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Ayalon-SystemPaymentMamluk-1957
Ayalon-SystemPaymentMamluk-1957
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Economic and Social History of the Orient
DAVID AYALON
(The Hebrew University, Jerusalem)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Introductory Notes
I. Mamluk Army Units, Military Schools, etc.
2. The Ratio between the Dirham and the Dinar
The List of Payments to the Mamluk
Pay in the Bahri Period
Pay in the Circassian Period
(a) TheJadmak'ya
(b) The Nafaqa
The Nafaqa of the Amirs
Pay to the Mamluks of the Amirs
(c) The Dress (Kiswa)
(d) The Meat (Lahm)
(e) The Sheep for Sacrifice (Adbiya, rarely Dahayd)
(f) The Fodder ('Aliq)
(g) The Horses and Camels
The Distribution of Horses
I. to the Amirs
2. to the Mamluks
Plots for Growing Clover as Horse Food
The Camels
The Prices of the Horses and Camels
Total Amounts of Payment
i. Sums Paid to a Whole Expeditionary Force
2. Total Amounts of Other Payments
The Offices Responsible for the Army's Pay
The Office of the Vizir (Difwdn al-Wizdra)
The Office of Ustdddr (Diwdn al-Ustdddrzya)
The Office of Ndzir al-Khdss
The Army Expenditure and the State of the Treasury
Confiscation and Extortions of Money to Cover the Expenses of the Campaigns
Appendix A: The Expenses of sultan Q~ytbay during the Early Years of his
Reign
Appendix B: Data on Mamluk Currency
Preface1)
No great religion in human history has ever been so intimately con-
nected with and so much dependent upon military might as Islam has
been from its very inception. Yet our knowledge of muslim armies and
military societies, especially in the Middle Ages, is extremely meager.
This is partly due to the fact that the study of the subject has been greatly
neglected by the orientalists; but, in my opinion, this is not the main
reason. The main blame for such a gloomy state of affairs should be laid
at the door of the Muslim sources themselves, for though these sources
deal so much and so often with wars, campaigns and battles they say very
little about the structure, organization and functioning of the armies
involved. In this respect the sources of the Mamluk sultanate (i 2 0 o-1517)
constitute an outstanding exception, for they contain information on the
Mamluk army and military society which far surpasses in richness,
variety and accuracy anything of the same kind which can be found in
other Muslim Mediaeval sources.2) This fact is of extremely great signi-
ficance, for the Mamluk army was not a force of secondary importance
in comparison with other Muslim armies. In its heyday it was the
strongest army in Islam and one of the strongest in the world.3) Even
i) This paper deals with the various kinds of pay which the mamluk received,
except his income from his feudal fief. The paper is a chapter of a work, origin-
ally written in Hebrew, on the Mamluk military society and army. The com-
plete work has not yet been published. Parts of it were published either in book
form or as articles.
2) There is no doubt that a much better and more reliable picture can be
drawn of the army and of the military society of the Ottoman Empire than of
those of the Mamluk sultanate, but this is true only of the Ottoman Empire from
the sixteenth century onwards. Our knowledge of that empire in the Middle Ages
is much inferior to our knowledge of the Mamluk sultanate. As for the technical
military treatises as a source for the study of the history and organization of the
Muslim armies of the Middle Ages, they can be safely used only after exhaustive
scrutiny and with the greatest caution. Some of the limitations and defects of
those military treatises were pointed out in my work "Gunpowder and Firearms
in the Mamluk Kingdom", London, 1956, pp. XI-XIII, XV-XVII.
3) Ibn Khaldtin, who spent many years in the Mamluk sultanate, states in un-
equivocal language that the center of power in the Muslim world passed from
the Abbasid caliphate to Egypt owing to the Mamluks. In a passage which
throws a most clear light on the Mamluk system of servitude and which deserves
special attention and study (Kitadb al-'Ibar, V, p. 371, 11. 4-27) he pays a glowing
at the time of its decline few Muslim armies could compare with i
very doubtful whether the Ottoman army, which was in the zenith
power in the early sixteenth century, could have defeated the dec
Mamluk army at all in 1516-17 without the extensive use of the
revolutionary weapon, firearms, a weapon which the Mamluks cou
adequately employ for socio-psychological reasons.1) Nor is this a
Mamluk army, like a great and vital section of the Ottoman arm
longed to a special institution which developed only within the bo
ries of Islamic civilization and without which the history of Islam
have been very different, viz., the institution of the so-called "s
armies which lasted for no less than a thousand years from the
ninth to the early nineteenth centuries. Thus the study of the Ma
in Egypt and Syria from the middle of the thirteenth to the beginnin
the sixteenth centuries inevitably has far wider implications tha
period or the region with which it is directly concerned.
