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Perception
Perception
First Form of Mind
T Y L E R BU R G E
1
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Acknowledgments
Chapter 1: Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature,
© 1950, 1951, 1952, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1972,
1977, 1978, 1986, 1997 by Iris Murdoch. Used by permission of Penguin Books, an imprint
of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights
reserved.
Chapter 3: Stephen E. Palmer, Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology, The MIT Press,
1999, p. 32.
Chapter 6: W.G. Sebald, translated by Michael Hulse, from The Rings of Saturn, © 1995 by
Vito von Eichborn GmbH & Co Verlag KG. Translation © 1998 by The Harvill Press.
Reprinted by permission of New Directions Publishing Corp.
Chapter 11: William Blake, Notebook, British Library Add MS 49460, 3rd and 4th lines
from first draft of the poem.
Chapter 16: Excerpt from Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited
© 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1967 by Vladimir Nabokov. Used by permission of
Alfred A. Knopf, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of
Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.
Chapter 19: Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence,
© 1988 by Hans Moravec. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Contents
Preface xi
Animal Eyes xxi
Figures xxii
Abbreviations xxiv
PA RT I . P E R C E P T IO N
1. Introduction 3
Biological Function, Action, Sensing, and Perception—The Emergence of Mind 3
Principal Aims of the Book 10
The Fregean Source of Key Semantical Notions for Perception 15
2. Perception 19
Perceptual States as Sensory States 20
Representation and Information Registration 21
Representation and Veridicality Conditions 28
Representations and Representational Contents 30
The Three Fundamental Representational Constituents in Perceptual States 36
The Basic Representational Form of Perceptual States 49
Perception as Objectification 50
Perceptual Constancy—First Mark of Representational Mind 60
3. Perceptual Constancy: A Central Natural Psychological Kind 64
Scientific Practice Demarcates Perceptual Constancies from
Other Invariances 65
Two Misguided Ways of Thinking About Perceptual Constancies 70
Even Non-Perceptual Invariances Contribute to the Fitness of Individuals
that Sense 74
Efference Copy: An Example of a Non-Perceptual Invariance 76
Path Integration: Another Non-Perceptual Invariance 78
Very Simple Perceptual Color and Lightness Constancies 80
Retinal Image Contour Registration and Surface Contour Perception 82
Visual Spatial Property and Relation Constancies 90
Visual Body Categorization 91
Visual Spatial Perceptual Constancies and Body Categorization 94
Visual Temporal Perceptual Constancies 99
PA RT I I . F O R M
4. Some Basics about Perceptual Systems 109

Principles Governing Transitions Contrasted with Representational Contents 109
Perception, Computation, and the Language-of-Thought Hypothesis 111
Representational-Dependence Hierarchies in Perceptual Attribution 118
Two Methodological Points About Natural-Kind and Functional Attributives 120
Taxonomic Hierarchies in Perception 124
viii contents
5. Perceptual Reference Requires Perceptual Attribution 131

Basic Form of Perceptual Contents 131
Perceptual Reference is Partly Guided by Perceptual Attribution 133
Support for (AA1) 134
Support for (AA2) 143
General Remarks on Attributives and Perceptual Discrimination 146
Criticism of Two Attempted Rejections of (AA1) and (AA2) 148
6. Form and Semantics of Representational Contents of Perceptual States 156
Review of Basic Form of Perceptual Representation 156
Perception of Property-Instances 159
Betokening and Four Types of Perceptual Attribution 169
Perceptual Attribution of Relations 175
Scope Hierarchies in Perceptual Content 179
Scope and Modificational Attribution Hierarchy 185
Absence in Perception of Negations, Conditionals, Disjunctions,
Quantifiers 190
Perceptual Contents, Propositions, and Noun Phrases 201
7. Perceptual Attributives and Referential Applications in Perceptual
Constancies 208
Perceptual Constancies and Frege’s Sense–Bedeutung Distinction: Similarities 208
Perceptual Constancies and Frege’s Sense–Bedeutung Distinction:
Differences 213
Minimalism: Defocus and Color Constancy 214
Minimalism and Iconic Representation in a Spatial Coordinate System 219
Perceptual Units in Packages in Iconic Visual Spatial Representation 233
Linkage of Different Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual Constancies 237
The Form of Perceptual Attributives in Linkages 241
Accuracy Conditions for Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual Constancies 244
Referential Applications in Accuracy Conditions for Tracking Particulars 248
8. Egocentric Indexing in Perceptual Spatial and Temporal Frameworks 255
Egocentric Spatial Indexes in Perception 255
Egocentric Temporal Frameworks and Perceptual Representation of Motion 264
Is Temporal Representation Constitutive to Perceptual Representation? 275
9. The Iconic Nature of Perception 293
Noun-Phrase-Like Structure and Iconic Representation in Perception 296
Iconic Aspects of Perceptual Spatial Representation 304
Temporal, Qualitative, and Packaging Iconic Aspects of Visual Perception 312
Iconic Visual Perception and Maps or Pictures 314
Some Ways Not to Think about Iconic Representation 315
Iconic Perception, Iconic Concepts, Iconic Representation in Propositional
Thought 331
Part–Whole Representation in Pictures and Visual Perception 334
Compositionality in Iconic Perceptual Representation 347
Spatial Mapping in Visual Perception Again: The Non-Planar Surface
of the Scene 350
Relations Between Iconic Format and Representational Content 355
The Tractability of Iconic Attributional Complexity 360
contents ix
PA RT I I I . F O R M AT IO N
10. First-Formed Perception: Its Richness and Autonomy 367

What are First-Formed Perceptual States Like?: Three Limitative Views 367
Framework 372
Marr’s 2½-D Sketch 378
Change Detection 380
Treisman’s Binding Theory 383
Two Lines of Empirical Criticism of Treisman’s Theory 391
Philosophical Views Influenced by Treisman’s Binding Theory 401
Two Types of First-Formed Perception 405
11. Intra-Saccadic Perception and Recurrent Processing 409
Two Changes in Scientific Understanding of Perception-Formation 409
Some Main Brain Areas Involved in Visual Processing 413
Timing of Visual Processing; Some Main Types of Representation 420
Categorization and Timing 423
Levels of Specificity in Perceptual Categorization 427
Perceptual Constancies in Categorization Processing 431
12. Further Attributives: Primitive Attribution of Causation, Agency 433
Methodology for Finding Perceptual Attributives 433
Primitive Attribution of Mechanical Causation 446
Primitive Attribution of Agency 466
Attribution of Further Structural Elements of Agency 475
PA RT I V. SYS T E M
13. Perceptual-Level Representation and Categorization 483

Perceptual Categorization is Perceptual 487
Richer Perceptual Categorization and Perceptual Processing that
Contributes to It 493
14. Conation: Relatively Primitive, Perceptually Guided Action 502
Action Imperialism 502
Relatively Primitive Action 504
Form of Relatively Primitive Conative States 508
Broader Structure of Conation in Causing Relatively Primitive Action 512
Summary: Philosophical Issues 526
15. Perceptual Attention 531
Forms of Perceptual Attention 532
Attention and Accuracy 537
Sources and Levels of Attention 545
Perceptual-Level Attention Commands and Guidance of Saccades 547
The Executive Control System and Propositional Drivers 556
Supra-Perceptual Effects on Perceptual-Level Operations: An Example 565
16. Perceptual Memory I: Shorter Term Systems 567
Perceptual Memory and Consciousness 569
Priming and Memory 570
x contents
Visual Sensory Memory 572

Fragile Visual Short-Term Memory 575
Trans-Saccadic Memory 576
Visual Working Memory 584
Conceptual Short-Term Memory 599
17. Perceptual Memory II: Visual Perceptual Long-Term Memory 609
Overview 609
Ability-General Long-Term Visual Perceptual Memory 613
Episodic Visual Memory; De Re Long-Term Non-Episodic Visual Memory 619
Perceptual and Conceptual Attributives in Long-Term Memory 622
Summary of Relations Among Major Types of Visual Perceptual Memory 623
18. Perceptual Learning, Perceptual Anticipation, Perceptual Imagining 625
Perceptual Learning 625
Perceptual Anticipation 630
Perceptual Imagining 641
19. Perception and Cognition 647
The Original Epistemic Grounds for Reflecting on Cognitive Influence
on Perception 649
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s Conceptions of Modularity; The Visual System
as a Module 655
Uses and Misuses of the Term ‘Cognition’ 662
The Issue of Cognitive Penetration 677
Framework Issues 680
Conceptions of Penetration 684
The Cognitive Penetration Controversy 693
A Computational Construal of Modularity 701
Psychological Systems and Psychological Kinds 710
The Empiricist Model of Perception and Conception: Degrees of Abstraction 714
What Should Count as Cognition? 722
20. Conclusion 735
Emergence of Representational Mind 735
Empirical Characteristics of First-Formed Perceptions 738
Changes in the Science; Reading the Changes Philosophically 740
Perception: Form and Representational Content 744
Perception: The Seed of New Things to Live and Die For 746
Bibliography 749
Author Index 813
Subject Index 839
Preface
This book is not the one that I set out to write over twelve years ago. I had intended to fol-
low Origins of Objectivity with an account of what is distinctive about the main represen-
tational capacity more advanced than perception. I thought, and still think, that that
capacity is propositional representation. I took some steps in that direction in the Petrus
Hispanus Lectures, Lisbon, 2009, and the Nicod Lectures, Paris, 2010, and developed an
argument for connecting propositionality, constitutively, with propositional deductive
inference. I remain interested in that other book, and hope to complete it. But it was
pre-empted.
In writing a lead-up to discussing propositional capacities, I wanted to elaborate an
account of perception. Perception is, I think, the first representational capacity to evolve. It
is the main pre-propositional representational capacity. The lead-up was intended to be a
relatively concise refinement of the account of perception in the last chapters of Origins of
Objectivity, a refinement that now occupies approximately Chapters 1–3 of this book.
I became interested in vision just before I spent a semester teaching at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1982. My interest resulted in part from reading David
Marr’s important book, Vision. Although Marr died before I arrived at MIT, I audited
courses in perceptual psychology by Marr’s former colleagues during the visit. I later wrote
some articles on vision and made it a central theme of Origins of Objectivity (2010).
During work on that book and later, I benefitted from discussions of vision science with
my son, Johannes Burge, who is currently a vision scientist at the University of
Pennsylvania. After 2010, I came to understand the science more thoroughly, and devel-
oped ideas about structural and semantical issues associated with perception. I did so
through giving a series of graduate seminars at University of California Los Angeles
(UCLA), and through discussing the science with various scientists—especially in person
with David Brainard, Bill Geisler, and Shimon Ullman, and via correspondence with
Jeffrey Schall and Yaffa Yeshurun—and with Ned Block, one of few philosophers who ser
iously engages with the science. In writing the refinement of the Origins account of visual
perception, I soon realized that I had too much material to present in a run-up to another
topic, in a single book. The preliminary became the whole.
