GNSS loss and GNSS Interference on Airbus A/C

Reference: 34.36.00049 Issue date: 17-JUN-2024 Last check date: 17-JUN-2024 Status: Open
A/C type/serie: A300, A300-600, A310, A318, A319, ... ATA: 34-36
Engine manufacturer: Supplier:
Purpose / Reason for revision: Main changes: ADIRU alignment during spoofing - lockup of GLU-920
Engineering Support Status: Open
Revision updates are highlighted in bold blue.

Contents
0. BACKGROUND 2

1. COCKPIT EFFECTS 3

1.1 DESCRIPTION OF COCKPIT EFFECTS 4

1.1.1 A300-600 / A310 4

1.1.2 A320 Family / A330 / A340 5

1.1.3 A380 7

1.1.4 A350 10

1.2 SUMMARY OF FUNCTIONAL AND SYSTEM EFFECTS 13

1.2.1 Navigation 13

1.2.2 Surveillance 15

1.2.3 Communication 16

1.3 RELATED WISE ARTICLES 16

2. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 17

2.1 FCOM PROCEDURES AND REPORTING 17

2.2 UNDUE TAWS ALERTS 17

3. MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS 19

3.1 LIST OF MAINTENANCE ACTIONS 19

3.2 TRANSIENT SYMPTOMS OBSERVED IN AN AREA NOT KNOWN PREVIOUSLY FOR GPS INTERFERENCE 21

3.3 EFFECTS DURING GPS INTERFERENCE OR SPOOFING EXPOSURE NOT COVERED IN CHAPTER 1 OR EVENTS REQUIRING FURTHER ANALYSIS 23

4. GLOSSARY 24
0. BACKGROUND

On most Airbus aircraft, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS1) signals are one of the main inputs used for aircraft positioning and time reference for on-board Communication, Navigation
and Surveillance functions. The Airbus aircraft installations are compliant with applicable regulations and recommended practices on aeronautical usage of GNSS for Communication, Navigation
and Surveillance applications.

Performance (accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity) of the aircraft positioning highly relies on the external GNSS signals. A degradation of the external GNSS signals due to external
or internal Radio Frequency Interferences (also known as “GNSS RFI” or “jamming”2) can lead to a performance degradation of the computed aircraft position. The reception of fake GNSS
signals transmitted with the intention to mislead GNSS receivers (also known as “spoofing”) may also lead to impacts on aircraft.

To ensure the robustness of the Airbus aircraft architecture, the systems also take into account inertial references and/or NAVAIDs (i.e. VOR, DME) to augment and complement the aircraft
position’s accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity.

Therefore, when GNSS signals from the satellite constellation are lost or degraded by interference or spoofing, depending on the duration, aircraft capabilities can be maintained, limited or
lost during the flight. These effects on aircraft capabilities shall be considered in flight crew decisions: for example, assessment of the capability to fly PBN routes, procedures and approaches.

The objective of this article is to clarify the impact of GNSS signal loss, GNSS RFI and GNSS spoofing on aircraft operations, and to provide recommendations on how to handle these events
in the daily aircraft operations.

This document is divided into three parts:

1. Cockpit effects that can be observed by the flight crew during GNSS RFI.
2. Operational considerations to be considered during flight preparation/flight/post-flight phases.
3. Maintenance recommendations to be considered during post-flight analysis after GNSS RFI.

Note: The STC solutions or cabin impacts (such as BFE in-flight entertainment/connectivity) are not considered in this article.

1. COCKPIT EFFECTS

This chapter covers A300-600, A310 autonomous architecture (i.e. GPS outputs are directly connected to the FMS), and A320, A330, A340, A380 and A350 aircraft in hybrid configuration
(i.e. GPS outputs sent to the IRS which sends a “hybridized” position to the FMS).

These aircraft are fitted with two MMRs, three ADIRUs and two (A300-600/A310/A320/A330/A340/A380) or three (A350) FMS to compute the aircraft position. The A/C position is used by
the FMS for navigation purposes.

1Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) refers to a worldwide position and time determination system that includes one or more satellite constellations, aircraft receivers and system integrity monitoring, augmented as
necessary to support required navigation performance for the intended operation. It includes the United States Global Positioning System (GPS) currently used by commercial aircraft, and augmentation systems such as
Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS).

2GNSS Radio Frequency Interferences (GNSS RFI): The effect of unwanted energy due to one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in the GNSS frequency band (1559 – 1610 MHz). GNSS RFI
may induce a degradation of position performance (such as lower accuracy and integrity) or loss of information.
In case GPS data is lost due to GNSS RFI affecting both MMRs, the aircraft position source will switch to pure IRS and will enter into the so-called coasting mode. If the integrity of GPIRS
data falls below a certain threshold, then the position source will switch to other radio navigation based solutions (from FMS) according to the availability of DME and VOR. If NAVAIDs are
not available, the aircraft position solution will switch to IRS only.

In the case fake GPS data is received due to spoofing, the hybridization within the ADIRS is expected to reject fake GPS data and switch to “coasting mode”.

Besides, MMRs elaborate deviations relative to a flight path and distance to a runway datum point in xLS modes such as FLS, GLS and SLS. In case GPS data is lost due to GNSS RFI affecting
both MMRs, the xLS modes GLS, SLS, FLS using GPS data will not be available.

- Cockpit effects are covered in section 1.1

- Description of the effects on systems and functions are covered in section 1.2
DESCRIPTION OF COCKPIT EFFECTS

Important note: The below described effects may be observed if an A/C is operating in an area where RFI are present. Depending on the interference features (and A/C functions), the GPS
receivers may be affected differently leading to the potential appearance of one or several of the effects described below.

1.1.1 A300-600 / A310

Function ND/CDU ECAM ALERT / lights Other Effects

ADS-B
OUTstd DO- ADSB light ON In case of spoofing, erroneous GPS parameters may be broadcast.
260B
ADS-C, ADS-C and CPDLC shall be considered as lost if the aircraft time reference
CPDLC is more than +/- 1 s from UTC reference
Aircraft
NAV ADC FM/GPS POS DISAGREE
position
With clock standard APE5100-1, when UTC selector is set on “GPS” and
the GPS 1 does not provide UTC time anymore to the clock, the clock
provides an internal time. The precision of the internal time diverges from
Clock
UTC time. The FMS predictions may also diverge.

In case of spoofing, date and/or time may be erroneous.