What was said in the preceding lines about the Mamluks of Egyp
Syria in general applies to their system of payment as well. It may we
that the following account of Mamluk pay will not look very impr
in comparison with what is known about the pay system of Euro
armies of the same period, where the scholars studying the subjec
in many cases use archive materials, a kind of source which is so
for the Muslim countries in Mediaeval time.2) As far as the worl
Islam is concerned, however, there is little likelihood of its being p
tribute to the Mamluks and declares roundly that it was they who saved
when it was on the verge of extinction.
i) See "Gunpowder and Firearms, etc.", pp. 46ff and pp. io8-i I.
2) Most of the surviving archive material of Mediaeval Islam has come
to us through the contemporary historians who copied state documents
works from time to time. Even in this respect the Mamluk sultanate se
have been luckier than most other Muslim Mediaeval states or countri
few Muslim historical works can compare in the richness of their archive m
to Masdlik al-Absdr of Ibn Fadl Allah al-'Umari and to Subh al-A'sh
Qalqashandi. The original Mamluk documents found in the convent of St
rine's in the Sinai peninsula and part of which are now being prepared
publication by the Hebrew University bear striking testimony to the me
care with which al-Qalqashandi copied the documents contained in his b
to the accuracy of his information and comments on the same.
to furnish a description of
which could compare with
One of the great merits o
the bulk of these can be
for most of the data conc
isolated statements about the amounts due to the mamluk for each of the
various items of his salary. Where such general statements occur, they
have to be corroborated by strong additional evidence, not usually
available, which is a serious disadvantage.1) The great advantage of the
Mamluk data lies in the fact that they are given in connection with
actual cases of pay. The stereotyped kind of information is the following
one: The mamluk was entitled to a certain sum of money, but the autho-
rities, mainly owing to the lack of funds, paid him a smaller sum. Both
sums are mentioned by the sources. This kind of information repeats it-
self over and over again, and the figures always tally. So much for the
pay of the individual mamluk. The same applies to the figures quoted
by the Mamluk sources for the sums paid to the whole army, to a whole
expeditionary force or to a considerable section of the army. The accura-
cy of these figures can be established by means of multiplying the pay
of the individual mamluk by the number of the soldiers involved in
each case. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the Mamluk sources usu-
ally furnish very accurate figures on the numerical strength of the Mam-
luk armed forces.2)
A wealth of information is supplied by Mamluk sources on the curren-
cy of the realm and on the ratio between the different monetary units.
The reliability of this information can be established by the same method
Introductory Notes
Before starting with the study of the main subject of the prese
paper, it is essential to do two things. First, to explain briefly some of
terms - especially those pertaining to the army units and to the mil
schools - which recur most frequently in this paper, but which
described in detail in other chapters of my work on the Mamluk mil
society. Second, to give a short sketch in a chronological order of
changing ratio between the two principal coins of the realm: the dir
and the dinar.2)
The sayfitya were Royal Mamluks who had formerly been mam
amirs. Each of these had served under a different master before he was
thrown together with the others into the same td'ifa. No wonder, there-
fore, that the sayfzya were indifferent and strange to one another, to the
mushtaraawdt, to the qardn4 and to the sultan. They lacked the essential
unifying bond of solidarity with the khushddsh on the one hand and of
loyalty to the ustddh on the other. Their allegiance to any particular
sultan was loose and vacillating. They were extremely weak as a political
unit and seldom acted independently to improve their position. They
usually made common cause with the qardunf in their struggle for a
better status.
The absolute supremacy of the mushtarawdt over the qardngS and the
sayfzya found its expression in numerous ways, of which the most con-
spicuous were the participation in battle and the pay. The sultan tried
to spare the lives of his own mamluks as best he could and to send the
members of the other two groups into the thick of the fighting. He also
discriminated the aqrdnJs and s~ayflya by often giving them lower pay than
to his mzusbtarawdt, though legally they were entitled to the same pay.
The mamluks of the amirs were socially far inferior to the Royal Mam-
luks. They constituted no serious political factor in the Mamluk military
society; rebellions and mutinies of great proportions were extremely
rare among them. In addition, they were necessarily less well trained
than the Royal Mamluks, for they did not have access to the first-rate
military schools in which the latter grew up and studied. As we shall see
did little to justify that name. Both the .halqa and the awldd
deprived of their horses and ceased to take part in militar
No wonder, therefore, that these two units were the most
element in the whole military society of the Mamluk sultan
our information on their pay is much scantier than the inf
the pay of the other elements of which that society was compo
We would emphasize in this connection that the data on th
various sections of the civilian population of the sultanate a
far and less reliable than those on the pay of the military. It th
not serve as a basis for any study of real value.
