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Collective Skill Formation in the Knowledge
Economy
 Collective Skill
Formation in the
Knowledge Economy

Edited by
Giuliano Bonoli
Patrick Emmenegger
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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Acknowledgements

Like other large collaborative projects, this volume would not have been pos-
sible without the support of various individuals and institutions. The book
was developed within the GOVPET Leading House project, which is gen-
erously financed by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and
Innovation (SERI). The book benefited greatly from the enthusiasm and the
commitment of the whole GOVPET team and of the members of the scien-
tific advisory board, many of whom are authors or co-authors of the book’s
chapters. They are the first to be thanked.
Gratitude is also due to the scientific advisory board and GOVPET team
members who are not part of the book, but whose advice throughout the
preparation of the project was extremely precious: Pepper Culpepper, Anke
Hassel, Cathie Jo Martin, and Justin Powell from the scientific advisory
board, and Scherwin Bajka, Carmen Baumeler, Sonja Engelage, Flavia Fos-
sati, Cecilia Ivardi Ganapini, Margarida Matos, Ihssane Otmani, Delia Pisoni,
Alexandra Strebel, and Linda Wanklin from the GOVPET team. Finally, we
would like to thank Chantal Kamm, Emily Murphy, and Matthias Pilz for
helpful feedback on earlier versions of the chapters.
A very important contribution was made by Alyssa Taylor, who proofread
and formatted the entire manuscript and greatly helped us improve the qual-
ity of our English. Finally, at Oxford University Press, we are very grateful to
Adam Swallow for managing this project from start to finish in an efficient
and friendly way.
Table of Contents

List of Figures viii

List of Tables ix
List of Contributors x

1. Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy:

Challenges and Dilemmas 1
Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger
2. Occupations and Collective Skill Formation in
the Knowledge Economy: Exploring Differential
Employment Integration for the German Case 31
Christian Ebner, Sandra Hirtz, and Daniela Rohrbach-Schmidt
3. Reshaping the Role of Professional Associations and
the Federal State in Swiss VET: Ambiguous Reactions
to the Knowledge Economy 55
Regula Bürgi, Philipp Eigenmann, and Philipp Gonon
4. Still Egalitarian? How the Knowledge Economy Is
Changing Vocational Education and Training in
Denmark and Sweden 76
Martin B. Carstensen and Christian Lyhne Ibsen
5. Efficiency, Social Inclusion, and the Dutch Pathway
towards Vocational Education and Training Reform 101
Dennie Oude Nijhuis
6. The Politics of Social Inclusion in Collective Skill
Formation Systems: Actors, Coalitions, and Policies 128
Leonard Geyer and Niccolo Durazzi
7. Employer Visibility and Sectors as Predictors of
Egalitarian Values in VET: A Mixed-method Study of
Recruiters’ Views on Apprentice Candidates 154
Anna Wilson
8. Pride and Prejudice? The Influence of Occupational
Prestige on an Integration Programme for Refugees in
Switzerland 181
Annatina Aerne
 Table of Contents vii

9. The Credibility of Vocational Qualifications as a

Barrier to Increasing the Flexibility of Collective Skill
Formation Systems: An Analysis of the Slow Expansion
of Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) in Switzerland 204
Markus Maurer
10. Employer Influence in Vocational Education and
Training: Germany and Sweden Compared 229
Marius R. Busemeyer and Kathleen Thelen
11. Employers’ Cooperation in the Knowledge Economy:
Continuing Vocational Training in Switzerland 255
Gina Di Maio and Christine Trampusch
12. Enhancing Permeability through Cooperation: The
Case of Vocational and Academic Worlds of Learning in
the Knowledge Economy 281
Nadine Bernhard and Lukas Graf
13. Declining Collectivism at the Higher and Lower End:
The Increasing Role of the Austrian State in Times of
Technological Change 308
Lina Seitzl and Daniel Franz Unterweger
14. How Collective Skill Formation Systems Adapt to a
Knowledge Economy 334
Patrick Emmenegger and Giuliano Bonoli

Index 350
List of Figures

5.1 The structure of the Dutch educational system in the early 1980s 105
5.2 The current structure of the Dutch educational system 117
8.1 Actors involved in the implementation of INVOL 189
13.1 Number of participants in public training workshops according to AMS
data, 2001–2019 316
13.2 Number of all apprentices, apprentices in public training workshops and
training organizations in the ICT occupations, 2002–2018 324
13.3 Share of firm-based and non-firm-based VET training in the ICT
occupations, 2002–2018 325
List of Tables

1.1 Skill formation systems in advanced economies 2

2.1 Predicted probabilities in per cent for the risk of earning low wages by
occupation 42
2.2 Predicted probabilities in per cent for the risk of performing a
low-skilled job by occupation 43
2.3 Predicted probabilities in per cent for the risk of having a temporary
contract by occupation 45
2.1A Descriptive sample statistics 53
5.1 Number of youths participating in upper-secondary vocational
education as part of a school-based and workplace-based pathways,
1970–2020 104
7.1 Factors influencing apprentice recruiters’ egalitarian values 165
7.2 Main answer categories derived from responses to qualitative survey 166
7.3 Summary of response frequency to qualitative survey questions, by
sector groups 167
7.1A Coding procedure for the ‘employer visibility’ variable 178
7.2A Sector groups based on similar business activity and sought apprentice
profile 178
7.3A Interviewee details 179
7.4A Details over cited respondents to qualitative survey cited in chapter 179
7.5A Complementary summary of responses to qualitative survey, by sector
groups 180
8.1 Interviewees 190
8.2 Hypothesized motives of PTOs to participate in the programme 198
10.1 Expansion of dual study programmes, 2004–2016 237
11.1A Overview of expert interviews 2016/2017 on higher vocational
education in Switzerland 280
12.1 Key examples for permeability between vocational and academic worlds
of learning—a multi-dimension analysis of the DuBAS case 300
List of Contributors
Annatina Aerne is a postdoctoral
researcher at the University of Lausanne
at the Swiss graduate school of public
administration (IDHEAP). Her current
research focuses on migration and labour
markets. Previously, she researched
organization and culture, focusing on the
art scene in Bogotá, Colombia.
Nadine Bernhard is a postdoctoral
researcher at the Centre for Comparative
and International Education at
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin in
Germany. Using institutional,
organizational, comparative, discourse
analytical, and/or ethnographical
approaches she works on questions of
institutional change, educational transfer,
internationalization, organizational
evolutions, educational practices, social
inequality, and diversity in education
(with the main focus on vocational
education and training and higher
education).
Giuliano Bonoli is a professor of social
policy at the Swiss graduate school of
public administration, University of
Lausanne. His main research focus is on
social and labour market policies, with an
interest in international comparisons, the
politics and the transformation of welfare
regimes.
Regula Bürgi works at the education
ministry of the canton of Lucerne,
Switzerland. Her research interests are
international organizations, history of
education, vocational and higher
education.
Marius R. Busemeyer is a full professor
of political science with a focus on
comparative political economy at the
University of Konstanz and speaker of
the Excellence Cluster ‘The Politics of
Inequality’ in Germany. He is also an
affiliated senior researcher at the WSI,
Düsseldorf. His research focuses on
comparative political economy and
welfare state research, education and
social policy, public spending, theories of
institutional change and public opinion
on the welfare state.
Martin B. Carstensen is professor with
special responsibilities in public
administration and politics in the
Department of Social Science and
Business, Roskilde University, in
Denmark. His work focuses on the
dynamics of institutional and ideational
change in key policy areas of advanced
economies like labour market policy,
education policy, and financial
regulation.
Gina Di Maio is a project and quality
manager in higher education at the
Zurich University of the Arts in
Switzerland. In her dissertation, she
investigated how to get employers to
cooperate and collectively provide
vocational training. She focused on
inclusiveness-enhancing training
programmes for disadvantaged
candidates as well as continuing
vocational training.
Niccolo Durazzi is a lecturer in the
political economy of social policy in the

