NEOPATRIMONIALISM IN AFGHANISTAN:

FORMER WARLORDS, NEW DEMOCRATIC

BUREAUCRATS?
WEEDA MEHRAN

Abstract
An indispensable part of the liberal peacebuilding package is rebuilding effective and meritocratic
administrative structures. This paper analyses building state institutions in Afghanistan with
a focus on the role of warlords in the process. The findings are based on in-depth interviews
conducted from 2012 to 2016 in five different provinces of Afghanistan. The paper uses neopatri-
monialism as an analytical framework to shed light on our understanding of warlords’ influence
on building state institutions in a war-torn country such as Afghanistan. The paper argues that
warlords have played a major role in the formation of neopatrimonialism in the country, a system
that has proven pervasive, flexible and resistant to change. Additionally, this paper contends that
neopatrimonial networks centred on warlords have been relatively effective in delivering services
to those within the network while excluding others, nonetheless creating enough legitimacy and
support to survive. Overall, this neopatrimonial system excludes some segments of the population
and is very difficult to reform to make it more inclusive.

Keywords: neopatrimonialism, statebuilding, warlords, Afghanistan

Introduction
In societies emerging from civil wars, which have a strong propensity for reverting to
violence, the function of state bureaucracies extends beyond the mere provision of public
services. Bureaucracies are expected to directly or indirectly prevent the recurrence of
violence, function as a means of conflict resolution while helping the state to monopolise
violence, and build legitimacy (Grimm 2008, 536). Building state institutions in a con-
flict-wrought country is by no means an easy and straightforward task.

The success and effectiveness of building bureaucratic administrations are influenced

by factors such as lack of human and financial capital (Weidner 1964), the self-interest of
bureaucrats (Cheng 2012), resistance by local communities, and inconsistent and weak
implementation of reforms (Divjak & Pugh 2008). Some other factors such as post-war
socio-economic development, terms of peace, stateness (or what has remained of the
state institutions) and national actors who pursue their personal interests (Mac Ginty
2010; Reno 1999) are among the most influential indicators of the success of building
bureaucratic administrations. In addition to these well-documented limitations, Afghan-
istan also has the inclusion of warlords in the liberal peacebuilding1 project, with the
expectation that warlords will turn into democratic bureaucrats. Liberal peacebuilding
in the aftermath of a conflict aims at political transformation from a war government (or

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the absence of it) to a post-war democratic government and from economies of war to
an equitable and transparent market economy and post-war development (Mac Ginty
2010). Inclusion of warlords in the liberal peacebuilding project in Afghanistan started
with relying on the military power of warlords in the initial stages of Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, which ousted the Taliban from power in November 2001. As the discourse
of war evolved from ‘The War on Terror’ to dismantling the Taliban and revamping
and restructuring the state in Afghanistan, warlords became even more instrumental
(Omicinski 2001). This was an ambitious plan that required sufficient ‘boots on the
ground’, a commitment that neither the US nor the nations contributing troops to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were ready to make. Consequently, when
the Taliban were chased out of an area, the warlords became responsible for ensuring
security, bringing order, and warding off the Taliban. As such, the anti-Taliban resistance
groups, under the umbrella structure of the United Front — commonly referred to as
the Northern Alliance — played an indispensable role in Operation Enduring Freedom,
which was launched by the United States with the support of United Kingdom on 7
October 2001. The warlords also filled in the vacuum left behind.

International actors implementing the liberal peacebuilding project in Afghanistan hoped

that ultimately the process would reform the warlords and turn them into bureaucrats.
While peacebuilding and development interventions in Afghanistan have been studied
extensively, there is a dearth of knowledge about the impact of warlords on building
state institutions. Hence, this paper aims to fill this gap by studying what impact war-
lords have on building state institutions.

I analyse the involvement of a number of warlords in the statebuilding2 process dur-

ing the period 2001–2014. By using neopatrimonialism as an analytical framework, this
paper contributes to our understanding of warlords’ impact on building state institu-
tions in a war-torn country such as Afghanistan. The paper argues that warlords have
played a major role in the formation of a neopatrimonial system in the country that is
held together by reciprocity and a certain level of legitimacy. As such, this system is per-
vasive, flexible and resistant to change and should not be confused with acts of corrup-
tion. The findings illustrate that neopatrimonial networks have been relatively effective
in delivering services to those within the network while excluding others, which can
have significant impacts for both peacebuilding and its accompanying development pol-
icies. In particular, access to state services is limited to those outside the neopatrimonial
networks. In some parts of the country, the privatisation of state institutions takes place
across various state institutions, which has made it extremely difficult for those outside
the network of the captors (generally the public) to take action against it.