Brief notice will be made now of the Mamluk officers
called amirs (sing. amir, pl. umard') and were divided into three
(c) The third rank was that of an Amir of Ten (amtr 'ashara). All such
amirs were entitled to keep in their service between io to 20 horsemen.
The number of the Amirs of Forty and Amirs of Ten was not fixed
At the closing decades of Mamluk rule we find the number of the first
group fluctuating between Io and 75 and that of the second group
varying between I8J and 225.
A few words must be said in the present context about the military
schools or barracks of the Cairo citadel. These were called tibdq (sing.
tabaqa) and were exclusively dedicated to the training of the Royal
Mamluks. The Mamluk boys brought from abroad spent several years
in these institutions until they reached maturity and became fully-fledged
soldiers. On finishing the school they received their certificate of manu
mission together with their horse and equipment. After having left the
school the mamluks did not sever their connections with it. They con-
tinued to belong to the old barracks where they had received their recruit
training. This connection with the old barracks was expressed in many
ways, one of them being the order of the pay parade. The mamluk
received their pay according to their tibdq, the total number of which was
about twelve. The most important and famous among these tibdq were
tabaqat ar-Rafraf, tabaqat at-Tiziya, tabaqat az-Zimim and tabaqat al
Ashrafiya. A very considerable part of the barracks' personnel was com-
posed of eunuchs who served as a barrier between the young recruits
and the adult mamluks. The head of the whole school (muqaddam al
mamdlik as-sultAinya), his deputy (nd'ib muqaddam al-mamdlik as-sultddnya
During the Bahri period and the first two to three decades of the Cir-
cassian period there existed a more or less fixed ratio between the dirham
(the silver coin) and the dinar (the gold coin). When changes did occur
they usually were slight. The dinar was ordinarily equivalent to 20
dirhams. Sometimes its value rose to 25 or 28 dirhams.2) But since the
reign of the Circassian sultan Faraj (80I41398-808/1405; 809/1406-815/
1412) the dirham became more and more debased as a result of the
growing practice of mixing it with inferior metals. The dinar, on the
other hand, was almost always made of gold3) both under the Circassians
and in the period which preceded their rule4). Thus the difference in the
respective values of the two coins steadily increased. Mamluk sources
say that the debasement of the dirham started in 806/1403, i.e. in exactly
the same year which, according to the same sources, witnessed the be-
ginning of the general economic decline of the realm.5) In actual fact
the debasement of the dirham started somewhat earlier as did the econo-
mic decline of the Mamluk sultanate.
I.usn al-Muadara,
3) For II, see:
an exception p. 213, 11. 24-26.
Ibn Iyis, V, pp. 86-87.
4) This does not mean that the purchasing power of the dinar was the same
under the Bahris as under the Circassians. In the present state of our knowledge,
however, there is no possibility whatsoever of establishing even approximately
the changing value of the dinar throughout Mamluk rule.
s) For a description of the economic decline of the Mamluk sultanate see
"Gunpowder and Firearms, etc.", pp. o103-107.
6) Nujzm, VI, p. Io 6, 11. -6.
7) Nujbm, VI, p. I i .
8) Sub , III, p. 442.
1)Nujzjm, VI, p. 27;p. 3 5 6;p. 5 37;p. 5 96; pp. 667-668; VII, p. 11;p. I I;
p. 224. HIawddith, p. I1; p. 68; p. 76; p. 99.
2) H.awadith,
Nujpm, VII, p. 473. p.
Ibn208;
Iygs,p.II,225;
p. 57.p. 231; p. 271; pp. 294-297.
3) Nujam, VII, p. 496. Ibn Iyis, II, p. 6i.
4) The difficulty lies in the fact that the sources no longer mention the ratio
between the dirham and the dinar. They either mention the ratio between the
nisffidda dirham and thefls (pl.ful/s) or quote the value of a ra.tl of/jul/s(Nujam,
VII, p. 496. HIawddith, p. 332; p. 445; P. 503; P. 51o; p. 530o. Ibn Iyis (KM),
III, p. IS; p. Ioz02; p. 117; p. 231; p. 385; IV, p. 251; p. 295; p. 327; p. 338; V,
pp. 87-88). I could not fix for certain the exact relation of the nisffldda to the
fils or to the dinar during the greatest part of the period of the existence 6f the
first-named coin. On the fils and the nisffldla, see E. Strauss, "Prix et Salaires a
l'Epoque Mamlouke", REI, 1949, PP. 52-53, where the changing value of the
dirham in relation to the dinar is also discussed.