The book is about first form of representational mind. I take perception to be the most
primitive type of representational mind. Relevant first form is three-fold.
One type of first form is the representational structure of perception. Here, first form is
the first representational form that emerges in the evolution of representational mind.
This form is center-stage in Chapters 1–9. I had the main ideas about this structure when I
wrote Origins, but I discovered much more in thinking through its details, applying it to
cases, developing a semantics for it, and reflecting on how it is embedded in the iconic
format of perception.
A central theme in the book, centered in Parts I and II, is developing the foundations
for a systematic semantics for perceptual states. Perceptual psychology takes perceptual
states to be accurate or inaccurate. One of its main aims is to explain, causally, how
xii preface
accurate and inaccurate perceptual states are formed. It has, however, paid little attention
to explaining what it is for such states to be accurate or inaccurate, or to reflecting on how
representational capacities combine to yield a form of representation. Nor have these
issues been related to the obvious iconic nature of perceptual representation. I take steps
toward remedying this situation. In the course of doing so, I think that I have discovered
some basic aspects of attribution, the root of predication. Predication in language and
thought has been a longstanding topic of philosophical reflection, beginning with Aristotle
and Kant, and developing mainly in Frege, but also in Tarski and Strawson. Traditionally,
the topic has been pursued by reflection on logic. I have found it enlightening to reflect on
its roots in perception.
The second type of first form of representational mind is the first-formed states in the
order of perceptual processing. What is the nature of the perceptual states that are formed
fastest? What properties in the environment do they represent? What sort of processing
leads to them? There are empirical answers to these questions, at least for mammalian
vision. These answers provide a starting point for reflecting on what the fastest-formed
perceptual states are like in lower animals and even in evolutionary history. Of course,
each species must be considered on its own. I do not much discuss lower animals, nor do I
provide an evolutionary account, although I occasionally comment on those topics. This
second type of first form is center-stage in Chapters 10–11. Issues about later-formed per-
ceptual representations, such as those used in perceptual recognition of individuals, and
perhaps for causation, agency, and functional attributes, such as mate or edible, are
touched on in Chapter 12.
The third type of first form of representational mind is a natural-kind system of repre-
sentational capacities, with perception at the representational center of the system. The
systems that I highlight are the visual-perceptual system and the visuo-motor system.
The two systems intersect and overlap. What it is to be part of these systems is the
central theme of Part IV, Chapters 13–19. I believe that perception shares its representa-
tional structure and content, outlined in Chapters 2–12, with several other representational
capacities. Generically, the capacities are conation, attention-initiation, memory, affect,
learning, anticipation, and imagining. I think that the listed generic capacities have
perceptual-level species—species that have representational structures and contents that are
essentially those of perception. These capacities differ from perception in mode (memory
vs. perception) and transition-operations, not in form or content. The notion of represen-
tational level is explained in Chapter 1, the section The Principal Aims of the
B ook, and again, more fully, at the beginning of Chapter 13.
Perceptual-level species of the listed capacities share attributional content with percep-
tion. They share attributional and iconic structure with perception. And they involve
operations or transformations that are either similar to those in perception-formation
itself, or at least not more sophisticated than they are. These sub-species join with percep-
tion to form two large, natural-kind psychological systems—the perceptual system and
the perceptual-motor system. These systems are unified (a) in sharing a function (contrib-
uting to perception in the first case, contributing to perceptually guided action in the sec-
ond), and (b) in sharing the representational structure of perception. They are also unified
(c) in using only representational attributive contents in or borrowed from perception;
and (d) in being held together by computational causal processes both within perception
and between perception and the perceptual-level species of the listed generic capacities.
preface xiii
Again, the relevant perceptual-level species are perception-guided conation, perceptual-

attention initiations (or attention commands), perceptual memory, perceptual affect, per-
ceptual learning, perceptual anticipation, and perceptual imagining.
I think that these two large, overlapping systems—the perceptual system and the
perceptual-motor system—constitute the natural-kind center of lower representational
mind. I conjecture that variants of these systems, sometimes perhaps omitting one or two
of the auxiliary capacities—such as perceptual imagining—or adding other auxiliary
capacities—like amodal mapping—occur in all animal perceivers, from insects to human
beings. These systems and the perceptual-level capacity-species are discussed in Chapters
13–19, focusing on visual perception and visually guided action.
The three notions of first form are associated with the general plan of the book. Parts I
and II discuss what perception is. Part III centers on how perception works—how it is
formed and the nature and scope of its processing. Part IV treats relations between per-
ception and satellite capacities, and wherein they form a unified perceptual system and
perceptual-motor system.
A further theme runs through nearly all parts of the book. The theme is opposition—
sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit—to a way of thinking about perception started by
the classical empiricists, Locke and Hume. In trying to understand the main features of
perception, this approach takes too seriously intuitive groupings and senses of similarity
via introspection of conscious perceptual experience. It also errs by distinguishing percep-
tion from conception primarily in terms of differences in abstraction. Perception is sup-
posed to operate toward the concrete end. Conception, toward the abstract end. The
spectrum is intuitive—not very carefully explained. My opposition is centered in reflect-
ing on the explanatory practice of perceptual psychology. It also derives from reflecting on
the form, content, function, capacities, and uses that turn up in systematic explanation—
causal and semantical.
As with language, so with perception, understanding representational form and content
depends not on introspection of intuitively salient features of the vehicle of representation
(sentence or image-like-representation), but on competencies that underlie use of the rep-
resentation. Intuitive reflection on sentential structure would treat it as linear and as simply
being composed of a string of words. Reflection, in logic and linguistics, informed by sys-
tematic consideration of sentential use, reveals a hierarchical structure with words forming
phrase units that are not immediately obvious to intuition. Finding representational struc-
ture in perception is parallel. It depends not primarily on introspection of conscious per-
ceptual images, but on systematic reflection on the capacities evinced in uses and
transformations of perceptions. This reflection must consider the representational func-
tions of perception and the structures of capacities discovered in empirical science. Most of
what there is to be understood about perception is unconscious. All operations that lead to
perceptions are unconscious, and there are many unconscious perceptions. Moreover, given
the way in which perceptual discriminative capacities, and their use in guiding action, are
molded, in evolution and learning, by perceiver-needs and by frequently unobvious causal
and statistical patterns in the environment, one cannot rely on introspection of images,
and intuitive types of image-similarity to understand perception—even the iconic, broadly
image-like character of vision. Perceptual grouping does not in general conform to intuitive
image-similarity. Yet all perceptual groupings are grounded, at least partly, in shape-size-
motion attributions, plotted iconically in an image-like way in perceptual representation.
xiv preface
The book is resolutely a work in philosophy of science—specifically philosophy of

psychology. Perceptual psychology, centrally the psychophysics of vision, has become a
mature science in the last fifty years. It gives philosophy an opportunity to understand
important features of psychological capacities at a level of depth, rigor, and empirical
groundedness that has never before been attainable. Philosophy should leap at the oppor-
tunity to make use of such a powerful and rapidly advancing science, as a basis for philo-
sophical understanding. Some philosophy of perception makes no use at all of perceptual
psychology. Much philosophy of perception makes at best decorative use. I think that it is
no longer intellectually responsible to philosophize about perception without knowing
and seriously engaging with that science. I believe that the practice of centering philo-
sophical reflection about perception on phenomenology, or on analysis of ordinary talk
about perception, without closely connecting the reflection with what is known from sci-
ence (a centering that is a residue of the early empiricist model of perception), and the
practice of allowing epistemology to guide reflection on what perception must be like, will
all soon become museum pieces of past, misdirected philosophy.
Most of the book’s claims are, of course, supported only empirically, by interpreting the
empirical results of the science. Some of the claims are, however, supported apriori. One
should not confuse apriority with innateness, certainty, obviousness, infallibility, dogma-
tism, unrevisability, or immunity from revision based on empirical considerations. To
be apriori supported, or apriori warranted, is to have support or warrant that does not
depend for its force on perception or on sensing. Most apriori warranted judgments in
this book are warranted by reflection that yields understanding of key concepts or prin
ciples used or presupposed in the science. All the relevant apriori judgments are synthetic,
certainly in the sense of being non-vacuous and the sense of not being truths of logic.
I think that the judgments are also synthetic in the sense of not being the products of ana
lysis of conceptual complexes into concepts contained in the complexes. I think that most
concepts that are central to our discussion are not complexes. They are simple. They are,
however, necessarily and apriori embedded in networks with other concepts. Reasoning
through such networks sometimes yields synthetic apriori understanding of foundations
of mind.
Apriori supported judgments can be further supported empirically, by the science. But
insofar as they are apriori warranted, they have sufficient warrant to support belief; and
the warrant derives from reasoning or understanding, independently of support from per-
ception, perceptual experience, or sensory registration. An example of an apriori war-
ranted judgment, I think, is that perceptual states can be accurate or inaccurate. Another
example is that perceptual states have a representational function—to accurately pick out
and characterize particulars via causal relations to them: perceptual states fail in some way
(representationally) if they are not accurate. I doubt that one can know apriori that any
individual has perceptual capacities. Our empirical knowledge that we do have such
capacities is, however, firm. It is more certain than some things that we know apriori about
perception. As noted, being apriori does not imply some super-strong type of support.
Apriori warrant for belief in simple arithmetical truths is super-strong. But much apriori
support is not stronger, often less strong, than strong empirical support.
Our firm empirical knowledge that individuals have perceptual states does not require a
detailed, reflective, philosophical understanding of what perception is. Knowing that indi-
viduals have perceptual states requires only a minimal understanding. One must be able to
preface xv
distinguish perception, at least by some cases, from just any sensing. And one must be able
to recognize various examples of perception. Detailed philosophical understanding
requires reflection, articulation, and elaboration of a minimal understanding of the con-
cept perception and of relations between perception and other matters—semantical, func-
tional, biological, causal, and so on. Elaboration is mainly empirical, but partly apriori. Given
an elaborated understanding of what perception is, it is possible to draw, apriori, some fur-
ther conclusions about the form, semantics, and functions of perceptual states. Such con-
clusions are abstract and limited. They are important in being basic to understanding.
Again, most of the book’s claims are empirical. For example, the accounts of how per-
ceptual and perceptual-motor systems work in Parts III and IV, and the accounts of what
these systems are in Part IV, are warranted partly by appeal to explanations in the science.
Those accounts and those explanations are certainly empirically, not apriori, warranted.