NAV/ADC GPS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
GPS(*) GPS PRIMARY LOST
GPS 1(2)(1+2)
SLS (LPV) (*) LPV (HSI)
TAWS (*) TERR TERR MODE FAULT light Spurious terrain alerts (1).
Time
Inconsistent time and FMS predictions (time drift or jumps (1)).
Predictions
Table 1.1: A300-600/A310 Cockpit Effects description

(*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C
(1)Spurious terrain alerts and inconsistent time jump are not systematically observed in GNSS RFI areas. Such events do not occur in case of GPS total loss. Please report
inconsistent information observed in GNSS RFI areas to Airbus to allow a safety analysis and follow-up of the event. Refer to section 3.3 for a list data needed to investigate the
event.
1.1.2 A320 Family / A330 / A340

Function ND/PFD ECAM ALERT ECAM STATUS Other Effects

(a) NAV ADS-B TRAF FAULT (a) ADS-B TRAF

ADS-B IN (b) NAV ADS-B FAULT ADS-B only traffic may be
(b) ADS-B
(*) shown at an incorrect position
ND: ADS-B inhibited if NAV GPS 1 FAULT + NAV GPS
(also called on ND, caused by reception of
2 FAULT
ATSAW) incorrect ADS-B OUT data
(a) Post / (b) Pre FWC std: A320 H2-F7; A330 T5; A340 L13
ADS-B OUT NAV ADS-B RPTG 1(2) FAULT ISI1
In case of spoofing, erroneous GPS
std DO- inhibited if NAV GPS 1 FAULT + NAV GPS ADS-B RPTG
parameters may be broadcast.
260B (*) 2 FAULT
Aircraft
NAV FM/GPS POS DISAGREE
Position
CPDLC and ADS-C shall be
considered as lost if the aircraft
time reference is more than +/-1 s
from UTC reference (Refer to clock
item or FCOM description on the
operation of clock Internal Mode).
Note: the position information
ATC
inserted in ADS-C reports will have
DATALINK
a downgraded accuracy. The
downgrading will be detectable by
ground controllers via one specific
field of ADS-C reports called Figure
of Merit set to one specific value
(30Nm) in order to inform of the
GPS loss.
Computed time to cool the engine
will be augmented by 3 minutes
Bow Rotor
(only applicable to A320 Neo family
with PW1100 engines)
With clock standard APE5100-1
(A320/A330/A340), APE5100
(A330/A340), when UTC selector is
Clock
set on “GPS” and the GPS 1 does
not provide UTC time anymore to
the clock, the clock provides an
 internal time. The precision of the
internal time diverges from UTC
time, affecting ATC Datalink and
FMS predictions. TFU1

In case of spoofing, date and/or

time may be erroneous.
Backup altitude, backup Mach,
backup characteristic speed Erroneous back up speed and
may not be available. erroneous backup altitude may be
DBUS NAV BKUP SPD FAULT BKUP SPD FAULT
(only applicable to UAMM Step observed in case backup is
2 function on A320/A330/A340 activated.
aircraft) MOI
If FLS selected:
LOC & G/S deviations, and
FLS LIMITED TO F-APP + RAW if
FLS (*) distance to the runway may not
GPS PRIMARY LOST
me available without any fault
on ECAM TFU3
If GLS selected:
- GLS Red flag
- With NDs in the ROSE mode:
o LOC & G/S Red flags
o LOC & G/S deviation bar out
GLS 1(2)(1+2)
of view
GPWS INOP SYS if GLS 1 fault occurs
GLS (*) Same behaviour on PFD NAV GLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
GLS AUTOLAND inhibited if
NAV GLS 1 FAULT + NAV GLS 2 FAULT
GLS LOC & G/S deviations, and
distance to the runway may not
be available, without any fault
on ECAM TFU3
GPS GPS PRIMARY LOST NAV GPS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT GPS 1(2)(1+2)

LS (5) NAV LS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT

OANS (*) ARPT NAV POS LOST

ROW/ROP SURV ROW/ROP LOST

ROW/ROP
(*) inhibited if NAV GPWS TERR DET FAULT
Degraded voice/datalink
SATCOM communications (3).
Only applicable to A330/A340.
SFCC SLAT/FLAP TIP BRK FAULT See ISI 27.51.00042.
If SLS selected: NAV SLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT SLS 1(2)(1+2)
SLS (*) - SLS Red flag
- With NDs in the ROSE mode: SLS limited to APPR1
 o LOC & G/S Red flags
o LOC & G/S deviation bar out
of view
Same behaviour in PFD

SLS LOC & G/S deviations, and

distance to the runway may not
be available, without any fault
on ECAM TFU3
Spurious terrain/obstacle alerts (2).

NAV GPWS TERR DET FAULT GPWS TERR

TAWS (*)
NAV GPWS FAULT (4) GPWS (4) In case of spoofing, TERR on ND may
be shifted.
Time Inconsistent time and FMS predictions
(time drift or time jumps (2)).
Predictions
Wind Inconsistent wind speed
Information and direction. (1) (2)
Table 1.2: A320/A330/A340 Cockpit Effects description

(*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C
Only applicable with Honeywell ADIRU Block III, as the computation of the wind speed and direction uses the hybrid GPS/IRS ground speeds (ADIRU standards before Block III
(1)

use only IRS).

Spurious terrain/obstacle alerts, inconsistent time jump, and inconsistent wind information are not systematically observed in GNSS RFI areas. Such events do not occur in case of
(2)

GPS total loss. Please report inconsistent information to Airbus to allow a safety analysis and follow-up of the event. Refer to section 3.3 for a list data needed to investigate the
event.
(3) Impacts are due to the SATCOM frequency band (1626.5 MHz) close to the GPS L1 frequency band (1575.42 MHz).
(4) Due to the Radio Altimeter rejection by TAWS computer during the ‘RA reasonableness check’ (which uses GPS geometric altitude).
(5) Only applicable with Collins Aerospace MMR GLU-925, P/N 822-1821-430.

Other effects:

- In case of jamming: GPS Data dashed on GPS MONITOR pages of MCDUs

- In case of spoofing: GPS Data erroneous on GPS MONITOR pages of MCDUs
- Total GPS loss leads to a red flag (“ALT”) on grey background and red scale displayed on PFD, in case no air data are available.
1.1.3 A380

Function ND / PFD ECAM ALERT ECAM STATUS Other Effects

ADS-B POS RPTG LOST

ADS-B OUT
ADS-B RPTG 1(2)(1+2)
Aircraft
NAV FM/GPS POS DISAGREE
Position
CPDLC and ADS-C shall be
considered as lost if the aircraft
time reference is more than +/-1 s
from UTC reference (Refer to clock
item or FCOM description on the
operation of clock Internal Mode).
Note: the position information
ATC
inserted in ADS-C reports will have
DATALINK
a downgraded accuracy. The
downgrading will be detectable by
ground controllers via one specific
field of ADS-C reports called Figure
of Merit set to one specific value
(30Nm) in order to inform of the
GPS loss.
With clock standard APE5100-3,
when UTC selector is set on “GPS”
and the GPS 1 does not provide
UTC time anymore to the clock, the
clock provides an internal time. The
precision of the internal time
Clock
diverges from UTC time, affecting
ATC Datalink and FMS predictions.
TFU1

In case of spoofing, date and/or

time may be erroneous.
If FLS selected:
- FLS Red flag NAV FLS 1(2)(1+2) CAPABILITY LOST
- With NDs in the ROSE mode: FLS LIMITED TO F-APP+RAW if GPS
FLS (*) Detected loss of deviations from FWC
o F/LOC & F-G/S Red PRIMARY LOST
70B (Batch 7) TFU3
flags
 o F/LOC & F-G/S deviation
bar out of view
Same behaviour in PFD
Note: FLS LOC & G/S
deviations, and distance to the
runway may not be available,
without any fault on ECAM TFU3
If GLS selected:
- GLS Red flag on ND
- With NDs in the ROSE mode:
o LOC & G/S Red flags NAV GLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
o LOC & G/S deviation bar out GLS 1(2)(1+2)
SURV GPWS 1+2 FAULT (6)
of view GLS AUTOLAND
GLS (*) Same behaviour on PFD inhibited in case of NAV GLS 1 FAULT
NAV GLS 1(2)(1+2) CAPABILITY
+ NAV GLS 2 FAULT
LOST Detected loss of deviations from
GLS LOC & G/S deviations, GPWS 1+2
FWC 70B (Batch 7) TFU3
and distance to the runway
may not be available, without
any fault on ECAM TFU3
GPS PRIMARY LOST
NAV GPS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
GPS or GPS 1(2)(1+2)
NAV GNSS SIGNAL DEGRADED (5)
NAV PRIMARY LOST
LS NAV LS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT

OANS (*) ARPT NAV POS LOST

RNP AR RNP AR CAPABILITY LOST (7) RNP AR

SURV ROW/ROP LOST

ROW/ROP ROW/ROP
inhibited in case of NAV GPS 1 FAULT +
(*) BTV (*)
NAV GPS 2 FAULT
SATCOM SATCOM Degraded voice/datalink
communications (3).
If SLS selected:
- SLS Red flag
- With NDs in the ROSE mode:
o LOC & G/S Red flags
o LOC & G/S deviation bar out
of view NAV SLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
SLS 1(2)(1+2)
SLS (*) Same behaviour in PFD SLS limited to APPR1

SLS LOC & G/S deviations, and

distance to the runway may
not be available, without any
fault on ECAM TFU3
 SURV TERR SYS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT TERR SYS 1(2)(1+2)
TAWS Spurious terrain/obstacle alerts (2).
SURV GPWS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT (4) GPWS 1(2)(1+2) (4)

TCAS SURV TCAS 1+2 FAULT (4) TCAS 1+2 (4)

Inconsistent time and FMS

Time
predictions (time drift or time
Predictions
jumps (2)).
Wind Inconsistent wind speed
Information and direction (1) (2).
WX GND CLUT(anti clutter See ISI 34.48.00034 for further
WXR SURV PRED W/S 1+2 FAULT (4) PRED W/S 1+2 (4)
function not available) possible effects.
Table 1.3: A380 Cockpit Effects description

(*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C
Only applicable with Honeywell ADIRU Block III, as the computation of the wind speed and direction uses the hybrid GPS/IRS ground speeds (ADIRU standards before Block III
(1)

use only IRS).

(2)The spurious terrain/obstacle alert, inconsistent time jump, and inconsistent wind information are not systematically observed in GNSS RFI area. Such events do not occur in case
of GPS total loss. Please report inconsistent information to Airbus to allow a safety analysis and follow-up of the event. Refer to section 3.3 for a list data needed to investigate the
event.
(3) Impacts are due to the SATCOM frequency band (1626.5 MHz) close to the GPS L1 frequency band (1575.42 MHz).
(4) Due to the Radio Altimeter rejection by AESS computer during the ‘RA reasonableness check’, which uses GPS geometric altitude.
(5) On aircraft equipped with FWC 70B (Batch 7)
(6) Only shown on ground for maintenance purposes, only when both GLS are lost
(7) Shown in case of NAV GNSS SIGNAL DEGRADED ECAM while under RNP AR operation

Other effects:
- In case of jamming: Data dashed on POSITION/GPS Page of both MFD
- In case of spoofing: GPS Data erroneous on POSITION/GPS Page of both MFD
- Total GPS loss leads to a red flag (“ALT”) on grey background and red scale displayed on PFD, in case no air data are available.
1.1.4 A350

Function ND/PFD ECAM ALERT ECAM STATUS Other Effects

ADS-B IN (*) ADS-B IN only traffic may

(also called be shown at an incorrect
ATSAW or SURV ADS-B TRAFFIC 1(2)(1+2) FAULT ADS-B TRAFFIC 1(2)(1+2) position on ND caused by
ADS-B reception of incorrect
Traffic) ADS-B OUT data
ADS-B POS RPTG LOST
ADS-B OUT
ADS-B RPTG 1(2)(1+2)

Aircraft NAV GNSS/ACFT POS DISAGREE

Position

In case of spoofing, date

Aircraft time and/or time may be
erroneous.

ANF (4) (*) ARPT NAV POS LOST

CPDLC and ADS-C shall be

considered as lost if the
aircraft time reference is
more than +/-1 s from UTC
reference.
Note: the position information
inserted in ADS-C reports will
ATC have a downgraded accuracy.
DATALINK The downgrading will be
detectable by ground
controllers via one specific
field of ADS-C reports called
Figure of Merit set to one
specific value (30Nm) in
order to inform of the GPS
loss.
 If FLS selected:
FLS LOC & G/S deviations, and distance FLS LIMITED TO F-APP+RAW if
FLS (*)
to the runway may not be available, GNSS 1+2 FAULT
without any fault on ECAM
If GLS selected:
- GLS Red flag GLS limited to APPR1 if only one
- With NDs in the ROSE mode:
o LOC & G/S Red flags side lost
o LOC & G/S deviation bar out of view NAV GLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT GLS 1(2)(1+2)
GLS (*)
Same behaviour in PFD GLS AUTOLAND
Note: GLS LOC & G/S deviations, and inhibited in case of NAV GLS 1
distance to the runway may not be FAULT + NAV GLS 2 FAULT
available, without fault on ECAM
NAV GNSS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
GPS NAV PRIMARY LOST NAV GNSS 1+2 REJECTED BY IRs GNSS 1(2)(1+2)
NAV GNSS 1(2) REJECTED BY IRs TFU2

NAV RNP AR CAPABILITY

DOWNGRADED
if NAV GNSS x FAULT x=1 or 2
RNP AR ECAM status/INFO:
only “FOR RNP AR : MINIMUM LIMITED
displayed TO RNP 0.3” RNP AR (in case of RNP AR
RNP AR CAPABILITY LOST
during RNP Note: post FWS S5.2 and post PRIM P8 CAPABILITY LOST)
AR occurrence rate is reduced (ref TFU
operations 22.00.00.201)

NAV RNP AR CAPABILITY LOST

If NAV GNSS 1+2 FAULT

SURV ROW/ROP LOST ROW/ROP

ROW/ROP
inhibited in case of NAV GNSS 1+2 FAULT BTV

SATCOM SATCOM Degraded

voice/datalink
communications (2).
If SLS selected:
- SLS Red flag
- With NDs in the ROSE mode:
o LOC & G/S Red flags SLS limited to APPR1
o LOC & G/S deviation bar out of view NAV SLS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT
SLS (*) SLS 1(2)(1+2)
Same behaviour in PFD
Note: SLS LOC & G/S deviations, and
distance to the runway may not be
available, without any fault on ECAM
 SURV TERR SYS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT TERR SYS Spurious terrain/obstacle
TAWS
SURV GPWS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT (3) GPWS (3) alerts (1).
TCAS SURV TCAS 1+2 FAULT (3) TCAS 1+2 (3)

Inconsistent time and FMS

Time
predictions (time jumps
Predictions (1)).ISI2

Wind Inconsistent wind speed

Information and direction
MAP NOT AVAIL
See ISI 34.48.00034 for
WXR WX GND CLUT (anticlutter function not SURV PRED W/S 1+2 FAULT (3) PRED W/S 1+2 (3)
further possible effects.
available)
Table 1.4: A350 Cockpit Effects description

(*) Optional function, the effects can be shown only if the option has been selected for a given A/C
(1)Spurious terrain/obstacle alerts and inconsistent time are not systematically observed in GNSS RFI areas. These events do not occur in case of GPS total loss. Please report
inconsistent information to Airbus to allow a safety analysis and follow-up of the event. Refer to section 3.3 for a list data needed to investigate the event.
(2) Impacts are due to the SATCOM frequency band (1626.5 MHz) close to the GPS L1 frequency band (1575.42 MHz).
(3) Due to the Radio Altimeter rejection by AESS computer during the ‘RA reasonableness check’ (which uses GPS geometric altitude).
(4) ANF applications are hosted in the core software of the CDS outer DUs.