School of Social and Political Science at
the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.
His research takes a comparative political
economy approach to examine advanced
capitalist countries’ transition in the
knowledge economy, with a particular
focus on education, skills, and labour
market policy.
Christian Ebner is a professor of
sociology at the Technische Universität
Braunschweig, Germany, where he
specializes in work and organizational
research. He is also a research fellow at
the Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung. His
research interests comprise vocational
education and training, the
transformation of the working world, and
how occupations shape social
inequalities.
Philipp Eigenmann is head of research
and a lecturer in education at Thurgau
University of Teacher Education (PHTG)
in Kreuzlingen, Switzerland. His research
interests are history of education, higher
education, vocational education, and
teacher education.
Patrick Emmenegger is a professor of
comparative political economy and
public policy at the University of St.
Gallen in Switzerland. His research
focuses on education, skills, and labour
market policies, industrial relations,
democratization, state building, and
institutional theory.
Leonard Geyer is a researcher at the
European Centre for Social Welfare
Policy and Research in Vienna, Austria.
His research interests comprise
comparative political economy, (active)
labour market and skills policies, and the
role of social partners in determining
policy outcomes, wages, and working
conditions.
List of Contributors xi
Philipp Gonon is recently retired (in
2021) but is still working at the Institute
of Education at the University of Zurich
in Switzerland. His research focuses on
Swiss vocational education and training,
history and comparative international
VET and digitalization at a Secondary II
level.
Lukas Graf is an assistant professor of
educational governance at the Hertie
School, The University of Governance in
Berlin. He works at the intersection of
political economy, sociology, educational
science, and public policy. He combines
comparative, institutional, and
organizational approaches to analyse
questions of educational governance,
labour markets, social inequalities,
institutional changes, and
internationalization processes.
Sandra Hirtz is a research associate at the
Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung
Forschungsdatenzentrum (BIBB
Research Data Centre (BIBB-FDZ)) in
Bonn, Germany. The focus of her
research is on the German vocational and
education training system. Her research
interests cover wage inequality in the
German labour market, especially with
regard to occupational and sectoral
stratification.
Christian Lyhne Ibsen is an associate
professor at FAOS, Department of
Sociology, University of Copenhagen in
Denmark. His research focuses on
collective bargaining, vocational
education and training, and the future of
work and employment relations.
Markus Maurer is a professor of
vocational education at the Zurich
University of Teacher Education in
Switzerland. His research focuses on
implementation of education and
xii List of Contributors
training policy reforms, on adults in
vocational education, as well as on
comparative analysis of education and
training systems.
Dennie Oude Nijhuis is a lecturer at the
Institute for History at Leiden University,
in the Netherlands. He specializes in the
comparative political economy of labour
markets and welfare states and the
political economy of European
integration. He is also the editor of
Business Interests and the Development of
the Modern Welfare State.
Daniela Rohrbach-Schmidt is a research
associate at the Bundesinstitut für
Berufsbildung Forschungsdatenzentrum
(BIBB Research Data Centre
(BIBB-FDZ)) in Bonn, Germany. Her
fields of research are vocational
education and training, occupations, and
social inequality.
Lina Seitzl is a member of the German
parliament. Previously, she worked as a
postdoctoral researcher at the School of
Economics and Political Science of the
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland and
was part of GOVPET, a centre of
excellence for research on the governance
of vocational and professional education
and training. Her research examines the
effects of digitization and the knowledge
economy on dual training systems.
Kathleen Thelen is Ford professor of
political science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in the United
States and a permanent external member
of the Max Planck Institute for the Study
of Societies in Germany. Her work
centres on the origins, evolution, and
contemporary political economies of the
rich democracies. Her current work
focuses on the American political
economy and on the political economy of
platform capitalism.
Christine Trampusch is a professor of
comparative political economy at the
Cologne Center for Comparative Politics
(CCCP), University of Cologne in
Germany. Her research includes models
of capitalism, labour–business–
government relationships and
the change of institutions and policies.
Daniel Franz Unterweger is a researcher
and consultant at 3s: Research &
Consulting for Lifelong Learning, based
in Vienna. He is involved in several
projects for Cedefop and the European
Commission, and has previously
consulted the OECD on the governance
of skills policies. He is a former member
of GOVPET at the University of St.
Gallen (Switzerland).
Anna Wilson is a postdoctoral researcher
with the International Postdoctoral
Fellowship (GFF-IPF) at the School of
Economics and Political Science,
University of St. Gallen in Switzerland.
Her research interests lie mainly in firms’
strategies to address skill mismatches in
the knowledge economy, firms’ role in
including disadvantaged young people in
VET, and the institutional, internal, and
external conditions enabling and
constraining them.
1
Collective Skill Formation
in a Knowledge Economy
Challenges and Dilemmas

Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

1.1 Introduction

Skill formation has been subject to rapidly increasing attention in the last
decades, both in academic debates as well as politics. Generally, skill forma-
tion systems are expected to provide individuals with access to high-quality
training and the economy with a well-trained workforce. Yet skill formation
systems display important differences with regard to the division of tasks
between firms, intermediary associations, and the state in providing and
financing skill formation.1
Based on Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012: 11–15), we can distinguish
between liberal, segmentalist, statist, and collective skill formation systems
(see Table 1.1). In liberal regimes, the general education system and market-
based transactions are the primary providers of education and training.
Public commitment to skill formation is limited and firms are rarely involved
apart from basic on-the-job training. In contrast, segmentalist regimes rely
on internal labour markets and lifelong employment to retain employees.
In this way, large firms provide newly recruited employees with a consider-
able amount of high-quality training, for instance in firm-specific vocational
schools. However, public commitment to skill formation is low and small
firms are rarely involved. Most training therefore focuses on firm-specific
skills. Statist regimes feature a strong public commitment to skill formation
and full-time vocational schooling. However, since training is part of the

1 We thank Christian Lyhne Ibsen and Christine Trampusch for helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this chapter.

Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger, Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy. In: Collective Skill Formation in
the Knowledge Economy. Edited by Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger, Oxford University Press.
© Oxford University Press (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192866257.003.0001
2 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

Table 1.1 Skill formation systems in advanced economies

Involvement of firms in VET

Low High

Public commitment High Statist (e.g. Sweden) Collective (e.g. Germany)

to VET
Low Liberal (e.g. United Kingdom) Segmentalist (e.g. Japan)

Source: Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012: 12).

general education system, firm involvement remains limited. These systems

therefore often struggle to facilitate a smooth transition from training into
employment.
This book focuses on collective skill formation systems, which are charac-
terized by a strong public commitment to and high involvement of firms in
the training effort. Four specific features distinguish collective systems from
the other regimes. First, they are based on dual training combining school-
based and work-based learning—increasingly also at the post-secondary
level (Graf 2018). Second, employers and their associations are involved in
the financing and administration of training, meaning that collective skill
formation regimes presuppose inter-firm cooperation and employers’ will-
ingness to engage in collective action. Third, intermediary organizations,
including trade unions, play an important role in the administration and
development of these systems. Finally, collective systems lead to certified and
standardized occupational skills that are portable between firms. The most
prominent examples are the vocational education and training (VET) sys-
tems of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Yet
elements of collective systems are increasingly adopted in other countries as
well (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012: 14–15).
Collective skill formation systems have been long hailed for their capac-
ity to straddle the twin demands of supplying relevant skills to employers
and offering a point of access for large groups of the population (including
working-class youth) to stable and relatively well-paid jobs (Thelen 2014).
Unsurprisingly, then, the European Union (EU) is strongly pushing its mem-
ber states to develop and strengthen dual training in the framework of
collective skill formation systems. Based on the Copenhagen Process (started
in 2002) and further enhanced with the 2010 Bruges Communiqué (Euro-
pean Union 2010) and the 2015 Riga Conclusions (European Union 2015),
the EU is actively promoting work-based learning, in particular with regard
to dual apprenticeships and by involving the social partners in the governance
of these systems.
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 3