The paper first provides background information on how and why warlords were
included in the process. This is followed by a discussion on neopatrimonialism, research
methodology and the findings.

Afghan Warlords Building Institutions

Following Le Billon (2001, 575) this research defines warlords as strongmen who con-
trol territory and resources ‘through their ability to wage war and who do not obey
higher (central) authorities’. According to Giustozzi (2009, 5), a warlord is a ‘legitimate,
charismatic and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over a military
force capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large scale violence over a size-
able territory’ while the central authority has collapsed, weakened or has never been

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present (Giustozzi 2009, 5). For Giustozzi, the absence of political legitimacy defines
warlords; hence, the author refers to some figures as ‘strongmen’ rather than warlords.
Many of those figures discussed by the participants in this research occupy legitimate
political positions, have military capabilities, and have been in control of territory (e.g.
a province/a city). Yet, these individuals have also been seen to be in opposition to the
authority of the central government. As an example, Atta Mohammad Noor threatened
President Ghani with ‘civil protest’ and options other than civil action after being fired
by the President (RFE/RL 2017).

Afghanistan was not short of educated manpower to fill administrative state positions.
The aristocracy and the educated elite welcomed the efforts of the international commu-
nity to modernise the country and build a democratic state. However, they could not
run the country on their own, primarily for three reasons. First, they lacked a social base
(Suhrke 2009) as they had lived outside Afghanistan and did not share experiences of
years of war with the population who had remained behind. Second, the warlords were
largely uneducated and, therefore, felt threatened by the educated elite and disliked
them. The warlords came from Islamist backgrounds; as such, they did not appreciate
the secular political outlook of the educated political elite. Third, warlords could not be
bypassed, as the international forces depended on their military power, as by 2002 they
were controlling almost the whole country.

In fact, striking political deals with the warlords was not unprecedented in Afghani-
stan. During the communist regime, President Najibullah made deals with a number
of militia commanders before the civil wars of the early 1990s. However, these deals
never included administrative and ministerial positions (Giustozzi 2004, 2–3). Warlords
remained militia commanders rather than becoming governors and ministers. During
the civil wars, at a time when the state barely functioned if it existed at all, warlords
and military leaders occupied administrative positions. Hence, warlords’ presence in
high-ranking political and administrative positions was a new phenomenon. By the end
of 2004, warlords already occupied major state positions or had placed their close associ-
ates in those positions, a trend that has continued to date.

Inclusion of warlords in the process had a tremendous impact on how these institutions
took shape. Out of 27 ministries in the first administration of Karzai in early 2004, four
were led directly by warlords or militia leaders, while many more were occupied by close
associates of warlords. Furthermore, in late 2003 and early 2004, 27 out of 32 (84%) pro-
vincial governors were former commanders from the civil war period and hence, closely
associated with the warlords. Many more were mainly assigned as governors because of
their close connections with the warlords. The same pattern can be observed in adminis-
trative positions in line ministries and districts. Many of the ministers in Karzai’s cabinet
lacked basic skills and they were even hired to ‘represent an ethnic group or co-opt a war-
lord, they fill up the ministries with their own people — defined by clan, ethnic group or
region’ (Simonsen 2004, 713). Warlords continued to have a prominent presence during
Karzai’s second term in office. While the initial inclusion of warlords in the statebuilding
project laid the foundation of a neopatrimonial state, the patronage networks extend far
beyond warlords and isolated acts of corruption and have shown resistance to change.
This argument will be unpacked in the sections that follow.

Analytical framework

The most common description of state officials one hears in Afghanistan is one that refers
to corruption. This description is rather problematic. The common definition of corrup-

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tion adopted by many organisations and governments is the World Bank’s (1997) defi-
nition which describes corruption as abusing public office for private or political gains.
Corruption as such is commonly gauged based on ‘public opinion’, and ‘public interest’,
which are both difficult to pin down (Kurer 2005, 222–223). Public opinion can be cultur-
ally relativistic and the definition of corruption based on public interest in fact ‘presup-
poses a generally accepted agreement on what constitutes the public good’ (Kurer 2005,
222). Furthermore, this definition fails to capture the magnitude of corruption in coun-
tries like Afghanistan where corruption is the norm rather than the exception. When the
corrupt way is virtually the only game in town, to define the system as corrupt is failing
to capture a phenomenon that is functional, efficient and carried out systematically, or
when ‘legislation itself is corrupt’ (Kurer 2005, 222–223). When a warlord assigns one of
his supporters (cronyism) or a family member (nepotism) as a judge, another one as the
chief of police and yet another as an MP, the nature of this act and its impact are signifi-
cantly different from isolated counts of abuse of office. Therefore, this paper turns to the
literature on neopatrimonialism as a guiding analytical framework.