I became interested in perception partly because it promises insight into basic types of
representation of the world, and partly because it is a key factor that must be understood if
one is to understand empirical knowledge. This book shows some fruits of the first motiv
ation. In investigating the structure and semantics of perceptual representation, one inves-
tigates primitive and basic types of reference and attribution. My interest in the role of
perception in empirical knowledge remains. But I take understanding perception to owe
almost nothing to epistemology, whereas understanding epistemology absolutely requires
understanding perception. Epistemology investigates epistemic norms for capacities that
can contribute to obtaining knowledge. One cannot understand the norms without under-
standing the capacities. One understands perceptual capacities by reflecting on empirical
science and its basic commitments, not by reflecting on epistemology. Understanding per-
ception is the task of this book. Epistemic use of an understanding of perception is poster
ior. For epistemic work in this direction, see my ‘Perceptual Entitlement’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), 503–548; and ‘Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical
Warrant’, in P. Graham and N. Pedersen eds., Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020).
I have some slight hope, even in this specialized world, that this book will interest not
only philosophers, but at least some scientists in perceptual psychology and other areas of
psychology. The best science is informed by a breadth and depth of perspective that is
philosophical. This point is particularly relevant to perceptual psychology. A central, often
stated, aim of the science is to understand conditions in which accurate perception occurs,
and conditions under which illusions occur. (See Chapter 1, note 25.) Accuracy is a
semantical concept.
So the science is committed at its very core to there being a semantics for perception—a
systematic account of relations between perceptual representation and its subject matters.
The account must explain what it is for perception to be accurate or inaccurate. Of course,
the science is mainly concerned with causal patterns and mechanisms. Much of it, indeed
probably most of it to date, focuses on pre-representational, pre-perceptual states that
register the proximal stimulus. But the point of this scientific work is partly to build
toward understanding perception of the physical environment. Part of understanding per-
ception scientifically is to understand not only the causal patterns that lead to accurate
and inaccurate perception, but also to understand the form and content of perceptual
states, and what it is for them to be accurate or inaccurate.
xvi preface
Yet the science has paid no serious attention to these issues—specifically to semantics.
It has not developed a vocabulary or set of principles that enable it to discuss accuracy and
inaccuracy of perception with the precision and clarity of its accounts of causal, forma-
tional aspects of psychological states and processes. It provides no answers to questions
like ‘What is it for a perceptual state to be accurate or inaccurate?’, ‘What sorts of represen-
tational competencies are involved in forming a state that is accurate or inaccurate?’; ‘In
what ways can a perception be partly accurate and partly inaccurate?’; ‘What is the repre-
sentational form or structure of perceptual states?’. Such questions are addressed in Parts I
and II of the book.
Scientific understanding of perception is incomplete if it does not incorporate a system-
atic semantical understanding of perceptual states into its understanding of principles
according to which perceptual states are causally generated. Semantical understanding is
understanding of the representational contents, their forms, and their accuracy condi-
tions—the conditions for representational success. Perceptual psychology would benefit
from mastering the vocabulary necessary to think systematically about the semantics of
perception.
Philosophy is the source of modern work in semantics—first the semantics of mathem
atics and logic, later the semantics of natural language. The basic semantical concepts, in
something like their modern form, come from Gottlob Frege, about 130 years ago. In the
last section of Chapter 1, I explain some of Frege’s basic concepts. I think that these con-
cepts, with some modification, are valuable in understanding perception, even though
they were first developed for understanding much higher-level representation—represen-
tation in mathematics.
I think that parts of the science need not only a deeper grip on semantics, but a much
more rigorous terminology. Uses of terms like ‘representation’, ‘knowledge’, ‘cognition’,
‘recognition’, ‘judgment’, ‘belief ’, ‘concept’, ‘prediction’, ‘intention’, ‘voluntary’ are far from
reflective, much less standardized, in the science. Assimilating the whys and wherefores of
terminology, is often the beginning of better, more fruitful empirical inquiry. Centrally, in
Chapter 19, the section Uses and Misuses of the Term ‘Cognition’, but also
throughout the book, there is a concerted effort to emphasize sharper uses of key mental-
istic terms so as to respect basic differences in representational level. Such differences cor-
respond to important differences in representational kinds—that is, representational
capacities.
This is a long, complex book. Understanding anything well requires effort and patience.
Genuine philosophical and scientific understanding cannot be grabbed off the shelf. The
time and effort required to understand this book will be considerable. One cannot get
there in a few sittings. The key point is to read and reread carefully and slowly, noting and
reflecting on nuances and qualifications, mastering terminology, reading in context, con-
necting different contexts together, reading the footnotes, going back to earlier passages—
all the while, reflecting. Few readers outside philosophy ever read this way. Most
philosophers have, I think, lost the art. Iris Murdoch, in harmony with the marvelous
quote that heads Chapter 1, wrote: ‘In philosophy, the race is to the slow’. Too many race at
high speeds. The psychological and sociological pressures to form opinions and publish
them quickly, and often, are very strong. Academic pressures and computer fluency have
yielded much more writing, with no more time to master the increasingly complex topics
written about. Careless reading, misdirected criticism, uninformed opinions, simplistic
preface xvii
proposals abound. Perhaps it was always so. However, as knowledge grows—and grows
more complex—lack of patience in pursuing understanding is an increasingly debilitating
vice. Given that philosophical understanding of this book’s topics has become harder—
because more is known and what is known is more complex—patience is more required
than ever.
For those who may have some interest in the book, but are not initially willing to invest
large of amounts of time in it, I set out a plan for getting some of the book’s gist. My hope
is that after achieving an overview, some readers will be tempted to go back for more—not
just noting fine points, but mastering the book’s conceptual framework and conceptual
intricacies.
For vision scientists, Parts I–II deal with the least familiar ideas—principally, the repre-
sentational form and semantics of perception. Part III and Chapters 13–18 in Part IV
mainly describe matters that many vision or visuo-motor scientists are familiar with,
although these passages cast those matters in a conceptual form that may be more unified
than specialized accounts provide. Chapter 19 of Part IV, supported by Chapters 13–18,
presents a large view of the visual system and visuo-motor system that uses perhaps famil-
iar empirical materials to develop a possibly less familiar, or more sharply articulated,
view of those systems as wholes.
For those, either vision scientists or others, who simply want to get a sense for the main
lines of thought, I offer the following, tentative guide.
I recommend, in Part I, the first two sections of Chapter 1 and all of Chapter 2. In
Chapter 3, I recommend the prologue and the section Retinal Image Contour
Registration and Surface Contour Perception. This section illustrates con-
cretely how I think perceptual constancies are distinguished from other invariances in
visual perception.
In Part II, I recommend the prologue at the beginning of Chapter 4, and the third and
fifth sections of the chapter (Representational-D ependence Hierarchies in
Perceptual Attribution and Taxonomic Hierarchies in Perception). In
Chapter 5, I recommend the first two sections (Basic Form of Perceptual
Contents and Perceptual Reference is Partly Guided by Perceptual
Attribution). In Chapter 6, I recommend the first three and the last of the sections
(Review of Basic Form of Perceptual Representation; Perception of
Property Instances; Betokening and Four Types of Perceptual
Attribution; and Perceptual Contents, Propositions, and Noun
Phrase). Chapter 7 gives the central account of the semantics of perception. This may be
hard to follow if one has skipped too much of the slow development of concepts that lead
up to it. The key section is the next- to-
last one (Accuracy Conditions for
Perceptual Attributives in Perceptual Constancies). Chapter 8 centers
on the way space and time are represented in visual perception. It can be skipped by those
not interested in details of perceptual representational structure. Chapter 9 connects basic
representational structure (the structure of reference and attribution) with the iconic form
of visual perception. The key sections are the first and the last two (Noun-P hrase-L ike
Structure and Iconic Representation in Perception; Relations
Between Iconic Format and Representational Content; and The
Tractability of Iconic Attributional Complexity).
xviii preface
In Part III, I recommend the prologue at the beginning of Chapter 10 and the first and
last sections of that chapter (What Are First-F ormed Perceptual States
Like?: Three Limitative Views and Two Types of First- F ormed
Perception). In Chapter 11, I recommend the prologue and the first section (Two
Changes in Scientific Understanding of Perception-F ormation). The
second section is a brief run-through of the course that visual processing takes in the
brain. The main points will be familiar to any vision scientist. The remaining sections pro-
vide basic facts about timing and about perceptual categorization. They may be skimmed
or skipped by those seeking only gist. All these sections in Chapter 11 are mainly descrip-
tive—with some improvements, I think, in conceptual rigor—of facts familiar to many
vision scientists. Chapter 12 has a methodological discussion of considerations that bear
on whether an attributive is, or should be, considered a perceptual attributive—an attribu-
tive, or characterizer, generated in the visual system (Methodology for Finding
Perceptual Attributives). That section tries to codify and state more precisely
methods already in place in the science.
Part IV treats the visual system at a level of generality far from the focused empirical
studies that make up most of the science. The prologue for Chapter 13 is recommended. It
sets the plan of Part IV. Readers trying for an overview can pick and choose within, or
skip, Chapters 13–18. These chapters discuss categorization, conation, attention, various
forms of short- term memory, long- term memory, affect, learning, anticipation, and
imagining. The chapters develop the idea that all these capacities have functions at the
representational level of perception. As noted, the notion of level is explained briefly in
Chapter 1 and in more detail at the beginning of Chapter 13. The chapters are part of an
extended argument that the perceptual-level functions and operations of these capacities
occur within the visual system or the visuo-motor system, in a specific sense of ‘occur
within’. Chapter 19 can be read by sampling the beginning of each section, then determin-
ing how much further to read. Chapter 19 uses work in Chapters 13–18 to develop the
idea that the perceptual system—for which the visual system is paradigmatic—and the
perceptual-motor system are lower representational mind. A proposal for understanding
the unity of lower representational mind is advanced in A Computational
Construal of Modularity. Although I explore some intermediate territory in
What Should Count as Cognition?, I think that lower representational mind
contrasts most dramatically with capacities for propositional inference and language, the
more primitive of which constitute the first capacities in upper representational mind. I
believe that the most important feature of upper representational mind is competence to
produce explanations. This capacity develops into science, moral thinking and practice,
and, most broadly, into understanding. The section The Empiricist Model of
Perception and Cognition: Degrees of Abstraction brings together criti-
cisms, which recur throughout the book, of an old way of thinking about the relation
between perception and thought that, while not prevalent in psychophysics of perception,
remains widespread in other parts of psychology and in philosophy. This section might be
useful to psychologists as well as philosophers. Chapter 20 summarizes main themes, and
concludes.