I) For a detailed description of the nafaqa see below the section dealing with
"Pay in the Circassion Period".
2) Sulik, I, p. 449; p. 682. 11. 20-22; p. 724; II, p. 499, 11. 7-9. Nuj]m (c),
VIII, pp. 259,1. i8-260, 1. 5; IX, p. 146, 11. I1-I4. Zetterst6en, p. z128; p. 228.
Nujim, V, pp. 14, 60.
the fixed date.') Its cancellation was made known by means of the
"torch-bearers" (mashd'il~ya)2). Its distribution usually started at the begin-
ning of the second half of the Muslim month, probably on the first
day of ceremonial procession (mawkib)3) in that part of the month. The
I5th, I6th or I7th of the month were the most common days for the
commencement of the jdmakya pay4), though instances are known of
payment being made somewhat earlier or later.5) The distribution of the
idmakya lasted ordinarily until the zoth or 21st of the month, but occa-
sionally it was stretched up to the 27th.6) The old custom was to finish its
payment in three consecutive days of ceremonial procession. In 85 8/1454
the mamluks of the ruling sultan (iuzlbdn) stoned the Majordomo (ustdddr)
for stretching its payment over five mawkib days instead of three.7) In
861/1457 the mamluks demanded again that the payment of the jdmakya
should be completed during three mawkib days only.8) But this demand
was never met. During the last 70 to 80 years of Mamluk independent
rule thejdmakya was distributed in four mawkib days.9)
Both the jdmakya and the nafaqa were paid in a special parade ('ard)
which took place in the Royal Courtyard (al-.hawsh as-sulztdtf) in the Cairo
i) Nuj~ m, VII, p. 425, 11. 6-7; p. 691, 11. 4-5; p. 826, 11. 12-13; p. 829, 11.
14-15 ; P. 830, 1. ii.
2) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 430, 11. I5, x8, I9. The mashd'iltya served mainly as exeuc-
tioners, leaders of punished persons under disgraceful conditions, town criers,
etc. See Van Berchem, Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum, II, Syrie du Sud, J~rusa-
lem, HIaram, p. 320, note 7. Al-Maqrizi, Histoire des Sultans Mamluks (ed. Qua-
trembre), vol. I, part II, p. 4, note 5.
3) On the mawkib see L. A. Mayer, Mamuk Costume, Genbve, 1952, p. 78, and
note 3, where the difference between mawkib and khidma is also explained.
4) I.Iawddith, p. 698, 11. 6-7. Ibn Iyis (KM), III, p. 391, 1. 20; IV, p. 18, 11.
18-19, 2i; p. 237, 11. 18-20; p. 291, 11. 3-6; p. 307, 11. 8-ii; p. 312, 11. I3-i4; P.
326, 11. 4-6; p. 330, 11. 4-6; p. 350, 11. 20-23; p. 360, 11. 2-3; p. 382, 11. 1I-16;
pp. 386, 1. 22-387, 1. 7; P. 416, 1. 16; p. 430, 11. 20-21; p. 480, 11. 9-10; V, p. 19,
11. I6-Is8; p. 78,11. 5-8.
5) Hawddith, p. 134, 1. 23; p. 194.
6) -Iawddith, p. 514, 11. 9-14. Ibn IyIs, V, p. 45, 11. 12-I5. See also ibid., IV,
p. 471,11. 4-5 ; P. 483,1. 11i.
7) Nujam,
8) I.awadith,
VII, p.p.474,11.
201, 11.
6-I 3;I0o-12.
P. 477,11. 5- II.
9) Hlawddith, p. 486, 11. 6-io. See also the references in the following notes.
schools (muqaddam al
Chief of the Corps o
markets (mu.htasib)
cials;3) but al-Ashra
time after his becom
during the pay of th
of Mamluk rule, pay
During the parade t
In the absence of the
deputized for him. T
together with the hig
he who read the nam
official parades.5) Bo
to the tabaqas. Each
mamluk, on hearing
advance towards the
I) HIawddith, p. 68i,
696, 11. 8-9. Ibn Iyas (
the sultan transferred h
bench called mastaba (Ib
2) Ibn Iyis, IV, p. 144,1
in the Mamluk Kingdo
place in the mayddns in
during the greatest par
whereas in ra's
3) On the thenawba,
Bah.riseeperiod next"Studies
D. Ayalon, to nothing
on the is knownofabout
Structure the pay-parades.
the Mamluk
Army", BSOAS, 1954, pp. 60-6i. See also the references in note i .