Neopatrimonialism

The literature on patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism has its roots in the writings of
Max Weber. Weber in Economy and Society describes patrimonialism as a political and
institutionalised system in which the ruler uses the members of his own households and
followers as his administrative staff members (Weber 1978). While in the 1970s the term
‘patrimonialism’ was employed by scholars to explain the political cohesion in African
societies, nowadays the concept — with the prefix of neo — has a negative connotation
and is viewed as a flaw that needs to be overcome with increasingly ‘rational’ or ‘imper-
sonal’ institutions (Pitcher et al. 2009, 140). Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of patrimo-
nial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Clapham (1985, 48) a prominent scholar
in African studies, uses the term to signify ‘a form of organization in which relationships
of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is
formally constructed on rational-legal lines’. In neopatrimonialism, the power of officials
who hold positions in bureaucratic organisations are formally defined and the distinc-
tion between the private and the public, at least formally, exists (Erdmann & Engel 2007,
105). Nonetheless, in a neopatrimonial system, state officials exercise their power and
authority based on their private interests.

Neopatrimonialism in postcolonial African states is often viewed as ‘usurpation of

imported formal governance structures by indigenous informal societal forces’ that
is perceived to lead to state fragility (Boege et al. 2009, 15). However, as a form of
hybrid political order, neopatrimonialism does not necessarily mean state fragility or
state failure (Boege et al. 2009, 15). Patronage networks can have a stabilising impact
and be effective in delivering services and can contribute positively to both economic
and political development. For example, Englehart and Grant (2015) illustrate that
provincial governors in Afghanistan who were deeply rooted within the patronage
networks in a province were more likely to bring security in their respective province
than more educated and qualified governors who lacked a strong patronage network.
Likewise, Mukhopadhyay (2009; 2014) argues that given the historically weak central
state in Afghanistan, the hybrid form of warlord-governors is the best compromise
in delivering services and maintaining security in the periphery where the central
government often has limited access. Mukhopadhyay (2009) views the performance
of ‘strongmen-governors’ such as Atta and Sherzai ‘exceptional’. Research else-
where also shows that state affairs of any nature (e.g. economic, political, religious
or regional) run by personal relations and personal networks enjoy a certain level of

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effectiveness as a result of being embedded in the social norms that bring about a
certain level of political and economic development (Bayart et al. 1999, 91).

In neopatrimonialism, the relationship between the ‘personal’ and the ‘public’ is rather
complex. The personal and the public intersect and mutually constitute each other form-
ing a ‘hybrid system’. For example, in the context of African states, while a number of
‘jobs, promotions, credits and licenses are distributed according to private discretion’,
many other cases of administrative careers, credits and licences are distributed based
on ‘fixed procedures, rules, and laws that follow the formal course of a legal rationality’
(Erdmann & Engel 2007, 104). In other words, mutual dependence and reciprocity form
the basis of legitimacy in neopatrimonialism. In turn, legitimacy is the backbone of neo-
patrimonialism such that it cements the whole system together (Pitcher et al. 2009, 127).

Both reciprocity and legitimacy set neopatrimonialism apart from corruption. Corruption
can undermine the legitimacy and authority of civil servants while neopatrimonialism
enjoys a legitimacy that corruption lacks altogether. Hence, describing a neopatrimonial
system as just another form of corruption means ignoring all the complexities of a sys-
tem that might function well at times or have dire consequences at other times. In fact,
‘the parties to a patrimonial arrangement are highly aware of their mutual dependence
and have institutionalised means of holding each other accountable’ (Weber 1978, 1010).
This mutual dependency and the recognition of each party’s responsibilities render the
patrimonial system a certain level of legitimacy (Pitcher et al. 2009, 10).