Yet the rise of the knowledge economy has put a question mark over
whether such solidaristic outcomes are still possible to sustain (Anderson
and Hassel 2013; Thelen 2014; Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021; Carstensen
and Ibsen 2021). Increasingly knowledge-intensive forms of production lead
to demands for new, higher, and ever-changing skills, which creates a num-
ber of challenges for skill formation systems, both with regard to their ability
to supply relevant skills to employers and offering a point of access for large
groups of the population. For instance, labour market polarization created
by automation processes is reducing the pool of mid-skilled jobs that in the
past have greatly contributed to middle-class well-being and that were made
accessible through vocational training (Autor 2010).
These challenges are compounded by a number of concomitant develop-
ments, in particular growing social inequality and the emergence of multicul-
tural societies. Social inequality has been rising in most advanced economies
in recent decades (OECD 2008; Piketty 2013; Atkinson 2015). Inequalities in
income and resources are associated with inequality in the ability to learn
and school achievement (OECD 2019a), generating problems of access to
demanding VET programmes for those at the bottom of the distribution.
Such inequalities are further exacerbated by the emergence of multicultural
societies that result from mass migration to advanced economies. For indi-
viduals with a migration background, access to dual VET can be problematic,
as they may suffer from disadvantages both in the education system and in
the labour market side of dual VET.
Clearly, changing levels of social inequality are in part also related to the
shift towards a knowledge economy. Labour market polarization created by
automation processes is a case in point (Kristal and Cohen 2017; Murphy and
Oesch 2018). Yet macro-structural pressures such as technological change do
not automatically translate into levels of social inequality. Instead, they are
mediated by social and political institutions, most notably education and skill
formation systems that have the potential to both accentuate and weaken the
effects of these structural trends (Emmenegger et al. 2012).
The shift to a knowledge economy and the concomitant expansion of
social inequalities are pulling collective skill formation systems in opposite
directions. Vocational training must remain competitive and integrative in
a context that changes and makes both functions more challenging. Adopt-
ing a political economy perspective, the contributions to this book examine
how collective skill formation systems cope with and are adapted to a knowl-
edge economy in the context of growing social inequalities. This perspective
implies that, in addition to changes in the socio-economic context, we
highlight the power of actors and conflicts of interest, emphasize the role of
institutions in structuring political and economic processes, and stress the
4 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

challenges of cooperation and collective action (Streeck 2009; Thelen 2014;

Busemeyer 2015).
In this introductory chapter, we first review structural economic, social,
and macro-political trends that challenge collective skill formation systems.
Our focus is on the growing relevance of knowledge-intensive production
processes. However, we also emphasize other macro-trends that, as argued
above, are crucial for these systems’ ability to perform an integrative func-
tion: the rise in social inequality and the emergence of multicultural societies.
Subsequently, we discuss what we argue to be the two main dilemmas col-
lective skill formation systems face in a knowledge economy: (1) balancing
efficiency and inclusiveness in an increasingly knowledge-intensive economy
and (2) collective action in the age of de-collectivization. The final section
reviews the contributions to this volume.

1.2 Challenges

Collective skill formation systems have managed to produce appreciable

outcomes both in terms of efficiency and inclusiveness (Busemeyer 2015).
However, a number of ongoing socio-structural and macro-political trends
have the potential to disrupt the successful operation of these systems. In
this book, we focus on the key trends that are part of the overall transition to
a knowledge economy. On the one hand, increasingly knowledge-intensive
forms of production are likely to lead to demands for new, higher, and
ever-changing skills. This puts pressure on collective skill formation system’s
ability to provide industry with the necessary skills and contributes to the
decline of collectivism as a form of coordination in advanced economies.
On the other hand, trends that are happening concomitantly amplify these
challenges. These include the rise in social inequality and the emergence of
multicultural societies, which are reinforcing inequalities in terms of skill
acquisition and making it harder for collective skill formation system to fulfil
their integrative function.
Our focus on these challenges is not meant to deny the relevance of
other structural trends. However, macro-trends often interact and accentuate
each other. For instance, digitalization, deindustrialization, and globaliza-
tion all create pressure on low-skilled work in advanced economies and
demand a stronger focus on more knowledge-intensive forms of production.
We argue that it is not productive to try to isolate these structural trends
to create some artificial conceptual separation. Instead, we subsume these
structural economic, political, and social trends under the label ‘knowledge
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 5

economy’, which captures well how economic activity is increasingly skill and
knowledge intensive.
The knowledge economy pushes firms to increasingly require new, higher,
and ever-changing skills. Yet it does so in a context of increasingly diverse
and unequal societies. In the following, we discuss how these developments
challenge collective skill formation systems.

1.2.1 The growing relevance of knowledge-intensive

production processes

Technological change that goes under the broad rubric of digitalization

is transforming the world of work (Thelen 2018; Crouch 2019; Grundke
et al. 2018). Digitalization refers to the phenomenon of replacing analogue
or physical processes through digital ones (Loebbecke and Picot 2015). It
denotes how production processes are automatized (computerization) and
how different parts of the producing equipment may be able to communicate
among themselves (internet of things). Digitalization does not only imply
the use of big data and digital technologies (machine learning, artificial intel-
ligence) in the production of goods, it also refers to the rise of platform firms
which provide digital services (online marketplaces, social media, app stores),
which lead to new labour market structures (gig economy).
These developments create a number of challenges for skill formation sys-
tems (Gonon 2019; Achtenhagen and Achtenhagen 2019; Rolandsson et al.
2019). Most of these challenges have to do with the growing importance of
knowledge-intensive production in advanced economies and with an accel-
erated pace of change due to technological innovation. These processes lead
to changing and higher skill needs as well as labour market polarization
since change is skill-biased and empowers multinational companies that
are more capital-intensive and less labour-intensive (Acemoglu and Autor
2011). Moreover, these developments are accentuated by ongoing processes
of globalization and deindustrialization. Less knowledge-intensive and more
routine-task-intensive occupations—precisely the traditional focus of col-
lective skill formation systems—are at the highest risk of suffering from
international trade (Owen and Johnston 2017). In addition, the decline of the
industrial sector and the expansion of the service economy challenge collec-
tive skill formation systems, because these systems were originally anchored
in the craft and industrial sectors and depend on neo-corporatist institutions
more prevalent in the industrial sector to function (Culpepper and Thelen
2008; Strebel et al. 2021).
6 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