4) Ibn Iyas (KM), III, p. zz22, 11. 21-24; pp. 323,1. 21-324,1. Io.
5) Nujqm, VII, p. 218, 11. io-zo20. Hawrddith, p. I13, 11. 7-23. Ibn Iyis, IV, p.
291,11. 3-6; p. 307.11. 8-u ; p. 3 3,11. 20-23; p. 413, 11. 6-7; P. 416,11. u6-u9;V, p.
19, 1l. I6-i8; p. 78. 11. -8. Kdtib al-mamdlik or kitib al-mamdlik as-sulftdnya
(his office was called kitadbat al-mamilik) was in numerous cases of Coptic origin
Often he was a Q.di (Nuidm, VII, p. 449, 11. Io-I I; p. 713, 11. I4-I 5 ;P. 765,1. 18.
Hawdidith, p. 193, 1). I-3; p. 220zzo, 11. 3-4, 7-9; P. 363, 1. I; p. 672, 1. 17. IbnIyis
(KM), III, p. 143, 1. 5; p. 240, ll. 2z-1; p. 359, 1. I9;p. 388, 1. I ; IV, p. 99, 11.
i6-17; p. xx8, 11. 3-6; p. 2zI, 1. 7;p. 321, 11. 1i-I2).
receive his pay in a purse (surra) and return to the ranks.1) When the
mamluks received their meat and other rations in money instead of in
kind the same procedure was repeated (the sources use in such cases the
got a very big army. When Sultan Q~nsofh al-Ghawri, on the eve of the
battle of Marj Dibiq, paid the nafaqa to his whole army in four days, he
was strongly criticized by his amirs who feared lest this hasty procedure
would lead the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and of Safawid Persia to
the conclusion that no army had been left in Egypt, which would tempt
them to attack the country.6) For the whole Mamluk period, I came
across one single case in which the distribution of pay to the army was
completed in a single day. This happened in 873/1468 when an expedi-
tionary force was hastily organized to march against the Turcoman
Shah Siwar. The pay parade lasted from morning until dusk.7)
The contemporary sources say practically nothing about how the
mamluks were dressed on pay parades. An isolated remark by Ibn Tagh-
ribirdi throws some light on this subject. In 866/1462 Sultan Khush-
qadam ordered the Royal Mamluks to wear on these occasions their
ceremonial dress (qumdsh al-mawkib), viz. the kalaftdt - hat, the tight-
sleeved coat (qabd') and the sword, "in accordance with the old custom"
I) Nujfm, VI, p. 533, 1. i6; p. 534, 1. i5; P. 685, 1. 17; PP. 687-88. Ibn al-
Furit, IX, p. 33, 11. 16-17.
2) Ibn Iyas (KM), III, p. 285, 11. i5-2i; IV, p. 371, 11. 16-17; V, p. 8, 11. 5-8;
p. 28, 1. I5.
3) HIlawddith, p. 179, 11. I2-20. Ibn Iyis, V, p. 11 3,1. 23.
4) Nujim, VI, pp. 533-34; PP. 687-88. Iawdadith, p. 514,11. 9-14.
5) Ntujzm, VII, p. 693, 11. 9-1 3; p. 831, 11. 4-5.
HIawddith, p. 514, 11. 9-14. Ibn Iyis, IV, p. 19, 11. i1-14; p. 20, 11. 17-19.
6) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 27, 11. I8-zz22.
I) .Hawddith,
Mamluk Costume, pp.p.13,417,11. 13-I'.
14, 16, 17, On the
18, 21-23, 27. kalaftdh and the qabd', see L. A. Mayer,
2) The devastating effects on the Mamluk and his morale of such a proce-
dure, which made him wait for his first monthly pay a very long time after his
return from the campaign, are very obvious.
3) See the references in p. 60, notes 3-4, P. 6I, note I and p. 58 note 3.
4) See the references in p. 60, notes 3-4, P. 61, note I and p. 58, note 3
5)Ibn
6) I.awddith,
Iyss, IV, p.p.436.