Additionally, neopatrimonialism is an elaborate and more complex form of clientelism

(Bratton & Van de Walle 1994; Pitcher et al. 2009, 106–107). Clientelism is defined as ‘the
exchange or brokerage of specific services and resources for political support’ (Erdmann
& Engel 2007, 106). The patron–client relations in neopatrimonialism are characterised
by a hierarchy of domination. The relationship and exchanges between the ‘little man’
and the ‘big man’ often take place through brokers or networks of brokers, who are also
responsible for connecting the political centre to the periphery (Weingrod 1968, 327).
The object of exchange is also different as the transactions are ‘less about the exchange
of private or personal goods and services but more about the transfer of public goods
and services by the patron’ (Moran & Johnston 2009, 107). Notably, in neopatrimonial-
ism exchanges are ‘politically motivated distribution of “favours” not to individuals but
essentially to groups, which in the African context will be mainly ethnic or sub-ethnic
groups’ (Pitcher et al. 2009, 107).

In sum, based on this review of the literature, neopatrimonialism will be explored (1)
in terms of the role warlords play in this neopatrimonial hybridity of formal–informal
social and political relations, (2) as objects of exchange between the warlords and their
clients and (3) to analyse factors that hold the patrimonial system together and make it
resistant to change.

Research Methods
The data were collected through 120 in-depth interviews over a period of four years
(2012–2016) in five different provinces of the country (Heart, Mazar-e Sharif, Bamyan,
Kabul and Nangarhar). Using a snowball sampling method, interviews were conducted
with supporters and advisors of warlords and some of their strongest critics as well
as journalists and civil society organisations in order to have a balanced set of inter-
view subjects. I employed semi-structured interviews to ask primary questions and to

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allow respondents the flexibility to frame their answers in their own terms. The majority
of the interviews were conducted primarily inside Afghanistan with the exception of
fewer than 10 interviews with scholars and experts outside the country. The interviews
were conducted in Persian, Pashtu or English. I subsequently translated the Persian and
Pashtu interviews to English. On average the interviews lasted 1–1.5 hours. The longest
interview lasted approximately three hours. A number of follow-up interviews were also
conducted via Skype or in person when new events involving warlords were unfolding.

After transcribing the interviews, I imported the transcriptions into the WeftQDA soft-
ware for analysis. Consistent with the process of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967),
I analysed the data inductively. In other words, the concepts and theories are ‘grounded’
in the observations or data from which they are developed. Essentially, I started analysis
with the first four to five interviews and conducted ‘open coding’ on the interviews line
by line and carried out a preliminary analysis through comparing the codes. Gradually the
analysis led to theoretical coding, ‘substantive theories’ which explores the relationships
between categories and concepts (Strauss & Corbin 1998). This research was conducted in
accordance with ethical procedures and principles on research with human participants by
the Faculty of Human Social and Political Science, University of Cambridge.3 Verbal con-
sent of the interviewees was obtained and identities of all of the subjects have been kept
confidential. Furthermore, names of warlords or characters of concern are withheld unless
the incident reported was also reported in local or international media to cross-reference
the findings.

Themes emerging from the analysis of the data are organised in three broader categories
of: (1) formal/informal hybridity, (2) pervasive patronage networks and a captured state,
and (3) objects of exchange between the warlords and their clients. A common theme
across all these sections is discussing factors that hold the patrimonial system together
and make it resistant to change.

The Informal/Formal Hybridity: Privatised State Administrations in

Afghanistan
A hybrid model of governance that draws on a mix of both formal institutions and infor-
mal power appears to be inevitable in historically weak states that undergo international
statebuilding efforts with limited resources (Mukhopadhyay 2009, 1). As noted by Blunt
and Khamoosh (2016, 85), the informal and formal ‘venues of influence’ are highly per-
meable and ‘interests are intertwined’.

While the peacebuilders in Afghanistan expected the co-opted warlords to be at the

mercy of the state, warlords acted as if they were ‘entitled’ to a share of the state for the
services they had offered to the cause. The
While the peacebuilders in Afghanistan prevalence of this form of transaction and
expected the co-opted warlords to be at the ease with which such transactions are
made can point to the belief in an ‘entitle-
the mercy of the state, warlords acted as if
ment’ among state officials who deal with
they were ‘entitled’ to a share of the state
state institutions in a manner akin to deal-
for the services they had offered to the ing with private property.4 Warlords have
cause. frequently justified this sense of entitle-
ment by invoking the discourse of having
fought against the Russian army, the communist government, and the Taliban regime
to support their demands for a share of political power or to request social and

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economic policies compensating for their past efforts (Payame Aftab 2016; Rahnoosh
2015). This, in turn, indicates a belief in ‘entitlement’ by virtue of their military services
in the past or present. Ismail Khan, Fahim, Atta and Sayyaf, the most influential war-
lords in the country, have frequently referred in their public speeches to the rights of
the mujahidin and that they should not be marginalised in the process of statebuilding
because of all the sacrifices they have made during years of jihad (Rahnoosh 2015). For
example, in 2016 Ismail Khan, during the commemoration of the Hoot 24 Uprising that
took place in 1979 in Herat — one of the biggest uprisings against the communist
regime of Afghanistan led by the mujahidin and also the beginning of Ismail Khan’s
jihadi career — emphasised that the mujahidin should be given a share in the govern-
ment (Payame Aftab 2016).