In the context of knowledge-intensive production processes, we identify

three main challenges. First, the growing relevance of knowledge-intensive
production processes leads to new, higher, and ever-changing skill demands.
While predictions are difficult to make, the literature estimates that between
9 per cent (Arntz et al. 2016) and 47 per cent (Frey and Osborne 2013) of all
jobs are at risk of automation. However, in the same period, a similar number
of new jobs will be created. Yet these new jobs require different skills, which
implies that a large part of the labour force will have to be re-skilled in this
period (see also OECD 2017; Cedefop 2018; McKinsey Global Institute 2018).
However, as technological change and globalization make investments into
new equipment more attractive, production processes for most businesses
may benefit from automation and different parts of the producing equipment
may be able to communicate among themselves. Therefore, it is possible that
in production processes, digital technologies and infrastructure are increas-
ingly substituting labour (Kemmerling and Trampusch 2021). As investments
into capital and technology become more attractive alternatives, firms may
reduce investment in training (OECD 2017: 8). At the same, digitalization is
also related to offshoring processes (Brown et al. 2011; Goos et al. 2014).
In any case, technological change is skill biased, thus substituting for
workers performing routine tasks, while complementing workers performing
non-routine tasks (Autor 2010; Kristal and Cohen 2017). As a result, recent
studies suggest that the impact of technological change on skill demands leads
to a trend towards labour market polarization, with technological change
strengthening demand for non-routine cognitive jobs carried out in high-end
jobs and having little impact on demand for non-routine personal services
carried out in low-end jobs (Murphy and Oesch 2018). This development has
been clearly observed in the United States but also in several European coun-
tries (Autor 2010; Autor and Salomons 2017), with demand sometimes being
skewed towards the upper end of the skill distribution (Oesch and Menés
2010; Oesch 2013).
Given the increase in demand for high-skill labour, we can expect firms
to require an overall upskilling of training, which all else equal, is more
likely to exclude weaker students. As training curricula are revised so that
they comply with the requirements of technological innovation, they may
become less accessible for academically weaker students (Martin and Knud-
sen 2010). Moreover, collective skill formation systems have historically been
good at providing a well-trained workforce for mid-skilled occupations first
in industry and then in the services. They have thus contributed to providing
access to good quality mid-level jobs to individuals for whom tertiary educa-
tion is not accessible. In this respect, collective skill formation systems have
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 7

been able to perform a socially integrative function also thanks to the exis-
tence of a strong demand for labour in the middle of the skill distribution
(Thelen 2014). With labour market polarization and the decline of demand
for mid-skilled professionals, this integrative function may be put at risk.
Second, digitalization, globalization, and deindustrialization increase the
pace of economic change (e.g. due to accelerated production processes, rad-
ical technological innovation, or changing product markets) and thus create
uncertainty about the skills firms will require in the future. Put differently,
training decisions for firms might become riskier since they are increasingly
unsure about their future skill demands. Similarly, because skill formation
requires young individuals to ‘accept the long deferral of gratifications that
is the essence of investing’, for them, skill formation ‘presupposes a degree
of certainty as to what one is likely to need and value in the future’ (Streeck
1989: 92). If there is growing uncertainty about future value of (occupational)
skills, talented youth might increasingly opt for general education, which is
considered the ‘safer’ and more flexible option, thus further contributing to
academic drift (Iversen and Soskice 2001). Research has not yet answered the
question whether collective skill formation systems can adapt (fast enough)
to the needs of a knowledge economy, and whether and how they differ in
meeting this challenge from liberal or statist training systems (but see Ander-
son and Hassel 2013; Chuan and Ibsen 2021). If they cannot, firms may no
longer turn to collective skill formation systems to meet their training needs.
In addition, in the light of previous adaptation processes, it is unclear
whether technological change will complicate the reconciliation of social
inclusiveness and economic efficiency (Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021). More
ambitious and knowledge-intensive programmes may need stricter entry
requirements, thereby de facto becoming inaccessible to academically less
inclined students (Martin and Knudsen 2010; Carstensen and Ibsen 2021). At
the same time, prospective apprentices increasingly face the risk of learning
an occupation, which the labour market of the future will not demand. Con-
sequently, having insufficient or obsolete skills has emerged as a new social
risk (Bonoli 2005). Given these uncertainties, apprentices might increasingly
opt for training opportunities that focus on transferable and more general
skills (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001), which could contribute to a devaluation of
vocational education.
Third, by removing constraints (e.g. geographical restrictions on business
activities), digitalization, globalization, and to a lesser extent deindustrializa-
tion also increase the structural power of business and weaken the ability of
collective actors to integrate firms (Thelen and Busemeyer 2012; Emmeneg-
ger and Seitzl 2019)—a ‘dualization’ process that can also be observed in
8 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

other parts of the economy (Emmenegger 2014; Thelen 2014). As Brown

et al. (2011) highlight, due to new possibilities of high-speed data transfer
and further standardization of production processes (‘Digital Taylorism’),
it might matter increasingly less where jobs are performed. If firms are
not dependent on a specific institutional environment (characterized, for
example, by egalitarian wage setting or employment protection legislation),
firms might refrain from collective training due to the uncertainty of pay-
offs in the provision of collective training (Streeck 2009; Sorge and Streeck
2018). Importantly, de-collectivization processes can also be observed among
trade unions, which further reduces firms’ motivation to organize collec-
tively. At the same time, due to increased capital mobility, digitalization also
increases the share of multinational corporations, which are often harder
to integrate into collective governance than more traditional corporations
(Edwards 2004).
Moreover, digitalization advances new forms for corporations, thus mak-
ing their organization more difficult and increasing the heterogeneity of their
skill needs (Thelen 2018). Particularly relevant for training is the role of
e-business and the rise of platform business models. As the cost for com-
munication and computing has decreased, new digital forms to create and
deliver value have emerged. These processes have encouraged new forms of
transaction and transformed the way businesses interact with customers and
suppliers, which may also affect employment relationships. For instance, the
gig economy makes it easier and less costly to contract freelancers for small
jobs, making it less attractive for firms to train in order to address skill gaps
(Crouch 2019).

1.2.2 Rising social inequality and the emergence

of multicultural societies

Over the last few decades, we have witnessed a large increase in social
inequality across the developed world. This trend has been documented in a
large number of studies, which confirm the view that income inequality has
been increasing over the last three to four decades in a majority of advanced
countries (OECD 2008; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Atkinson 2015). The trend
in wealth inequality has followed an even sharper rise (Piketty 2013). There is
some cross-national variation in the pace of this trend, with English-speaking
countries and particularly the United States being at the forefront. However,
countries with collective skill formation systems are not immune. Between
the 1980s and the 2010s, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands experienced
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 9

a more or less constant increase in inequality in disposable incomes (but not

Denmark and Switzerland).
Studies on inequality have tended to focus on income inequality, i.e. on
inequality of outcomes. With regard to the integrative capacity of collec-
tive skill formation systems, however, equality of opportunity seems just as
important. In any case, the two types of inequality are related, since suc-
cess in education is highly dependent on the socio-economic conditions in
which people grow up (Atkinson 2015). Educational sociologists have long
known that household income and social class are key determinants of edu-
cational success. In their seminal study, Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) showed
that social origin, measured for example by fathers’ profession or educa-
tional level, remains a powerful predictor of educational trajectories in most
countries. Even though this conclusion has been challenged by subsequent
studies, showing that a trend towards equalization is more pervasive, social
background remains a powerful determinant of educational success (Breen
and Jonsson 2005). In a well-known survey of school performance of fifteen-
year-old youths, the OECD (2019b: 58) found that the socio-economic status
related performance gap remained stable in the vast majority of countries
between 2009 and 2019. Large educational inequalities at the end of com-
pulsory schooling constitute a challenge for skill formation systems that
typically target the low to middle part of the skill distribution because it
affects their level of preparedness. PISA surveys also show that, on aver-
age, the proportion of ‘low achievers’ has increased in several countries
(OECD 2019a: 138).
Scholars of skill formation systems are not the only ones who are interested
in these developments. The link between inequality of outcomes and the skill
distribution is at the centre of the perspective taken in the social investment
literature, which emphasizes the need for policies that enhance individuals’
capabilities, not least by means of educational investments at all stages of the
life cycle, in order to allow people to participate in the labour market and
maximize their social welfare (Morel et al. 2012; Garritzmann et al. 2021).
Preserving (and developing) the integrative capacity of collective skill for-
mation systems in a knowledge economy is an objective that is perfectly in
line with the strategy put forward in this literature.
Inequality of opportunities is driven by inequality of outcomes but also
by another important trend: mass migration and the advent of multicultural
societies. Large-scale immigration and the management of multicultural
societies are major societal and political issues in Western democracies.
Migration is not a new development, but migration flows have been on the
rise over the last few years. In 2017, some five million individuals migrated
10 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