For valuable input, I am grateful to: Marty Banks, John Bartholdi, Blake Batoon, Ned
Block, David Bordeaux, David Brainard, Denis Buehler, Daniel Burge, Dorli Burge,
Johannes Burge, Susan Carey, Sam Cumming, Will Davies, Frank Durgin, Chaz Firestone,
preface xix
Julian Fischer, Bill Geisler, Katherine Gluer, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Peter Graham, Gabe
Greenberg, Michael Hansen, Catherine Hochman, Gabby Johnson, Nancy Kanwisher, Ed
Keenan, Philip Kellman, Ela Kotkowska, Bill Kowalsky, Kevin Lande, Hakwan Lau, Gavin
Lawrence, Yannig Luthra, Tony Martin, Peter Momtchiloff, Bence Nanay, Peter Pagin, Alexi
Patsaouras, Christopher Peacocke, Sam Pensler, Atthanasios Raftopoulos, Jacob Reid,
Michael Rescorla, Pieter Roelfsema, Jeffrey Schall, Brian Scholl, Wesley Seurat, Houston
Smit, Sheldon Smith, Irene Sperandio, Galen Strawson, Paul Talma, Shimon Ullman,
Tamar Weber, Fei Xu, Yaffa Yeshurun. Thanks also to three anonymous reviewers. The two
complex drawings, Figures 9.2 and 9.3, are by Bill Kowalsky, as are the other drawings,
except for one by Johannes Burge.
My immediate family—sons and wife—has supported and taken interest. I am espe-
cially grateful to my wife, Dorli, for patience in understanding her often distracted hus-
band and for helping me to look more carefully at the world, especially appreciating details
and finding joy in the beauties of little things.
Tyler Burge
Animal Eye Grid
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 22 24
25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35 36
Animal eye grid credit lines: (1) Tarsier monkey, © nikpal/Getty Images; (2) Horse, © Magdalena Strakova/EyeEm/
Getty Images; (3) Cat, © Dobermaraner/Shutterstock.com; (4) Racing pigeon, © triocean/Getty Images;
(5) Red-eyed tree frog, © Mark Kostich/Getty Images; (6) Indian elephant, © Volanthevist/Getty Images; (7) Bearded
vulture, © Slowmotiongli/Dreamstime.com; (8) Robber fly, © suwich/Getty Images; (9) Blue-spotted pufferfish,
© Shahar Shabtai/Shutterstock.com; (10) Deer fly, © ekamelev/Unsplash; (11) Goat, © Tsuneya Kudoh/EyeEm/Getty
Images; (12) Iguana, © Gaschwald/Dreamstime.com; (13) Grey butterfly, © egor-kamelev/Pexels; (14) Emerald tree
boa, © George lepp/Getty Images; (15) Ant, © Visual&Written SL/Alamy Stock Photo; (16) Jumping Spider, © Razvan
Cornel Constantin/Dreamstime.com; (17) Discus Fish, © tunart/getty Images; (18) Tokay Gecko, © Spaceheater/
Dreamstime.com; (19) Octopus, © iStock.com/leventalbas; (20) Eurasian Eagle Owl, © GlobalP/Getty Images;
(21) Sumatran tiger, © ekamelev/Unsplash; (22) Human, © Tatiana Makotra/Shutterstock.com; (23) Chameleon,
© aluxum/Getty Images; (24) Bee, © ekamelev/Unsplash; (25) Chimpanzee, © Karl Ammann/Getty Images;
(26) Green tree python, © Zoran Kolundzija/Getty Images; (27) Finschs Imperial Pigeon, © Marc Dozier/Getty Images;
(28) Sparrowhawk, © Katie Kokoshashvili/Shutterstock.com; (29) California grey whale, © Michael S. Nolan/Alamy
Stock Photo; (30) Lion, © Ben Puttock/Alamy Stock Photo; (31) Northern harrier eagle, © Wildlife World/
Dreamstime.com; (32) Mantis shrimp, © Alex Permiakov/Shutterstock.com; (33) Napoleon wrasse fish, © ifish/Getty
Images; (34) Caiman crocodile, © Jonathan Knowles/Getty Images; (35) Fly, © egor-kamelev/Pexels; (36) Parrot,
© Couleur/Pixabay.
Animal Eyes
Figures
3.1. Geisler Contours 85

7.1. Drawings conveying the different modes of representation for the top edge and
side edges and their lengths in two orientations of the same surface, or two
orientations of two different but similarly sized and shaped surfaces 211
9.1. A sample surface made up of six smallest-discriminable cells 337
9.2. A model of the iconic representational content of a perceptual state representing
the 6-cell surface. 339
9.3. Depiction of a scene showing different points of view 353
10.1. Illustration of a simple example of the Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP)
experimental paradigm. Source: M. Potter, B. Wyble, C. Hagmann, and E. McCourt,
‘Detecting Meaning in RSVP at 13 ms per Picture’ 393
11.1a. Diagrammatic section through the head, sketching major features of the main visual
pathway linking the eyes to the striate cortex (V1). Source: J.P. Frisby and J.V. Stone,
Seeing, second edition, figure 1.5, p. 4, © 2010 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
by permission of The MIT Press 413
11.1b. Illustration of two visual pathways underneath the cortical areas of the brain.
Source: J.P. Frisby and J.V. Stone, Seeing, second edition, figure 1.6, p. 5, © 2010
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by permission of The MIT Press 414
11.2. Some main visual areas of the brain 416
12.1. The launching (top row) and entrainment (bottom row) effects, discovered
by Michotte 448
12.2. Habituated launching sequence and the same sequence in reverse 451
12.3. William Ball experimental paradigm 456
12.4. Causation and overlap 463
14.1. Important states in Relatively Primitive Action-Motor System 523
15.1. Sequence of display in each trial of flashed discs 538
15.2. A visibility map of a 15-degree-circumference-sized part of a retinal image.
Source: J. Najemnik and W. Geisler, ‘Simple Summation Rule for Optimal
Fixation Selection in Visual Search’, figure 2a, p1288, © 2009, with
permission from Elsevier 555
15.3a. Flow chart for computational program of Tsotsos and Kruijne for visual
discrimination task. Source: Adapted from J. Tsotsos and W. Kruijne, ‘Cognitive
Programs: Software for Attention’s Executive’, Figure 1, p. 4, open-access distributed
under the terms of the Creative Common Attribution License (CC BY) 559
15.3b. Abstract diagram of the structure of the functional components necessary to
support the executive control of attentive processing with information-passing
channels indicated in red arrows. Source: Adapted from J. Tsotsos and W. Kruijne,
‘Cognitive Programs: Software for Attention’s Executive’, Figures 5–6, p8,
open-access distributed under the terms of the Creative Common
Attribution License (CC BY) 559
figures xxiii
15.3c. Diagram of model for system of processing of visual executive-control system’s

(vAE’s) attention commands for visual task execution. Source: Adapted from
J. Tsotsos and W. Kruijne, ‘Cognitive Programs: Software for Attention’s
Executive’, Figures 5–6, p8, open-access distributed under the terms of the
Creative Common Attribution License (CC BY) 560
16.1. A typical Sperling test display 574
18.1. Examples of figures used in mental rotation experiments. Source: Adapted from
Roger N. Shepard and Lynn A. Cooper, Mental Images And Their Transformations,
figure, page 495, © 1982 Massachusetts Institute of Technology by permission
of The MIT Press 643
19.1. Causal analogy 727
Abbreviations
CSTM conceptual short-term memory

FEF frontal eye fields
FFA fusiform face area
FFE fast field echo
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging
FVSTM fragile visual short-term memory
IT inferior temporal cortex
LGN lateral geniculate nucleus
LOT language of thought
LTM long-term memory
MST medial superior temporal area
MT middle temporal area / medial temporal cortex
ms millisecond
OFC orbital frontal cortex
PFC pre-frontal cortex
PHC para-hippocampal cortex
RC retrosplenial cortex
RDS random dot stereograms
RSVP rapid serial visual presentation
SM simple model
SOA stimulus onset asynchrony
TSM trans-saccadic memory
V1–V5 visual cortical areas
VLTM visual long-term memory
VWM visual working memory
WM working memory
PART I
PE RCE P T ION
1
Introduction
In philosophy, if you aren’t moving at a snail’s pace, you aren’t moving at all.
Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics
In the grand array of occupants of the universe, from sub-atomic particles through higher
animals, the animals with minds stand out as special. Some of the specialness derives from
our being in this group. We interest ourselves. This interest extends to animals like us.
The natural interest is grounded in more than self-interest. It is grounded in a deep
joint in nature—the joint between the minded and the mindless. The joint may be ragged.
It may have borderline cases. But it is real. It is relevant to matters of great value and
importance—science, understanding, morality, art. Without mind, none of these pursuits
or goods exist. They seem good independently of whether we engage with them. They
depend for being good on realizing functions of certain types of minds. The minded-
ness and the type of mind ground the goodness, not their being ours. My project is
understanding—understanding some central aspects of mind.
Understanding the mind–mindless joint requires understanding mind in its most basic
forms. Of course, mind depends on the mindless and makes use of it. Without the regularities
of organic chemistry, minds could not be minds. Without the regularities of the broader
macro-physical world, minds could not navigate through it. In many ways, the non-minded
physical world stamps itself into the very natures of mental states. In understanding mind,
however, it is important to understand what is new and different about it, at its most
elementary levels. Such understanding aids understanding richer forms that guide the
listed pursuits. Those pursuits are not possible where mind begins. They are not possible for
the first forms of mind. However, they depend on and employ these forms. A central aim of
this book is to understand forms of mind at this initial juncture—forms of perception.
Biological Function, Action, Sensing,

and Perception—The Emergence of Mind
Before mind emerged, another deep and interesting joint in nature had already developed.
Brief attention to this joint is valuable in understanding the joint on which mind hinges.
Most of the universe is fire, rock, or emptiness. Already with life, there is a momentous
difference. Life occupies small crevasses in the universe. However, it marks a large change
from the chemical mixes from which it emerged. Although the living share a material
basis with the non-living, the living comprise a genuinely new and different group of the
universe’s occupants.
The point is not just intuitive. It shows up in new terms and methods in the scientific
study of life. Notions of function, growth, reproduction, natural selection, adaptation,
Perception: First Form of Mind. Tyler Burge, Oxford University Press (2022). © Tyler Burge.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198871002.003.0001
4 Introduction
life-cycles, ecology have no place in physics or chemistry. They are central to biology. The
historical study of evolution and a lesser emphasis on law, are foreign to physics and
chemistry. These scientific differences signal subject-matter differences. The living are
very different from the rest.
A key aspect of life, lacking in the lifeless natural world, is function. Rock and fire have
no functions in themselves. Biological functions are patterns of operation whose existence
derives from their contributions to success in reproduction.1 The function of photo-
synthesis is to convert light energy into chemical energy that subsequently is transformed
in a way that feeds an organism’s other operations. The process exists in plants and other
organisms because it contributed to their reproduction. It was naturally selected.
Like other types of function, biological function is conceptually linked with doing well,
being successful. These types of goodness are not moral, or products of plans or purposes.