Pervasive patronage networks and warlord authority

Once warlords had established their authority in different provinces, they placed their
patronage networks within the state struc-
ture to secure their interests. For instance, a
Once warlords had established their
civil society activist from Kabul, interviewed
authority in different provinces, they in August 2012, echoed what was commonly
placed their patronage networks within heard from many other interviewees: no
the state structure to secure their Chief of Police, or head of a line ministry or
interests. army general, or even lower ranking offi-
cials, can work in Balkh Province if they are
not approved by Atta Mohammad Noor, the de facto governor of Balkh Province.

According to a UN staff member from Mazar-e Sharif in 2013, when in 2004 President
Karzai assigned General Khakrizwal, a Pashtun, as the Chief of Police in Mazar-e Sharif,
Khakrizwal’s headquarters were overtaken by Atta’s men and the Chief of Police was
confined in his residence for a week. In describing this particular incident, also reported
by the BBC (Najafizada 2004), another respondent, a female civil society activist working
in Mazar-e Sharif interviewed in 2013, stated that shortly afterwards, the General was
replaced by Sardar Mohmmad Sultani who was sympathetic to Atta. Similar observa-
tions can be made in other parts of the country where warlords have resisted the central
government’s assignments of officials in their de facto constituencies.

A UN member of staff, interviewed in Mazar-e Sharif in 2014, whose account was echoed
by at least eight other respondents, stated that General Dostum, a powerful warlord in
the north, was dissatisfied with the fact that Saa’ee, the Governor of Jawzjan Province
was loyal to President Karzai. After failing to convince Governor Saa’ee to join him in
a political coalition in order to run for the 2014 presidential election, Dostum allegedly
resorted to violence to intimidate the Governor. The aforementioned UN staff member
who had talked to Governor Saa’ee about the incident, stated:

On the 15th of June Governor Saa’ee received a phone call from General
Dostum asking him to hand over his arms and join Dostum in the fight
against the Taliban and be on his side during the presidential elections of
2014. The Governor refused. On the 17th of June Governor Saa’ee’s residen-
tial compound was surrounded by Dostum’s armed men, which led to an
exchange of fire between Dostum’s men and the Governor’s bodyguards.

The data also yielded a similar pattern in Herat and Nangarhar, two other major prov-
inces in Afghanistan.

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Afghanistan is by no means unique in this regard. Even in more advanced countries such
as Indonesia, patronage is systemic and has
a consolidated grip on civil service and
A specific and extreme form of ‘extends its reach across and between all lev-
neopatrimonialism is a ‘captured state’, els and sectors of government’ (Blunt et al.
where the public office is not only used in 2012, 77). The degree to which a patronage
a private manner, but is used extensively network takes over state institutions differs
in an unchallenged manner. in various parts of the country. A specific
and extreme form of neopatrimonialism is a
‘captured state’, where the public office is
not only used in a private manner, but is used extensively in an unchallenged manner.

A captured state

State capture occurs when the privatisation of state institutions takes place across var-
ious state institutions, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for those outside the
network of the captors (generally the public) to take action against it. In other words,
state capture refers to the actions of groups, firms or individuals to influence the forma-
tion of laws, regulations, and governmental policies aimed at providing private benefits
through illicit or non-transparent methods (Hellman et al. 2003). Institutions available
for capture may include the executive, the judiciary, or regulatory agencies. The term has
commonly been used when exploring the relationships between businesses and the state.
An example is Russia in 1998–1999, when both federal and regional authorities were
under the control of oligarchic capital (Yakovlev 2006).

Based on the analysis of interviews, it can be observed that state capture is more likely
to happen in provinces where warlords are governors (i.e. Balkh under Atta, Nangarhar
under Shirzai and Herat under the ruling of Ismail Khan). Analysis of the data shows
that in these provinces, a single patronage network controls virtually all state institutions
especially the most significant administration positions. For example, Atta’s patronage
network controls the Governor’s office, Chief of Police, key posts in the Afghan National
Army, customs office and so forth. A journalist interviewed in Mazar-e Sharif in 2014
stated: ‘Even the principal of a high school and the head of a clinic cannot get into that
position, unless they are part of the network’.