to OECD countries (OECD 2018). Current demographic and geopolitical

trends suggest that the trend towards increasingly multicultural societies is
unlikely to revert. Migration is a multifaceted phenomenon and raises a num-
ber of issues in relation to skill formation. In general, immigrant children
and youth tend to face more difficulties in terms of school performance.
Research has repeatedly shown that having a migration background is a
major factor of disadvantage in most school systems (Heath et al. 2008;
OECD 2019b: 180–98).
The integration of immigrants into the labour market is a major public and
policy preoccupation. Western European countries’ response to the emer-
gence of multicultural societies has been the adoption of ‘integration’ policies
that are meant to improve social cohesion and reduce potential tensions
between immigrants and natives (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Immigrants
are obviously a very diverse group and the issue of integration concerns above
all low-skilled immigrants, many of whom come as asylum seekers. However,
the success of integration policies remains mitigated. In spite of the efforts
made, in virtually all European countries immigrants, however defined, are
overrepresented among the disadvantaged and are often excluded from the
labour market (Kogan 2006; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010). In addition,
immigrants are more likely to be dependent on welfare state support (Barret
and Maître 2013).
Collective skill formation systems, because of the involvement of employ-
ers, are a promising tool to promote the economic and the social integration
of low skilled and unskilled immigrants (Dahlstedt and Bevelander 2010;
OECD 2016; Joyce 2018). Many young immigrants who arrive in Western
countries as asylum seekers lack the basic skills required to succeed in an
academic education. In addition, training provided at the firm level can be a
very effective way to teach non-cognitive skills that are essential to succeed
in the labour market and difficult to acquire for immigrants coming from
culturally distant places (Kautz et al. 2014).
Another challenge concerns skilled immigrants who struggle to get their
skills recognized. Among the various immigrant groups, refugees are one
of the main targets of training policies, also because in various occupations
the recruitment of apprentices has become extremely difficult. Over the last
few years, several European countries have accepted large numbers of young
refugees, often fleeing war-torn countries. Yet refugees often lack education
or possess limited educational credentials. What is more, these credentials
are generally not known to employers in receiving countries. For refugees,
skill formation systems, and particularly dual VET, seem a promising tool to
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 11

promote integration. It is therefore not surprising that various collective skill

formation systems have developed dedicated programmes (Aerne and Bonoli
2021). Yet, it remains unclear to what extent these programmes succeed in
integrating immigrants.
Next to questions concerning integration, large-scale immigration has also
the potential to influence collective skill formation systems in other ways.
Most notably, immigration of individuals, in particular skilled ones, might be
in competition with VET systems, as firms increasingly opt to recruit from
this pool of workers rather than train themselves. As a result, immigrants
might provide an alternative to trained domestic workers (Røed and Schøne
2012). In turn, occupation-specific regulations and access restrictions might
be used to protect domestic workers from competition from immigrants
and thereby accentuate labour market integration problems (Busemeyer and
Trampusch 2019; Trampusch 2019).
These ongoing transformations will undoubtedly require the reform of
skill formation systems. At the same time, though, the growing relevance of
knowledge-intensive production processes is likely to complicate the inclu-
sion of disadvantaged youth, which accentuates the tension between the
logic of selectivity, which is inherent in the labour market, and the logic
of inclusiveness, which governs (public) education systems (Bonoli and
Emmenegger 2021). The presence of large numbers of individuals with weak
educational records challenge skill formation systems that already struggle
to cope with macro-structural pressures, such as technological change, glob-
alization, and deindustrialization. In this knowledge economy, which puts
a premium on high and transferable skills and in which well-paid low-skill
jobs are all but gone, skill formation systems are increasingly tasked with the
inclusion of disadvantaged youth. Little surprise, then, that collective skill
formation systems are dealing with two dilemmas, which we discuss in the
next section.

1.3 Dilemmas

The challenges that we outlined above generate two main dilemmas that col-
lective skill formation systems face in the current context. These two dilem-
mas form the core interest of this book’s contributions. The first dilemma
concerns the balancing between efficiency and inclusiveness, while the sec-
ond dilemma focuses on the struggle to act collectively despite increasingly
heterogenous interests.
12 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

1.3.1 Balancing efficiency and inclusiveness

Collective skill formation systems are supposed to provide an economy with

a well-trained and competitive workforce (related to concerns about effi-
ciency) and are supposed to integrate young people into the production
system, including academically weaker students (related to concerns about
inclusiveness). Inevitably, there is a trade-off between these two functions
(Thelen 2014; Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021; Carstensen and Ibsen 2021).
An efficiency-oriented system is likely to be selective and demanding and
thus to exclude academically weaker youth. In contrast, an inclusive train-
ing system is by definition less demanding and as a result less suited to the
requirements of highly competitive firms. In theory, collective skill formation
systems could be located anywhere on this efficiency–inclusiveness contin-
uum. In reality, however, since they require the voluntary participation of
firms, the extent to which they can directly promote inclusiveness is limited
(Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021).
Given the above, we can expect employers to resist inclusiveness, if
they perceive inclusiveness-enhancing interventions to have negative con-
sequences for economic efficiency. Such negative consequences include the
declining prestige of certain forms of training, which might make it more
difficult to recruit promising youth for such activities. Following Carstensen
and Ibsen (2021), we are not arguing that employers always know what is best
for them and therefore always push for ‘efficient’ policies. Instead, we define
efficiency as the perceived political-economic effect. In addition, we do not
argue that employers mind inclusiveness per se. In fact, employers are happy
to transfer this responsibility to the state. However, we expect employers to
object to two kinds of pro-inclusiveness measures: (1) those that force them
to play a social policy role and (2) those that shift the overall objective of skill
formation systems too much towards inclusion.
How do collective skill formation systems balance the twin objectives of
efficiency and inclusion? In general, governments will prioritize measures
that can be defined as ‘external’, i.e. interventions targeting academically
weaker students aiming to improve their ability outside of the collective skill
formation system, so that they will be better able to enter it. External mea-
sures are to a large extent ‘invisible’ to employers and do not require them
to adapt the way they train. Such external measures are by far the most
common approaches collective skill formation systems use to improve inclu-
siveness. Examples of external measures are an additional year of schooling
or the provision of supervision and coaching in the search for an appren-
ticeship position (Bonoli and Wilson 2019). Yet external measures have only
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 13