685,For11.
the7-17. Ibn
pay to Iyis (KM),
at-tabaqa III, pp.
al-khdmisa and256-257; p. 323.
to other fire-
arms units composed of awldd an-nds, see D. Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in
the Mamluk Kingdom, London, I956, pp. 63-65, 74-76. The tabaqa al-khadmisa
derived its name from the fact that it received its monthly pay on a fifth pay-day
at the end of the month and not during the four regular pay-days in the middle
of the month together with the rest of the army. This was a sympton of the
Mamluks' negative attitude towards the units employing firearms. From the
size of the jdmaklya of the awldd an-nds it may be wrongly concluded that their
pay was not very much lower than that of the Royal Mamluks. It deserves to be
emphasized, therefore, that thejdmakya was the only pay which the aw/dd an-nds
received with any degree of regularity. They had practically no income from
feudal fiefs during the later stages of Circassian rule.
7) Khi/at, II, p. 214.
i) Ibn Iyis (KM), III, p. 399, 1. II; p. 433, 1. 3; P. 462, 1. 14; IV, p. 8, 1. 19; p.
25, 11. 20-22; p. 41, 11. 12-13.
2) Nujim, VI, pp. 6-7; VII, p. 648, li. I , 17; P. 650o, in the notes. Ibn Iyss,
II, p. 25, 1. 16. Poliak, Feudalism, p. 4.
3)Ibn
4) Nujum, VI,III,p.p.33I,13,11.
Iyas (KM), 11 17-18.
i- ; IV, p.I.awddith, p.
3 1 8, 11. 2-6. 702, 1. 7. Ibn Iyis, V, p. 26, 1. 4.
5) Ibn Iyis (KM), III, p. 291, 1. I2.
6) Nujz7m, VII, p. 6, 11. 3-7; p. 37,1. I.
7) Nujam, VII, p. 428, 11. 10o-1 5. Ibn Iyis, II, p. 41, 11. I-7; p. 66, 11. 28-29;
(KM) III, p. 329, 11. I8-2I; p. 435,11. 19-2I; IV, p. 13,11. 23-24,1. 6.
8) NAujm, VI, p. 553, 11. I4-I7; p. 559, 11. 12-14.
9) Ibn lyis, II, p. 91, 11. I7-I8; (KM) III, p. 4,11. o10-Il.
son as his successor. The son usually ruled for only a very short period,1)
yet the mamluks demanded the nafaqat al-bay'a both from the new sultan
and from the son of the old sultan.2)
With nafaqat as-safar the mamluk had to cover all his own and his ser-
vant's (ghuldm) expenses in connection with the impending military
campaign, including the repairs to his equipment and uniform.3) The
nafaqa was not distributed very frequently. Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil
(689/I290-692/1I293) received special praise because he paid the nafaqa
to the army three times during his short reign of three years.4)
The official amount of a nafaqa of any kind was i oo dinars. During the
early part of Circassian rule the mamluks did receive that sum in full ;5)
but later on the cases of paying a lower sum became increasingly fre-
quent. According to the historian Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Ashraf AynBl
(857/1i45 3-865/1460) was the first Mamluk sultan who discriminated
between the various categories of the army in the payment of the nafaqa
and this because the treasury was no longer able to pay the full sum to
the whole army as was the old custom. Thence forward the authorities
paid I00oo dinars to those soldiers only whom they were afraid of, whereas
they paid as much as they liked to those soldiers whom they considered
as harmless (ammd tafriqat al-mi'a wa-aqallfa-hddhd shay' tajaddada min al-
Ashraf Ayndl wdlidihi li-'aj al-khizdna 'an at-taswiya bayna al-jam!' wa-illd
fal-'dda al-qadima taswiyat al-kull f mi'at dindr ash-shari/ wa4-da'iJffa-baqiyat
al-'dda al-dna man khdfi~ ghd'ilatahu a'.t/zhu al-'dda al-qadima wa-man istad'afz
jdnibahu a't/ihu md arddi).6) From the reign of AynMl onwards, the pay of
i) The short reign of the sultans' sons in the Circassian period and its con-
sequences were discussed in"The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom",JAOS,
1949, PP. 138-139 and in "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army",
BSOAS, pp. 458-59. The average duration of the reign of the pure Mamluk sul-
tans during the Circassian rule was not very long either. This added to the finan-
cial difficulties caused by the payment of the nafaqat al-bay'a.
2) Ibn Iyas, II, p. 43, 11. 24-28.
3) Nujim, VI, p. 666. Ibn Iyis, V, p. 123, 11. 20-2 1.
4) Nujim (c), VIII, p. 26, 11. 1-4. Manhal, III, fol. 64b, 11. 6-8.