The findings also illustrate that patrimonial networks are extremely resistant to change.
President Karzai (2001–2014) tried to curb the regional power of the warlords and to
prevent them from becoming de facto rulers in their respective provinces. A strategy to
achieve this was dislodging warlords from their territory. However, the central govern-
ment had little to no influence over the periphery whereas warlords wielded significant
power in provinces, driving President Karzai to rely on warlords for political support.
This was to the extent that Karzai’s realpolitik strategies became a major contributor
to state capture in most parts of the country. Inherently, Karzai’s approach was one of
supporting the corrupt networks around him while simultaneously condemning corrup-
tion. For example, after allegations of corruption and of the involvement of the former
Governor of Helmand Province, and only after immense international pressure, in 2005
did Karzai remove Akhundzada, a warlord in the south on suspicion of narcotics links
(Fairweather 2014). An Afghan journalist interviewed for this study stated that in 2008,
in anticipation of the need for Akhundzada’s electoral support in the south, Karzai then
spoke in favour of the sacked governor. Later on, Akhundzada was accused of ballot
stuffing in favour of Karzai in the 2009 presidential election.

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Evident from this trend is the high level of impunity enjoyed by the neopatrimonial net-
works centred on warlords. Respondents interviewed for this project mentioned many
examples of higher and mid-level echelons in the security sector and state officials who
have enjoyed total impunity despite their gross misconduct and breach of the law. A
respondent working for an NGO that is involved in capacity-building programmes for
the Afghan Police reported that in early 2013 after accusations of corruption and com-
plaints about Sayed Ghafar, the Chief of Police in Herat, were raised by a number of
MPs in the parliament, he was removed from his position only to be assigned to lead the
Crime Branch of the Police Department in Kabul. Examples of extreme forms of impu-
nity and officials being described as ‘untouchable’ are plentiful in some areas, described
as ‘state capture’, where a patronage network controls state administration and the judi-
cial system. In face of such resistance the question arises, what glues the system together
and holds it?

Transactions, reciprocity and legitimacy: the backbone of Afghan

neopatrimonialism

Doling out administration positions to patronage networks and potential supporters is

based on the premise of reciprocity and expectations of future returns, or merely having
an insider at a particular post to utilise when needed. Inevitably, the allegiance of these
state officials goes to the warlords. Furthermore, these transactions can benefit warlords
both economically and politically which can potentially undermine both peacebuilding
and development. As described by one of the respondents who works at the parliament:

installing their associates in the customs services means that when a war-
lord imports goods, taxes will be overlooked by the customs officials; or
when convoys of narcotics pass through a police checkpoint, the police do
not stop or confiscate the drugs; or an MP would give a vote of confidence
to the minister that is supported by a warlord. Such examples are countless
in Afghanistan.

This pattern conforms with the observation by Pitcher et al. (2009) that objects of exchange
in a neopatrimonial system are not merely about exchanging private or personal goods
and services, but they are more about the transfer of public goods and services by the
patrons. Such reciprocities cement the neopatrimonial system and are the source of its
legitimacy.

Warlords at times have distributed revenues they collected from customs, or through
their lucrative licit or illicit businesses. For example, Shirzai reportedly kept most of Kan-
dahar’s customs revenue rather than sending it to Kabul, netting him an estimate of $8
million a month (Forsberg 2010). Shirzai also levied taxes on local businesses and traders
in exchange for permission to operate. Some of this money was used to almost double
the low salaries of teachers and other civil servants (Giustozzi & Ullah 2006).