limited inclusion potential. As a result, governments regularly try to push the

inclusiveness logic further by developing tools that intervene more directly
into the functioning of the VET systems, such as subsidies for firms who
train disadvantaged youth or less ambitious short-track vocational degrees
(Di Maio et al. 2019; Durazzi and Geyer 2022). We call these measures ‘inter-
nal’ because they are part of the VET system and require active involvement
by employers.
Internal measures, however, are tricky and sometimes resisted by employ-
ers. If governments try to impose internal measures against the will of
employers, they are unlikely to succeed. Since collective skill formation
systems rely on the voluntary participation of firms, employers can eas-
ily resist measures they feel inappropriate, first in the political arena, and
then if unsuccessful, simply by not using them. In a way, the interaction
between governments and employers regarding the definition of the appro-
priate balance between efficiency and inclusiveness can be conceptualized as
a two-level game. First, on the system level, governments and employers share
a common objective of keeping a functioning collective skill formation sys-
tem. They are likely to agree that this is an asset for a country’s economy.
Second, on the firm level, individual firms can decide autonomously whether
or not to contribute to government-induced efforts to increase inclusiveness.
Here firms clearly have the upper hand. If governments are too intrusive
with their demands, firms will simply pull out of the system. Since govern-
ments want to avoid this outcome, they will refrain from being too intrusive
(see Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021).
In addition, the balance between efficiency and inclusiveness preferences
is also decisively shaped by the particular makeup of governance institutions.
Carstensen and Ibsen (2021) argue that the degree of firm, union, and state
involvement in VET governance affects which actors are involved in specific
aspects of the skill formation system. For instance, Busemeyer and Tram-
pusch (2012) highlight five main areas of conflict: (a) who provides training
(is the dominant venue of training the workplace or in public schools?),
(b) who finances training (how much of the funding comes from companies
and the state, respectively?), (c) who controls access to training (the state,
firms, or the social partners?), (d) who is involved in the administration of
the system (do social partners play an active role in the day-to-day adminis-
tering of training programmes?), and (e) who controls the content and quality
of training (is training monitored by firms, social partners, or the state?).
For each area of conflict, actor composition might be different. Importantly,
however, these governance questions do not neutralize the tension between
efficiency and inclusiveness in collective skill formation systems. Yet they are
14 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

likely to shape how the politics of skill formation systems ultimately play out
(Durazzi and Geyer 2020; Carstensen et al. 2022).
Moreover, as we argue below, these challenges take place in a context in
which collective solutions are increasingly difficult to adopt. This is arguably
why in some countries we see the development of inclusive training solu-
tions outside the realm of collective training. For example, since the late
1990s, Austria has been developing public training workshops, which consti-
tute an alternative, state-based access route to skill formation (Durazzi and
Geyer 2020; Carstensen et al. 2022). Collective skill formation systems always
have the opportunity to ‘de-collectivize’ and turn to state-provided training.
However, this option means losing many of the benefits of collective skill for-
mation systems (Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021). As a result, most countries
try to adapt their collective systems, so that they can cope with the changing
socio-economic context (Busemeyer et al. 2021; Graf et al. 2021). However,
the trade-off between efficiency and inclusiveness is in our view an intrinsic
feature of any such system. This means that balancing these two objectives is
likely to remain a key dilemma for many years to come.

1.3.2 Collective action in the age of de-collectivization

Collective skill formation systems face the challenges associated with the rise
of a knowledge economy in a period of constant de-collectivization. These
systems rely on cooperation between several actors, most notably firms, in
order to produce a collective good: a skilled workforce. While skills are
tied to an individual, their acquisition is costly and marred by uncertainty
because individuals cannot know whether these skills will be in high demand
in the future. Unless this uncertainty can be reduced, individuals are likely
to be reluctant to bear the costs of financing their own skill acquisition
(Crouch 2005).
Similarly, employers benefit from a skilled workforce, which is why we
could expect employers to co-finance skill acquisition. Yet employers might
be equally reluctant to do so. The economic literature on labour markets
has repeatedly shown that skill formation systems are vulnerable to cooper-
ation dilemmas (Marsden 1999; Johansen 2002; Culpepper 2003), with the
employers’ decision to train or recruit skilled workers corresponding to a
prisoners’ dilemma with the collective under-provision of training as a Nash
equilibrium (Emmenegger and Unterweger 2021). Firms participate in train-
ing activities only if they expect to benefit from their involvement. Whether
they do is dependent on the behaviour of other firms. If other firms do not
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 15

train, if the quality of training is low, or if competition for prospective trainees

increases its cost, firms are unlikely to train themselves.
The literature has emphasized how employers’ organizations, serving as
intermediaries between firms, can help ‘to restrain free-riding on training
costs’ (Marsden 1999: 223). In addition, these systems are also dependent
on the collective organization of labour, which serves an important coun-
terweight to business and provides many of the (beneficial) constraints that
facilitate employer collective action (Streeck 1992). In any case, coopera-
tion in collective skill formation systems is not self-sustaining but depends
on public policies and capable intermediary organizations (Ryan 2000;
Culpepper 2003; Emmenegger et al. 2019; Graf et al. 2021).
Yet the rise of a knowledge economy has the potential to fatally undermine
the collective action necessary to keep these skill formation systems going
because the knowledge economy may destabilize the fragile institutional
arrangements that facilitate cooperation. Moreover, these structural changes
are likely to trigger adjustment processes, which have to be collectively nego-
tiated and agreed upon. In this context, complicated and time-consuming
negotiation processes, delays (or outright failures) to adapt to new challenges,
or the exit of dissatisfied firms may lead to a creeping collapse of collective
skill formation systems (Anderson and Hassel 2013).
The most visible indicators of collective action on both sides of the class
divide are employer associations and trade unions, which also play impor-
tant roles in VET governance (Emmenegger and Seitzl 2020). These collective
organizations have been under constant pressure in recent decades and suf-
fer from processes of de-collectivization (Baccaro and Howell 2017). This
is most visible in the case of trade unions, which have seen their member-
ship numbers dwindle in recent decades (Donado and Wälde 2018) due to
the joint pressures of deindustrialization and digital technologies increas-
ingly substituting workers (Kemmerling and Trampusch 2021). Yet unions
are key actors in providing the constraints to push employers to consider
skill investments (Streeck 1992; Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). As unions lose
power, these constraints disappear or must be replaced by other actors, most
notably the state (Martin and Thelen 2007; Thelen 2014), although there is
much debate whether the state is able to fill this void (Howell 2016, 2019;
Busemeyer et al. 2021; Carstensen et al. 2022).
In addition, recent structural economic, social, and macro-political trends
have also made employer collective action harder. For various reasons related
to globalization, deindustrialization, and technological change, the diversity
of both firms and their skill needs have increased. Today’s collective skill for-
mation systems must also try to integrate multinational corporations with no
16 Giuliano Bonoli and Patrick Emmenegger

previous experience in local skill formation systems (Unterweger 2020), have

to deal with new business models that defy conventional logics of employer–
employee relationships (Thelen 2018), and have to serve economic sectors
that have little tradition in collective skill formation, never mind the nec-
essary organizational infrastructure (Graf et al. 2021; Strebel et al. 2021).
Internationally exposed firms demand additional and ever-changing train-
ing to have the necessary skilled workforce to compete, but not all firms are
able or willing to keep up with these developments (Emmenegger and Seitzl
2019). In addition, post-secondary training has gained in importance, but
here collective action and coordination problems seem even more vexing
(Johansen 2002; Bowman 2005; Trampusch and Eichenberger 2012). It thus
seems evident that collective action is getting more challenging.
Less noticed, but equally important are the organizational struggles of
employer associations, which have tended to lose sway over their members
and have seen their membership numbers decline (Woll 2006). Facing
an increasingly internationalized economic environment, firm interests are
becoming increasingly heterogeneous. In addition, large firms have begun
to pursue lobbying strategies independent of employer associations (Streeck
et al. 2006). Although it is debated whether the representativeness of
employer and business associations is declining, there can be no doubt that
they are under stress and must adapt their organizational structure as well as
activities to the changing needs of firms (Brandl and Lehr 2019; Strebel et al.
2021). However, in the case of employers’ associations, there are also impor-
tant organizational interests that may make employers’ associations rally in
defence of collective skill formation systems. These intermediary associa-
tions are often concerned with their organizations’ prestige and autonomy,
which is often predicated on the collective nature of training (Emmenegger
and Seitzl 2019; Trampusch 2010). Moreover, as membership numbers dwin-
dle, these organizational interests might gain in importance (Davidsson and
Emmenegger 2013).
In the context of collective skill formation systems, such developments
linked to de-collectivization and changing skill requirements are often related
to processes of segmentalism, which refer to how the content and governance
of training increasingly focuses on the needs of large firms, resulting in a less
encompassing and thus more segmented labour market with limited occupa-
tional mobility for employees (Busemeyer 2012; Thelen 2014; Emmenegger
and Seitzl 2019). This literature argues that firms increasingly exit from col-
lective skill formation because training becomes too costly for them. In order
to motivate the other (larger) firms to remain in the system, the state agrees
to their demands for a more fragmented (i.e. segmented) skill formation
 Collective Skill Formation in a Knowledge Economy 17