They are good for the system, or individual, or species, because they aid survival long
enough to reproduce. Being a biological function is an objective matter: functions are
what they are independently of whether anyone recognizes them. They are open to object
ive evaluation, even scientific evaluation, by rational standards. Whether and to what
degree a process fulfills one of its functions can be empirically assessed. Either a process
functions well or it does not.
Some functions are attributable to plants and animals as whole organisms. Others are
attributed only to subsystems or parts of a plant or animal. For example, functions to grow
and reproduce are functions of the whole plant. By contrast, production of pollen grains is
a function of the anther in a plant’s flower. Photo-synthesis is an operation in each indi-
vidual cell. The whole plant, its sub-systems, and its parts can succeed or fail in realizing
their functions.
Functional processing in plants responds in ways sensitive to the environment. Photo-
synthesis depends on features of the plant that are specialized to be sensitive to light.
Photo-synthesis yields responses, such as directional growth, that depend on chemical
reactions in the plant that transform the light’s energy into chemical energy. These are
antecedents of sensing and action that occur in animals. I think it well to follow common
sense in thinking that these are not strictly cases of sensing or acting. I say that plants are
sensitive to the environment, whereas animals sense it. Animals, but not plants, act.
Directional growth and pollination are not actions. A plant’s absorption of water and
nutrients is not drinking or eating. The Venus Fly Trap’s engulfing of visitors is not eating.
I conjecture that this is so because the relevant changes in the plant can be too easily
1 This conception of biological function derives from L. Wright, ‘Functions’, The Philosophical Review 82
(1973), 139–168. There are other, compatible notions of function that figure in biology. I use Wright’s because
it is familiar, explanatory, and teleological. Other conceptions of function in biology also take teleology ser
iously and are not as centered in evolutionary history—so-called organizational conceptions. A revision of the
Wright account of function, which I think of as an expansion of it, rather than purely a correction of it, cen
ters on any contributions to reproduction within a living system, rather than purely on original-etiological
contributions. For excellent work on this conception of function, see G. Schlosser, ‘Self-Reproduction and
Functionality: A Systems- Theoretical Approach to Teleological Explanation’, Synthese 16 (1998), 303–354;
W. Christensen and M. Bickhard, ‘The Process Dynamics of Normative Function’, The Monist 85 (2002), 3–28;
M. Mossio, C. Saborido, and A. Moreno, ‘An Organizational Account of Biological Functions’, British Journal
of Philosophy of Science 60 (2009), 813–841; M. Mossio and L. Bich, ‘What Makes Biological Organization
Teleological?’, Synthese 194 (2017), 1089–1114. See also J. Garson, A Critical Overview of Biological Functions
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2016). Although I use Wright’s notion, the notion of biological function that I rely on does
not need to be specific enough to choose between these conceptions. Any scientifically based explanatory notion
of teleology will suffice.
Biological Function, Sensing, and Perception 5
explained in terms of summations of changes that occur in plant cells. There is no need to
postulate a central locus of conation, as we do for agents.
Some speak metaphorically, even poetically, of sensing and acting by plants. Some sci-
entists like to say that plants communicate with one another. Perhaps there is a broad
enough notion of communication to allow such talk to be non-metaphorical. I believe that
any such communication is not action. Calling functional, cross-individual patterns of
sensitivity and response among plants’ “communication” serves advertisement more than
understanding. True understanding depends more here on exploring differences than on
engaging in assimilation.
I think that serious conceptual and scientific investigation of these matters will confirm
some variant of what common sense assumes. Plants may communicate. They do not act.
Some or all animals, and perhaps other organisms that are neither plants nor animals, do.
I think that action has to do with a coordination among central capacities of an
organism—typically, but not necessarily, endogenously causing movement by the individual.2
As noted, I conjecture that plants do not act, because their changes derive not from a central
coordinating capacity, but from a mere aggregation of changes in plant parts. Photo-synthesis
occurs in every plant cell. Growth is not action partly because it is a summation of aggre-
gate increases in various cells. Directionality in growth stems from the fact that more
stimulated cells multiply faster. Plants are sensitive to light. Relevant stimulation for
growth is often from light. Plants grow toward the light. Directional growth is an aggregate
response of changes in the plant’s most stimulated cells. This is not action. Similarly, for
absorption of water and nutrients. Such absorption is not drinking or eating. These points
are at best a gesture at a position on a complicated topic.
I take the notion of sensing, as distinct from that of sensitivity, to be tied to action.
Plants are sensitive to stimuli. Animals sense stimuli. Sensing and action emerge
together.3
The distinction between plant responses and animal (or other organisms) action is not
central to the present project. It is background. What I have pointed to is a broad analogy
between plant sensitivity and functional growth-like responses, on one hand, and animal
sensing and functional behavioral responses that include action, on the other.
The sensing-action nexus is very old, older than the emergence of mind. Organisms
that surely lack minds—paramecia, simple worms, snails—act. They eat, swim, or crawl.
They depend on elementary sensing capacities in fulfilling these activities’ functions.
Here again, biological functions of the organism are to be distinguished from biological
functions of organs and operations within the organism. For example, eating, mating,
swimming, crawling, and navigating are biological functions of the whole animal. All
meet earlier-discussed conditions for being a biological function. All depend for being
functional on the well-functioning operation of biological systems or organs within the
organism. For example, eating’s fulfilling its function depends on the well-functioning
operation of a digestive system. The whole-animal functions are relevant to understanding
success and failure for the whole animal, not just sub-systems or sub-parts of the animal.
Acting and sensing are functional pursuits at the level of the whole animal. They form the
womb out of which basic forms of mind are born.
2 See T. Burge, Origins of Objectivity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapter 8.
3 I advance this conjecture in Origins of Objectivity, 376–377; see also 331–334.
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Schools for All, i. 139.
Schuckmacher, Mr (a merchant), ii. 229.
Scipio, iv. 61, 257; ix. 41, 373.
Scioppius (Schoppe, Kaspar), vi. 76.
Scolding Wife (Cossé’s), xi. 246.
Score, ——, pupil of (Reynolds’s), ix. 55.
Scotch, The, iv. 318; xi. 64, 545.
—— Character, On the (a fragment), xii. 253.
—— Drink, address to (Burns), v. 132.
—— Encyclopedia, vii. 194.
Scotland, iii. 122, 285 n., 414, 415; iv. 3, 4, 5, 60, 317, 322; ix. 201 n.;
x. 19, 378; xi. 382, 402, 480, 485.
—— Tour in (Pennant’s), ii. 170, 172.
Scots’ Magazine, vi. 475.
Scots, Mary Queen of, xii. 156.
Scotsman (newspaper), x. 221.
Scott, John, vii. 132, 492; xi. 496.
—— —— of (Amwell), i. 423.
—— Sir Walter, iv. 241;
also referred to in ii. 370; iii. 48; iv. 206, 243, 253–6, 260, 261,
312; v. 122, 154–6, 320, 369, 377; vi. 45, 162, 209, 222, 269, 336,
356, 386, 399, 400, 409, 420–6, 443, 462, 518; vii. 5 n., 36, 58,
99, 105, 126, 129, 134, 156 n., 180, 183, 200, 201, 229, 298, 314
n., 319, 320, 336, 338, 340, 367, 381; viii. 128, 413, 422, 423–4,
460, 478 n.; ix. 124, 158, 173, 254; x. 13, 20, 185, 202, 207, 212
n., 244, 312, 314, 327, 329, 330, 387, 392, 403, 420, 434; xi. 235,
344, 349, 350, 356, 381, 382, 531, 532, 537, 547, 558, 559; xii. 1,
46, 65, 88 n., 161, 179, 239, 253, 255, 259, 272, 275, 284, 307,
310, 372, 375, 389, 446.
—— Racine, and Shakespeare, vii. 336.
—— Life of Napoleon, xi. 593.
Scotus, Duns, xii. 35.
Scourge for Simony, A (or Return from Parnassus), v. 284.
Scribe, Eugène, ix. 242.
Scriptures, The, iii. 274.
Scroggins, Jack (a prize-fighter), xii. 12 n., 14.
Scroop (in Shakespeare’s Henry V.), i. 289.
Scrub (Farquhar’s Beaux’ Stratagem), i. 155; ii. 76 n., 77 n., 79, 83; iv.
259; vii. 203; viii. 9, 88, 230, 388.
Sculpture, Lectures On (Flaxman’s), x. 330.
Sea-horses (Breughel’s), ix. 349.
Sea-pieces (Vandevelde’s), ix. 35.
Seaport (Berghem’s), ix. 355.
—— (Claude’s), ix. 13.
—— (A. Cuyp’s), ix. 35.
Sea-Storm (Bakhuisen’s), ix. 20.
Seasons, The (Thomson’s), v. 85, 86, 88, 91, 374, 376; vii. 66; xii.
259, 273, 346.
Sebastian (Shakespeare’s Tempest), xi. 417.
Secession (Lord Holland’s Poem), ii. 217.
Secondate (a song), viii. 326.
Secret, The (Edward Morris), ii. 228.
Sects and Parties, xii. 360.
—— On the tendency of, i. 47.
Sedley, Sir Charles, iii. 402; v. 106.
Seduction, A Comedy (Holcroft’s), ii. 115.
Seine, vii. 312 n.; ix. 96, 98, 100, 105, 160.
Sejanus (minister of Tiberius), i. 390.
—— (Ben Jonson’s), v. 186, 265.
Selden, John, iii. 394; vii. 316, 320.
—— (in Holcroft’s Alwyn), ii. 97.
Select British Poets, Preface and Critical List of Authors from, v. 365.
Self-Love, On, xi. 132.
—— —— and Benevolence, xii. 95, 104.
Selkirk, Alexander, v. 94.
Selma (Ossian), v. 18.
Selwyn, George Augustus, x. 159, 160.
Semira (in Arne’s Opera, Artaxerxes), viii. 451.
Semiramis, Court of, iii. 142.
Seneca, i. 390; iii. 328; v. 230; x. 98, 107; xii. 281.
Senecio (Cowley’s Essays), viii. 60.
Sense, On People of, vii. 242.
Sentimental Journey, The (Sterne’s), vi. 22; vii. 83, 311; viii. 557; xii.
256.
Sentinel (a journal), vi. 518 n.; vii. 137 n.; ix. 451.
Septimius (Beaumont and Fletcher’s False One), v. 253.
Sepulchres, Essay on (Godwin’s), x. 399.
Seraglio, The (Dimond’s Opera), xi. 381.
Seraskier (in Siege of Belgrade), viii. 531, 532.
Serjeant at Law, The (in Chaucer), v. 24.
Sermons (Bishop Butler’s), x. 323; xii. 266.
—— (Godwin’s), iv. 210; x. 400.
—— (South’s), xii. 266.