Other effects:
- In case of jamming: Data dashed on POSITION/GNSS Page of both MFD
- In case of spoofing: GPS Data erroneous on POSITION/GNSS Page of both MFD
- Total GPS loss leads to a red flag (“ALT”) on grey background and red scale displayed on PFD, in case no air data are available.
Summary of functional and system effects

The tables below contain the functional and system effects corresponding to cockpit effects described in section 1.1.
Note: These alerts/warnings could arise in case of GNSS RFI, however all of the described functional or system effects may not be observed on every flight impacted by GNSS RFI.

1.1.5 Navigation
 A320
SYSTEMS A300-600/A310 A380 A350
A330/A340

All Phases: Loss of GPS and SBAS-based Navigation functions for the duration of the loss.
All Phases: Loss of GPS-
MMR
based Navigation functions. Approach & Landing: Loss of FLS, GLS and
Approach & Landing: Loss of FLS, GLS and SLS deviations.
SLS deviations and SLS deviations.

All Phases: The hybridization between GPS

measurements and IRS data is lost and
GPIRS position enters into coasting mode.
GPIRS position drifts when not updated via
GPS measurements.

All Phases: The hybridization between GPS measurements and If GPS data are lost and or rejected for more
IRS data is lost and GPIRS position enters into coasting mode. than 1 hour, then the ADIRU latches the
GPIRS position drifts when not updated via GPS measurements. coasting mode until the end of the flight
No effect. (TFU 34.10.00067).

ADIRU IRU initialization performed In flight: the A/C position switches to an

During alignment, flight crew needs to enter position manually to
with the last memorized alternate navigation mode that offers the
align IRS.
position. best position solution accuracy and integrity
among: radio NAVAIDs and IRS position.

On ground: the A/C position switches on IRS

position.
Time data are maintained according to
ADIRS internal clock

During alignment: The flight crew needs to enter position manually to align IRS. In case of GPS spoofing, the
IRS may align on the spoofed position. FCOM procedure for cockpit preparation if erroneous GPS
data is observed is available on A320 and under analysis for A330/A340/A350/A380.
All Phases: Clock will not be synchronized with UTC time provided by GPS; Clock is maintained All Phases: Clock will not be synchronized
based on its internal reference. At aircraft power up the UTC displays zero’s in case of with UTC time provided by GPS; Clock is
unavailability of GPS signal. For initialization of the clock the Pilot has to manually input the maintained based on ADIRS clock function.
Clock
time, using SET, INT; if GPS is resumed then change the knob to GPS.
In case of spoofing, date and/or time may
In case of spoofing, date and/or time may be erroneous. be erroneous.
Approach & Landing: GLS Approach & Landing: GLS and SLS
parameters (deviations, course, parameters (deviations, course, and
Approach & Landing: GLS
ISIS N/A and channel) are not available. channel) are not available during approach
deviations are not available.
Aircraft position and velocity and landing. Aircraft position and velocity
coming from MMR is invalid. coming from MMR is invalid.

Flight Guidance
FMGC (A320)
FMGEC (A330/A340)
FCGU/PRIM (A380&A350)
Flight Management
FMGC (A320)
FMGEC (A330/A340)
FMS (A380&A350)
Airport Navigation
OANS
(A320/A330/A340/A380)
ANF (A350)
Approach functions requiring GPS
Approach functions requiring
are not available: GLS, FLS (in Approach functions requiring GPS are not
GPS are not available: GLS,
case of RNAV (GNSS)) and RNP available: SLS, GLS, FLS (in case of RNAV
FLS (in case of RNAV (GNSS))
AR. (GNSS)) and RNP AR.
Approach function receives and RNP AR.
Non availability of Pre-Capture Non availability of Pre-Capture Zone of the
only ILS data Non availability of Pre-
Zone of the LOC Beam in case of LOC Beam in case of NAV PRIMARY loss.
Capture Zone of the LOC
GPS PRIMARY loss. The functions BTV, ROW/ROPS are not
Beam in case of GPS
The functions BTV, ROW/ROPS available
PRIMARY loss.
are not available.
All Phases: The aircraft position solution will switch from GPIRS to All Phases: The aircraft position provided by
radio NAVAIDs and inertial position. the ADIRU is used irrespective of GPS loss.
The aircraft position solution
In case of jamming: GPS data are dashed in the GNSS monitor In case of jamming: GPS data are dashed
will switch to radio NAVAIDs
page. in the GNSS monitor page.
or inertial position.
In case of spoofing: GPS Data erroneous on GPS MONITOR In case of spoofing: GPS Data
pages of MCDUs erroneous on GPS MONITOR pages of
MCDUs
Approach & Landing: The aircraft position
Approach & Landing: The aircraft position cannot be computed
used by ANF is provided by ADIRU.
and displayed on the airport moving map.
N/A Loss of support to Airport Navigation,
Loss of support to Airport Navigation, Runway Approaching
Runway Approaching Advisory, BTV/ROPS
Advisory and BTV/ROPS (on A380 only) functions from OANS.
and TOS2 functions from ANF.
Table 1.5: Functional and System Effect for Navigation System

Surveillance

The table below contains the functional and system effects corresponding to cockpit effects on the ND, ECAM alerts/status/ INOP sys.

A320
SYSTEMS A300-600/A310 A380 A350
A330/A340
Part of AESS Part of AESS
ATSAW function not available on A380 All Phases: Loss of ATSAW function
All Phases: Loss of ATSAW
TCAS No effect
function(*)
In case of spoofing TCAS may be lost In case of spoofing TCAS may be lost (see
(see ISI 34.48.00034) ISI 34.48.00034)
Part of AESS
All Phases: GPS parameters are invalid within ADS-B OUT All Phases: GPS parameters are invalid within ADS-B OUT messages (position integrity
messages (position integrity tagged as degraded). tagged as degraded).
XPDR Note: A380 and A350 ADS-B function is more robust with respect to A320/A330/A340 as
In case of spoofing: it is based on GPIRS position. GPIRS position enters in coasting mode and can remain
incorrect position sent via ADS-B OUT available longer than GPS position.

Take-off, en-route & approach:
In case of invalid GPS position,
the TAWS uses the alternate
position computed by the FMS or
the IRS.
No effect Approach , Landing & on Ground
In case of invalid GPS data, : Loss of ROW/ROP ,RAAS
TAWS the TAD and TCF functions functions(**)
(EGPWS / GPWS) will switch to data from
(T2CAS / T3CAS FMS. Loss of terrain function when
A320/A330/A340) GPS FOMs exceed the current
RNP according to flight phases
On A350, the ADS-B out position will depend on the SBAS activation:
- If SBAS is activated, the ADS-B OUT function is impacted as the transponder
position source is pure GPS data
- If SBAS is NOT activated, the ADS-B OUT function is not impacted as the
transponder position source is GPIRS data. Nevertheless, on long flights, the position
quality indicator could be lowered, due to IRS drifting.
Part of AESS.
All Phases:
No immediate loss thanks to back-up positioning (FMS, IRS) but some degradations may
be expected after certain time :
– Potential loss of envelope modulation (when position too degraded)
– Potential loss of predictive terrain alerts and display on ND (when position too
degraded)
In case of spoofing basic TAWS modes (1 to 5) may be lost (see ISI 34.48.00034)

In case of spoofing, basic

In case of spoofing:
Undue TAWS alerts
Erroneous TERR map display on ND
WXR No effect
Table 1.6: Functional and System Effect Description for Surveillance Systems
TAWS modes (1 to 5) may be
lost (see ISI 34.48.00034)
No effect
Part of AESS
All Phases:
 WXR – Potential loss of ground declutter function (when position too degraded)
See ISI 34.48.00034 for further possible effects.