5) NAujim, V, p. 528, 11. 1-2; VI, p. 55, 1. 2; p. z121, 11. 19-21; p. 228, 11. 2-6;
p. 253, 11. 9-23; pp. 480-481; p. 496, 11. 2-7. Ibn al-Furit, IX, p. 371, 11. I 1-1 5.
For additional data on the nafaqa see Ibn al-Furit, IX, p. 163, 11. 2-4. Nujlm,
V, p. 4Io, 11. I-2; VI, p. 53, 1. 6.
6) Nujzth, VII, p. 6 o, in the notes.
3) Ha.wddith,
11. I5-I7; p. 623,
(KM) III, p. 246, 11. p.4-7;
11. 9-io; 264,P.11.6z5, 11.p.2-3.
z-3; IV, 119, Ibn Iyis,
11. 6-9; II, p. 94,
p. 382, 11. 10o-I; p. o107,
11. 17-20; V, p. 26, 11. 4-6; P. 113, 1. 22; p. I23, 1. I9; p. 124, 11. 4-6.
4) Nujim, VII, p. 8J2, 11. 13-16. HIawddith, p. 678, 11. 7-15; PP. 68x, 1. zz22-
682, 1. 3; p. 682, 11. 12-14. Ibn Iyis (KM), III, p. 20, 11. 22-23; p. 21, 11. I-5, 7-9;
p. 31, 11. 13-t7; P. h 7e, 11. 12-14; P. 33, 11. 3-5 ; IV, p. 2t, 11. 6-d n.
6) See the references in the preceding note.
luks was not confined to the nafaqa, but included other kinds of pay:
as usual" (ba'atha, arsala, .hamala an-nafaqa ild al-umard' 'ald jdrf al-'dda).4)
It happened only once in Mamluk history - on the eve of the battle of
Marj Dibiq - that the Amirs of Forty and the Amirs of Ten (but not
the Amirs of a Thousand) received the nafaqa in a pay-parade.5)
Until the days of Sultan Barsbay (825/i422-842/1438) the nafaqa was
paid to the Royal Mamluks first and only afterwards to the amirs.
When Barsbiy reversed, in 836/1433, this time-honoured order and paid
2) Nujim, VII, p. 450. Ibn Iyis, IV, p. 22; p. 25; pp. 65-66. See also the
references p. 58, note 4.
3) See the references p. 58, note 4.
4) Ibn Iyis, I1, p. 41, 11. 22-23; p. 67, 11. 7-9; P. 93, 1. 19; p. 103, 1. 24; P.
Io6, 1. 6; (KM) III, p. 25, 11. 3-8; p. 246, 1. i; p. 264,1. 4; p. 312, 11. 19-20; IV, p.
322, 11. 15-21; p. 384, 11. I2-16.
3) Ibn Iyis, V, p. 28, 11. 14-23.
3) Ibn Iyas, II, p. Io03, 1. 24; p. 222, 11. 6-7; (KM) III, p. 22, 11. 5-Io; IV, p.
322, 11. 15-22; p. 384,11. iz-i6. Cf. also Nujim, VII, p. 648; p. 65o, 1. 12.
4) Nujzm, V, pp. 14-1S; VI, p. 228, 11. 2-6; p. 25 3, 11. 9-23; p. 496, 11. 2-7; p.
644; pp. 685, 1. 20-686, 1. 5; VII, pp. 648, 1. 15-649, 1. 3; P. 758, 11. z-4.
Harwddith, p. 5o6, 11. 12-16; p. 698, 11. 1i-12; p. 702, 11. 3-8. IbnIlys (KM), III,
p. 7, 11. 5-I8; p. 22, 11. 5-IO; V, p. 27, 11. Io, 22-28. In 813/1410o Sultan Faraj
paid the following nafaqa to the members of the expeditionary force which
marched against Sultan (then amir) al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh: to 2 of his highest
ranking Amirs of a Thousand - 6,oo000 dinars each; to the rest of the Amirs of a
Thousand - 2,000 dinars each; to each Amir of Forty - 500oo dinars; to each
Amir of Twenty - 300 dinars; to each Amir of Ten - 200 dinars; to each
Mamluk - ioo dinars (Ta'rikhQaytbay, B.M.MS., Or. 3028, fol. 39a, 1. ii -
39b, 1. 3). When Sultan Baybars I visited Alexandria in 66I/I'263 he gave each
of his amirs a nafaqa ranging between 3,000 and 100oo dinars, according to his rank
(Ibn 'Abd
Baybars az-.Zihir,
granted Sirat (about
200,000 dirhams arz-Zio,ooo000
dhir Baybars, fol.army
dinars) to the 68a,of 11.
the 13-1). In 662/1264
Syrian coast (al-'askar as-sdhili) (ibid., fol. 8Ia, 11. 3-y). This seems
that the size of that army was quite small.
i) Ibn Q .di Shuhba, fol. 36a, 11. 10o-15. Cf. also the following sources
which quote somewhat different figures: Nluj'm, V, p. 414, 11. i- 6; p. 477,11.