—— on Astronomy (by Dr T. Chalmers), iv. 228.
—— at the Boyle Lectures (Bentley’s), xi. 178 n.
—— and Tracts (Channing’s), x. 317, 318, 320.
Serpentine, The, viii. 253.
Serres, Dominic, ii. 214.
Sessions of the Poets (Suckling’s), v. 270; viii. 54.
Setebos (Shakespeare’s Tempest), v. 187; xi. 601.
Setiniano (a town), ix. 211.
Settle, Elkanah, v. 76.
Seven Champions of Christendom, The (Rich. Johnson’s), i. 9; ii. 2,
5; vi. 413; viii. 98.
—— Dials, The, ii. 195.
Seven before Thebes, The (Æschylus), x. 94.
Severn, The, vi. 186.
Sevigné, Madame, vii. 311.
Sewards, The, v. 146.
Sewell and Cross’s, xii. 131.
Sforza (Massinger’s Duke of Milan), v. 266; viii. 289, 290.
Sganarelle (in Molière’s L’École des Maris), xi. 356.
Shackleton, Abraham, iii. 420.
Shadowless Man, The. See The Devil’s Elixir.
Shadrach (in Bible), iii. 265.
Shadwell, Thomas, iii. 258; vi. 464; viii. 54, 159, 160, 370.
Shaftesbury (1st Earl of), vi. 41.
—— 3rd Earl of, i. 100; iv. 204 n.; vi. 388; vii. 6; viii. 94; xi. 139; xii.
333.
Shaftoe, Sir Jennison, ii. 41.
Shafton (Heywood’s The Stranger), v. 213.
—— Sir Piercie (in Scott’s Monastery), viii. 454.
Shakespeare, William, vii. 336; also referred to in i. 15, 23, 24, 39, 63,
64, 76, 79, 100, 102, 105–6, 137–8, 150, 156, 158, 161, 164–5, 384,
388, 391–4, 396, 398–9, 425, 432; ii. 35, 71, 79, 81, 107, 108 n.,
111, 166, 178–80, 184, 200, 217, 220, 229, 392, 401, 405, 409, 436;
iii. 1, 168, 170, 207, 239, 258, 336, 403, 405, 435; iv. 45, 95, 200,
222, 228, 244, 248, 276, 324, 334, 365, 368; v. 13, 44, 68, 70, 71,
82 n., 122, 123, 125, 127–8, 145–7, 154, 164, 173, 175, 176, 178–1,
186, 187, 190, 193, 198, 202, 207, 210, 211, 215, 218, 222, 223, 225,
229, 240, 243, 246–8, 250, 254, 257–8, 261, 268, 273, 282, 289,
293–4, 297, 307, 345–7, 355, 357, 368, 371; vi. 21, 39, 42, 49, 50,
77, 85, 100, 145, 175, 213, 217 n., 218 n., 223, 235, 236, 259, 266,
280, 288, 309, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 346 n., 354, 355, 357, 367,
371, 392, 393–5, 400, 401, 409, 413, 424–5, 432, 433, 443, 449,
453, 455; vii. 28, 36, 58, 63, 71, 73, 86, 91, 118, 120, 133, 158, 185,
187, 197, 203, 204, 226, 245, 248, 294, 298, 303–4, 306, 312, 313,
320, 326, 329, 360, 371, 410 n.; viii. 76, 78, 89, 113, 124, 144, 162,
180, 181, 183–5, 188, 191, 198, 200, 202, 204–6, 213, 221–3, 230,
234–6, 249, 257, 268, 269, 271, 273, 283, 284, 287, 293, 296, 301,
316, 336, 342, 343–5, 347, 351, 364, 383, 428–30, 436, 444, 455,
478 n., 518, 519, 528–9; ix. 17, 117–8, 129, 133 n., 159, 168 n., 242,
243 n., 277, 421, 432, 474; x. 9, 16, 25, 29, 32, 42, 64, 69, 74, 77,
82, 83, 111, 112 n., 115–7, 128, 155, 165, 180, 202, 204, 205–6, 209,
243, 244, 286, 296, 408; xi. 179, 190–1, 194, 226, 245, 254–6, 261,
283, 290, 309, 311, 377, 389, 391, 397, 399, 400, 410, 416, 418,
422, 431, 432, 440, 443, 444, 450, 451–2, 454 n., 457, 460, 486,
487, 504–7, 518, 539, 540, 573; xii. 7, 22, 27, 34, 38–9, 50, 51, 54,
67, 74 n., 121, 153, 164, 167, 193 n., 207, 208, 229, 253, 273, 277,
281, 330, 336, 339, 346, 347, 355, 369, 372, 375, 389.
Shakespeare, Beauties of (Dodd’s), i. 257.
—— Doubtful Plays of, i. 353.
—— On the Dramatic Writers, Contemporary with, Lyly, Marlowe,
Heywood, Middleton, and Rowley, v. 192.
—— versus Harlequin (a pantomime), viii. 435.
—— Historical Illustrations of, xi. 601.
—— Poems and Sonnets, i. 357.
—— (and Posthumous Fame), i. 21.
—— and Ben Jonson, On, viii. 30.
—— and Milton, On, v. 44.
Shakespeare’s Plays, Characters of, i. 165;
also referred to in i. 392, 395, 418, 424, 432, 458; iii. 447; iv. 307;
vi. 99, 478; vii. 122, 381; viii. 154 n., 178, 536; xi. 567, 569, 582,
601.
—— —— Female Characters of, xi. 290.
Shallow (Shakespeare’s Henry IV.), i. 64, 293; iii. 400; viii. 33, 34,
35.
—— Lord (? Lord Castlereagh), iii. 122.
Shandy, Mr (Sterne’s), i. 135; iv. 15; vii. 203, 221; viii. 121; ix. 427; x.
39.
Shapsugar, viii. 433.
Sharp, William, ii. 152, 153, 226; vi. 302 n.; vii. 95.
—— (Garrick’s Lying Valet), ii. 76 n., 77.
Sharpe, Granville, ii. 56; vii. 83.
Sharrard Street, ii. 172.
Shaw, Cuthbert, v. 122.
—— John (prize-fighter), iv. 223.
She Stoops to Conquer (Goldsmith’s), xi. 403;
also referred to in vi. 348, 412; viii. 11, 78, 164, 506; ix. 351.
—— Wolf sucking Romulus and Remus (a bronze), ix. 239.
—— Would if She Could (Etherege’s), viii. 68.
—— Would and She Would Not (Cibber’s), ii. 83, 424.
Sheares, the two (John and Henry), ii. 181.
Shee, Sir M. A., i. 149; vii. 314; ix. 247, 435.
Sheepcote Hills, ii. 167.
Sheep-face, iii. 238.
Sheffield, ii. 18; v. 286; ix. 290.
—— Advertiser (newspaper), vii. 14.
—— Iris (newspaper), vii. 13.
Shelburne, William Petty, Earl of, iv. 237.
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, v. 378; vi. 149, 285, 334; vii. 208, 246, 378–9;
viii. 474; x. 256; xii. 179, 341.
—— Posthumous Poem, x. 256.
—— Mary Wollstonecroft, vi. 506.
Shenstone, William, v. 118, 119, 375; vi. 97 n., 151 n., 224; xii. 169,
241.
Shepherd, Jack (a criminal), vii. 449.
—— Sir Samuel, iii. 261.
—— Rev. W., vii. 61 n., 174 n.
—— Boy in a Storm (Gainsborough’s), vi. 437; ix. 395; xi. 204.
Shepherd’s Calendar (Spenser’s), v. 98, 370.
—— Pipe (Brown’s), v. 315.
Shepherds in Vale of Tempe (Poussin’s), vi. 172.
Shepherdess of the Alps, The (Holcroft’s), ii. 86.
Shepperson, Mr (a tradesman), ii. 175.
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, i. 257, 378 n.; ii. 83–6, 89, 102, 114, 167,
201, 208, 223; iii. 17, 349, 423, 466, 467; iv. 212, 233, 334; vi. 146,
206, 350, 354, 405, 413–4, 455; vii. 7 n., 41, 87, 183, 184, 275; viii.
17, 70–1, 164–6, 415, 510; ix. 150, 472; x. 213; xii. 76, 138 n., 139
n., 140 n., 293, 369.
—— Tom, xi. 481.
—— Life of (Moore’s), vii. 183.
—— Mrs, ii. 83, 84, 86.
Sherlock, Dr Wm., x. 363.
Sherwood, Neely & Jones, publishers, iii. 451.
—— Forest of, ii. 110; v. 143, 346.
Shetland Isles, The, ix. 124.
Shiel, Mr, viii. 478.
Shield, William, ii. 79–80, 87–91, 111, 113, 164, 169, 195, 274, 275; vi.
432.
—— Mrs, ii. 195, 199.
Shiloh, iii. 221.
Shining Ones (in Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress), v. 14.
Shipman, The (in Chaucer), v. 24.
Shippen, William, iii. 408.
Shipwreck (Falconer’s), xi. 486, 494, 495.
Shirley, James, v. 345.
Shoreditch, iv. 44 n.
Short, Mr (actor), viii. 315, 331.
Shortest Way with Dissenters (Defoe’s), x. 357, 360, 374, 376.
Shrewsbury (town), i. 284; vii. 227; xii. 259, 260, 265.
Shropshire, vi. 283; viii. 89, 287; ix. 68; xii. 415.
Shuter, Edward, i. 157; ii. 77, 368; xii. 33.
Shylock (Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice), ii. 71; v. 210; vi. 293;
vii. 305; viii. 175, 179, 181, 184, 203, 208, 249, 250, 294; xi. 351,
397; xii. 142 n.
Siam, Account of the kingdom of (Lord Kames’), iv. 84.
Siberian Exiles, The (in Thomson’s Castle of Indolence), v. 89.
Sibylla Libyca (L. Caracci’s), ix. 355.
Sibyls and Prophets (Michael Angelo’s), ix. 360.
Sicily, ii. 223; ix. 255.
—— King of, iii. 179.
—— Prince of, ii. 214.
Sick Chamber, The, xii. 125.
—— Nun (Champagne’s), ix. 110.
—— Pigeon (Miss Geddes’s), xi. 245.
Siddons, Mrs (Miss Sarah Kemble), viii. 312; xi. 381; also referred to
in i. 156, 189, 325; ii. 66, 69, 105, 114, 115, 184, 196, 368; v. 247; vi.
50, 85, 275, 309, 341, 343, 349, 365, 418, 448, 452–3; vii. 76, 161,
256, 298–9, 301, 305–6, 338; viii. 177, 180, 198–9, 211, 222–3,
257, 273, 284, 313, 345, 350, 373, 376, 385–6, 389, 390, 391, 395,
410, 479, 515; ix. 26, 55, 147, 401, 432, 474; x. 201; xi. 257, 307,
349, 366, 405, 408; xii. 122, 237, 307, 354–5, 365, 390.