(*) only if ATSAW function configured

(**) only if GPS configuration and RAAS function activated

1.1.6 Communication

A320
SYSTEMS A300-600/A310 A380 A350
A330/A340

SATCOM SATCOM communication may be degraded

 AFN messages timestamp will not be synchronized with UTC time provided by GPS. The source of the timestamp switches
to either: ADIRU (A350 only), CLOCK, CMC/CFDIU.
However, position information inserted in ADS-C reports will have a downgraded accuracy. The downgrading will be
ATSU (A320/A330/A340)
N/A detectable by ground controllers via one specific field of ADS-C reports called Figure of Merit set to one specific value
ATC (A350/A380)
(30Nm) in order to inform of the GPS loss.

In case of spoofing ATSU/ATC can be lost.

Table 1.7: Functional and System Effect Description for Communication Systems
RELATED WISE ARTICLES

The following articles (referenced across this document) provide additional details on some specific aircraft configurations affected by GNSS interferences:

Technical Follow Up

1. 31.21.00014 “Electrical Clock - Time drift linked to GNSS Radio Frequency Interferences”: for A300/A310/A320/A330/A380 aircraft equipped with clock APE5100-1 or APE5100-3.
2. 34.10.00066 “NAV GNSS 1(2) Rejected by IRS”: for A350 aircraft.
3. 34.36.00.030 “MMR GLU-925: GPS locked after Radio Frequency Interferences (RFI) exposure”: for aircraft equipped with COLLINS Aerospace MMR GLU-925.
4. 34.38.00.002 “Spurious RWY TOO SHORT message due to inaccurate OANC A/C position computation”: for A380 aircraft equipped with OANS standard A5.2 and A6.2.
5. 34.10.00067 “Latched ADIRU coasting mode further to long exposure to RFI”: for A350 aircraft

In Service Information
1. 34.52.00035 “NAV ADS-B RPTG x FAULT in GPS degraded environment”: for A320 and A330 aircraft
2. 46.00.00057 “FSA-NG Time acquisition”: for A350 aircraft.
3. 27.51.00042 Flaps Electrical Control and Monitoring - Consequences of clock adjustment on the WTBs for A330/A340 aircraft
4. 34.48.00034 HONEYWELL - GNSS RFI impact on EGPWS and AESS
5. 34.36.00066 COLLINS AEROSPACE - MMR GLU-920 (P/N 822-1152-1xx) - GPS locked after Radio Frequency Interferences (RFI) exposure

Modification Operational Impact

1. 22.00.00101 “AUTO FLIGHT - GENERAL - CERTIFY AND DEFINE UAMM (Unreliable Airspeed Mitigation Means) STEP 2 FUNCTION”: For A320
2. 27.00.00109 “FLIGHT CONTROLS- GENERAL - ACTIVATE UAMM STEP2 FONCTION BY WIRING DSI ON FCPC”: For A330
2. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

FCOM PROCEDURES AND REPORTING

The effects of GNSS RFI detailed in section 1 should be considered in airline’s operations in order to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft.
 Refer to the Airbus recommended procedures of the FCOM manual in section:
o A350: NORMAL PROCEDURES - SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GNSS INTERFERENCES
o Other programs: NORMAL PROCEDURES - SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GPS INTERFERENCES

Note: next FCOM revision for this section will include (from Apr A350/A380, May A320/A330 and Sep A300-600/A310):

 Updated cockpit effects table in line with section 1 of this article

 Dedicated list of cockpit effects resulting from erroneous GNSS data
 GNSS deselection before the interference area for autonomous GNSS architecture (A300-600/A310 and some A320,refer to ISI 34.36.00033 "GPS Hybrid or Autonomous
Architecture - configuration")
 Operational recommendations for persistent effects when applicable
 Operational considerations for Undue TAWS alerts linked to GNSS in line with section 2.2 of this article.
 A320: operational recommendations for preliminary cockpit preparation (ADIRS alignment) in GPS spoofing area

 A320: Update of the MMR Reset procedure (MMR GLU-920 is now included, addition of NAV ILS X(+Y) FAULT)

In addition, Airbus recommends to perform the following actions after a flight with possible GNSS RFI:
- Flight crew should report possible GNSS RFI and associated cockpit effects to the maintenance team,
- Maintenance team should apply recommended action detailed in section 3 (system tests, data collection, reporting to Airbus engineering or flight operations support),
- Operator should report any identified suspected GNSS RFI events to regional (e.g. ANSPs) and international organizations (e.g. EUROCONTROL’s Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR), refer to
https://www.eurocontrol.int/service/eurocontrol-voluntary-atm-incident-reporting) in order to facilitate and accelerate GNSS RFI event confirmation/resolution, and generate NOTAM to operators’
community.

UNDUE TAWS ALERTS

Airbus has received several event reports from Operators of unexpected TAWS alerts in flight interpreted as undue and potentially linked to GNSS interferences.

The TAWS equipment installed on Airbus fleet have been certified in accordance with the applicable technical/qualification specifications and airworthiness requirements. As an input for the
vertical and horizontal position, the GPS data or Radio Altimeters are used. Nowadays, some context of operations (e.g., military areas) can interfere with the external GPS or Radio Altimeter
signal. These phenomena can generate some undue TAWS alerts.

Airbus, as an aircraft manufacturer, provides in the FCOM a directive procedure in the section PRO-ABN-SURV-[MEM] EGPWS/TAWS WARNINGS that defines how the flight crew has to react
to a real terrain threat. Outside the GNSS interference context, Airbus does not intend to introduce any delay by the introduction of conditions in the application of the TAWS warning
procedure.

Nevertheless, Airbus is well aware that the increasing number of undue predictive TAWS alerts is a significant operational burden for airlines operating the affected airspaces. Airbus
acknowledges the need to support airlines in this challenging context.

The following evolution of the FCOM SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES - GPS INTERFERENCES will be available from next FCOM revision (from Apr A350/A380, May A320/A330 and Sep
A300-600/A310):
 TAWS warnings may be considered cautionary during daylight VMC conditions provided the
cause of the warning can be identified immediately.

 Within a GNSS interference area:

o If expected undue predictive TAWS alerts:
TERR SYS OFF……. CONSIDER

The basic GPWS modes remain operative. The consequences of the predictive
modes inhibition are described in FCOM/DSC-34-SURV

Note:
In cruise above MSA, the flight crew can set TERR SYS to OFF.
In other flight phases, the operators must perform a safety assessment based
on their knowledge of operations to adapt the procedures and the pilot briefings
to specific routes.

Over areas where undue TAWS alerts are expected, operators shall define an airline policy. For this, operators need to perform a safety assessment based on their knowledge of the context of the operations
(e.g. knowledge of the departure, cruise, approach operations, aircraft lateral and vertical position, consideration of cold weather operations, clear knowledge of the environmental conditions and terrain or
interference threats, etc…). This assessment will allow operators to adapt procedures and pilot briefings to specific routes and airports, such as:

 Potentially disregard an anticipated undue TAWS alert: prepare the crew to potential undue alerts at specific locations to avoid delay in procedure application for genuine ones by making
decisions during flight.