system. However, by doing so, the collective nature of these skill formation
systems is increasingly undermined. Hence, segmentalism describes how the
collective nature of collective skill formation systems is being increasingly
compromised.
Obviously, these developments have implications for power dynamics in
the politics of training. For instance, these developments strengthen the posi-
tion of large firms at the expense of intermediary associations. However, there
are also less obvious effects related to the ‘power of inaction’ (Woll 2016).
For instance, de-collectivization trends might strengthen the power of actors
who do not want any policy interventions. This is most likely the case for busi-
ness and in particular large firms, which may benefit from structural changes,
as they can increasingly turn to firm-specific training solutions. Such devel-
opments are related to forms of gradual institutional change such as drift
(Hacker 2004) but also the problem that the state is dependent on the coop-
eration with employers in the context of training reform (Busemeyer and
Thelen 2020), which is, however, increasingly difficult, as the intermediaries
lose influence over their members (Bonoli and Emmenegger 2021).
There is plenty of evidence of struggles to act collectively. For instance,
in several countries, we observe declining numbers of firms participating
in training activities and of youth starting apprenticeships (Strebel et al.
2021). In addition, we observe an increasing number of youths struggling
to enter the training system (Durazzi and Geyer 2020, 2021). In Germany,
for example, every year between 250,000 and 300,000 youths who have failed
to obtain an apprenticeship position enter the so-called transition system, a
vast range of programmes that help them re-integrate the standard training
system (BMBF 2019: 25). In Denmark, before the 2014 reform, the number of
VET students without an apprenticeship position kept increasing, reaching
13,000 (i.e. one third) in 2013 (Carstensen and Ibsen 2021). In Switzer-
land, every year between 10 and 12 per cent of those finishing compulsory
education fail to enter the general education or VET system (Bonoli and
Emmenegger 2021).
In sum, recent structural economic, social, and macro-political trends have
made employer collective action considerably harder, which is, however, a
necessary condition for collective skill formation systems to thrive. More-
over, these developments have led to segmentalism, which describes how
collective action is becoming less inclusive, moving away from the coop-
eration of a large number of heterogeneous firms to the cooperation of a
small number of more homogeneous ones. In this book, we are particu-
larly interested in understanding the conditions that weaken or possibly even
prevent such tendencies.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 XXI

Clarísimo Marqués, en quien derrama[364]

el cielo cuanto bien conoce el mundo;
si al gran valor en que el sujeto fundo,
y al claro resplandor de vuestra llama
arribare mi pluma, y do la llama 5
la voz de vuestro nombre alto y profundo,
seréis vos solo eterno y sin segundo,
y por vos inmortal quien tanto os ama.
Cuanto del largo cielo se desea,
cuanto sobre la tierra se procura, 10
todo se halla en vos de parte en parte;
y, en fin, de solo vos formó natura
una estraña y no vista al mundo idea,
y hizo igual al pensamiento el arte.
 XXII

Con ansia estrema de mirar qué tiene

vuestro pecho escondido allá en su centro,
y ver si a lo de fuera lo de dentro
en aparencia y ser igual conviene,
en él puse la vista; mas detiene 5
de vuestra hermosura el duro encuentro
mis ojos, y no pasan tan adentro,
que miren lo que el alma en sí contiene.[365]
Y así, se quedan tristes en la puerta
hecha por mi dolor, con esa mano, 10
que aun a su mismo pecho no perdona;[366]
donde vi claro mi esperanza muerta,
y el golpe que os hizo amor en vano
non esservi passato oltra la gonna.[367]
 XXIII

En tanto que de rosa y azucena

se muestra la color en vuestro gesto,
y que vuestro mirar ardiente, honesto,
enciende el corazón y lo refrena;
y en tanto que el cabello, que en la vena 5
del oro se escogió, con vuelo presto,
por el hermoso cuello blanco, enhiesto,
el viento mueve, esparce y desordena;
coged de vuestra alegre primavera
el dulce fruto, antes que el tiempo airado 10
cubra de nieve la hermosa cumbre.
Marchitará la rosa el viento helado,
todo lo mudará la edad ligera,
por no hacer mudanza en su costumbre.[368]
 XXIV

Ilustre honor del nombre de Cardona,[369]

décima moradora de Parnaso,[370]
a Tansilo, a Minturno, al culto Taso[371]
sujeto noble de inmortal corona;
si en medio del camino no abandona 5
la fuerza y el espirtu a vuestro Laso,
por vos me llevará mi osado paso
a la cumbre difícil de Helicona.[372]
Podré llevar entonces sin trabajo
con dulce son que el curso al agua enfrena, 10
por un camino hasta agora enjuto,
el patrio celebrado y rico Tajo,
que del valor de su luciente arena
a vuestro nombre pague el gran tributo.
 XXV

¡Oh hado esecutivo en mis dolores,[373]

cómo sentí tus leyes rigurosas!
Cortaste el árbol con manos dañosas,
y esparciste por tierra fruta y flores.
En poco espacio yacen mis amores 5
y toda la esperanza de mis cosas,
tornadas en cenizas desdeñosas,
y sordas a mis quejas y clamores.
Las lágrimas que en esta sepultura
se vierten hoy en día y se vertieron 10
recibe, aunque sin fruto allá te sean,
hasta que aquella eterna noche escura
me cierre aquestos ojos que te vieron,
dejándome con otros que te vean.[374]
 XXVI

Echado está por tierra el fundamento[375]

que mi vivir cansado sostenía.
¡Oh cuánto bien se acaba en solo un día!
¡Oh cuántas esperanzas lleva el viento!
¡Oh cuán ocioso está mi pensamiento 5
cuando se ocupa en bien de cosa mía!
A mi esperanza, así como a baldía,
mil veces la castiga mi tormento.
Las más veces me entrego, otras resisto
con tal furor, con una fuerza nueva, 10
que un monte puesto encima rompería.
Aqueste es el deseo que me lleva
a que desee tornar a ver un día
a quien fuera mejor nunca haber visto.
 XXVII

Amor, amor, un hábito vestí,[376]

el cual de vuestro paño fue cortado;
al vestir ancho fue, mas apretado
y estrecho cuando estuvo sobre mí.
Después acá de lo que consentí, 5
tal arrepentimiento me ha tornado,
que pruebo alguna vez, de congojado,
a romper esto en que yo me metí.
Mas ¿quién podrá deste hábito librarse,
teniendo tan contraria su natura, 10
que con él ha venido a conformarse?
Si alguna parte queda por ventura
de mi razón, por mí no osa mostrarse;
que en tal contradición no está segura.
 XXVIII