Likewise, exchanges at the parliament level are often the subject of political gossip in
Kabul and have frequently led to extensive coverage in the national media. In an inter-
view, a civil society activist working for an NGO that works closely with the parliament
stated that ‘there are different networks in the parliament. If a minister from one network
is impeached, the rival network makes sure they find an issue with the performance of
a minister of the rival networks and impeach him.’ While these MP networks might
be defined by ethnic ties and connections, ethnicity does not necessarily always define
the patron–client relationships. The majority of participants of this study mentioned

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that financial incentives can easily overcome ethnic and network fragmentations. For
instance, an employee of the parliament interviewed in Kabul in 2013 describes how
impeaching a minister is seen as an opportunity for making money:

The parliament had decided to impeach any minister who had failed to
spend more than 50% of his budget … The MPs started charging the minis-
ters up to $10,000. On the first day, seven ministers were impeached … The
answers of two ministers [names withheld] were not found to be satisfac-
tory. There are insider reports that some MPs were paid up to $30,000 [by
these two ministers] … The amount of money paid to these MPs depended
on how much influence each had.5

According to another interviewee, both of the above-mentioned ministers have been

supported by warlords. One respondent describes how buying votes of confidence in the
parliament has become a norm to the extent that ‘lobbying’ is automatically translated
into monetary transactions. Herein, the question remains, how are these transactions
justified? The following statement by one of the respondents of this study, who has been
working in the parliament, illustrates why the MPs feel entitled to such monetary trans-
actions:

There was a campaign for [name withheld], we had a gathering at Kabul

Express (a hotel in Kabul) and invited MPs to convince them to vote for
[name withheld]. About four female MPs approached me and asked me,
‘Can we talk to you in private?’ We went downstairs where it was quiet.
One of these MPs then asked me: ‘So where is the money? When is the
money going to be distributed?’ It was unexpected and I was surprised.
I asked what money? They said, ‘Well you know how much money we
spend to become MPs, we have to compensate for it.’

These narratives show that state institutions have become marketable commodities,
which exchange hands among state elites
and those in possession of currencies such as
Under such circumstances, where access hard cash and social, economic, and political
to civil services is limited to those well influence. This can not only limit access to
connected, the implication for many state institutions, but also have a negative
indicators of development, from access impact on service delivery as allegiance of
to employment opportunities to good state officials goes to the patron rather than
governance, safety and security, is the state. Under such circumstances, where
negative. access to civil services is limited to those
well connected, the implication for many
indicators of development, from access to
employment opportunities to good governance, safety and security, is negative.

The cash price of an administration position depends on the location and whether the job
allows for ‘besides-salary income’ as was mentioned by a few respondents.

For instance, ‘buying’ a job at the customs offices is quite costly, explains one civil serv-
ant interviewed in Nangarhar in 2013; however, ‘it can generate incomes multiple times
the actual monthly salary of the customs officer’. Hence, states another interviewee who
served as a civil servant in Kabul for 20 years, ‘it comes as no surprise that a civil serv-
ant who has paid a politician or a warlord for his job, asks for bribes in exchange for
providing formal services’. Jackson (2015) makes a similar observation in her study of

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patronage politics in Kandahar. According to the author, in Kandahar those who want to
work in the government must have access to key power brokers be it at provincial level
or district level.

Patronage networks are particularly crucial during elections as the network tries to
maintain the incumbent patron in the office. This reciprocal act, in turn, ensures the lon-
gevity and survival of the patronage network. For example, at least a dozen interviewees
mentioned that General Raziq, then the Chief of Police in Kandahar, provided financial
support to President Karzai’s campaign. According to Aikins (2009), Raziq also rigged
votes in favour of Karzai. Warlords frequently resorted to violence and intimidation in
support of a patron. This has been to such an extent that writing about the 2014 presiden-
tial election, Giustozzi and Mangal described Afghan mainstream politics as ‘becoming
more violent and ruthless’ and ‘moving closer to the Taliban’s way of doing things’
(Giustozzi & Mangal 2014, 3).

Similar patterns of exchanges that a number of warlords have established at the higher
administrative levels can be observed at the middle and lower level civil services mak-
ing the patronage networks pervasive. At the national level, transactions are also polit-
ically motivated and take place in complex patrimonial networks that can go beyond
regional and ethnic connections.

Concluding Remarks
This paper illustrated that the inclusion of warlords in the statebuilding project has con-
tributed greatly to widespread and systematic abuse of state offices for personal and pri-
vate purposes. The magnitude and extent of using office for private purposes go beyond
the limited scope of ‘corruption’ defined as the abuse of public office for private gain.
Consequently, this paper uses the literature on neopatrimonialism to illustrate the extent
to which state institutions are run by patronage networks. In this kind of state structure,
the boundary between the formal and the informal is blurred and the two mutually con-
stitute each other creating a hybrid formal/informal structure centred on warlords.