 Inhibit temporary GPWS predictive modes (TERR PB-SW OFF / TERR SYS OFF on MFD) over areas where predictive Undue TAWS alerts are expected to be recurrent.
Important notes :
 Inhibition of GPWS predictive modes implies a deactivation of a Safety Net. Thus, it requires an associated procedure ensuring the reactivation after leaving the affected area in
a timely manner.
 GPWS predictive modes inhibition in approach can lead to an increased risk of Mode 2 nuisance TAWS alerts at certain locations (e.g., cliff on the approach path). Further
information is given below in “design specificities”.
 The decision to inhibit the predictive GPWS predictive modes must not be based on flight crew judgment only but briefed before the flight.

As the interference threat evolves with time, we recommend updating the threat analysis on a regular basis.

The following design specificities shall be taken into consideration for safety assessment and guidelines definition:

 The GPS deselection via MCDU or MFD has not impact on TAWS:
o GPS deselection only inhibits the use of GPS inputs for the navigation data computation. It leads to GPS PRIMARY LOST (NAV PRIMARY LOST on A350). The TAWS system will still
use GPS based data, if available, regardless of the GPS deselection.
 GPWS predictive modes, based on a terrain database, use GNSS inputs as primary position source. An inconsistent GNSS position input can lead to an Undue predictive TAWS alert.
GPWS basic modes do not use GNSS based inputs.

 Impact of GPWS predictive modes inhibition (TERR P/B to OFF):

o ROW/ROP & BTV functions are inoperative
o RNP AR operations are not permitted
o A/C equipped with TAWS computers ACSS T2CAS & T3CAS (all P/N) and Honeywell EGPWS MARK V-A P/N 69000942-152/-252:
 These TAWS computers implement an algorithm, based on airport and terrain databases, inhibiting nuisance Mode 2 alerts when predictive modes are active.
 The deactivation of predictive modes on A/C equipped with these TAWS equipment, leads to reactivation of basic TAWS Mode 2 increasing the risk of nuisance at certain
locations (e.g., cliff on the approach path leads to sudden radio altitude decrease and high terrain closure rate):

These alerts are as per design but not appropriate in the particular context of the A/C flying the published approach path.
3. Maintenance RECOMMENDATIONS

The alerts described in section 1 may point to a real defect of a system. In order to confirm that the events were not due to equipment failure, maintenance actions need to be carried out.

LIST OF MAINTENANCE ACTIONS

Airbus is currently working on troubleshooting tasks dedicated to handle GNSS RFI events. These tasks are expected to become available in the 2nd half of 2024.

Prior to availability of the above-mentioned troubleshooting tasks and in case of confirmed or suspected GNSS interference in flight, Airbus recommends performing the following actions
once on ground:

Note: The list of associated maintenance tasks references can be found in Table 3.1
1. Reset both MMR 1 and MMR 2 (power off >10 sec)
2. If GPS function is affected:
o Perform MMR 1 and MMR 2 BITE test
o Perform IR system test (Step not applicable to A300-600/A310)
3. If GLS, SLS or FLS functions are affected, perform MMR 1 and MMR 2 BITE test (if not performed in previous step)
4. If ADS-B Out function was affected, perform ATC1 and ATC2 BITE test
5. If OANS function was affected, perform OANS BITE test (Step not applicable to A300-600/A310)
6. If TAWS function was affected, perform
o TAWS BITE test
o A320/A330/A340 family: Reset Honeywell EGPWS
o A350/A380: Reset both Honeywell AESU
7. If ADS-B In (ATSAW) function was affected, perform TCAS BITE test (Step not applicable to A300-600/A310)
8. If ROW/ROP function was affected, perform (Step not applicable to A300-600/A310)
o A320/A330/A340/A350 family: GPWS BITE test
o A380: OANS system test

If all the tests are OK neither further troubleshooting nor LRU removal is required. Please, note that new LRUs will exhibit same behavior when exposed to the same interferences.

If a fault is confirmed, perform troubleshooting as per the applicable TSM task.

Note: With Collins MMR GLU-920, GLU-925 the following faults will be recorded on the PFR if the MMR is not able to track satellites during more than 15 minutes.
- GPS ANTENNA1(43RT1) /COAX CABLE/MMR1(40RT1)) and/or
- GPS ANTENNA2(43RT2) /COAX CABLE/MMR2(40RT2))
In this case, the fault is associated to TSD: “GLS-P NO SATELLITES TRKD” or “GLS-M NO SATELLITES TRKD”.
If triggered over known RFI area, no GPS antenna issue is to be suspected.

With newer MMR standards, Collins GLU-2100 and Honeywell IMMR, no GPS antenna fault is raised with no satellite tracked. After 15 minutes of satellite loss, the following faults are
logged:
- MMR1(40RT1) /SIGNAL IN SPACE FEEDBACK and/or
- MMR2(40RT2) /SIGNAL IN SPACE FEEDBACK
Special cases:
- If the GPS interference is still present on ground, the tests might not pass. In case of known interference on ground, the operator can either move the A/C to a non-affected location or apply MEL for
affected equipment. System’s nominal behavior should be retrieved soon after leaving the interference area.
- Please report the event to AIRBUS if normal system behavior was not recovered after exiting the RFI area.

TASK A/C TYPE AMM / MP(A350) REFERENCE

A320/A330/ AMM Task 34-36-00-860-801-A – Reset of the Multi-Mode Receiver

MMR A340/A380
reset MP TASK A350-A-34-36-XX-00001-398A-A Reset of the Multi-Mode
A350
Receiver (MMR)
AMM TASK 34-14-00-740-004-A SYSTEM TEST of the Inertial Reference
A320FAM
(IR)
IR AMM TASK 34-14-00-740-803-A SYSTEM TEST of the Inertial Reference
A330/A340
System (IR)
test A380 AMM TASK 34-10-00-740-802-A BITE Test of the IR (System Test)
AMM TASK A350-A-34-1X-XX-00001-343A-A BITE Test of the Inertial
A350
Reference (IR) (System Test)
A320/A330/ AMM Task 34-36-00-740-003-A – BITE test of the MMR
A340
MMR A380 AMM Task BITE Test of the MMR (System Test
BITE test MP TASK A350-A-34-36-XX-00001-343A-A – BITE Test of the Multi-Mode
A350
Receiver (MMR) (System Test)
A300-600/A310 AMM 34-36-00 P. Block 501 MMR BITE test
ATC standalone: AMM Task 34-52-00-74-004-A – BITE Test of the ATC
T3CAS: AMM Task 34-72-00-740-001-A – BITE Test of the T/TISS 
A320
SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-053-A C. BITE Test of the T/TISS (ATC2
part)
A330/A340 AMM Task 34-52-00-740-801-A – BITE test of the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
ATC
AMM Task 34-71-00-740-803-A – BITE Test of the AESS (Master AESU
BITE test A380
XPDR/TCAS Test)
MP Task A350-A-34-71-XX-02001-343A-A – BITE Test of the Aircraft
A350 Environment Surveillance System (AESS) (Master-AESU XPDR/TCAS
Module-Test)
A300-600/A310 AMM 34-52-00 P. Block 501 ATC Operational Test
OANS A320/A330/ AMM Task 34-38-00-740-801-A – BITE Test of the Onboard Aircraft
BITE Test A340/A380 Navigation System (OANS) (System Test)
 TASK A/C TYPE AMM / MP(A350) REFERENCE