Siddons’ (Mrs), Lady Macbeth, viii. 373.
Sidmouth, Lord, iii. 38, 240, 241; xii. 295, 370.
Sidney, Algernon, iii. 399; iv. 61, 81, 95, 250; vii. 320.
—— Biddulph (Mrs Sheridan’s), viii. 123 n.
—— Sir Philip, v. 175, 189, 195, 196, 201, 300, 303, 318, 370; vi. 175,
354; vii. 36; ix. 9, 10, 58; x. 14, 64; xii. 27, 282, 286.
Sidney’s (Sir P.), Arcadia, v. 295.
Sidon, xii. 153.
Sidrophel (Butler’s Hudibras), viii. 65; xi. 478.
Siena, ix. 227, 228, 252, 302.
Sieyes (Abbé), iii. 210; vii. 13, 276.
Sigismonda and Guiscardo (Dryden’s), xii. 323.
See also Tancred.
Sigismunda, The (Hogarth’s), ii. 368; vii. 119; ix. 389.
Signor Brabantio (Shakespeare’s Othello), vi. 25.
—— Immerito (in Return from Parnassus), v. 284.
—— Orlando Friscobaldo (in Dekker’s Honest Whore), v. 235, 247.
Silence (Shakespeare’s 2nd Henry IV.), i. 64; viii. 33; xii. 16, 453.
Silent Woman, The (Ben Jonson’s), viii. 42.
Silenus (The Elgin), ix. 329, 339.
—— (Rubens’), ix. 72, 387; xi. 228.
—— and Apollo (Caracci’s), v. 124; ix. 9, 10.
Silky, Mr (Holcroft’s Road to Ruin), ii. 123.
Silly Shore (Crabbe’s), iv. 353.
Silvester Daggerwood (a play), viii. 316, 468.
Simmons, Samuel, vi. 286; viii. 250, 255, 350, 387; xi. 378; xii. 24.
Simon Lee (Wordsworth’s), iii. 168, 172 n.
—— Pure (Mrs Centlivre’s A Bold Stroke for a Wife), iii. 143; vii. 186;
ix. 159.
Simpkins, Jas., xii. 1.
Simple Story (Mrs Inchbald’s), vi. 364; vii. 303; viii. 127; xii. 437.
Simplon, The, vii. 169, 177; ix. 182, 278, 279–82, 290, 296.
Simpson, Mr (picture cleaner), ii. 198.
Sinbad, the Sailor, vii. 24; ix. 121.
Sinclair, John, viii. 370; xi. 374.
Single Plays, Poems, etc., The Four P’s, The Return from Parnassus,
Gammer Gurton’s Needle, and other works, On, v. 274.
Singleton, Henry, xi. 247.
Sion (in Switzerland), ix. 282.
—— House, picture of (Wilson’s), ii. 165; xi. 199.
Sir Alfred Irthing (in Wordsworth’s Excursion), i. 124.
—— Amorous La Foole (Ben Jonson’s Silent Woman), viii. 43.
—— Andrew Aguecheek (in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night), i. 314, 315;
viii. 36, 43, 165, 510; xii. 24.
—— Anthony Absolute (in Sheridan’s Rivals), iii. 226; viii. 117, 165,
509; x. 35; xi. 307, 396.
—— Archy Mac Sarcasm (Macklin’s Love à la Mode), viii. 350.
Sir Benjamin Constant (Murphy’s Know your Own Mind), viii. 164.
—— —— Dove (in Cumberland’s Brothers), ii. 83, 206.
—— Benjamin Backbite (in Sheridan’s School for Scandal), viii. 251,
292, 329.
—— Charles Grandison (Richardson’s), ii. 130; iii. 226; iv. 371; v. 15;
vi. 90, 400; viii. 118, 120, 186; ix. 59, 282, 432; x. 36, 37–9; xi.
254; xii. 33, 62.
—— —— Racket (Murphy’s Three Weeks After Marriage), viii. 427.
—— Clement Willoughby (in Miss Burney’s Cecilia), xii. 65.
—— David Daw (Cumberland’s Wheel of Fortune), xi. 207.
Sir Edward Mauley (in Scott’s Black Dwarf), vii. 345; viii. 129.
—— —— Mortimer (G. Colman the younger’s The Iron Chest), viii.
241, 343.
—— Epicure Mammon (in Ben Jonson’s Alchemist), vii. 141; viii. 45;
x. 117; xi. 171.
—— Eustace Gray (Crabbe’s), xi. 606.
—— Fopling Flutter, or, The Man of Mode (Etherege’s), iii. 67; vi.
187; vii. 42, 224; viii. 68, 82; xii. 13.
—— Francis, iv. 379 n.
—— Fretful Plagiary (Sheridan’s Critic), viii. 164.
—— George Versatile (in Holcroft’s He’s Much to Blame), ii. 162.
—— Giles Mompesson (in a play), viii. 390.
—— —— Overreach (Massinger’s A New Way to Pay Old Debts), v.
213, 268 n.; viii. 272, 284, 289, 290, 291, 302, 390, 472; xi. 352.
—— Harry Beagle (in Colman the elder’s Jealous Wife), viii. 163, 317,
505.
—— —— Moredon (in Leigh’s Where to Find a Friend), viii. 258, 259.
—— —— Sycamore (in Bickerstaffe’s Maid of The Mill), ii. 83.
—— —— Wildair (Farquhar’s), i. 158; viii. 86, 163; xii. 33.
—— Henry Chomley (in Mrs Charles Kemble’s Smiles and Tears, or,
Widow’s Stratagem), viii. 266.
—— Hugh Evans (Shakespeare’s Merry Wives), i. 425; iv. 162; v. 294;
viii. 22.
—— —— Middleton’s Head (an inn), viii. 439.
—— Jasper Herrington (in Miss Burney’s The Wanderer), x. 44.
—— John Barleycorn, ii. 2; xii. 314.
Sir John Brute (in Vanbrugh’s Provoked Wife), viii. 83.
—— —— the Curate (in Merry Devil of Edmonton), v. 294.
—— —— Daw (in Ben Jonson’s Silent Woman), viii. 43.
—— —— Falstaff (in Shakespeare), i. 6, 23, 43, 64, 291, 293, 425; v.
209 n., 239, 252; vi. 409, 504; viii. 22, 32, 33, 103, 165, 340, 343;
ix. 36, 190; x. 121, 243; xi. 311, 365; xii. 453.
—— —— Lambert (in Bickerstaffe’s Hypocrite), viii. 245, 246.
—— —— Oldcastle, a play (? Munday and Drayton), v. 289; x. 117.
—— Joseph Banks and Emperor of Morocco (Peter Pindar’s), viii.
168.
—— Lennox Leinster (Theodore Hook’s Diamond Ring), viii. 475.
—— Leoline (Coleridge’s Christabel), v. 166; x. 413.
—— Lucius O’Trigger (in Sheridan’s Rivals), viii. 508.
—— Martin Mar-all (Dryden’s), viii. 69.
—— Oliver Surface (Sheridan’s School for Scandal), viii. 251.
—— Paul Pliant (Congreve’s Double Dealer), viii. 72.
—— Pertinax Macsycophant (Macklin’s Man of The World), viii. 166,
299, 300, 318, 350.
—— Peter Pigwiggin (in Pigeons and Crows), viii. 469.
—— —— Teazle (Sheridan’s School for Scandal), viii. 251, 291, 388,
465; xi. 392; xii. 24.
—— Pierce Exton (in Shakespeare’s Richard II.), i. 297.
—— Plume (in Hogarth’s Marriage à la Mode), i. 25; viii. 134; ix. 76;
xi. 498.
—— Politic Would-be (in Ben Jonson’s Volpone), viii. 43.
—— Ralph (in a play by Holcroft), ii. 221.
Sir Reginald Front de Bœuf (in play founded on Ivanhoe), viii. 426.
—— Robert Bramble (G. Colman the younger’s Poor Gentleman) viii.
319; xi. 376.
—— Roderick (in Return from Parnassus), v. 284.
—— Roger de Coverley (in Addison’s Spectator), i. 8, 12, 83; iv. 246,
367; viii. 97, 98, 151, 152; x. 310; xii. 35.
—— Roland de Vaux of Tryermaine (in Coleridge’s Christabel), v.
166; x. 415.
—— Rowland (Congreve’s Way of the World), viii. 75.
—— Sampson Legend (in Congreve’s Love for Love), i. 12; viii. 72,
151, 278.
—— Sedley Clarendel (Miss Burney’s Camilla), xi. 345.
—— Solomon Sadlife (in Cibber’s Double Gallant), viii. 361.
—— Thomas Booby (in Fielding’s Tom Jones), vii. 363; viii. 107; x.
27; xi. 435.
—— —— Grandison (Richardson’s Sir Charles Grandison), xii. 154 n.
—— Toby Belch (in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night), iii. 213; viii. 32.
—— Tophas (in John Lyly’s Midas and Endymion), v. 198, 201.
—— Tunbelly Clumsy (in Sheridan’s Trip to Scarborough), vi. 414;
viii. 37, 83.
—— Wilful Witwond (in Congreve’s Millamant), viii. 37, 74.
Sirens, The, x. 12.
Sisera, xi. 321.
Sismondi, Simonde de, x. 79.
Sismondi’s Literature of the South, x. 44.
Sistina, The Via, at Rome, ix. 233.
Sistine Chapel, vi. 346, 363; ix. 232, 235, 341, 360, 366, 371; x. 354.
Sitting For One’s Picture, On, vii. 107.
Skeffington, Sir Lumley St George, vi. 13.
Sketch-Book (Irving’s), iv. 367.
Sketches of The History of The Good Old Times, xi. 582.
—— of Man (Lord Kaimes’), ii. 271.
—— of the Principal Picture Galleries in England, i. 419.
Skiddaw, ii. 329; iv. 270, 274; xi. 552.
Skinner, Cyriac, Sonnet to, vi. 177.
Slade (a village), ii. 166.
Slaukenbergius (Sterne’s Tristram Shandy), iii. 127; viii. 8.
Slave, The (a play), xi. 397.
Slave Trade, The, iii. 294; iv. 330.
Sleeping Child (Murillo’s), ix. 54.
—— Nymph (Titian’s), ix. 25.
—— —— and Satyr (Polemberg’s), ix. 20.
Sleigh, Dr, ix. 415.
Slender (Shakespeare’s Merry Wives), vi. 433; viii. 15.
“Slippery George” (Canning), ix. 187 n.
Slipslop, Mrs (in Fielding’s Tom Jones), vii. 223; viii. 12, 115; x. 33.
Sly (in Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew), iii. 434.