Boscán, vengado estáis, con mengua mía,

de mi rigor pasado y mi aspereza,
con que reheprenderos la terneza
de vuestro blando corazón solía.
Agora me castigo cada día 5
de tal salvatiquez y tal torpeza;[377]
mas es a tiempo que de mi bajeza
correrme y castigarme bien podría.
Sabed que en mi perfeta edad y armado,
con mis ojos abiertos me he rendido 10
al niño que sabéis, ciego y desnudo.
De tan hermoso fuego consumido
nunca fue corazón. Si preguntado
soy lo demás, en lo demás soy mudo.
 XXIX

Pasando el mar Leandro el animoso,[378]

en amoroso fuego todo ardiendo,
esforzó el viento, y fuese embraveciendo
el agua con un ímpetu furioso.
Vencido del trabajo presuroso, 5
contrastar a las ondas no pudiendo,
y más del bien que allí perdía muriendo,
que de su propia vida congojoso,
como pudo esforzó su voz cansada,
y a las ondas habló desta manera, 10
(mas nunca fue la voz dellas oída):
«Ondas, pues no os escusa que yo muera,
dejadme allá llegar, y a la tornada
vuestro furor esecutá en mi vida.»[379]
 XXX

Sospechas, que en mi triste fantasía

puestas, hacéis la guerra a mi sentido,
volviendo y revolviendo el afligido
pecho, con dura mano, noche y día;
ya se acabó la resistencia mía 5
y la fuerza del alma; ya rendido
vencer de vos me dejo, arrepentido
de haberos contrastado en tal porfía.[380]
Llevadme a aquel lugar tan espantable,
do por no ver mi muerte allí esculpida, 10
cerrados hasta aquí tuve los ojos.
Las armas pongo ya; que concedida[381]
no es tan larga defensa al miserable;
colgad en vuestro carro mis despojos.[382]
 XXXI

Dentro en mi alma fue de mí engendrado

un dulce amor, y de mi sentimiento
tan aprobado fue su nacimiento
como de un solo hijo deseado;
mas luego dél nació quien ha estragado 5
del todo el amoroso pensamiento;
que en áspero rigor y en gran tormento
los primeros deleites ha trocado.
¡Oh crudo nieto, que das vida al padre[383]
y matas al abuelo! ¿por qué creces 10
tan disconforme a aquel de que has nacido?
¡Oh celoso temor! ¿a quién pareces?
¡Que la envidia, tu propia y fiera madre,
se espanta en ver el mostro que ha parido![384]
 XXXII

Estoy contino en lágrimas bañado,

rompiendo el aire siempre con sospiros;
y más me duele nunca osar deciros
que he llegado por vos a tal estado,
que viéndome do estoy y lo que he andado 5
por el camino estrecho de seguiros,
si me quiero tornar para huiros,
desmayo viendo atrás lo que he dejado;
si a subir pruebo, en la difícil cumbre,
a cada paso espántanme en la vía 10
ejemplos tristes de los que han caído.
Y sobre todo, fáltame la lumbre
de la esperanza, con que andar solía
por la escura región de vuestro olvido.[385]
 XXXIII

Mario, el ingrato amor, como testigo[386]

de mi fe pura y de mi gran firmeza,
usando en mí su vil naturaleza,
que es hacer más ofensa al más amigo;
teniendo miedo que si escribo o digo 5
su condición, abajo su grandeza,
no bastando su fuerza a mi crueza,
ha esforzado la mano a mi enemigo.
Y así, en la parte que la diestra mano
gobierna, y en aquella que declara 10
el conceto del alma, fui herido.
Mas yo haré que aquesta ofensa, cara
le cueste al ofensor, que ya estoy sano,
libre, desesperado y ofendido.
 XXXIV

Gracias al cielo doy que ya del cuello

del todo el grave yugo he sacudido,
y que del viento el mar embravecido
veré desde la tierra sin temello.
Veré colgada de un sutil cabello[387] 5
la vida del amante embebecido
en su error, y en su engaño adormecido,
sordo a las voces que le avisan dello.
Alegrárame el mal de los mortales;
mas no es mi corazón tan inhumano 10
en aqueste mi error como parece,
porque yo huelgo, como huelga el sano,
no de ver a los otros en los males,
sino de ver que dellos él carece.[388]
 XXXV

Boscán, las armas y el furor de Marte,[389]

que con su propia sangre el africano
suelo regando, hacen que el romano
imperio reverdesca en esta parte,
han reducido a la memoria el arte 5
y el antiguo valor italiano,
por cuya fuerza y valerosa mano
África se aterró de parte a parte.
Aquí donde el romano encendimiento,
donde el fuego y la llama licenciosa 10
solo el nombre dejaron a Cartago,
vuelve y revuelve amor mi pensamiento,
hiere y enciende el alma temerosa,
y en llanto y en ceniza me deshago.[390]
 XXXVI

A la entrada de un valle, en un desierto,

do nadie atravesaba ni se vía,
vi que con estrañeza un can hacía
estremos de dolor con desconcierto;
ahora suelta el llanto al cielo abierto, 5
ora va rastreando por la vía;
camina, vuelve, para, y todavía
quedaba desmayado como muerto.
Y fue que se apartó de su presencia
su amo, y no le hallaba, y esto siente: 10
mirad hasta dó llega el mal de ausencia.
Moviome a compasión ver su acidente;
díjele lastimado: «Ten paciencia,
que yo alcanzo razón, y estoy ausente.»[391]
 XXXVII

Mi lengua va por do el dolor la guía;

ya yo con mi dolor sin guía camino;
entrambos hemos de ir con puro tino;
cada uno va a parar do no querría,
yo, porque voy sin otra compañía, 5
sino la que me hace el desatino;
ella, porque la lleve aquel que vino
a hacella decir más que querría.
Y es para mí la ley tan desigual,
que aunque inocencia siempre en mí conoce, 10
siempre yo pago el yerro ajeno y mío.
¿Qué culpa tengo yo del desvarío
de mi lengua, si estoy en tanto mal,
que el sufrimiento ya me desconoce?
 XXXVIII

Siento el dolor menguarme poco a poco,

no porque ser le sienta más sencillo,
mas fallece el sentir para sentillo,
después que de sentillo estoy tan loco.
Ni en sello pienso que en locura toco, 5
antes voy tan ufano con oíllo,
que no dejaré el sello y el sufrillo,
que si dejo de sello el seso apoco.
Todo me empece, el seso y la locura;
prívame este de sí por ser tan mío; 10
mátame estotra por ser yo tan suyo.
Parecerá a la gente desvarío
preciarme deste mal, do me destruyo:
yo lo tengo por única ventura.[392]
 CANCIONES
E N VE RSO S CO RTO S

Culpa debe ser quereros,[393]

según lo que en mí hacéis;
mas allá lo pagaréis,
do no sabrán conoceros,
por mal que me conocéis.
Por quereros, ser perdido
pensaba, que no culpado;
mas que todo lo haya sido
así me lo habéis mostrado,
que lo tengo bien sabido.
¡Quién pudiese no quereros
tanto, como vos sabéis,
por holgarme que paguéis
lo que no han de conoceros
con lo que no conocéis!
 II

Yo dejaré desde aquí

de ofenderos más hablando;
porque mi morir callando
os ha de hablar por mí.
Gran ofensa os tengo hecha
hasta aquí en haber hablado,
pues en cosa os he enojado
que tampoco me aprovecha.
Derramaré desde aquí
mis lágrimas no hablando;
porque quien muere callando
tiene quien hable por sí.