MP A350-A-31-63-XX-01ZZZ-343Z-A BITE Test of the Control and Display

A350
System (CDS) (System Test)
GPWS: AMM Task 34-48-00-740-002-A BITE Test of the GPWS
EGPWS: AMM Task 34-48-00-740-002-B BITE Test of the GPWS
T2CAS: AMM TASK 34-43-00-740-004-A Bite Test of the T2CAS 
SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-054-A B.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TAWS
A320
part)
T3CAS: AMM Task 34-72-00-740-001-A – BITE Test of the T/TISS 
SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-052-F B.BITE Test of the T/TISS (TAWS
part)
EGPWS: AMM TASK 34-48-00-740-801-B Operational Test of the
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning (GPW) Computer by BITE
GPWS T2CAS: AMM Task 34-43-00-740-802-A BITE Test of the Traffic and Terrain
BITE Test Collision Avoidance System (T2CAS)  SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-
A330/A340
054-A B.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TAWS part)
T3CAS: AMM TASK 34-72-00-740-801-A BITE Test of the T/TISS 
SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-051-D B.BITE Test of the T/TISS (TAWS
part)
AMM TASK 34-71-00-740-802-A – BITE Test of the AESS (Master AESU
A380
TAWS Test)
MP TASK A350-A-34-71-XX-01001-343A-A BITE Test of the Aircraft
A350
Environment Surveillance System (AESS) (Master AESU TAWS Module Test
A300-600/A310 AMM: 34-48-00, P. Block 501 GPWS operational test
TCAS: TASK 34-43-00-740-001-A BITE Test of the TCAS
T2CAS: AMM TASK 34-43-00-740-004-A Bite Test of the T2CAS 
SUBTASK 34-43-00-740-053-A A.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TCAS
A320 part)
T3CAS: AMM Task 34-72-00-740-001-A – BITE Test of the T/TISS 
SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-051-A A.BITE Test of the T/TISS (TCAS
part)
TCAS
TCAS: TASK 34-43-00-740-801-A – BITE test of the Traffic Collision
BITE Test
Avoidance System (TCAS)
T2CAS: AMM Task 34-43-00-740-802-A BITE Test of the Traffic and
Terrain Collision Avoidance System (T2CAS)  SUBTASK 34-43-
A330/A340
00-740-053-A A.BITE Test of the T2CAS (TCAS part)
T3CAS: AMM TASK 34-72-00-740-801-A BITE Test of the T/TISS 
SUBTASK 34-72-00-740-050-A A. BITE Test of the T/TISS (TCAS
part
 TASK A/C TYPE AMM / MP(A350) REFERENCE

AMM Task 34-71-00-740-803-A – BITE Test of the AESS (Master AESU

A380
XPDR/TCAS Test)
MP Task A350-A-34-71-XX-02001-343A-A – BITE Test of the Aircraft
A350 Environment Surveillance System (AESS) (Master-AESU XPDR/TCAS
Module-Test)
TASK A350-A-34-71-XX-00001-132A-A - Reset of Aircraft
A350
AESS reset Environment Surveillance Unit (AESU) 1(2)
A380 TASK 34-71-00-860-801-A - Reset of the AESU1(2)

Table 3.1: Maintenance tasks references

TRANSIENT SYMPTOMS OBSERVED IN AN AREA NOT KNOWN PREVIOUSLY FOR GPS INTERFERENCE

In case a GNSS RFI is suspected and the area is not known to be affected (no NOTAM entry or previous experience), an analysis needs to be performed in order to confirm the root cause.

The analysis consists in the study of all potential sources of GNSS perturbation: aircraft and/or receiver failure, GNSS constellation anomaly, environment masking, multipath or space
weather. In case all of those potential sources are discarded, then it is likely that a GNSS RFI occurred.

Please report such a case to AIRBUS together with further information in order to allow an assessment of the event and to confirm if it can be linked to RFI or if regular troubleshooting is
required on A/C.

Information to be provided for analysis:

A300 / A310 A320 / A330 / A340 A380 A350

As minimum information, please provide:
N/A Post Flight Report Post Flight Report Post Flight Report
CMS dump CMS dump
Flight data: Flight data: Flight data: Flight data:
- DFDR/QAR - DFDR/QAR - DFDR/QAR - DFDR/QAR
- DAR if customization available - SAR 58 (this report contains - SAR 99 (this report contains
including additional useful GPS information) useful GPS information)
GPS/ADIRU parameters
Pilot Report: Pilot Report: Pilot Report: Pilot Report:
- Detailed event report - Detailed event report - Detailed event report - Detailed event report
- Picture of FMS CDU pages: - Picture of FMS pages in - POSITION/GPS Page status - POSITION/GNSS Page status
- GPS MONITOR MCDU: during events ( MFD) during events ( MFD)
- POSITION MONITOR - GPS MONITOR
- - POSITION MONITOR
- IRS MONITOR
N/A MMR data: MMR data: MMR data:
- Troubleshooting Data (TSD) - Troubleshooting Data (TSD) - Troubleshooting Data (TSD)
 - GPS REPORT for MMR
Rockwell Collins GLU-925,
GLU-2100 or Honeywell RMA
55B (*)
Accessible via MDCU 
SYSTEM REPORT TEST 
MMR  SPECIFIC DATA
N/A IR data:
- TSD of IR1, IR2 and IR3
- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT
(Northrop Grumman ADIRU
and Honeywell Block III(**)
Accessible via MDCU 
SYSTEM REPORT TEST 
IR  SPECIFIC DATA
Table 3.2: Information to be provided to evaluate presence of GPS interferences
- GPS REPORT
Accessible via OMT 
SYSTEM REPORT TEST 
ATA 34  MMR 
SPECIFIC DATA
IR data:
- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT
Accessible via OMT 
SYSTEM REPORT TEST 
ATA 34  IR  SPECIFIC
DATA
- GPS REPORT
Accessible via OMT 
SYSTEM REPORT TEST 
ATA 34  MMR 
SPECIFIC DATA
IR data:
- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT
Accessible via OMT 
SYSTEM REPORT TEST 
ATA 34  IR  SPECIFIC
FUNCTIONS

(*) MMR with “GPS REPORT” menu:

- Collins GLU-925 P/N 822-1821-430 (A320/A330/A340/A380)
- Collins GLU-925 P/N 822-1821-632 (A350)
- Collins GLU-2100 P/N 822-2532-300 (A320/A330/A350/A380)
- Honeywell RMA-55B P/N 066-50029-1161 (A320/A330/A340)

(**) ADIRUs with “GPIRS REPORT” menu:

- Honeywell Block III P/N HG2030BE0x
- Northrop Grumman P/N 465020-0303-0318, 465020-0304-0318, P/N 465020-0303-0316, P/N 465020-0304-0316

Note for SAR files: SARxx file name contains the date and time of recorded data:
Example: SAR00585810181120043231 –> SAR 58; Date 20 Nov 2018; Time 04:32:31 UTC

If the event is confirmed to be related to GNSS RFI:

Recommendations given in chapter 3.1 apply.

Note: Reports of suspected GNSS outage or RFI should be transmitted to international organizations (e.g. EUROCONTROL's Voluntary ATM Incident Reporting (EVAIR), refer to
https://www.eurocontrol.int/service/eurocontrol-voluntary-atm-incident-reporting) or regional ANSPs in parallel of Airbus analysis, in order to produce an additional analysis of the GNSS
signals, accelerate GNSS RFI event confirmation/resolution, and generate NOTAM to operators’ community.