Small-coal Man’s Musical Parties (Thomas Britton), vii. 35.
Smalridge, Bishop, iii. 408.
Smart, Christopher, v. 122.
—— John, ii. 224.
Smeaton, John, vi. 511.
Smiles and Tears, or, The Widow’s Stratagem (Mrs Charles Kemble),
viii. 266.
Smirk (in Foote’s The Minor), ii. 170; viii. 167.
Smirke, Sir Robert, vi. 278.
Smith (in Scott’s Peveril of the Peak), xi. 540.
—— (an author), v. 359.
Smith, Adam, i. 138; ii. 415; iv. 400; vi. 49; vii. 185, 271, 464; xi. 289;
xii. 262.
—— Alderman, iii. 213.
—— Rev. G., ii. 174.
—— Horace, xii. 276 n.
—— Raphael, vi. 404.
—— William, iii. 237, 238; vi. 67; ix. 55.
—— Mr (actor), viii. 301, 370, 529; xi. 303.
—— Mr (a surgeon), ii. 194; vii. 408.
—— Miss, viii. 180, 515.
Smiths, The (in Miss Burney’s Evelina), vi. 157; vii. 72; viii. 124; x.
42; xi. 442.
Smithfield, ii. 213; iii. 239, 266; iv. 83 n.; vi. 428; xi. 323, 443.
Smithson, Sir Hugh, x. 172.
—— Miss, xi. 391.
Smock Alley, ii. 63.
Smollett, Tobias, i. 138; ii. 328; iv. 365; vii. 36, 70; viii. 107, 112, 113,
115, 116, 117, 133, 174, 510, 552; ix. 391; x. 27, 31, 32, 34, 35; xii. 64,
145, 253–4 n.
Smug the Smith (in Merry Devil of Edmonton), v. 294.
Smugglers’ Cave. See Up all Night.
Snake in the Grass, The (a picture), vi. 437.
Snug the Joiner (Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream), viii.
275; xii. 74 n.
Snyders, Franz, ix. 54.
Soane, John, i. 144; viii. 426.
Social Contract (Rousseau’s), vii. 224; xi. 47.
Society of Arts, vi. 449; ix. 421, 422.
—— of Authors, xi. 346.
—— for Constitutional Information, ii. 140, 142.
—— for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce,
etc., ix. 420.
—— of Painters in Oil and Water Colours, ix. 309.
Society for the Suppression of Vice, i. 60, 139; viii. 33, 283.
—— A New View of, iii. 121.
Socinians, x. 360.
Socinus, iv. 217; xi. 420.
Socrates, vi. 111; viii. 28; x. 346, 348; xi. 228, 491.
Soho Square Bazaar, xii. 131.
Solander, Dr Daniel Charles, ii. 203.
Soldier, The Tired (song in Arne’s Artaxerxes), viii. 192.
Soldier’s Daughter (Cherry’s comedy), viii. 537; xi. 297.
Solfatara, Stream of, ix. 256.
Soliloquy on Death, The (in Addison’s Cato), v. 356.
—— On Honour (in G. Colman the younger’s The Iron Chest), viii.
344.
Solitude (Wilson’s), xi. 199.
—— (Zimmerman’s), i. 340.
Solomon, iii. 146, 147, 394.
—— (Haydon’s painting), ix. 309.
—— (Prior’s), v. 106.
—— Mr, ii. 164.
Solomon’s Temple, ix. 348; xii. 263.
Somasco, College of the, x. 277, 287.
—— Monastery of the, x. 283.
Somers, Lord John, iii. 401; iv. 250.
Somers Town, ii. 345; xii. 148, 349.
Somerset House, vi. 270, 296, 435; vii. 90; ix. 12, 48, 126, 324, 463,
480; x. 195; xi. 247.
—— Street, ii. 264.
Somersetshire, iii. 409; ix. 185; x. 416; xii. 265, 346.
Somerville, William, v. 122.
—— Miss (actress), viii. 307, 352, 392, 530; xi. 302, 403.
Sompnoure, The (Chaucer’s), v. 24, 25.
Son-in-Law, The (John O’Keefe’s), i. 155; viii. 230, 388.
Songs (Campbell’s), iv. 347.
Songs and Sonnets (Southey’s), v. 164.
Sonino (a town), ix. 249.
Sonnets and Inscriptions (Southey’s), iii. 205.
Sontag, Mademoiselle, xi. 370, 372.
Sophi, The, iii. 142.
Sophia, granddaughter of James I., iii. 405.
—— (in Holcroft’s The Road to Ruin), ii. 123.
—— Western (in Fielding’s Tom Jones), i. 44; vi. 452, 453; vii. 221;
viii. 144, 153, 506, 556; x. 32; xii. 364, 435.
Sophocles, iii. 336; iv. 216; v. 347; vi. 111; viii. 396; x. 81–2, 94–7,
248; xii. 168.
Sorceror, The (Weber’s), ii. 222.
Sospetto d’ Herode (Marino’s in Crashaw’s translation), v. 315.
Sorrentum (a town), ix. 253.
Sophron, x. 100.
Sorrows of Werter, The (Goethe’s), iv. 217; v. 362.
Sotheby, William (friend of Scott), iv. 421; ix. 473; xii. 276, 492.
Soul, The, a poem (Davies), viii. 53.
South, Robert, iv. 216; xi. 124; xii. 266.
—— Audley Chapel, xii. 132.
—— —— Street, ii. 55; ix. 158; xii. 132.
—— Sea House, iv. 364.
—— —— Isles, The, xii. 284.
Southampton Buildings (London), ii. 88, 95, 106, 163.
—— Coffee House, vi. 192, 197.
Southcott, Joanna, iii. 297; x. 121; xii. 297.
Southern, Thomas, v. 359; viii. 162; xi. 301–303.
Southey, Robert, iv. 262; also referred to in i. 152, 388, 391; iii. 34,
48–51, 92 n., 99, 121, 126, 145, 149, 157, 177, 193, 200, 205, 210,
220, 224, 242, 246, 249, 258, 262, 277–80, 295–6, 302, 311, 312,
319, 433, 448; iv. 202, 218, 308, 329, 361; v. 40, 147, 162, 164, 377;
vi. 67, 151–2, 176; vii. 16, 102, 321, 374, 514; viii. 24, 362, 422; ix.
216; x. 20, 135, 139, 140, 141, 235, 238 n., 244, 410, 416; xi. 256 n.,
328, 342, 411, 413, 423, 444, 448, 457, 486, 493, 503, 512; xii. 116,
187, 267, 271, 275, 295, 358.
Southey, Poet Laureate, iii. 48.
—— Robert, A Letter to William Smith, iii. 210, 218, 224.
Southey’s (Mr) New-Year’s Ode, iii. 49.
Southgate, ii. 175.
Southwark Fair, The (Hogarth’s), viii. 144.
Sowerby, Mr (actor), viii. 190.
Spagnoletti, lo. See Ribera, Josef.
Spain, iii. 23, 51, 55, 99, 106, 158, 162, 216, 228, 393; iv. 93; v. 186;
vi. 156; vii. 52; viii. 111, 442; xi. 317, 554.
Spanish America, iii. 235, 270.
—— —— Revolution in (1820), vii. 52.
—— Girl with Flowers (Murillo’s), ix. 25.
—— Inquisition, The, vii. 243.
—— Painters, ix. 389.
—— Refugees, Articles on (Stoddart’s), ix. 143 n.
—— Rogue, or, Guzman de Alfarache (Aleman’s), i. 12, 123; vi. 419;
viii. 111, 151; xii. 142.
—— Tragedy, The (Kyd’s), v. 289, 294.
Sparke, Anthony, xi. 321.
Sparkish (in Wycherley’s Country Girl), i. 12; v. 231; viii. 36, 77, 151;
xi. 276.
Sparks, Mrs, ii. 78; viii. 246, 255, 258, 301, 329; xi. 307, 396.
Speaker (William Enfield’s), v. 90, 147; vi. 294.
Speaker’s house, iii. 128.
Specimens of Early Dramatic Poetry (Lamb’s), i. 194; v. 213; xi. 298.
Spectator, The, i. p. xxxi, 8, 9, 83, 370, 372; ii. 42; iii. 405; iv. 367; vi.
278 n.; vii. 226; viii. 95, 97, 99, 100, 158; ix. 92; xi. 543; xii. 19, 179,
331.
Speculation (Reynolds’s), xii. 198 n.
Speculum Crape-gownorum (Defoe’s), x. 369.
Speeches in Parliament on the Distresses of the Country, by Mr
Western and Mr Brougham, iii. 132.
Spelling Book (Dilworth’s), vii. 26.
Spence (Joseph), vi. 30; vii. 209; xi. 498.
Spencean Plan, iii. 212, 213.
Spenser, Edmund, v. 19;
also referred to in i. 39, 69, 110, 138, 161, 164, 358, 400, 429; iii.
73, 113, 209, 258, 339 n., 433, 444; iv. 201, 244; v. 11, 45, 46, 58,
61, 68, 146, 173, 175, 187, 192, 196, 247, 254, 299, 303, 368,
369–71; vi. 111, 289; vii. 65, 134, 181, 227, 255, 320, 362; viii. 16,
27, 128, 241, 364, 404, 437; ix. 71, 252; x. 9, 13, 73, 74, 77, 81, 83,
115, 121, 155, 210, 238, 242, 245, 348, 416; xi. 48, 235, 307, 333,
334, 435, 464, 490, 492, 503, 519, 573, 579, 581, 606; xii. 2, 30,
328.
Sphynx, The (a newspaper), xi. 386.
Spider, Lines to a, vii. 127.
Spines, Jack (a racquet player), vi. 89, 451.
Spinoza, Benedict de, iv. 217; viii. 284; x. 141, 145, 150; xi. 53, 71.
Spira, Francis, Life of (by N. Bacon), ii. 43.
Spirit of the Age, The, iv. 185;
also referred to in vi. 474.
—— of Ancient Chivalry, The (Ariosto’s), v. 224.
Spirit of Ancient and Modern Literature, On the. German Drama,
Contrasted with that of the Age of Elizabeth, On the, v. 345.
—— of Monarchy, iv. 359; vii. 379; xii. 241.
—— of Obligations, vii. 78.
—— of Partisanship, xi. 521.
Spital Sermon (Dr Parr’s), iii. 86, 126.
Spleen, Poem on the (Green’s), v. 119.
Splendid Shilling (Philips’s), v. 373.
Spoleto (a town), ix. 260.
Sportsmen in a Landscape (Gainsborough’s), xi. 203.
Spring, Ode to (Mrs Barbauld’s), v. 147.
Spurzheim, Dr, iii. 305; vii. 18, 19, 231, 347; ix. 315.
Spurzheim’s Theory, On Dr, vii. 137.

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