunction against these defendants against putting up bunds or
digging a trench, and for damages for the loss caused by flow of
water.
ISSUES
1. Can defendants protect their land from normal rain water?

2. Can defendants protect their land from flood water?
3. Whether any legal injury has been caused to the plaintiff?
RATIO OF THE CASE
In this case it was urged before the court that there was no stream on
the west of the defendant’s lands and, therefore, they have not the
right of riparian owners in times of flood. But the finding of the
Lower Appellate Court about there being a stream, was supported by
the description given to the channel in the Commissioner’s plan.
The Case contends that the flood is a common enemy against which
every man has a right to defend himself, and it would be mischievous
if the law were otherwise, for a man must then stand by and see his
property destroyed, out of fear lest dome neighbour might say ‘you
have caused me an injury.’
However, there is a great distinction between protecting oneself from

an apprehended danger and getting rid of the consequences of an
injury which has actually occurred. The distinction was clearly
marked in Whalley v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co. [(1884) 13
QBD 131],
It was further contented that the right of protection against flood water
should not be confused with the customary right of an agriculturist in
this country It appears to us that in India, the right of an agriculturist
to drain off into the lower lands the water brought into his land for
ordinary agricultural operations is a customary right. He is entitled to
do so by custom; otherwise, it will be impossible to carry out
agricultural operations successfully. It is further contented that no
legal injury is caused to the plaintiff as the principal of damnum sine
injuria prevails its states that injury which is being suffered by the
plaintiff but there is no violation of any legal right of a person. In such
circumstances, where there is no violation of the legal right of but the
injury, or damage is being suffered by the plaintiff, the plaintiff can’t
bring an action against the other for the same, as it is not actionable in
law, unless there is some infringement of a legal right is present.
DECISION OF THE COURT
Therefore, this is a case of damnum sine injuria, and the plaintiff must
adopt their own protective measures against the flood water”. In these
circumstances, both the appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs
throughout.
Submitted by Parth
Gupta
UILS Panjab
University
4th Year

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CHHATRAPAT SINGH DUGAR V.

Citation: AIR 1916 P.C. 64

Date: 10 March, 1936

Chhatrapat Singh Dugar filed for insolvency under the Provincial

1. Whether the clerical error in the Privy Council order, which

3. Whether Surpat Singh Dugar had the legal standing to execute

2. Limitation of Execution under Section 39, Civil P. C.: The court

3. Standing of the Applicant: The court expressed doubts about the

The court expressed sympathy for the applicant's situation regarding

A dissenting opinion might argue:

The respondents argued that the clerical error invalidated the

The court issued the following judgment:

CHAMAN LAL VS SUDHIR CHANDRA AND ORS.

Date- 23 SEPTEMBER 1971

Citation- AIR 1972 All. 229

This case involves two appeals arising from insolvency proceedings,

The court should consider whether transferees have a legitimate

The petitioning creditor argued that the court had no jurisdiction to

The respondents (transferees) argued that they wanted to participate in

KALA CHAND BANERJEE VS JAGANNATH MARWARI,

Equivalent citations: (1927) 29 BOMLR 882

Bench: V Dunedin, Salvesen, J Wallis

Date- 3 March 1927

This appeal arises from a High Court decision that overturned a

Whether the mortgagees were justified in pursuing a foreclosure suit

The mortgagees were not justified in pursuing the foreclosure suit

The court emphasized that any transaction with an insolvent in such

The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to continue the

The respondents attempted to support their case by invoking a plea of

JARNAIL SINGH & OTHERS V. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA

CITATION- 10 SCR 663

To address this, Clause 4A was added to allow reservations in

The requirement to collect quantifiable data and apply the creamy

1. Whether the Nagraj Judgement needed reconsideration by a seven-

2. The second issue questioned whether the States had to collect

Arguments against collecting quantifiable data included the assertion

Opponents of applying the creamy layer principle to Scheduled Castes

India had a disturbing history of caste and class-based discrimination.

CITATION- AIR1969 SC 1316, (1969) 1 SCC 497

1. Was the deed dated 27th July, 1922, a mortgage deed or an

2. If the deed was a mortgage, were the defendants entitled to the

3. Did the defendants acquire ownership of the property through

Defendant's argument: The deed was an outright sale disguised as a

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR VS THAKUR

DATE- 23 January 1967

Equivalent citations- 1967 AIR 1170, 1967 SCR (2) 454

Bench: Rao, K. Subba (Cj), Shah, J.C., Shelat, J.M., Bhargava,

The case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh, decided

1. Not to be present in any area of the Raipur district.

2. To reside within the municipal limits of Jhabua town, in the

3. To notify his movements and personally report to the Police

The respondent challenged this order by filing a petition in the High

1. Whether Section 3(1)(b) of the Act was valid and in compliance

2. If Section 3(1)(b) was found to be unconstitutional, whether the

3. The impact of the state of emergency declared under Article 352

The appellant, representing the State of Madhya Pradesh, argued

The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the

The Court's key findings and reasoning can be summarized as

1. Unconstitutionality of Section 3(1)(b): The Court agreed with