EFFECTS DURING GPS INTERFERENCE OR SPOOFING EXPOSURE NOT COVERED IN CHAPTER 1 OR EVENTS REQUIRING FURTHER ANALYSIS

If an A/L suspects GNSS RFI and observes effects not covered in chapter 1 (or defined in chapter 1, but referring to this section 3.3), we recommend contacting AIRBUS for further event
analysis. For instance, AIRBUS has received reports about different kind of events potentially linked to GNSS RFI exposure such as map shift or ADS-B Out erroneous position.

These represent unexpected behaviour and require investigation.

We recommend A/Ls to provide AIRBUS with the following information along with the event report to help events analysis:
 A300 / A310 A320 / A330 / A340 A380 A350
General GPS N/A As minimum information please provide:
analysis Post Flight Report Post Flight Report Post Flight Report
information CMS dump CMS dump
(Equivalent Flight data: Flight data: Flight data: Flight data:
to Table 3.2) - DFDR/QAR - DFDR/QAR - DFDR/QAR - DFDR/QAR
- DAR if customization - SAR 58 (this report - SAR 99 (this report
available including contains useful GPS contains useful GPS
additional GPS/ADIRU information) information)
parameters
Pilot Report: Pilot Report: Pilot Report: Pilot Report:
- Detailed event report - Detailed event report - Detailed event report - Detailed event report
- Picture of FMS CDU - Picture of FMS pages in - POSITION/GPS Page - POSITION/GNSS Page
pages: MCDU: status during events ( status during events (
- GPS MONITOR - GPS MONITOR MFD) MFD)
- POSITION MONITOR - POSITION MONITOR
- - IRS MONITOR

N/A MMR data: MMR data: MMR data:

- Troubleshooting Data - Troubleshooting Data - Troubleshooting Data
(TSD) (TSD) (TSD)
- GPS REPORT for MMR - GPS REPORT - GPS REPORT
Rockwell Collins GLU-925 Accessible via OMT  Accessible via OMT 
or Honeywell RMA 55B (*) SYSTEM REPORT SYSTEM REPORT
Accessible via MDCU  TEST  ATA 34  TEST  ATA 34 
SYSTEM REPORT MMR  SPECIFIC MMR  SPECIFIC
TEST  MMR  DATA DATA
SPECIFIC DATA
N/A IR data: IR data: IR data:
- TSD of IR1, IR2 and IR3 - GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT - GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT
- GPIRS IN-AIR REPORT Accessible via OMT  Accessible via OMT 
(Northrop Grumman SYSTEM REPORT SYSTEM REPORT
ADIRU and Honeywell TEST  ATA 34  IR TEST  ATA 34  IR
Block III(**)  SPECIFIC DATA  SPECIFIC
Accessible via MDCU  FUNCTIONS
SYSTEM REPORT
TEST  IR 
SPECIFIC DATA
In case of a T2CAS dump or EGPWS Depending on A/C GPWS Not possible to dump Not possible to dump
spurious dump computer configuration : AESU on wing. A/L can AESU on wing. A/L can
TAWS - T2CAS dump or contact Honeywell contact Honeywell
- T3CAS dump or
warning - EGPWS dump representatives. representatives.

In case of an - Air Traffic Control report together with ADS-B raw data containing position + integrity information (data to be requested
by A/L to authorities, not usually available at A/L level)
ADS-B Out - ATC transponder side in use during events
issue - Was the pilot requested to switch transponder? Did the situation change if done?
In case of Photos/videos of ND showing erroneous weather Photos/videos of ND showing erroneous weather
WXR related display display
issues
 Not possible to dump AESU on wing. A/L can contact
Honeywell representatives.
Other N/A FMS dump: FMS dump : FMS dump:
- A320: AMM TASK 22- - AMM TASK 22-70-00- - MP TASK A350-A-22-
70-00-610-006 860-804-A 7X-XX-01003-752A-A
- A330: AMM TASK 22-
70-00-610-008

Table 3.3: Information to be provided in case of different cockpit effect

4. GLOSSARY

A/C Aircraft
ACMS Aircraft Condition Monitoring System
ADIRS Air Data and Inertial Reference System
ADIRU Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit
AESS Aircraft Environment Surveillance System
AFN ATC Facilities Notification
ANF Airport Navigation Function
ATSAW Airborne Traffic Situation Awareness
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit
BTV Brake To Vacate
BUSS Back Up Speed Scale
CFDIU Central Fault Display Interference Unit
CFDS Central Fault Display System
CMC Central Maintenance Computer
CMS Central Maintenance System
DAR Digital AIDS Recorder (A320)
DAR Digital ACMS Recorder (A330/A340/A380)
DBUS Digital Backup Speed
DFDR Digital Flight Data Recorder
DLCS Data Loading Configuration System
DMC Display Management Computer
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
EFB Electronic Flight Bag
EGPWC Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Computer
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EICU EFB interface Control Unit
EIS Electronic Instrument System
EIU Electronic Instrument Unit
EPE Estimated Position Error
EPU Estimated Position Uncertainty
FANS Future Air Navigation System
FDIF Flight Data Interface Function
FLS FMS Landing System
FMC Flight Management Computer
FMG Flight Management Guidance and (Envelope)
(E)C Computer
FMS Flight Management System
FOM Figure Of Merit
FOMAX Flight Operation and MAintenance eXchanger
FWC Flight Warning Computer
FWS Flight Warning System
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GLS GBAS Landing System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GPIRS GPS and IRS mixed data
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWC Ground Proximity Warning System
HDOP Horizontal Dilution Of Precision
HFOM Horizontal Figure Of Merit
HIL Horizontal Integrity Limit
HIPL Horizontal Integrity Protection Level
HUD Head Up Display
HUDC Head Up Display Computer
IFE In Flight Entertainment
IRS Inertial Reference System
ISIS Integrated Standby Instrument System
LOC Localizer
ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter
MCDU Multipurpose Control Display Unit
MFD Multi Functions Display
MMR Multi-Mode Receiver
ND Navigation Display
NSE Navigation System Error
OANS Onboard Airport Navigation System
PFD Primary Flight Display
PRAIM Predictive Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring
PRIM PRIMary System
PVT Position, Velocity, Time
RAAS Runway Awareness and Advisory System
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RNP Required Navigation Performance
RNP AR Required Navigation Performance Authorization
Required
ROPS Runway Overrun Prevention System
ROW Runway Overrun Warning
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
SATCOM SATellite COMmunication
SBAS Satellite Based Augmentation System
SCI Secure Communication Interface
SLS SBAS Landing System
TAWS Terrain Avoidance and Warning System
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TOS Take Off Securing
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
VDOP Vertical Dilution Of Precision
VHF Very High Frequency

VIL Vertical Integrity Limit

VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range
WXR Weather Radar
XPDR Transponder
Survey for the Engineering Support section
 Annex

General Information
Potential impact: Maintenance, Operational Reliability
Key information:
Solution benefit:
First issue date: 22-FEB-2019 Issue date: 17-JUN-2024 Last check date: 17-JUN-2024

Technical parameters
ATA: 34-36
A/C type/serie: A300, A300-600, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380
Engine:
Engine manufacturer:
Fault code/ECAM
warning:
FIN:
Part Number:
Supplier:

Attachments
General:
- ISI_34.36.00049_Summary.docx

Links
Other articles (ISI/TFU):
- 31.21.00014, 34.10.00066, 34.36.00.030, 34.38.00.002, 34.52.00035, 46.00.00057
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