4-20; p. 488, 11. I 5-I7. Ibn al-Furit, IX, p. 142, 11. 24-26.
2) Ibn Iyis, (KM), III, p. 22, 11. J-I0.
3) Hlawadith, p. 687, 11. 7-8; p. 702, 11. 3-8.
4) Ibn Iyis (KM), III, p. 7, 11. 5-18. In addition to the nafaqa the amirs
received daily rations (raawdtib) of meat, spices, bread, fodder and oil. The most
important amongst them received a dress (kiswa) as well. In RamadSin the
sultan's favourite amirs received sugar and sweets and in the feast of sacrifice
they received sheep (Sub1, IV, p. y , 11. 7-Io; p. 6, 11. 17-18. Daw' as-Subh, p.
2J8, 11. I6-I19; p. 263,11. 7-9. Khi/at, II, p. 2zi6, 11. I6-I8, 27-29).
5) Because of the scantiness of our information on pay to the mamluks of the
amirs, the data on all their kinds of pay were gathered in the present section.
6) See, for example, Nquj'm, VII, p. 694, 11. I o-13.
IX, 2)
pp. Nuji~m,
76, 1. 22-77,V,1. p. 4I1, the
3. From 1. i.sizeIbn Q.di
of the Shuhba,
nafaqa receivedfol. 38b,
by the 11.it isi-2.
amirs Ibn al-Furit,
made clear that their mamluks got a much smaller nafaqa than that of the Royal
Mamluks. Take for example the case of the Amir of Ten, who was usually al-
lotted zoo dinars. Even if that amir had been content with half that sum, the
second half would have been distributed between those of his mamluks who
accompanied him to the field of battle and the number of whom was some-
times more than five. The same conclusion is true of the nafaqa of the mamulks
of the amirs of higher categories, though these might have received a somewhat
bigger sum than that of the mamluks of the Amirs of Ten.
3) Nujtm, VII, p. 3 9 ', 11. 8- u .
a fight against its curtailment. Indeed, these mamluks did not cons
any political power to reckon with. Their subdued behaviour and
effacement before their masters stand in glaring contrast to the viril
offensive spirit which marks the attitude of the Royal Mamluks to
the sultan. No wonder, therefore, that the freedman of a Mamluk
had small scope for advancement and that he could never hope to
come a sultan himself.1)
When it was decided to cancel a campaign after having distribute
nafaqa, the mamluks had to return the money. This was usually
difficult procedure, for by that time most of the money would al
have been spent. The only way left was to deduct the nafaqa by i
ments from thejdmdkiya (the mamluks were exempted, however,
returning the sum they spent on buying a camel.2) The following
cident is instructive in this connection. Sultan Barsbly decided in
1433 to pay the nafaqa to the army in order to deceive Qari Yalak
Aq-Quyunlu chieftain and make him believe that the mamluk
determined to attack him. The nafaqa was distributed, however, on
the amirs, for it was considered much easier to get the money back
them than from the ordinary mamluks, as the contemporary sour
plicitly states.3)
The largest nafaqa was given to soldiers who took part in expedi
ishtakda
11. 2z-I4). min makhdimihi amara bi-inSdfihi minbu (Ibn 'Abd az-.Z hir, fol. 7Ia,
2) Ibn Iyus, IV, pp. 6I2, 1. 20-i22, 1. 8.
3) Nujim, VI, pp. 686-687 and especially p. 687, 11. 1-6.
The Nafaqa during the Campaign and on the Army's Return Home
The main pay in connection with a campaign was given to the mem-
bers of the military expedition on the eve of its departure. Usually this
was the only pay throughout the campaign. It did occur, however, that
the army received an additional nafaqa either during the campaign1) or
immediately on its return home.2) These payments were much lower
than the original nafaqa.
To be concluded
2) Nujum,
Shuhba, fol. 4ob, 11.VI,
21-24.p. 6i, 11. I2-13. Ibn al-Furlt, IX, p. 32, 11. i8-2o. Ibn Q.di