In Afghanistan, administration positions have become objects of transactions or resources,

which can be bought, sold, exchanged and doled out for political support. These find-
ings also support Jackson’s (2015) study of patronage networks in Kandahar, where the
author finds that assignment of state officials even in lower ranking state institutions is
virtually impossible without the support of a patron. Obtaining a position within the
state administration through a monetary transaction also means that the office can be
run based on the discretion of the incumbent rather than on the basis of the rule of law,
which is the most crucial function performed by the state. Once these posts are acquired
through a patronage network, the allegiances of the civil servants go to the patron. This
relationship is a kind of ‘job insurance’ for those who gain their positions through the
patrimonial system. In return, the civil servant in his/her role as a client ensures various
demands of the patron are met and his interests are guaranteed. For instance, warlords
who help MPs get into the parliament later require the MPs to promote their interests in
the political arena, modify laws or block reforms. Consequently, adherence to norms and
practices which stand outside the rule of law has created a web of informal networks and
transactions at various administration levels that extend beyond the formal structure of
the state. This is a hybrid system of formal and informal rules that are mutually reinforc-
ing each other and have rendered stability to the neopatrimonial system.

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State institutions in Afghanistan are already suffering from the flight of qualified and
able officials and civil servants as a result of lack of clarity and transparency in the pro-
cess of hiring civil servants. Adherence to patron–client relationships centred on war-
lords and the informal norms, as opposed to the rule of law, as vehicles of government
service does not remain hidden from the public eye, especially since Afghanistan has a
relatively free and highly dynamic media which extensively discusses political issues.
Consequently, having the knowledge of what happens within the higher-ranking polit-
ical sphere of the country while feeling powerless to change anything at that level leads
to profound alienation and political disengagement of the public.

It is worth stressing that the neopatrimonial system discussed in this paper is by no

means limited to Afghanistan. Research elsewhere shows that in societies emerging out
of prolonged violent conflict, the ‘politics of survival take over any semblance of public
ethics’ (Le Billon 2008, 346). Reno (1999, 7) notes that ‘the rulers of the weakest states,
which face the most pressure from outsiders, are the most consistent and thorough in
destroying remaining formal state institutions’. Reno (1999, 7) claims this is paradoxi-
cally tolerated by creditors, foreign firms and officials of some strong states who ‘tacitly
support hard-pressed rulers’ desperate attempts to manage change in this unexpected
fashion’. Likewise, in Afghanistan the approach of winning the warlords over to the side
of the peacebuilders undermined building merit-based, efficient and well-functioning
state bureaucracies and has led to the erosion of state institutions and a hybrid form of
state institutions, which are run by informal networks. This can potentially have dire
consequences for development as it limits access to state institutions, increases inequal-
ity and undermines good governance.

While circumventing warlords in the whole liberal process might not be feasible, at the
very least inclusion of warlords in the process should be approached with extreme cau-
tion. To hope that warlords will jump on the bandwagon and become peacebuilders and
champions of development is merely wishful thinking.

DR WEEDA MEHRAN works at the Global Studies Institute, Georgia State University.
Her research takes a multidisciplinary approach to studying jihadi propaganda. Weeda
completed her PhD degree titled ‘The Political Economy of Warlord Democracy in
Afghanistan’ at the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of
Cambridge in 2015.

ORCID
Weeda Mehran http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0207-919X

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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Acknowledgements
The author wishes to extend her gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their con-
structive comments and the editors of the journal for their painstaking review of differ-
ent versions of this article.

Endnotes
1
Liberal peacebuilding in the aftermath of a conflict aims at political transformation from a war
government (or the absence of it) to a post-war democratic government and from economies of
war to an equitable and transparent market economy and post-war development (Mac Ginty 2010).
2
Statebuilding in this paper is approached as building state institutions.
3
http://mws.hsps.cam.ac.uk/pps/current/undergraduate/soc_erassessment.html
4
The term ‘entitlement’ is not used pejoratively here.
5
The topic of the MPs getting money from the ‘impeached ministers’ was also widely dis-
cussed in the Afghan media. For instance, the newspaper 8am reports that the ‘MPs Wednes-
day Syndrome’ did the trick, referring to announcing the impeaching on Wednesday in order
to give the MPs time on Thursday and Friday to strike deals with the impeached ministers.
Hasht-e Sobh’s article titled ‘Khana-e milat or manba-e tawled-e fisad’ [House of the peo-
ple or source of corruption?] (April 5, 2013) particularly refers to the incident discussed above.
https://8am.af/x8am/1392/01/18/corruption-house-of-nation-parliament-editorial/.
http://8am.af/1392/01/18/corruption-house-of-nation-parliament-editorial/, accessed 12 No-
vember 2013.

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